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  • 8/12/2019 BORDWELL, David. Interpretation, Theatrical Performance and Onthology

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    Interpretation, Theatrical Performance, and Ontology

    Author(s): Nol CarrollSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 59, No. 3 (Summer, 2001), pp. 313-316Published by: Wileyon behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/432328.

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    Symposium:StagingInterpretations Carroll,Interpretation,Performance,Ontology 313Noel CarrollInterpretation,TheatricalPerformance,and OntologyBoth JamesHamiltonand DavidSaltzchallengethe ontological view that theatrical perfor-mances are interpretations. altz even calls thecorrelationbetween theatricalperformancesandinterpretations fallacy.Because there aremanydifferentways to understandherelevantnotionsof interpretation nd because there are alterna-tive ways of deploying them in characterizingthe ontological status of theatrical perfor-mances, Hamiltonand Saltzexplorea numberofdifferent ormulationsof theputative allacyandspikethem one at a time.

    I found both of these essays immensely richandpenetrating,and I learneda greatdeal fromthem. I agree with many of their findings. Forexample, I believe that Saltz is absolutelycor-rect to argue that the assimilationof so-calledtheatricallperformativenterpretationwith criti-cal interpretations mistaken.' However,sinceinterpretation igures in the ontological distinc-tion that I drawbetween mass artworksandlivetheatricalperformances,2 othSaltz andHamil-ton fearthatI, too, commit the interpretational-lacy. But on that point I have yet to be con-vinced.In certainrespects,I havebacked nto this de-bate. In the offendingpassagesof my writing,Iwas not directlyconcernedwith developinganaccount of the ontology of theatrical perfor-mance,but ratheran account of the ontology offilm and,then,of massart.Partof my accountofmass art evolved through a contrast betweentoken performancesof mass artworks,such asfilm screenings, and token theatrical perfor-mances. Both sorts of performancesare tokensgeneratedfrom types, but I claim thatthere areontologically significant differences in theirmanner of generation.Token performancesofmass artworks, uchas film screenings,aregen-eratedby templates,such as reels of celluloid,whereastokentheatricalperformancesare gen-eratedfrom interpretations.The pertinenttem-plates with regard to mass artworksare them-selves tokens, whereas the interpretations hatmediatebetweentheatrical ypes and token per-formances thereofare types.Connected o thisdistinction, hen, is another,which, thoughpresentin my writings,was not

    perhapsas salientas it mighthave been.3Tokenperformancesof mass artworks,such as a filmscreening, are derived from the relevant tem-platesmechanically,electronically,or somehowautomaticallywithout the interventionof inten-tionalprocesses. Gettinga tokenperformance fa film onscreen involves essentially setting amechanism n motion;the process can be fullyautomated.In contrast, evolving an interpretationof atheatrical ype and implementing t requirethemediation of intentional processes-acts ofimagination andjudgmentby actors,directors,set designers, costumers, lighting specialists,and so on. Putintoa roughslogan:tokenperfor-mances of mass artworksare mechanicallyme-diated; token theatrical performances aremind-mediated.4That s, if you wanttoexplainwhy a characteris physically placed screen left in tonight'sscreening/performance f The Phantom Men-ace, you advert o a causal chaininvolving pho-tography,chemistry,and the optics of projec-tion. If you want to explain how the charactergot to be standingstage left in tonight's theatri-cal performanceof TitusAndronicus,you referto a networkof judgments,intentions,andgov-erninginterpretations,ncluding the actor's be-lief that that is where he shouldbe standing.Thescreenplacementof the filmactor onightis counterfactually ependent in termsof proxi-mate causation) on physical processes-thestructure f therelevant emplateand theprojec-tion system.The stage placement of the theateractorstonightis counterfactuallydependentonintentionalprocesses, including the actor'sbe-liefs, relative to a governing interpretation,about where he or she should be. All thingsbeing equal, the placementof the film actor to-nightin relationto the overallscreen spacecan-not be otherwise, whereas the placement of thetheateractorcan vary,shouldthe actor udge orbelieve that, in accordancewith a betterinter-pretation of the scene in this space, he or sheshould standa littlemoreupstageordownstage.I use the notion of interpretation o label theintentionally mediated distance between thetheatricaltype and the token theatricalperfor-

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    314mance.5The label interpretation as chosen,not to aligntheatrical nterpretationwith criticalinterpretation, ut in the perfectly unexception-able sense of interpretation s a matterof fill-ing something n. Interpretation,n my sense,involves going beyond the given;in this context,it signals going beyondwhat is given by theplaytype. From the perspectiveof executinga tokentheatricalperformance,the play type-whichmay be specified by a text, or, as in many mpro-visations and rituals, by a mere action plan-isincomplete. The performersand designers mustfill it in with determinate hoices. That s to treatthe theatrical ype as a recipeor a set of instruc-tions or a baseline from which variations, .e.,interpretations, re to be spun.

