bundesrat and bundesstaat

This brochure invites you to find out about the Bundesrat. It is a strik-ing splash of colour in the ranks of legislative bodies. The Bundesrat’scomposition and the range of roles it fulfils are entirely unique.Germany’s federal system is the framework within which theBundesrat’s particular meaning and significance emerge.

The brochure opens with an introduction to the key traits of Germanfederalism, in which the “parliament of the federal states’ govern-ments” forms a link between the central federal level and the individ-ual federal states. This is followed by an explanation of theBundesrat’s composition, organisation and working methods. A briefhistorical overview offers insights into the constitutional tradition inwhich the Bundesrat is embedded.

An index assists readers looking for specific terms. A bibliography andsome Internet links are provided for readers who would like to domore reading on the subject.

The Bundesrat

http://www.bundesrat.de

Information about the federal states

http://www.bundesrat.de

Bills and ordinances adopted by the Federation

http://www.bundesrecht.juris.de/bundesrecht/GESAMT_a.html

Subject-specific sites/Federalism

The European Centre for Federalism Research in Tübingen is planning to develop an online documentation resource on federalism. The Centre’s homepage offers a broad range of links offering more information.

http://www.uni-tuebingen.de/ezff

International servers

Committee of the Regions

http://www.cor.europa.eu

European Union

http://www.europa.eu

Austrian Legal Information System

http://www.ris.bka.gv.at

Swiss server for legal experts

http://www.legalresearch.ch

Internet

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The federal state system

A federal constitutional body 4Federalism – unity in diversity 5Distinct roles and shared responsibilities 10

Organisation and working methods

The seat of the Bundesrat 14The Plenary session 14Distribution of votes 16The members 17The President and the Presidium 18Voting 20Plenary sessions 23The Chamber of European Affairs 24The committees 25The Mediation Committee 27The Bundesrat’s working methods 29

The roles played by the Bundesrat

The Bundesrat – a federal body 34The roles played by the Bundesrat 341. Submitting opinions on draft government bills 352. Convening the Mediation Committee 363. Taking decisions on consent bills 364. Participating in addressing objection bills 415. Bundesrat draft bills 416. Statutory instruments 427. Consent to general administrative regulations 438. European Union draft legislation 449. Participation in foreign affairs 45

10. Right to be informed by the Federal Government 4611. Other roles 47

The status of the Bundesrat

A second chamber? 50The mandate 52Taking decisions as a federal constitutional body 53Taking decisions as a political constitutional body 54Counterweight involved in monitoring the Federal Government 56Counterweight involved in rectifying Bundestag decisions 59Link between the Federation and the federal states 61Building on a sound tradition – forerunners of the Bundesrat 62Overview of legislative activities 64

Annex

BibliographyIndex Internet

The Bundesrat and the federal state system

The Federal Council of the Federal Republic of Germany

InhaltContents

Bundesrat Public Relations11055 BerlinGermany

www.bundesrat.de

We would be delighted to send you furthercopies of this brochure or other informationmaterial about the Bundesrat or federalismfree of charge.

Index of topics

1. Works of collected articles on the Bundesrat

Handbuch des Bundesrates / Bundesrat (Ed.),New edition annually

Der Bundesrat im ehemaligen PreußischenHerrenhaus / Bundesrat (Ed.), 2002

Der Bundesrat / Ziller, Gebhard/Oschatz, Georg-Berndt,10th edition 1998

Der Bundesrat. Mitwirkung der Länder im Bund /Pfitzer, Albert, 4th edition 1995

Praxishandbuch Bundesrat: verfassungsrechtlicheGrundlagen, Kommentar zur Geschäftsordnung,Praxis des Bundesrates / Reuter, Konrad, 1991

Miterlebt – Mitgestaltet. Der Bundesrat im Rückblick /Hrbeck, Rudolf (Ed.), 1989

Das Parlament der Regierenden. 40 Jahre Bundesrat.Eine Chronik seiner Präsidenten / Herles, Helmut, 1989

2. Essays on the Bundesrat

Bundestag und Bundesrat bei der Umsetzung vonEU-Recht / Zeh, Wolfgang / In: Der Politikzyklus zwischenBonn und Brüssel / Derlien, Hans-Ulrich et al (Ed.), 1999,pp. 39 – 51

Das parlamentarische Regierungssystem und derBundesrat – Entwicklungsstand und Reformbedarf /Dolzer, Rudolf/Sachs, Michael / In: Veröffentlichungen derVereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer, Vol. 58,1999, pp. 7–77

Die Rolle des Bundesrates und der Länder im Prozeßder deutschen Einheit / Klein, Eckart (Ed.), Schriften-reihe der Gesellschaft für Deutschlandforschung, Vol. 66,1998

Zusammensetzung und Verfahren des Bundesrates /Herzog, Roman / In: Handbuch des Staatsrechts derBundesrepublik Deutschland / Isensee/Kirchhof (Ed.),Vol. 2, 2nd edition 1998, pp. 505– 522

3. Works of collected articles on federalism

Die deutschen Länder: Geschichte, Politik, Wirtschaft /Hans-Georg Wehling (Ed.), 2nd edition 2002

Ende des Föderalismus: Gleichschaltung undEntstaatlichung der deutschen Länder von der natio-nalsozialistischen Machtergreifung bis zur Auflösungdes Reichrats / Talmon, Stefan, in: Zeitschrift für neuereRechtsgeschichte, 24 (2002), pp. 112–155

Föderalismus: Analysen in entwicklungsgeschichtlicherund vergleichender Perspektive / Benz, Arthur (Ed.),Deutsche Vereinigung für Politische Wissenschaft,Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Sonderheft, 32/2001

German federalism: past, present, future / ed. byMaiken Umbach. – 1. publ. Basingstoke [et al.]. Palgrave,2002

Föderalismus in Deutschland / Bundeszentrale für poli-tische Bildung (Ed.), Informationen zur politischen Bildung,No. 275, 2002

Föderalismus: eine Einführung / Sturm, Roland/Zimmermann-Steinhart, Petra, 2005

Das föderative System der BundesrepublikDeutschland / Laufer, Heinz/Münch, Ursula, 7th edition1997

Föderalismus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:eine Einführung / Kilper, Heiderose, 1996

Föderalismus: Grundlagen und Wirkungen in derBundesrepublik Deutschland / Reuter, Konrad, 5th edition 1996

Zustand und Perspektiven des deutschenBundesstaates / Blanke, Hermann-Josef/Schwanengel,Wito (Ed.), 2005

Föderalismusreform in Deutschland / Hennecke, Hans-Günter (Ed.), 2005

Dokumentation der Kommission von Bundestag undBundesrat zur Modernisierung der bundesstaatlichenOrdnung / Deutscher Bundestag, Bundesrat, Öffentlich-keitsarbeit (Ed.), 2005

Europäischer Föderalismus im 21. Jahrhundert /Europäisches Zentrum für Föderalismusforschung (Ed.),2003

Der deutsche Bundesstaat in der EU: die Mitwirkungder deutschen Länder in EU-Angelegenheiten alsGegenstand der Föderalismus-Reform / Hrbek, Rudolf,in: Europa und seine Verfassung/Gaitanides, Charlotte(u.a.) (Ed.), 2005, pp. 256–273

Föderalismus und Integrationsgewalt: dieBundesrepublik Deutschland, Spanien, Italien undBelgien als dezentralisierte Staaten in der EG /Blanke, Hermann-Josef, 1991

Bibliography

Abstention 22Agenda 23, 26, 31

Bill passed by the Bundestag 28, 38f., 64Bound by instructions 21, 27, 50Budget 20Bundesrat (Kaiserreich) 62Bundestag 4, 18, 36, 44f., 47, 59ff.

Call to order 23Casting of votes 17, 20ff.Casting votes en bloc 20f.Centralised state 5ff.Chamber of European Union Affairs 24ff., 44Chamber of the federal states 34, 50, 54f., 61Checks and balances, system of controls

6ff., 56ff.Coalition government 20Coat of arms 23Committees 18f., 25ff., 30, 46– Committee members 25ff.– Committee meetings 18, 27, 56, 64Consent bill 28, 36ff., 59, 64

Distribution of votes 16Division of powers 4ff., 10f., 59f. Draft bill 35f– Draft bill introduced by the Bundesrat

38f., 64– Draft bill introduced by the Bundestag 36f.– Draft bill introduced by – the federal government 30, 35f., 64Elections 14f., 60European Union 11, 30, 53

Federal Constitutional Court 4, 19, 37f., 48ff. Federal Government

4, 26, 35f., 42ff., 56ff., 61Federal President 4, 19, 37, 48Federal state 3ff., 40, 52f., 59 Federalism 4ff., 34, 52 Foreign policy 44ff., 57

Incompatibility 18Interests of the federal states 32ff., 52ff., 58ff.

Länder governments 14ff.Länder parliaments 7Landesvertretung, representative office of federal state 20, 31Legal ordinance 42f., 57, 64Legislative emergency 47, 54Legislative procedure 34ff., 51

Mediation Committee 27ff., 36ff., 43, 64Meeting/session– Bundesrat plenary session 23f., 29f., 64– Meeting of the Chamber – of European Affairs 24f., 44, 64– Meeting of Bundesrat Committees

25ff., 30f., 64– Meeting of Mediation Committee 27ff., 36Member– Members of the Bundesrat 14ff., 27– Member of Bundesrat committee 25ff.– Member of the Chamber of – European Affairs 25– Member of the Mediation Committee 27f.Minute-taker 23, 29Minutes of the meeting 21, 23, 31

Objection bill 38ff.Official document 30f.Opposition 14, 56Parliamentary Council 6, 55Parliamentary group 27Party politics 54ff.Permanent Advisory Council 20, 31Plenary 13ff., 18ff., 23, 30Plenary session 14f.President of the Bundesrat 18ff., 22, 25, 46Presidium 18ff., 22Prior discussion 31

Question time 46

Regionalisation 9Reichsrat 62Right to information 46

Seat of the Bundesrat 14Second chamber 51f.Second reading 30, 36, 46Secretariat of the Bundesrat 19, 31Secretary-General of the Bundesrat

19, 23, 29Speaking right– Speaking right: Member of the Bundesrat

18, 23– Speaking right: Member of – the federal government 26 ,46State of defence 47, 54Statistics 64Stenographers 23Subsistence allowance 18

Vice-President 18Vote 20f., 24Vote-caster 21, 45

Coats of arms of the Federation and the 16 federal states

Baden-WürttembergArea: 35752 km2

BerlinArea: 891 km2

Schleswig-HolsteinArea: 15799 km2

BremenArea: 404 km2

HesseArea: 21115 km2

Lower SaxonyArea: 47641 km2

Rhineland-PalatinateArea: 19853 km2

SaxonyArea: 18417 km2

Area: 23182 km2

BavariaArea: 70552 km2

BrandenburgArea: 29480 km2

HamburgArea: 755 km2

Area: 34086 km2

SaarlandArea: 2569 km2

Saxony-AnhaltArea: 20447 km2

ThuringiaArea: 16172 km2

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania

North Rhine-Westphalia

States with more than 7 million inhabitants have six votes

States with more than 6 million inhabitants have five votes

States with more than 2 million inhabitants have four votes

Total population 82.1 millionSource: Federal Statistical Office, 2008

Total of 69 votes

Munich

Stuttgart

Erfurt

Wiesbaden

Mainz

Düsseldorf

Hannover

Saarbrücken

Kiel

Schwerin

Magdeburg Potsdam

Dresden

Bonn

Bremen

Berlin

Hamburg

Bremen0,7 million

Baden-Württemberg10,7 million

Rhineland-Palatinate4,0 million

Hamburg1,8 million

Bavaria12,5 million

North-Rhine Westphalia18,0 million

Thuringia2,3 million

Saxony-Anhalt2,4 million

Hesse6,1 million

Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania1,7 million

Saarland1,0 million

Schleswig-Holstein2,8 million

Lower Saxony8,0 million

Brandenburg2,5 million

Berlin3,4 million

Saxony4,2 million

Distribution of votes in the Bundesrat

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Each federal state has at least three votes

The Bundesrat andthe federal systemThe Federal Council of the FederalRepublic of Germany

Author: Dr. Konrad Reuter Editor: Secretary General of the Bundesrat

Berlin 2009 – 14th edition

16 federal states or Länder make up the Federal Republic of Ger-many. The federal system means that many political decisions aretaken in the federal states. This principle is enshrined in the BasicLaw. However, the Bundestag and the Federal Government can-not determine everything on their own even when it comes tonational matters at the federal level. Through the Bundesrat thefederal states also have a say in Berlin.


