caesar 36 - the soviet strategic interest in limited disarmament

8/2/2019 Caesar 36 - The Soviet Strategic Interest in Limited Disarmament

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6 March 1964

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OCX No. 1051/64Copy No.

THE SOV IET STRATEG IC INTE REST I N LIM ITE D DPSARMABIENT

D D / I STAFF STUDY

CIA/RSS

REFERENCE TITLE: CAESAR X X I I I



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\CaESAR .&HI1 OCB Ho. 1051/64

Off. See. No. 12

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THE SOVIE+ $TRATEGIC INTEREST IN LXBIBHTEDISARMAMENT

T hi s is a working pap9r. I t is i n t ended to be ani n formal airing of a, c r i t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e psoBlem, no$a d e f i n i t i v e s t at e me n t on t h e s u b j e c t . ]In t h i s e x e r c i s e ,t h e q u e s t io n of disarmament is discussed i n terms of S ov i e ts t r a t e g i c th o ug h t, p la n ni n g, and goa l s . While p s l i t i c a l(propaganda) ob je c t iv es have long seemed primary and areno doubt s t i l l impor tan t (if not primary) in S ov i e t posi-t i o n s on. isarmament, t h i s paper is concerned l a rge ly w i t ht h e hard g ai ns -- in S o vi et m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h r e l a t i v e to

t h a t of t h e U.S.--which the USSR may hope t o make throughthe conc l u s i on of agree.ments on l imi t ed m e a s u r e s of armsc o n t r o l .

Although th’e w r i t e r has b e n e f i t e d from the sug-gest ions and r e s e a r c h f i n d i n g s of co l l eagues , he is s o l e l yr e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e paper as a whole.

Staff would welcome comment on t h e p a p e r, addressed to

The DD/I Research

Zrwin P. Halpesn, who wrote it, OF t o t h e Chief o r DeputyChief of t h e Staff. / 1



I 4 .THE &VIET STRATEGIC IW~ERESTIN EPMITXDDISARMAMENT

summary

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Although t h e Sov ie t s have in the pa s t s ucc ee ded i nt e m p o r a r i l y d e c e i v i n g t h e world public about t h e magnitudeof so v i e t s t r a t e g i c power, t h e i r actual m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i -t i e s have been incommensurate w i t h bo th Sov i e t p o l i t i c a la s p i r a t i o n s ( espec ia l ly i n Europe) and the U. S. s t r a t e g i cm i l i t a r y c h al le n ge . T h ei r p a st i n a b i l i t y t o preserve awor ld image of S o v ie t m i l i t a r y pre-eminence OF to e f f e c ta s i g n i f i c a n t ch ang e in t h e a c t u a l c o r r e l a t i o n os? serateg iof o r c e s d o e s n o t seem t o have dampened t h e i r des i re t oa c h i e v e s u c h goals .

The So vi et s have always regarded t h e fundamentalq u e s t i o n as t h a t of t h e b a la n ce of power: while t h e y haveo f t e n t a l k e d tough and invoked s t ra teg ic t h r e a t s , t h e yhave gene ra l ly been cautious in t h e i r a c t i o n s . (The Cubanm i s s i l e ba s e ve n tu r e w a s slot an e x c ep t i o n : t h e d e c i s i o n st o p la ce miss i les i n Cuba and then to remove them wereboth taken because of f e l t s t r a t e g i c i n f e r io r i t y ; I[Ulra-

s hc he v g r os s ly miscalculated the risk i n deploying t h emi ss i l e s and withdrew them r a p i d l y when the risk was made

c l e a r t o him.) ILhrushchev s t i l l appea rs to r e ga r d a favor -a b l e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n as c r i t i c a l t o his f o r e i g n p o l i c y .Yihile he may f i n d t h e c u r re n t s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e of theUSSR adequate to the task of d e t e r r i n g t h e West isom i n i t i a t -ing gene ra l war , he almost c e r t a i n l y f i n d s that t h e s t i l lmarkedly i n f e r i o r s t r a t e g i c p o s it i o n of t h e USSR does nots a t i s f y s o v i e t p o l i t i c a l r e q u i r e m e n t s . He undoubtedlyr e a l i z e s t h a t as l ong as the Uni ted States m a in t a ins acred ib le m i l i t a r y s up re ma cy , t h e USSR w i l l 1 bs without ane f f e c t i v e b a s i s for c h a n g i n g t h e p o l i t i c a l o r d e r of t h i n g si n Europe--no more t h r ough ne go t i a t i ons t h a n through d i r e c tm i l i t a r y a c t i o n. H e is consequent ly eager t o neeatral9zeU.S. s t r a t e g i c s up re ma cy , to f o s t e r the idea of n u c l e a rstalemate and s t r a t e g i c b a la nc e.



Khrushchev w l s t r i v e to improve the s rategic sit-u a t i o n 2of t h e USBR, we beyieve, in part through d i r e c t ia-cremenps t o Sov iet mi1i tai .y power , and, in p a r t , by an in-di rec t . method: controll img %he arms ra ce In di re ct compe-t i t i o n i n t h e s t r u g g l e for mil i t a ry supremacy is t y p i c a l l ya Sovie t t a c t i c , Because of important advantages (notablysec rbcy) and, d i s a d v a nt a g e s ( n o t a b ly s t r a in e d resources),th e Sov ie t s hdve a lmos t never engaged the United States i n.a d i r e c t , numerical. weapons competition. Thus, i n s t e a d of!producing long-range bombers and, l a t 0 r , ICBMs, on a c r a s hb a s i s , Woscow h as t r i e d to compensate for d e f i c i e n c i e s i nthese c a p a b i l i t i e s by i n d i r e c t methods. These have included,a t v a r i o u s times and i n va r io us combina tions, (1) d e c e p t i v epropaganda claims about S o v ie t m i s s i l e s t r e n g t h , (2) p o l i -

t i c a l e x p l o i t a t ion of @arl y t echno log ica l b reak th roughs inweaponry and space e x p l o r a t i o n ; (3) the b u i l d - u p of power-f u l forces t o cope w i t h a t h r e a t from Vestern Europe andt h e h o ld in g of Europe as s t r a t e g i c hostage under the nun-erous m e d i u m . and in tesaed ia te range b a l l i s t i c missi les; (4)maJor m i l i t a r y d e m o n s t r a t i o n s , s u c h as i n c r e a s i n g t h e e x p l i c i tm i l i t a r y budge t and exp lod ing ve ry h igh y ie ld nuc lea r wea-pqns; and ( 5 ) t h e Cuban venture--in t h e s e n s e of be ing an e f fec -t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e t o a crash ICBM pap~gram.

Having f a i l e d w i t h these schemes to produce t h ed e s i r e d e f f e c t s , Khrushchev now seems to h av e t u r n e d t ol i m i t e d disarmament t o augment the r e l a t i v e power p o s i t i o nof t h e Soviet Union; he has c l e a r l y rejected the a l t e r n a -

t i v e of a r ad i ca l s tep-up in the production and deploymentof s t r a t e g i c weapons. Th is is not to s a y t h a t a f i r mp o li c y l i n e on l i m g t e d disarmament has been set. On thec o n t r a r y , w e are i n c l i n e d LO think t h a t t h i s i s su e , l i k eimpor tant m i l i t a r y p roblems such as t r o o p s i ze , is s t i l li n f l u x . The m i l i t a r y e l i t e , who have in t h e pas t r es i s tedc e r t a i n of Xhrushchev's m i l i t a r y programs, have a l s o showns i g n s of d i s s e n t from c e r t a i n of his arms l i m i t a t i o n sschemes. They may for p r o f e s s io n a l s e a s o n s t e n d t o regardnot arms c o n t r o l b u t s u b s t a n t i a l arms expansion as t h e bestway to approach t h e problem of s t r e n g th e n i n g n a t i o n a ls e c u r i t y . Hence, nega t ive S ov ie t ac t io ns a t Geneva mayt o some e x t e n t r e f l e c t i n d e c i s i o n o r con t roversy in MQSCOW.

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s t r a t e g i c nuclear forces within the next decade.th e problem of keeping thq. East European empire intact maydictat~~reguireanentsor luinimum l e ve l s of Soviet conven-t ionaL forces, i s r e s pe c t ive of United States p o s i t ions.

A t the same time, however, because the S o v i e t s (orsome,*ofthem) seem to have 8 strong s t r a t e g i c jbn%erest i nregula t ing the' arms competition, they mag be w i l l i n g t oabandon some taboos, such as aeria l s ur v e i l l a nc e of Soviett e r r i t o r y , which, whether by their c h o o s h g Or no t p areperhaps becoming dispensable itennscsuftable for internat iona lbargaining.

S i a i l a r l y ,

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1 THE D I L F I ~ AF BOYIER

A. The Problem

B .

C . P o l i c y S i n ce Cuba

The P o l i c y of Indirect Competition

11. TFIE STRATEGY OF DIScmMAh'EI?''f

A.

B . S t r a t e g i c Objectives

C . The L i m i t s of Disasmment

General Atti tude towards Arms L h i t a t i Q n s

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. . I I. TEE DILEMMA OF POVIERI-r

A. The Problem"

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Driven by the i r grea t power p r e t e n s io n s as w e l l asby p u r e l y m i l i t a r y c o n s i de r a t i on s , the Soviets have longf e l t compelled t o r i v a l t h e m i l i t a r y might of t h e UnitedS t a t e s . This compulsion h as been vexing t o Soviet s t r a t eg -ists who have foand,&hemelves a t a grea t d i sadvan tage i n ,

r e s p e c t to mater ia l resources at t h e i r disposa l , and who

a t each junc tu re have had to face t h e r e a l i t y of m i l i t a r yc a p a b i l i t i e s which were incommensurate w i t h both Sov ie tp o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s a n d t h e U. S. chal lenge. Except fors h o r t p e ri o ds i n which Sovie t b ravado and pub l ic c redu l i tycombined t o p r o j e c t a mirage of a power imbalance i n favorof t h e USSR, t h e Sov iet s have been i n t h i s predicaments i n c e a t l e a s t 1957. It was then t h a t t h e Soviets, giddyw i t h the f i r s t s u c c e s s f u l ICBM test which Syabol iCal lyended t h e i n v u l n e r a b i l i t y of t h e United States t o s t r a t eg i ca t t ack , began t o cha l lenge t h e primacy of U.S . m i l i t a r ypower.

P l a i n l y , t h e S o v ie t s see m i l i t a r y force as a symboland instrument of t h e i r t o t a l power po si ti or l. They expect

the world t o see i n t h e growth of t h e l s m i l i ta r y power proofof t h e success a n d i n v i n c i b i l i t y of t h e i r s o c i a l system.Moreover, the p o l i t i c a l a mb it io ns of the USSR seem t o p la c ed i f f e r e n t , e v e n greater , demands on S o v ie t m i l i t a r y d ev elop -ment than, s a y , might be deemed necessary for d e t e r r e n c eof genera l war, I t has appeared t o be a basic Sovie t po l icyassumption--and a sound one--that a world be l i e f i n S ov i etm i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y w o u l d be ex t remely he lp fu l t o the s u c -cess of t h e Communist movement and of S o v ie t f o r e ig n p o l i c y .A c o r r o l l a r y a s s u m p t io n e v id e n t l y is t h a t 8 world image ofS o vi e t m i l i t a r y i n f e r i o r i t y v i s- a- v is t h e Nest--an imagedeve lop ing s ince 1961--is a serious l i a b i l i t y . I f Bovietl e a d e r s , p o l i t i c a l and mi l i t a ry , are at odds on a numberof basic d e f e n s e q u e s t i o n s , t h e y seem t o be of one mind on

t h i s .

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1. A Modern Day Bismarck

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. ; Khsuskchev h imse l f is an unabashed p r a c t i t i o n e r ofc l a s s i c a l r e a l p o l i t i k . He has regarded the s t r a t eg ic powerba lance a s c r i t i c a l t o h i s f o r e i g n po l i c y , and on the b a s i s0% -ciaimed " p h i f t s i n t h e c o r r e l a t i o n of fo rces" he hasdemanded co nc ds s io ns from t h e 'i'iest. Basing pol i c y on claiqedS o v ie t m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , he has t r i e d to erode the Westerpw i l l to oppose Sovie t p o l i t i c a l o f f e n s i v e s . And he h a s ex-

weapons i n naked attempts a t n u c l e a r c o e r c io n .

m i t , c on fe re nc e t o t r y LO settle o u t st a nd i n g i n t e r n a t i o n a lissues w i t h t h e Vest on the b a s i s of an a l leged new align-ment of power. Having p i c t u r e d the ICBM breakthrough int h e USSR as ending U.S. s u p e r i o r i t y , he made the spec iousclaim t h a t t h e S o v i e t s were now r o u gh ly e q u f v a l e n t i n m i l i -tary power w i t h t h e United St a t e s . V h i l e he achieved agsee-ment i n 1959 over an exchange of v i s i t s between P r e s i d e n tEisenhower and h i m s e l f , and es tab l i shed t h e " S p i r i t of CampDavid" which marked a new phase i n Sovie t f or e i gn p o l i c yand domestic p o l i c y as w e l l , a series of u n f o r tu n a t e ci r -cumstances (for him) prevented t h e m u l t i l a t e r a l s u m m i t con-f e re n ce i n P a r i s in 1960 f rom m a t e r i a l i z h g and l e d theS o v i e t s t o under take a major reassessment of the s t r a t e g i cs i t u a t i o n .

' p l o ' i t e d t h e world's fear of n u c l e a r war, brand ish ing h i s

In t h e t f i f t i e s , he waged a h a r d campaign f o r a sum-

Having fa i l ed t o make progress toward a p o l i t i c a ls e t t l e m e n t on the b a s i s of a cla ime d new alig nmen t of powerdur ing Pres ident Eisenhower g s adminis t ra t ion, Khrushcheva g a in used t h i s s trategem w i t h P r e s i d e n t Kezaaedy. Soona f t e r m ee ti ng w i th t h e P r e s id e n t i n V ien na in Yuly 1961,Khrushchev declared:

The Weste rn l eaders s t a t e t h a t the m P l i -tary power of t h e c a p i t a l i s t and soc ia l -is t camps now is equa l ly ba lanced . . . Int h e p o l i c y of t h e Western powers, unfor-t u n a t e l y , there is no common s e n s e , acommon se n s e which sh o ul d f l o w from t h e

acknowledgement of t h e c o r r e l a t i o n offorces t h a t has a r i s e n in t h e world.,..

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Again in J u ly 1961, Warushchev pl a i n t i v e l y argued--on theb a s i s o $ , a l l e ge d a d mi ss i oq s i n t h e Vest t h a t bloc s t r e n g t hw a s l*ncd i n f e r i o r " t o Ve s te r n s t r e n g th - - t h a t " w ith equals t r e n g k h , t h e r e m u s t b e e q u a l r i g h t s , e q u a l o p p o r t y n l t i e s . "But once ag ai n, .HChrushchev's e f f o r t s came t o n o th in g . TheA m e r i c an ' p h t i n t h e East-Vest dia logue was n ot t o concedea changed poy&r re la t i on sh ip as a b a s i s f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s,I n f a c t , t h e V ni te d S t a t e s . i n 19 61 p ur su ed a p o l i c y ofs u b s t a n t i a l l y s t re n gt h e ni n g i t s s t r a t e g i c and t a c t i c a lf o r c e s , and, consequent ly , of widening i t s m i l i t a r y l e ado v e r t h e USSR. By September 1961, U.S. spokesmen were

. c la iming c lear mil i t a ry supremacy for t h e Un it ed S t a t e s(and ad di ng h s u l t : i n j u r y by publ ic ly downgrading ear l i e re s t i m a t e s of Sovie t ICBBI s t r e n g t h ) .

