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TRANSCRIPT
An Actor Manages: Actor Training and Managerial Ideology
Dr Broderick D.V. ChowLecturer in Theatre Brunel University LondonKingston Lane, Uxbridge, UB8 [email protected]
Introduction
What is an actor’s work? Is it the process of creating and presenting
a character? Or is it the business of managing a career? While the
former attracts people to the business, the latter is essential. As
Michael Simkins (2013) in the Guardian estimates, 92% of actors in
Britain are out of work at any one time. The precarious nature of the
business therefore means that actors must combine the
unremunerated labour of auditions, promotional material and
managing finances with one or more non-acting based jobs – often
casual or part-time and flexible enough to allow time off for
auditions – as well as creating showcase pieces and their own work
during those fallow times when an actor is euphemistically said to
be ‘resting.’ The business of acting is often set in opposition to the
actor’s ‘craft’, a term that resonates with philosopher Richard
Sennett’s conceptualization of craftsmanship as undivided skill and
attention for its own sake. ‘Working on my craft’ was how I justified
handing over 300 Canadian dollars for eight weeks of scene-study
classes while a working (and resting) actor in Vancouver. Though
nearly all of us in the class had already completed training at a
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university or drama school, it was understood that working on one’s
craft was a lifelong process. Eventually, the glorious moments in
scene studies of the American greats became the thing itself, far
superior to any job. In an industry nicknamed ‘Hollywood North’,
dominated by commercials and two lines as a cop on Smallville, it
could sometimes seem like the acting in class, not the stuff out in
the industry, was real acting.
In this article I will argue that the business of acting and its creative
craft are two sides of the same coin. Psychologically-based actor
training stems from an ideology of individual self-management –
mental, physical, and emotional – that accompanies the emergent
practice of management in the twentieth century. By reading the
theories and techniques of Stanislavskian and post-Stanislavskian
actor training against changes in the organization of work in North
America and Europe in the 20th century, I outline a citational
network between discourses of acting and business management. I
analyze three stages in the development of organizational
management – Taylorism, Management by Objectives, and Human
Resources Management – leading to the current moment of the
‘new economy’ where a rhetoric of the ‘creative industries’
dominates, which I suggest is a culmination of nascent ideological
tendencies. The three earlier stages of organizational management
are an instrumentalisation of tacit knowledge that resembles the
development of Stanislavsky-based actor training. Acting and
2
organizational management brought an increased focus to emotion,
empathy, and social relations and how these could be produced,
maintained, and instrumentalized by waged labour. 1 Systematic
actor training (Jonathan Chambers’ term for derivations of
Stanislavsky’s ‘System’) reaches its apotheosis of usefulness in our
current historical situation of ‘precarity’ in which the worker no
longer has recourse to forms of structure and security enjoyed
under Fordism and must self-manage – a role that the actor has long
prefigured.
My method follows Jon McKenzie’s study of ‘performance’ in Perform
or Else. Drawing together three discursive fields – cultural
performance, organizational performance, and high-performance
technology – McKenzie identifies three interlinked principles:
efficacy, efficiency, and effectiveness. In this citational network,
performance is concerned with whether or not something ‘works.’
Performance is a generalized principle applied to both the
functioning of a copper wire and a human being in everyday life,
and is therefore a normative and even terrorizing ‘mode of power
and knowledge’ (McKenzie 2001: 164). Here, I develop upon
McKenzie’s reading together of cultural performance and
organizational management to argue that the discursive
resemblance between actor training and management theory
1 Empathy, within the theatre, can refer to both the actor and the spectator’s identification with the character. Within the literature of management, however, we see that this human process can be mobilized to industrial ends.
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represents an ideological imperative to ‘act the part.’ This
imperative demands that one identifies with one’s job on a personal,
emotional, and even spiritual level. By thinking critically across
fields I hope to raise difficult questions regarding creative labour in
today’s precarious labour economy.
