caesar 30 - soviet strategic doctrine at the start of war

8/2/2019 Caesar 30 - Soviet Strategic Doctrine at the Start of War

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I I 3 JULY 1962TS NO, 104646I l r - - - - l1._

SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR THE START OF W AR5 QW j E C 7 ' 5TXA'TfGlC DOCTRINE FOR TCURRENT

.INTELLIGENCE I ISTAFFSTUDY

REFERENCETITLE

CAESARX V I - 6 2

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CURRENTINTELLIGENCE

C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C YII 1


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( SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE' FO3 THE START OF WART h i s i s a w o rk i ng p a p e r , t h e s e c o nd i n a s e r i e s o fCAESAR r e p o r t s on problems of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h o u g h t andp o l i c y . T h i s ptrper d e a l s w i t h S ov ie t s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e o r t h e s t a r t of a g e n e r a l war.The p r e d e c e s s o r i n t h i s series--CAESAR-XIV of 3 A p r i l1962; "SOVIET hlILITARY THOUGHT ON FUTURE VAR: DOCTRINEAN D DEBATE S I N C E 1960"--was based e n t i r e l y on open Sov ie tm a t e r i a l s , p r i n c i p a l l y p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y p u b l i c a t i o n s .The p r e s e n t s t u d y , d e a l i n g w i t h t h e n a r ro w er s u b , j e c t oft he f i r s t a t t a c k , d r a w s upon c l a s s i f i e d S o v i e t d oc um en tsa s w e l l a s upon v e r y r e c e n t p u b l i c m a t e r i a l s . B ec au set h e p a p e r d r a ws h e a v i l y o n IRONBARK m a t e r i a l , t h i s s tu dymus t r emain wi th in t h e IRONBARK community. I t s d 4 s t r i b u -t i o n w i t h i n USIB a g e n c i e s s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e b e c o n f i n e dt o normal r e a d e r s o f IRONBARK r e p o r t s . This s tudy mayn o t b e q uo te d i n b r i e f i n g s o r p u b l i c a t i o n s wi t ho u t p r i o rc o n s u l t a t i o n wi th t h e o r i g i n a t o r .A l t h o u g h t h i s pa pe r h a s n o t b e en c o o r d i n a t e d w i t ho t h e r o f f i c e s , t h e a u t ho r has be ne f i te d much f rom dis-c u s s i o n of t h e t o p i c w i t h c o l l e a gu e s i n

o f t h e D D / I . Special; t h a n k s a r e du e t oof ONE anda l o n e is r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e p a p e r ' s c o n c l u s i o n s , someof which a r e c o n t r o v e r s i a l .i n s i g h t s a LLUVLCIZ: , 15 bnouia D e un

The Sino- So vi e t S t ud ie s Group wou Id welcome cornment011 t h i s pape r , a d d r e s s e d t o I r w i n P e t e r H a l p e rn ; , who+ o r t o t h e c o o r d i n a t o r of t h e S S S G , T I-I

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.\ I\ ISOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE FOR TH E START O F WAR-

SUMMARY AN D CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . Page iI .

XI.

111.

I V .

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . INTRODUCTION Page 1 A . The Problem Page 1B . The P r i n c i p a l S o u r c e s U s e d . . . . . . . . Page 3SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FIRST PHASE O F ' Page 4

Page 5Page 9

Page 11Page 15Page 15

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . UCLEAR WARA . How War W i l l Begin . . . . . . . . . . . . B . Th e Importance of t h e F i r s t A t ta ck . . . . .C . Hedging: "Try for a Short War, P r e p a r e f o r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Long One"TH E CASE FOR PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACKA . T h e New Doc t r i na l Formula . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .B . Evolvement of t h e C on ce pt i n S e c r e tD i s c o u r s e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .C . S o v i e t Y t r a t e g i c T a r g e t L i s t s . . . . . .E . The F e a s i b i l i t y of Pre-emption . . . . . .SOME IMPLICATIONS OF PRE-EMPTION . . . . . . .B . Some Notes on Es t ima t ing Force Leve l s . . .

D. Doct r i i l e on t h e U s e of S t r a t e g i c Missiles .

A . Pre-emption as a G uid e t o F o rc e S t r u c t u r e .

C . The Problem of Warning . . , . , . . , . .D . S t r a t e g i c Command Machinery Str ea ml in ed .

Page 17Page 21Page 22Page 23Page 27Page 27Page 29Page 33Page 35

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SOVIET STRATEGIC DOCTRINE EDR THE START OF W A H '(IRONBARK1 Summary and Conclus ions

B ot h c l a s s i f i e d a nd o pen S o v i e t m i l i t a r y s o u r c e s indicatet h a t t h e USSR has added t o i t s s t r a t e g i c c on ce pt s t h e d o c t r i n eof pre-empt ive a t t ack .w a r , b u t a meaningful course o f a c t i o n in t h e e v e n t d e t e r r e n c ef a i l s ( o r is t ho u gh t t o have f a i l e d ) . W have found no i n d i c a t i o nin t h e m i l i t a r y mater i a l s examined for t h i s s t u d y t h a t t h e USSRi n t e n d s d e l i b e r a t e l y t o i n i t i a t e d i r e c t m i l i t a r y a c t i o n a g a i n s tt h e West a t any t i m e e x c e p t under t h e t h r e a t of imminent a t t a c kby t h e West, or in r e sp o n se t o a Western a t t ack . Bu t inasmuchas t h e d e c i s i o n to go t o war is s t i l l t h e p r e r o g a t i v e of t h ep o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e USSR, i t would be imprudent t o d rawf i r m c o n c l u s i o n s a b ou t S o v i e t i n t e n t i o n s f ro m t h e m i l i t a r ys o u r c e s a l o n e ,t o t h e e x t a n t d o c t r i n e s of d e t e r r en c e and r e t a l i a t i o n i n 1961,g i v es t h e USSR a more f l e x i b l e s t r a t e g i c p o s t u r e , i f a more com-p l e x b a s i s f o r m i l i t a r y plann ing . De t e r r ence undoubted ly rema inst h e f i r s t m i s s i o n o f t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h m e n t , b u t S o v i e tm i l i t a r y l e a de r s see an u r g e n t n e e d f o r a p r e - e m p t i v e c a p a b i l i t y ,as t h e i r c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y t o r e t a l i a t e has d i m i n i s h e d .Chary of s u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e USSR might i n i t i a t e w a r , S o v i e t m i l i -t a r y s po ke sm en h av e t e n d e d t o a v o i d t h e t e r m "pre-emption."t h e l e s s , t h e y h a v e made i t abundan t ly c lea r t h a t t h e USSR h a s as t r i k e - f i r s t - i f -necessa ry d o c t r i n e which bears i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a -t i o n s f o r t h e pl an n in g of S o vi et s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s .

This is not a s t r a t e g y f o r a premeditated

The d o c t r i n e of pre-emptive a t t a c k , which w a s e v i d e n t l y a d d e d

Never-

Our f i n d i n g t h a t a d o c t r i n e of pre-emptive a t t a c k h a s beenadopted in t h e USSR is based mainly on t h e f o l l o w i n g e v id e n ce :(1) D e fe n se M i n i s t e r M al i no v s k y' s i n c o r p o r a t i o n of t h e , doc-t r i n a l formula on pre -empt ion i n t h e s t a t e d m i s s i o n of t h e S o v i etarmed f o r c e s f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e a t t h e CPSU Congress in October1961. (The f o r m u l a is : f o r e s t a l l a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k b y d e a l i n gt h e enemy a " t i m e l y and devas t a t i ng b low." )

o p e n p u b l i c a t i o n s of t h e USSR Defense Min i s t ry .h i n t s in 1960 of a n e e d f o r a p re -em pt iv e d o c t r i n e , t o v i r t u a lacknowledgment of i t s e x i s t e n c e by J u l y 1 96 1.

(2) The f r e q u e n t r e i t e r a t i o n s of t h a t formula i n r e c en t'(3) T h e e v o l u t i o n in t o p secret S o v ie t p u b l i c a t i o n s , from

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( 4 ) Th e p u b l i c d i s c l o s u r e i n 1961 o f t h e a d o p t i o n of ad o c t r i n e t h a t stresses t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a d e c i s i v e i n i t i a lp h a s e of a f u t u r e g e n e r al war. I n c o n j u n c ti o n w i t h t h i s , t h ea s s i g n i n g t o t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s ( p r i v a t e l y i n 1960a nd p u b l i c l y i n 1 9 61 ) t h e m i s s i o n of a c h i e v i n g t h e p r i n c i p a lg o a l s of w a r i n a v e r y s h o r t t i m e . (The S o v i e t s he dg e a g a i n s tt h e p o s s i b i l i t y of a p r o t r a c t e d war b y m a i n t a i n i n g l a r g e , v e r -s a t i l e f o r c e s . ) /enemy miss i le l a unc her s -- in o f f i c i a l s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t l i s t sp u b l i s h e d i n t o p s e c re t S o v ie t m a t e r i a l s .

(5) The p r i o r i t y g i v en c o u n t e r f o r c e o b j e c t i v e s- - n o t a bl y

(6) The d o c t r i n a l p r o v i s i o n s t h a t s t r a t e g i c missi less h o u l d be u s e d s u d d e n l y , p u r p o s e f u l l y , e n masse, a g a i n s t t h emost i m p o r t a n t e n e m y o b j e c t i v e s .The p i v o t a l p ro bl em i n S o v i e t m i l i t a r y p l a nn i n g , it isc l e a r , i s t h a t o f p r e p a r i n g t h e armed f o r c e s t o d e a l w i t h t h ep o s s i b i l i t y of a n a t t e m p te d W es te rn s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .p o l i t i c a l leaders might have l i t t l e g e n u i n e f e a r t h a t t h e Westi n t e n d s t o mount a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h em. Bu t t h e m i l i -t a r y l e a de r s take a v e r y s e r i o u s v ie w of t h e p r o b l e m of s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k . I t is t h e i r t a s k t o f i g h t a w a r , s h o u l d dete r -r e n c e f a i l , a nd t h e p r o b a b l e enemy t h e y f a c e i s a n awesome one .They see a r a p i d l y e xp an di ng n u c l e a r a t t a c k f o r c e i n t h e Uni tedS t a t e s and f e e l t h e b l an k e t of s e c r e c y o v e r t h e i r own s t r a t e g i cfo rces g r a d u a l l y r e c e d i n g . They a r e faced w i t h t h e p r o s p e c tof n o t b e i n g a b l e t o d e l i v e r a n e f f e c t i v e s ec on d s t r i k e i n an u c l e a r war a n d t h e y a re aware of t h i s . T h e y seem t o r e a s o n ,i n d ra w in g u p a d o c t r i n e f o r t h e s t a r t of w a r , t h a t o n l y b ys t r i k i n g f i r s t , by b lu nt in g much of t h e en em y' s a t t a c k forces ,c a n t h e USSR s u r v i v e t h e f i r s t n u c l ea r p ha se of t h e w a r . Thep ro gr am mi ng i n t h e U n it e d S t a t e s of immense nuclear a t t a c kf o r c e s may t h u s be s a i d t o have a d u a l e f f e c t o n t h e USSR: onthe one h and , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of d e l i b e r a t e S o vi e t r e s o r t t owar i s r e d u c e d ; on t h e o t h e r h and , t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a S o v i e t

p r e - e m p t i v e a t t a c k has i n c r e a s e d as a c o u r s e of a c t i o n , s h o u ldd e t e r r e n c e f a i l o r b e t ho u gh t t o ha ve f a i l e d .