2 . Foreign Pol icy Record

The record of S o v ie t f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n r e s p e c t t ot h e East-Y!est con f ro n ta t io n over t he pa s t decade shows amix of g a i n s and losses. On th e one hand, Sov ie t mili-t a r y power, t ho ug h i n f e r i o r t o t h a t o f t h e U n it ed S t a t e s ,has succeeded i n i n h i b i t i n g c e r t a i n V es te rn i n i t i a t i v e sand i n making the U ni te d S t a t e s r e c o n c i l e i t s e l f to g a i n sa l r ead y ach ieved by th e .USSR. Thus, So vi et power was suf-f i c i e n t to discourage the Vest from i n t e r ve n i n g i n t h eHungar ian upr is ing of 1956 and from smash ing the Ber l in

T:all c o n s t r u c t e d i n 1 96 1. On t h e o th e r ha nd , t h e S o v i e tp o s t u r e was not formidable enough t o f o r c e t h e :!est i n t op e r ce p t i b le p o l i t i c a l r e t r e a t on major outs tanding i n t e r -n a t i o n a l issues. Sovie t power f a i l e d , f o r example , top r e v e n t t h e U n it e d s t a t e s from deploying nuclear weaponsa t European ba s e s i n t h e ' f i f t i e s ; 'it f a i l e d t o cow t h eVest into a B e r l i n s e t t l emen t ; and it f a i l e d i n t h e mostd i r e c t c o n f r o n t at i o n w i t h t h e U ni te d S t a t e s t o e s t a b l i s ha s t r a t e g i c mi l i t a ry base in Cuba (a l though i t succeededin e s t a b l i s h i n g a p o l i t i c a l l y i mp or ta nt S o v i e t p r es en c ei n Cuba) .

A lth ou gh t h e p a t t e r n 02 success and f a i l u r e i n SO-v i e t f o r e i gn p o l i c y d e f i e s a t t em p ts t o draw a s t r i c t cor-

r e l a t i o n between them and th e power b ala nce , t h e reco rd

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of S o v i e t a c t i o n s n e v e r t h e l e s s shows t h a t , a t l eas t s i n c et h e E o r p n Van., the Soviets have always b e e n s e n s i t i v e t ot h e Un,gted S t a t es pos tu reh md p o l i cy and t o t h e changes i nt h e w o r l d m i l i t a r y s t r u c%ur e . e Although t h e y have ta lkedtough and l i b e r a l l y invoked s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t s a t d i f f e r e n tt i m e s s i n c e S t a l i n ' s d e a t h , t h e y have genera l ly been ex-t remely cautgous i n a c t i o n . It can be s a i d , t h a t , as a

r u l e , t h e i r a g g re s si v e d e c l a r a t o r y p o l i c y h as been occa-s ioned by seeming changes i n t h e power b a l a n c e i n t h e i r

favor--ICBI breakthrough, space f e a t s , high y ie ld e x p lo -s i o n s , etc.--but t h e i r C Q n s e s V a t i V e a c t i o n s ha ve been oc-

cas oned by a r e a l is&ic appsec i a t on of t h e s t r a t e g i c powers i t u a t i o n , i n w h i c h , t h e y have always been second-best.

and problems of s t r a t e g y i n rea31 l i f e can seldom be reducedt o simple formulas OP equa t ions . Cons ide r , for example,the fo l lowing paradox : t h e c l e a r s t r a t e g i c supremacy oft h e U n i t e d S t a t e s has prevented the USSR from f o r c i n g i t sprogram for a European se t t lement on t h e West; on t h e o th e r

hand , anx ious t o redress t h e imbalance of power in ordert o res tore dynamism t o t h e i r f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t h e S o v i e t sembarked on t h e v e n tu r e t o place m i s s i l e s i n Cuba. Supe-r io r U.S. power i n t h e Cuban case d i d not r e s t r a i n b u tr a t h e r tended t o provoke t h e USSR t o u n de r ta ke a r i s k yventure; however, when t h e moment of c o n f r o n t a t i o n occurred,t h e s i t u a t i o n r e v er te d t o t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , in which t h eS o v ie t l e a d e r s h ip b e l i e v e d i t t h e be t t e r p a r t of v a l o r to

r e t r e a t i n t h e f a c e of a s u p e r i o r W.S; power.+*

The l o g i c of power t a k e s unexpected t u rn s , however,

*Even i n t h e case of Eorea, th e Sov ie t s p robably had ca l -cu l a t ed t h a t t h e U n i t e d Sta t es would not intervene m i l i -t a r i l y i n t h e e v e n t of a North Korean attack:admin i s t ra t i on had ind ica ted s uc h a course b u t t h e mesident '

r e v e r s e d himsel f upon learning of t h e North Xorean t reachery .

t h e U.S.

**In regard to t h e Cuban venture, long and carefu l s t u d yof t h e S o v i et a c t i o n h a s l e d us t o b e l ie v e s t r o n g l y t h a tt h e S o vi et s , a t l e a s t u n t i l the P r e s i d e n t ' s s p e e c h of 22October , d i d n o t estimate t h a t there was a g r e a t r i s k of

s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k a g a i n s t e v e n C u b a , l e t alone themselves:a t any s tage of t h e v e n tu r e.

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B. The Pollicy OS In di re ct Competi t--.oaI '-,'/

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.-;'The S ov i e t s , t hen , have l ong had a consuming des r et o be ranked as s u p e r i o r or a t l e a s t equa l to the UnitedS t a t e s i n m i l i ta r y might and t o e f f e c t p o l i t i c a l c h a n g e sow t h a t b a s i s . T h i s m o t i va t i on , i n t u r n , h a s g i ven i m p e t u sto t h e more s t k i c t l y m i l i t a r y n eeds to compete w i t h t h eU ni te d S t a t e s i n a n arms race. For what w o u l d s u f f i c e asa "minimum deterrent" f e l l s h o r t 09 t h e p o l i t i c a l need toclose t h e s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y gap. However, because of t h epecu l i a r ph i l o sophy of t h e p r e s e n t S o v i et l e a d e r s h i p , andt h e a r r a y of advantqges ( nota bly sec rec y) and disadv ant -ages ( n o t a b l y s t r a i n e d r e s o u r c e s ) , in comparison t o the

United St a t e s , t h e USSR h a s almost never .attempted tQ compete ,

d i r e c t l y w i t h t h e U ni te d S t a t e s i n an arms b u i l d - u p , buthas r e p e a te d l y tu r ne d t o i n d i r e c t methods to ach i eve itss t r a t e g i c o b j e c t i v e s .

T h e i n d i r e c t methods u s e d haye i nc luded , a t v a r i o u st i m e s and in var iou s combinat ions , (1) dec ept i ve propagandaclaims about S o v i e t miss i l e strength, (2) p o l i t i c a l exp l o i -t a t on of e a r l y t e chno l og i ca l b reak t hroughs i n weaponryand space exp l o ra t i on ; (3) t h e build-up of powerful forcest o cope w i t h t h r ea t s from Siestern Europe, and th e holdin gof Europe as s t r a t e g i c hostage under t h e numerous m e d i u mand in t e rme dia t e range b a l l i s t i c miss i les ; (4) major m i l i -t a r y d e m on s tr a ti o ns , such as m i l i t a r y bu dg et i n c r e a s e s a nd

v e r y h i g h y i e l d n u c l e a r e x p l os i o n s .Cuban m i s s i l e base ven t u re , which was i n d i r e c t i n the s e n s et h a t i t was a bold a l t e r n a t i v e t o a d i r e c t com pe t i t i on i nnumbers of i n t e r con t i n en t a l weapons for t h e purpose of sub-

s t a n t i a l l y im pr ov in g S o v i et s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t i e s a g a i n s t t h eU ni t ed S t a t e s . *

There was a l s o t h e

*The m i s s i l e s which were t o be deployed in Cuba werei n t ended t o supplement and ease requ i rement s on the S ov i e tICBM program, bu t not t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r it.

. . .



In t h e l a t e ' f i f t i e s , when the S o v i e t s . i n t h e p o l i t -ica l -propaganda realm bol gly and r e p e a t e d ly c h a l l e n g e d t h eprimacy':'of U.S. m i l i t a r y ,power, t h e y p a ra d o xi c a ll y f a i l e dt o c on ve rt a t e c h n o lo g i c a l head- s t a r t i n t o a s u p e r i o r i t yi n fo rces - in -be ing . U n t i l 1962, S o v i e t i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l ,fo rces g rew very l i t t l e . I t had been d e c i d e d i n t h e e a r l y' & i f t i e s not., t o have a major in te rc on t i ne n t a l bomber fo r ce ,and a d e c i s i o n w a s evident ly made in 1958 to forego deploy-ment of t h e f i r s t g e n e r a t i o n ICBM in f a v o r of second gene-r a t i o n systems, t h e i i r s t of which W Q U I ~ot become opera-t i o n a l u n t i l e a r l y 196%.

The pa t te rn 8.f actual development and deployment ofweapons of t h e i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l s t r i k e f o r c e s of t h e USSR

between 1957 and 1962 r e f l ec t ed no governing s t r a t e g i c con-cep t , e x c e p t , p e r h a p s , t h a t of seek ing , w i t h minimal means,t o deter t h e United S t a t e s f rom a t tack ing t h e S o v ie t campand to a c h i e v e m i l i t a r y r e s p e c t a b i l i t y . Furthermore , duringt h a t per iod t h e USSR possessed none of t h e fo l lo wing cap-a b i l i t i e s claimed or in t imated by t h e propaganda and byS o v ie t w r i t i n g s on m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e :

(1) a m i l i t a r i l y e f f e c t i v e p r e - e m p t i v e

(2) a s u r e - f i re r e t a l i a t o r y c a pa b i l i t y ;

c a p a b i l i t y;

or

(3) a war-winning c a p a b i l i t y a g a i n s tt h e U n i t e d S t a t e s .

Nor can i t be s a i d t h a t , i n t h e p e r i o d i n q u e s t io n , S o v ie tp l a n n e r s so u gh t t o e f f e c t a shift i n t h e ba lance of powerby means of rea l increments in S o v i e t i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l s t r i k ec a p a b i l i t i e s . If there was i n f ac t a s t r a t eg ic phi losophywhich guided the development of of f e n s v e i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a lf o r c e s up t o 1962, it was t h a t of a "very minimum deterrent I'

\



F o r b e f o r e t h a t d a t e , t h e U 3 S R had a force 0.: dubious re-l i a b i l i t j y which, 'in r e l a t t o n t o U.S. offens ive and defen-s i v e I&ces, w a s capab l e df do i ng ve ry l i m i t e d damage t o

9. muchmore ser ious deployment program, more o r l e s s consonantw i t h , t h e s t r a t e g i c t h r e a t , w a s i n evidence bejeose t h a tda%e i n respeqt t o s t r a t e g i c s ir de fen se weapons.

I n s h o r t , as n a t i o n a l i n t e l l i g e n c e e s t i m a te s havepo i n t ed out , t h e USSR w a s w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e on ac tua lc o n d i t i o n of l i m i t e d i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l c a p a b i l i t i e s and con-s i d e r a b l e v u l n e r a b i l i t y over a long p e r i o d of t i m e . B u tt h i s was not t r u e of the seeming-.co n d i t i o n of t h e s t r a t e g i cm i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n .

In t h e p e r i o d i n which c r i t i c a l d e f e n s e d e c i s i o n swere being made--1958--Khrushchev was Fi rmly in t h e sad-d l e . It was i n all p r o b a b i l i t y his ideas about ; Jovietlong-range fo rc e development t h a t car r i ed t h e day. Facedas he was w i t h competing demands for l i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s(he had , for example t o choose between a l a rge ICBM pro-gram and a l a rge B'IRBM program), and con fid ent about hisa b i l i t y t o understand h i s c o u n t e r p a r t s i n t h e Y;est and t ocon t ro l r i sk s , K hrushchev was in no h u r r y to u p s e t a c t u a lU . S . mi l i t a ry supremacy by dep loy ing a powerful in tercon-t i n e n t a l s t r i k i n g fo rc e . Khsushchev, r a t he r , was c o n f i d e n tt h a t a s e e m i n g a l t e r a t i o n in t h e power s i t u a t i o n woulds e r v e h i s purposes, a t l e a s t i n t h e ne ar r un . He undes-

stood q u i t e w e l l t h a t what m a t t e r s i n ' r e g a r d t o t h e powerba l ance ques t i on in peacet ime is n ot t h e a c t u a l m i l i t a r yc a p a b i l i t i e s of a s t a t e , b u t what o t h e r s t h i n k about thes t a t e v s c a p a b i l i t i es - -or more acc ura te l y , vha t one s t a t e ' sb e l i e f s are about ano ther . In 1960, he exaggerated Sovietr o ck e t c a p a b i l i t i e s a ga i n s t t h e United S t a t e s because hew a s aware of ac tua l 3oviet i n f e r i o r i t y i n s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s ,b u t was c o n f i d e n t t h a t h i s claims Would be g e n e r a l l y b e li e ve d .

, m e r i c a n t e r r i t o r y i n t h e e v e n t of g e n e r a l war,

Thus, i n t h e y e a r s 1958-61, s t r a t e g i c decept ion-- inwhich Soviet propaganda formed a bond f o r Restern s e l f -decep t i on and f e a r s a bo ut t h e trend i n Sovie t s t r a t e g i cweapons development--to b o l s t e r t h e image of S o v i e t m i l i -t a r y power and , consequent ly , the S ov i e t s t r a t e g i c deter -

r e n t . As p o i n t e d o u t i n other i n t e l l i g e n c e i s s u a n c e s g

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I

s t r a t e g i c decept ion, a s a n i n t e g r a l p a s t of s o v i e t p o l i c y ,had as objec t ives no t on lp compensa t ion for an unavoidable,advers,&j' mba lanc e i n s t r a t e g i c power , but also t h e conceal-ment 3 r o m t h e Best t h a t t h e Sovie t ICH3EI 3!orce programmed ,

f o r t h e period 1958-1962 would not close the gap and mighteven ,permi t i t t o widen s u b s t a n t i a l l y . The e f f o r t t o dece ive ,msreover, waF intended not merely to d e t e r an attack on theSoviet Union, ' b u t to secure p o l i t i c a l gains as w e l l .

f e c t of 7 o v ie t d e c e p t i v e m i s s i l e claims reached a high p o i n ti n e a r l y 1960. I n h i s speech t o the Supreme ",viet i n Jarnu-a r y of t h a t year he , boas t ed t h a t t h e USSR w a s " s e v e r a lyears" ahead of t h e United s t a t e s i n t h e "mass produc t ion"

of ICBMs, and that t h e "Sovie t army t oday possesses suchcombat means and f i r e power as no army has e v e r had before, It

s u f f i c i e n t " l i t e r a l l y t o wipe t h e c o u n t r y or c o u n t ri e s t h a ta t t a c k us off t h e face of t h e ea r th . " Consequently, X#su-shchev s a i d , " th e S o v i e t p e o p l e can be calm and conf iden t ;t h e Soviet army's modern equipment ensures t h e u n a s s a i l -a b i l i t y of o u r country . t1 f > t t h e end of t h e following monthhe would announce unambiguously t h a t t h e Soviet Union is"now t h e wor ld s s t r o n g e s t m i l i t a r y power.