A federal constitutional body

Federalism – unity in diversity

Distinct roles and shared responsibilities

A federal constitutional bodyThe Bundesrat is one of the five permanent constitutional bodies ofthe Federal Republic of Germany. Alongside the other componentsof the federal system – the Federal President, the Bundestag (Fed-eral Parliament), the Federal Government and the Federal Constitu-tional Court – the Bundesrat is the body within the federal structurethat represents the interests of the federal states. The Bundesrat par-ticipates in the Federation’s policy decisions and thus acts as acounterweight to the political bodies representing the federal tier,namely the Bundestag and the Federal Government, as well as con-stituting a link between the Federation and the federal states. Its sta-tus and function are described in Article 50 of the Basic Law, whichsince 1992 has also included an explicit reference to the Europeandimension of policy:

“The Länder shall participate through the Bundesrat in the legisla-tion and administration of the Federation and in matters concerningthe European Union.”

The significance of this constitutional provision is most clearlyrevealed if one first considers the backdrop to it: the way in which thestate is structured, comprising the Federation (central authority) andthe federal states (Länder) – in other words, the specific form feder-alism assumes in Germany. Federalism has long been the form ofstate organisation adopted in Germany, creating state unity whilst atthe same time setting limits on this within the federal system, andthus ensuring that the notion of unity is not given excessive weight.

“All state authority is derived from the people. It shall be exercisedby the people through elections and other votes and through spe-cific legislative, executive and judicial bodies.”

Article 50 BL

Article 20 (2) BL

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The five permanentconstitutional bodies of

the Federation

Federal President

Federal government

Bundestag

Federal Constitutional Court

Bundesrat

Federalism – unity in diversityThe term “federalism” is derived from the Latin word “foedus”, whichcan be translated as “alliance” or “treaty”. Federalism means forminga federal state and cooperating within the entity thus formed: sever-al states enter into an alliance to form one single all-encompassingstate structure (federation, confederation), whilst to a certain extentmaintaining their own characteristics as states (federal states, con-stituent states).

This contrasts with other forms of state organisation, such as on theone hand the centralised state (unitarism), which does not haveautonomous sub-units, and on the other hand the confederation. Thelatter is a union of states under international law, in which the indi-vidual states remain entirely independent and their union does notper se constitute a state. The German Confederation, which existedfrom 1815 to 1866, was an alliance of this type. In a federal state,the state as a whole should be responsible for those matters thatabsolutely must be regulated in a uniform manner in the interests ofthe people. The federal tier of government should however restrict itsactions to this specific role, for all other matters should be regulatedby the constituent member states. As a consequence, while manyaspects in a federal system are harmonised, a range of other areasare not covered by uniform provisions. Unity in diversity is the funda-mental principle underlying any genuine federal state.

It is even stated in the constitution that this fundamental principle isinviolable and unalterable. Article 79 (3), Basic Law provides:

“Amendments to this Basic Law affecting the division of the Feder-ation into Länder, their participation on principle in the legislativeprocess, or the principles laid down in Articles 1 and 20 shall beinadmissible.”

Article 79 (3) BL

5


As long as the Basic Law remains in force, there is thus an obligationto preserve the underlying fabric of the federal structure. However,that does not mean that there is no need to ponder the meaning andpurpose of federalism. On the contrary, federalism would be in ratherpoor shape if it were merely perceived as an unalterable system.

In 1949 the Parliamentary Council opted for the federative principleof state organisation, because it also implied a further division ofpolitical power between the federation and the federal states (verti-cal division of power), in addition to the classical division of powerbetween the legislature, the executive and the judiciary (horizontaldivision of power). This twofold division of powers serves as an effec-tive means to prevent abuse of power by any part of the system.

That is why right from the outset one of the goals of the peaceful rev-olution in the former GDR in 1989 was the reintroduction of the fed-eral states or Länder in former East Germany, However, no form ofstatehood is perfect – except perhaps theoretically. For that reason,the pros and cons must always be weighed up against each other.In a democracy, the litmus test is the response to a straightforwardquestion: how does this benefit the people? The focus should be onthe citizens – not on a rapid, powerful state apparatus.

Modern form of state

6


Legislature (legislation)

Executive (government and administration)

Judiciary (administration of justice)

Federation

16 federal states

Länder input and participation in decision-making by the Federation and influence of central government on the Länder

Twofold division ofpowers within the

federal state system

Advantages of the federal state system compared with theunitary state

Power-sharing In a federation, the classical horizontal division of powers (legisla-tive – executive – judicial) is complemented by a vertical divisionof powers between the state as a whole and the individual con-stituent states. Power-sharing means control of how power isused and protection against abuse of this power.

More democracy The sub-division into smaller political units makes it easier tograsp and comprehend the actions taken by the state, thus fos-tering active participation and co-determination. In addition, voterscan exercise the fundamental democratic right to vote and thus toparticipate in decisions on two fronts, for in a federal state thereare elections both to the central parliament and to the parliamentsof the constituent states.

Leadership opportunities Political parties enjoy greater opportunities and competitionbetween them is promoted, as minority parties at national levelcan nonetheless take on political responsibility in the individualstates making up the federation. This offers them a chance to testand demonstrate their leadership skills and overall performance.

Closer to the issues In a federation public bodies are closer to regional problems thanin a unitary state. There are no far-flung “forgotten” provinces.

Closer to people The federal state brings state structures much closer to the gen-eral public. Politicians and public authorities are much moreaccessible than in a unitary state that concentrates power in ananonymous, distant centre.

Competition The constituent states always automatically compete with eachother. Competition has a stimulating effect. Exchanges of experi-ence foster progress and serve as a safeguard, ensuring that anymistakes are not repeated across the whole country.

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Sound balance Mutual checks and balances, coupled with respect for each otherand a need to reach compromises make it more difficult, if notwell-nigh impossible, to adopt extreme stances. As federalismstrikes a fair balance, it also has a stabilising effect.

Diversity The division of the country into federal states or Länder ensuresthat a whole host of economic, political and cultural centres canexist. That offers greater scope to preserve and develop regionalcustoms, as well as the specific historical, economic and culturalcharacteristics of an area. This diversity can give rise to greaterfreedom.

Ultimately these arguments in favour of federalism prove to be advan-tages for each individual citizen. Whilst the federal system may cer-tainly have disadvantages too, these benefits clearly outweigh thedrawbacks.

Disadvantages of the federal state system compared with theunitary state

Lack of uniformity The federal states’ autonomy automatically leads to differences.Diversity is the opposite of uniformity. This can cause difficulties,for example, for school children if their family moves to anotherfederal state.

Complicated As there are many decision-making centres in the Federal Repub-lic of Germany, the division of powers between the Federation andthe federal states means the various tiers of state must worktogether, show consideration, exercise mutual oversight and alsorespect the limits of each part of the federal structure. The ensu-ing intermeshing of state activities is thus complex and can behard for the general public to understand.

Time-consuming Parliaments, governments and the public administrations of theFederation and the Länder have to wait for input, decisions or con-

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sent from other tiers of state, as well as engaging in lengthy nego-tiations with each other to reach a consensus. This can also behighly time-consuming.

Expensive Generally speaking, the cost of maintaining distinct parliaments,governments and public administrations at the Federation andfederal state level is considered to be more expensive than run-ning the corresponding institutions in a unitary state. It is debat-able whether this assumption is correct, for it would be impossi-ble to simply dispense with institutions in the federal states byadopting a unitary state system. Various federal bodies would cer-tainly have to grow accordingly and it is not clear that centralisedmammoth authorities would really be cheaper in the final analysis.

Federalism is not a relic from the days of the stagecoach but instead,given its adaptability, a form of statehood very much in tune with ourtimes. Nor is it a peculiarity of the German system. Looking at mapsof the world, we find a whole host of countries with a federal struc-ture, all of which are very different from each other in the details ofhow the system works and the impact this has on citizens in thosecountries. For example, the countries in the following list are all fed-eral states, as stipulated in their constitutions: Canada, the USA,Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, India, Russia, Austria, Belgiumand Switzerland. Even such traditionally centralistic states as France,Spain and Italy have shifted to “regionalising” their countries, which,although it does not constitute federalism, is nonetheless a step inthat direction. And one thing is certain: a united Europe will only beable to survive as a federative union of states, not as something akinto a centralised state. Federalism is therefore a form of state with afuture, particularly in Europe.

–

A form of statewith a future

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“Just as the Länder have made a decisive contribution tointegrating the plurality of cultural and social traditionsinto the nation-state, the regions within a united Europewill be essential participants in allowing diversity to mergeinto political unity.”

Kurt Beck, President of the Bundesrat(2000/2001)

Distinct roles and shared responsibilitiesThe Basic Law ascribes particular roles to the Federation and thefederal states in the spheres governed by the legislature, executiveand judiciary. Generally speaking, it is fair to say that the Federationis responsible for legislation in most spheres, administration is inessence handled by the federal states and responsibilities in the judi-cial sphere are closely intermeshed, involving both the Federationand the federal states. Nonetheless, the federal states also have sig-nificant legislative responsibilities, particularly for policies on cultureand education, local government law and the police forces. Similarlythe Federation also has a fully-fledged administrative substructure incertain areas, for example for the foreign services, the armed forcesand employment offices. Generally however the following principleapplies:

Legislation is on the whole dealt with by the Federation.

Public administration is on the whole a matter for the federalstates.

This division of responsibilities gives the Federation a powerful posi-tion, as it can establish uniform standards for all federal states andthe population at large through its overarching legislative compe-tence.

However, the federal states – and this is an important compensato-ry mechanism – may participate in the Federation’s legislativeprocess via the Bundesrat: federal laws that particularly affect theconcerns of the federal states may only be adopted with the explicitconsent of the Bundesrat. As a consequence, on the one hand theLänder are subject to “the will of the Federation”, which limits theirpolitical autonomy; on the other hand, however, they can have an

Division andintermeshing

10


influence on the Federation’s deliberations and thus contribute to theemergence of this “federal will”. The Federation and the federalstates are closely interlinked.

The Bundesrat constitutes a link binding the Federation and the fed-eral states. Its role is to ensure that irreconcilable contradictions donot arise between the central state and the individual federal statesalthough responsibilities are divided between the various tiers ofstate.

The Bundesrat’s role as mediator determines its constitutional statusand its composition:

The Bundesrat is a constitutional body of the federation, but it ismade up of representatives of the federal states. This in a sensecompensates the federal states for the fact that they have to alarge extent relinquished their independent legislative compe-tence, and also grants them the right to have a say when the Fed-eration devises administrative provisions. Through the Bundesratthe federal states also have an opportunity to participate in mat-ters pertaining to the European Union.

The Bundesrat is a body of the (federal) legislative, but it is madeup of members of the (federal states’) executive bodies. Thisstructure means that federal legislation can draw directly on theadministrative experience of the federal states.

The Bundesrat has been described as probably “the most originalGerman contribution to federalism”. The structure, organisation andremit of the Bundesrat is quite unique among second chambers andcan ultimately only be understood properly if one considers the longconstitutional tradition embodied by the Bundesrat.

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The Bundesratforms a bond

“The Basic Law takes the idea of federalism based on soli-darity. Germans from former East Germany made a con-scious decision to opt for this inner unity after the fall of theWall. We should understand the call for more competitionas a complement to the solidarity principle rather than as asubstitute for it.”

Matthias Platzeck,President of the Bundesrat(2004/2005)

Who is represented in the Bundesrat, who is authorised to take partin deliberations there, who may vote? How do the decision-makingprocesses work? This chapter presents the membership and structure of the variousbodies in the Bundesrat. The focus is on presenting how the Bun-desrat’s day-to-day work is done, a topic rarely addressed directly inthe media. The atmosphere, style and working methods are signifi-cantly different from those in the Bundestag: work in the Bundesrathas a different rhythm and functions according to a distinct procedure.


The seat of the Bundesrat

The plenary session

Distribution of votes

The members

The President and the Presidium

Voting

Plenary sessions

The Chamber of European Affairs

The committees

The Mediation Committee

The Bundesrat’s working methods

The seat of the BundesratOn 1st August 2000 the building at Leipziger Straße 3–4 formerlyoccupied by the Herrenhaus (House of Lords), the upper chamber ofthe Prussian parliament, became the Bundesrat’s seat in Berlin. Thereis also a branch office in the “federal city of Bonn”. Some committeesmeet there regularly several times a year.

Before August 2000 the Bundesrat’s official seat had been in the Bun-deshaus in Bonn, along with the Bundestag, ever since the Bun-desrat’s first constitutive meeting on 7th September 1949. Before theBundesrat moved into the plenary hall in Bonn, which still exists today,the venue was used for meetings of the Parliamentary Council, whichdrew up the Basic Law there in 1948/49. Next to it stood the plenaryhall of the Bundestag, which was constructed from scratch in 1949.

