c4isr roadmap briefing

JAPCC Roadmap for Air C4ISR in NATO

Presenter

Presentation Notes

NOTES TO NATO AIR C4ISR ROADMAP BRIEFING Sir, it is great to have you back up here in Kalkar. Since your last visit in August we have been working the Roadmap hard to deliver a final product. In front of you is the Air C4ISR Roadmap Text document. Although longer than we initially expected we feel that it hits the target of the key Air C4ISR issues within NATO along with Gap analysis and Recommendations. It is ready for your stamp of approval. Likewise, I believe you will see we have met your expectations for the briefing. I know it comes in the 11th hour but this will be a lasting legacy with considerable strategic impact throughout all of NATO and its nations.

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Outline of Air C4ISR Roadmap

Introduction• Building the Roadmap• Goal: Network-Enabled Alliance

Strategy• Programmes• Force Development & Human Dimension

Today and Tomorrow• Ground Environment• Air & Space Environment

Gaps and Recommendations

Benefits





Benefits

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Building the Roadmap

• What is C4ISR?• Fragmented Air C2 structure• No C4ISR community • Intel isolated from S(TA)R community• Non-interoperable networks• No coherent C4ISR agenda • Deficiencies - FFT, FMV, RAP, Intel Analysts, Doctrine, Trg

Problem

DefinitionScope

Aim

Methodology

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What’s the problem? There are many! Definition - What is C4ISR? Fragmented NATO Air C2 structure No NATO C4ISR community Intel community is isolated from the S(TA)R community Non-interoperable networks No coherent Alliance C4ISR agenda Deficiencies - FFT, FMV, RAP, Int Analysts, Doctrine … Inter-Alliance training, certification and qualification

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ProblemScope

Aim

Methodology

C4ISR

‘The provision of information and intelligence to commanders that enables decision superiority necessary to execute the Commander’s Intent, along with the appropriate level of situational awareness, to the point of achieving the desired effect.’

JAPCC

Definition

Presenter

Presentation Notes

JAPCC’s definition of C4ISR ‘The provision of information and intelligence to commanders that enables decision superiority necessary to execute the Commander’s Intent, along with the appropriate level of situational awareness, to the point of achieving the desired effect.’

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Problem Aim

Methodology

Definition

This Roadmap concentrates on the Air C4ISR capabilities, both present and planned, looking out 10 years. It focuses on end-to-end Air C4ISR capabilities, from sensor to decision maker to effectors.

Scope

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Scope This Air C4ISR Roadmap concentrates on the Air C4ISR capabilities, both present and planned, looking out 10 years. It focuses on end-to-end Air C4ISR capabilities, from sensor to decision maker to effectors.

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Problem

Methodology

DefinitionScope

• To inform and influence warfighters, commanders, policy makers, and industry, supported by academia, in providing a description and common understanding of the NATO Air C4ISR landscape today and in the future.

• To target current programmes by identifying the gaps between the current capabilities and future capability requirements.

Aim

Presenter

Presentation Notes

AIMS To inform and influence warfighters, commanders, policy makers, and industry, supported by academia, in providing a description and common understanding of the NATO Air C4ISR landscape today and in the future. To target current programmes by identifying the gaps between the current capabilities and future capability requirements.

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Problem

DefinitionScope

Aim

• Director driven • Bottom-up approach• Angles of attack • Building blocks – C2, Comms, ISR, today, future• Document research• NATO & national programme research• Stakeholder consultation• Conferences, committees, working groups

Methodology

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Director driven – Talk about the success that Gen Hobbins had with the US Air C4ISR Roadmap and his intent to see that success to be realized in NATO Bottom-up approach – Little in the way of NATO C4ISR strategy, vision, guidance … therefore, start from scratch. Angles of Attack – Looking at C4ISR from many angles: Leadership, Organization, Systems perspective, Personnel, Doctrine, Operational. Building blocks – C2, Comms & Computer systems, ISR, today, future Document Research – NC3B documents, NATO guidance, ACT, ACO, NC3A, documents NATO & National programme research - Consultation with many stakeholders – ACT/C4I, ACO, CC Air Ramstein, NC3A, NAEW&C, C2 COE, ACCS Project Office, NACMA, NAPMA Conferences, committees, working groups – JISR ICDT, JTST WG, DFCIS WG, ACCS

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Goal: Network-Enabled Alliance

Alliance Network ConnectivityAlliance Network Connectivity

SharedInformation

SharedInformation

Fused Intelligence

Fused Intelligence

Joint Common Operating PictureJoint Common

Operating Picture

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Our Roadmap seeks to achieve an Air C4ISR vision of A fully interoperable joint network-centric NATO Air C4ISR capability that enables decision superiority to achieve the desired effect. To achieve this vision we must immediately work towards realizing the GOAL of a NETWORK-ENABLED ALLIANCE. So, how do we achieve this goal over the next 10 to 15 years? We have to create an environment within Air C4ISR where warfighters and commanders alike have the capability of Real Time Command and Control and Situation Awareness (due to a joint Common Operating Picture.) An environment must also exist where Network-Enabled Platforms and Weapons have the capability to share the correct information. Further, our Alliance Air C4ISR must the capability to sift through, determine what data is important and useful, and provide this as Fused Intelligence in an expeditious manner to enhance the Targeting process. Lastly, an Air C4ISR environment must exist which provides a robust capability for the Alliance to be Network Connected. It must be redundant, self-healing, self-forming, and impervious to attacks from those seeking to disrupting the Alliances goals and desires. What’s the goal or the target? A NATO Alliance that is Network Enabled to be able to achieve the intended effects. What are the capabilities needed to create this Network Enabled Alliance? Alliance Network Connectivity Joint Common Operating Picture Fused Intel Shared Information

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Benefits

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Air C4ISR Strategic Guidance (or lack of)

Bi-SC Strategic Vision: the Military Challenge

Military Committee Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance StrategyNC3B – NNEC Strategic Framework DocumentsACT – JISR Strategy & Capabilities Dev Campaign PlanBICES Agency Charter – Strategic GoalsBi-SC AIS Strategy 2005-2010

Bi-SC Strategic Vision: the Military Challenge

Military Committee Guidance for the Military Implementation of Alliance StrategyNC3B – NNEC Strategic Framework DocumentsACT – JISR Strategy & Capabilities Dev Campaign PlanBICES Agency Charter – Strategic GoalsBi-SC AIS Strategy 2005-2010

No overarching C4ISR strategy!

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Key message: Strategic management tells us that there’s one vision, and usually aligned strategies to accomplish that vision. In NATO, thankfully there’s one strategic vision, but many strategies (one for each agency and programme it seems) that may not be aligned to the vision – each agency seems to have its own strategic plan and possibly not aligned with the others. CLICK There is no overarching C4ISR Strategy!!!! Bi-SC Strategic Vision: the Military Challenge (Ref: ACT’s Draft Concept for JISR in Future Alliance Operations) The Strategic Vision see intelligence collection, analysis, dissemination and sharing as critical in reducing the decision time between recognizing a security risk and executing the desired course of action. NC3B – NNEC Strategic Framework Documents – Overarching guidance to develop NATO’s networking and information infrastructure (NII). These documents are NNEC Vision & Concept, NNEC Business Case, NNEC Roadmap, & Compendium of NNEC-Related Architectures. ACT – JISR Strategy & Capabilities Dev Campaign Plan dated 8 Apr 2005. POC is HQ SACT / FCRT BICES Agency Charter – Strategic Goals Bi-SC AIS Strategy 2005-2010 (Ref the Bi-SC AIS Implementation Plan dated 10 May 2007) NAC – CAFJO. Bi-SC Letter dated 20 Feb 2006