    The variationsmay mesh with or go againstthe grain of the theatricaltype, but either waythey are interpretationshat fill in the recipe.That is, I count as interpretations oth attemptsto get at the authorialmeaningof the text, suchas William Poel's productionof Hamlet,AndreAntoine'sproductionof ThePowerof Darkness,and KatieMitchell'sproductionof Henry VI,6aswell as more radicalrereadings, uch as RichardForeman'sof ThreePennyOpera,PeterSellars'sof The Merchantof Venice,andJoan Akalaitis'sof Cymbeline.7Moreover, interpretations,n my sense, notonly concern the thematicmeaningof the type,but also judgmentsabout the way in which theactor shouldwear herhat,lower hersword, ighta cigaretteor not, and so on. How thathappenstonightonstage is intentionallymediated,or,as Iwould say, interpretivelymediated. How thathappens n a tokenperformance f a motionpic-ture s mechanicallydeterminedby a device run-ningthetemplate n accordancewith the way themachine was designed to be used. We see theactor smoking a certainway in an episode ofMelrosePlace because that is what the camerarecordedandwhat theappropriatelyunctioningprojection apparatus here a TV monitor) ren-ders.I furtherarguethat the template-mechanismmodel can be generalized across the productionof tokenperformances ndpresentations f massartworks,and that it reveals an ontological dis-tinction between them and the intention-alisticallyor interpretivelymediatedproductionof things like tokentheatricalperformanceson-stage (as opposedtorecordings herefrom). still

    The Journalof AestheticsandArtCriticismthinkthatthisis a workabledistinction, houghIwill mention one potentialsort of problemcasebeforeconcluding.With these (I hope) clarifications n hand,letme now turn to the reservations hat Saltz andHamiltonhavevoiced aboutmy position. First,Ihave repeatedly spoken of theatrical perfor-mancetokensas being generatedfrominterpre-tations;I do not identifytheatricalperformancetokens with interpretations.8thinkthatI under-stand Saltz's reluctance to call Rex Harrison'sthree hundredth ive, onstage renditionof I'veGrown Accustomed to Her Face an interpreta-tion and his preferencefor calling Harrison'stheatricalperformance nexecutionof thesong.But I do not think that this inclinationcompro-mises my claim that the pertinent heatricalper-formance oken was generated rom aninterpre-tation-a set of choices about cadences anddramatic intonations-that, in this case, wereworkedout in advance n concert with the direc-tor andperhapsothers. There is something thatwe can call Rex Harrison'sinterpretationof'I've GrownAccustomed to Her Face, ' and histhree hundredth heatricalperformanceokenofit is counterfactually ependenton that,whereasthe one millionthfilm performanceoken of thatsong at a screeningsomewherein Sri Lanka isgenerated by running a template of GeorgeCukor'sMy Fair Ladyon the rightkind of ma-chine in the right way.In speakingof the generationof performancetokensby means of interpretations, thinkthat Ican acknowledgethe distinctionSaltz wishes tomaintainbetween interpretation nd executionwithoutabandoningmy central thesis about thegenerationof theatricalperformance okens. Atthe sametime, however, houghIagreethat nter-pretationsare generally in place before perfor-mances,I would not wish to precludethe possi-bilitythat hey maybe bornduringperformances.An actormay discover a new line delivery-aninterpretiveact of filling in the play, on my ac-count-during a performanceand then continueto act in accordancewith that interpretation nsubsequent venings. AlthoughSaltzis rightthatnot every element of a theatrical performancetoken can be called aninterpretation,ven if it isdependentonone,I do notthink hathe should, fhe does, want to deny that interpretations-thatthen govern later performances-can emergeduring okentheatricalperformances.