The plenary sessionThe essence of the Bundesrat is the assembly of all its members, theplenary session. Its composition is stipulated in Article 51 of the BasicLaw:

“The Bundesrat shall consist of members of Land governments, whichappoint and recall them.”

That means that in order to be a member of the Bundesrat, one musthave a seat and a say in a government at federal state level. The gov-ernment in each of the federal states decides which of its members willbe appointed to the Bundesrat. However, the number of full memberseach federal state may appoint to the Bundesrat is determined by thenumber of votes that state holds in the Bundesrat. The remaining mem-bers of the cabinets in the federal states are however generally appoint-ed as alternate members of the Bundesrat, which means that in prac-tice all the members of a Land government belong to the Bundesrat. Allof the c. 170 appointed members de facto enjoy exactly the samerights, as the Bundesrat’s rules of procedure grant the same rights toalternate and full members. The Bundesrat is a parliament of the feder-al states’ governments. There is no scope for the opposition in the var-ious federal states to make its voice heard directly in the Bundesrat.

The move fromBonn to Berlin

Article 51 (1) BL

14


There is no such thing as “elections to the Bundesrat”, and thus the Bun-desrat does not have legislative terms as such. In constitutional parlanceit is a permanent body, whose membership is renewed from time to timeas a consequence of elections at federal state level. As a result, elec-tions to the parliaments in the federal states always have nationwidepolitical significance too. As early as the 1950s the slogan was: “Yourvote in the Hesse state decides who's on the Bundesrat's slate”. Whilstvoters first and foremost determine the composition of the parliament intheir federal state and thus which party or parties will govern their federalstate, at the same time this indirectly determines who will have a seatand a say in the Bundesrat, for the majority in each Land parliamentmakes up the government of that federal state, which in turn appointsmembers from its ranks to the Bundesrat. This procedure is also thefoundation stone for the Bundesrat’s democratic legitimacy, as its com-position is determined by elections expressing the will of the people. Thepolitical power exercised by the Bundesrat stems from the electorate.

15


A permanent body

Bundesrat

Land government

Landtag (federal state parliament)

Electorate (in each federal state)

Distribution of votesMust all of the constituent states have the same number of repre-sentatives in the federative body representing them at national level– for example, with each individual state having two senators, as isthe case in the US Senate? Or would it be fairer and more democ-ratic to take population figures as the yardstick, which would meanthat North Rhine-Westphalia, for example, would have 26 timesmore votes than Bremen? An integral part of the “constitutionalDNA” in Germany is the principle of a weighting system for thenumber of votes allocated to represent each of the constituentstates. Whilst the system is shaped by population figures in eachfederal state, this is not the only decisive element. Each of the fed-eral states united in the overall state structure also “counts” in itsown right. The result is a system that is a hybrid of federative anddemocratic representation. However, the Basic Law definitelywished to avoid a structure that would allow the larger federalstates to overrule the others, whilst at the same time not making itpossible for the smaller federal states to have more power thantheir size would merit. When the Basic Law was adopted in 1949each of the federal states was therefore allocated at least threevotes, those with over two million inhabitants were granted fourvotes, while five votes were given to the federal states with a pop-ulation of more than six million.

The introduction of the five relatively small federal states from theformer GDR into this system cast a new light on the balancestruck between the votes allocated to small, medium and largestates. It was felt that the four largest federal states should still beable to function as a blocking minority (one-third of all votes) inrespect of amendments to the constitution. Article 51 (2) of theBasic Law was therefore amended in the Treaty of Unification of31st August 1990. A fourth category of voting rights was estab-lished, allocating six votes to federal states with a population ofmore than seven million.

“Each Land shall have at least three votes; Länder with more thantwo million inhabitants shall have four, Länder with more than sixmillion inhabitants five, and Länder with more than seven millioninhabitants six votes.”

States and population figures

New rules in the united Germany

16


Article 51 (2) GG

The number of votes in each of the federal states is indicated on thefront flap. The Bundesrat has a total of 69 votes and thus 69 fullmembers. Accordingly, 35 votes are needed for an absolute majori-ty, which is generally necessary to adopt a decision, whilst 46 votesare required for the two-thirds majority stipulated in certain instances.

The membersOnly the Minister-Presidents and Ministers in the federal states, (orMayors and Senate members in the case of the city-states of Berlin,Bremen and Hamburg) may be members of the Bundesrat. StateSecretaries who have a seat and a say in the cabinet of a federalstate are also entitled to be members of the Bundesrat. Membershipis based on a decision adopted by each federal state government; itends automatically if a member either leaves the Land governmentor is recalled due to a decision taken by the Land government.

This means that all members of the Bundesrat have a twofold role toplay. They hold a position both at federal state and national level;they are politicians in both the Land and at federal level. Members ofthe Bundesrat take on comprehensive political responsibility as aresult. They cannot simply ignore how decisions they take withintheir particular federal state will impinge on national policy, whilst intheir ministries in the federal states they experience first-hand theconsequences of policies they pursue at the national level.

Individual members are not free to simply vote as they see fit, foreach federal state must vote en bloc in the Bundesrat. Being a mem-ber of the Bundesrat does not therefore give members a “free man-date” but nor does it imply an “imperative mandate”. Members of theBundesrat vote in accordance with a uniform line devised jointly bythe cabinet members in each individual federal state. They representtheir federal state.

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Only cabinet members from the federal states

Dual function

The mandate – each federal statevotes en bloc

If no decision can be reached on how votes are to be cast and therepresentatives of a particular Land therefore do not all cast thesame vote in the Bundesrat, that federal state’s vote is not valid. Dueto the absolute majority required to adopt decisions in the Bundesrat,the final outcome of this kind of non-uniform voting is tantamount tothe federal state casting a “no” vote or abstaining. Any member ofthe Bundesrat present in the meeting can therefore undermine a votein favour of a motion.

Members of the Bundesrat are not remunerated for their work in theBundesrat. They merely receive a subsistence allowance, along witha per-kilometre allowance for road and air travel; members of theBundesrat are entitled to free tickets for rail travel.

Members of the Bundesrat enjoy an important right, which one mighteven describe as a prerogative, pursuant to Article 43 of the BasicLaw: they may attend all sessions of the Bundestag and its commit-tee meetings and have the right to be heard there at all times. Fur-thermore, they may also appoint “representative” to exercise thisright on their behalf. Members of the Bundestag do not enjoy similaropportunities to provide information and present their position in theBundesrat.

Dual membership of the Bundesrat and Bundestag is prohibited. Thetwo offices cannot be combined (incompatibility).

The President and the PresidiumAll the federal states have equal rights when it comes to the mostsenior position representing the Bundesrat: every year one Minister-President is elected to this position. The order is determined as afunction of the population figures of the various federal states andthe cycle begins with the head of government in the most populousfederal state. The Minister-Presidents agreed upon this system in1950 in Königstein/Taunus. One of the merits of this “KönigsteinAgreement” is that each of the federal states assumes the presiden-cy once every sixteen years, although the main advantage is certain-ly that appointments to this position are not subject to shifting majori-ties and party political considerations.

Speaking rights in the Bundestag

Annual rotation among the

Minister-Presidents

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The President’s main duty is to convene and chair the Bundesrat’splenary sessions. In legal terms he or she represents the FederalRepublic of Germany in all Bundesrat matters. The BundesratPresident is assisted by two Vice-Presidents, who advise thePresident in the conduct of official duties and deputise if the Pres-ident is absent.

The Bundesrat President is the highest administrative authority forthe Bundesrat’s officials. The Bundesrat Secretariat, with c. 185 staffmembers, is primarily in charge of providing practical back-up for thepreparation and conduct of plenary and committee meetings. It actsunder the aegis of the Secretary General of the Bundesrat and is divided up into: Committee Offices; the Office of the President,Parliamentary Relations; Parliamentary Service; Press and PublicRelations, Visitor Service, Petitions and Submissions; InformationTechnology; Documentation; Administration; Stenographic Service.

In addition, the Basic Law ascribes a further particularly responsiblerole to the President of the Bundesrat outside the sphere of the Bun-desrat:

“If the Federal President is unable to perform his/her duties, or ifhis/her office falls prematurely vacant, the President of the Bun-desrat shall exercise his/her powers.”

This representative role is crucial, particularly if the Federal Presidentis on an official visit abroad or is taking leave. In such cases, the Bun-desrat President is responsible, for example, for signing bills, formal-ly receiving diplomatic credentials from foreign ambassadors, as wellas for appointing and dismissing civil servants.

In protocol terms the Bundesrat President is often considered to rankas “No. 2” after the Federal President because of this representa-tional role. However, there is no binding definition of protocol rank-

Article 57 BL

Powers of the head of state

19


Offices of the federal states

Each federal statecasts its votes en bloc

20


The Bundesrat’s budget

Permanent Advisory Council

ings in the Federal Republic of Germany. For that reason there is nodefinitive answer to the question of which of the supreme represen-tatives of the constitutional bodies (Bundesrat, German Bundestag,Federal Government and Federal Constitutional Court) ranks secondafter the Federal President, who is undisputedly the highest rankingrepresentative of the state in protocol terms.

The Presidium of the Bundesrat, i.e. the President and the two Vice-Presidents, are responsible for drawing up the Bundesrat’s draftbudget plan, which always keeps a very tight rein on expenditure. Ataround 19 million Euro, the “Separate budgetary plan 03 – Bun-desrat” is one of the smallest budget items within the Federation’stotal budget, which amounted to around 261.7 billion Euro for 2006(in other words c. 261.700 million Euro). That means per annum theBundesrat’s budget amounts to about 23 cents per inhabitant of theFederal Republic.

The Presidium is assisted by a Permanent Advisory Council, which iscomposed of the sixteen plenipotentiaries of the federal states to theFederation. Like the Council of Elders in other parliaments, this bodyadvises the President and Presidium. However, it also plays a keyrole in the realm of information and coordination. After cabinet meet-ings on Wednesdays, a member of the Federal Government regular-ly provides information to the Permanent Advisory Council about thedeliberations and decisions of the Federal Government.

Each of the German federal states has a representative office inBerlin to ensure that federal state interests are taking into account bythe Bundesrat, Bundestag, Federal Government and other bodiesbased in the capital. Each of these offices is headed by the respec-tive “plenipotentiary of the federal state to the Federation”. Theseplenipotentiaries are generally also members of the Bundesrat if theyare members of the government in their federal state.

VotingAs stipulated in the Basic Law, each federal state must cast its votesen bloc, voting either for or against a motion or abstaining. Each indi-vidual state government must therefore reach an agreement as tohow votes should be cast before voting takes place in the Bundesrat.

The way votes are cast in the Bundesrat can lead to severe tensions,particularly in coalition governments, which can strain cohesion in acoalition to breaking point.

The position of each federal state should be reflected in the Bun-desrat, not that of individual members of the Bundesrat. The rules oncasting votes en bloc are also there to ensure that votes by membersof a federal state do not simply cancel each other out. The govern-ment of each federal state is the only body authorised to issue votinginstructions. As laid out in the Basic Law, neither the Minister-Presi-dent (who is entitled to issue guidance within the federal state) northe parliaments in the federal states may issue such instructions. Asa result the governments of the federal states bear parliamentaryresponsibility and can therefore also be “ousted” by the parliamentsin the federal states in response to positions they adopt in the Bun-desrat.

The votes of a federal state are cast by its Bundesrat members. Gen-erally speaking, the federal state government decides before a Bun-desrat session which of the members will cast the votes; alternative-ly, members decide themselves in the course of the plenary session.Usually votes are cast by just one member for each federal state,known as the vote-caster. He or she casts all the votes for the feder-al state in question, even if no other representatives from his or herfederal state are in attendance at the meeting. In almost all cases adecision by the federal state government stipulates how the federalstate’s votes will be cast in the Bundesrat. However, sometimes thecabinet grants the vote-caster discretionary powers to vote as he orshe sees fit, in order to ensure that he or she can reach an agreementwith other federal states, has scope to consider possible compro-mise solutions or can take into account new circumstances that havearisen since the cabinet meeting.

The Basic Law expects that votes will be cast in a uniform, en blocmanner and respects the practice of vote-casters determined inde-pendently by the federal states; it does not encroach on the consti-tutional prerogatives of the Länder with prohibitions and stipulationson arrangements in this domain. In keeping with a 2002 ruling fromthe Federal Constitutional Court, this conception of the Basic Lawsignifies that another member of the Bundesrat from the same fed-

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Instructions from the governments in the federal states

The vote-caster

eral state may at any time object to the votes cast by a vote-caster. Insuch cases, the fundamental conditions for the vote-caster system towork no longer apply. Should this situation arise in a meeting, the Bun-desrat President records the votes of each individual member of theBundesrat as a vote for the whole federal state, provided that ano-ther member of the same federal state does not cast a contradictoryvote. However, if the votes cast by a federal state are not all either infavour of or against a motion (or indeed abstentions), the vote fromthat federal state is not valid; the divided position of that federal stateis not taken into account in the outcome of the Bundesrat vote.