S o v i e t

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IRONBARK0 o v i e t l e a d e r s e v i d e n t l y b e l i e v e t h a t a s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n eof pre-emption i s f e a s i b l e : t h a t i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y t h e y w i l lh av e s u f f i c i e n t w arn in g t i m e t o i n i t i a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n . How-e v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t u n o f f i c i a l o p in i on i s d i v i d e d as t o howmuch and h o w good warning w i l l be may r e f l e c t i r r e s o l u t i o n ont h e q u e s t i o n o n t h e o f f i c i a l l e v e l . I n any case , w e c a n n o tanswer t h e c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n , a s t o what k ind of e v i d e n c e t h eS o v ie t l e a d e r s h i p w i l l a c t on pre-empt ively . We t h i n k t h a t ,owing t o t h e i m p r o b a b i l i t y of t h e i r h a v i n g i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l ee v i d e n c e of a n i r r e v o c a b l e W es te rn i n t e n t i o n t o a t t a c k , t h eS o v i e t l e a d e r s h i p would a c t o n l e s s t h a n c e r t a i n e v i de n ce .The risk t o t hem, th ey may rea so n, i s t o o g r e a t n o t t o a t t a c kf i r s t ; t h e r e may n o t be a chance t o r e t a l i a t e w i t h s u f f i c i e n tfo rce t o e n a b l e t h e USSR t o p u r s u e t h e w a r .

The S o v i e t s ha ve a l r e a d y t a ke n s t e p s t o speed u p t h ep r o c e s s of making t h e d e c i s i o n t o go t o war a s w e l l a s t h eimplementa t ion of t h a t d e c i s i o n . T he se s t e p s i n c l u d e t h eassignment of t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s t o a Supreme HighCommand, w h i c h e x e r c i s e s e x c l u s i v e c o n t r o l o v er t b e i r deploy-ment and use , and t h e pl ac in g of Khrushchev a t t h e h e a d of t h ec o u n t r y ' s s t r a t e g i c arm i n t h e post of Supreme High Commander.T h i s p o s t , w e t h i n k , e n a b l e s K hru shc hev p e r s o n a l l y , w i t h o u tp r i o r c o n s u l t a t i o n w i t h t h e r u l i n g col legium, t o push t h ew a r b u t t o n .To t h e So vi et s , pre-empt ion means more t h a n a last-momenta t t emp t tounlmz!i ex i s t i ng weapons i n t h e f a c e of an imminentenemy a t t a c k . As a d o c t r i n e , i t p r o v i d e s a b a s i s f o r m i l i t a r yp l a n n i n g , a g u i d e t o t h e development of a f o r c e s t r u c t u r e .I t d e f i n e s t h e m i s s i o n a n d r o l e of S ov ie t s t r a t e g i c forcesi n a ge ne ra l way . But t h e d o c t r i n e o f p re -e m pt io n i s n o ta war p l a n t h a t d e f i n e s s p e c i f i c mi s si o ns or a b l u e p r i n tt h a t d i c t a t e s p r e c i s e nu mb er s end ty pe s of weapons. We can-n o t , o n t h e b a s i s of t h e d o c t r i n e a l o n e , es t imate t h e num-bers of weapons w h i c h t h e S o v i e t s r e g a r d a s n e c e s s a r y t o f u l -fill t h e tasks o u t l i n e d by t h e d o c t r i n e . I n a r r i v i n g a t forcel e v e l s , ho we ve r, t h e S o v i e t s use a r e q u i r e m e n t s a p p r oa c h , t a k i n gaccoun t of t h e numbers and t yp es of impo r tan t enemy t a r g e t s asa b a s i s f o r c a l c u l a t i n g S o v ie t f o r c e n e ed s . The t a r g e t i n g e mp ha si s

i s on t h e enemy's means of n u c l e a r a t t a c k , on a s t r a t e g i c a sw e l l a s t a c t i c a l s c a l e ; i n d u s t r i a l and a d m i n is t r a t i v e o b j e c t i v e sa r e i n c lu d e d, b u t p u r el y p o p u l a t i o n t a r g e t s a p p a r e n t l y a r e n o t .TS#104646

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SOVIET STRATEGIC D O CTRIN E FO R THE START O F WAR1I . INTRODUCTION

A . The ProblemThe S o v i e t c l a s s i f i e d d o cu me nt s w h ic h w ehave examined for t h i s s t ud y , t a ke n t o g e t h er w i t h t h eopen m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e , o f f e r u s i n s i g h t s i n t o t h et h i n k i n g a n d p l a n n i n g of S o vi e t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s f o rf u t u r e w a r , and s p e c i f i c a l l y f o r i t s i n i t i a l p h a s e .W c an r e c o n s t r u c t , on t h e b a s i s of t h e S o v i e t m i l i -t a r y m a t e r i a l s , t h e main e le men ts of s t r a t e g i c m i l -i t a r y do c t r i n e o f t h e US SR f o r t h e s t a r t o f war. Ourc o n c lu s i o n s, i n a number of cases , must be i n f e r e n t i a lowing t o t h e c i r c u m s p e c ti o n w i t h w hi ch t h e c r i t i c a lq u e s t i o n of t h e f i r s t a t t a c k i s g e n e r a l l y d i s c u s s e d - -i n t h e p r i v a t e as w e l l a s i n t h e p u b l i c d i s c o u r se . A l -t ho ug h t h e c l a s s i f i e d d oc um en ts us e d f o r t h i s p r o j e c th av e b ee n c l a s s i f i e d t o p s e c re t b y t h e U S S R M i n i s t r yof D e fe ns e , t h e y d o n o t b e t r a y t h e h i g h e s t m i l i t a r y se -c r e t s o f t h e USSR; t h ey d o n o t d i s c u s s o f f i c i a l warp l a n s ; t h e y d o n o t g i v e n u m er i ca l d a t a on e x i s t i n g o rp r o j e c t e d S o v i e t fo rce l e v e l s ; t h ey g i v e no d e t a i l e dd a t a o n t h e u s e a nd d ep lo ym en t o f S o v i e t ICBMs, -t c .Hence, i n t h i s p a pe r , w e do no t p resume t od u p l i c a t e Sovie t w a r p l a n s ; t h e a v a i l a b l e e v id e nc e d oe sn o t e n a b l e u s t o do t h i s . Nor d o e s it f a l l w i t h i n o u rcompetence t o comment on t h e a c t u a l p r e se n t 5 o r pos-s i b l e f u t u r e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e USSR t o mount a n e f f e c -t i v e f i r s t s t r i k e . T here is n o t n e c e s s a r i l y a d i r e c tc o r r e l a t i o n b etw ee n d o c t r i n e and c a p a b i l i t y . Rat he r , ,o u r a i m i n t h i s s t u dy i s t o d e s c r i b e and a n a l y z e S o v i e ts t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e f o r t h e i n i t i a t i o n of a p o s s i b l e f u -t u r e war, as t h e d o c t r i n e h a s e m e r g e d s i n c e J a n u a r y 1960;and then t o r e l a t e t h e d o c t r i n e t o t h e problem of f o r c es t r u c t u r e i n o r de r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e p a t h b e i n g t a k e n i nt h e de v el op m en t o f t h e s t r a t eg ic miss i l e forces .When w e s p e a k of S ov ie t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e ,w e have i n mind t h e Soviet meaning of t h e term. I t isg e n e r a l l y u n d e r s t o o d t o be a g u i d e f o r m i l i t a r y p l an n in g ,

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f o r d ef en se p o l ic y and s t r a t e g y . I n t h i s s e n s e , m i l i -t a r y d o c t r in e d e s c r ib e s t h e c h a r a c t e r of f u t u r e war;o u t l i n e s bas ic s t r a t e g y f o r t h e war, and i n d i c a t e s t h ek i n d of f o r c e s t r u c t u r e n ee de d t o f i g h t t h e war e n v i -s ioned ,S o vi e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e , a s t h e c l a s s i f i e dmate r ia l s bear o u t , h a s t o a l a r g e e x t e n t b e e n made pub-l i c . This may seem p a r a d o x i c a l i n vi ew of t h e S o v i eto b s e s s i o n w i t h secrecy i n mil i t a ry . mat te r s . Pet t h ec l a s s i f i e d l i t e r a t u r e co nf i rm s t h a t t h e c u r r e n t d o c t r i n efor n u c l e a r w a r w a s l a r g e l y f o r m u la t e d i n t h e p u b l i cspeeches of Khrushchev (beg inn ing i n January 1960) andi n t h e s p e ec he s a nd o r d e r s of t h e USSR M i n i s t e r of D e-f e n s e , Marshal Malinovsky. No r e f e r e n c e has been madei n t h e a v a i l a b le secre t m a t e r i a l s t o a s ec r e t s p e e c ho r a r t i c l e on d o c t r i n e by Khrushchev; Blalinovslcy i n re -c e n t years h a s a p p a r e n t l y d e l i v e r e d o n l y on e major se-c r e t s p e ec h on d o c t r i n a l m a t t e r s - - in hfay 19C0--and t h a ti s d i sc u ss e d i n s e v e r a l o f t h e c l a s s i f i e d s o u r c e s . The some-w ha t t o r t u o u s e v o l u t i o n o f t h e "new m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e "h a s a l r e a d y b e e n de s c r ibe d a t some l e n g th i n o u r CAESARX I V s t u d y d a t e d 3 A p r i l 1 9 62 . S u f f i c e i t t o n o t e heret h a t t h e s e c r e t l i t e r a t u r e examined by u s r e i n f o r c e s t h eo p e n l y p u b l i s h e d e v i d e n c e t h a t S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n ew a s i n a h i g h l y f o r m a t i v e s t age i n 1960-1961; and t h a tt h e major d o c t r i n a l q u e s t i o n s b e a r i n g on t h e s t a r t ofwar have s i n c e been res ol ve d and removed f rom t h e realmof t h e o r e t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y .Our t a s k , t h e n , i s t o d i s c e r n t h e d o c t r i n a lc o n c e p t s t h a t g u i d e S o v i e t p l a n ne r s i n d e t e rm i n i n g t h emake-up of t h e s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s . We l e a v e t h e much morecomplex task of e s t i m a t i n g n um be rs of e x i s t i n g a nd p la n ne dmi ss i l e s i t e s t o more competent hands, f o r d o c t r i n e i sb u t one of many inputs i n t h e e s t i m a t i n g p r o c e s s .W e wish t o n o t e a l s o t h a t o u r paper f o c u s e son problems of t h e s t a r t of a g e n e r a l w a r , w h i c h , i n

t h e S o v i e t v i e w , w i l l i n e v i t a b l y i n v o l v e t h e mass u s eof n u c l e a r miss i l e weapons. The paper d o e s n o t d e a lwi th p rob lems bear ing on the o u t b r e a k of l i m i t e d o r l o -c a l i z e d c o n f l i c t s i n v ol v i n g S o vi e t f o r c e s . I n p o i n t of