Bits and Objectives: Scientific Management and the Detailed
Division of Labour
Since the 1990s many governments have turned to the ‘creative
industries’ as a key player in the ‘new economy.’ The UK
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) was influential,
bundling together a number of industries including advertising,
publishing, and (together with music and visual arts) the performing
arts, as the ‘creative industries’ (DCMS 2001). The creative
industries, Kate Oakley (2004) points out, bear a heavy burden,
charged with the revival of entire cities and communities without
sufficient evidence that they are up to the task. Justin O’Connor
(2012), in an extended critical review of Terry Flew’s The Creative
Industries (2011), points out that what began as a policy to secure
more funding for culture was uncritically expanded as a way of
redefining other forms of work. Within this ‘creative industries’
ideology, ‘creativity’ takes on a dual meaning. On the one hand, it is
mainly associated with what we tend to think of as ‘artistic’ labour.
On the other hand, today, creativity is also thought of as a general
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feature of work, artistic or not. In this vein is Chris Bilton’s work on
‘creative management’ (2006, 2010), which aims to manage and
nurture innovation, while negotiating uncertainty. But adopting the
rhetoric of creativity also risks adopting creative labour’s precarious
conditions and a high-level of personal and emotional investment in
one’s labour (see Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2009, 2011; McRobbie
2002).
While theatre is only one of a series of creative industries today, the
‘actor’ is the figure that haunts the history of management.
Management increasingly resembles the acting labour of the
Western modern theatre, in which actors create characters with
believable psychological interiority. My argument focuses on
Stanislavsky’s system and subsequent adaptations, which remain a
backbone of most training regimes in the English-speaking theatre,
though they are by no means the only forms practiced today in
conservatoires or universities.
Alison Hodge notes that actor training is a phenomenon of the
modern, director-led theatre, which resulted in ‘a more objective
examination of the nature of the actor’s work’ (2000: 2). As well as
being motivated by these shifts in the European theatre, Konstantin
Stanislavsky’s experiments also determined the shape of the
theatre industry to come by systematizing and professionalizing the
actor’s work. His experiments at the Moscow Art Theatre (MXT) in
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the early 1900s correspond with practices at the beginnings of
modern organizational management, which were taking place in
America a decade or so earlier, specifically Frederick Winslow
Taylor’s development of the paradigm of Scientific Management,
commonly known as Taylorism. Taylor argued that managers must
gather knowledge of the entire production process in order to divide
the process into tasks for the worker (hence, as the political
economist Harry Braverman points out, the huge expansion from
1890s to 1950s of degrees in engineering). Scientific management
separates ‘conception’ from ‘execution’, as managers assume a
‘monopoly over knowledge’ (Braverman 1974: 113). A ‘task-based’
management theory, Scientific Management parallels other
performance practices. As a number of scholars have argued,
Vsevolod Meyerhold’s system of biomechanics was directly inspired
by Taylorism’s Soviet adaptation while also ‘humanising’ it (Pitches
2003; Evans 2009). What has not been acknowledged, however, are
the parallels between Taylor’s work and Stanislavsky’s. These are
not similarities in terms of specific practices so much as ideological
similarities; a drive to systematize and rationalize embodied
knowledge.
A ‘craft’ is a skill or process that an individual performs, whether the
portrayal of a character or repair of an engine. Craft is what
Scientific Management seeks to break down. Dividing a process
among several workers (what Braverman calls a ‘detailed division of
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labour’) directly benefits the capitalist in terms of economy and
control. As labour is the source of surplus value, and the
accumulation of value the driver of capitalism, the capitalist is
driven to economize on the overall wage bill by dividing a process
into tasks. The capitalist can then pay lesser-skilled workers less
money to perform the easier tasks, whereas the minimum pay of
the worker who performed all operations of the process would be by
default the highest pay for the most difficult task (Braverman 1974:
77-80). This economizing creates greater output for less input, and
improves the efficiency of production processes (as in Henry Ford’s
assembly line). At the same time, separating planning from doing
further alienates the worker from the products of his/her labour. The
designation ‘Scientific’, therefore, is not neutral, but ideological – it
naturalizes the imperative of maximizing surplus value, regardless
of the human cost.