In the Bundesrat it is not really possible to adopt a “neutral stance”by abstaining from a vote. Pursuant to Article 52 (3) of the BasicLaw, decisions in the Bundesrat may only be adopted with anabsolute majority, whilst a two-thirds majority is required for amend-ments to the constitution. This means that abstaining from a vote istantamount to voting against a motion – and the substantive impactof this type of vote depends on the balance of all votes cast.

In the Bundesrat voting is generally by a show of hands. Because ofthe large number of votes to be taken in each session, the Bundesrat-President generally asks only for a vote in favour of a motion andthus determines if there is a majority or a minority for a motion. Inother words, separate voting rounds are not held to count votesagainst a motion and abstentions, for the distinction between thesetwo voting options is not relevant in establishing whether there is anabsolute majority. A “roll-call vote of the federal states” is taken whena vote is held on amendments to the constitution or on other partic-ular important decisions. The federal states then vote in alphabeticalorder by acclamation. In such cases the votes cast are recorded inthe minutes of the meeting. Secret votes are not envisaged in theBundesrat’s rules of procedure.

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Decisions only with an absolute majority

Votes

“We need a reform of the federal system… above all there is aneed to correct erroneous developments and recall once againthe principles originally spelled out in the Basic Law: subsidiarityand autonomy for the federal states and municipalities, reinforcingthese fundamental principles and breathing new life into them.”

Dieter Althaus,President of

the Bundesrat(2003/2004)

Plenary sessionsOn Fridays at 9.30 a.m. the Bundesrat comes together for its pub-lic plenary sessions, which are usually held every three weeks ormore frequently. Members take their seats in sixteen blocks ofseats. There are no party political parliamentary groups. The seatsare arranged in alphabetical order according to the names of thefederal states – as are the coats of arms adorning the front wall ofthe room. Facing the members, on a slightly raised platform, are thePresident, the Secretary and the Secretary General of the Bun-desrat; members and representatives of the federal government sitto the left and right of them on two longer rows of seats, with a sec-tion for Bundesrat staff on the left too. Comments are made from amicrophone at the speaker’s desk. The stenographers are seated infront of this desk.

The calm tone usually found in deliberations here is a particular hall-mark of the Bundesrat’s plenary sessions. The atmosphere couldwell be described as cool rather than overheated; people talk calm-ly and sedately, focussing on the facts. Discussions also remainmatter-of-fact in debates with representatives of the Federal Gov-ernment, even though there are sometimes considerable differ-ences of opinion. Interjections are rare, the meeting never needs tobe called to order, and even now when more lively debates arebeing explicitly encouraged, it is unusual to hear expressions of dis-content or applause, which until the 90s were more or less consid-ered poor form.

The generally comprehensive programme of issues to beaddressed in the meeting – 40, 50, sometimes even over 80 pointson the agenda – is tackled briskly and efficiently. The meeting usu-ally focuses on one or two issues, which are addressed in detail.Speakers on the other agenda points simply submit declarationsexplaining and substantiating their government’s decisions. Oftenthese are written declarations, which are not presented orally in theplenary, but are instead simply noted in the minutes and can beconsulted subsequently in the session report. Whenever possible,votes on several issues are taken together to save time and ensurethat endless individual votes are not required. Usually the Presidentcan adjourn the meeting after three to four hours.

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Matter-of-fact debating style

Brisk approachto the agenda

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The Bundesrat is sometimes referred to as the “House of Lords”,the “Upper Chamber” or as a “well-tempered parliament in whicheverything is smaller, quieter, more refined”. One could debatewhether such descriptions are always accurate; however it is cer-tainly true that efforts to drum up votes or set a particular mood aregenerally to little or no avail due to the special features of the Bun-desrat’s decision-making procedures. Impartiality is therefore oneof the prime concerns in the Bundesrat. The rules of proceduretake it for granted that members will be cooperative and show con-sideration in procedural manners, and dispense entirely with pro-visions on many aspects usually governed by detailed rules in otherparliaments. Guidance is provided in these cases by the “custom-ary practice of the assembly”. The idea is to reach agreements indealing with official business instead of adopting a confrontationalapproach, as even without specific rules no decision can beattained by “fighting matters out in a vote”.

While the tone in the plenary may be calm, the meetings are any-thing but leisurely. Given the plethora of agenda points to be exam-ined, the procedure is so dense and the votes are taken so rapidlythat even knowledgeable observers in the public gallery canscarcely keep up. This brisk pace is possible because the meet-ings, and particularly the votes, are prepared very carefully and pre-cisely. As a result debates are very much focused on the relevantissues, even if the debating style is not exactly spectacular.

The Chamber of European AffairsDecisions that are to have an external legal effect must be adopt-ed by the Bundesrat plenary session. There is one exception to thisgeneral rule: Article 52 (3a) of the Basic Law states that the Bun-desrat may create a Chamber of European Affairs for matters con-cerning the European Union; this chamber’s decisions have thesame effect as decisions of the Bundesrat itself. The Chamberdeals with urgent and confidential matters pertaining to the Euro-pean Union, particularly draft legislation. However, so far the Cham-ber of European Affairs has held very few meetings.

Impartial

Careful preparation for

votes


Pooled expertise

The committees do the groundwork

Committee on Foreign Affairs

Committee onDefence

AgriculturalCommittee

Committee on Family andSenior Citizen Affairs

Committee on EuropeanUnion Questions

Committee on Health

Committee on Labour and Social Policy

Finance Committee

Committee on Internal Affairs

Committee on Legal Affairs

Committee on Women and Youth

Committee on Urban Development, Housing and Regional Planning

Committee on Economic Affairs

Committee on Cultural Affairs

Committee on TransportCommittee on the Envi -ronment, Nature Protec-tion and Reactor Safety

It is only convened at the express request of the President of theBundesrat. The purpose of this arrangement is to avoid having toarrange special sessions of the Bundesrat. Meetings of the Cham-ber of European Affairs are public, although it may meet in cameraif confidential issues are to be addressed. Each federal stateappoints one member of its government to the Chamber, but hasthe same number of votes in this body as in the plenary. The Cham-ber is thus a kind of miniature Bundesrat to deal with particular cir-cumstances. It may also adopt decisions without holding a meet-ing, using an alternative written procedure instead.

The committees The work done in the committees lies right at the heart of parlia-mentary activity. Every piece of legislation, whether it is initiated bythe Federal Government, the Bundestag or a federal state, is firstexamined in the committees. Ministers from the federal state min-istries, who are well-versed in the subject-matter, or officials fromtheir ministries go through the legislation “with a fine-tooth comb”.

Each federal state appoints a member to each committee and has onevote there. The Bundesrat has 16 committees. Their areas of respon-sibility correspond in essence to the portfolios of the federal ministries.Thanks to this system the Federal Government’s expertise is directlycomplemented by that of the Bundesrat and the federal states.

The heads of the Länder governments generally represent the fed-eral states in the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defence Com-mittee, which are therefore described as “political committees”.

“Politicalcommittees” andexpert committees

In contrast, the ministers in charge of the relevant ministries attendmeetings of the expert committees, such as the Committee on Eco-nomic Affairs or the Finance Committee. All Committee membersmay be replaced by “representatives”, i.e. experts from the min-istries. This facility is used especially frequently in the expert com-mittees. Some committees almost always meet as civil servantgroups. The “representatives” may rotate during the meeting, sothat the appropriate experts from the federal states are involved foreach specific point on the agenda. In the Committee on the Envi-ronment, Nature Protection and Reactor Safety, for example parti-cipants might include experts specialised in soil protection, waterresources management, protection against dangerous substances,safety in nuclear facilities, waste disposal or emissions abatement.

The focus in these committees, which are of course not apolitical,is not so much on spectacular matters but instead on practical pre-cision work. The very last details of draft legislation are discussedthere; this is where the federal states can help to shape andimprove national and European legislation, whilst also exercisingscrutiny of such legislation. The good reputation that the Bundesratcommittees enjoy is rooted in the rock-solid expert knowledgeassembled in the committees, coupled with the experience aboutenforcement gleaned by the executive in each federal state, asthese executive bodies are both close to the citizens and close tothe actual impact of implementation.

Part of the ongoing dialogue between the Federation and the fed-eral states occurs in the committees. The Federal Chancellor andthe Federal Ministers are entitled – and at the request of the Bun-desrat are obliged – to attend committee meetings (as well as ple-nary sessions). They have the right to speak at any time. “Envoys ofthe Federal Government”, i.e. civil servants from the federal min-istries, may also attend the meetings. The relevant experts from thenational executive and the federal states’ executive bodies all sittogether around the same table in the Bundesrat’s committeerooms. Meetings of the committees are held in camera, becausediscretion is crucial to ensure open and candid discussions, andbecause confidential matters may be on the agenda.

26


Civil servants from the

federal ministries participate too

Practical precision work

The Mediation Committee Legislation is developed in a cooperative process involving both theBundestag and the Bundesrat. Approximately half of all bills – con-sent bills – can only enter into force if both assemblies agree. Therole of the Mediation Committee is to reach a consensus if there aredifferences of opinion concerning these bills, or relating to objectionbills.

This is a joint committee in which the Bundestag and the Bundes-rat are equally represented. Each federal state has one seat, and theremaining committee members making up the other half of the groupcome from the Bundestag, which allocates its seats as a function ofthe size of the various parliamentary groups. As there are 16 federalstates the committee has 32 members. A named alternate is appoin-ted for each member, but alternates may only attend meetings if themember they represent is unable to attend. The purpose of this is tolimit the number of participants at the meetings. Each parliamentarygroup and each of the federal states may replace their representati-ves at most four times in the course of one legislative term of theBundestag. The meetings are strictly confidential. They are conduc-ted by one of the two committee chairpersons, one of them a mem-ber of the Bundesrat, the other a member of the Bundestag. The twochairs take turns in chairing the meeting every three months and mayreplace each other if necessary.

Members of the Committee, including those from the Bundesrat, arenot bound by instructions. It would however be unrealistic to belie-ve the Committee could simply disregard the party political balanceof power, for the Mediation Committee’s work is only successful ifits proposals are ultimately adopted by the Bundestag and the Bun-desrat.

27


A bridge between the Bundestag and the Bundesrat

Joint Bundestag and Bundesrat committee

Party political balance of power

Bundesrat Bundestag

The Mediation Committee only becomes involved if it is called uponby the Bundesrat, the Bundestag or the Federal Government toaddress a particular bill. As a consequence of the various phases inthe legislative process, the Bundesrat is automatically the body thatgenerates the most work for the Mediation Committee. The Bun-desrat can refer all bills adopted by the Bundestag to the MediationCommittee. The Bundestag and the Federal Government may onlyconvene the Committee after the Bundesrat has refused to approvea consent bill. A series of three mediation procedures may in somecircumstances be required for this category of bills. That is howev-er the upper limit, for each constitutional body is only entitled torefer the same bill to the Committee once.

Mediation Committee decisions are taken on a majority basis. Allmembers do not by any manner of means have to support a partic-ular “consensus proposal” – the term used to describe all the Com-mittee’s decisions. In accordance with procedural rules, the medi-ation process can lead to four different outcomes:

The Committee may recommend that a bill passed by the Bun-destag be revised, i.e. that provisions not acceptable to the Bun-desrat be reformulated, that additions be made or sectionsdeleted.

A bill passed by the Bundestag may be confirmed. In this casedraft amendments submitted by the Bundesrat are rejected.

The proposal may be made that the Bundestag repeal the bill inquestion. This happens when the Bundesrat rejects a bill in itsentirety and succeeds in having this position accepted by theMediation Committee.

Mediation Committee proceedings may be concluded without acompromise proposal being submitted. For example, this occurswhen it is not possible to reach a majority decision in the Com-mittee as there are an equal number of votes in favour of andagainst a proposal.

The Mediation Committee may only make proposals to resolve con-flicts between the Bundesrat and Bundestag, but cannot adopt billsitself. It is not a “super-parliament”.

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Not a “super-parliament”

Proposals

Cases wheremediation occurs

The Bundesrat’s working methods There are days when everything is quiet in the Bundesrat. Whilstthere is a constant flurry of people coming and going in the Bun-destag, the Bundesrat seems to be having a break. But appear-ances can be misleading. Two factors characterise the Bundesrat’sworking methods and make it different from other legislative bodies:the twofold functions of its members and the deadlines set for themost important decisions. As a consequence, the Bundesrat’s workis carried out under permanent time pressure, and is mainly donein the capitals of the federal states and not at its seat in Berlin.