Over t h e same p e r io d , t h e p r i n c i p a l m i l i t a r y e le me nti n t h e S o v i e t d e t e r r e n t scheme was t h e massive fo r c e in tendedfor war ag ai ns t Europe. Thi s might have been a meaningfulanti-U.S. s t r a t e g y i n a p u r e l y m i l i t a r y s e n se had the wi th- -drawal of SAC forces f r o m E u r o p e not Coincided w i t h t h eemergence of t h e S o v ie t NIRBM fo rce . The r e a l d e t e r r e n ta g a in s t t h e Uni ted S ta tes , hence , w a s l a r g e l y i n d i r e c t ;Europe , as Khrushchev would acknowledge ( i n September l9 6 l ) ,was a "hostage."

t h e s t r a t e g i c d ec ep ti on scheme had b a c k f i r e d ; n o t o n ly wasit exposed t o t h e whole wor ld b u t i n the meantime i t haddone irreparable damage to t h e USSR b y s t i m u l a t i n g a majorimprovement i n t h e d e f e n s e p o s tu r e of the U n i t e d S t a t e s ,t h er e b y r e s u l t i n g i n a s u b s t a n t i a l w id en in g of t h e ac tua lU.S. m i l i t a r y l e ad . i!'urthermose, i t was by t h a t t i m e c l ea rt o t h e Sovie t l eaders t h a t t h e e f f e c t i v e n e s s of t h e counter-Europe t h r ea t had been undermined by t h e p r o v e n i n a b i l i t y

Khrushchev's p u b l i c conf idence in t h e d e t e r r e n t ef-

By t h e end of 1961, t h e Sovie t l eaders rea l i zed t h a t

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of t h e ? o v ie t s t o f o r c e l' le st er n p o l i t i c a l r e t r ea t s an d t oprovide ,{ the necessa ry back ing f o r Sov ie t po l i t i c a l o c'len-s i v e s gh !!estern Europe. '

P a in f u l l y c o n s c io u s of s l i p p a ge b ot h i n r e s p e c t t o

..f *

t h e power balance and t h e s t a b i l i t y of S o v i e t s t r a t e g i cd e t e r r e n c e ($h,eir r e t a l i a t o r y t h r e a t was no longer cred ib le

i n t h e West), Sovie t l eaders under took a g e n e r a l r e a p p r a i s a lof t h e p ea ce ti me S o v ie t m i l i t a r y p o s t u r e a nd t h e s t r a t e g i cs i tu a t io n . They conc luded, it seems, t h a t t h e i r s t ra t eg y --of b u i ld in g d e t e r r e n c e a n d p u r s u in g f o r e ig n p o l i c y objec-t i v e s on t h e b a s i s of; l u f f i n g t h e 7:'est about Sovie t long-r a n g e a t t a c k c a p a b i J i t i e s w h i l e h o l d i n g Europe hostage under the t h r e a t of mass a n n i h i l a t i o n of S o v ie t MRBMs--was

no longer adequate for p o l i t i c a l p u r p o s e s OF, perhaps , Torna t ionaL se cu r i ty .The immedia te Sov ie t r e ac t i on t o th e cr i s i s i n u t i l i -

t a r y s t r a t e g y was t o t a k e a new se r i e s of e s s e n t i a l l y in-d i r e c t measures t o improve t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n ( a n c-regard t o t h e immediate p o l i t i c a l problem, t o s t r e n g th e nth e weakened barga in ing p os i t io ns of t h e USSR i n B e r li n ).Some of t h e s e measures were demons t ra t ions OF coun te r -demonstra t ions; o t he rs amounted t o r e a l i n c re m e n ts i n S o v i e tm i l i t a r y p o w e r . To h e lp obscure o r compensate f o r t h e i rs t ra t e g i c de f ic ien c ie s , th e Sov ie t s emphasized super -bombsmanned bombers, and nuclear s u b m c t r i n e s . They resumed nuclearte s t in g , suspended the t ro op reduc t ion program, de::ersed

t r a n s f e r of s p e c i a l iz e d c a t e g o r i e s of 'servicemen t o thereserves , and announced increases in t h e o v e r t m i l i t a r ybudge t .

CPSU Congress, t h e Defense Mi ni st er drew a p i c t u r e of al a r g e and v e r s a t i l e m i l i t a r y e s t a b l ishment t h a t was pre-p a re d t o l a u n ch a pre -emptive a t t a ck aga ins t a would-beaggressor and t o f i g h t e i t h e r a s h o r t or a p r o t r a c t e d wari n Euzasia i f n e c e ss a r y. l a l i n o v s k iy ' s s p e ec h a l so gaved o c t r i n a l u n d er p in n in g t o t h e p o l i c y m ea su re s b e a r in g o nt h e size and composition of t h e armed f o r c e s , t h e r e b y i n-d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e c ha ng es were in tended t o h a v e g r e a t e rpermanence than was sugg ested by prev ious :Soviet p ub li c

s t a t e m e n t s .

I n f a l l 1961, i n a major p o l i c y s p e e c h a t the 22nd



T

.

The dec i s ion t o make pub l i c i n t h i n l y v e i l e d langu-age t h e ; d o c t r i n e *of pre -eyp t i ve ac t ion was e v i d e n t l y t a ke nw i t h t,hs a i m of c o u n t e r i n g p o s s i b l e i n t e n t i o n s of t h e U . 3 .adve r sa ry t o fol low up i t s new c l a i m s t o m i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t yw i t h a more a g g r e s s i v e f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The S o v i e t s , i n e f -f e c t , i n t i m a t e d t h a t the USSR had lowered t h e t h r e s h o l d fori r i i t ' i a t i ng w.a~f . They presumably es t imated that the t h r e a t -ened i n i t i a l u s e of nucleaks by them (if h r e a t e n e d w i t himmdnent attack) would be more c r e d i b l e t han t h e i r prev iousclaims to a r e l i a b l e second strike c a p a b i l i t y .

had t o f i n d a new b a s i s on which t o b u i l d the image of So-v i e t m i l i t a r y power. The dramatic measures taken i n 1961

would not have a l a s t i n g e f f e c t . The c o l l a p s e of s t r a t e g i cdecept ion , t h e d iminut ion of s t r a t e g i c secrecy, t h e emesg-ence of Communist China as a r i va l pow er and p o t e n t i a l t h r e a tt o S o v i et s e c u r i t y , t h e ch an ge s in the composit ion and de-ployment of U.S. s t r a t e g i c fo rces , and probably such domes-t i c problems as scarce r e s o ur c e s and d i v i s i o n s i n t h e l e a d -e r s h i p - - a l l t hese f ac t o r s combined t o f o r c e t h e S o v i e t s t osearch f o r new answers t o t h e s t r a t e g i c dilemma. The con-c l u s i o n m u s t have been unavoidable t o t h e S o v i e t l eader s :a r e a l i n t e r c o n ti n e n t a l a t t a c k c a p a b i l i t y ha d t o be developed.The U n i t e d S t a t e s i n 1961 was s t i l l i n 8 p o s i t i o n t o devas t -a te t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w i t h r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e damage t o i t sown t e r r i t o r y .

'i 'lith t h e s h i f t i n g of t h e s an ds , t h e S o v ie t l e a d e r s h i p

In 1961, t h e S o v i e t s w e r e i ndeed t ak ing m e a s u r e s toimprove t h e i r i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y . Theys t epped up cons t ruc t i on of s i t e s for advanced ICBMs; an dthey sought to improve t h e i r r e t a l i a t o r y c a p a b i l i t y byharden ing a p o r t i o n of t h e new launch s i t e s .

Such measures t a k e a l o n g t i l e t o implement, and t ipe--

a t l e a s t as f a r as t h e c o m p e ti t io n in ICBMs is concerned--was p l a i n l y on t h e s i d e of the Uni ted X a t e a . In view oft h e urgency which they at tached to the problem 0% sedress-i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c i mb al an ce which could no l onge r be con-cealed from t h e world, t h e 30viets i n 196% t r i e d a t y p i c -a l l y in d i re c t and unusua l ly imagina t ive meaeuver to e f f e c ta changed s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n almost overnight. Having

estimated t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n would not provoke U.S. i n t e r v e n t i o n

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(beyond a p o s s i b l e blockade) and t h a t i f t h e Uni ted S ta teswere abgut t o i n t e r v e n e ( $ . e . t o t ake m i l i t a r y a c t i o n b e y o n da blocvikde) t h e USSR c o u l i i withdraw w i t h o u t i r r e t r i e v a b l ep ol it .i ?c al l o s s , t h e S o v i e t l eaders took a chance on deploy-in g EBRBM and IRBM l a u n c h e r s i n C u b a .ceeded, t h e i r a d d i t i o n a l s t r a t e g i c s t r e n g t h would have sig-n i 3 i c a n t l y a)t,ered t h e g e ne ra l s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n , so groatw o u l d have been the psycho log ica l impact of even a s m a l l

number of Sovie t IRBIv'Is and MRBMs i n C u b a .

Had t h i s gamble suer

C. Pol icy Since Cuba,

1. Controversy over t h e New Cour se

Y i t h t h e co l l apse of t h e Cuban venture, t h e c r i s i si n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s t r a t e g y h a d d e e p e n e d .S o v i e t s f a i l e d t o e f f e c t a r a d i c a l improvement in t h e i rs t r a t e g i c pos tu re - - they su f fe red t h e embarrassment of agrave defeat which cos t them p r e s t i g e w i th t h e i r Eas te rncomrades as w e l l as with the Yes te rn adversa ry .

Not only bad t h e

Both t h e deployment in and wi thdrawal of missi lesfrom C u b a were taci t admiss ions of S o v ie t s t r a t e g i c in-f e r i o r i t y . The Ce nt ra l Committee orga n Kommunist (No. 18,1962) e x p l i c i t l y a dm it te d i n a n editorial t h a t the Sovie tl e a d e r s h i p had "sober ly weighed ' t h e ba lance of power" d u r -ing t h e cr i s i s i n t h e Caribbean and took the only reason-able course open to them. I"& s o v i e t p r e s t i g e dipped lowin t h e wake of t h e c r i s i s , t h e remaining dynamism went outof f o r e i g n p o l ic y , l e a v i n g i t aimless and v i r t u a l l y immobile.The Chinese taunted t h e S o v ie t l eaders w i t h a c c u s a t i o n s ofbo th "adventurism" and "cap i t u la t onism. '' Sovie t m i l t a r ymorale seemed t o s l i p t o a low ebb and t here were ind ica -t i o n s of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n among t h e m i l i t a r y o v e r K hr us hc he v' shandl ing of t h e Cuban operation.

Under such condi t ions , t h e need t o improve the r e l a -t i v e s t r a t e g i c p o s it i on of t h e USSR w i t h genuine incrementst o t h e mil i tary became a p o l i t i c a l l y i r r e f u t a b l e a r g u m e n t ,and t h e p o s i t i o n 02 t h e advoca tes of greater defense spend-i n g was consequen t ly s t reng thened .

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B ut aga i n , t h e expec t ed, t h e l o g i c a l , d i d not happen.Rather , , , (Soviet leaders f e l l i n t o a pol cy struggle, Bast ingu n t i l , s p r in g 1963, over what c0urse t o BoPlow i n pu r s ui t09 the common objective of improving the c o u n t r y ' s r e l a t i v es t r a t e g i c pos i t i o n . On tb bas i s of l a r g e l y i n d i r e c t a ndinconc lus ive ev idence , we have d i s ce rned t w o p r i nc i pa lsehobls of t hought i n con t en t i on over a whole range ofb a s i c n a t i o n a l p o l i c y matters . There was on t he one hand ,t h e t r a d i t io n a l i s t - m in d e d school which argued for d i r e c tmeasures t o improve t h e c o u n t r y q s t r a t e g i c pos i t i on . Thisgrouping, which probably attsfPcted m o s t of t h e m i l i t a r ye l i t e and was a p p a r e n t l y l e d by Kozlov i n t h e Party Pres i -dium, sought (1) to , i n c r e a s e t h e de fense e s t ab l i shm en t 's

share of t h e c o u n tr y * s s t r a i n e d resources; (2) to make even

greater t h e d i s p a r a t e growth of heavy i ndus t ry by g r ea t l yexpanddrig, among o t h e r t h i n g s , plant f a c i l i t i e s for heavymachine-building; (3) t o strengthen CQDV@nt%Ona%s w e l las s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r y f o r c e s ; (4) t o t a k e a hard line onfo re i gn po l i c y , and , hence , to undermine ear l i e r e f f o r t st o achieve accomodat ion with t h e T:es% (e .g., disarmamentn e g o t i a t i o n s ) .

The o ther school of t hough t , which w e s h a l l c a l l Khru-shc hev 's inasmuch as he was pl a i n l y I ts p r i n c i p a l s p o k e s -man, prefer red to steep an a l mo s t d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s i t ecou rse (a l thou gh toward t h e same ob jec t ive of improving ther e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n 01 t h e USSR).w a s t o m ai nt ai n t h e pacs of growth of 3 o v i e t arm@d s t r e n g t h

without f u r t h e r impai r ing t h e cop;lntry's economic growth ors t i m u l a t i n g t h e West i n t o a n ot h er cycle in t h e wms r ace .In t h e p i t c h of t h e debates , Khrushchev thus sought ( a ) t ohold the l i n e on r e so u rc e a l l o c a t i o n s , r e s i s t i n g a r a d i c a ld i s t r i b u t i o n of resources e i t he r i n favor OB t h e m i l i t a r ye s tab1 shment or economic development ; (2) t o res is t anyw'idening of t h e gag i n rate of development between heavyi n d u s t r y ( m i l i t a r y ) a nd l i g h t i n d u s t r y , and s p e c i f i c a l l yt o oppose any major expansion of t h e heavy machine-build-i n g i n d u s t r y ; (3) t o c u t back the s i ze of c o n v e nt i o na l f o r c e sw h i l e s tr e ng t he n in g s t r a t e g i c lorces; (4) to p u r s u e rapproche-ment w i th t h e Vest and genera l ly to reduce i n t e r n a t i o n a l

.tendiOnS; ( 5 ) t o engage i n disarmament negotiatPona w i t h t h ea i m of slowing down the arms race and improving t h e re la -

t i v e s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n of t h e USSR. The last aim, whichis c e n t r a l t o t h i s s tu dy , w i l l be d i s c u s s e d a t l e n g t h s h o r t l y .