The destruction of traditional craftsmanship entrenched class
divisions (Braverman 1974). By concentrating ‘knowledge’ in the
minds of managers, a workforce of laborers with specialist
knowledge became unnecessary; a process Braverman calls
‘deskilling.’ By ‘destroying the craft as a process under the control
of the worker’, Braverman writes, ‘[the capitalist] reconstitutes it as
a process under his own control. He can now count his gains in a
double sense, not only in productivity but in management control,
since that which mortally injures the worker is in this case
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advantageous to him.’ (1974: 78).Therefore, Scientific Management
represents the destruction of embodied knowledge and a division of
knowledge between the head and the hand. Management (despite
the etymological link to the Latin manus, or hand) is demarcated as
an intellectual exercise – the head can understand what was
previously known by hand.
The detailed division of labour does not seem immediately
applicable to the creation of individual, singular characters – while a
director could economize by dividing up Keira Knightley’s
performance to forty-four child laborers – she is probably not going
to. But both Taylor’s practices at the Midvale Steel Works in the
1880-90s and Stanislavsky’s practices at the Moscow Art Theatre a
decade later attempted to capture knowledge that was at first
glance tacit, embodied, natural, and mercurial, in the form of
method – understandable, transmissible. When embodied or
intuitive practices are broken down, whether they are the
mechanic’s craft or the actor’s work, they can be understood and
perfected. Both Taylor and Stanislavsky were outsiders to closed,
guild-like practices. Taylor’s apprenticeship in the factory was, as
Braverman points out, an act of youthful rebellion against his
wealthy father; Stanislavsky was an amateur actor, who, as his
biographer Jean Benedetti notes, was pretty bad at acting. In
Stanislavsky’s case, having viewed foreign actors such as Eleonora
Duse and Tommasso Salvini in Moscow, he sought to capture what
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his biographer Jean Benedetti describes as the ‘ease, naturalness
and flow of the actor of genius’ (2000: 3) by means of a method.
Unlike the factory worker, the actor does not simply carry out the
tasks set by a director but engages herself in a complex process of
planning. The emphasis on planning is at the heart of Stanislavsky’s
system and was, in some ways, a theatrical revolution. Compare the
1896 staging of Chekhov’s The Seagull with the MXT’s fabled
production two years later. In the first, Sharon Carnicke argues,
actors would learn their parts on their own, and meet for ‘a few’
rehearsals; in the latter, Stanislavsky’s actors ‘put eighty hours of
work into thirty-three rehearsals’ (Carnicke 2000: 12). The labour of
the actor shifts behind the closed doors of the rehearsal room, with
the actor analyzing the play and dividing it into a ‘score’ of actions.
‘If our preparatory work is right’, Stanislavsky wrote, ‘the results will
take care of themselves’ (Stanislavsky qtd. in Carnicke 2000: 25).
Reading Stanislavsky through Taylorism, the actor is both a
manager who plans a series of actions, and a worker who executes
them.
The Stanislavsky ‘event’ transformed the modern theatre, most
would say, for the better. By systematizing the ‘nature’ of the
actor’s creativity, Stanislavsky inspired a century of Western actor
training and democratized the profession. The MXT and its ensemble
mode of working replaced the Russian theatre’s star system,
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meaning anyone, in theory, could learn to be an actor. But it is
tempting to see this moment of the actor’s autonomy as the
beginning of the profession’s precaritization.
In the next phase of management the skills of the actor enter into
the remit of the manager. What Taylor overlooked was the role
emotion played in organizations and workplaces. Taylorism’s
monopoly on planning degraded the worker’s psychological and
emotional wellbeing – to maintain productivity management would
also need to mediate antagonisms brought on by the degradation of
skilled labour. Management theorists from the 1930s onwards
would address this oversight, including the focus of the next
section, Peter F. Drucker.
Performing (Self) Control: Managerial Ideology and Labour as
Dressage
Managers hold control and power, but they are not the same as
owners. In the early phases of industrial capitalism, this lack of
(literal) ownership was viewed as a problem. Adam Smith, in The
Wealth of Nations, worried that because directors of ‘joint-stock
companies’ were managers of other people’s capital, they would not
employ the same vigilance as if it were their own (1776, in Fournier
and Grey 2000: 8). The manager is therefore a median figure that
requires its own role and corresponding ideology to justify its
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existence. Willard Enteman calls this ideology managerialism: an
ideology in which ‘the fundamental social unit is neither individuals
nor the state, but organizations’ (1993: 154). Managerialism views
the individual as a rational actor, who can nevertheless sacrifice
his/her own self-interest for the team. Following an Althusserian
reading of ideology, however, we know that ideology is not merely a
matter of personal worldview. In his most famous essay, Louis
Althusser writes that when an individual is ‘hailed’ on the street by a
police officer, and turns around, the ‘mere one-hundred-and-eighty-
degree physical conversion’ interpellates him as a subject: ‘Because
he has recognized that the hail was “really” addressed to him, and
that “it was really him who was hailed”’ (Althusser 1971: 48).