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[IRONBARKJ f a c t , t h e r e h a s b e en n o d i s c u s s i o n o f a l o c a l war r o l eand m i s s i o n f o r S o v i et armed f o r c e s i n e i t h e r t h e openor a v a i l a b l e s e c r e t S o vi e t m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t i i r e . L o c a lwar i s d i s c u s s e d o nl y i n terms o f a t r i g g e r for a g l o b a ln u c l e a r w a r . T h i s is not t o s a y t h a t l o c a l war d o c t r i n ea nd o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s do n o t e x i s t i n t h e USSR. W knowfrom o pe n s o u r c e s t h a t S o v i et m i l i t a r y cadres have beenc a l l e d upon t o s t u d y t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f l o c a l wars andWestern l o c a l war d o c t r i n e . U nd ou bt ed ly t h e r e a re con-t i n g e n c y p l a n s f o r t h e employment of S o v i e t t r o o p s i nl i m i t e d a c t io n s . Bu t inasmuch a s S ov ie t p o l i t i c a l d o c -t r i n e r u l e s o u t t h e u s e of S o v i et t r o op s i n " n a t i o n a l l i b -e r a t i o n " s t r u g g l e s i n u nd er de ve lo pe d c o u n t r i e s , i t i s un-l i k e l y t h a t t h e r e i s a m i l i t a r y p ro gra m f o r t h e use ofS o vi e t t r o o p s i n t hose p l a c e s .B. T h e P r i n c i p a l S o u r c e s Used

The p r i n c i p a l s o u r c e f o r t h e p r e s e n t s t u d y ,t h e " S p e c i a l Col lec t ion of Ar t i c l e s from MILITARY THOUGHT"( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as t h e " S p e c i a l C o l le c t i o n " ) , mer-i t s some e x p l a n a t i o n b e c a u s e of i t s s i n g u l a r n a t u re . I ti s c l a s s i f i e d TOP SECRET--by t h e USSR--but i s a n u n o f f i -c i a l document,t h a t i t was e s t a b l i s h e d , i n e a r l y 1 96 0, as a n a d h oc d i s -c u s s i o n f o r u m f o r t h e a i r i n g of f r a n k , c o n t r o v g s x andf r e e - r a n g i n g v i e w s of s e n i o r m i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s . The a r -t i c l e s , a c c o r d i n g t o a n e d i t o r i a l n o t e , e x p r e s s o nl y t h eo p i n i o n s of t h e a u t h o r s on t h e p ro bl em s d e a l t w i t h . Thea r t i c l e s chosen f o r p u b l i c a t i o n i n t h e " Sp e ci a l Collec-t i o n " were e v i d e n t l y r e g a r d e d as t o o s e n s i t i v e f o r p ub l i -c a t i o n i n t h e SECRET "Collections" of MILITARY THOUGHTa r t i c l e s , or i n t h e more w i d e l y c i r c u l a t e d m on t hl y MILI-TARY THOUGHT, which i s e v i d e n t l y r e s t r i c t e d t o m i l i t a r ys t a t i o n s .*

I t s s p e c ia l s t a t u s stems from t h e f a c t-T h e c i r c u l a t i o n of t h e p u b l i c a t i o n i s l i m i t e dt o army commanders and h i gh er . The c o n t r i b u t i n g w r i t e r s ,f o r t h e most p a r t , are drawn from t h e same narrow c i r c l eof m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s . Numbered among t h e c o n t r i b u t o r s ared e p u t y m i n i s t e r s of d e f e n s e , m i l i t a r y d i s t r i c t c ommandersand s e n i o r s t a f f o f f i c e r s , c h i e f s and o f f i c i a l s of m i l i -t a r y d i r e c t o r a t e s , a n d m i l i t a r y academy h e a d s and t h s o r i z t s .

*None of t h e c l a s s i f i e d 3 ov i e t inn te r ia l s u s e d i n t h i ss t u d y are d a t e d later t h an f a l l 1961. Issues of t h e SECRETv e r s i o n of MILITARY THOUGHT, p u b l i s h e d i n l a t e 1961, becamea v a i l a b l e t o o l a t e for c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n this paper .-3- T5# 104646

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I 7( Constituting a vehicle principally for theexchange of unofficial or individually held viewpoints,the materials contain a multiplicity of recommendationsfor the planning and conduct of strategic and front op-erations in a future general war, Now and then, however,the writers allude to elements of official doctrine--upon which we have based our conclusions in large part.The articles in the collection vary in quality. Some aredistinguished for the care and thoroughness exercised intheir preparation. Other articles are disjointed. strik-ingly naive, and woefully incomplete. The unevenness, wesurmise, stems from different levels of competence anddifferent degrees of access to data on modern weaponsamong the contributors.

on our subject in other t o p secret issuances of the So-viet Defense Ministry. One such document has been par-ticularly valuable for this project. It is the authori-tative INFORAUTION BULLETIN OF TEE MISSILE TROOPS, whichwas first issued in serial form in July 1961. The BULLE-TIN, as opposed t o the "Special Collection," does notcarry unofficial or controversial articles; its useful-ness to us is principally in its technical informationbearing on strategic missiles.11. SOVIET ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FIRST PHASE OF NUCLEAR

We have a l s o found some useful information

WARThe main concern of Soviet military leaders is thatof fighting a war, should it break out. Yet, the natureof modern warfare is such that the questions of decidingwhen to initiate war and how to fight it have become in-extricably linked. In the USSR, the military leaders havehence taken a strong professional interest in the circum-stances under which future war might begin. Technical re-quirements, such as the need for short reaction time inthe initial employment of strategic weapons, have tendedto increase the influence of the military in the makingof critical strategic decisions. While the final author-ity in the launching of the first attack will, of course,be exercised by the jealous political leadership, the m i l -itary--charged with reading and interpreting the military-

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t e c h n i c a l i n d i c a t i o n s of a p o s s i b l e e n e m y a t t a c k - - w i l l-exert i m p or t an t i n f l u e n c e i n t h e m aking of t h e f a t e f u ld e c i s i o n . As w e s h a l l de m on s tr at e s h o r t l y , t h e y ha vedemanded a v o i c e i n d e te r m in i ng t h e t i m i n g a nd c o n di -t i o n s f o r t h e l a u n c h in g o f t h e f i r s t a t t a c k . They h av eb u i l t a case a n d t h e y h a v e , from a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , re-c e i v e d t h e a pp ro v al of t h e p o l i t i c a l l e a d er s f o r a doc-t r i n e of p r e - e m p t i v e a t t a c k .t o war d o e s n o t p r o p e r l y f a l l w i t h i n t h e scope of t h i sp a p e r .e x c l u s i v e p r e r o g a t i v e of t h e p a rt y -g o ve r nm e nt l e a d e r s h i p ,( th e c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l s u nd er sc or e t h i s p o i n t ) , w e can-not draw f i r m c o n c l u s i o n s about S o v ie t i n t e n t i o n s t o i n -i t i a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n on t h e b a s i s o f t h e a v a i l a b le m i l -i t a r y l i t e r a t u r e . W c a n , h ow ev er , i d e n t i f y t h e e l e m e nt so f S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c d o c t r i n e t h a t w i l l g u i d e t h e USSR i np r e p a r i n g i t s fo rces f o r t h e s t a r t of w a r , a n d t h a t w i l lsu gg es t when and how mi l i t a r y actLon should be i n i t i a t e d .

The c r i t i c a l q u e s t i o n of S o v ie t i n t e n t i o n t o goInasmuch a s t h e d e c i s i o n t o go t o w a r i s t h e

A . How War W i l l Begins , F u t u r e g e n e r a l war w i l l b e g i n , t h e S o v i e t sp r e d i c t . w i t h a s u r p r i s e a t t a c k .so t o s p e a k , t h a t t h e f i r s t a t t a c k w i l l t a k e t h e f o r m o fm as se d n u c l e a r s t r i k e s by o ne major power a g a i n s t a n o t h e r .I n no a v a i l a b l e S o v i e t s o u r c e i s t h e r e e v e n a t r ace of ah i n t t h a t a f or m al d e c l a r a t i o n o f war might under any c i r -c u m s ta n c es p r e ce d e t h e o u t b r e a k of h o s t i l i t i e s .

W f i n d n o i n d i c a t i o n i n a ny o f t h e S o v i e tm a t e r i a l s . open 01' * c l a s s i f i e d , t h a t t h e USSR p l a n s t o i n -i t i a t e m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s a g a i n s t t h e West d e l i b e r a t e l y ,w i t ho u t s e r i o u s p r o vo c a t i on , a nd a t a t i m e e n t i r e l y oft h e i r choo s ing . However , t he re i s good ev idence , w h i c hw e s h a l l d i s c u s s s h o r t l y , of t h e e x i s t e n c e of a d o c t r i n et h a t c a l l s f o r t h e i n i t i a t i o n of war by the USSR underc o n d i t i o n s o f t h r e a t of a n im minent a t t a c k a g a i n s t t h eb l o c b y t h e West. The USSR may i n i t i a t e '67ar, i n s h o r t ,

They g ive heavy odds,

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b u t o n l y if t h e war i s j u s t i f i e d a s " d e f e n s i v e" i n ap o l i t i c a l s e n s e . * T h i s does n ot r u l e o ut t h e p o s s i b i l i t yt h a t S ov ie t l eader s m i gh t f a b r i c a t e gr ou n ds f o r l a un c h-i n g a p r e v e n t i v e war. W h i l e t h e r e is n ot hi ng i n t h es o u r c e s i n o u r p o s s es s i on t o s u g ge s t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o fa m i l i t a r y d e c e p t i o n on t h e p a r t of t h e S o v i e t s , o n ec o n t r i b u t o r t o t h e " S p e c i a l C o l l e c t i on " ascr ibed t h ep o s s i b i l i t y t o t h e West.The c l a s s i f i e d as w el l a s open m i l i t a r y m a -t e r i a l s d e p i c t a W e s t e r n e f f o r t t o l a u n c h a s u r p r i s e n u -c l e a r a t t a c k a s t h e most l i k e l y t r i g g e r of a f u t u r e w a rand t h e m o s t d a ng e ro us t h r e a t to t h e s e c u r i t y of t h e USSR.