Khrushchev's p la n

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s

I t appea r s , i n r e t rospec t , t h a t dur i ng t h e w i n t e r .of 1962-63, Khrusbchev s u f f e r e d s e r i o u s Boss of prestigsi n Sovif!$ r u l i n g c i rc l e s ; ,;?hat h i s s t r a t eg i c if not g o l i t i -c a l LhSnking was p u t i n t o q u e s t i on ; t h a t he had some ve rysough ' s l edd ing , , es pec ia l ly i n January and February ; and t h a tS o v ie t f o r e i g n p o l ic y l a p s e d i n t o a confused and ra ther a i m -l e ~ s t a t e i n t h e course of' t h e i n t e r n a l p o l i cy debates.Eventua l ly , *ward the end of Ma~ch , Khrushchev managed tog e t t h e upper hand. A t that t-e, S ov i e t fo r e i g n pol .i cyseemed t o t a k e a m ore de l i be ra t e C O U F S B - - ~ ~ o p t i m i s t i cTsarapkin made a "b ig concess ion" a t Geneva; accard wasreached on a "hot l ine"; t h e S o v i e t s asked for r e s ~ m p t h nof b i l a t e r a l t a l k s on Berlin and Germany, e t e . - -and s ignsof a se t t l em ent i n Khrushchev 's favo r of ou t s t and i ng dames-

t i c i s s u e s , n o t a b l y r e s o u r c e a l l o c a t i o n s , began t o appear .Thus, Khrushchev's course ev en tu al ly won o u t i n t h e

i n t e rn a l rough and t u m b l e , and it is t h i s cou r se w e seebeing c h a r t e d today. H i s success has been i l l u s t r a t e d byt h e s i g n i n g of a p a r t i a l t e s t b a n t r e a t y in Ju ly , and t h eannouncement i n December of a m a m m o t h chemical investmentprogram, a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e m i l i t a r y budget (nominal thoughIt may have be en ), and a "contemplated" c u t i n t h e s i z e ofS ov i e t forces.* Although Khrushchev's views now seem t o pre-v a i l , there is s t i l l i m p o r t a n t r e s i s t a n c e which m u s t be over-come if c e r t a i n of h i s foreign and domest ic programs are eve rt o see t h e light of day or are to have any l a s t i ng e f f e c t s .Each of h i s programs is f o u g h t for i n d i v i d u a l l y ; each t e n d st o gi ve way t o a g r e a t e r or less,er degree t o t h e i n e r t i aof t h e Sovi et bureaucracy. The r e s u l t is t h a t , h Q W e V e P

r a d i c a l Khrushchev-@s r i g i n a l p l an s for change may be, t h ebureaucracy seldom makes ra di c al swings in n a t i o n a l p o l i c y ,

*In h i s speech a t t h e February 1964 plenum of t h e C e n t r a lCommittee, Khrushchsv mentioned a t one p o i n t t h a t t h e USSR"is p ro ce ed in g w i t h c e r t a i n s e d u c t i o n s i n m i l i t a r y e x pe nd i-t u r e s and t h e num er i ca l s t r eng t h of t h e armed forces,"

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ET



because of omnipresent strongly e n t r e n c h e d i n t e r e s t s . * Asw e s h a l L see s h o p t l y , t h q r e is evidence of, internal resis t -ance tm' hruskchev ' s mmsk r e d u c t i o n and control schemes,a s t h k was evidence of r e s i s t a n c e t o his resource aBPoca-t i o ns p rogram. 3

. '. -t r a t eg ic Assessment

Looking now a t t h e s t r a t e g i c power s i t u a t i o n , theSovie t s p robab ly see t h e i r relative posi t ion improveds ince the Cuban debacle of October 1962, b u t s t i l l g r e a t l yi n f e r i o r t o t h e UniTed States i n terms of a c t u a l m i l i t a r ypower, and sti l l p r e c a r io u s in terms of t h e world image

of t h e balance of power. Thus, on t h e one hand, th ey maysee i n the world t od a y a f a i r l y s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o nwhich is owing in p a r t t o t h e deployment or' 8 r e l a t i v e l ymodest I-!,! force combined with a massive Suropean thea te rc a p a b i l i t y , a n d i n p a r t to &&e U . S . acknowledgment th a t

t h e Soviet Union is capable 0% doing gr ea t damage t o t h e

-*Khrushchev's speech rat t h e February 1964 plenum of t h e

Cent r a l Committee con ta ined an i l l umi na t ing d i s cus s io n ofthe problem of b u re a uc r at i c i n e r t i a i n t h e Soviet Union.In an e f f o r t t o e x p l a i n why his chemical program adoptedi n 1958. as nev er f u l l y implemented, Khrushichev s a i d :

' I .

. t is very d i f f i c u l t t o c hange e x i s t i n g p r o po r t i o n s.TQ make i t c l ea re r , I s h a l l make use of geomet r ica l term.Take a c i r c le , devide i t i n t o 368 de gr ee s among t h e com-mit tees , m i n i s t r i e s , and Gosplan depa rtme nts. Everyonethen guards h i s own sec tor w i t h i n t h e l i m i t s ass igned h i m .A s 8 r u l e , w h i l e working out t h e p l a n for t h e nex t yea rand determining t h e e x t e n t of ca p i t a l inves tment by ind i -v i d u a l br a nc h es , t h e l e v e l of inc rease ach ieved l a s t yearis taken as t h e base. So if a b ra nc h i n t h e p a s t yearhas shown an increase of 8 . 5 p e r c e n t , t h e n t h i s is t akenby t h e d e p a r t m e n t a l i s t s p r o t e c t i n g t h e i n t e r e s t s of t h e i rbranch of t h e i r s e c t o r as the s t a r t i n g b a s i s of'the planfor t h e nex t yea r , wi thou t t ak in g changed cond i t ions in toaccount. t1

,

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United s t a t e s (even in a r e t a l i a t o r y strike) and t h e r e b yhas a @edib le (a l though pot abeolwte) s t ra teg ic de te r -rent. ,!Repeated by t h e S e b r e t a r y QQ Defense on s e v e r a loccasi'ons s in c e th e Cuban cr s is, t h i s acknowledgementhas been eager ly rece ived by t h e Soviets and used t o sub-s t a n t i a t e s t r i d e n t c la im s, resumed i n 1963, to a r e l i a b l ea ~ dr ed ib l e , qecond s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y .Sov ie t compuls ion t o th re a t en p re-empt ive ac t ion - - tha t is,Lo a d v e r t i s e a lower th resho ld of w a r i n t h e even t ofimp en din g E e s t e r n n i l t a r y i n i t i a t i ve s- -h as t h u s diminished,a s has t h e appearance 01 such t h r e a t s .

The prev ious

Th e S o v i e t s , , o n t h e o t h e r hand, cannot help b u t be

d i s q u i e t e d a b o u t t h e w e l l - pub l i c i z e d f a c t t h a t t h e U. 3 .

s t r a t eg ic f o r c e s are f a r m 0 r e p o w e r f u l t h a n c o u n t e r p a r tYoviet fo rces , can k i l l t h e USSR s e v e r a l t i m e s over, andeven a j l t e r r ece iv ing a Sovie t f i r s t nu cl ea r saXvo, can i na r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e a n n i h i l a t e t h e main s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t si n t h e USSR. s o v i e t m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ' a p p r e c i a t i o n of t h emagnitude of power and v e r s a t i l i t y of combat capabi l i ty oft h e "main adversary" is p l a in ly r e g i s t e r e d , among otherplaces, i n t h e Defense Mi ni st ry book, "ldili tasry St ra te gy , '

i n both i t s v e r s io n s .

The g rea t d i spar i ty in Borces - in -be ing is o n l y p a r tof t h e s t o r y . The o t h e r p a r t is t h e f a c t t h a t Lhe Uniteds tates h a s a f a r grea te r p o t e n t i a l t o i nc re as e t h e f i r e -power of i t s s t r a t e g i c f o rc e s (it can add some BO00 Minute-

men a year t o i t s a r s e n a l s ) a t f a r l e g s cost t o the coun-t r y ' s general economic development and p u r s u i t of Otherm i l i t a r y p r og r a m t h a n has t h e IJSSR.

The d i s p a ra t e s i t u a t i o n i n r e s p e c t t o b ot h forces-in-being and potent ia l , moreover , is bound t o be a c h i e ff a c t o r m o t i va t i ng t h e T o v ie t s t o a l t e r the s t a t u s quo i nth e i n t e r n a t i o n a l power s t r u c t u r e . !:hile the Sovie= arep r ob a bly c o n f id e n t t h a t t h e i r present power positlbon iss u f f ic i e n t t o de t e r t h e Vest :Cmm i n i t i a t i n g g e n e r al war,t h e y have l i t t l e reason t o b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y can win s u c ha war, or even su rv ive as a n a t i o n s h o u ld d e t e r r e n c e f a i l .Ilor can t h e y be c om plac en t a b ou t t h e p o l i t i c a l w or th oft h e i r m i l i t a r y power vis -a -v i s t h e l iest .

- 1 5 - .



s T

Vhat t h e S o v i e t s l e a r n e d f ro m t h e a b o r t i v e effortt o p l a c e m i s s i l e s i n C u b a is t h a t t h e U ni te d S t a t e s , s ol o n g ab' i t had s t r a t e g i c ' s u p e r io r i t y ( l o c a l s u p e r i o r i t y .is no.d 'necessary, as i n t h e case of B e r l i n ) , w o u l d a c ta g a i n s t a ny S o v ie t e f f o r t of t h a t Bind to change thebalance of power.o P h de, terminat ion on severa1,occas ions in 1961 and1 9 6 2 , b u t t h e ' s o v i e t leader had e vi de nt ly not been con-vinced. Khi le Khrushchsv may dec ide t h a t i t is necessa ryt o t e s t Pres ident Johnson as w e l l , Khrushchev seems a tp r es e n t t o be of a d i f f e r e n t p e r s u a si o n , and t Q be' t t empt ingt o change th e power balance i n o th er , less sudden and pro-vocative ways--e . . arms c o n t r o l *

President Kennedy had w-lxzshchev

To s u m up, the Soviets a t t h i s j u n c tu r e p r o b a b ly. f i n d t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l s t r a t eg ic s i t w t on more comfort-able t h a n a t : an y t i m e s i n c e e a r l y 19663, i n that t h e i r ' de te r-r e n t has recogn izab ly inc reased . They n e v e r t h e l e s s d e s ireto improve t h e i r r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c g o s i t ion, which remainsv e r y i n f e r i o r , t ho ug h t h e y are under l e s s compulsion thanin 1961-62. As suggested e a r l i e r , f o r c e s s u i t a b l e ford e t e r r i n g t h e Tiest f ro m in i t i a t i n g g e n e r a l war migh t n o ts a t i s f y S o v ie t p o l i t i c a l r e qu ir e me n ts . The f a r more' power-f u l and l e s s v u l n e r ab l e U.S. s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s , i f t h eUnited St a t es makes c l e a r i t s de te rmina t ion t o use themi f n e c e s s a r y , w i l l g e n e r a l l y act as a brake on a g g r e s s iv et e nd e n ci e s i n S o v ie t f o r e i g n p o l i c y . If t h e U n it ed S t a t e smain ta ins a c r e d i b l e s t r a t e g i c m il i t a r y supremacy , th e

USSR would be wi thou t e f fe c t iv e . g rounds t o change the p o l l -t i c a l order of th in gs i n Europe--no more through negot ia-t i o n s t h a n t h r o u g h d i r e c t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . Consequently,t h e S o v i e t s are eager t o n e u t r a l i z e U.S. s t r a t e g i c s up re -m a c y , t o f o s t e r a nd p r e s e r v e t h e idea ~f nuc lea r stalemateand s t r a t e g i c b a l an c e ; t h e y a re c e r t a i n l y a n xi ou s t o pre-v e n t t h e g a p fr om w id en in g a ny f u r t h e r ; and t h e i r c u r r e n tp o l i c i e s s u g g e s t t h a t t h e y are u n w i l l i n g t o t o l e r a t e t h ee x i s t i n g s t r a t e g i c gap i n d e f i n i t e l y a nd are a c t i n g t o reducei t . Their preferred method of a c h ie v i ng t h e s e g o a l s , isn o t the m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c a t t ack weapons to p a r a l -l e l t h o s e of t h e United gta ters, but--as w e s h a l l a r gu e i nth e p a ge s t h a t f ol lo w- -a r e v e r s e s t r a t e g y o f arms c o n t r o li n c o n ju n c t i o n w i th a vigorous R L D program, e s p e c i a l l y

i n t he f i e l d of e s s e n t i a l l y d e f e n s iv e w e a p o n s .

- l e -



\

11. THE STRATEGY OF DISARMl'J.B~NTTi l e

6 J /$' / I

I .

A. General A t t i t u d e Towards A r m s L i m i t a t i o n s

These.djays l t is v er y d i f f i c u l t to speak of a "So-.

v i e t a t t i t u d e " as i P a l l S o v i e t e l i t e views conformed withIChrushchev's . P la in ly , th ey do not. There e x i s t s , r a t h e r ,8 d i v e r s i t y of views among t h e Sowiiet e l i t e on perhaps thewhole gamut of d o me s ti c and f o r e ig n p o l i c y matters. Weare on f irmer ground when w e s p e a k of Ia rushchev ' s v iewsand t h e oppos ing v iews ,of i d e n t i f i a b l e s p e c ia l i n t e r e s tgroups , such as the m i l i t a r y high command.

. 1. Khrushchev's V i e w s

On t h e q u e s t i on of r e a c h in g a c c o r d w i th t h e Nest onarms l im i t a t i o n s , K hr us hc he v' s t h in k in g may d i f f e r g r e a t l yf ro m t h a t of h i s m i l i t a r y associa tes . H e h a s l o n g d i s p l a y e da n i n t e r e s t i n u s in g dis ar ma me nt i s s u e s os an ins t rumentof p o l i c y; w he re as t h e S o v i et m i l i t a r y , t r a d i t i o n a l l y , h av es e e n l i t t l e va lue i n di sa rmament ou t s id e of propaganda,a l though of l a t e the y have ev i de n t ly begun t o t a k e a p r o f e s -s o n a l i n t e r e s t i n d is ar ma me nt g u e s t i o n s . *

Khrushchev, w e t h i n k , now s e e s ' i n c e r t a i n t y p e s ofarms l i mi t a t io ns , even when symmetr ica l ly imposed, a m e a n sf o r a dv an ci ng t h e i n t e r e s t s of the 3ov ie t Union . He probab ly

*There now exists in the USSR Min i s t r y of Defense a s m a l ls taff concerned with d isarmament . ( S i m i l a r s t a f f s h a v ebeen s e t up i n Poland and Czecho slovakia .) bn th e USSR,t h e s t a f f p ro vi de s m i l i t a r y c o n su l t an t s to t h e M i n i s t r y ofFore ign A:tf a i r s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l O r g an i z a t i o n S e c t i on , w hichis r e p o n s i b l e for d is arm am en t o r g a n i z a t i o n a l work. k t u a l l y ,however, t h e disarmament po l i cy ques t ion s are handled ona much h igh er po l i cy l ev e l .

- l a -



s

d r e a d $ d em on st ra te d a wkl lin gne ss Lo agree on some mea-s ur e s. , 'f or l i m i t i n g t h e arms race1 i n d i c a t i n g t h a t disarma-ment is more than a propaganda tool for him. Y h i l e he hasp u r s u e d c e r t a in arms c o n t r o l schemes i n c o n j u nc t i o n withcveating an atmosphere of p o l i t i c a l d e te n te , it seemsl i k e l y t h a t 'vhrious arms c o n t r o l schemes have an i n t r i n s i cv a lu e for him, ra the r than being dependent on a "soft;"phase of S ov ie t diplomacy. Kn other W O F ~ S , a w a r m i n t e r -n a t i o n a l c li ma te f a c i l i t a t e s accord on arm l i m i t a t i o n sb u t is n o t e s s e n t i a l %or t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n 09 agreementswhich have a l re ad y been made. The S o v i e t s would e x p e c t ,because of the s t r o n g m u t u a l i n t e r e s t i n n ot s t i m u l a ti n g

a new cy cl e i n t h e arms r ac e , t o r e t a i n a good amount ofp o l i t i c a l f l e x i b i l i t y . S u c h was the case d u r in g the 1958-

61 morator ium on nu cl ea r- te s t in g; and such was t h e casea g a in i n t h e fal l . of l963- -a f te r t h e s i g n i n g of t h e t h ree -environment t e s t ban treaty--when t h e S o v ie t s h a r a s s ed theVest i n respect to convoy passage on t h e Autobahn and Pro-fe ss or Barghoorn' s a r r e s t . Indeed, t h e S o v i e t s i n theser e c e n t a c t i o n s may w e l l have been te s t ing t h e i r room. or

Khrushchev and h i s c o l l e a g u e s , p l a i n l y ha ve r e ga r d eddisarmament as a very u s e f u l means of p o l i t i c a l a g i ta t i o n

to capture peace s e n t im e n t s a nd t o m o b i l i z e p r e s s u r e a g a i n s tWes te rn m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n s and a c t i o n s . S t i l l , even I n t h el i g h t of t h e d i s a p p o in t i n g r e c o r d of disarmament negotia-t i o n s , i t would seem f a i r to s a y t h a t t h e S o vi et i n t e r e s ti n disarmament has almost a lways t ranscended t h e i n t e r e s ti n propaganda. An abi din g aim--beyond t h a t of propagandae x p l o i t a t on--of Sov ie t disarmament pro pos als over t h e p a s tdecade has been t o r e s tr u c t u re world mi l i t a ry power to t h eadvantage of t h e USSR. Some proposa l s have t r i e d t o t rade-o f f r e d u c t i o n s i n force t h a t would have been (or a l r e a d yhad been) u nd er ta ke n u n i l a t e r a l l y i r r e s p e c t i v e of t h e Vest-ern response ; and some have sought to d i sa rm t h e Vest 09

i t s d i s t i n c t m i l i t a r y a d v an t ag e s by e l im in a t i n g t h o s e wea-pons which were i n ample s u p p ly i n U.S. a r s e n a l s b u t h a r d ly

e x i s t e d a t a l l i n S o v i e t a r s e n a l s .