Paraphrasing religious philosopher Blaise Pascal – ‘Kneel down,
move your lips in prayer, and you will believe’ (1971: 42) – Althusser
notes the way ideology is not embedded in a subject’s beliefs, but
his/her practices, or, perhaps, performances. Managerialism
therefore is both an ideology of organizations, and the practice by
which the individual affirms or performs his/her commitment to an
organization. Therefore, the practice of management lies at the
intersection of organization, performance, and emotional
investment.
The manager’s labour is not directly productive, in that it does not
directly create use values. Instead, the manager indirectly improves
productivity and organizational performance (i.e. efficiency),
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extracting as much surplus value from the worker as possible. One
of the earliest management theorists, Henri Fayol, noted that ‘Whilst
the other functions [of the organization] bring into play material and
machines, the managerial function operates only on the personnel’
(1916[1971]: 181). Fayol’s principles branch out from the division of
labour to more intersubjective principles (known as ‘soft skills’ in
today’s MBA programmes) such as ‘Initiative’, ‘Esprit de corps’, and
‘Discipline.’
The substance of a manager’s labour is already ‘performance’,
therefore, in two senses (which, according to McKenzie, are
intertwined). A manager is responsible for the quality performance
of an organization, and to ensure this is required to perform a
certain way. Contra McKenzie, performance has not replaced
discipline, rather, the manager performs discipline. Jackson and
Carter, drawing on Foucault, call this ‘labour as dressage’: ‘non-
productive, non-utilitarian and unnatural behaviour for the
satisfaction of the controller and as a public display of compliance,
obedience to discipline’ (1998: 54). Dressage means both
‘discipline’ and ‘taming’, but it also refers to the show of
performance of a disciplined and tamed horse. The only function of
labour as dressage is to demonstrate or show compliance2.
2 The question of course becomes: ‘who is the audience for this show’ of compliance? Slovenian philosopher Slavoj Žižek’s body of work from 1989 onwards would answer: The Big Other – the network of socio-symbolic rules that guarantees our intersubjectivity, but crucially, doesn’t really exist.
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Here we can return to Adam Smith’s quandary: why would a middle-
ranked employee agree to this performance of compliance (without
a stake in ownership)? Precisely because managerialism provides a
role to inhabit. This is a mechanism of ideological interpellation akin
to Stanislavsky’s holistic approach to character. The manager’s role
is best explored through the work of Peter F. Drucker, the Austrian-
born theorist of management, and one of the first to try to define
the ‘function’ of the manager. Despite at times being incorrect in his
predictions, Drucker remains a benchmark for organizational theory,
bringing together Scientific Management with an interest in human
behaviour.3
Drucker recognized that Scientific Management’s exclusive concern
with productivity meant it was poorly placed to address the problem
of worker motivation. A purely Taylorist organization diminished
worker flexibility and adaptability, and increased resistance to
change: ‘[Scientific Management] knows how to organize the
present job for maximum output but only by seriously impairing
output in the worker’s next job’ (1977: 232). Denying the human
dimension of management hindered economic performance. In this
way, his theories brought Taylorism together with Elton Mayo’s
human relations movement, which ‘recognized that the social-
psychological climate of an enterprise is as much a factor in
3 In the 1970s, Drucker argued that the United States was seeing the retrenchment of corporate power. Naïvely, he suggested that top CEOs would no longer be household names, an idea that Bill Gates, Jeff Bezos, Rupert Murdoch, and many others have since belied.
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productivity as technical capability’ (Locke 1996: 24). Drucker’s
innovation is known as ‘management by objectives’ or MBO. MBO
sets goals for an organization and distributes these goals in
objectives to be accomplished by individual workers or teams. What
is distinctive about MBO, however, is that objectives cannot stand
on their own as singular tasks, but must be integrated into a ‘job.’