We c a n n o t s a y w i th c e r t a i n t y w h e t h e r t h i s r e p r e s e n t s agenu ine est imate of W es te rn i n t e n t i o n s . S o v i e t p o l i t i -c a l l e a de r s on t h e one hand may harbo r v e ry l i t t l e r e a lf e a r t h a t t h e U ni te d S t a t e s w i l l mount a s u r p r i s e a t t a c ka g a in s t t hem. Khrushchev , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , had t o l d

* T h i s p r e s e n t s no r e a l problem f o r t h e USSR. A So-v i e t D e fe n se M i n i s t r y b oo k, "War a nd P o l i t i c s "( s i g n e d t o p r e s s December 1 9 5 9 ) , h a s a l r e a d y r a -t i o n a l i z e d a poss ible f i r s t - s t r i k e s t r a t e g y f o r t h eUSSR w i t h i n t h e f ra me wo rk of " d e f e n s i v e " war i n ap o l i t i c a l s en se :"Contemporary methods of c o n d u c t i n g w a r s h av e g r e a t l yi n c r e a s e d n o t o n l y t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f s u r p r i s e b u ta l s o t he ro l e o f at tack- -which i s t h e basic a n d m s ti m p o r t a n t w ay of c o n d u c t i n g war, and of p r o v i d i n g f o rt h e d e c i s i v e d e s t r u c t i o n & t h e f o r c e s of t h e enemyand t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n & o n e ' s own f o r c e s . A t t ac k i nt h e m i l i t a r y s en se of s t r a t e g y by no means c o n t r a d i c t st h e d e f e n si v e c h a r a c t e r of w a r i n d e fe ns e of the so-c i a l i s t f a t h e r l a n d from t he p o l i t i c a l p oi n t of view.'Marx and Enge l s co ns ta n t ly ad v i sed Communis ts t h a ta , . . j u s t war, d e fe n s iv e i n c h a r a c t e r , does not pre -c l u d e s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k op e r a t i o n s bu t on t h e c on t r a r yp r e s u p p o s e s them.

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i n 1958 t h a tL r because ofa n Am eric an v i s i t o rllRoNeARKl t h e U n i t e d . S t a t e s coui t s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l s ys te m , a l t ho u g h he has r e c e n t l ymade s e v e r a l p ub1,ic a l l u s i o n s t o t he dangerous i m p l i -c a t i o n s of P r e s i d e n t K en ne dy 's s t a t e m e n t t h a t t h e U n i te dS t a t e s m ight i n i t i a t e n u cl e ar war u n d e r c e r t a i n con-d i t i o n s . K h r u s h c h e v ' s major m i l i t a r y c o n c e r n , t o o , ap-pea r s t o be t h a t o f d e t e r r i n g p r o ba b l e en em ie s of t h eUSSR f r m i n i t i a t i n g a n u c l e a r c o n f l i c t a nd h e claimsa c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e n t f o r c e f o r t h e USSR.* If he iss a t i s f i e d , a s h e a p p e a r s t o be, t h a t t h e U n i t e d S t a t e si s d e t e r r e d , then he would have no l o g i c a l r e as o n t of e a r a U.S. s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . His est imate of t h e pos-s i b l e f u t u r e c o r r e l a t i o n of fo rces m a y , o f c o u r s e , bed i f f e r e n t . S o vi e t m i l i t a r y l e ade r s , on t h e o t h e r h a n d ,may look a t t h e problem somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y . Th e i rp r o f e s s i o n a l c o n c e r n i s p r i n c i p a l l y t h a t o f f i g h t i n ga war, s h o u l d d e t e r r e n c e f a i l . H y p o t h e s i z i n g t h a t aw a r w i l l t ake p l a c e , f o r p u rp o se s of p r e p a r i n g f o r i t ,t h e m i l i t a r y s p e c i a l i s t s c on cl ude t h a t t h e p r o b a b l eenemy w i l l at tempt to g a i n i m p o r t a n t a d v a n t a ge s i n th ewar by s t r i k i n g f i r s t . From t h i s , t h e y draw c o n c l u s i o n sa b ou t t h e h i gh p r o b a b i l i t y of an at tempted s u r p r i s e f i r s ts t r i k e - - b ut n o t a bo ut t h e p r o b a b i l i t y of war i t s e l f .H en ce , t h e i r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a s t h emain danger f o s t e r s a "prepare- for - the-worst" phi losophyi n p la nn in g f o r f u t u r e w a r . The f o r c e s t r u c t u r e , r ead i -n e s s and v i g i l a n c e t h a t w i l l r e s u l t from p r e p a r i n g a bo vea l l t o f o r e s t a l l an enemy s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , t h e S o v i e t sseem t o t h i n k , w i l l p r e p a r e t h e armed f o r c e s o p t im a l lyf o r a ny other g e n e r a l war c o n t i n g e n c y .

The p o s s i b i l i t y of war b y a c c i d e n t o r m i s -c a l c u l a t i o n h a s a l s o been acknowledged i n open pub l i ca -t i o n s , b ut i t h a s n o t b ee n t a k e n u p in t h e s e c r e t d i s -c o u r s e . We do n o t know how s e r i o u s a view Sovie t m i l i -t a r y p l a n n e r s t ake of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . But i t seems,i n any case, t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c r e q u i r e m e n t s p l a c e d o n

%A c r e d i b l e d e t e r r e nt force i s o ne t h a t c a n w t t h s t a n da n enemy s u r p r i s e a t t a c k a nd r e t a l i a t e w i t h s u c h de-s t r u c t i o n as would be u n a c c e p t a b l e t o t h e a t t a c k e r .-7-J

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/IRONBARK( t h e s t a t e t o d e a l w i t h s u ch a cont ingency a re p r o b a b l ymuch t h e same a s t h e o n e s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h a n enemy s u r -p r i s e a t t a c k .Much has been s a i d i n t he propaganda abou tt h e gr a ve da nge r o f a l o c a l w a r e s c a l a t i n g r a p i d l y intoa g l o b a l n u c l ea r war. I n h i s s pee ch a t t he 22nd C P S UC o n g r e s s , Marshal Ma l inovs ky pos tu l a t e d a r i g i d f or mu lao n t h i s p ro bl em : an y armed c o n f l i c t , he s a i d , w i l l " in -e v i t a b l y " d e v el o p i n t o a g l o b a l n u c l e a r / r o c k e t war s h o u l dt h e nuc l e a r powe rs bec ane i nvo lve d i n i t . Somewhzte a r l i e r ' i n a r t i c l e s i n t h e t o p s e c r e t " S p e c i a l . C o l l e c t i o n p "s e v e r a l m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s men ti on ed t h e p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t

g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war might s t a r t w i t h a " l oc a l w a r " be-tween t he superpowers i n "one of t h e a reas of t h e world."One w r i t e r , C o l . Gen. Pavlovs lcy, hyp oth es iz es i n the" S p e c i a l C o l l ec t i o n " t h a t t h e West might f i r s t a t t a c ka b lo c s a t e l l i t e . The USSR wo uld t h e n e n t e r t h e wart o de fend t h e " f r i e n d l y c o un t ry , " and t h e c o n f l i c t wouldt u r n i n t o a wor ld war. s s i d e P r o m t h i s i n s t a n ce , noo t h e r t y p e s of l o c a l w a r s i t u a t i o n s a re s p e c i f i e d i nt h e c l a s s i f i e d m a t e r i a l s .N o e x p l i c i t a l l ow a nce ha s be en made f o r a"p au se" i n l o c a l i z e d h o s t i l i t i e s between t h e superpowers ,i n wh ich t i m e a cessa t ion of h o s t i l i t i e s c ou ld be broughta b o u t . A t most , a "pause" m ay be i n ip l ic i t i n t h e s t a t e -ment by Pavlovsky i n an e a r l y 1 9 61 i s s u e of t h e " S p e c i a lC o l l e c t i o n , " t h a t an a t t a c k a g a i n s t a S o v i e t s a t e l l i t ec o u l d "s c a r ce l y " b e c o n f i ne d t o a l o c a l war and would"most pr oba b ly" l e a d t o a wor ld war. T h i s i s a l e s sr i g i d f o r m u l a t i o n t h a n t h e o ne p r e s e n t e d by M al in ov sk ya t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress l a s t October. A s f a r a s w ec a n d i s c er n , t h e S o v i e t s r e ga r d t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of al o c a l war e s c a l a t i n g i n t o a g e ne r al n u c l e ar c o n f l i c t a sp a r t of t h e problem of s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . F ore wa rn ed byt h e e x i s t e n c e of a t h r e a t e n i n g p e ri o d i n t h e form ofl o c a l i z e d h o s t i l i t i e s , t h e S ov ie t m i l i t a r y l eade rs wouldp r o b a b l y expect the enemy t o u s e t h e el em en t o f s u r p r i s ei n o r d e r t o mount an a t t a c k a g a in s t s t r a t e g i c t a r g e t s

i n t h e USSR s h o u l d t h e l o c a l war s i t u a t i o n become un-f a v o r a b l e t o him. (American d oc tr in e has been made

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llRoNBARKl c l e a r on t h e p o i n t o f i n i t i a t i n g nu c le a r w a r f ar e , b u tn o t a g e n e r a l n u c l e a r war, shou ld t h e S o v i e t s t a k ea d v a n t a g e o f a l o c a l p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f c o n v e n t i o n a lf o r ces t o o v e r r u n NATO p o s i t i o n s , ) S o v i e t s t r a t e g ywould th us have t o be t h a t of denying the enemy t h eo p p o rt u n i t y of s t r i k i n g f i r s t . Thus, t h e danger in -h e r e n t i n a loca l war i n v o l v i n g f o r c e s of t h e majorpowers , as t h e S o v i e t s p ro b ab l y see i t , i s t h a t t h ep r e s s i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r e v e n t i ng a poss ib le enemyn u c l e a r a t t a c k may be t r a n s l a t e d i n t o a c t i o n before ap e a c e f u l s e t t l e m e n t of t h e l oc a l f r a c a s c o u l d be a r r a n g e d .B. The Importance of t h e F i r s t A t t a c k

S o v i e t c o n c e r n o v e r t h e i m p or t an c e of t h ef i r s t massed n u c l e a r s t r i k e s in a f u t u r e war h a s i n -creased demons t r ab ly in r e c e n t y e a r s , The h e i g h t e n e dc o n c e r n has emerged a g a i n s t a backdrop of s i g n i f i c a n ti n c r e m e n t s t o US s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k f o r c e s and the s h r i n k -i n g of t h e v e i l of secrecy s u r r o u n d i n g S o v i e t s t r a t e g i cf o r c e s . T h e s u b j e c t of s e r i o u s deba te i n S ov ie t m i l i -t a r y c i r c l e s u n t i l a b ou t a y e a r a g o, t h e q u e s t i o n oft h e i m p o r ta n c e of t h e o p en i ng p h as e of a f u t u r e g e n e r alwar, h a s s i n c e be en a ns were d by o f f i c i a l m i l i t a r y o p i n i o n .M i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e now a s s i g n s o v e r r i d i n g i m po r ta n c et o t h e i n i t i a l s t r a t e g i c o p e r a t i o n s i n a f u t u r e n u c l e arw a r .