Many centres of activity yet still speedy

In the plenary hall of theBundesrat the members areseated in alphabetical orderin 16 “Länderblocks” withsix seats each. There are noparty political groups. TheSecretary and the Secre-tary General of the Bun-desrat sit next to the Bun-desrat President to assisthim/her in chairing themeetings and counting thevotes.

The members and repre-sentatives of the FederalGovernment sit to theirright and left. Other Bun-desrat staff also sit on theleft-hand side. There arethree blocks of seats fromwhich guests of honour, vis-itors and journalists can fol-low the proceedings.

The extremely short deadlines set for deliberations on laws – sixweeks (in certain cases three or nine weeks) for the first reading,three weeks for the second reading and two weeks for objections– compel the Bundesrat to work at a strenuous pace. The amend-ments to the constitution in 1994 did not do away with this timepressure, but simply somewhat alleviated it for the first reading. Anew nine-week deadline for opinions was introduced. It applies tobills amending the Basic Law or transferring sovereign rights to theEuropean Union or international organisations. In addition, the Bun-desrat may call for the deadline to be extended from six to nineweeks “for good cause”, particularly if a bill is especially lengthy.

The dates of plenary sessions are laid down in advance for eachcalendar year with due consideration to the weeks in which theBundestag is in session. About 13 meetings are held each year atthree-week intervals. The Federal Government submits its draft pro-posals to the Bundesrat six weeks before these dates (or three ornine weeks beforehand for the exceptional cases stipulated in theconstitution). Drafts from the Bundestag are sent three weeks priorto the plenary session. All drafts are passed on immediately to theappropriate committees. As far as possible they are printed on theday they are received and then distributed to members. The com-mittees must complete their deliberations two weeks before theplenary session. That means that the committees have only threeweeks to prepare in the case of draft bills from the Federal Gov-ernment (in the aforementioned exceptional cases less than oneweek or six weeks), whilst they have less than a week to considerdraft bills from the Bundestag.

These extremely short deadlines are only acceptable because thecommittee members and experts from the ministries in the federalstates can seek out information from other sources before the draftlegislation is received. Nonetheless, the actual decisions can onlyreally be prepared once the committees have received a copy of thedraft bill. Prior to the committee meeting, the various ministries ineach federal state need to reach an agreement on what their fed-eral state’s position will be; the cabinets in the federal states alsohave to address the key points in draft legislation at this juncture ifthe issues are of a political nature.

30


Preparation in thefederal states

Tight deadlines for discussions

About 13 meetings a year

Recommendations for the plenary are drawn up on the basis ofintensive discussions in the Bundesrat committees. The secretaryof the lead committee compiles these into an official recommenda-tions document, which forms the basis for further decisions in thefederal states’ capitals. In formal terms the cabinets in the federalstates now have to address all the draft legislation and recommen-dations included on the agenda of the Bundesrat. However, in prac-tice other civil servant groups work upstream of each cabinet, sothat only significant or controversial matters must be decided uponin the cabinet. As well as deciding upon additional motions to betabled, the cabinets of each federal state stipulate on a case-by-case basis whether the members of the Bundesrat shall be boundby instructions and how votes shall be cast.

Two days before the plenary session, officials in the federal states’representative offices discuss the meeting once again with seniorofficials from the Bundesrat Secretariat and the Permanent Advi-sory Council in the light of cabinet deliberations. At this preparato-ry stage there is of course also lively contact between the federalstates, with a view to finding allies to support their position. A short,confidential meeting of Bundesrat members, known as the “prelim-inary discussion”, is regularly held immediately before the plenarysession.

Decisions on the individual draft bills are adopted in the publicsession. The Federal Government or other competent bodies arenotified on the day of the plenary session and the results of thevotes are published subsequently as an official document, alongwith the minutes of the meeting. Committee deliberations for thenext plenary session generally begin again in the week after a ple-nary session.

31


Political decisions bythe governments in the federal states

Search for allies

Official documents

The federal states are entitled to have their say at the federal level,particularly if their interests are affected; that is precisely why theBundesrat exists. Although this sounds simple, it is not easy to putinto practice.

The next chapter addresses the question of the work carried out bythe Bundesrat and the rights it enjoys.


The Bundesrat – a federal body


1. Submitting opinions on draft government bills

2. Convening the Mediation Committee

3. Taking decisions on consent bills

4. Participating in addressing objection bills

5. Bundesrat draft bills

6. Statutory instruments

7. Consent to general administrative regulations

8. European Union draft legislation

9. Involvement in dealing with foreign affairs

10. Right to be informed by the Federal Government

11. Further roles

The Bundesrat – a federal bodyThe Bundesrat is a federal body that shares responsibility for overallfederal policy. It is not a “chamber of the federal states” (i.e. a bodyat the federal state level of the system), even though this expressionhas crept into common parlance. The Bundesrat’s role as a federalbody extends exclusively to exercising federal powers and assumingfederal responsibilities.

The Bundesrat is not responsible for dealing with the functions to becarried out by the federal states. That means it is also not a coordi-nating body to address problems and concerns that may perhaps bedealt with in a harmonised or coordinated manner by all the federalstates. For example, the federal states are responsible for setting thedates for school holidays. It makes sense for the federal states to takea coordinated approach on this question to ensure school holiday peri-ods do not begin at the same time throughout the country, whichwould cause chaos on the road network and in holiday areas. This kindof “holiday regulation” is adopted by the federal states directly (to bemore precise, by the Permanent Conference of Ministers of Educationof the Federal States) without any Bundesrat involvement. This type ofsubject-specific Conference of Ministers exists for all the ministries, aswell as for the heads of government of the federal states in the formof the Conference of Minister-Presidents. The Bundesrat makes everyeffort to ensure its deliberations are not linked to discussions in thesesubject-specific Conferences of Ministers, in order to prevent the pow-ers and responsibilities of the Federation and the federal states frombecoming intermingled; that would blur the distinction between theresponsibilities of the various tiers of state even more than is alreadythe case within the “cooperative federalism” system.

The roles played by the BundesratThe Bundesrat’s areas of involvement relate to legislation and admin-istration, as well as to policy on the European Union; in other wordsthe whole sphere of state activity by the federal level in crafting poli-cy. The Basic Law refers in Article 50 to “participation”, but uses thisterm in a sense much broader than simply a supportive, advisory roleof assistance. The participation may involve simply advising the Bun-

Not a “chamber of the federal states”

More than a simplyadvisory role

34


destag or the Federal Government, but it may also involve playing amuch more active role in actually shaping policy and can even signi-fy that the Bundesrat is empowered to take decisions on its own –depending on the details of the individual provisions in the constitu-tion governing this participation.

1. Submitting opinions on draft government bills

In the Federal Republic of Germany most bills are initiated in the formof draft bills from the Federal Government. The Bundesrat has the“first say” in the parliamentary processing of executive bills. TheBasic Law stipulates that the Federal Government shall first submitits draft bills to the Bundesrat (the draft budget is the only exampleof legislation that must be submitted to both the Bundesrat and theBundestag at the same time). The Bundesrat is entitled to submit anopinion on this draft legislation within a six-week deadline (althoughin certain cases a deadline of three or nine weeks applies). The Bun-desrat makes use of this right in virtually all cases. Review and dis-cussion of legislative proposals submitted by the government aretwo of the Bundesrat’s primary roles. The experience and insightsgleaned by the federal states in the implementation of laws, almostall of which are enforced by them, are incorporated into federal leg-islation in this first reading. In this context the executive bodies in thefederal states conduct an intensive dialogue with the federal execu-tive. The Bundesrat’s checks-and-balances role in the federal systemof government is manifested particularly clearly in this setting.

The Bundesrat examines the draft bills in its committees, taking allrelevant aspects into account: constitutional, technical, financial andpolitical. It often proposes amendments, additions or alternative solu-tions. Frequently the opinion is simply “no objections”. If a draft bill isrejected in its entirety by the Bundesrat, the Federal Governmentrarely submits the bill to the Bundestag nonetheless.

At this stage in the legislative procedure, the Bundesrat’s assess-ment of a bill is not binding on the Federal Government and the Bun-destag. However, this initial assessment is an important indicator of

The Bundesrat has the “first say” on draftgovernment bills

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what the Bundesrat’s position is likely to be when it has the last wordin the second reading. The Bundesrat’s opinions can therefore notsimply be ignored. The Federal Government formulates its view onthese assessments in a written “counter-statement”. The draft bill, theBundesrat’s opinion and the government’s counter-statement arethen all submitted to the Bundestag.

2. Convening the Mediation CommitteeThe President of the Bundestag must submit all legislative decisionsadopted by the Bundestag to the Bundesrat. In this second reading,the issue is discussed first of all in the committees, which in particu-larly assess whether the Bundesrat’s opinion in the first reading hasbeen taken into account and whether or not the Bundestag has intro-duced other amendments. If the Bundestag’s decision on the legis-lation is based on a draft bill initiated by the Bundestag only this“second reading” occurs, even though in that case the term is actu-ally a misnomer.

If the Bundesrat is not in agreement with the version of a bill passedby the Bundestag, it may refer the matter to the Mediation Commit-tee within a period of three weeks. The Bundesrat’s submission tothe Mediation Committee, which must be adopted by the plenarysession with an absolute majority, includes specific proposals foramendments along with detailed substantiation of these proposals.

3. Taking decisions on consent bills Bills that have a special bearing on the interests of the federal statescannot become law unless the Bundesrat gives its express approval.Legislation in this category cannot be passed if the Bundesrat votesdefinitively against a bill. This rejection of a bill cannot be overturnedby the Bundestag. In that case, the only remaining recourse for the

36


Bundestag and the Federal Government is to refer the matter to theMediation Committee in an attempt to reach a consensus. Thatmeans that the Bundestag and the Bundesrat must agree on con-sent bills if legislation is to be adopted.

The provisions of the Basic Law indicate which bills require Bun-desrat approval. They can be classified in three groups:

Bills amending the constitution. These require Bundesrat consentin the form of a two-thirds majority vote in favour of adoption.

Bills that have a particular impact on the finances of the federalstates. On the revenue side these primarily include all bills relatingto taxes for which all or part of the revenue accrues to the federalstates or local authorities: for example income tax, value-addedtax, trade and motor vehicle tax. On the expenditure side this cat-egory comprises all federal bills that oblige the federal states tomake cash payments, provide benefits equivalent to cash pay-ments or provide comparable services to third parties.

Bills that impinge on the organisational and administrative juris-diction of the federal states.

In terms of the number of bills that fall into this category, the lastgroup of bills mentioned above is particularly significant; that isbecause the whole bill requires the consent of the Bundesrat if a billcontains even one binding provision of this type. This holds, for exam-ple, when federal law prescribes certain jurisdictional arrangements,forms, time limits, administrative fees, types of document delivery ornew authorities. Even bills that in essence do not affect the interestsof the federal states, such as international treaties or bills on defenceissues, may nonetheless require Bundesrat consent due to theseindividual clauses.

The 2006 federalism reform granted the Länder the right in billsadopted by the federal states to regulate the establishment ofauthorities and administrative provisions in a manner that differs fromfederal legislation. Bundesrat consent is therefore only necessary ifa federal bill exceptionally comprises provisions that do not offerscope for the federal states to regulate the matter differently, due toa particular need for uniform regulation across the country (Art. 84(1) BL).

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Federal government

Bill passed

Adoption

No amendments proposed Amendments proposed

Referral to MC Rejection

Bill rejected

Bill fails

Bill fails unless the federal government or the Bundestag refer the matter to the Mediation Committee

Bill fails unless the federal government or the Bundestag refer the matter to the Mediation Committee

Bundesrat Bundestag

Draft bill

Counter-statement

Opinion

Decision by Bundestag

Decision by Bundesrat

Adoption of the amended bill

Mediation Committee (MC)

Adoption Rejection

Decision by the Bundesrat

Counter-signature

Federal President:Signature and promulgation of law

Taking decisions on consent bills

Bills may be introduced in the Bundestag by the federal government, theBundesrat or by members of the Bundestag (Article 76, sub-section 1,Basic Law).

This flow chart depicts the procedure for a bill introduced by the federalgovernment (the most frequent scenario for legislation).

Bills initiated by the Bundesrat are submitted to the Bundestag togetherwith an opinion from the federal government. Bills introduced by theBundestag (by political groups or one or more Bundestag members) are submitted to the Bundestag directly. The procedure in the Bundestag(and after deliberations there) is identical to the procedure for bills initiated by the federal government.