‘The human being does individual motions poorly’, Drucker writes,
but a job, allows the worker to invest in his/her work personally or
emotionally (Drucker 1977: 230). A human is not a tool, Drucker
argued. Therefore, management must make use of a worker’s ‘will,
personality, emotions, appetites and soul.’ (1977: 230).
Drucker gave little advice on ‘soft-skills’, leaving this task to be
taught in business schools. His concern was more structural than
psychological. However, his management theory points to an
important feature of the ideology of managerialism: the
instrumentalisation of emotion. In his seminal text The Practice of
Management, Drucker gives a surprising insight: rather than
instructing readers on how to manage others through manipulation
or guile, Drucker suggests that the manager’s first object should be
his or her self. He writes: ‘The greatest advantage of management
by objectives is perhaps that it makes it possible for a manager to
control his own performance. Self-control means stronger
motivation’ (1955: 112). The desires of the manager must become
consonant with the goals of the organization – they must take on
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the objectives for themselves. A manager who is managed by self-
control and objectives ‘acts not because somebody wants him to but
because he himself decides that he has to – he acts, in other words,
as a free man’ (1955: 117) – in other words, he has to want it.
It is easy to see the parallels between MBO and Stanislavsky’s
System of bits and objectives. Both actors and managers begin their
planning by identifying a ‘super-objective’ of sorts, and devising
smaller objectives that lead to this overall goal. Here, the new
paradigm of actor training seems to influence management: while
Taylor prefigured Stanislavsky’s analysis of the text into action, MBO
draws on Stanislavsky’s mobilization of human desire through the
analysis of the text in terms of character objectives. While desire is
utilized in Stanislavsky’s system to creative and artistic ends, and in
Drucker’s system to improve the firm’s efficiency, ultimately, the
result is the same: desire becomes part of a new form of labour that
is utilized in production, whether this production is theatrical,
physical, or cognitive/immaterial. In other words, since Drucker
demands not only the manager’s intellect but also her desire, by
performing her compliance with the norms and desires of the
corporation this new manager is doing the labour of the actor. In a
way, Drucker addressed the alienation of the work in the Fordist
factory. But his work led to a different kind of alienation – the
alienation of the emotions, and of the self. Today, this alienation is
so characteristic of modern work it often goes unnoticed. Jackson
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and Carter write that today it is: ‘[…] considered inadequate simply
to work but required that when one worked one should self-actualize
[…] we are required to be empowered’ (1998: 59). Tony J. Watson’s
ethnographic research with managers notes that managers use
‘self-concepts’ and discursive formations such as ‘the sort of person
I am’ (1997: 150) in order to identify with the organization. In social
psychology this is called ‘identity work’, a performative and
discursive construction of the self. The job of the manager is not
only to make the employee or colleague believe in the organization
but to make oneself believe. Only in this way can the manager
‘make clear to the world that there is no division between the
manager as a human being and the manager as a functionary’
(Watson 1997: 150).
Emotion as Material: Strasberg and Carnegie
The increasing emphasis in management theory on the
management of one’s self in order to create favourable interactions
with others accompanied the shift in the economies of the West
from the manufacture of goods to the renting of intellectual
property and accumulation of surplus value through brands and
symbolic capital. Drucker predicted this shift by conceiving of the
‘knowledge worker’ and the Italian autonomist philosopher Maurizio
Lazzarato (1996) uses the term ‘immaterial labour’ to describe
these new forms of work. But while immaterial labour does not
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produce material commodities of the sort analysed in chapter one of
Das Kapital, such as coats or chairs, its practice certainly involves a
familiar material: the body and its affective and emotional
capacities.
Lee Strasberg, Stanislavsky’s disciple and the originator of what is
today known as American Method Acting, understood that ‘emotion’,
or ‘feeling’ was a material that could be worked on and disciplined.