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Critical NATO Air C4ISR Enablers07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

ACCS / ALTBMDBiSC-AIS / Air C2ISE3AJoint TST

C2

NGCS EvolutionDF-CIS

NSP2K

EHF SATCOM

AGSINTEL FUSION CTRBICES

CWIDCNAD Trial Series / MAJIICSTEADFAST Series ExCOMBINED ENDEAVOR Ex

Tactical C2 IS Interoperability

Functional C2IS Interoperability Networked Battlespace EnablerBattle

Management

ACCS LOC 1 IOC

FOC−20M

Common Data Format

YEARYEAR

NMT IOC

NMT FOC

Mission Critical Requirements Key Requirements Developing Requirements

Deployed Reach Back

X-Band and Limited UHF

EHF: Increased Bandwidth

IEG

Limited Cap

IPv4 IPv6

NRF FOC DCIS

CJTF FOC DCIS

CJTF IOC DCIS

IOC

8 UAVs

Collection

SAR/MTIIOC FOC

IOC FOC Trend Analysis

NRF/C4I

NATO’s ISR

NATO’s CIS

NATO/PfP CIS

Steadfast Exercises

Imperial Hammer

Steadfast Cathode

Combined Endeavor

Better C2 & SAImproved TargetCharacterization

Shared Awareness Decision Superiority

CO

MM

SIS

RIn

tero

pera

bilit

yD

emon

stra

tions

EventsRisk LevelJoint Programme / Initiative Joint Utility

Warfighter EffectsWarfighter Effects

FOC Lower Layer FOC Real time TBM surveillance and engagementLower Layer

IOC

TrialQuest

FAST/JTS Integrated

10C−20M

Effective Intel

Effective Intel

Effective Comms - EoIP

Effective Depl Comms

Effective Engagement

Effective ISR

Presenter

Presentation Notes

EXPLANATION: This slide which may look somewhat complex but is actually quite simple when you break it down. The slide must be explained before going into the details. This slide paints the picture of the status of Critical NATO Air C4ISR Programmes from the present until roughly the 2021 timeframe. Down the left hand you will see 4 key areas that we emphasized: C2, Comms, ISR, and Interoperability Demonstrations. Along the bottom you see the descriptions of what the colors mean. Dark purple indicates a Joint Program/Initiative & Light purple is joint utility. NOTE: All Air C4ISR Programmes are joint in nature. Green, Yellow, and Red indicate the risk level. The diamond indicates an event is taking place. Also, along the bottom, you see the Warfighter Effects that these capabilities will deliver So, let’s first take a look at C2 programmes and see where they stand: ACCS, which provides your Tactical C2 Interoperability plans for LOC 1 to be come IOC in late 2009 with an FOC sometime in the 2011 timeframe. ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) ACCS Enhancements contract needed in 2007 to support 2010 Lower Layer IOC: A delay of any kind will affect IOC Bi-SC AIS--Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information System--provides your Functional Air C2 Information System but is at high risk due to both lack of operational involvement and money. Currently there is no operational engagement with NC3A where they are the project lead. This is something that needs to be fixed. The E-3A is undergoing a platform transformation with NATO Mid-Term upgrade. This is funded and will provide NATO with an Airborne Battle Management capability. The next milestone for the E-3A is 2011 which is the target date for realizing Mission Critical Requirements enabling a more robust NATO Networked Enabled Capability. JOINT TST: FAST/JTS ( flexible & advanced C2 Services for JTST and JTS is Joint Targeting system) is the NATO Joint TST Software Tool since Oct 2006. However right now its only in use in the Air environment (CAOCs) due to lack of ICC terminals for the services. FAST/JTS is a future requirement for ACCS. And through BI-SC AIS the FAST/JTS tool can be used in the joint environment. Evolvement into IOC/FOC is yet not on a timeline!! Communications has four key programmes: The Evolution of the NATO Ground Communication System, Deployable Force-Communication Information Systems, NATO SATCOM Post-2000, and Extremely High Frequency SATCOM. The NGCS is evolving over the next seven (7) years to connect NATO’s network to national networks through Information Exchange Gateways (IEGs). Regional Gateways (RGW) will be situated to optimize national access to the NATO network. The problem we have is that the US RGW is in Norfolk and for USAFE to talk to CC-Air Ramstein it is a requirement to go through Norfolk and compete with the rest of North America (CONUS and CAN) for bandwidth. Our preferred solution is to permit the US Forces Europe to access a RGW here in Europe enabling Assured Access and better bandwidth utilization Our SATCOM ground environment is inadequate to serve the needs of today’s mission. Deployable Force CIS is funded to deliver NRF SATCOM terminal and associated comms. Funding for the CJTF level SATCOM is yet to be approved NATO SATCOM Post-2000 program has delivered an X-Band and limited UHF capability for NATO that is being used today in ISAF and KFOR SATCOM EHF is not funded, but seeks to achieve IOC by 2010 - unlikely. EHF will allow for a much greater increase in bandwidth capacity enabling a much greater information through-put. ISR is an area where large organic gaps exist within NATO. At present AGS is the program which will provide a SAR / MTI capability. Currently the program is high risk and seeks to achieve IOC in the 2013 timeframe with 8 x Global Hawk UAVs. Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) brings together 19 Nations through an MOU (outside NATO Command structure) at Molesworth, UK to analyze Intel and share products. Trend Analysis could be a future mission for this organization. There are four Interoperability Demonstrations worth mentioning—CWID, TRIAL QUEST/MAJIIC, STEADFASTCATHODE, COMBINED ENDEAVOUR CWID as NATO’s C2 Interoperability Test Bed is RED for three reasons: 1) No warfighter involvement 2) the demonstration is technically based vice operationally based which would ultimately create a more challenging scenario 3) Participation is voluntary but Coalition warfare is certainly NOT Therefore, ACO must be involved, the scenario must be more OPERATIONALLY challenging and lastly, active participation from ALL nations must be encouraged because CWID feeds the NRF cycle two (2) years down the road TRIAL QUEST/MAJIIC as NATO’s ISR Interoperability Test Bed is RED for the similar issues. STEADFAST CATHODE: SPAIN 2008 COMBINED ENDEAVOUR: GERMANY 2008 (CLICK) Now, if you were to ask me, out of all these enablers, which ones should be given the highest priority I would say these five (CLICK) You will notice a RED LINE just flew in. The point I want to make here is that to the left of the line we stay in the Industrial Age where to the right of the line, with the right emphasis, collectively NATO beings to realize the Information Age Transition: So, if we address these key enablers today and ensure they are on track, this is what the future will look like. Ref: AC/322(SC/5)N(2007)0009 dated 10 May 2007 Bi-SC AIS Implementation Plan: “The Bi-SC AIS programme is one of the largest NATO common funded programmes, … about 700 Million Euro.” Page 77/143; Contract Award 09/2008, Final Service Acceptance 09/2011, Joint Formal Acceptance Inspection 12/2011. NEXT SLIDE

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Force Development & Human Dimension

Agile, joint and expeditionary Technologically superiorRapidly reconfigurableSpecialisedIntegratedHighly educated and trained

Agile, joint and expeditionary Technologically superiorRapidly reconfigurableSpecialisedIntegratedHighly educated and trained

‘Operations will require military forces that are:

Presenter

Presentation Notes

To quote Air Chief Marshal Sir Clive Loader ‘It is no use having the best kit in the world unless we continue to have the best people to field it.’ The human dimension underpins the whole C4ISR arena. Therefore, it must not be seen as a separate issue. One could look at the issue of fratricide to demonstrate the importance of the human dimension[1]. Fratricide issues expose unsatisfactory aspects of the NATO training and exercise programme, which along with other key factors increases the risk of human error. Fratricide could occur due to problems related to C4ISR such as failure to comply w Bi-SC Analysis Lessons Learned Initial Report dated 13 December 2006. We need to work towards accepting the human dimension issue within the C4ISR arena.