- 18 -



s

Moreover, w h i l e t h e ,Xmiets s i n c e 1954 have usua l lyc a l l e d FQI- formals t r e a t i e s . on arm l i m i t a t i o n s , t h e y ha vea l s o t d e d t o p l a c e l i m i t s on t h e arms race by t a c i t agree-inent . .;'The 1958-651 moratorium on n u c l e a r t e s t i n g was a s u c -c e s s f u l outcomerof such a p o l i c y . S i m i l ar l y , t h e c u r r e n tp r a c t i c e of bidd ing QOP IpecLprocal. u n i l a t e ra l red uc t ion s ,or3 i n Khrushchev's words "a p o l i c y of mutual example, I t isn o t r e a l l y n6d . Thus, i n March 1957, after t h e 3ov i e tbudget had been c u t an d S ov i e t trooi3 s i z e had been reducedby n e a r l y 2 mil l ion men t o t h e gre-Korean war level, Zorindec l a red a t t h e U ni ted Na t i on s t h a t "ac t i ons of t h i s kinddo mu c h to improve th e in t e rn a t io na l atmosphere and s t r eng the nconfidence between s t a t e s . !.ll governments , and pa r t i c u l a r lyt hose w i t h l a r g e armed forces, would do w e l l t o follow t h a t

example.

Khruslichev himself advocated rec ipro cal . unilateralarm r e d uc t io n i n e a r l y 1960 i n a p p e a l i n g to The !?est t ofo l low h i s announced plan 0.C a one-third r educ t i on. in t roop s i z e . A t t h a t t i m e , however, he was bidd ing forc u t s i n c o n ve n t io n a l f o r c e s w h i l e c la iming s u p e r i o r i t y i nh s s i l e s and mi l i ta r y power i n g e n e r a l . Once aga i n i nDecember 1963, i n announcing p la ns t o cu t m i l i t a r y s pe nd in gand f o r c e s , h e d i d t h e same th in g. This t i m e he made noc l a im s t o 3 ov i e t m i l i t a r y sup remacy , and he has s i nce hadsome success i n g e t t i n g t h e U ni te d S t a t e s t o re sp on d i n t h emanner des i red by him. In a year-end s ta tement to t h e UPI,Khrushchev s p e l l e d o u t h i s preferred disarmament scheme,

which he a p p r o p r i a t e l y ca l l ed a "poll i c y of mutual example" :

I should l i k e to no t e one other a s p e c tof t h e matter , which is t h a t if s o l u t i o n s0 . C some 02 the above ment ioned i s su es Pe qui rea p p r o p r i a t e i n t e r n a t i o n a l a gr ee me nt s, i"orothers a d i f f e r e n t a p p r o a c h can be Pound.Take for i n s t a n c e t h e ques t i on of m i l i t a r ybudgets. The Supreme Joviet of the USSRhas a l r e a d y t a k en a d e c i s i o n to reduce ourm i l i t a r y e x p e n d i tu r e u nd er the budget for1964. I t w o u l d be a good thing if others t a t e s a l s o took s i m i l a r a c t i o n . P am q u i t es u r e t h a t t h e peoples would wholeheartedly

i ndo r se such a pol i cy- - I would c a l l i t wpol c y of m u t u a l example-- in t he cu r t a i l m en tof the arms race.

- l 9 -

.



s T

Or take t h e quest ion of r e d u c t i o n s offorces.i ' h g t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of c e r t a i n further reduc-

f o r c e s . There is h a r d l y any nedd for d e t a i l e d .e x p l a n a t i o n t h a t i f s i m i l a r taction were taken

arppeai-.'for f u r t h e r colastruc$ive measures toachieve an i n t e r n a t i o n a l d e t e n te

A t l e a s t a t t h i s s t a g e , the idea of B P Q C A ~ F Q C Z ~ uni-

I r e c e n t l y said w e were conternplat-

. , : . t i o ns i n t h e s t r e n g t h of our @ o ~ n t a " y ~ srmed

' by t h e other s i d e too, new chances would

. l a t e r a l disarmament s e e m s t~ appeal most to IChsushehev asa means of a c h i e v in &UPPIIS c ~ n t r o l nd improving the r e l a -

sees a number of advantages i i a this approachto '

the overa$ ls t r a t e g i c power s t r ugg l e . R e c i p r o c a l u n i l a t e r a l disarma-ment precludes the problem of i n s p e c t i o n ; does not bind t h eS o v i e t s t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l treaties (and like t h e moratorium,can be undone a t lower cost i n terms of world opinion thani f t h e USSR w e r e l e g a l l y bound by t r e a t y ) ; a f f o r d s t h e S o vi etUnion general ly greater f l e x i b i l i t y t ha n in a n e g o t i a t e ddisarmament; and does not invo lve t h e S o v i e t s in drawn outEast-West n e g o t i a t i o n s o v e r measures t h a t the USSR wouldl i k e t o take q u i c k l y i r r e s p e c t i v e of 1Yestesn actions (sucha s a c u t i n conven t iona l fo rc e s ) .

t i v e s t r a t e g i c m i l i a ry p o s t u r e of the USSR. He undoubtedby

On t h e other hand, t h e Sovie t s do no t have t h e as-surance i n this approach t h a t t h e Viest will fo l low s u i t .

The West d i d n o t , for example , respond i n k i nd t o ear l i e rSovie t force and budgetary c u t s . For this reason, one cans p e c u l a t e , i n t e r n a l O ~ ~ O Q ~ R ~ Sf & F O Q ~ u t s might f i n da l l i e s mong f o r e i g n a f f a i r s o f f i c i a l s who may fee l t h a tmore could be gained from t h e Vest by negotiated arms con-t r o l s e t t l e m e n t s .

Khrushchev himself h a s i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e idea ofu n i l a t e r a l r e d u c t i o n s had to be sold to his s k e p t i c a l c o l -leagues. In t h e summer of 1963 he t o l d a v i s i t o r about aprevious MQSCOW debate on u n i l a t e r a l v e r su s n e g ot i at e d forcer e d u c t i o n s , i n which he argued s u c c e s s f u l l y that t h e Westshould not be allowed to c o n t r o l t h e S o v ie t d e c i s i o n . X ee v id e n t l y a l s o had e n c ou n t er e d r e s i s t a n c e to t h e idea of

uni la te ra l d i sa rmament as opposed t o t r ad ing-of f , i n fo rmal

- 20 -

s



.. '

. .

n e g o t i a t i o n s i n late 1959, when he was t ry ing t o g ai n ap-p r o v a l ,$n ruling Soviet c$scles f o r his plan for a one-t h i r d #tat i n t h e s i z e of *Sovie t fo rces . Thus, % W O weeksbefore! announcing his p l a n in January 1968, Khrushchev re-marked a t a Kremlin recept ion: '( . . If t h e s u p p o r t e r s OY

the Gold war drag us into the labyrinth Q$ e n d l e s s debate ,m u b t ' w e m i g W t h e i r path, the one t o which they wish t oimpel us? Should we not t h i n k for o u r s e l v e s and unilater-a l l y r ed uc e our armed r t o ~ ~ e snd place rockets t o guardo u r f r o n t i e r s ? "

2. M i l i t a r y S k e p ti c s

The m i l i t b l r $ e l i t e , Who haV@ been knolwrm t o $ O l dideas v e r y d i f f e r e n t from HChsushctaee~~sbout force r e q u i r e -

t a t i o n s ch em es .ments, also have shorn Signs of d i s s e n t his arm P i m i -

T h e m i l i t a r y e l i t e may, contrary t o Khrushchev, tendto regard n o t arms c o n t r o l b u t a r m expansion as the bestway to approach t h e problem of s t r e n g t h e n i n g nationals e c u r i t y . M i l i t a r y e l i t e a t t i t u d e s , t o be sure, are 601-

ored by p r o f e s s i o n al i n t e r e s t s in main ta in ing and inc reas -ing t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e m i l i t a r y e s t ab l i s hm e n t . S o v i e tm i l i t a rg o f f i c e r s , moreover , may fret t h a t s e ve r e m i l i-t a r y cuts--even t hough accompanied by s i m i l a r OF grea ter

r e d u c t i o n s i n the West-tend t o ' underr$.ine t h e p r e s t i g e andpower s t a t u s of t h e m i l i t a r y i n Soviet s o c i e t y .

t y p e s of accord disarmament as p r e J u d i c i a 8 to t h e in-teres ts of S o v ie t n a t io n a l s e c u r i t y , OF t o their profes-sional i n t e r e s t s . They would probab ly offer no r e s i s t a n c et o t y p e s of disarmament arrangements that dl0 n o t a d v e r s e lya f f e c t S o v i e t force s t r u c t u r e , a n d t h a t t e n d t o be morep o l i t i c a l in na$ure, such as non-aggression pa ct s and de-nuc lea r ized zones .

On the other hand, t h e m i l i t a r y may no t r egard a l l

There is f a i r l y good ev idence t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y highcorngland (presumably with some e x c e p t i o n s ) was v e r y relax-t a n t t o have t h e USSR s i g n 8 t r e a t y b an ni ng n u cl e a r t e s t i n g

- 211 -



i n t h r e e environments. A s t u d y of BED STAR between %hei n i t i a l i n g of Uhe -test b?p drea&y on July 26 and its s ign-ing cbnihgust g P showed that the p r i n c i p a l organ of thedefense es t ab l i shment had nothilag whatever to s a y i n favorof the ban. I n c o n t r a s t , PRAVDA kept up a . cons tan t streamof propaganda in favor 09 the t r e a t y during that p e r i o d .Nigrebver, Marshal Malinovsky's 28 July O r d e r of $he Day,honoring EJavk'Day, po in te d i n t h e same d i r e c t i o n . Insharp c o n t r a s t w i t h t h e mood of th e t i m e , Ial inovsk~v tressedt h a t t h e dangar of! war had not diminished and that theUSSR was "st rengthening" i t s d e f e w e c a p a b i l i t i e s 8 Aftert h e treaty was s i gned , however, the s e n i o r o f f i c e r s re s ig n edthemselves t o t h e accomplished P a c t and acknowledged it asan e a r n e s t of the p b a c e f u ~ n t e n t i o n e of the USSR.

,

. .

The m i l i t a r y a g ai n subtly demonstrated opposition

t o Khlrushchev's i n t e n t i o n , announced at the December Plenumof the Central Committee, t o under t ake another u n i l a t e r a lforce cut. A s t u d y of the Soviet press and r a d i o broad-c a s t s found another ins t ance of conspiracy of s i l e n c e on

force c u t s h a s been under de l i b e r a t i on i n h i g h e r p o l i c yc i r c l e s ,** Thus not u n t i l the end of February d i d 8 s e n i o rmarshal mention Khruahehev's prop osal for another t roop c u t .Some mil i tary SpQkeSm@n--no&ably Marshal CBiugko~ i n anXWESTX'YA a r t i c l e on 21 December--have seemed to argueaga ins t i t , p r i n c i p a l l y by warning of a cont inu ing bu i ld -up of Viestern nsampowEr strength. Soviet m i l i t a r y organshave given minimal

a t t e n t i o n ta+h e

proposed troop c u t ;at t h e same time, they have publ i shed materials c a l c u l a t e dt o draw a t h r e a t e n i n g picture of Western m i l i t a r y powerand hence t o r e i n f o r c e t h e warning given by Chuykov.

t h e past of $be m i l i t a ry , while the question of further

*See FBIS R dio Propaganda Report CD. 233 of 5 September1983, " I n d i c a t i o n s of S o v i e t M i l i t a r y O p po s it i on t o t h eTest Ban Treaty."

1964, f lSovie t M i l it ary Demonst rates Resastance to ThreatenedForce C u k s

.

**See FBIS Radio Propaganda Report CD . 241 of l a January

- 22 -



Khruslichev has s i n c e mentioned--once b r i e f l y Bn h i sFebruary, 11 speeoh a t t h e , .Central Committee plenum--thatt h e So&t Union " is psoc8eding" w i t h " c e r t a i n r e d u c t i o n s "in rniliitarg expend i t u re s and troop st rength. However, hisc a r e f u l l y mbi&uous l anguage regard ing the p r e c i s e statusof these rnet~s11res, aken together w i t h his commitment i nthe Same speech t o e n s u r e the s a t i s f a c t i ~ n f a l l m i l i t a r yrequi rement s ; 'raises a queStion as t o how successful PChru-shchev has been in p u t t i n g across h i s program for m i l i t a r yc u t s .

B. S t r a t e g i c O b j e c ti v e s

The S o v i e t s now s e e m to be p ~ r ~ ~ i n gp~lllacgraimeda t c o n t r o l l i n g the East-::lesi: arms race. O n the b a s i s QTt h e current S ov i e t a c t i ons , the character Qf pas t S ov i e tdisarmament proposals our understanding s f Soviee s t r a -t e g i c m i l i t a r y t ho ug ht and c a p a b i l i t i e s , and the g e n e r a ls t r a t e g i c p re di ca me nt 01 the USSR desc r i bed in the f i r s ts e c t i o n of t h i s pape rp we i n f e r a range 02 probable stra-t e g i c ( p o l i t c o- mi li ta ry ) ~ b j e c t i v e s f t h e c u r r e n t Sovie tp o l i c y of l i m i t i n g the arms race.*

*Terminology, evident€y, IIQ l onger poses a problem fort h e S o v i e t s . Their r e j e c t i o n or accep tance of the Amesi-can usage of "arms C O I ~ ~ I P Q ~ " epends upon whether 8 s t a t e do b j e c t i v e of "arms con t ro l " is genera l and complete dis-armament. Thus, She inin , vice cha i rman of t h e Committeeon t h e Study of Disarmament i n t h e USSR Academy of Sciencesr e c e n t l y w ro te in an Amepican journal:

At t h e p r e s e n t time, after the AmericanGovernment has agreed w i t h Soviet Govern-ment on p r i n c i p l e s of c~mplete nd uaniver-s a l disarmament, measures of ' l a r m ~ontro1"are proposed as ways toward t h e r e a l i z a t i o nof these p r i n c i p l e s , n o t as a l t e r n a t i v e sto t h e m . Such, a t least, s h o u l d be t h ecase--and such is %he be l i e f of JeromeWiesnes, who wrote t h a t "arms c o n t r o l "means the same i n t h e United Sta te s asdisarmament means in t h e USSR. (BULLETINOF ATOJAAHC SCIENTISTS January 1964)

- 23 -s



s

1. Alter t h e Power Balance! I .*

. r In working t o reach accord w i t h the Vest on l i m i t -

r,

4 ;..

i ng t h e arms race, t h e Soviets (notably FXhrushchev'scoterie) seems t o have as 8 pr i m ary ob j ec t i ve the improve-m e n t of t h e r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c military p o s i t i o n of t h eUSSR. They sde in a regula ted arm compet i t i on , we think,an opportuni ty--perhaps the o nly opp~r$@Jnit$in t h i s

them f o r a number 0% years: t h e i r f e l t need to r i v a l t h eUnited S t a t e s i n s t r a t e g i c military powers brat their in-a b i l i t y and/or m3luctaYkc@ to rise to t h e Challenge i nd i r e c t f a s h i o n . Hn this r espec t , th e S ov i e t s have a greater

i n t e r e s t i n p la c i ng l i m i t s on the arms race than t h e UnitedSt a t e s .

decade--to e Oe S S lV @ th@ pX%dhmeR& Which has @Qpbfl rQZl .&~d

A mininun Sovie t expec ta t ion is undoubtedly to pre-vent the imbalance of power--actual m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l - -from worsening. An extreme ex pe ct at io n may be to a l t e rt h e balance of power. i n t h e i r f a v o r . (This, w e t h i n k , ap-p e a r s t o S o v i et leaders as a r e a l i s t i c i f remote develop-ment, as we s h a l l argue l a t e r i n t h i s di scuss ion . ) TheS ov i e t s p robabl y c a l c u l a t e t h a t , w i t h i n t h i s decade, t h e ycan ach ieve t h r ough arms c o n t r o l measu~es i n c o n j u n c t i o nw i t h some forward movement i n armaments) a more symmetrical ,s t a b l e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n - - t h a t i s , more t han the minimumbut l e s s t h a n t h e m a x i m u m o b j e c t i v e s .