Federal government

Bill passed Bill rejected

Bill fails

Bundesrat Bundestag

Draft bill

Counter-statement

Opinion


Approval Referral to MC


No amendments proposed Amendments proposed

Mediation Committee (MC)

Adoption of amended bill

Bill failsBill fails

Objection overridden with 2/3 majority

Objection not overridden


Objection overridden with absolute majority

Objection not overridden


Counter-signature

Federal President:Signature and promulgation of law

Agreement Objection with absolute majority

Objection with 2/3 majority


Participating in addressing objection bills


The Bundesrat can always only vote “yes” or “no” to a bill in itsentirety, but is not entitled to partially reject a bill i.e. it may not deleteindividual provisions. If there is any dispute as to whether Bundesratconsent is necessary, the Federal President decides in the firstinstance when promulgating legislation whether a particular bill is aconsent bill. However, a definitive and binding decision can only betaken by the Federal Constitutional Court. That is also the forumwhere a binding decision may be taken on whether the right of con-sent of the Bundesrat has been dealt with correctly in a particularinstance. In some cases, when bills only require consent due to theprocedural provisions, the legislation is divided into separate parts:a procedural bill that requires Bundesrat consent and a bill on theactual substance, which does not require consent. While the Bun-desrat may submit an objection to the bill on the actual substance,this objection can be overturned by the Bundestag. The case law ofthe Federal Constitutional Court states that bills may be divided inthis manner at the discretion of the legislator. To date the FederalConstitutional Court has not yet had to give a ruling on the specificextent of these discretionary powers. The Bundesrat assumes thatthis system has been applied inappropriately if the subject-matteraddressed means the bills ought to be combined in a single pieceof legislation.

The Bundesrat’s constitutional status and significance are primarilyrooted in its right of co-decision on consent bills. This right meansthe Bundesrat has a great deal of influence on legislation. Until the2006 federalism reform, around half of all bills required Bundesratconsent. The reform aims to reduce this high percentage by grant-ing greater legislative competence to the federal states, as well as byintroducing new provisions on waivers in the field of administrativeprocedures. Consent bills will however continue to make up a sub-stantial percentage of legislation, particularly as new cases requir-ing consent have been introduced in the area of finance. The Bun-destag will not be able to decide on its own about these bills in thewake of the reform, but must take the Bundesrat’s opinion into con-sideration. However the Bundesrat cannot have an impact on itsown either, particularly as a “no” vote hinders new developments,but does not per se play an active part in shaping a policy area.

Significant influence on legislation

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When is a bill a consent bill?

Rather than going their own way, both assemblies ought to showmoderation and seek a fair balance, demonstrating mutual under-standing and reciprocal consideration, values that both the Bun-destag and the Bundesrat must respect as political imperatives inthe federal system. That is indeed what happens in practice. In fact,as the statistics on page 64 reveal, few bills have failed as a resultof being rejected by the Bundesrat.

4. Participating in addressing objection billsThe Bundesrat is also involved in the genesis of bills that do notrequire its consent. These are described as objection bills. Herehowever it can only strenuously urge the Bundestag to adopt a par-ticular approach. If the Bundesrat submits an objection within twoweeks of the conclusion of mediation proceedings, the Bundestaghas to submit the bill to another reading. If the Bundestag does notshare the Bundesrat’s reservations, it can override the objectionwith an absolute majority of its own (described as the “chancellormajority”). If the Bundesrat’s objection was based on a two-thirdsmajority, a corresponding two-thirds majority of votes cast in theBundestag is required to override it (this majority must also repre-sent a majority of the Bundestag’s members). If the objection isoverridden, the bill in question may be enacted. However, if thereis not a sufficient majority in the Bundestag to reject the objection,the bill cannot become law, as is the case if the Bundesrat does notapprove a consent bill.

5. Bundesrat draft billsThe Bundesrat is entitled to submit its own draft bills to the Bun-destag. The draft bills are submitted to the Federal Government toallow it to table its comments. Within six weeks (or in certain cases,within three or nine weeks), the bills are then passed on to the Bun-destag.

The Bundestag considers this draft legislation using the same pro-cedure as for draft bills introduced by the Federal Government and

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initiatives from the Bundestag. The Bundestag is free to decide asit sees fit, and may thus also refuse to adopt a bill. It is not possibleto refer the matter to the Mediation Committee with a view to over-coming the Bundestag’s rejection of such bills. This aspect of pro-cedure is unfavourable for the Bundesrat, which may explain why itinitiates relatively few bills. However, the Bundesrat has been suc-cessful in having measures adopted to improve legal, customer andconsumer protection. The following provisions are based on legis-lation initiated by the Bundesrat: the right of revocation for hire-pur-chase transactions, prohibition on agreements concerning theplace of jurisdiction, the obligation to comply with formal criteria inpurchases of real estate (to protect purchasers) and more rigorousstate oversight of old people’s homes. The Bundesrat also set theball rolling on combating abuse of asylum law and fighting organ-ised crime, as well as introducing proposals on providing cover forlong-term care needs.

The Bundesrat also uses the parliamentary instrument of resolu-tions as a political complement to its right to initiate legislation.These are requests, generally addressed to the Federal Govern-ment, that aim to draw attention to problems that have not yet beenadequately addressed in legislation.

6. Statutory instruments

The Highway Code, which affects almost everyone, is not passedby the Bundestag; instead this legislation is adopted by the Feder-al Minister of Transport with Bundesrat consent. It is an example offederal administration involving the Bundesrat.

Statutory instruments are binding provisions on the implementationof bills. Bundesrat consent is stipulated for most statutory instru-ments from the Federal Government and individual federal minis-ters. A considerable part of the Bundesrat’s workload involvesexamining such legislation, a process that only rarely involves theBundestag. Most of the work in this field is done in the committees.

These provisions, which are generally less politically significant, donot take up much time in the public plenary sessions. The right of

42


consent signifies that the Bundesrat is entitled to determine thecontent of statutory instruments on an equal footing with the otherbodies involved. In practice, consent is often granted “subject to”certain amendments. It is not possible to refer the matter to theMediation Committee.

Since the amendments to the constitution in 1994, the Bundesrathas enjoyed a formal right of motion for statutory instruments. It maysubmit drafts of statutory instruments that require Bundesrat con-sent to the Federal Government.

As becomes clear in the following list of examples, these statutoryinstruments address a broad range of policy areas: Road TrafficRegulations, Federal Ordinance on Species Protection, Ordinanceon Hospital Care Charges, Ordinance on Utilization of Land forConstruction, Ordinance on Work in Pressurised Environments,Ordinance on Dangerous Substances, Ordinance on HazardousIncidents, Ordinance on Minimum Hygiene Standards for Poultry-meat and Ordinance on Quantitative Analysis Methods for BinaryTextile Fibre Mixtures.

7. Consent to general administrative regulations

Just like statutory instruments, numerous general administrative reg-ulations also depend on Bundesrat consent, if these provisionsaddressed to the administrative authorities affect the powers andresponsibilities of the federal states. For example, the “Schedule ofExemplary Fines” for regulatory traffic offences and the “PointsSchedule” for forfeiture of a driving licence were both enacted withthe consent of the Bundesrat.

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8. European Union draft legislationWith the growing integration of the European Union, national law isincreasingly being influenced by legislation adopted in Brussels.The decision-making body is the Council of Ministers, in which eachMember State is represented by a member of the government. Pur-suant to Article 23 (2) of the Basic Law, the Bundestag and,through the Bundesrat, the federal states participate in the processwhereby the Federation reaches a position concerning specificEuropean Union matters. The Federal Government is thereforecharged with providing the Bundestag and the Bundesrat withcomprehensive information on all European Union affairs as rapidlyas possible.

After extensive consultations in the committees, the Bundesrat – inurgent cases the Chamber of European Affairs – gives its opinionson the European Union draft regulations and directives submittedto it. If this European Union legislation affects matters which fallwithin the jurisdiction of the Federation at the national level, the Fed-eral Government must give “due consideration” to the Bundesrat’sopinion in its decisions in Brussels. If such legislation primarilyaffects the legislative jurisdiction of the federal states, the structureof Länder authorities or their administrative procedures, then theBundesrat’s assessment must be taken into account as the “deci-sive opinion”. In other words, in such cases the Bundesrat really hasthe final say in determining the German position in the Council ofMinisters. In this context however, the Bundesrat also has a duty to“comply with federal responsibility for the nation as a whole”. Thisphrase refers to jurisdiction in the key policy areas of integration,foreign affairs and security. If the Bundesrat’s opinion conflicts withthat of the Federal Government, and if an agreement cannot bereached, the Bundesrat’s opinion is the decisive factor, providingthat it is based on a decision approved by a two-thirds majority. TheBundesrat’s right to have the last word is restricted in matters thatcould cause an increase in expenditure by the Federation or couldlead to a drop in federal revenue. In such cases the Federal Gov-ernment must approve the German position as determined by theBundesrat. In cases in which EU legislation mainly affects the exclu-sive legislative competences of the federal states in the realm of the

44


school system, culture or radio and television broadcasting, theGerman delegation is headed by a minister from one of the federalstates, appointed by the Bundesrat, who is in charge of conductingthe negotiations and is entitled to vote.

9. Participation in foreign affairs

Article 32 (1) of the Basic Law provides that the Federation shall beresponsible for maintaining international relations with other coun-tries. This provision does not assign this responsibility to any par-ticular constitutional body and thus excludes neither the Bundesratnor the Bundestag from involvement as federal bodies. Neverthe-less, as conveyed in the Basic Law, foreign affairs is a key policyarea in which the Federal Government is active, enjoying powers totake far-reaching and indeed perhaps even existential decisionsindependently of the legislative bodies. However, internationaltreaties regulating the federation’s relations with other nations orrelating to matters of federal legislation do require the “consent orparticipation of the appropriate legislative bodies in the form of afederal bill”, as stipulated in Article 59 (2) of the Basic Law.

In terms of the Bundesrat’s rights, this means that a treaty law(referred to as a “ratification law”) requires Bundesrat consent if theadoption of a domestic law with similar content would require theconsent of the Bundesrat pursuant to the Basic Law. By using itsright of veto, i.e. refusing to approve a law, the Bundesrat can pre-vent an international agreement from coming into force for Ger-many. The Maastricht Treaty concerning the deepening of the Euro-pean Communities into the European Union, to mention just oneexample, required the Bundesrat’s consent. Other types of agree-ment subject to the Bundesrat’s approval include agreements ondisaster relief, administrative and judicial cooperation, tax law, pen-sion law, the protection of capital investments, and environmentalprotection.

If the Basic Law does not require consent for national implementa-tion of the content of an international treaty, the treaty law must stillbe forwarded to the Bundesrat, but here the Bundesrat only has a

45


Consent to ratification bills

right of objection (in the second reading). In such cases, the Bun-destag may override the Bundesrat’s objections, thus enablingentry into force (ratification) of the treaty.

The foreign policy sphere also includes the contacts with countriesabroad maintained by the Bundesrat, its committees, the BundesratPresident and individual members, particularly through official visitsfrom and to the Bundesrat.

10. Right to be informed by the Federal Government

Pursuant to Article 53, third sentence of the Basic Law, the Bun-desrat shall be “kept informed by the Federal Government withregard to the conduct of its affairs”. This obligation to provide infor-mation relates to all government business, and is therefore notrestricted to legislative and administrative activities, but alsoincludes for example information about the general political situa-tion, foreign and defence policy. The Federal Government must pro-vide comprehensive and timely information on an ongoing basis atits own initiative. Furthermore the Bundesrat is entitled to “sum-mon” any member of the Federal Government to its plenary andcommittee meetings and put questions to them. Conversely, mem-bers of the Federal Government are entitled to attend all meetingsof the Bundesrat and its committees, as well as to speak there atany point. However, the Bundesrat rarely utilises its formal right toput questions in the plenary sessions. The second chamber doesnot have a specific “Question Time” nor does it use the system ofwritten questions, which are both standard practice in the Bun-destag.

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11. Other rolesThe Basic Law assigns numerous other tasks and competences tothe Bundesrat. For example, the Bundestag and Bundesrat eachelect half of the members of the Federal Constitutional Court. TheBundesrat can also lodge complaints of unconstitutionality and cantestify in cases before the Federal Constitutional Court. The Bun-desrat appoints representatives to the Federal EmploymentAgency’s Management Board, as well as to other public bodies. It isentitled to make proposals or has a right of consent in respect ofappointments to various other positions. Bundesrat consent isrequired for proposals to the Federal President on appointments tothe position of Chief Federal Prosecutor, for attorneys in the Feder-al Supreme Court and for Deutsche Bundesbank Board Members.

The Federal Minister of Finance must account annually to the Bun-destag and the Bundesrat for revenue and expenditure to enabledischarge of the Federal Government.