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Benefits





Benefits

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NATO Air C4ISR Roadmap – Ground Environment

VoIP Begins

20072007

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Today’s View: Intro. We now move to the detailed Roadmap view, showing the NATO Air C4ISR situation as it is, or as we know it to be, and as it will be based on existing NATO programmes underway. The first few views look at the Ground Environment and next we will look at the Air & Space views. Situate the viewers to the slide: Map of NATO nations, info on the Air Ops Centres, parametric data, and a timeline showing significant milestones. Let’s begin with the Air Surveillance and Control Systems of NATO. As you can see from the multitude of colours, we have Interoperability and Integration issues across NATO. Presently we have 18 NATO and 13 National systems Air Surveillance and Control Systems, not to mention those of US & Canada, all utilizing 9 different Operating Systems where many of their Core Operating Functions are done manually. What this means is that within some of our CAOCs the interface between our systems is done by an operator taking a floppy disk out of one computer, walking across the room, or in some cases to another building, and plugging into another system. Similarly, within this framework, if I may be so bold, we are still thinking with a Legacy mindset with a VERY LIMITED Expeditionary capability. A legacy environment consisting of a very high demand on manning, limited data exchange, and an “augmented by Voice” capability With the expansion of the NATO membership, the coming of age of the basic NADGE, and the delay with the next main operating system—ACCS– some NATO members out of complete necessity to accomplish their national missions have had to develop their own national Air C2 environment What this has led to is a multitude of different hardware and national sub-applications Within that Air C2 Ground environment, we see to the left a significantly large CAOC structure supporting today’s mission. On the map you can see the black dots that represent the Military Committee agreed ARS & DARS sites of the ACCS programme. CLICK

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NATO Signals Battalions1. Brunssum2. Naples

VoIP Begins

20072007

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Still in the 2007 view, you now see NATO’s backbone network overlay the map. The NGCS (NATO General Communications System), similar in structure to the US GiG, it includes landline, microwave, radio, and SATCOM medium. The NGCS connects NATO’s HQs, ACCs, CAOC’s and CRCs, supporting their telecommunications needs. The main NGCS nodes (shown as buttons on the map) are co-located with major NATO installations. Services supported by the NGCS include: Telephone networks, Video Teleconferencing (VTC) Classified networks Unclassified networks, and Mission secret networks in theatre. Link 1 protocol for CRC data exchange; and ICC connectivity, for example. Shown on the map are the 12 static Satellite Ground Terminals, situated around Europe and one in the US, to move NATO’s data. At present, the NGCS does not connect to the National networks of the Alliance. Therefore, this is one barrier to information sharing within the alliance. There is a project underway, the NGCS Evolution, to physically connect the NGCS to the national networks through an Information Exchange Gateway (IEG) – a demarcation point that includes firewalls to protect both sides of the gateway. That demarcation point in most cases is close to the National MOD’s communications’ hub. There is a plan to implement the IEGs, but as you can see with the 1st gas gauge, IEG it has yet to be put into action. Today the network supports Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4), which supports Voice over IP, for example, which is being used in ISAF on a limited scale. NATO will eventually migrate to IPv6 in years to come, which will give many more systems the means to plug & play on the network as we move towards an NGCS that supports “Everything over IP”. At present there is no IPv6 capability. For example, the US and other nations will move to IPv6 much sooner than NATO. Network Ops / Network assurance in NATO could be much better, especially as we grow our network to connect to the nations and move our business activities over to the unclassified domain. In 2006, NCSA (NATO CIS Services Agency) stood up a Computer Incident Response Capability that continues to grow. It’s a weekday operation that need to be a 24/7 operation to protect our networks fulltime. There are other aspects of Net Ops that include integrating new technologies like the Data Diode system that currently in test. Link 16 (J-Series message protocol) will evolve in the ground environment as ACCS is fielded. Speaking to deployed operations, NATO’s Deployable CIS capability is limited, as was evident in the early days of NATO taking the ISAF lead, with the C2 structure changing and the Regions taking on more responsibility, the deployable CIS was slow to adjust to the demands. It resulted in work around solutions and user frustration. There is a programme underway to improve the Deployable CIS equipment inventory, CP 0149, however, there are 2 issues worth mentioning here: (1) Manning of the NATO’s Signals Battalions is an issue, they’re below strength, and (2) the way we acquire capacity using Minimum Military Requirement (MMR). We rarely buy enough to cover contingencies, so when the plan changes, like in ISAF, we’re forced into the very slow procurement process to acquire capacity to meet requirements, and that becomes the critical path to operations. Today in ISAF, Industry is delivering CIS services, which is very common in most nations. We must be careful how we employ contractors - in areas that are relatively secure. CLICK