The e x t a n t d o c t r i n e on t h e s t a r t of war wasp u b l i c l y r e v e al e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e by Defense Mi n i s t e rMal inovsky i n h i s speech a t t h e 2 2 n d CPSU Congress l a s tOctober , and has s u b s e q u e n t l y b e e n rea f f i rmed and c l a r i -f i e d . The p r i n c i p a l e l e m e n ts of t h e d o c t r i n e i l l u m i n a t i n gS o vi e t o f f i c i a l t ho ug ht on t h e v i t a l i m p o r t a n c e of t h eo p e n i n g o p e r a t i o n s a r e a s f o l l o w s :(a) The i n i t i a l p e r i od o f f u t u r e n u c le a r warm i gh t b e d e c i s i v e n o t only f o r t h e c o u r s e b u t f o r t h eout'come of t h e war as a whole. (Malinovsky, KOMNIUNIST,N o . 7 , May 1962)

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(b ) S t r a t e g i c n u c l ea r missi le weapons, whichw i l l p l a y t h e p r i m a ry r o l e i n t h e i n i t i a l pe r i od o f t h ewar, make i t p o s s ib l e t o a t t a i n t he s t r a t e g i c g o a ls ofwar " w i t h i n a s h o r t p e r io d of t i m e . "23 October 1961 speech a t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress;Moskalenko, RED S T A R , 13 September 1961) .( c ) The v e r y f i r s t mass n u cl e ar s t r i k e s arec a p a b l e of p r e d e t e r m i n i n g t h e whole subsequen t cour seof t h e war a n d c o u l d lead t o such l o s s e s i n t h e r earand among t h e t roops as would p u t t h e f l o v i e t 7 p e o p l eand t h e c o u n t r y i n a n e xc e p t i o n a l l y d i T f i c u l T p o s i t i o n .(Mal inovsky, 23 October 1961 speech a t t h e 22nd CPSU

C o n g r e s s ) .

(Malinovsky,

So s e r i o u s i s t h e S o v i et m i l i t a r y v iew of t h ei n i t i a l p ha se of w a r , t h a t M a li no vs ky i n h i s speech a tt h e P a r t y C o n g r e s s l a s t October took t h e r a r e s t e p o fi n v o k i n g t h e a u t h o r i t y of t h e CPSU Pre s id iu m i n empha-. s i z i n g t he need t o g i v e " s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n " t o t h ei n i t i a l pe r iod i n t h e c ou rs e of m i l i t a r y s t u d y a n dt r a i n i n g . T h i s s t e p m ig ht a l s o h av e b ee n t a k e n w i t ht h e a i m of conveying t h e i mp re ss io n t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a la nd m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s now s h a r e a common view of t h eproblem. *s a y c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t t h e f i r s t s t r i k e s will d e c i d et h e war:b i l i t i e s " a n d " c a p a b i l i t i e s . " The e m ph a si s p l a c e d on

I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e does n o tthe p rob lem i s s t a t e d i n terms O f p o s s i -

*For a d i s c u s s i o n of e a r l i e r d i f f e r e n c e s overt h i s q u e s t i o n b e t w ee n Kh ru sh ch ev a n d t h e m i l i t a r yl e a d e r s , see CAESAR-XIV of 3 A p r i l 1962, " S o v i e tM i l i t a r y Th ou gh t o n F u t u r e War: D o c t r i n e a n d D e-b a t e S i n c e 1960."

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1 t h e i n i t i a l o p er at io ns does-of c o u r s e 3 s u g g e s t Ia n es t imate of a r f a i r l y h i g b p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e i & i+c*-'L Gf i r s t p h a s e o f t h e war w i l l ' be t h e d e c i s i v e o n e .H e r e i n l i e s a n i m p o r t a n t g u i d e t o m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r si n d e t e r mi n i n g t h e f u t u r e c o mp os it io n of S o v i e tf o r c e s : s t r a t e g i c fo r ce s are o f c a r d i n a l i mp or -t a nc e . By t h e same t oken , th e a l lowance made i nt h e d o c t r i n e f o r t h e p o s s i b l e i n d e c i si v e n es s a ndi n co n cl u si v en e ss o f t h e f i r s t p ha se of w a r a l s op r o v i d e s a g u i d e l i n e f o r t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of t h earmed f o r c e s : a b a s i s is t h e r e b y l a i d f o r a moref l e x i b l e a nd va r i e d m i l i t a r y f o r c e than would beneeded f o r a s h o r t n u c l e a r e x ch a ng e .

i/

In s t r e s s i n g t h e i mp ort an ce of t h e i n i t i a lp h a s e of war, t h e d o c t r i n e is p r i m a r i l y c o n c e r n e dw i th t h e p o s s i b l e e f f e c t s of t h e f i r s t Westernn u cl e ar s t r i k e s a g a i n s t t h e USSR. A t t h e samet i m e , t h e doct r ine- -which is fo rmula ted a s as o r t of o b j e c t i v e law--seems t o b e a r o n t h e a b i l -i t y of t h e U ni te d S t a t e s t o w i t h s t a n d t h e f i r s tn u c l e a r blows f r o m t h e USSR. In e i t h e r case , t h ed o c t r i n e i m p l i e s a hi gh premium f o r t h e f i r s t massedn u c l e a r s t r i k e .p l a nn e r s f u l l y a p p re c i a t e t h e advan ta ges o f l aunch-i n g t h e f i r s t as opposed t o t h e s ec o n d b lo w, b u tis n o t i n i t s e l f proof of t h e a d o p t i o n of a s t r i k e -f i r s t - i f - p o s s i b l e s t r a t e g y .C . Hedging: "Try For a S h o r t War, P r e p a r e f o r a

I t i n d i c a t es t h a t S ov ie t m i l i t a r y

Long One"C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e d o c t r i n e w h i c h s t r e s s e st h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e f i r s t phase of a f u t u r e w a ri s t h e d o c t r i n e on t h e a n t i c i p a t e d d u r a t i o n oft h e war. W a re a f f o r d e d a c l ea r p i c t u r e of t h i sl a t t e r d o c t r i n e by t h e c l a s s i f i e d ma t e r i a l s . I ti s , i n e f f e c t , a d o c t r i n e of h e d g i ng : i t s a y st h a t s t r a t e g i c p lann in g must t ak e accoun t o f t h ep o s s i b i l i t y of e i t h e r a s h o r t o r a pro longed war.

-11.- TS# 104646

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( Whether f u t u re war w i l l b e l o n g o r s h o r t w a sf o r some time a b on e of c o n t e n t i o n i n t h e op enp e r i o d i c a l p r e s s a nd i n t h e t 'o p S e c r e t " S p e c i alC o l l e c t i o n , " as wel l . Some o f f i c e r s , who proposeda b l i t z k r i e g s t r a t e g y f o r t h e USSR i n t h e t o ps e c r e t o r g an , p r e d i c t e d t h a t t h e h o s t i l e s t a t eor c o a l i t i o n of s t a t e s could be de pr ive d o f t h ec a p a b i l i t y t o res is t " i n t h e c o u r s e o f a few hoursor, a t t h e o u t s i d e , w i t h i n a few days . " Oth e rsa r g u e d e q u a l l y c a t e g o r i c a l l y t h a t t he i n i t i a lop e r a t i o ns would no t p r e de t e r m ine t h e outcome ofwar, t h a t a war between two wor ld sys tems "cannotbe of s h o r t d u r a t i o n . " Most c o n t r i b u t i o n s tooka pos i t ion somewhere be tween t h e two e x t r e m e s ,s a y i n g t h a t t h e war might be r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t ; t h a ti t might even assume a fas t -moving " b l i t z " c h a ra c t e r ,a l t h o u g h t h i s was "improbable"; t h a t t h e w a r would" no t n e c e s s a r i l y " b e p r o lo n g ed ; b u t t h a t i n a nycase t h e USSR m us t p r e pa r e for a " p r o t r a c t e d , h a r dwar. I'

The ques t ion was r e s o lve d by Sov i e t o f f i c i a l -dom i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1960. I n a r e p o r t ( k e p t se-c r e t from t h e g e n e r a l p u b l i c ) t o t h e All-Army Con-f e r e n c e of Se c re t a r i e s of P r ima r y Pa r t y O r ga n i z a t i o nsi n May of t h a t y e a r , t h e D ef en se M i n i s t e r eschewedb o t h e x t r e m e s , c a l l i n g them "one-s ided." The USSR,he s a i d , m us t de ve lop a nd pe r f e c t t h e means andmethods of armed combat with a view toward a c h i e v -i n g v i c t o r y o v er t h e aggressor "above a l l i n t h es h o r t e s t p o s s i b le t i m e , " b u t a t t h e same t i m e mustp r e p a r e s e r i o u s l y f o r an extended war. "his doc-t r i n e , h e s a i d , g ov er ns t h e d i r e c t i o n of m i l i t a r y !

:

o r g a n i z a t i o n .

s u b s t a n c e , b e e n made p u b l i c 2 l t ho u g h n ot s p e l l e do u t . I t was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n M a l in o vs k y' s speecha t t he 22nd CPSU Congress l a s t October: t h e D e-f e n s e M i n i s t e r a t t h a t time s t r e s s e d b o t h t h e

I t might be added t h a t t h i s d o c t r i n e h a s , i n

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* * . _L_.I(IRONBARKJ i mp or ta nc e . of t h e i n i t i a l s t a g e of war a n d t h ec o n t i n u i n g need f o r v a r i e d a nd l a r g e armed f o r c e s .And he r e i t e r a t e d t h a t p o s i t i o n most r e c e n t l y i na n a r t i c l e i n the M a y (No. 7) 1962 KOMMUNIST.. . .

Thus, c a l c u l a t e d t o f i n i s h t h e war i n t h es h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e t i m e , th e d o c t r i n e i s p r e -d i c a t e d u p o n t h e assumpt ion t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i cmissi le f o r c e s w i l l p l a y t h e d e c i s i v e an d p r i n -c i p a l r o l e i n t h e war. B u t c o n s i d e r i n g t h ep o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e fo rces wou ldf a i l t o . b r i n g a b o u t a d e c i s i o n i n t h e s h o r t r u n ,t h e d o c t r i ne c a l l s f o r t h e m ai nt en an ce of o t h e rt y p e s o f f o r c e s ( eq ui pp ed w i t h n u c l e a r w ea po nsa n d o p e r a t i n g as combined arms) w h i c h would bep r e p a r e d t o wage extended war.