F u l f i l l m e n t OP %he in t s r i aa expec ta t ion- -a s t r a t e g i cstandoff--would be a great achievement for t h e USSR. I twould presumably be the S o v i e t c a l c u l a t i o n t h a t t h e UnitedS t a t e s , which was n o t provoked to attack the USSR whent h e United St a t e s had great s u p e r i o r i t y , would be even l e s si n c l i n e d t o do so when the m i l i t a r y s t r e n g th s of t h e twopowers were more ne ar l y equ a l . Such a s i t u a t i o n would t hena f f o r d t h e USSR greater f l e x i b i l i t y and op p o r tu n i ty toc h a l l e n g e asd probe U. S. p o s i t io n s m i l i t a r i l y and p o l i t i-c a l l y .loca l p reponderance og Sovie t convent ionaB m i l ita r y forcesi n Europe w o u l d take o n e x c e p t i o n a l s i g n i f i c a n c e in i n t e r -n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s in Europe.

,

In t h i s r e s p e c t , t h e p r ox i mi ty of t h e USSR and a

- a4 -



On t h e other hand, it does no t seem that t h e primaryin t@r@s$/ f t h e U S S R i n cqxrbrsP1 n g th@ arm compet ionis a lgi i t ing r e l a x a t i o n 02 i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s . sucha goalrwould imply acceptance of t h e s t a t u s quo in i n t e r -n a l r e l a t i o n s - - i n c l u di n g being r e s ig n e d t o an indeje i n i t es t a t e of marked s t r a t e g i c i n f e r i o r i t y , i n m i l i t a r y power,and i t t h e n e g o t i at i o n s t a b l e . W think, r a t h e r , t h a t t h e3 o v i e t s are edger to r e l a x i n t e r n a t i o n a l te n si o n s i n orderto f a c i l i t a t e progress toward more s p e c f i c p e l it i c a l ,economic and s t r a t e g i c g o a l s . Such goals inc lude (a) t h eb a s i c need to improve %he r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i c m i l i t a r ys t a t u r e of t h e U S S R; (b) t h e long-s tanding des i r e t o makesome s u b s t a n t i a l p r o gr e s s o n B e r l i n , and (c) t h e immediategoal of o b t a i n i n s s u b s t a n t i a l and long t e r m c red i t s froiii

t h e l'fest $0 Support lX9V SrOViet economic gSOglpanaS.

2. M a x i m i z e P Q W ~ Ft Lower Level of Expendi tures

A c o r o l l a r y of t h e ba s i c o b j e c t i v e of a l t e r i n g t h ebalance of power may be % he pescc?ived opportunity t o g a i ni n t h e s t r a t e g i c r i v a l r y by means of maximizing Sovie tpower a t a lower l e v e l of mi l i t a ry expend i tu re . Hence,Khrushchev, who is eager to s t r e n g t h e n h i s t w o bases--economic development and military power-for p o l i t i ca l lmaneuver, sees an o p p o r tu n i t y to have h i s cake an d e a tA t too. He could ease th e economic burden of s t a y i n g i n

the arms compet i t ion . Me m i g h t see a 'comparative advant-age i n a l i m i t e d arms competit ion inasmuch as the USSRis forced eo pay a much grea ter economic penalty for de-

Zense than is t h e United S t a t e s .

3, 18Contractiniz h e Arena"

Not onl y might Khrushchev move t o slow down the r a t eof expansion of forces in both camps; he might a l so see t h ep o s s i b i l i t y 02' reduc ing the s ize of t h e a r e n a of compet i t ioni n a way that would exclude f i e l d s in which the USSR wascomparat ively weak b u t allow t h e U3SR to compete in f i e l d s

i n which it was comparat ively be t t e r off OF might be thought

- 25 -



. t o b e n e f i t more i n terms of i ncrement s t o i t s s t r a t e g i cpower.

. , Perhaps a good example of what w e migh t ea11 t h es t r a t e g y of " c o n t r a c t i n g t h e arenaq1 s t h e agreement madel a s t f a l l a t t h e U.N. no t to o r b i t s t r a t e g i c weapons. H e mt h e B o v i s t s pay have s een c l e a r advantages for themselves:the agreement 'removes t h e n e c e s s i t y t o compete i n t h e de-velopment of a weapon i n which, w e bel ieve , they have no i m -mediate i n t e r e s t , a t a t i m e when c r i t i c a l r e s o u r c e s are un-d e r g re a t s t r a i n by compet ing requi rements , m i l i t a r y andc i v i l i a n , w i t h i n t h e USSR. (The agreement removes t h e needt o compete n o t o n l y , i n the development of o r b i t a l bombard-ment s y s t e m s but in the deOelopment of cos t ly counter -wea- .

pons t o n e u t r a l i z e t h e a d v e rs a r y 's c a p a b i l i t y as w e l l . ) Theagreement t h e r e b y e n a b l e s the S o v i e t s t o c o n c e n t r a t e t h e i rl i m i t e d r e s o u r c e s i n pursuits of t h e i r own choosing, wheret h e y may f e e l themselves t o be i n a stronger p o s i t i o n t ocompete e f fec t iv e ly - - to en joy the p r e s t i g e of ano t he r ' I f i r s t ' I

Hence, "cont raqt ing t h e arena" would a f f o r d t h e S o v i e t sgreater f l e x i b i l i t y b oth in respect t o s h i f t i n g r e s ou r ce sw i t h i n t h e m i l i t a r y es t ab l i shm en t and f r o m t h e d e fe n se t ot h e c iv i l i an economy.

t/

4:a .

4. Symmetrical Measures Seen as Advantageous

While asymmetrical forcel q e d u ct i o ns i n f a v o r of t h eUSSR a re , of course, prefer red by ' t he S ov i e t s , sym m et r i ca lr e d u c t i o n s o r other r e s t r a i n t s of apparent mutual b e n e f i tmay a l so s e rv e t h e a i m of imp rov ing t h e i r s t r a t e g i c s i t u a -t i o n . They may c a l c u l a t e t ha t apparen t symmet r i ca l mea-s u r e s c a n be advantageous t o them i n t h e fo l l ow i ng re spec t s :

(a) The d i s p a r a t e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n , which hasa tendency t o widen, can be prevented from doing so. Evenf a i r l y s ym me tr ic al arms c o n t r o l measures t end t o dep r i vet h e United S t a t e s of an important inh er en t advantage:grea te r p o t e n t i a l f o r s t r e n g t h e n i n g its F i l i t a r y power ( e . g . ,t h e a b i l i t y to add some 1000 Minuteman r ~ c k e t s y e a r ) .The g r e a t e r p o t e n t i a l of t h e United Sta tes is l i k e l y t o be

an advantage so l o n g as t h e S o v i e t d e t e r r e n t is g e n e r a l l y

- 26 -



e f f e c t i v e , b u t not a b s o lu t e . (Such a s i t u a t i o n obtains a tt h e p r e s e n t t i m e when t h e United States acknbwledges theexistent& of a 3 o v i e t s t r i t e g i c d e t e r r e n t b u t i n s i s t s t h a tthis cdolntry is not a b s o l u t e l y de te r red , on the c o n t r a r y ,that it is w i l l i n g t o r i s k a l l- o ut war i n defense of i t scommitments and i n t e r e s t s . ) We d o u b t t h a t t h e r e w i l l e v e rbe *a s i t u a t on of absolute m u t u a l deterrence; there is al-ways t h e p o ~ s ~ i b i l i t yh a t a nat ion would p re fe r d e a t h tos u r r e n d e r . In other words , a proclaimed " v i t a l i n t e r e s t "may be j u s t t h a t , t h e loss of which w o u ~ d e regarded ase q u i v a l e n t t o loss of B A f e , an i n t e r e s t t h e r e f o r e d e f e n d e dw i t h t h e l i f e of t h e n a t i o n .

(b ) T h e s t r a i n on S o v i e t r e s o u r c e s , created by the

demands of t h e new chemical program, moreover, w i l l probablybe p r o h i b i t i v e as regards t h e USSR's a b i l i t y t o c l o s e t h es t r a t e g i c gap by d i r e c t coangpetition w i t h th e United Statesin t h e expans on and d i v s r sif c a t ion of strategic f o r c e s .What is more, the task of main ta in ing t h e v i a b i l i t y of t h eS o vi e t d e t e r r e n t , of p r ev e nt i ng f u r t h e r s l i p p a g e i n t h es t r a t e g i c p os i t i on of the USSR, is becoming i n c r e a s i n g l yburdensome. (According t o the best judgment of th e U . S .i n t e l l i g e n c e com uni tp , the pace of Sovllet m i l i t a r y procure-ment w i l l be f o r c e d $0 S ~ O W own t o s a t i s f y t h e economicprogram. And even though t h e S o v i e t s in t h e s h o r t t e r mhave t h e o p t i o n Of reduc ing C OQVeXl t iOI l aP f o r c e l e v e l s t oe a s e - p r e s s u r e s on t h e s t r a i n e d resources, i n t h e long termt h e y w i l l probably have t o cult back or s t r e t c h out one OF

more programs for advanced weapons.) Hence, a g a in thea t t r a c t i o n of symmetrical arms l i m i t a t i o n s as a way out oft h e dilemma.

-

(c) The Soviets may also b e l i e v e t h a t t hr ou g h whatseem t o be mutual ly b en ef ic ia l d isarmament agreements t h e ycan o b t a i n immediate m i l i t a r y g a in s. For example, t h e So-v i e t s migh t have seen some mil i tary advantage in t h e s ign-in g of t h e test ban t r e a t y l a s t A u g u s t , In f a c t , they havee x p l i c i t l y claimed, ev i den t ly i n answer to unnamed internalc r i t i c s , t h a t t h e USSR h a s p r o t e c t e d i t s Bead i n h igh yi e l dweapons, w h i l e l eav ing open $he p o s s i b i l i t y of t e s t i n g smallweapons underground--a f i e l d i n which the Uni ted S ta tes a l -ready has a m i l i t a r y lead. There is no t e l l i n g , m o r e o v e r ,

how much informat ion and what kind of conc lus ions they have

- 27 -

s



drawn about t h e e f f ec t s of t h e i r v e r y h ig h y i e ld e x p lo s io n s ,informapion which is no% available t o us, but which theU n i t e d f 6 t a t e s r equ i res i f i o n l y t o e v a l u a t e more a c c u r a t e l yS o v ie t j s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k c a p a b i l i t i e s a nd U. S . requirementsfor d e f e n s e a g a in s t them.

2 '

5. El mcnate Obsolescent Forces

Another goal (which may be suppor ted by only a mi-n o r i ty i n t h e m i l i t a r y who s ha r e Khrushchev's views on war)may be t o c l e a r t h e , d e o k s of "QbSQh?te"weapons, i n s t a l l a -t i on s , and unnecessary perso nnel . Khrushchev 's concept ion

of what is obso lescen t is much broader than t h a t of manyof h i s m i l i t a r y c o l le a g u e s, and has been a con t inu ing sourceof con ten t io n between them. To t h e e x t e n t t ha t Khrnshchevdes i res to "clear t h e decks" by disakmarraent accord, i t isn ot s u r p r i s i n g t h a t t h e ground fo rces commanders are coldt o h i s arm c o n t r o l schemes: t h e ground forces now a re animmediate object of such schemes. I t is noteworthy thatw h i l e i n p a s t , S o vi et m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s j u s t i f i e d t h e re-t e n t i o n of a l a r g e s t a n d i n g a r m y on t h e grounds tha t i t w a sn e c e s s a r y i n t h e even t of g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r , they nowadvance t h e addi t ional argument t h a t t h e USSR must be pse-pared f o r t h e contingency of l i m i t e d war, The l a t t e r argu-ment is probably a more compelling and more d i f f i c u l t onef o r Khrushchev t o r e f u t e ; it may be t h e chief obstacle i n

t h e p a t h of t h e troop c u t which+he has "contemplated"--andwhich is probably much g r e a t e r t h a n t h e one plow s a i d to beunderway . (Khrushchev may, in o ther words, be t r y i n g tores tore t h e program tempo rar i ly adopted i n 196O--of s e v e r eu n i l a t e r a l c u t s i n co n ve nt io n al forces--which was g r a d u a l l ydefeated by a combination off i n t e r n a l and e x t e r n a l f a c t o r s . )

Again assuming t h a t it is a "clear t h e decks" program,Khrushchev would want t o cu t conven t iona l forces i r r e s g e c -t i v e of U . S . a c t i o n s . Reciprocal U.S. a c t i o n s , i n t h i scase, would probably make i t e a s i e r f o r Khrushohev t o pushh i s program through. In 1960 Khrushchev was m o r e f r a n k i ne x p l a i n i n g his o b j e c t i v e s : t h e nature of WEIF had changedr a d i c a l l y from TYorld War IP and a new philosophy was needed

f o r the development of S o v ie t forces, e tc . And he e x p l i c i t l y

- 28 -



s t a t e d i n p u b li c t h a t i t was no long er important whether th eT'est se .c ipsocate& i n c u t t J n g its f o r c e s ; t h e UESR would dos o i n @y case, a l t h o u g h I h e c ip r o c i t y was de s i r a b l e .

.. r

6 Prevent Disseminat ion 0.c' Lltra tegic ?;capons.a .

The S o vi e t i n t e r e s t i n p r e v en t i n g t h e saread of hu-

c l e a r power is probab ly a t l e a s t a s s t r o n g a s t h e Americani n t e r e s t . The S o v i e t s w is h t o c o n c e n t r a t e bloc n u c l e a rpower i n t h e i r own h a nd s ; t h i s b e in g im p o ss ib le , s h o r t ofmaking war o n C h i n a , ( o r c o l l u d i n g i n it), t h e 3 o v i e t s ha veacted t o i n h i b i t , a t l e a s t to defer , Chinese development

of nuclear weapons. (Ve w o u l d n o t r u l e o u t a S o v ie t dec i -s i o n a t same P u t u r e t i m e t o d e s t r o y OF t o c o o p e r a t e i nd e s tr o y in g C hi na 's n u cl e ar f a c i l i t i e s i n o r d er to preven tChina :L'rom r i v a l l i n g and t h r e at e n i n g t h e USSR as a majornuclear power . ) The dovie ts are also grea t ly concernedabout weapons-sharing in the % e s t ; a s IS known, th ey in te r-p r e t mu l t i l a t e r a l or m u l t i n a t i o n a l f o r c e s a s a f o r m ofd an ge ro us n u c l e a r p r o l i f e r a t i o n . T h e i r p r i n c i p a l co nc er nc l e a r l y is Vest Germany, which they fear a s a h i s t o r i c a l l yh o s t i l e power, and ag ai n st which t h r e a t they have developedenormous conven t iona l and s t r a t e g i c fo rc es . ( I t might exp la in ,i n l a r g e p a r t , t h e S o v i et s ' 'E uropea n myopia" r e f l e c t e d byt h e i r f o r ce s t r u c t u r e . 1

The Soviets are h e n c e l i k e l y t d have a k e e n i n t e r e s ti n any sugges t ions or schemes which might prevent OF r e t a r dt h e p r o 1 f e r a t o n of nuc l ea r weapons and s t r a t e g i c d e l verysys tems , bo th ins ide and ou ts id e t h e b l oc , o r , f a i l i n g t h a t ,which would impose i n t e r na t i on a l co n t ro l s on va r i ous Nthc o u n t r i e s a f t e r t h e y de ve lo p a n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y .