16



VoIP Begins Link cryptoremoved IP-crypto Black Core Net SCIP, PKI, CIRC BLACK

networks

20122012

Presenter

Presentation Notes

2012 View Moving now to 2012, we see by the blue colour of the map, that NATO’s ACCS LOC1 capability is now delivered, resolving the many interoperability and integration issues associated with the earlier Air Surveillance & Control Systems. ACCS - The shades of blue for NATO Europe are different though because newer NATO member nations are not included in the ACCS rollout plan. Those countries include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. During this period, ACCS and ICC are operating simultaneously according to the ACCS migration plan. The black dots on the map indicate the Military Committee agreed ARS & DARS sites. Air Ops Centres – The number of CAOCs has reduced to 4 static and 2 deployable, according to today’s plan, with interoperability to the ARS and DARS. The issue of the day will be the migration from ACCS to ICC, of the CRCs to ARS and establishment of the DARS. NATO’s networking and information infrastructure is evolving according to NATO’s Network-Enabled Capability (NNEC) strategic framework. The NGCS communications backbone network continues to evolve as the bandwidth capacity increases through technology improvements at the nodes. IEGs are now being installed to connect the NATO networks to the national networks, with a planned completion date of 2014, the 2012 timeframe is a critical period for this activity. The green arrows reaching out to the nations illustrates the growing network. IPv6 is starting to appear throughout NATO with early adaptors starting the migration out of necessity to be interoperable with nations that have/or are upgrading their networks to IPv6. NetOps continues to improve with technology, however as our networks extend more and more into the nations, our risk to information assurance increases, so network security is becoming much more important. With ACCS being implemented, we see Link-16 in the ground environment growing. As already said, the NGCS will evolve towards EoIP. Some timeline milestones follow: (1) 2007 – local Voice over IP (VoIP) begins; NATO IP Crypto Equipment is being introduced to move towards the BLACK Core Network (all encrypted network). (2) 2008 – Non real-time data IP services; Link crypto is being removed as IP Crypto Equipment is being introduced. (3) 2009 – Limited Secure Voice/Video Teleconferencing (VTC) over IP; Progress being made on the IP-crypto for NATO Unclas services. (4) 2010 – Real time data IP services through a Black Core network – security encryption close to the desktop with encrypted data (black) flowing across defence and commercial/public networks - diversity; (5) 2011 – Secure Communications Interoperability Protocol (SCIP) telephones and other devices are starting to replace plain telephones and other telecom devices. For example, SCIP telephones can carry higher classification information than the security domain they are connected to. (6) 2012 – International interconnection of BLACK networks; CLICK Supporting Material The NNEC Force Proposals for 2008 are summarized here. The main items are: Advanced Networking – A single virtual network across which any type of information can be transported: IPv6, SCIP, Multi Layer Precedence and Pre-emption (MLPP) protocol, and EoIP. Voice over IP – From a military viewpoint, the deployment of VoIP will limit the amount of infrastructure that must be deployed, as just one network will carry all signals; this will reduce the footprint for highly tactical deployments. EoIP. Advanced Tactical Communications – Development of a Common Joint Tactical Radio system needs to be accomplished in order to ensure interoperability. Software Defined Radio (SDR) with TRANSEC/COMSEC protection and Electronic Protection Measures (EPM) are key to this capability. NATO’s SDR Users Group (SDRUG) working under NC3B is moving this agenda forward. (1) Still on Advanced Tactical Communications, the Tactical Communications Post-2000 (TP2K) program is delivering standards to NATO to merge radio (wireless) communication capabilities. An Allied Architecture is required to underpin the development of an interoperable coalition-wide mobile communications grid, and the work of the TP2K and the SDRUG is contributing to that effort to move towards a Common Joint Tactical Radio system. TP2K standards are being developed for: Ground-Air-Ground. UAV network segment. Radio network segment. Airborne network segment. Maritime network segment. Unmanned Ground network sensors. Ad hoc networks. Long Range Communication – SATCOM is the primary long-haul communications medium into expeditionary operations that are without telecom infrastructure. However, we would be at risk to rely entirely on SATCOM, so HF systems are advancing under NATO’s Advanced HF Communications capability to improve bandwidth, network adaptiveness, jamming and intrusion protection. Networked Tactical Data Link (TDL) – Current TDL systems used throughout the NATO nations include: Link 1/4/11/16/22 and Common Data Link (CDL). In the short term, networked enabled capabilities are likely to be achieved through various interoperability and networking technologies – such as the NATO NIRIS (NATO Interoperable Recognized Air Picture Information System) – being developed by NC3A, which will allow interoperability between different data link standards and which may serve as gateway devices that interface TDLs with emerging IP network based solutions, such as JTRS (Joint Tactical Radio System) airborne network waveform (ANM) and common datalink formats. The “Standard CDL” already exists in NATO STANAG 7085 and dedicated CDL radio systems are already in operation. Still on TDL, two emerging and key enabling technologies to support the use of tactical data in network centric operations are the new Wideband Networking Waveform (WNW) and the related Airborne Networking Waveform (ANW) which will provide an Ethernet-like capability to units on the edge of the battlefield over which IP based data can be carried with variable bandwidths of up to 10’s of Mb/s. A medium term progression on networked TDL will include the use of increased connectivity of platforms, gateway and other ad hoc solutions to support interoperability and connections between TDL and IP-networks, ehanced Link-16 capabilities, gradual introduction of JTRS and IP-based connectivity and complex manual network configurations. In the network-enabled future, the trend will be for the gradual phasing out of the classical data links, to be replaced by an IP-based communications infrastructure, carrying near real-time tactical information using web-based protocols such as IPv6, TCP (Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol), UDP (User Datagram Protocol), and XML (eXtensible Markup Language).

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VoIP Begins Link cryptoremoved IP-crypto Black Core Net SCIP, PKI, CIRC BLACK

networksSecure Voice/

VTCoIP EoIP IEG (QoS)On IP CC2 PNC CDIS IPv6

20172017

Presenter

Presentation Notes

2017 View In 2017 we are operating in a pure ACCS environment. From a network perspective, we are beginning to realize the results of today’s NNEC strategy – we are supported by the networking & information infrastructure (NII). IEGs connecting the NATO network to the national networks were completed in 2014, enabling improved information exchange amongst the Alliance. IPv6 continues to grow, as more-and-more nodes migrate based on the needs of the users. At this time, NATO is operating IPv4 and IPv6 simultaneously to ensure network interoperability across the Alliance. NetOps is fully functioning in a network-enabled environment. Link-16 is now NATO’s protocol for operational data exchange. Timeline 2013 – Robust Secure Voice/VTCoIP; Deployment of the next generation of IP-crypto begins. 2014 – Removal of the Bandwidth Management Equipment (BME) as network moves into EoIP phase and the BLACK Core network matures. Quality of Service (QoS) on IP is supported according to Coalition standards. Voice and data service over IP is possible in all supported security domains. 2015 – Cyber Command & Control Capability is implemented aimed at Protection, Detection, Reaction and Recovery due to cyber attacks on NATO’s CIS. 2017 – Protected Network Core (PNC) and Cross Domain Information Sharing (CDIS) (Classified & Unclassified) is implemented

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NATO Air C4ISR Roadmap – Air and Space

ISR

COMMERCIAL

NATIONAL

CRCs

CAOCs

NATO IVUS/UFO

UK/SKYNET 4/5, FR/SYRACUSE III, IT/SICRAL

E-3 (FR, NATO, UK, US)E-8 (US)EC-130H (US)EMB-145 (GR)EUROFIGHTER (GE, IT,

SP, UK)F-15 (US)NIMROD R1 (UK)Sentinel R1 (UK)

F-16 (BE,DA,GR, NL,NO,PL, PO, TU,US)F-18 (CA, US)F-22 (US)RC-135 (US)Rafale (FR)Sea King (UK)TORNADO (IT, UK)

B-2 (US)C-17 (CA)CP-140 (CA)E-2C (US)

Link 16 Interoperability

Num

ber o

f Airc

raft

16/26 Nations

Total AC Attack2007

ISR/Tn2007

Space Bw Deployable Bw

8,000

~5,000

~2,500

71%

29%41%

59%

94%

6%

NUS:64%

US:36%

NUS: 29%

US: 71%

NUS: 64%

US: 36%

NUS: 28%

US: 72%

NUS: 63%

US: 37%

NUS:

UHF

SHFX-Band

UHF

2007

SHFX-Band

Presenter

Presentation Notes

NATO 2007 Before I jump into Present Day NATO Air C4ISR let me briefly explain the slide and what I will be talking about. C2 connectivity and capability, ISR capability, Satellite connectivity and capability, and UAS capability. To have a synchronized Air C4ISR environment available any time anywhere its essential that all these capabilities are shaking hands, synchronized so as to be able to distribute ISR data, through satellite bandwidth to the C2 ground environment that filters and distributes this data to the tactical Air Power assets. I would describe present day NATO Air C4ISR as Limited Interoperability and Integration…..allow me to explain as I would like to start with the big picture. C2Link 16ISRUASSATCOM or SATELLITE - Let’s further refine the present day situation by starting with C2. -- As was alluded to when we discussed the NGCS, the NGCS itself provides the Functional Services at the Operational / Strategic level such as your Land, Maritime, and Air Services. However at present time these Function Services are not Interoperable. -- The solution to the lack of Interoperability at the Operational / Strategic level is the Bi-Strategic Command (Bi-SC) Automated Information System (AIS) program which exists today but: --- The air segment of it, the Air Command and Control Information System (Air C2IS) which provides Operational and Strategic level C2 information services, is late and at risk because there is no Operational Involvement. (This is represented by the red circle around the ACCs) -- At the present time ICC satisfies the Tactical Level information services but we can not afford any delays within the ACCS program which we will cover more of later. -- Today’s C2 structure is supported by a legacy Link 1 architecture not able to support the needs of the warfighter or commander. ( In fact, if NATO’s own E-3A was to identify and report an air or surface track on Link-16, all the amplifying information on this track would be lost or “stripped” when it is transferred to Link-1. This IS a problem.) The C2 structure is mainly supported by L-1. But several nations already have a IJMS or L-16 ground capability. We need to add some txt to balance the story right!++++ The hundreds of C2 nodes and centres are static by nature and deployable C2 capacity is scarce and beside the AWACS fleet only exists of deployable personnel, without any means! LINK 16 -- Today there are 7,887 total aircraft within NATO. Of those Aircraft the USAF has 1,626 Link-16 capable aircraft. The other nations within NATO possess 677 aircraft which have a Link-16 capability. This accounts for 15 of the 26 nations INCLUDING NATO’s own asset. -- Now of those aircraft, you see within this bubble a fairly small amount of Link-16 equipped aircraft coming from the US, UK, CAN, Netherlands, GE, IT, Portugal, and Poland. -- A further sampling of this data shows that ISR/Transport which includes RECCE, Transport, ISR, and EW NATO possesses 157 aircraft which are Link-16 capable comprising only 6% of the total 2,627 aircraft. -- The “fast-jet” capable aircraft total 5,260 today. Of those, NATO has 23% or 604 of the total aircraft leaving the USAF with the remainder at 1,542 aircraft or 58% of the Link 16 capability. SATCOM or SATELLITE? - Our SATCOM capability extends the NGCS core and functional services to NATO personnel in theater - Currently, our consortium of SATCOM services is being delivered by France, UK, and Italy and delivers a robust, X-Band Capability (Military Capability), but very limited UHF SATCOM (Your Tactical Satellite-INMARSAT / IRIDIUM) capability -- NOTE: X Band is your big stuff: 2 to 8 MBS and your UHF SATCOM capability delivers 1 or 2 voice channels (roughly 8 to 64 KBPS) - We have Limited Satellite Ground Terminals--both Transportable and Deployable--therefore the requirement exists to contract this capability through commercial service provider such as Thales in ISAF today. -- The commercial service provider is not unusual but depending on the tactical situation this can be a risky alternative ISR In today’s environment, be it War on Terror, human aid or stabilization missions, the need for ISR-data is ever growing rapidly. The lack of ISR sensors and platforms has forced NATO to creative use of all sorts non-traditional ISR platforms and sensors (PODs, on-board camera etc) to supplement the demand for optical, SAR or GMTI information. What are the talking points? UAS What are the talking points? Transition: Before we look into the future, specifically how 2010 to 2015 looks, let’s take a look at the NATO Air C4ISR Critical Enablers. NEXT SLIDE

19


ACCS

DARS

ARS

ISR NATIONAL

CAOCs

CRCs


NATO EHF

US/MUOS

COMMERCIAL

737-700 (TU)A-10 (US)A-400 (GE)B-1 (US)B-2 (US)B-52 (US)C-130 (NL, UK, US)C-17 (US)

C-5 (US)C-17 (CA)CP-140 (CA)E-2 (FR, US)E-3 (NATO, UK, US)E-8 (US)EA-6B (US)EC-130H (US)EMB-145 (GR)Euro Hawk (GE)EUROFIGHTER (GE, IT,

SP, UK)

F-15 (US)F-16 (BE, DA, GR, NL,

NO, PL, PO, TU, US)F-18 (CA, US)F-22 (US)GLOBAL HAWK (US)JAS-39 (HU)KC-767 (US)KDC-10 (NL)P-3 (GE, PO, US)RC-135 (US)Sea King (UK)

Rafale (FR)Sentinel R1 (UK)TORNADO (UK)TRISTAR (UK)VC-10 (UK)

E3A MNT ACCS LOC 1 IOC ACCS FOC Air C2IS

XNATO IV(decommissioned)


17/26 Nations


UHF

UHF

EHF

SHFX-Band

DFCIS

Num

ber o

f Airc

raft

Total AC2007

Total AC2012

Attack2007

Attack2012

ISR/Tn2007

ISR/Tn2012

8,00071%

29%

NUS: 64%

US: 36%

NUS: 29%

US: 71%

38%

62%

41%

59%29%

71%94%

44%

56%

~8,500

~5,000~6,000

~2,500~3,000

NUS: 99%

US: 1%

NUS: 32%

US: 68%

NUS: 64%

US: 36%

NUS: 28%

US:72%

NUS:

US: 63%

NUS:37%

NUS: 63%

US: 37%

6% NUS

NUS: 98%US: 2%

US: 85%

2012

SHFX-Band

EHF

Presenter

Presentation Notes

SLIDE: NATO 2012 Now assuming that the right emphasis has been placed on the key C4ISR enablers this is potentially what the landscape would like in the 2012 The major theme here is Enhanced Interoperability and Integration Command Control - In late 2009/2010 ACCS will modernize the CAOCs, DARS, and the Communications that links them together. This will enable an expeditionary posture with automated and adaptable processes. - Within ACCS, the Common Operating Picture (COP) will be delivered to the CAOC via J-series message within the Link-16 protocol. - Bi-SC Automated Information System (AIS) is scheduled to deliver the Joint interoperable Air Functional Service (Air C2IS) by 2009; however its timely delivery depends on an operational commitment and assigned funding today LINK 16 Growth of Link 16 in Europe with only the fighter platforms and not the transport platforms Desire to invest Link 16 in fast jet more so than transport Percentage is going up due to older aircraft being retired Still difficult for certain nations Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Slovakia Explain who is now in the bubble vice 2007 Explain increase capability due to DARS/ARS SATCOM - Our ground segment will improve with the delivery of CP-0149 adding Satellite Ground Terminals for the NRF around the 2009 timeframe - UHF SATCOM will continue to be limited for NATO resulting in a dependence on commercial satellite providers - EHF SATCOM and the huge bandwidth associated with that will be arriving on the NATO scene around 2010 Software Defined Radio – Although there are few NATO nations that can claim to have a SDR capability, the NATO Software Defined Radio Users Group (SDRUG) advances the SDR knowledge and standardization issues including information on waveform development, to keep the topic moving forward throughout NATO and with industry. ISR Investments are in fourth generation targeting pods such as Pantera, Litening, Also the growth is towards UAS in the Tactical, MALE, and then HALE due to costs as compared to heavy platforms such as AWACS, Joint STARS, etc This can be see by NATO’s unwillingness to go with a manned AGS platform Transition: Now let’s look even further into the future with 2017 (CLICK) NEXT SLIDE

20


ISR NATIONAL

ACCS

DARS

ARSCAOCs

CRCs


US/MUOS

NATO EHF COMMERCIAL

737-700 (TU)A-10 (US)A-400 (GE)B-1 (US)B-2 (US)B-52 (US)

C-130 (NL, UK, US)C-5 (US)C-17 (CA, US)CP-140 (CA)E-2 (FR, US)E-3 (FR, NATO, UK, US)E-8 (US)EA-6B (US)EC-130H (US)EMB-145 (GR)EUROFIGHTER (GE, IT,

SP, UK, +)

Euro Hawk (GE)F-15 (US)F-16 (BE, DA, GR, NL,

NO, PL, PO, TU, US)F-18 (CA, US)F-22 (US)F-35 (US, +)GLOBAL HAWK (US)JAS-39 (HU)KC-767 (US)KDC-10 (NL)P-3 (GE, PO, US)

Rafale (FR)RC-135 (US)Sea King (UK)Sentinel R1 (UK)TORNADO (UK)TRISTAR (UK)VC-10 (UK)

E3A MNT ACCS LOC 1 IOC ACCS FOC Air C2IS DCIS CJTF IOC


Num

ber o

f Airc

raft

17/26 Nations

Total AC2007

Total AC2012

Attack2007

Attack2012

ISR/Tn2007

ISR/Tn2012


UHF

UHF

EHF

SHFX-Band

DFCIS+ACCS

8,00071%

29%

NUS: 64%

US: 36%

NUS: 29%

US:71%

38%

62%

41%

59%29%

71%94%

44%

56%

~8,000

~5,000~6,000

~2,500~3,000

NUS: 99%

US: 28 1%

NUS: 32%

US: 68%

NUS: 64%

US: 36%

NUS: 28%

US: 72%

NUS:

US: 63%

NUS:37%

NUS: 63%

US:37%

6% NUS:

NUS:98%US: 2%

US: 85%

AGS FOCAGS IOC

2017

SHFX-Band

EHF

Presenter

Presentation Notes

SLIDE: 2017 Theme: Solid Interoperability and Integration Milestones! What are they? Why are they important? How do they relate to the slide? Link 16: F35/JSF coming into service C2: Tactical: ACCS across ALL the nations Strategic: Bi SC AIS Air C2IS: Fully embedded into strategic and operational level C2 ISR: FOC for AGS SATCOM: Increased bandwidth, US now 80% military reliance and 20% commercial, US TSAT UAS: Mass proliferation of UAS into the civil and military sectors

21






Benefits





Benefits

22

Recommendation: C4ISR champions at every levelRecommendation: C4ISR champions at every level

ISRGovernance

NNECGovernance

NationsMC

EWGACTACOSRB

ICNACMOCNADNSC

CBC/MBCNCS

NC3B NC3B ACT / C4I (JISR-ICDT) ACT / C4I

(JISR-ICDT)

StakeholdersStakeholders

Gap 1: Lack of C4ISR Governance

Presenter

Presentation Notes

When we talk about a lack of C4ISR governance, we’re really talking about stakeholder alignment and creating a common agenda that responds to operations. We need C4ISR stakeholders to be aligned to the Alliance’s needs. Two important NATO bodies lead the C4ISR effort: the NATO Consultation, Command and Control Board (NC3B) leads the NNEC effort and ACT/C4I leads the JISR effort through the working of the JISR ICDT (Integrated Capability Development Team). The leadership in both domains is essential as is stakeholder alignment to move forward a common C4ISR agenda along the three overlapping and mutually dependent dimensions: network, information and the human dimension. Greater overlap and alignment of C4ISR stakeholders on the operational needs is the goal here. Recommendation: Recognizing that added bureaucracy is probably not the solution to enhance C4ISR governance, greater synergy through C4ISR champions at every level will move the yard sticks forward. NEXT SLIDE What is the Issue (Gap)? Lack of C4ISR governance. So what? C4ISR stakeholders are not aligned to the Alliance’s needs. Operators in ISAF are frustrated with the lack of integration and interoperability between their C2IS systems and with their ISR systems. Stakeholders must be aligned to NATO’s the warfighter’s needs! To achieving effective C4ISR in a joint manner demands harmonisation of C2, CIS and ISR efforts. � Prerequisites are: Avoid duplication of effort, aligned project management, transparent ownership, process and leadership. However this is the perfect world, in reality: EXAMPLE: two NATO bodies have stepped forward to take on leadership roles in the C4ISR area; NC3B agreed that it would be the organization to take on the leadership role in NNEC governance and ACT agreed that it would lead the JISR governance through the JISR ICDT. Within NNEC governance, NC3B’s focus is exercised along three overlapping and mutually dependent dimensions; network, information and human dimensions. The JISR ICDT focus is intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance with dependencies on network, information and human dimensions. Both bodies overlap in terms of interests, stakeholders and programs of work. Close coordination is, therefore, essential. This split between C4 and ISR governance is best felt at stakeholder level (nations- NCS), where it can be unclear as to where there interests are been taken care off. Governance is therefore key, although there will be challenges to address this.. A fix for the NC3B versus JISR governance would be to: �Recommendation: Enlarge the JISR ICDT to include all C4ISR stakeholders, looking across the whole spectrum of C4ISR NEXT SLIDE Stakeholders MC – Military Committee, EWG – Executive Working Group, ACT – Allied Command Transformation, ACO – Allied Command Operations SRB – Senior Resource Board, IC – Infrastructure Committee NACMO – NATO Air Command and control system Management Organization CNAD – Conference of National Armament Directors NSC – NATO Security Committee CBC/MBC – Civil/Military Budget Committee NCS –NATO Committee for Standardization, NNEC – NATO Network Enabled Capability (NCW)

23

Recommendation: Effective/Cohesive Trg & Dev effortRecommendation: Effective/Cohesive Trg & Dev effort

Gap 2: Force Development Disconnect

NationsNations

RIGHT PERSON!

RIGHT POSITION!

RIGHT TIME!

RIGHT PERSON!

RIGHT POSITION!

RIGHT TIME!

STRATEGIC LEADING & DIRECTINGSTRATEGIC LEADING & DIRECTING

OPERATIONAL OR ORGANISATIONALINCORPORATE PEOPLE / CAPABILITIES

OPERATIONAL OR ORGANISATIONALINCORPORATE PEOPLE / CAPABILITIES

TACTICAL OR PERSONAL DIRECTTACTICAL OR PERSONAL DIRECTAcquire knowledge / skills, culturalAssimilation, adopting core values

Specialist

Acquire knowledge / skills, culturalAssimilation, adopting core values

Specialist

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Based on our analysis we would conclude that Force Development is the #2 gap existing with C4ISR. What is the Issue (Gap)? The disconnect and lack of alignment within the Alliance on training & development. So what? NATO forces in theatre are operating to different standards that can result in disastrous consequences – like fratricide. What you see on the left is an example of Force Development within a specific NATO nation. When an Airman enters the Air Force they undergo significant training and development to acquire the proper knowledge and Skills necessary to perform a task. They also undergo cultural assimilation and adopt the core values. They become a Specialist of sorts. After a period of time at the Tactical level growing and developing they then progress to the Operational or Organizational level where they learn to incorporate both people and capabilities to improve the organization and the mission it is tasked to perform. Some Airman go beyond the Operational level into the Strategic. This is where they lead and direct large organizations with and lots of people. The problem or issue is that every nation is slightly different and in some cases here in NATO you don’t always get the right person for the task at hand. It is not always the case that the person has the proper mindset, proper training, and proper certification such that you have the right person in the right position at the right time. Therefore, What's Needed is much greater cohesiveness training and development led by ACT delegated to the Joint Education and Training folks. As an example, transforming the NATO C2 course into a full-blown NATO C4ISR course embracing all aspects of the NNEC principles. This along with a Force Development model much like you see here for those within and new to the NATO scene would help ensure that we have a properly trained Airman who is thinking joint, agile, and net-centric enabling the C4ISR system within NATO. C4ISR Guidance. There is no C4ISR strategic, doctrinal or conceptual documentation within NATO. Recommendation: C4ISR guidance is needed, which captures all aspects of C4ISR in line with NATO’s level of ambition. C4ISR Training and Development (T&D) - A champion for the advancement of the human dimension in the C4ISR equation is lacking in NATO. This is largely because the T&D responsibility rests with both NATO and Nations, yet with no clear delineation of responsibility. This dilemma is complicated further given the wide range of missions for which we are training. The T&D cycle is, therefore, fragile; moreover, any NATO efforts are often ineffective without National collaboration. Recommendation: ACT (delegated to Joint Education and Training (JET)) should continually review the process and ensure an effective and cohesive T&D cycle against the challenge of the NATO and National dilemma. Specifically, JET should capture an effective T&D effort for the C4ISR community. For example, transform the NATO C2 course into a NATO C4ISR course embracing all of the NNEC principles, thus delivering net-centric people. The Joint environment - The reality of ISAF and NRF operations places an emphasis on our people thinking ‘Joint’, ‘Agile’, ‘Expeditionary’ and ‘Transformational’. This is as true at the National level as it is within NATO. Importantly, a number of important training evolutions, the STEADFAST series as an example, are neither supported nor effective given the agile demands upon the warfighter. Disappointingly from a C4ISR perspective, scenarios are often poorly structured (for example, Air could receive greater operations benefit from the STEADFAST exercises) and not relevant to the NATO need in the 21st Century. Recommendation: Education must continue to raise awareness of the Joint challenge. The JWC plays a central ‘bridging’ role to ensure cross component cohesion, which needs to be strengthened, in particular with exercise scenario planning. NAEW&C Midterm Upgrade provides additional consoles and Air Battle Management capabilities. However, at present, these capabilities are not reflected in NAEW&C CONOPS or concept of employment. Recommendation: New Air Battle Management capabilities due to the NAEW&C Midterm Upgrade need to be formalized in a CONOPS and/or concept of employment.