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    Symposium:StagingInterpretations Carroll, nterpretation,Performance,Ontology 315Both Saltz and Hamilton appearto connectthe notion of interpretation retty strictlyto theexcavationof the meaningof a text. Thus,Saltzcorrectly reminds us that performancesmay

    challenge the meaningof a text,while Hamiltonhelpfully points out that most theatricalperfor-mances involve a great deal of what might becalled the stimulationof effects rather hantheprojection of meanings. However, as alreadymentioned,my use of interpretation s broaderthan thatof determining he meaningof a theat-rical type; it refers to the filling out or fleshingoutof a theatrical ext or action planwith effectsas well as impliedmeanings,whetherornottheycorrespond o authorial ntentions.9Casting anactor, planning a lighting scheme, designing aset, and adoptingan alienation echnique areall partsof composing an interpretation n myaccount and not merely, as Saltz might say,choices consistent with theirinterpretation. 10Given the broadness of my concept of inter-pretation, resist thosecriticismsthatemphasizethat there is moreto theatricalperformancehanthe determination f meaning,or even canonicalmeaning, narrowlyconstrued. For I agree thatthere s more, ut I count much of that moreas interpretation.Perhaps Saltz and Hamiltonwill complain that my conceptionof interpreta-tion is too broad.Nevertheless,I find some con-firmation in my usage in ordinarylanguage,where the notion of dramatic nterpretation, sfound, for example, in theater manuals, oftenranges beyond the deciphermentof meaningtothe kinds of choices I count under the rubricoffillingin the theatrical ype. And,in anyevent,ifit turns out that I have misused languagehere,then I will be happyto look foranotherword forthe intentionalprocesses I have located as onto-logically essential for the generationof theatri-cal performance okens.'1My use of the concept of interpretationpromptsHamilton o worrythat I mustbe think-ing exclusively of text-based plays and herightly stresses that not all theatrical perfor-mances are textbased. Thus, he suggeststhatmydistinctionsrest too narrowlyon recent, espe-cially western,models. His reasoning seems tobe: if performancesaregenerated rom interpre-tations, these must be interpretations f some-thing, and the most likely candidates are playtexts. ButI thinkthat nterpretationsn my sensecanalso be fillings-inor fleshings-outof sketchy

    action plans or oral instructionsor traditional,unwritten criptspasseddownthrough hemem-ory of a community or a troupe. The theatricaltype that is filled out by an interpretation eednot be a well-madeplay; therefore,my relianceon interpretation oes not entail an inadvertentprivilegingof somewhat recent, arguablyparo-chial forms of westerntheater.Saltz objects to my notionthat token theatri-cal performances regeneratedby interpretationtypes on the groundsthat actualperformancesinvolve more fine-grained hoices thanareman-datedby an interpretationype. Thatis, theexe-cutionof the performance okenis not fully de-terminedby the interpretation. onight hewavein the protagonist'shair is a little flatter thanitwas last night. But I do not see why this callsinto questionmy claim that the actor'scoiffureis governed by an interpretation-in this in-stance, a predetermineddesign-type intention-ally createdto fill in the look of thecharacter.Two numerically differentcoins may differ inmany subtle details (within certain variances)while still being tokensof the sametype.12Per-hapsthe problemhereis that Saltz is confusingmy thesis aboutthe generationof token theatri-cal performances rominterpretationypes withthe thesis that token theatricalperformancesareidenticalwith interpretations.'3In short, then, I remain fairly satisfied withthe ontological distinction that I drew betweenthe generationof token theatricalperformancesand the generation of token presentations ofmass artworks.However,before concluding, Ishouldmention,aspromised,one possible prob-lem case.There s atheatricalperformance roupcalledSurvivalResearchLaboratories.They specializein pieces involving machinescrashing into anddestroying other machines in what might becalled metallicgladiatorialspectacles. Sincethese machines are directed by remote controland,therefore,are intentionallymediated,theseperformancesare token theatricalperformancesnot only in termsof theirdistribution enues, buton my theoryas well. Nevertheless, t is easy toimaginethese machinesbeing runautomaticallyby computersso that one might have congruentperformanceokens of the sameprogramoccur-ring simultaneouslyat numerous differentre-ceptionsites in theatersall over the world.

    Would such performances-which might

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    316 The Journalof Aesthetics andArt Criticismpave the way for synchronic, robotic, Disneyproductions of Beauty and the Beast every-where-count as theatricalperformance okensor as mass art performance okens?Would theyblur the distinction hatI set outearlier?My dis-position would be to regardthem as mass artperformance okens, ratherthan theatricalper-formance tokens, since they are mechanicallymediatedrather hanmind-mediated.Butif intu-itions lean powerfullyin the opposite direction,thatwould,of course, weigh heavily against mytheory.NOEL CARROLLDepartmentof PhilosophyUniversityof Wisconsin-MadisonMadison,Wisconsin 53706