The Sov ie t p roposa l ( f i r s t advanced i n September1962) t o e s t a b l i s h a fixed number of s t r a t eg i c weapons s y s -t e m s i n t h e U ni te d S t a t e s and USSR seem t o r e p r e s e n t t h eq u in t e s c e n c e of S o v i et p o l i c y : L e t t h e r e be b u t two greatm il i t ar y powers , each supreme i n his own realm, and near lyequa l t o one a n o th e r , so as t o have a s tand-off and t o beab l e t o s e t t l e d i f f e r e n c e s w i t h a minimum danger of resor tt o s t r a t e g i c weapons . (The arrangement imp l ie s m a x i m u mf l e x i b i l i t y o n a t a c t i c a l s c a le , ?or m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s asw e l l as p o l i t i c a l . )

- 29 -



7,. Undermine NATO's Military S t r u c t u r eI ,*

111 ..L. .

..) L i t t l e need be s a i d about an obvious and r e l a t e do b j e c t i v e :s t r e n g t h . The c u r r e n t policy of pursu i ng a d e t e n t e dimin-i shes t h e aQpasen t Sovie t t h r e a t Lo Europe, and consegu-e n t l y u n d e r c d s U.S. e f f o r t s to b u i l d up European conven-tional f o r c e s . This tack may be m ore e f f ec t i ve *than tilebo is te ro us S ovie t propaganda aimed a$ forestalling thees t ab l i shm en t of a m u l t i l a t e r a l n u c l e a r farce i n Europe.On t h e other hand, however, being i n t e r e s t e d in s e p a r a t i n gEurope from t h e Uniped States and i n e x p l o i t in g De Garullle'st e n d e n c i e s i n that d i r e c t i o n , the S o v i e t s d~ not appear to

be opposed to t h e idea (which a t t h i s s t a g e is probablypopular on ly in the Kremlin) of m u l t i n a t i o n a l c o n v e nt i o na lforces in Europe, Such a development w o u l d 1mply greaterEuropean independence 0% U.S. m il i ta r y power; would notpose a s h a r p t h r e a t to t h e Sov ie t Union, which is a majornuclear power; and w o u l d t e n d t o promote S o v i et f l e x i b i l i t yi n d e a l i n g w i t h a E u r o p e v i r t u a l l y free of t h e U.S. n u c l e a rsuppo r t . * It might be something t h a t t h e S o v i e t s somedayw i l l w an t t o encou rage . Consider the fo l l ow i ng s t a t e m e n tby Marshal Yerememkko i n the June 1963 i s s u e of INTERNATIONALAFFAIRS :

to andermine Kestern m i l i t a r y cohesion and

In working ofat t h e i r own variants of a' l mul tinat onal n u c l e a r f o r c e , t h e V e s t

*The changing p o l i t i c a l r e la t i o n s h ip s i n t h e Viesterna l l i an ce may a l so a f f e c t the m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l v a l u e s thatt h e S o v i et s a t t ach t o their counter-Europe military t h r e a t .While k t may become l e ss e f f e c t i v e a g a in s t t h e United S t a t e sas Europe moves in the d i r e c t i o n of p o l i t i c a l - m i l i t a r yautonomy, th e cont inu ed ex is te nc e of a massive eounter-Europe t h r e a t may on' . the o t h e r hand, make a more independ-ent Europe more r e spons i ve to S o v i e t p o l i t i c a l demands.(This would be so e s p e c i a l l y i f D e tPaulHe succeeds inpersua ding European members of the NATO f am i l y t h a t t h eW . 8 . c o m i t m s n t to defend Europe w i t h nu cle ar weapons is

u n r e l i a b l e . I

- 30 -

S E a y



s T

European NATO c o u n t r i e s proceed from thepremise t h a t it i s S m u c h sa f e r t o have akeapon in one's Q W ~ ocke t than in t h a t

. ,:'of he most devoted f r i e n d . They proceedfrom ther"need" to make it c l e a r t o st pos-s i b l e enemy t h a t an attempt to launch

2 ' a g g r e 9 s io n a g a in s t a WATD coun t ry would' involve' st nuc lea r coun te r -a t t ack , for the

government of t h e given country would pos-sess nuclear weapons w o u l d have thei n d i s p u t a b l e r i g h t t o have a s a y i n d e c i d -ing on t h e i r use.

~f i t were a q u e s t i o n of conven t iona l arma-

m e n t s , these arguments migh t carry somew e i g h t . B u t as a p p l i e d t o nuclear weaponst h e y are nonsense.. .

8. To l a k e P o l i t i c a l Gains

17hile contending t h a t t h e ba s i c S o v i e t o b j e c t i v e inl i m i t i n g t h e arms race is t o improve t h e r e l a t i v e s t r a t e g i cp o s i t i o n of t h e USSR, we recogn ize t h a t i n d iv id u a l S o v i e tp r o p o s a l s a r e d e s ig n e d t o s u p p o rt S o v i e t f o r e i g n p o l i c yo b j e c t i v e s , and, if rea l i zed , might t h e m s e lv e s c o n s t i t u t eimpor tan t p o l i t i c a l g ai ns f o r t h e USSR. V it h respect t oEurope, f o r example, such measures as non-aggress ion pact ,

n u c l e a r f r e e zone, f o r e i g n troop withdrawal, and non-pro-l i f e r a t i o n of n u c l e a r s , are d i r e c t l y t i e d i n with s u c hp o l i t i c a l aims as d i v i d i n g t h e NATO c o u n t r i e s n e u t r a l i z i n gGermany's f u t u r e m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l , * g a in in gacceptance of Sovie t ho ld ings in Eastern Europe, e t c . O t h e rarms con t ro l a r rangements may, more i nd i r ec t l y , a l so se rveimportant Sovie t p o l i t i c a l o b j e c t i v e s . Thus, a s has beensuggested in other i n t e l l i g e n c e i s s ua n ce s , t h e S o v i e t s saw

-TtTe expe ct a l i n o s f m S o v i e t p rop osa l s on l i m i t e d measures

t o con t inue t o a i m a t , or t o be t i e d to o t h e r p r o p o s a l s aim-

i n g a t , the weakening of t h e Yes te rn po s i t i on i n Germanyand Berlin.

- 31 -

SE*T



s

t h e t e s t ban as an i d e a l i s s u e on which to iso8at;e C O I Q ~ U H I -ist Chqlaa from t h e m a i n s t p a n of world opin ion .

. ) There is also the problem of domestic po'bi t ics . Asw e have a l re ady po in ted out t , HI;Barushchev had waged a d i f f i -c u l t s t r u g g l e a t home before his p r e s e n t course in f o r e i g nand homestic, p o l i c y c o u l d be cha r t ed .through c e r t a i n m i l i t a r y seiorms at home, he has bad t oe s t a b l i s h a c e r t a i n c l i m a te abroad. Thus, it was o n l y a f t e rKhrushchev had m e t with President Eisenhower in September1959, and re tu rn ed w i t h a h i g h l y o p t i m i s t i c sstimalte of t h eworld s i t u a t i o n , t h a t t h e Sov i e t l eader w a s a b l e t o p u t acrosshis hasd-fought mil l+tary program sad home. To rebat thosewho had misgiv ings about his pragsaun f o r sharp cuts in con-

v e n t i o n a l iorc6s (h e may not have deceived a l l his c o l l e a -gue s about Sovie t m i s s i l e s t r e n g t h ) he would point t o al td ef in i te l l improvement i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t ~ a t h n ,t l cons i derab l evT e l ax a t i o n 02 E a s t - V e s t t e n s ons, and "morefavorab le" p rospec%-sfor peace, as 8 sa fegua rd %os % Be r i s k si nvo l ved i n unde r t ak i ng t h e m i l i t a r y c u t s .

.iI

0I .

In o r d e r to c a r r y

Again in 1963, Khrushehev f i r s% ad to claim t h a tt h e t h r e a t of war had gr ea t l y d i m in i shed be fo re fo rm a l l yd e c l a r i n g t h a t 8 r e d u c t i o n i n the budget w a s planned anda r e d u c t i o n i n force s i ze cont emp l at ed. S i nce ea r l y l a s tyea r , Khrushehev had been campaigning behind t h e scenesf o r c u t s in defense spending-notably in convent iona l for -ces--and during t h e summer i n t i m a t ed his i n t e n t i o n s t~

s e v e r a l f o re i g n v i s i t o r s . But ,it w as-on l y a f t e r t h e s i g n -i n g of t h e p a r t i a l n u c l e a r t e s t t r e a t y and t h e f o s t e r i n gof t h e " s p i r i t of MQSCQW" t h a t Mhrushchev was able t o s e l lhis chemical progsam and military budget c ut to the b u s e a u -csacy an d t o amounce t o the S ov i e t peop le a "contemplated"p l a n for a troop c u t . *

*There has ev iden t ly been some c u t t i n g of S o v i e t f o r c e s ,beginning i n the summer Q? l a s t y e a r , i f o n l y t hr ou gh a t t r i -

i n t o m i l i t a r y s e r v i c e , e v i d e n t l y w i t h o u t o t h e r call-ups

t o o f f s e t t h e UU~QPOW~W e f i c i e n c y .

, tion. Thus, in September, t h e small c l a s s of 1944 was c a l l e g



9. Channel t h e A r m s Race in to R&D-----, i l , '

C J .L* ..-,P a i n f u l l y aware of t h e d i f f i c u l t y of ( indeed, t h e

v i r t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y of) as w e l l as t h e danger of, s t r i v i n gto ach ieve a d e c i s i v e lead i n a q u a n t i t a t i v e arms race withthe h i t e d S$.ates, 3oviet leaders have Bong been trying t os h i f t the c o m d e t i t i o n to t h e less dangerous and nore promis-i n g (for them) f i e l d of q u a lita t ive weapons developments.The i r concep t ion of s u p e r i o r i t y , i n s o f a r as it as r e v e a l e di n t h e l i t e r a t u r e , is d e r iv e d from an assessment of q u a l i -t a t i v e c r i t e r i a as w e l l as numerica l comparisons. They haves a i d t h a t "if one s i d e has more e f f e c t i v e weapons , i t i sposs ib l e for t h a t s i d e ( a l l o t he r t h i n g s b e i n g equa l ) toho ld t h e upper-hand over t h e enemy which

possessesi n f e r i o r

weapons.1t (KOMMJNIST OF THE aRBBED FORCES, No. 6 , March 1961).Reasoning t h u s , they have emphasized sciemtif i c and techno-l o g i c a l c a p a b i l i t i e s a s s u c h , and are v e r y m u c h concernedw i t h g a i n i n g lead t i m e over t h e United St a t e s in t h e develop-ment of new weapons and countermeasures. lThe So vi et Govern-ment i s n o t l i m i t i n g i t s e l f t o those mil i t a ry means whicht h e a d v e r s a r y h a s , 'I a Soviet Defense Minis t ry book sa id somey e a r s ago, "for undoub:tedly t h a t w o u l d be i n s u f f i c i e n t .Any pre-empting of t h e a d ve r s ar y ' s p o t e n t i a l i n t h e c r e a t i o nof the newest means of combat not on ly g ives undoubteds u p e r i o r i t y i n case of was, b u t a l s o makes i t d i f f i c u l t f o rt h e a g g r e s s i v e i m p e r i a l i s t fo rces t o unleash wars . ' I (E. .Rybkin, ttY/arand P o l i t i c s , 'I 1959)

I n t h e p a s t , t h e S o v i e t s h av e of ten based claims t om i l i t a r y s u p e r i o r i t y on t h e q u a l i t a t i v e f a c t o r s . T h i s hashe lped them t o draw a t t e n t i o n away f r o m i n v i d i o u s compari-sons of f o r c e s i z e . I n t w o importan t pronouncements i n1962, an a r t i c l e in KOIMJNIST i n May and a pamphlet in No-vember, Marshal Malinovsky dec la red t h a t "in t he compet i -t i o n f o r q u a l i t y of armament forced upon us by a g g r e s s iv eforces , w e are n o t o n l y n o t i n f e r i o r t o those who t h rea t enus w i t h war, b u t i n many re sp ec t s are s u p e r i o r t o them." '

In t h e KOMMU?JIST a r t i c l e Blalinovsky a l so t h r e a t e n e d t h a t" t h i s s u p e r i o r i t y w i l l i n c r e a s e if the arm race is no ts topped"; and i n t h e pamphlet, alter a s s e r t i n g t h a t t h e"development by our s c i e n t i s t s of super-powerful thermonu-

c l ea r bombs and also global r o c k e t s " w a s an index of S o v ie ts u p e r i o r i t y o v e r pr o b a bl e e n em ie s, he s t a t e d :

, ,

- 33 -



L e t them know we d o not i n t e n d $ 0 rest on

o u r l au re l s . T his common v i c e of a l l

,""not i n t e n d t o f a l l ' behind in development,- t 5 and we do not i n t e n d t o be i n f e r i o r in any

. y i C % Q k i O U S armies *.fS l i e n $0 US. \'le do

way to our probable enemies.

' The Sloyiets have, i n f a c t , made great e f f o r t s tosurge ahead i n t h e q u a l i t a t i v e development of s t r a t e g i cweapons, j u s t as th ey have done i n outer space e x p l o r a t i o n .They undoubtedly be l ieve t h a t t h e worldvs image of Sovietpower w i l l be much enhanced by m a r e t e c h n o l o g i c a l break-t h r o u g h s , t h a t the p o l i t i c a l returns w i l l be g r ea t eventhough t h e r e a l m i l l t a r y valtae may be small ( u n l e s s andu n t i l t h e r e is a c t u a l p r o d u c t i o n and deployment on a sub-

s t a n t i a l s e a l@ ) . The whole p a s t r ecord of S o v i e t a c t i v f -t i e s in advanced weaponry and o u t e r s p ac e is s u g g e s t i v eof a conipulsbn to be t h e f i r s t - - t o t i p %he s t r a t e g i c balancethrough psychological warfare. Thus t h e Sovie t s had thef i r s t ICEM, t h e first a r t i f i c a l e a r th s a t e l l i t e , t h e firstmanned space f l i g h t , t h e f i r s t (c l a imed) ABM. It seem t h a tt h e y a l s o asp i re to have t h e first Laser weapon syStei.i--adevelopment which might have an impact o n f o r c e posture com-p a r a b l e t o n u c l e a r a nd rocket technology.