Strasberg studied at the American Laboratory Theatre under the
tutelage of Maria Ouspenskaya and Richard Boleslavsky, both
students of Stanislavsky at the Moscow Art Theatre. As artistic
director of the Actor’s Studio, which trained numerous American
actors including Paul Newman, Dustin Hoffman, Anne Bancroft and
Sally Field, Strasberg has had enormous influence on American
acting. The radical departure in Strasberg’s training was ‘the
Method actor’s uncompromising search for “truth” and
“authenticity”’ (Counsell 1996: 53). Strasberg stressed the use of
‘affective memory’ (sometimes incorrectly known as ‘emotional
memory’), that is, evoking a specific emotion within the given
circumstances of the dramatic text by remembering a
corresponding feeling from the actor’s own past. All artists, he
argues, use their sensual memories of previous experiences, but
only actors must do so ‘in the presence of the audience at a
particular time and place’ (1988: 116). This is a fundamental
transformation to our approach to truth and sincerity. The System
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and the Method are means of disciplining and manufacturing
spontaneous emotion, but this is not the same as pretending. No, in
fact, both the System and the Method emphasise the ‘truth’ of the
moment, and this discourse is not limited to theatre professionals;
‘emotional truth’ and ‘believability’ are frequent (empty) clichés in
the evaluation of actors’ performances by the general public.
The idea that genuine emotion can be instrumentally manufactured
radically elides false and true, and parallels other ideological
changes. While Strasberg was formulating his Method with the
Group Theatre, Dale Carnegie, a former actor turned self-help
lecturer and entrepreneur, published How to Win Friends and
Influence People. He provides advice on interpersonal
communication and leadership, illustrated with anecdotes in an
upbeat, folksy narrative voice. Chapters titles are Machiavellian:
‘How to Change People Without Giving Offense or Arousing
Resentment’, however, Carnegie does not advise using guile or
manipulation. Rather, his advice oscillates between self-interest and
sincerity. One must ‘arouse in the other person an eager want’
(1936: 69) and ‘talk in terms of the other person’s interests’ [in
order to get them to like you] (1936: 110). But at the same time,
you must actually mean it. Honesty and sincerity run through his
principles, for example: ‘Make the other person feel important
— and do it sincerely’ (1936: 121). Carnegie doesn’t resolve the
contradiction between authenticity and manipulation – he simply
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pretends it doesn’t exist. Both Carnegie and Strasberg effectively
give the same advice: don’t deceive, but engage in a careful
process of feeling management.
William Whyte’s The Organization Man (1957)[2002], an
ethnographic study based on interviews with top American CEOs,
shows feeling management in action: ‘the calm eye that never
strays from the other’s gaze, the easy, controlled laughter, the
whole demeanour that tells onlookers that here is certainly a man
without neurosis and inner rumblings’ (Whyte 1957[2002]: 155-6).
Organization Man ‘must not only accept control, he must accept it
as if he liked it’ (Whyte 1957[2002]: 151, my emphasis). This is not
the same as deceit. It is wilful self-deception. Whyte’s ‘as if’ reminds
us of Stanislavsky’s ‘magic If.’ Stanislavsky’s fictional surrogate, the
acting teacher Tortsov, tells his students: “‘In this process the magic
“if” and Given Circumstances, when they are properly understood,
help you to feel and to create theatrical truth and belief onstage. So
in life there is truth, what is, what exists, what people really know.
Onstage we call truth that which does not exist in reality but which
could happen’” (Stanislavsky 2008: 153). Grisha, a student,
challenges Tortsov by pointing out the contradiction between ‘truth’
and theatre’s fictional nature. In reply, Tortsov tells Grisha: ‘“Decide
what is more interesting, more important to you, what it is you want
to believe, that the material world of facts and events exists in the
theatre and in the play, or that it is the feeling which is born in the
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actor’s heart, stirred by a fiction, that is genuine and true?”’ (2008:
154). Feelings, in other words, are ‘true’, because they arise from
the actor’s self. But this truth can be manipulated through a process
of ‘justification’ in reference to the Given Circumstances; this
creative work ‘“satisf[ies] your sense of truth and your belief in the
genuineness of your experiencing”’ (2008: 154). Transposed to the
corporate world, this passage takes on a different cast. As in the
world of a play, the Given Circumstances of the corporation are
largely out of the actor’s control. Unlike a play, the actor’s work of
generating true feeling becomes a means for the manager to submit
freely to control.4
Acting styles are never neutral, but reflect and refract ideologies
and larger social and historical changes. The discursive coincidence
between actor training and organizational management is not
metaphorical but quite actual. The two practices share techniques
and processes, which is demonstrated through the increasing
importance of ‘transferrable skills’ in the prospectus pages of
university drama courses. ‘Acting’ is not simply a useful metaphor
for understanding new forms of emotional and affective labour (cf.