O n e of t h e spokesmen who suppo r ted t h i sc a u t i o u s s t r a t e g i c c on ce pt e x p la i ne d t h e r eason-i n g u n d e r l y i n g i t . Major General M. Goryainovwrote i n a n a r t i c l e i n t h e " S p e ci a l C o l l e c t i o n , "t h a t p a s t e x p e r i e n c e teaches t h a t es t i ma t e s ofenemy s t r eng th a t t h e beg inn ing o f a war haveu s u a l l y pr ov en i n c o r r e c t and t h a t " no t a s i n g l ewar h a s e v e r g o ne t h e way it w a s planned." H ea l s o p o i n t e d o u t t h a t a number of s t r a t e g i c m i s -s i l e s c o ul d t u r n o u t t o be u n r e l i a b l e , an d o n l yp a r t i a l l y f u l f i l l t h e immediate t a s k s of w a r w i t h -o u t a d e c i s i v e r e s u l t . I n t h i s e v e n t u a l i t y , t h ea u t h o r s a i d , d u r in g t h e t i m e needed f o r r e s t o r i n gt h e combat c a p a b i l i t y of s t r a t e g i c missi le t r o o p s ,t h e g ro un d t r o o p s an d a v i a t i o n wou ld p l a y t h ed e c i s i v e r o l e . T h i s i s t h e most a c c e p t a b l e con-c e p t , h e s a i d , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t j t is t h ocostliest i n e x v e nd i t ur e s , both b e f o r e and d u r i n gt h e war.

One cannot, w e t h i n k , draw t h e c o n c l u s i o nfrom t h e d o c t r i n e o f h ed gi ng -t ha t is, p r e p a r i n g

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f o r e i t h e r a l o n g o r s h o r t war--that t h e USSRp l a n s t o m a i n t a i n a d u a l c a p a b i l i t y f o r e i t h e rn u c l e a r o r c o n v e n t i o n a l g e n e r a l war. The bui ld- '\u p o f t h e o l d e r br a n ch e s o f s e r v i c e , w hi ch h av e Ibeen re -equipped with n u c l e a r missi le weapons, \is d e p i c t e d as n e c e s s ar y t o meet t h e r e q u i r e m e n t sof a p r o t r a c t e d n u c l e a r w a r , n o t - a-n exc lus Lv. elyc o n v e n x n G a F . - 7 ' I i i - h n ot hi ng i n - t h e m i l i t a r yl Y f E % t i r e , c l a s s i f i e d o r o pe n, t o s u g g e s t t h a t as e p a r a t e body o f d o c t r i n e f o r a non-nuclear war i sb e in g r e t a i n e d . R a t he r , t h e l i t e r a t u r e h as onmany occ as io ns und e rscored t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f t h et h a t n u c l e a r r o c k e t weapons w i l l p l a y t h e main r o l e 'i n s uc h a war i s a n unque s t i one d a r t i c l e of d o c t r i n e .Only wi th in the f ramework of a n u c l e a r w a r does t h el i t e r a t u r e p r ov id e a p l a c e f o r c o n v e n t i o n a l w e a p o n s .

I,,Imployment of nu c l ea r weapons i n a g e n e r a l w a r : I

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\ -\ I111. THE CASE FOR PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK'

A . The New D oc t r i na l Fo r m ulaI t h a s a l r e a d y be en p o i n t e d o u t t h a t S o v i e tm i l i t a r y p l a nn i n g f o r f u t u r e war f o c u s e s p r i m a r i l y o nthe p r ob l e m of p r e p a r i n g t o ward o f f a n enemy s u r p r i s en u c l e a r a t t a c k . The S o v i e t s s a y t h a t a n enemy s u r p r i s ea t t a c k , i f c a r r i e d o u t , would p l a c e t h e USSR a t a v e r yg r e a t d i s a d v a n t a g e i n t h e war. The problem i s a l s o ex-p r e s s e d i n terms o f t h e immediate s t r a t e g i c aims whicht h e USSR w i l l t r y t o a t t a i n i n t h e f i r s t phas e o f t h ewar. According t o a number of s ta tements , c a r r i e d i nopen a s w e l l as c l a s s i f i e d m i l i t a r y s o u r c e s , p r e v en t -

i n g , or a t l e a s t r e p u l s i n g , a n enemy s t r a t e g i c a t t a c k ,a n d d e l i v e r i n g a c r us h ing c oun t e r b low , w i l l be fore-most among t h e immediate s t r a t e g i c S ov ie t a i m s i n fu -t u r e w a r .There a r e t w o ways of " pre ve nti ng " an enemys u r p r i s e a t t a c k , a cc o rd i ng t o t h e S o v i e t v i e w po i n t.The f i r s t , an d e v i d e n t l y p r e fe r r e d , method i s t o pre-v e n t war i t s e l f from b r e ak i n g o u t by d e t e r r i n g t h eenemy. Deterrence i s , of c o u r s e , t h e f i r s t m i s s i o no f t h e S o v i e t m i l i t a r y e s t a b l i s h me n t . T h i s ha s be e nmade a b u n d a n t l y c l ea r i n num ero us S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s .For example, t h e Party-Government appeal of June19 62 o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f r a i s i n g meat and m i l k p r i c e s

s t a t e d , i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n o f heavy d e f e n se e x p en d i tu r e s,t h a t .t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s a re used t o r e s p e c t i n gfo r c e o n l y , an d i f s o f a r t h e y h a v e n o tbegun a war, i t i s on ly be c a us e t he y knowou r ec onom ic a nd m i l i t a r y m i g h t , and knowt h a t t h e S o v i e t c o u n t r y now h a s e v e r y t h i n gn e c e s s a r y t o cool down t h e m i l i t a n t ardorof any aggressor .The second method of pr ev en t i ng an enemys ur p r i s e . , a t t a c k - - t he m ethod t h a t w ould be us e d s hou ldd e t e r re n c e f a i l - - i s t h a t of de s t ro yi ng t h e enemy:sn u cl ea r s t r i k i n g f o r ce , or as much of it a s p o s s i b l e ,

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IRONBARK in good- th i s isempt i n gm i l i a r

t i m e , The b es t and pe rhaps o nl y way t o a c h i e v eby s t r i k i n g t h e enemy f i r s t , t h a t i s , by pre-him. Such w a s t h e t h i n k i n g of a gr oup of S o v i e ty t h e o r i s t s who, i n 1955, a dva nc e d t he v i e w t h a ta s u r p r i s e a t t a c k c o ul d be f r u s t r a t e d i f the enemy wereh i m s e l f s u r p r i s e d a s he p r e pa r e d t o s t r i k e . T h i s i snow, from a l l i n d i c a t i o n s , t h e t h i n k i n g o f t h e S o v i e tm i l i t a r y l e a d e r s h i p , a n d i t i s r e f l e c t e d i n r e c en t l yp ro no un ce d d o c t r i n e f o r t h e s t a r t of w a r .A t t h e 22nd CPSU Congress l a s t O c tobe r ,M al in ov sk y s a i d t h a t t h e S o v i e t a rmed f o r c e s mu st b ep r e pa r e d "above a l l else" f o r t h e e v e n t u a l i t y o f a

W es te rn s u r p r i s e a t t a c k . With c l e a r a l l u s i o n t o as t r a t e g y of p re -e mp ti on , h e s a i d t h a t m i l i t a r y t r a i n -i n g i n 1 96 1 p os ed a s t h e main t a s k " t h e s t ud y a nd work-i n g o u t of t h e means o f r e l i a b l y r e p u l s i n g a s udde nn u c l e a r a t t a c k by t h e a g g r e s s o r a nd a l s o the means ofe x p l o d i n g h i s a g g r e s s i v e p l a n s by a t i m e l y a n d d e v a s t a t -in g blow ag a i ns t h im." A 1 hough l e s s a u t h o r i t a t i v e s o ur c esh a v e im p l i e d t h e ne ed f o r a p re -e mp ti ve s t r a t e g y i n t h ep a s t , t h i s s ta te me nt r e p re s e n ts t h e f i r s t t i m e t h a t t h ec o n c e p t o f p r e d e m p t i v e a c t i o n was i n co r p or a te d i n t h es t a t e d m is s i o n o f t h e S o v i e t armed fo r c e s . The newdoc t r i na l f o r m ula - - w h ic h is a b o u t a s f a r as t h e S o v i e tscan go i n s pe ak i ng of a p re -e mp ti ve s t r a t e g y w i t h o u ts u g g e s t i n g t h a t t h e USSR m ig ht i n i t i a t e war--has s i n c eb een r e i t e r a t e d s e v e r a l t i m e s i n o t h er a u t h o r i t a t i v ec o n t e x t s . T h e s t a t emen t on t h e n e e d ' t o "wreck t h e ag-g r e s s o r ' s plan s" by dea l i ng him a " t i m e l y blow" was,f o r example , carrjed 31 a . RE D STAR e d i t o r i a l o n 21 J a n -ua r y 1962 a nd a ga in i n RE D STAR, on 11 May, i n a n expo-s i t i o n o n S ov i et m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . T h e l a t t e r s o u r c ed e s c 2 i b e d t h i s m is s i o n as " t h e most p r i m a r y , t h e mostim por t a n t a nd t h e main t a s k of the armed fo rces . " Thed o c t r i n a l f o r mu l a h a s a l s o be en c a r r i e d i n v a r i o u ss i g n e d a r t i c l e s i n c o n s ec u t iv e i s s u e s o f KOMMUNIST OFTHE A m D ORCES i n r e c e n t months. Malinovsky t oo , i nan a r t i c l e i n t h e May KOMMUNIST, t h e a u t h o r i t a t i v e CPSUorgan, came close t o r epea t ing t h e formula i n s p e a k i n g

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1 of S o v ie t s t r a t e g y " to n i p i n t h e bud" t h e en em y' s p l a n sf o r a g g r e s s i o n and i n u n d e r s co r i n g t h e p o s s i b l e d e c i s i v e -n e s s of t h e i n i t i a l n u c l ea r p ha se of war. (A TASS E n g l i s hl a ngua ge r e v i e w of t h e Malinovsky pi ec e on 19 May c a l l e dt h e p o i n t on t h e d e c i s i v e n e s s of t h e f i r s t s t a g e " t heb a s i c p r o p o s it i o n " of S o v i e t m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . ) Theo pe n m i l i t a r y p r e s s h a s a l s o h i n t e d t h a t command-staffe x e r c i s e s h av e b ee n " r e c e n t l y " h e l d u n d er s i m u l a t e dc o n d i t i o n s of d e a l i n g a p re -e mp ti ve s t r a t e g i c s t r i k ea g a i n s t t h e enemy. According t o KOMMUNIST OF THE ARMEDFORCES, March (No. 5 ) 1962,on t h e b a s i s of r e c e n t l y h e l d ex e r c i s e s ,metbods were w or ked o u t f o r t h e r e l i a b l er e b u f f of a n enemy s u r p r i s e a t t a c k and t h ee x p l o s i o n o f h i s a g g r e s s i v e p l a n s by meanso f t h e t i m el y d e l i v e r y of a c r u s h i n g blowa g a i n s t h i m .