Should the Federal Chancellor no longer enjoy the confidence of theBundestag, without the Bundestag being dissolved, a complex pro-cedure allows the Federal Government to adopt bills with the con-sent of the Bundesrat. In this type of legislative emergency asdefined in Article 81 of the Basic Law, the Bundesrat constitutes a“reserve of legality” when the Bundestag is not able to take action.

Monitoring and oversight roles are also ascribed to the Bundesrat inthe provisions set out in the Basic Law concerning federal oversightof the activities of the federal states, domestic emergencies and nat-ural catastrophes. Bundesrat consent is also required if the Bun-destag determines that a state of emergency pertains because thecountry is under attack; this is known as the state of defence. Insuch cases the particular provisions for the state of defence laid outin Articles 115a to 115k of the constitution may be applied.

Legislative emergency

47


The Basic Law stipulates that the Bundesrat is a constitutionalbody, just like the Bundestag, the Federal Government, the Feder-al President and the Federal Constitutional Court.

The Bundesrat has a specific position within this system, which willbe addressed in the next section: it is more than an interface withthe federal states, for it is also a body responsible for scrutiny andoversight. The Basic Law seeks to achieve the division of powers– the Bundesrat plays a central role in that respect.

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A second chamber?

The mandate

Taking decisions as a federal constitutional body

Taking decisions as a political constitutional body

Counterweight involved in monitoring the Federal Government

Counterweight involved in rectifying Bundestag decisions

Link between the Federation and the federal states

Building on a sound tradition – forerunners of the Bundesrat

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Two legislative assemblies


A second chamber? In many states around the world – both centralised states andnations with a federal system – the legislature is organised into twoassemblies. This type of parliamentary system is generallydescribed as a “bicameral system”. In contrast, the Bundestag andBundesrat are not generally grouped together conceptually in thisway, indeed it is even debatable whether the Bundesrat can bedescribed as a “second chamber”. Critics who dispute that theBundesrat qualifies as a chamber point out that members are notelected to the Bundesrat and are bound by instructions when vot-ing. They would argue that these specific features mean one can-not refer to the Bundesrat as a parliamentary chamber. However,this line of argument disregards the fact that the standards appliedto the Bundesrat in its capacity as a body that represents the con-stituent states differ from the yardstick taken when considering abody that represents the people.

On occasion critics seek to use the stance of the Federal Consti-tutional Court to demonstrate that the Bundesrat does not qualifyfor chamber status. These critics insist that the Karlsruhe court hasruled explicitly that the Bundesrat is not a second chamber. TheFederal Constitutional Court did indeed state in a ruling in 1974:

Parliament

United Kingdom

Houseof Lords

House of Commons

States-General

The Netherlands

FirstChamber

SecondChamber

Federal Assembly

Switzerland

Councilof States

NationalCouncil

Congress

USA

Senate House of Representatives

51

Die Aufgaben des Bundesstaates

“A unique body”


“Democracy is not just a set of rules that helps us to takeequitable and reasonable decisions. Democracy is also alife form that needs tangible possibilities to develop itspotential. The federal states and above all the municipali-ties and districts are and will remain the most appropriateplace for that.”

Klaus Wowereit,President of theBundesrat(2001/02)

“Pursuant to the provisions of the Basic Law, the Bundesrat is nota second chamber of a unified legislative body that participates onan equal footing with the “first chamber” in legislative procedure”.

The Federal Constitutional Court therefore does not simply unre-servedly deny that the Bundesrat is a second chamber, and in itsruling also referred to an academic treatment of the topic, whichhighlights the “arbitrary nature” of the terminology selected. It isindeed a semantic battle, fought sometimes with great passion.However, in terms of the constitutional status of the Bundesrat, itis immaterial, for the roles and powers of the Bundesrat do not stemfrom the terms used to describe it, but instead from the various pro-visions of the Basic Law. The Bundesrat can certainly be cate-gorised as a “genuine second chamber” if, like most experts onconstitutional law and political science, one considers the decisivecriterion when applying the term “chamber” to be whether anassembly participates in the legislative procedure as a body thatactually shares in the decision-making (rather than playing a mere-ly advisory role). However, one can also very well claim that theBundesrat is not a second chamber if one thinks that other featuresare decisive, i.e. using this “arbitrary” terminology differently. Thisdoes not however alter the Bundesrat’s actual role and status. Itsmany specific features certainly make the Bundesrat “a uniquebody, unparalleled anywhere else in the world”.

The mandateThe basic idea underlying the democratic and federal constitutionof Germany is the division of powers. The Federation and the fed-eral states work within a mutual checks-and-balances system asthey conduct the business within their respective spheres ofresponsibility, whilst also practicing cooperation and consideration.When it comes to the division and execution of tasks, the main fea-ture that distinguishes the German form of federalism from all otherfederative systems is that the individual federal state governmentsparticipate directly in the decisions of the national state or Federa-tion. This principle is put into practice through the Bundesrat.

In this system of division of powers and shared responsibilities, theBundesrat has three central roles:

It defends the interests of the federal states vis-à-vis the Feder-ation and indirectly vis-à-vis the European Union.

It ensures that the political and administrative experience of thefederal states is incorporated into the Federation’s legislationand administration, as well as into European Union affairs.

Like the other constitutional bodies of the Federation, it sharesoverall responsibility for the Federal Republic of Germany.

The Bundesrat has a dual role to play in exercising these roles: onthe one hand, it acts as a federal counterweight to the Bundestagand the Federal Government; on the other hand however it alsoconstitutes a link between the Federation and the federal states.The Bundesrat represents the constituent states at the federal level,whilst at the same time reminding these constituent states of theirduties on behalf of the alliance that makes up the state as a whole.

Counterweight and link

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Taking decisions as a federal constitutional bodyIn every state based on a federal system there is a natural tensionbetween the state as a whole and the constituent states. The Fed-eration and the federal states seek to maintain and if possiblestrengthen their position, to fully exercise and perhaps also extendtheir rights. In this context the Bundestag and the Federal Govern-ment are the “central authorities”, to which the Basic Law has allo-cated the counterweight of the Bundesrat as a federative body atthe federal level. The main role of the Bundesrat is to preserve the“interests of the Länder” at the federal level, whilst at the same timeensuring that these are in tune with the concerns of the Federationas a whole.

The “interests of the federal states” in this sense are clearly con-cerns that essentially can only be regulated via consent bills; for thiscategory of legislation the Bundesrat has an absolute right of veto:

The way in which responsibility for state activities is divided upbetween the Federation and the federal states i.e. provisions onlegislative, administrative and judicial competences within Ger-many and in the European Union context.

How tax revenues are shared between the Federation and thefederal states.

Determination of the administrative procedures that authorities inthe federal states must apply in enforcing federal bills.

Are such organisational, fiscal and administrative concerns reallythe whole story when it comes to the interests of the federal states?Is it not much more the case that the governments of the Ländermay and indeed must also assert the interests of the people livingin their particular federal state when representing the “interests ofthe federal states”? How can one differentiate between the “inter-ests of the federal states” and the “interests of citizens”, given thatdemocratic states exist to serve their citizens? It is certainly impos-sible to draw a clear-cut distinction.

What are the interests of the federal states?

Right of veto

53


The Basic Law does not limit the Bundesrat to merely representingthe interests of the federal states. Instead the Bundesrat alsoshares responsibility for overall federal policy. That becomes appar-ent if one recalls that the Bundesrat also addresses objection bills,in other words precisely those bills that do not primarily affect theinterests of the federal states. In the case of consent bills, the Bun-desrat may refuse its consent because of the provisions that triggerclassification of the legislation as a consent bill but in addition – asrepeatedly confirmed by the Constitutional Court – it enjoys a com-prehensive right of scrutiny, meaning that it can also reject the billdue to other provisions that do not fall directly into the consent cat-egory. The right to receive comprehensive information from the Fed-eral Government, the participation of the Bundesrat when the stateof defence applies and its status as a “reserve of legality” in leg-islative emergencies are also manifestations of the responsibility theBundesrat shoulders for the whole country, a role that extends farbeyond defending regional interests.

Taking decisions as a political constitutional bodyThe Bundesrat is a political organ, for it is made up of politicians andhas a political remit. This puts it in a natural state of competition withthe Bundestag and the Federal Government. These two constitu-tional bodies are however not just political fora, but also express theparty political balance of power. However, in its capacity as a feder-ative body at the federal level, the Bundesrat primarily represents thefederal states and not political parties, triggering the question as towhether and to what extent there is scope for party politics in theBundesrat. Can the Bundesrat be a party political counterweight,should it take on this role and is it authorised to do so?

When the groundwork was being done prior to adoption of theBasic Law, efforts were made to ascribe to the Bundesrat the roleof a “counterbalance to party politics”, which would be guided by“greater objectivity” and the “desire for absolute impartiality”. TheParliamentary Council criticised such derogatory appraisals of partypolitics. In this view of the Bundesrat (in those days also referred to

Responsibility forfederal policies

Party politics in the Bundesrat?

54


as the “Council of the Federal States”), the Bundestag would seemto be “the font of all the evils of the party system and the Council ofthe Federal States to be wisdom and goodness incarnate”, to citecriticism from Hermann Brill, a Social Democrat from Hesse.

Contrasting the notions of “impartial politics” and “party politics”would indeed call the reputation of the political parties into question,for it would suggest that party politics are to be equated with biasedpolitics.

The constitution provides that the political parties have a mandate toparticipate in political decision-making. Within the system defined bythe constitution, they are actually the real “pillars of policy”; we livein a multi-party democracy. As a result it now goes without sayingthat Bundesrat decisions, which are after all political decisions, maybe coloured by party political concerns. “We are the fathers of ourfederal states and the sons of our parties at one and the same time”,Heinz Kühn, Minister-President of North Rhine-Westphalia, noted in1971 when speaking to the Bundesrat, with “a need to preserve theability to enter into compromises, yet without compromising our-selves or our ideas.”

In political discourse the issue of how much influence the partiesshould have in the political decision-making process remains con-troversial, as does the question of where the border line should bedrawn between a “political Bundesrat” and “party political abuse ofthe Bundesrat”. There are no rigid legal criteria for determining pre-cisely where this demarcation line lies. Instead it is up to the politi-cal parties to use their own critical judgement – bearing in mind theconstitutionally defined role of the Bundesrat – and to contribute toensuring the Bundesrat is an independent political force as a con-stitutional body.

Parties must use their critical judgement

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“I am profoundly convinced that the Bundesrat’s fact-basedapproach can serve as a role model for political action at otherlevels. Here the well-being of the state ranks above self-inter-est, here party political interests are not the yardstick foractions and decisions, here the focus is on the interests of the federal states and the well-being of their citizens.”

Peter Harry Carstensen, President of the Bundesrat(2005/06)

Party political camps emerge particularly clearly in the Bundesratwhen the majorities in the Bundestag and Bundesrat come from dif-ferent parties. If the opposition in the Bundestag has not managedto garner enough support on a particular issue, it then attempts tohave its position adopted in the Bundesrat on a case-by-case basis,particularly if the issues are politically controversial. So far it has notbeen the general rule for decisions in the Bundesrat to be guidedby party political concerns, with all the polarisation that wouldentail. The political party fronts, while they do play a role, arenonetheless not nearly as rigid as one might imagine; that is partlya consequence of the intrinsic tensions in relations between theFederation and the federal states, which naturally unite all the fed-eral states regardless of the party political loyalties of the Ländergovernments, as well as partly being due to other factors relevantacross the political spectrum, such as regional interests and thespecific concerns of the federal states as a tier of government.

Counterweight involved in monitoring the Federal Government In keeping with our constitution, the Bundestag elects the FederalChancellor; he or she must have the trust of the Bundestag, whichenables both the Chancellor and the government to conduct theirbusiness properly. The Bundesrat has no influence in the processof appointing or dismissing members of the government. Nonethe-less the Bundesrat, along with the Bundestag, plays a vital role inmonitoring the Federal Government’s activities.

This monitoring primarily takes the form of involvement in the leg-islative process. Whilst the principle of division of powers meansthat the government cannot simply promulgate bills, it does howev-er initiate most legislation and draws up the detailed implementingprovisions in the federal ministries. As all government bills must firstbe forwarded to the Bundesrat for its comments, it can carry outthorough scrutiny of draft legislation at this juncture – even beforedeliberations in the Bundestag. The structure of the Bundesrat,which as we have seen is composed of members of the govern-

56


More relaxed fronts

Monitoring and taking correctiveaction – relations between the constitutional bodies

ments of the federal states, plus the option of appointing experi-enced civil servants from the federal states as “representatives” toparticipate directly in committee meetings, have proven to be veryeffective factors in this scrutiny process. This system means thatthe federal ministries deal with a highly qualified counterweight atthe technical level too; the representatives from the federal statesknow their policy areas inside out and can thus take a very careful,detailed look at all spheres of domestic policy – even though thestate is active in so many different areas and the subject-matteraddressed tends to be highly complex.