24

Recommendation: Joint strategic & operational oversight of C4ISR programmes Recommendation: Joint strategic & operational oversight of C4ISR programmes

Gap 3: Limited Strategic & Operational Programme OversightLimited Strategic & Operational Programme Oversight

Bi-SC AISBi-SC AIS

ACCSACCS AGSAGS

NGCSNGCS

ALTBMDALTBMD

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What is the issue (gap)? There is limited strategic and operational oversight of NATO programmes. So what? Essential projects like those shown here may not be aligned to operational needs because they develop in isolation. This is not to say that there is no financial oversight and accountability – that’s not the problem here. The problem is the lack of alignment across the NATO capital programme with regard to operational needs and requirements, integration and interoperability. On a broader scale, when we look across the Alliance, the problem is compounded as each nation develops their capabilities in isolation. Description: Service vice system orientation is needed when looking at capital programme because capability is derived from more than one system – capability consists of services from many systems (C4ISR system of systems view). NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC) is a cornerstone to achieving interoperability and integration across the Alliance – NNEC must permeate all programmes. Tactical Data Links are evolving to IP-based broadband communications, but we cannot abandon existing technology (Link-11, Link-16) because these are the common modes of tactical communications. More work is needed to bring in ‘Link Exchange Management’ to remove the blockages to information exchange. ICC versus ACCS evolution – ICC to ACCS migration plan is needed with a view towards phasing out ICC. ACCS does not include new member nations. What’s Needed (Recommendation): Needed is Joint strategic and operational oversight of C4ISR programmes, to bring alignment to NATO’s capabilities that meet the operational needs. PM / PL (Project Manager / Project Leader) Bi-SC AIS (Bi-Strategic Command Automated Information System) ALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) ACCS (Air Command and Control System) AGS (Alliance Ground Surveillance) NGCS (NATO General Communications System) Additional Information Reference: AC/322(SC/5)N(2007)0009 dated 10 May 2007 – Bi-SC AIS Implementation Plan /143 – “The [Bi-SC AIS] relationship to other programmes like ACCS and ALTBMD will be established in the Bi-SC AIS Programme level Target Architecture as well as in the B—SC AIS Programme level Interface Control Document. These integration aspects will be managed by the appropriate Bi-SC AIS Programme Management levels. The Implementation Working Group (IWG) meetings allow for information sharing between the Bi-SC AIS, the ALTBMD, the ACCS and NGCS programmes. In the future, the Programme Management & Integration Capability (PMIC) will in particular address the integration issues related to these programmes.” “The ALTBMD Programme Office (PO) initiated the Theartre Ballistic Missile Defence Coordination Working Group (TCWG) as the mechanism for coordinating the implementation of each ALTBMD Target Architecture in Bi-SC AIS, ACCS and NGCS as required by the MOA between the ALTBMD PMO and the NC3B and the NACMA respectively. Page 25/143 – The ACCS – Bi-SC AIS Harmonisation Group has been established as the mechanism for coordinating ACCS and Bi-SC AIS issues.

25

Gap 4: Poor Information Management

Recommendation: Improved Information Management— Strategy…Concept…Planning —

Recommendation: Improved Information Management— Strategy…Concept…Planning —

KNOWLEDGEKNOWLEDGE

INFOINFO

“SENSEMAKING”“SENSEMAKING”

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What is the issue (gap)? Poor Information Management in NATO adds to confusion and weakens our ability to share information, hence share knowledge. So what? Information superiority and decision superiority are degraded because of poor information management. We overwhelm (the commander) and are overwhelmed ourselves by useless information because we lack process and mechanisms to better manage information holdings. The commander is inhibited by poor information management to acquire the knowledge to achieve decision superiority. NATO has an IM Policy, just recently released, however, it has no IM Strategy and no IM Implementation Plan. Both are being worked at ACT, but they’re late to need. Information management in all our nations is a real challenge, not only for NATO as a whole, and I say all with confidence. I spoke earlier about EBAO supported by NNEC – decision superiority supported by information superiority and network enabling. Information management is a key enabler to achieve that information superiority. What we’re showing in this slide is the jumble of ISR products that face the decision maker who needs to make sense of it all. There’s an IR product that delivers us Target Identification (TI) coordinates, Electro-Optic (EO) products, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI), Video, Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Link 16 data, and not shown here, SIGINT, ELINT, HUMINT and other data that potentially drowns the operator in information and starves him of knowledge. These are SR products furnished with Intelligence to create information that the commander receives via communications means, information that is displayed on a computer to help him make sense of it, information that he will assimilate into knowledge. So we have all the elements of C4ISR at work here in this illustration. Now we see the STANAGS that pertain to all the products shown there, NATO STANAGS that provide the data standards to process, fuse, share and display the information. Building these STANAGS to provide direction to the nations is an important task of NATO, and a vital aspect of Information Management in the Alliance. Recently at NC3A, we saw the good work done there by the MAJIIC team, the Multi-Sensor Aerospace / Ground Joint ISR Interoperability Coalition, that demonstrated the fusion of data from many ISR products into a common shared database, data that’s STANAG compliant, and the display of that information to aid the decision maker. NC3A and the MAJIIC Coalition are making some great strides in this area. NATO is presently working through the final stages of approving an IM Policy (that’s the closest we have to IM doctrine in NATO). Important aspects of the policy include Information Sharing, Information Standardisation, and Information Assurance, among others. The policy specifically talks about “Responsibility-to-share” defined as “The individual and collective obligation to make information available, discoverable and accessible for those entities that require the information to perform their official tasks and services.” An important initiative amongst the NATO partners in this regard is the recent establishment of the Intelligence Fusion Centre at RAF Molesworth in the UK. The participating nations are putting the notion of responsibility-to-share into action there. Recommendation banner: More progress is needed though. There is no NATO IM Strategy, but work is progressing on this front to develop the Bi-SC IM Vision, Strategic Concept and Implementation Plan. Supporting Material: “Information Management. IM is a discipline that directs and supports the handling of information throughout its life-cycle ensuring it becomes the right information in the right form and of adequate quality to satisfy the demands of an organisation.” [Draft NATO IM Policy] Knowledge Management - NATO does not recognise the term KM. Description: The slide shows a jumble of information in the form of Surveillance & Reconnaissance images from which we derive intelligence. Starting in the top left and rotating clockwise: (1) TI from an IR image; (2) EO; (3) Link-16; (4) SAR; (5) ESM; (6) EO & Video; (7) GMTI. These images contain information that consists of large files that need large pipes (bandwidth) to move from the source to the customer. This illustrates but some of the challenges with information management: storage, movement, sharing, presentation that has meaning, access to the right information at the right time Clarity (sensemaking) is needed but what we have is a confusion; Information is hard to find and difficult to move; 50% of time spent looking is wasted; Too many barriers to data sharing (data ownership issues); On knowledge management, we lack a strategy, concepts, and an approach to managing knowledge, - sharing our lessons learned, sharing valuable experiences, creating a learning culture, removing barriers to create communities of practice. What’s Needed? (Recommendation): Needed is better information management and a knowledge management strategy, concept and plan. Acronyms and buzzwords Target Identification (TI), Electro Optics (EO), Link 16, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), Electronic Support Measures (ESM), Video, Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) Semantic Web: It is about text mining and making relationships between words and the meaning of words Within the Semantic Web, information is given explicit meaning making it easier for machines to automatically process and integrate information available on the Web. Best Practices: It is about sharing Lessons Identified and translating those into solid lessons learned Tacit knowledge: Skilled Knowledge—you have to learn from doing Explicit knowledge: Codified knowledge (doctrine, TTPs, SOPs, Checklists) Communities of Interest/Practice: Come together on the Web via a Portal and share their knowledge Taxonomy: A terms used to describe relationship schemes (information, text and words) Reference: AC/322(SC/5)D(2007)0001 dated 12 April 2007 – Information Systems Sub-Committee (ISSC) 2006 Annual Report: Major Achievements on Info Management: NC3B approved the NNEC Data Strategy; 5 Info Mgmt Workshops were held on the draft revised NAC-level NATO Info Management Policy; work commenced on the Prime Directive on Info Management. Info Exchange Gateways issues are progressing to connect the NATO networks to the national networks. XML – MOU between DISA & NATO/NHQC3S outlining roles to host NATO’s XML Registry on the US Metadata Registry (MDR) and Repository system. Tactical Data Link Specifications – Adopted new baselines for ADatP-12© and STANAG 5511 Edition 7, continued the process to migrate Single Link (SL) ADatPs-11, -16, -22 into one Multi Link (ML) ADatP-33. Progressed the adoption of Variable Message Format (VMF)-related USA MIL-STDs as NATO STANAGs in line with the Bi-SC’s Data Link Migration Strategy. Adoption of USA MIL-STD-3011 (Joint Range Extension Application Protocol (JREAP)) as a NATO standard for Over-the-Horizon exchange of Link 16 data is reviewed. Plans to transform STANAG 5516 into XML format and transition this STANAG into MIL-STD-6016 structure and philosophy.