B. The Evolvement of t h e Concept i n S e c r e t D i s c o u r s eVar ious a r t i c l e s i n t h e t o p - s e c r e t " S p e c i a lC o l l e c t i o n " a l s o t hr ow l i g h t o n t h i s q u e s t i o n , s u g g e s t i n gt h a t M al in ov sk y' s t h i n l y - v e i l e d r e f e r e n c e t o a pre-e m p t i v e s t r a t e g y i n October 1961 s i g n a l l e d a c hange i nm i l i t a r y p o l i c y , To t h e t h e n e x i s t i n g d o c t r i n e of d e-t e r r e n c e and r e t a l i a t i o n w a s added t h e d o c t r i n e of pre-

e m pt ion , w h ic h , i n ou r v i ew , c a l l s f o r a l a r g e r f o r c et h a n w a s pr e v io us l y e nv i s a ge d a nd one w h ic h is p r i n -c i p a l l y c o un t e r- f or c e i n m i ss i on . More w i l l be s a i dl a t e r a b o u t t h e fo r c e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e new d o c t r i n e .There was a d i s c e r n i b l e e v o l u t i o n i n t h e wayi n w hic h t h e q u e s t i o n of s t r a t e g i c pre -empt ion w a st r e a t e d i n s u cc ee di ng i s s u e s of t h e "S p e c i al C o l l e c t i o n "between 1960 and 1961. Among t h e a r t i c l e s i n t h e "Spe-c i a l C o l l e c t i o n " p u b l i sh e d i n 1960, w e f i n d a numberof h i n t s of t h e p o s s i b l e need t o e nga ge i n p r e - e mpt ivea c t i o n on a s t r a t e g i c s c a l e . Thus v a r i o u s a r t i c l e s pub-l i s h e d in t h a t y e a r l i s t e d c o un t er f or c e t a r g e t s , n o t a b l y

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r o c k e t bases, f i r s t among t h e o b j e c t i v e s of S o v i e t- t r a $ e g i c missi le s t r i k e s . Also s e v e r a l a r t i c l e s en-d o r s i n g a b l i t z k r i e g s t r a t e g y g av e l o g i c a l g ro un dsf o r p l a c in g a h i gh premiumJon s t r i k i n g f i r s t .f o r 1 9 61 t r e a t e d t h e q u e s t i o n of s t r a t e g i c pre-emp-t i o n m o r e d i r e c t l y .i s s u e of t h e t o p sec r e t o r g a n f o r 1 9 6 1 ( s ig n ed t o t h ep r e s s 1 3 January ) developed a case for a s t r a t e g y ofpre-e mptio n. An a r t i c l e by t h e l a t e deputy c h i e f oft h e G e n e r a l S t a f f , Colone l Genera l N. Pavlovsky, whohad d i e d i n O c t o b er 1 9 6 0 , s t res sed t h a t t h e c h ie f t a s ki n t h e e ve nt of an enemy a t t ack w i l l be t o "prevent"mass n u c l e a r s t r i k e s by t h e enemy, i n s t a n t l y t o de-l i v e r c r u s hi n g n u cl e a r s t r i k e s , and t o I n i t i a t e v ig -o r o u s m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s b y a l l t y p e s of' armed fo rces .Pav lovsky ' s method of d i s r u p t i n g a n enemy s u r p r i s ea t t a c k e n t a i l e d t h e d e l i v e r y of a powerful f i r s t blowa g a i n s t him. The blow, he s a i d , m u s t be d i r e c t e da g a i n s t t h e e ne my 's i n d u s t r i a l a n d ec on om ic c e n t e r s ;a g a i n s t h i s miss i l e , a i r c r a f t , and nava l bases;a g a i ns t h i s s t o c k p i l e s of nuc lea r weapons , a i r c r a f t ,n u c l e a r s u b m a r i n e s , missile v e s s e l s , a n d a i r c r a f tc a r r i e r s ; a nd a g a i n s t t h e mo st i m p o r t a n t g r o u p in g sof h i s g r o u n d t r o o p s , r a d a r f a c i l i t i e s and o the r ob -j e c t i v e s , By d e l i v e r i n g i t s " f i r s t " m a s s e d n u c l e a rs t r i k e "a t t h e r i g h t time," he s a i d , t h e USSR c o u l d"co ns i de ra b ly weaken" (b lu n t ) t h e s t r i k e s of t h eenemy, p a r a ly z e h i s o p e r a t io n s f o r a c e r t a i n time,a nd u nd e r f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s , f o r c e hi m t o ceasea c t i v e m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s , In h i s view, t h e suc-cess of s u c h a s t r i k e would depend on (a) t h e r ead i -n e s s of a l l forces and weapons used t o d e l i v e r i t ,(b) t h e v a l i d i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n o n t h e o b j e c t i v e t ob e d e s t r o y e d , (c) t h e p r op er s e l e c t i o n of t h o s e objec-t i v e s , a n d (d) t h e s k i l l f u l use of t h e nuclear weapons.

I n t h e same i s s u e of t h e " S p e c i a l C o l l e c -t io n ," Col one l Gen eral Babadzhanyan (Odessa MD com-mander) p o in t ed o u t t h a t NATO d i d n o t - t h e n r e p r e s e n ta grave t h r e a t to t h e USSR. He s a w h e West as now

S e v e r a l a r t i c l e s i n t h e " S p e c i a l C o l l e c t i o n "Two a r t i c l e s car r i ed in t h e f i r s t

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d e t e r r e d f rom s t r i k i n g f i r s t by i t s i n a b i l i t y t o p r e v e n tt h e USSR from d e l i v e r i n g a " d e v a s t a t i n g c o u n t e r b l o w . " *But he admonished t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n c o u l d n o t b e perma-n e n t . H e e x p r e s s e d f e a r of t h e f u t u r e , when t h e West"will" have a g r ea t e r c a p a b i l i t y t o d e l i v e r a s u r p r i s em a s s i v e n u c l e a r s t r i k e which cou ld "des t roy t h e most i m -p o r t a n t and c r u c i a l i n s t a l l a t i o n s of t h e c o u n t r y , d i s -o r g a n iz e n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l , d i s r u p t m o b i l iz a t i o n and de-ployment of armed f o r c e s , a nd s e v e r e l y reduce the combate f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h e army and t h e c o u n t r y a s a whole."T h i s p r o s p e c t i s s o s e r i o u s , he s a i d , t h a t " ev er y meas-u r e m u s t be t a k e n i n o r d e r t h a t , i f t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s-r y t o s t a r t a war, i t w i l l no t beg in by a s u r p r i s emassed enemy nuclear s t r i k e , " R a t h e r t h a n w a i t f o r t h enew cond i t ions t o come a b o u t , h e argued for t he adop-t i o n of a new s t r a t e g i c concep t now: t h a t concep t i sc l e a r l y p re -e mp ti on . H e s a i d t h a t " i f it becomes e v i -d e n t t h a t a g g r e s s i v e f o r c e s h a v e d e c i d e d on war, andt h a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s is o n l y aq u e s t i o n of a s h o r t t i m e , and i f w e f a i l t o p r e v e ntt h e a g g r e s s o r ' s a t t a c k b y d i p l o m a t i c me an s, t h e n itis n e c e s s a r y t o wreck t h e enemy s t r i k e by a l l o u ra v a i l a b l e f o r c e s an d means d u r i n g t h e f i r s t d a y s oft h e war." What should be done "now and qui ck ly ," heemphas ized , i s t o p r e p a r e S o v i e t i n t e l l i g e n c e and t h earmed fo r ce s i n s uc h a way t h a t t h e y w i l l be i n a "cons-t a n t s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s t o d e l i v e r s u c h -f i r e - empt ive7blow a g a l n s t t h e a g g r e s s o r "

lrRoNBARKl

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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e w r i t e r d o es n o t e l a b o r a t eon t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s $ r a t e g i c c o n ce pt which herecommends f o r So vi e t f o r c e s t r u c t u r e . H e does s a y ,i n c o nc l u di n g h i s d i s c u s s i o n of t h e f i r s t a t t a c k , t h a t* " T h e s t r a t e g i c mi s s i l e s a t t h e i r d i s p os a l c l e a r l yc a nn o t s a t i s f y t h e r e qu i re m e nt s , of a major war and t h e i rq u a l i t y is n o t h i g h , s i n c e , a c c o r di n g t o a s s e r t i o n s byAmer icans thems e lves , o n l y 50% of t h e miss i l e s l aunchedr e a c h their t a r g e t "

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~ 1t h e p o s s i b i l i t y of h av in g o n ly a " l a s t minute" warningof enemy p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a t t a c k n e c e s s i t a t e s a "newapproach" t o t h e " p r e p a r a t i o n an d d e f i n i t i o n " o f t h es t a g e of r e a d i n e s s of So v i e t means o f a t t a c k .

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I n a s ec ond a r t i c l e , c a r r i e d i n t h e t h i r di s s u e of t h e " S p e c i al C o l l e c t i on " f o r 1961 ( s i g n e dLo t h e p r e s s 1 0 J u l y ) , General Babadzhanyan spoke ofp r e - e m p t i v e a c t i o n s t i l l more d i r e c t l y , n o t i n t h eform of a r g u m e n t a t i o n , b u t a s i f i t w e r e now o f f i -c i a l d o c t r i n e . H e s a i d t h a t I' a c o u n t e r s t r i k e , o ra s t r i k e t o f r u s t r a t e a s u r p r i s e e n e m y a t t ack" wouldbe c a r r i e d o ut -- ma in ly by s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e forces--upon t h e d e c i s i o n of t he pa r ty -government l e a d e r s .H e deve loped a s t r a t e g i c c on ce pt f o r o p e r at i o n s oft r o o p s of a f r o n t a f t e r t h e l a u n c h i n g o f e i t h e r a" c o u n t e r s t r i k e o r a s t r i k e t o f r u s t r a t e a s u r p r i s eenemy a t t a c k . "view t h a t f r o n t n u c l e a r / m i s s i l e we apons ( i . e . , t a c t i -c a l n u c l e a r w ea po ns ) mus t p a r t i c i p a t e i n a "coun te r -s t r i k e o r a f i r s t n u c l e a r s t r i k e . " The p h ra s e showst h a t t h e w r i t e r assumed t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e a l t e r n a -t i v e s t r a t e g i e s of r e t a l i a t i o n and f i r s t s t r i k e .