These comments also hold true for European Union affairs, whichcan no longer be slotted into the category of classical foreign poli-cy, but as a result of increasing European integration might well bedescribed as European domestic policy. As to date the structure ofthe EU has granted the governments of Member States the right todecide on European lawmaking and politics, monitoring the Feder-al Government’s activities in this area is crucial. That is why Article23 of the Basic Law, introduced into the constitution in 1992,granted the Bundesrat – and indeed the Bundestag - enhancedrights to participate and exercise scrutiny.

The Bundesrat also takes on a comprehensive monitoring role in thesphere of the actual executive activity of the Federal Government,

57


European domestic policy

Bundesrat

Basic Law

Federal government

Bundestag

§

A difficult counterpart

58


namely issuing statutory instruments and general administrative reg-ulations, as the majority of these provisions can only be adopted withBundesrat consent. As the Bundestag is only very rarely consultedon these matters, government activity here is subject to scrutinyexclusively by the Bundesrat, representing the federal states.

Generally speaking, it is fair to say that the Bundesrat constitutes amore difficult political counterpart for the Federal Government thanthe Bundestag does, for within the parliamentary system the majori-ty in the Bundestag determines which party or parties are in govern-ment and thus supports the government. In contrast, in the Bun-desrat it is entirely possible that different parties form a majority, andindeed that different viewpoints may influence decisions:

The party political mix in the Bundesrat and Bundestag may dif-fer, as the elections to the parliaments in the federal states, whichindirectly determine the composition of the Bundesrat, are held atdifferent times and frequently produce different outcomes thanelections to the Bundestag. In such situations the Federal Gov-ernment is then, as it were, confronted with an “opposition” in theBundesrat, which can take decisions as a majority in that body,rather than being limited to mere opposition.

The members of the Bundesrat, particularly the Minister-Presidentsas “princes in the federal states” may retain a particular degree ofindependence stemming from their personalities and the trustexpressed by their electorate. That means they may well pursuepolicies that are not determined by party political considerations.

Decisions taken by the Bundesrat are informed by political andadministrative experience gleaned on the spot.

The Federal Government must also pay attention to the need toensure respect for the “interests of the federal states”, the Bun-desrat’s principal role.

Counterweight involved in rectifying Bundestag decisionsThe Basic Law provides that two legislative bodies shall be respon-sible for federal legislation. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat arehowever not accorded an entirely equal status. The degree of Bun-desrat “participation” varies depending on the type of legislation.

In the case of consent bills, the Bundesrat’s corrective role is imme-diately apparent, but it also plays a part, albeit to a lesser extent,when it comes to objection bills. The Bundesrat may introduce newor additional arguments and decisions into legislation; if need be, itmay also prevent the passage of specific bills. However it is not theoption of saying “no” and generating conflict that takes centre-stage;the focus is on the possibility of concurring through a “yes” vote andreaching a compromise.

The Bundesrat certainly does not simply rubber-stamp decisions, butnor would it be fair to reproach it with being awkward and tending tosay “no”. There are always differences of opinion and also tough dis-putes, but the main focus is on striving to reach sound, fact-basedsolutions to the problems considered. Such efforts are part-and-par-cel of politics in a democracy; indeed, far from undermining theimportance of the Bundesrat’s corrective role, these efforts are thehallmark of that role:

Bundesrat participation in legislation is a manifestation of power-sharing and the checks-and-balances built into the federal system.In its capacity as the representative of the federal states, the Bun-desrat is responsible for ensuring the interests of the whole feder-ation are respected. Drawing on the federal states’ administrativeexperience in enforcing legislation, the Bundesrat can furthermoreplay a key role in ensuring top-quality, practicable federal bills.

Participation obliges the Bundestag and the Bundesrat to weighup the pros and cons of measures and strike the right balance, aswell as compelling them to exercise restraint and moderation. It iscertainly positive if this helps to avoid excesses in the substanceof decisions – but it is disadvantageous if compromises are basedon the lowest common denominator, blurring all political contoursbeyond recognition.

59


Participation

Participation enables broad majorities, right down to the level ofthe federal states and thus contributes to good relations withinthe country.

Participation signifies continuity and stability, if the right balancecan be struck and a broad majority attained, for then the resultsof elections do not lead to a radical change of course even in anage when there is almost a balance between the political camps.

Much of the Bundesrat’s political significance derives from the sig-nificant role it plays in shaping the Federation’s legislative frame-work, for the Bundesrat is not restricted to a purely advisory role.This role means the Bundesrat enjoys a strong position in relationswith the Bundestag and within the overall constitutional structure.

Of course, the way in which spheres of activity are divided betweenthe tiers of state can also trigger frictions and political tensions, justlike the overall system of division of powers. Election campaigns inparticular may heighten such tensions, causing stinging debates.Taking stock however, the system turns out on the whole to be pos-itive, if one does not overemphasise the kind of exceptional situa-tion described above; it is also important to bear in mind that unusu-al or sensational events attract more media attention than ifeverything is smoothly taking its normal course. In relationsbetween the Bundestag and the Bundesrat very few conflictsremain unresolved, and almost all the compromises attained aresatisfactory for both assemblies.

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Political friction

Sharing in decisions


“In the Bundesrat Germany has an instrument well-suitedto handling even major social challenges. This is demon-strated by the way in which the new federal states havebeen integrated, the solidarity shown in supporting the pro-found transformation processes in these federal states …”

Prof.Dr. WolfgangBöhmer, President of the Bundesrat(2002/03)

61

Link between the Federation and the federal statesThe Bundesrat is not just a counterweight to the Bundestag and theFederal Government, but at the same time also constitutes a linkbetween the Federation and the federal states. It represents both thestate as a whole (the Federation) as well as the constituent memberstates (the 16 Länder).

The Bundesrat is on the one hand the federative constitutional body inthe Federation through which the Länder, as constituent states, canparticipate directly in formulating the Federation’s political objectivesand thus contribute to crafting policy for the entire country. On theother hand, through the Bundesrat the Federation can drawn on thepolitical and administrative experience of the federal states and, withBundesrat consent, can extend the impact of its actions to their terri-tories via bills, statutory instruments, general administrative regulationsand indirectly through European Union legislation.

In other words, the Bundesrat is both the body that represents the fed-eral states to the Federation and the body that represents the Feder-ation to the federal states. This “mediator role” is particularly importantgiven the close interlinking between the competences of the Federa-tion and the federal states, which are much more closely intermingledthan, for example, in the USA. The Bundesrat must defend the inter-ests of the individual federal states, whilst at the same time also bear-ing in mind the needs of the state as a whole. All politicians involvedin Bundesrat decisions must consider the interests of the Federationhand-in-hand with the interests of the Länder, and can never appraisethe interests of the federal states without also being aware of the inter-ests of the state in its entirety. Through the Bundesrat as a federalbody made up of the Länder governments, the individual federal statesare closely integrated into the political commissions and omissions ofthe state as a whole. The federal states do not simply receive ordersbut instead share in the decision-making process.

Building on a sound tradition – forerunners of the BundesratThe Bundesrat is not an innovation dreamt up in the Basic Law. Onthe contrary, it was preceded by a whole host of institutions withmembership structures and mandates that were either identical or atleast very similar to the modern Bundesrat.

The Regensburg Perpetual Imperial Diet (1663–1806) of the HolyRoman Empire of the German Nation and the Frankfurt Federal Dietof the German Confederation, set up at the 1815 Congress of Vien-na, might even be counted as forerunners of the Bundesrat, albeitwith certain caveats.

The Federal Council of the 1871 German Empire was a true prede-cessor of the Bundesrat and was a key component in the constitu-tional order. Alongside the emperor, it was the supreme body of theReich. Every member of the federation could send “delegates” to theFederal Council corresponding to the number of votes it had there,which was calculated on the basis of the number of inhabitants. Asis the case in the Bundesrat today, each of the constituent states hadto cast its votes en bloc. The Federal Council had much greater pow-ers and responsibilities, along with more opportunities to influencepolicy, than was the case for the Reichstag, which represented thepeople. The Federal Council could even dissolve the Reich Parlia-ment if the emperor agreed.

The constitution of the Weimar Republic, established in 1919, wasbased on the sovereignty of the people. The Reichstag (the lowerhouse of the parliament), which was the state body that representedthe people, acquired greater political significance as a result. Scopefor the Reichsrat (the upper house of the parliament) to participate inthe legislative process was restricted. It could only object to billsadopted by the Reichstag, but the Reichstag was entitled to rejectthese objections with a two-thirds majority. In such cases the Presi-dent of the Republic decided whether to promulgate the bill with nofurther ado or to rule that a referendum should be held on the legislation.

On 14th February 1934 the Reichsrat was dissolved by a govern-ment decree based on the 1933 Enabling Act. Prior to this, the sov-

Federal Council of the German Empire

The Reichsrat of the Weimar Republic

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63


Meeting of the FederalCouncil in 1877. Otto von Bismarck,Chancellor of the German Empire, isspeaking (standing at the table).

ereign rights of the federal states had already been transferred to theReich, the federal state parliaments had been dissolved and the gov-ernments of the Länder had been placed under the control of theReich government.

In the wake of the total collapse of Hitler’s dictatorship, the Parlia-mentary Council drew the logical consequences from the catastro-phe when it drafted the Basic Law. That is why federalism is anessential aspect of the state system in Germany, which has been inforce throughout the whole country since 3rd October 1990. In thissystem the Bundesrat, the federative constitutional body at the fed-eral level, should be understood as an institution that has evolvedover the course of history, and has been shaped by the genesis ofthe German nation-state and the ensuing practical implementation ofthe principle of democracy. The main hallmarks of the Bundesrat areimbued with “constitutional DNA”, setting it firmly in a tradition thatlinks it to its two predecessors:

Constitutional body of the Federation (of the Reich),

Composed of representatives from the federal states’ govern-ments,

Staggered number of votes for the federal states,

Votes are cast en bloc by each federal state on the basis ofinstructions from the Land government, and

Powers and responsibilities pertaining to both legislation andadministration of the state as a whole.

The Basic Law ascribed a powerful position to the Bundesrat – it isweaker than the Federal Council in the 1871 German Empire, yetstronger than the Reich Council in the Weimar Republic.

The Bundesrat’s overview of legislative activities

481

29

301

559

75

70

545

42%

8

1

–

426

110

116

761

331

434

16

414

518

65

59

510

50%

6

1

1

579

66

69

604

283

391

5

207

428

49

46

424

56%

–

3

1

471

58

24

54

475

243

370

8

245

429

39

34

425

53%

3

–

–

550

72

478

50

443

262

414

14

225

461

39

34

453

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2

–

–

525

62

826

56

545

258

350

27

171

334

33

31

333

52%

1

1

1

471

60

759

43

384

266

470

75

136

516

104

96

506

53%

8

5

4

680

81

1017

55

523

297

323

53

111

354

77

69

339

54%

9

7

5

554

78

660

51

503

293

155

38

58

139

20

17

136

52%

2

7

6

298

45

405

28

289

147

283

61

183

320

6

6

320

60%

–

–

–

448

71

634

52

541

287

324

51

227

369

13

13

366

55%

1

1

1

546

61

769

53

593

395

3

413

108

297

507

85

71

493

57%

9

5

4

639

47

783

51

794

344

4

443

147

329

565

92

74

551

60%

10

13

12

619

69

746

54

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199

1

446

95

328

558

77

66

543

55%

7

5

2

504

58

604

50

683

160

1

1949

–53

1953

–57

2.1.19

57–61

3.. 19

61–65

4.. 19

65–69

5... 19

69–72

6.19

72–76

7.19

76–80

8.1980–83

9.19

83–87

10.19

87–90

11. 19

90–94

12.19

94–98

1998

–2002

13. 14.

Bundestag’s term of office

Draft bills fromfederal government

Draft bills from Bundesrat

Draft bills from Bundestag

Bills passed by Bundestag

Referrals toMediation Committee (MC)

Referrals to MC by the Bundesrat

Bills promulgated

Consent bills promulgated

Bills not adopted as Bundesrat consent denied

Objections

Objections overridden by the Bundestag

Statutory instrumentsdealt with by the Bundesrat

Administrative regulations dealt with by the Bundesrat

European Community/Union legislation

Plenary sessions

Committee meetings

Sub-committee meetings

Meetings of the Chamber of European Affairs


353

116

211

401

102

90

385

51%

5

22

22

436

30

511

35

480

83

–

2002

–200

5

15.

bundesrat and bundesstaat

Documents

federal body

federal government

federal stateshttp

bundesrat draft bills

central federal level

germanys federal system

bundesratthe bundesrat

individual federal states