26

Capability GenerationCapability Generation

Warfighter Needs

Warfighter Needs

Gap 5: Operational Lifecycle Management Disconnect

What’s Needed:Better implementation of Alliance interoperability

– Shorten Operational Life Cycle Implementation –

WhatWhat’’s Needed:s Needed:Better implementation of Alliance interoperabilityBetter implementation of Alliance interoperability

–– Shorten Operational Life Cycle Implementation Shorten Operational Life Cycle Implementation ––

Need/IdeaNeed/Idea

ExperimentExperiment

DemonstrationDemonstration

ExerciseExercise

OperationsOperations

Feedback & LessonsLearned

Feedback & LessonsLearned

Presenter

Presentation Notes

What is the Issue/Gap? The fifth Gap that we will discuss within Air C4ISR is the “Concept to Execution Approach” to managing new operational concepts, needs, or ideas. The Gap is that concepts and new ideas are not reaching the warfighter or operations. So What? Lessons go on being relearned and C4ISR deficiencies remain. ‘Quick Fixes’ become the band-aid solution rather than dealing with the bigger issue at hand. What this slide depicts here is how the Concept Development & Experimentation (CD&E) process should work. In that you have an “Idea” that surfaces or a “Need” from the warfighter through operationally necessity. This “Need” should be managed through an Operational Life Cycle Management where it is funnelled into an “Experiment” stage and then into “Demonstration” where its capability is shown. Then due to its utility or capability is introduced into an “Exercise.” Once it has demonstrated its worth it is introduced into real-world “Operations.” Now, throughout this Life Cycle Management it is crucial that both Feedback and Lessons Learned are captured and then reintroduced to further refine the “Need and Idea.” Now this is what would happen in a perfect world but we are far from that today. (CLICK) What we have is a barrier between Exercise and Operations. A wall exists stopping the implementation of the Idea and the subsequent operational feedback modifying the Idea to make it meet the needs of the warfighter. (CLICK) We need to break that wall down. (CLICK) Recommendation: What’s Needed is better implementation of Alliance interoperability such that the Operational Life Cycle Implementation is shortened MAJIIC is a perfect example of this as is CWID: to get ISR Data exploitation tools to the warfighter!!! Additional Information: Reference in the JAPCC library: 070827 Consolidated SFJT07-ENABLER 07 OECI Report.pdf. The Joint Warfare Centre report on JACKPOT 07 and ENABLER 07 Operational Experimentation & Capability Integration Report (Unclas) regarding NRF provides many good examples where CD&E is not working as well as it should. Areas include JCOP, Joint Situational Awareness, Recognized CIMIC Picture, JTST, NRF Reachback Traffic Analysis, Intel Reachback, NATO Public Information (PIO) Rapid Response. For example, on the Intelligence Reachback (IRB), an excellent idea to provide Intel support to a deployed NATO force from the rear; there was a lack of national involvement on this experiment, numerous technical issues, national caveat issues, IFC not able to participate due to real world operations, and so on. It was concluded that the IRB concept was not ready for implementation in the real-world environment. Operational Oversight and better operational life cycle management may move these issues forward.

27






Benefits





Benefits

28

Air C4ISR Roadmap “Benefits”

Decision Superiority Decision Superiority

Real-Time C2 & SSAReal-Time C2 & SSA

Improved Target characterisationImproved Target characterisation

Shared Situational Awareness Shared Situational Awareness

Alliance Network ConnectivityAlliance Network Connectivity

Shared InformationShared Information

Fused IntelligenceFused Intelligence

Joint Common Operating PictureJoint Common

Operating Picture

Presenter

Presentation Notes

We identified earlier in our briefing that the Roadmap seeks to achieve an Air C4ISR vision of A fully interoperable joint network-centric NATO Air C4ISR capability that enables decision superiority to achieve the desired effect. In achieving this vision and working towards the GOAL of an NETWORK-ENABLED ALLIANCE certain milestones had to met. If the milestones were met there is certain to be Benefits which come from this Working towards the GOAL we sought to certain capabilities such as: - Real Time Command and Control and Situation Awareness (due to a joint Common Operating Picture.) - Network-Enabled Platforms and Weapons that have the capability to share the correct information. - Fused Intelligence process AND an Alliance Network Connectivity that satisfies operational requirements (CLICK) This is important because once these capabilities have been realized we can then deliver the warfighter effects of: Real-time Command and Control and SSA Improved Target Characterization Shared Situational Awareness Decision Superiority (NEXT SLIDE)

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JAPCC Contact Names

Lt Col Fred Akkerman – Air C2 2266Lt Col Jim Bates – Comms 2263Wg Comd Dion Bowen – ISR 2264Lt Col Jens Fehler – UAS 2217Maj Ioannis Kollias – Data Links 2267Lt Col Ralf Korus – Air Defence 2292Lt Col Frank Scholze – ISR 2293Maj Tom Single – Space 2268Lt Col Matt Smith – NAEW & C 2269Lt Col Mauro Volpe – IM & KM 2213

Lt Col Fred Akkerman – Air C2 2266Lt Col Jim Bates – Comms 2263Wg Comd Dion Bowen – ISR 2264Lt Col Jens Fehler – UAS 2217Maj Ioannis Kollias – Data Links 2267Lt Col Ralf Korus – Air Defence 2292Lt Col Frank Scholze – ISR 2293Maj Tom Single – Space 2268Lt Col Matt Smith – NAEW & C 2269Lt Col Mauro Volpe – IM & KM 2213

+49 (0) 2824 90 xxxx

[email protected]

Questions