Hochschild 1983). In fact, ‘the actor’ is a metonym for the alienation
of the self within work in the 20th century, and prefigures the ideal,
self-managed subject: the freelancer.4 Arlie Russell Hochschild notes this similarity in The Managed Heart, her study of ‘emotional labour’ in the service industries (specifically among flight attendants and debt collectors), making use of Stanislavsky’s theories to conceptualize her distinction between ‘surface’ (feigned) acting and ‘deep’ acting (1983[2003]: 37-38).
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Self-Management for Precarious Labour
Taylorism sought to separate planning from execution, while the
school of MBO supported by Drucker attempted to reintegrate
individual tasks into a ‘job’, which supported personal investment
and self-actualization. In the contemporary firm we see, in the words
of Alan McKinlay and Phil Taylor, an ‘emergence of a new language
of work [which] has been paralleled by the rise of teamworking, a
form of work organization in which groups of employees assume
responsibility for complete production processes, including
administrative and organizational functions’ (1998: 173, my
emphasis). This is a larger shift from a hierarchical, Fordist model, to
a more lateral model of (self) control. The single manager is no
longer solely responsible for ensuring performance. Rather, each
employee assumes a management function; they must all perform.
As suggested earlier, the creative industries drive this shift. Not only
are the creative industries seen as an ideal area of expansion within
the post-Fordist economy, they also provide a model for
organizational management. Thus, Robert Hewison, John Holden and
Samuel Jones engage with theatre practices in their study of the
RSC (2010), and their use of the ‘ensemble’ as both a rehearsal
practice and an organizational tool. More generally, Bilton (2006)
argues that management in itself is a creative act, facilitating the
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conditions for creativity and moving the concept away from the
Romantic idea of the individual artist to creativity within systems
and organizations. In one sense, collective creativity is a positive
thing, as are the increasing autonomy and possibilities for self-
actualization to be found within the collective. But within the new
economy, collectives are often arranged around specific projects,
constantly being restructured and rearranged. The value of the
creative collective should be questioned if it is not supported by
institutional structures that give it security and stability.
Hesmondhalgh and Baker argue that creative industries policy does
not take into account the specifics of artistic labour: ‘policies that
argue for a radical expansion of [the cultural industries] under
present conditions, without attention to the conditions of creative
labour, risks fuelling labour markets marked by irregular, insecure
and unprotected work’ (2009: 5). While the ‘individualization of
work’ (McRobbie 2002: 518) may be perceived as flexible and
exciting, it comes with the removal of forms of labour security
enjoyed under Fordism. Scholars in diverse disciplines have called
this precarity, a pervasive adoption of short- or fixed-term contracts,
zero-hour contracts, and billable freelancing. In an individualized
labour economy, success requires constant self-management: ‘what
individualization means sociologically is that people increasingly
have to become their own micro-structures, they have to do the
22
work of the structures by themselves, which in turn requires
intensive practices of self-monitoring’ (McRobbie 2002: 518).
Without conflating ‘acting’ with all artistic labour, nor suggesting
that actor training is responsible for today’s freelance economy, it is
striking that it prefigures one key area of this shift: self-exploitation.
McRobbie notes the very high level of self-exploitation in the
creative industries, due to a combination of passion and pleasure.
The rewards for creative labour are presented as ‘inherent’; one’s
work becomes reconceptualised as one’s craft. The ideologies
become intertwined: ‘self-exploitation’ also doubles as a description
of the actor’s work in Stanislavsky-derived actor training, which asks
the actor to work on her emotions, body, and spirit. In other words,
the positive, ‘actorly’ sense of self-exploitation as artistic mining of
the self becomes ambiguously folded in with McRobbie’s usage of
the term ‘self-exploitation’ as long hours, exhaustion, and low
remuneration. The training of the actor is also useful for what we
might call acting’s ‘externalities’, that is, the business of it all, in
which the self is packaged and sold in order to find (temporary)
employment. Aside from the minimal amount of time spent actually
‘on-the-job’, acting involves enormous periods of unremunerated
labour, or rather, labour that is paid for by the promise of eventual
remuneration. This includes those performances that never come to
be – auditions and castings, which involve reading from the sides,
but also, networking with casting directors, agents and producers.