    1. One reason thatI concur with Saltz is that whereas al-ternative,incompatiblecritical interpretations annot bothbe acceptable, since they cannotboth be true, incompatibletheatrical nterpretations f thesameplay mayeach be theat-rically acceptable.2. See Noel Carroll, Towards nOntology of theMovingImage, Film andPhilosophy,ed. CynthiaFreelandand TomWartenberg New York: Routledge, 1995); Noel Carroll,DefiningtheMoving Image, n my Theorizing he MovingImage (New York:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1996); andNoel Carroll, TheOntologyof Mass Art, n myA Philoso-phy of MassArt (Oxford:Clarendon,1998).3. See my Definingthe Moving Image, pp. 68-69, andThe Ontology of Mass Art, pp. 213-214.4. This is why I disagree with Saltz's suggestion that the-atricalproductionscould be templates n my sense. For the-atricalperformance okens that are governed by what Saltzcalls productions nvolve the mediationof intentionalpro-cesses, whereas thetemplates havein mind are machine n-struments. do, however,discuss some similaritiesbetweentheatricalproductionsandfilm productions n my Towardsan Ontology of the Moving Image.5. This, of course, is not intended o deny thatinterpreta-tions go into the productionof a film type. Certainly nter-pretation s involved as a backgroundcondition in the cre-ation of the templates that subsequently generate filmperformances/screenings.However, once the template hasbeenfixed, you get to the tokenperformance f the filmtypeby running he templateon a machine, some sort of projec-tion apparatus.The generation of the token film perfor-mance, then, is achievedmechanicallyrather hanvia an in-terpretation.6. Mitchell says that when she works on an old play, shelooks upthe etymologicalroot of every wordin the text.SeeGabriella Giannachi and Mary Luckhurst, eds., On Di-recting: Interviewswith Directors (New York:St. Martin'sGriffin, 1999), p. 95.7. For an account of contemporaryrereadings such asthese, see Amy S. Green, TheRevisionist Stage: AmericanDirectors Reinvent the Classics (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1994).

    I should also note thatmy understanding f interpretationis not so broad as to count Aim6 CUsaire'sA TempestorHeinerMuller'sHamletmachine s interpretations f Shake-speare, since each is an original play in its own right.8. One of the subheadingsin Saltz's article asks, AreRecipes Interpretations? should note that this querycan-not apply to my position, since, on my view, from the per-spective of performinga play, it is play types andnot inter-pretationsof play types that arerecipes.Also, Saltz says something very peculiarin this subsec-tion of his essay.He maintains hatdeterminingwithrespectto anapple pie recipewhether sugar hould be understoodas granulatedwhite sugaror unbleached ugar s a matterofinterpretation,while determiningwhether o read apple asGrannySmith or Romaapples is a matterof execution.I donot see the distinction hatSaltz is gettingat. Both decisionsseem to me to be interpretations, aysof filling in therecipe.Thus, I am not moved by these examples to abandonmyview of interpretation.

    PerhapsSaltz hasin mindthatthe sugarcase involvesfig-uringout what therecipe means,while theapplecase is con-cerned with figuringout how to implement herecipe. Nev-ertheless, since my conception of the pertinent sort ofinterpretations not restricted o determiningmeaning,butincludes,as well, other kinds of decisions aboutthe ways inwhich to embodythe play type, Saltz's distinction, f he re-ally has one, does not threatenwhatI claim about theatricalinterpretation.9. Thus, I count Brecht'streatmentof the opening sceneof Coriolanusas a theatrical nterpretation.10. One possible counterexample o the claim that playsareinterpretationsmightbe theperformance f a dramaby aplay-readinggroupof amateurswhich is governedby noth-ing more than the idea thatan attemptbe made to read everyword n the text.Here, t mightbe said,there s no interpreta-tion. However, n this case, I would argue that the commit-ment to the rule thateveryword be readconstitutesa theatri-cal interpretation-a way of filling in the recipe-albeit avery minimalone.11. Marking his distinction,of course, does not provideareal definition of theatricalperformance,but it may recordone of its essential characteristics.Thus, there may be roomfor some ontology here even if Hamilton s right that a realdefinition of theatricalperformance s unlikely. That is, itmay not be the case, as Hamiltonsuggests, thatthe illumina-tion of the historicalconditionsof what counts as a theatricalperformancena certain radition s all we can ever hope for.12. Maybe Saltz's worry s that because of the variabilitybetween theatricalperformance okens, there is no system-atic way to identify whethera given performance s a tokenof the pertinent interpretation ype. However, although Ihave not worked this out in detail, it seems to me, as a firstapproximation,that the pertinent criteria for counting atoken theatricalperformanceas an instance of an interpreta-tion type include (1) that it be causally related to (that it bederived rom)the interpretationnquestion,and (2) that t beconstrained o respect the practice-sensitive imilaritiesbe-tween interpretation ypes and token performances hat arerequired o obtainin the relevantperformance radition.13. But I cannot be taken to hold the latter hesis, since Imaintain hatinterpretations re types, not tokens.

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