The S o v i e t s a l ready have s ignaif i c a n t c a p a b fl i t ie si n b a s i c f i e l d s r e la ted to Lasers and o p e n S o v i e t l i t e r a -t u r e - prov ides ev idence t h a t some fundamental research isnow

underway.*Also, more than a yea? ago9 Khrushehev

-us, a r ece5Car t i c r e i n a s0v1.e~; czen & u IL: l ia t ;%WLlXG

d i s c u s s e d a Sovie t exper iment i n which L a s e r f i g h t was fo-c u s e d on a p l a t e immersed in water; t h e p l a t e buc k l e d ande x p l os i v e b o i l i n g occurred as it was pierced by t h e light.I t is a l s o p l a i n t h a t t h e 3ioviets have a keen interest i nU.S. r e sea rch i n e xo t i c weapons. P.lso, the r e v is e d e d i t i o n

of the Defense Ministry book "Military S t r a t e g y , '' p u b l i s h e dl a s t f a l l , made t h e f o l l ow i n g rStatememt about weapons re-search i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s :

Varisus. systems of r a d i a t i o n , a n t i - g r a v i t y ,an t i -m a t t e r , plasma ( b a l l l i g h t i n g ) , e t c . ,are under s tudy as a means of d e s t r o y i n g. .mis-

s i l o s . P a r t i c u l a r a t t e n t i o n is d e ~ ~ t e aoLasers ( . b a t h r a y s ) , and i t is b e l i e v e d t h a ti n t h e f u t u r e powerful L a s e r s w i l l be able t odestroy any m i s s i l e or s a t e l l i t e .

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himse l f had ind ica ted t o a U.3. i n d u s t r i a l o f g i c i a l t h a tt h e SovJets were *ahead of , , the United Ztates i n t h e Laserf i e l d $hd were not l imitea i n t h e i r research to comunica-t ions . ; f dur in g a long conv ers at i on, Khsushchev f ing ere d as t e e l r u l e r w i t h t i n y ho l e s , which, he s a i d , had beend r i l l e d by Laser beams.

Ma l in b k k y , t o o , might have had Laser weapons i nmind when he s t a t e d i n a b r i e f i n t e r v ie w i n t h e November(130. 21, 1963) i s s u e of KC" ' I [ST OF "RE ARMED FORCES:

B u t t h e new weapons are a l s o being moder-n i zed and bejng replaced by s t i l l newerones. The p o s s i b i l i t y is not excluded

t h a t8

fundamental ly new weapon w i l l ap-p e a r , Comrade Khrushchev ha s spoken abou tt h e f a c t t h a t t h e weapons w e now have a r et e r r i f y in g w e a p o n s , b u t t h o s e which, soto s p e a k , a r e on th e way /Ea vykhode7 areeven more modern and even-more t e r r i f y i n g .

The S o v i e t s migh t see anoth er important advantage i n chan-n e l i n g the arms c o m p e t i t i o n i n to R&D: secrecy. Even i ft h e " o v i e t s threw open t o i n s p e c t i o n l a r g e areas of t h e i rc o u nt r y , t h e y c o ul d r e t a i n a s u b s t a n t i a l r e s e r v o i r ofs e c r e c y which would afford them t h e o p po r t un i t y t o f o r g eahead i n o n e OF ano ther f i e l d w i t h o u t t h e United S t a t e sknowing t h e pace of development. "he c o r o l l a r y a dv an ta ge

is t h a t i n a n e nv ir on me nt of a regula ted arms compet i t ion--w i t h respect to produc t ion and deployment of weapons-theUni ted S ta tes might l o s s t h e s t i m u l u s t o d e v ot e t h e v a s tamounts of resources necessa ry t o k e e p m i l i t a r y R&D on t h emove, w h i l e t h e S o v ie t s might , u n d e r p r o t e c t i o n of secrecy,make impor tant pro gr es s.

c

I f t h e major powers do m a k e s i g n i f i c a n t progress i nreduc ing the s i z e of t h e i r forces and p l a c i n g c o n t r o l s ont h e i r e x pa n sio n, l o g i c a l l y , q u a l i t a t i v e d ev elop me nt s i nweap mry would t end t o assume greater importance in t h es t r a t e g i c power r i v a l r y . The Soviets would , of course , w e l -come s u c h a development. Moreover, their compulsion t omove ahead t ec hno log ica l ly would p robab ly be greater under

circumstances of a p a r t i a l l y regula ted arms race, f o r t h e

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S o v i e t s w o u l d t h e n see a t em pt ing oppor tun i ty t o a l t er im-portantf.3r t h e s t r a t e g i c p,ower ba lance .were made through arms c o h t r o l c ou ld be c a r r i e d stlll f u r t h e rby vAgorous work in the development of exot ic weapons.

breakthrough. i n def en siv e weapons.t e g i c s t a n do f f , the development of a "pe r fec t " de fenset h e o r e t i c a l l y c ou ld n u l l i f y t h e s t r a t e g i c stalemate ands u b s t a n t i a l l y a l t e r the s t r a t e g i c balance in f a v o r of theUSSR. A t echno log ica l b reak th rough of t k i s magnitude, evenwithout f u l l deployment of t h e r a d i c a l l y new weapons, mighta l t e r t h e s t r a t e g i c , s i tua t ion : hum an fears and mass psycho-logy, as i n t h e p a s t , might d o th e work of deployment. Any

such developm@nt would , i n tu r np probably br in g on anotherarms r a c e ; b u t t h e d i v e r s i o n of U . S . s c i e n t i f i c e n er gi est o p ea ce fu l programs might r e s u l t in a long p e r io d of Sovie tm i l i t a ry a scendancy w i t h g r ea t p o l i t i c a l advantages

Thus, whatever gains

Consider , f o r example, t h e consequences of a Sovie tIn a s i t u a t i o n of s t r a -

C. The L P m i t s of Disarmament

Against t h e backdrop of es t imated mot iva t ion ando b j e c t i v e s , how f a r m i g h t w e expec t t h e S o v i e t s t o be w i l l -

t h e S o v i e t s calcu la te t o be i n t h e i r bes t i n t e r e s t w i t hrespect t o degrees of arms r educ t ion and con t ro l?

disarmament t h a t s t o p f a r s h m enera l and completedisarmament (GCD) . Arms c o n t r o l now appears t o be ani n t e g r a l p a r t of S o v i et s t r a t e g i c p la nn in g; OCD does n o t .17hile GCD, i r o n i c a l l y , p l a y s a t a c t i c a l r o l e i n e s t ab l i sh -i n g a g e n e r a l framework and environment for keeping negotia-t i o n s w i t h t h e West i n mot ion , and propagandiz ing t h e ''peace-l o v i n g i n t e r e s t s " of t h e USSR, i t is h igh ly doub . t iu l t ha tany Soviet leaders s e r i o u s l y regard QC D as a s t r a t e g i c g o a l .In f a c t , Khrushchev has of l a t e i n t i q a t e d - - i n n o t e s t o West-

'e rn heads of government i n December 1963--that W D is note ve n a p r o f i t a b l e t a c t i c a l course t o follow a t t h i s t i m e ,whereas par t i a l d i sa rm am ent measures are .

, i n g t o go in disarmament? O r , put another wayv, what might

There are , w e t h i n k , l i m i t s on S o v i e t i n t e r e s t in



This i s not t o q u e s t i ~ n h e strongry-enunciated'i'ihat we arejoviet ges i r e t o p r e v e n t p new world war.sugges$%ngh e r e is t h a t % Be S o v ie t s do not in t h e i s s t r a -t e g i c - p l a n n in g r e g a r d GCD, even supposing it were r e a l i z -a b l e , as a p r e r e q u i s i t e for gen era l peace (s i nce 1956 t h eS Q V ~ ~ ~ Save been saying t h a t w o r l d war I s "not P a t a l i s t i -ca ' l ly imevi tpb le '1, 98" if f u l l y implleasenLed, as s e r v i n gthe n a t i o n a l i n t e r es t s of the USSR.

BCD s e e m s t o be ~ o ~ n t e p .o the assumptions which t h e3 o v i e t s make about power and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s . In thef isst p la c e , S o v i e t leaders would no t ne ces sa r i ly a s s u m et h a t a disarmed worJd would be a more s t a b l e one ; theymight , w e t h i n k , meal est imate t h e r e v e r s e . As noted, t h e y

have demonstrated a keen apprec ia t ion Q:C the power of nu-clear-rocket weapons , which they c a l l "absoPute weapons"in t h e s e n s e t h a t t h ey t e n d t o make Barge-scale war a

t o t a l l y i r r a t i o n a l method o:€ c hi ev i ng p o l i t i c a l e nd s.F u r th e r , t h e y pr o b ab ly a s s u n i e t h a t t h e p r e s e n c e of l a r g estockpiles of weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n c o n t r i b u t e s t ow o r l d s t a b i l i t y if more o r l e s s s y m m e t r i c a l l y d i s t r i b u t e dbetween t h e two camps. The authors of t h e book "Mili taryZtra tegy" s a i d as much i n the f i r s t e d i t i o n of that worki n 1962. They wrote that American s t r a t e g i s t s "have begunt o u nd e rs t an d " that t h e m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of s t r a t e g i c nuc lea rweapons i n t h e United S ta te s and t h e USSR has a l r e a d ybrought about a n u c l e a r stalemate. Implying t h a t t h e y e n -d o r s e d t h e idea, t h e authors wrote khat " t h e growth of

n u c l e a r m i s s i l e power is i n v e r s e l y p r o p o r t i o n a l to t h ep o s s i b i l i t y of its use."* Moreover, the thrust of Khru-shchev ' s th i nk in g on nuc le a r w a r is that i f it can be madet o a pp ea r as s u i c i d a l , it w i l l not occur; and it is p a r t l yOR t h i s basis that he a ~ dther Sovie t spokesmen r e p u d i a t e

*To s u g g e s t t h t, t h e massing of weapons has increaseds t a b i l i t y c o n t r a d ic t s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l S ov ie t P in e t h a t thearm6 race i n c r e a s e s t h e danger of was; it was probably fort h i s reason t h a t th e s ta tement was dropped from the r e v i s e de d i t i o n of' t h e work, which, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , r e t a i n e d refer-

ences to a n u c l e a r stalemate.

, ..

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American ideas o n c o n tr o l le d s t r a t e g i c warfare, for theyt e n d tqltmake n u c l e a r w a r p a n a g e a b l e a n d t h e r e f o r e a pos-

s i b l e ,m&ional course of ';action.

I f t h i s -is indeed an opera t ive Sov ie t a s sumpt ion ,then , th e Sov i e t s would be a v e r s e t o t h e reduction of s t r a -t e g i c s tockp, ibes below t h e "unacceptable damage" l e v e l .For t h e n , g e n e r a l n u c l e a r w a r might no longer appear as"madness1' or a n l l im p o s s ib i l i t y , ' and the danger of ano therworld w a r might be g r e a t e r .

..

The problem of Communist China may a l s o d i c t a t e alower l i m i t to cuts,which the %v ie t s m ig h t be willing tomake in t h e i r s t r a t e g i c and convent ional military power.

Sharp c u t s i n s t r a t e g i c forces, f o r example , would t end toi n v i t e C h in e s e r i v a l r y - - o r French OF German, e f k . The So-v i e t s h a v e t r i e d to get around t h e Wth country problem bypropos ing a disarmament scheme ( f i r s t at the U . N . i n Septeni-

WV. . ----., " -----I- -- -,--I-- - - - - I I--I- ._..u--- ---September 1983; and a t Geneva again t h i s year ) which pro-v i d e s for r e t e n t i o n i n t h e United S ta te s and USSR, alone,of a " l i m i t e d " number of ICBMs, A BM s , and SAMs.*

be d i c t a t e d by t h e need to keep t h e East European bloc coun-t r ies i n tow, a l though it is d i f f i c u l t t o say what i n f l u -ence if any this c o n s i d e r a t i o n w o u l d h a v e o n t h e l e v e l ofS o v ie t s t r a t e g i c weapons. GCD, a t l e a s t a t t h i s j u n c t u r e ,

appears to be incompaaible with the S o v i e t s ' i n t e r e s t in

Lower l i m i t s on arms s e d u c t i o n in general would a l s o

p r e s e r v i n g t h e i r East European empire.

A t the s m e i m e , however, there is r e as o n t o b e l i e v et h a t t h e S o v i e t s might be w i l l i n g to t ake r e l a t i v e l y l a r ges t r i d e s i n t h e f i e l d of arm co n t ro l , and t o modi fy whathad e a r l i e r been P i g i d p o s i t i o n s and p r i n c i p l e s .

*We would not be s u r p r i s e d if a S o v ie t p r o p o s a l of t h i skind were eventual ly accompanied by a d i r e c t S o v ie t p r o p os a lt o t a k e a c t i o n against o t he r n a t i o n s p o s s e s s in g s u c h weapons.

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The problem of in sp ec t i on may be a c a se i n p o i n t ,

I n t h e 3pas t , secn ecy had played a c e n t r a l ro le in v i r t u -a l l y evbsy aspect of m i l i t a r y p l a nn i ng and force s t r u c t u r e .A t u r k i n g p o i n t was reached, however, with t h e U-2 a f f a i r ,fo l lowed by the- disc losure i n 1961 o f r e v i s e d U . S . estimatesof Sovi e t long- range s t r a t e g i c weapons. Such developmentsin s t r a t e g i c 4 u r v e i l l a n c e h av e p r ob a bl y had an enormous i m -p a c t on S o v i e t s t r a t e g y ; a t t h e v e ry l e a s t t h e y made t h eS o v i e t s p a i n f u l l y aware t h a t t h e i r c a p a b i l i t i e s for main-t a i n i n g m i l i t a r y s e cr e c y in the sphere of s t r a t eg i c weaponsdeployment were dwindl ing. As a r e s u l t s e c r e c y is perhapsno longer a c r u c i a l i n g r e d i e n t in some a s p e c t s of S o v ie tm i l i t a r y p lann ing . And as t h e v a l u e ( e f f e c t i v e n e s s ) ofs e c r e c y lessens, i t ' e n d s t o become 8 d i s p e n s a b l e cQInnAQdi$y.In o the r words , w e would not be s u r p r i s e d i f the Govietsshowed a m i l l ngness t o make "concess Ions" regardingsecrecy--e .g . , in t h e form of i n s p e c t i o n of deployed s i tes ,or some s o r t of "open s k i e s " in s p e c t i o n .*

There is s t i l l , however, a Parge r e s e r v o i r of secrecywhich is e s s e n t i a l to S o v i et m i l i t a r y p l a n n in g a nd whicht h e S o v i e t s i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d w i l l res is t compromising.T h i s i s , most n o ta b ly , the secrecy of %he l a b o r a to r i e s - - o fSoviet R&D, in which endeavor, they nay IPsPieve t h a t . t h e yw i l l be a b l e to a l t e r t h e power balance..i!a t h e world.

Pu t anoth er way, i n approaching t h e problem of armsc o n t r o l , t h e S o v i e t s are probably more concerned a b o u t t h econsequences of t h e loss of s e c r e c y t h a n about g i v i n g i non t h e p r i n c i p l e 0% no i n t e r n a t i o n a l i n s p e c t i o n . In f a c t ,t h e Sovi e t s have a l read y demonst ra ted th a t they no longer

*A % t h e same t i m e , we acknowledge t h a t t he re may be otber,perhaps stronger, r e as o ns m i l i t a t i n g against important conycessions on i n s p e c t i o n , such as t h e des i re t o keep t h e optlonof making a r a p i d , t e m p o r a r i l y secret deployment in t h ee v e n t of a breakthrough i~ some new weapon system.

- 39 -

c



T

o p p ~ s e nspection in pr inc ig l e - - in their proposals for"black boxes" %OF susve i1,lanee of undsrgkaand nucleartestirqk', for ground inspektion p o s t s LO prevent surpr i seattacks, and for "contsol'~ f a limited number of stsa-

1 tegic weapons in t h e United Rtaates and U33R.. I

, * ' In SU.,.! w 8 t h i n k t h a t the Sam COPlceX'nS t h a t rnoti-vate the USSR to reach accord v i t h the !Yes% on arms con-trols--the felt need t o protect and improve the nationallpower p o s i t i o n of the USSR--wfllB be Bns t rumnt a l in 88%-

t b g $he l i m i t s Of Soviet c8iSarEl~~EltQ l i C i @ S .

,

:.:

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,



,

caesar 36 - the soviet strategic interest in limited disarmament

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