23
Actors also self-manage their life-narratives and personal portfolios,
mining aspects of their personal history and image in order to
present a flexible but unique and hire-able self. In a typical audition,
an actor must ‘slate’ (USA/Canada) or do an ‘Ident’ (UK), stating
their name and agent, give ‘profiles’ (the casting equivalent of a
mug shot), and usually summarize themselves in a few pithy
sentences. At the same time as an actor is meant to mine their
inner self for emotional truth, they must also create an attractive
packaged self that can be sold. This, we should make no mistake, is
another form of labour, but it is not remunerated as such. Rather,
actors are happy to take it on. These externalities increasingly
resemble the work freelancers must do. But the insecurity and self-
exploitation of the job have long been accepted as part of the
actor’s lot. The actor is at the vanguard of the new economy.
Conclusion: Reviving the Naturalist Project
Our citational network between Stanislavsky-derived actor training
and organizational management is now complete. By comparing
similarities between features of practices I have looked for shared
ideologies. This process of ‘reading together’ draws attention to the
way in which positive aspects of one field (the liberation of the
actor’s creative potential, for example) may at the same time
support exploitative or damaging aspects in another. While my aim
has been primarily critical, having drawn attention to the ideological
24
overlaps between actor training and organizational management, a
number of possibilities for action emerge that could have positive
benefits both for actors as well as creative industries workers.
Firstly, by pointing to actor training’s overlap with the world of
business management, the citational network I have drawn
demystifies the craft and demands we consider acting labour as
labour. Without denying the ‘art’ of acting, a critique of actor’s
working conditions is essential at a time when the profession is
more precarious than ever. We might draw attention to the
discursive way in which unpaid labour is accepted and naturalized in
the profession (when Sanford Meisner calls line-learning and
substitution exercises ‘homework’ (1990), he blurs labour and
leisure). An investigation into unpaid or poorly paid working
conditions might have implications for arts funding policy as well as
Actor’s Equity guidelines.
Furthermore, Hesmondhalgh’s suggestion (2010) that creative
industries policy requires detailed empirical analysis of individual
creative industries should apply to the special case of acting. Actors
do not work in one creative industry, they work across many
(theatre, film, television, music, publishing, advertising), their
underemployment marking them out as what Marx calls an
‘industrial reserve army’ (Marx 1867[1976]: 784). Why actors would
accept these precarious conditions would best be ascertained
25
through empirical research, which might demonstrate the way
desire and passion are increasingly mobilized in the creative
industries as a means of control.
Finally, I agree with Jonathan Chambers’ call for more ‘historical
thinking’ in acting (Chambers 2010). Academic theatre
departments, by integrating practice and theory, are best placed to
lead here. Naturalism was intended to depict the human within the
larger social and historical forces that determine his being: this was
the aim of Zola, Ibsen, and Chekhov in the late 19th and early 20th
century, which was carried into Strasberg and Meisner’s work with
the Group Theatre in the 1930s, which staged Clifford Odets’
seminal piece of trade union theatre, Waiting for Lefty, in 1935. But
as Colin Counsell (1996) suggests, the process of creating realism
on the stage, as interpreted by Stanislavsky and his inheritors is
bound up in an ideology of bourgeois individualism. The notion of
‘realist drama’ is a historically and culturally constructed synthesis.
The root of drama is ‘action’, and ‘realism’ is meant to reflect life.
But life is not constant action in pursuit of objectives. Realist drama
therefore reflects life as defined by productivity, managerial
ideology at its purest. Perhaps by re-evaluating the ideology of
naturalism we might inject some ‘idleness’ into the theatre. Instead
of succumbing to the relentless drive of productivity, perhaps the
stage is the place where the actor might down tools, and go on
strike.
26
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