H e r e j e c t e d a " w i d e s p r e a d " p o i n t of

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-I C . S o v i et S t r a t e g i c T a r e e t L i s t s I

E v i d e n c e b e a r i n g o n t h e t y p e s of enemy ta rge t sse l ec t ed f o r d e s t r u c t i o n by S o v i e t s t r a t e g i c r o c k e t si s f u l l y c o n s i s t e n t w i t h a p re -e mp ti ve s t r a t e g y . The"Specia l C o l l e c t i o n " ma t e r i a l s f o r 1960- 61 g i ve g r e a t -e s t emphas i s t o t h e p ro bl em o f c o u n t e r i n g t h e e ne my 'smeans of nu c l ea r a t t a c k on a s t r a t e g i c as w e l l a s t ac -t i c a l s c a l e . I t a p p e a r s t o be a common vi ew among t h ec o n t r i b u t o r s t h a t t h e need f o r a c oun te r - f o r c e c a pa -b i l i t y f o r t h e USSR i s a f o r e gone c onc lus i on . Evenmore c o m p e l l i n g e v i d e n c e of t h i s o ut lo ok i s ' t o be foundi n t h e o f f i c i a l INFORMATICN BULLETIN OF THEMISS ILE TROOPS. More a u t h o r i t a t i v e t h a n t h e " S p e c i s lC o l l e c t i o n , " th i s top s e c r e t s e r i a l c o nt a i n s o nl y a r t i -c l e s t h a t r e f l e c t o f f i c i a l d o c t r i n e and r e g u l a t i o n s .The f i r s t i s s u e of t h e j o u r n a l , p u bl i sh e d i n J u l y 1 96 1,i n c lu d e d a t a r g e t l i s t f o r s t r i k e s by s t r a t e g i c miss i l es( i n t h i s c a s e , 1100 n.m.1 which was headed by enemy m i s -s i l e l a u n c h e r s . T h e l i s t , e v i d e n t l y i n order of p r i o r i t y ,was a s f o l l o w s :- - s t r a t eg i c mi s s i l e l a u n c h s i t e s ;- - s i t e s for t h e p r o d uc t i on , assembly ands t o r a g e of nuclear weapons and of meansf o r d e l i v e r i n g them t o t h e t a r g e t ;--large a i r f i e l d s , a i r f o r c e an d n a v a l b a s e s ;- - ce n t er s o f p o l i t i c a l a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and of-- large communica t ions cente r s ;--large f a c t o r i e s a nd pow er c e n t e r s ;- - ar s en a l s and d e p o ts w i t h s t r a t e g i c s t o c k sof a rm am en ts , m i l i t a r y e qu ipm en t or s t r a -t eg i c raw mater ia l s ;- - s t r a t eg ic r e s e r v e s a n d o t h e r t a r g e t s ofs t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n ce i n t h e d eep r e a rof t h e enemy.

m i l i t a r y i n d us t ry ;

S i g n i f i c a n t l y , p u r el y p o p u la t io n t a r g e t s a r e n o t i n c l u d e d i nany; o f t i e . c l l a s s l f i e d t a r g e t l i s t s . Aside from the pro-p o s a l o f a s m a l l m i n o r i t y t h a t t h e USSR a d o p t a c oun t r y -b u s t i n g s t r a t e g y w i t h regard to Western Europ e, none oft h e spo kesmen i n t h e t o p - s e c r e t S o v i e t mate i i a l s h a sc a l l e d f o r t h e i n d i s c r i m i n a te d e s t r u c t i o n o f c i t i e s . On

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. .. . . .. . . . . . . .. .. . . ... , ,, . '. .' : , . . .

t h e o t h e r ha nd , t h e f a c t t h a t o f f i c i a l s t r a t e g i c t a r g e tl i s t s a re n o t e x c l u s i v e l y c o un te r- f o r c e i n c o m p os i ti o nb u t i n c l u d e i n d u s t r i a l and a d m i n i s t r a t i v e o b j e c t i v e s ,p o i n t s up t h e v e r s a t i l e c h a ra c t e r o f S ov ie t s t r a t e g i c 'd o c t r i n e : t h e t a r g e t l i s t s are e v i d e n t l y d es ig n ed t opromote t h e w a r e f f o r t i n t h e mos t e f f e c t i v e way,w h e t h e r t h e USSR s t r i k e s f i r s t o r s ec o nd ,D. D o c t r i n e on t h e Use of S t r a t e g i c Missiles

In a d d i t i o n t o t h e above-mentioned t a r g e t r e q u i r e -m e n ts , o t h e r S o v i e t c o n c e p t s g o v e r ni n g t h e employmentof t h e s t r a t e g i c miss i l e s are a l s o f u l l y i n k e e pi n gw i t h a s t r i k e - f i r s t - i f - n e c e s s a r y s t r a t e g y , Soviet m i l i -t a r y d o c t r i n e , as u nf ol de d i n t h e t o p - s e c r e t "SpecialCol lec t ion" mater ia l s , d i c t a t e s t h a t n u c l e a r m i s s i l eweapons m u s t be used s u d de n ly , e f f e c t i v e l y , p ur po se -f u l l y , economica l ly , and en masse. Designed t o per-form t h e l e a d in g r o l e i n t h e i n i t i a l p e r i o d of w a r ,t h e m i s s i l e f o r c e s w i l l have t h e p r i n c i p a l aim ofr a d i c a l l y c h an gi ng t h e s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n as a whole- - f i rs t of a l l , e n d i n g t h e w a r i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i -b l e time.*

*There is ge ner a l agreement i n t h e "Special C o l -l e c t i o n " t h a t s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s m ig ht be ca l l edupon t o s u p p o r t armed combat i n t h e a t e r s o f o p e r a t i o n s ,d e s t r o y i n g m a i n groupings of enemy fo rces . But accord-i n g t o M ar sh al V a r e n ts o v , t h e ch ie f of the S o v i e t t ac-t i c a l - o p e r a t i o n a l m i s s i l e u n i t s , t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l eforces m u s t c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e main t a s k s , and t h e in -te res ts of t h e front w i l l be s e r v e d by them only ifs u i t a b l e r e s e r v e s of t h e i r means e x i s t . I t seem t obe g e n e r a l l y un de rs t oo d, i n s h o r t , t h a t t h e s t r i k e sof t h e s t r a t e g i c miss i le t r o o p s w i l l be mainly di rec tedt ow ar d a t t a i n i n g t h e p r i n c i p a l g o a l s of t h e w a r .

TS# 104646E l22-


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O f f i c i a l S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h i n ki n g a l s o s t r e s s e st h e i m p o rt a n c e o f c o n c e n t r a t i n g t h e mas sed n u c l e a rblows a g a i n s t t h e "main enemies , " * and s t r i k i n g a t" t h e most i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i v e s ." Maximum destructiono f t h e enemy, t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n o f w ho le c o u n t r i e s , waspo t i n c l u d e d among t h e o f f i c i a l m is s i o n s of t h e s t r a -t e g i c m i s s i le f o r c e s . Th i s i s d e s p i t e . c l a i m s ( q u o t e di n t h e 'Spec ia l C o l l e c t i o d l ) by Khrushchev and Malinov-s k y o f a S o v ie t c a p a b i l i t y t o "wipe any ag gr es so r f romt h e f a c e of t h e e a r t h" o r t o r educe s m a l l c o u n t r i e st o a " r a d i o a c t i v e d e s e r t . "E . T h e F e a s i b i l i t y of Pre-emption

B e f o r e e x p l o r i n g t h e m ea ni ng an d i m p l i c a t i o n s ofs t r a t e g i c pre-empt ion , let us t i e t o g e th e r t h e t h r e a dso f e v i d e n c e t o be found i n S ov ie t m i l i t a r y l i t e r a t u r ei n s up po r t of o u r h yp o th e s is t h a t a d o c t r i n e of pre-empt ive at tack was adopted by t h e USSR sometime i n1961. W h av e t h u s f a r f o un de d our h y p o t h e s i s u p o n( a ) t h e i n c o r p o r a t i o n o f t h e c o n ce p t i f i t h es t a t e d m i s si on of t h e S o v i e t armed f o r c e s f o r t h e

Khru-s t r i k e s*According t os h c h e v a l s o bel ieves h o u l d be d i r e c t e d p r i n c i p a l l y a g a i n s t t h e " main p a r t -n e r s " of t h e W es te rn c o a l i t i o n . K hr us hc he v i s s a i d t oh a v e t o l d a m e e t i n g o f t h e S o v i e t S uprem e M i l i t a r yC o u nc i l ( d a t e n o t g i v e n ) : " C u t down a t r e e , and t h eboughs w i l l fall o f f - -d e s t r o y t h e U n it ed S t a t e s a ndw i t h i t E ng la nd , a nd t h e o t h e r c a p i t a l i s t f o r t r e s s e swill s u r r e n d e r , '

TS# 104646-23- I

I

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a .I;., ,. . '> : .. .. ... ....

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.... .. - ...., .- \pcEGiq f i r s t t i m e , i n Ma l inovs ky' s s pe e c h a t t he 22nd CPSU Con-g r e s s l a s t O c tobe r ;

( b ) t he evo lu t i on i n t h e t r e a t m e n t of t h e q u e s t i o ni n t h e " Sp e c i a l C o l l e c t i on" betwe en 1960 a nd 1961 ;(c ) t h e d o c t r i ne t h a t s t resses t h e p o s s i b i l i t yof a d e c is i v e i n i t i a l p h ase o f war;(d) t h e d o c t r i n e t h a t a s s ig n s t h e s t r a t e g i c m i s -s i l e f o r c e s t h e m i s si o n of a c h i e v i n g t h e p r i n c i p a l goa l sof war i n a v e r y s h o r t t i m e ;( e ) t h e p r i o r i t y g iv e n c o un t er -f or ce o b j e c t i v e si n o f f i c i a l t a r g e t l i s t s ; and( f ) c o nc ep t s c a l l i n g f o r t h e u s e of t h e s t r a -t e g i c miss i l es " s u d d e n l y , p u r p o s e f u l l y , e n masse,a g a i n s t t h e m os t im por t a n t ob j e c t i v e s o f t h e m ainenemies . "T h i s same body o f e v i d e n c e s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e So-v i e t m i l i t a r y l e a d e r s r e g a r d s t r a t e g i c pre-emption noto n l y a s a d e s i r a b l e c o u r s e o f L ac ti on b u t a l s o a s ap r a c t i c a b l e o n e . B ut d o es t h e i r o u t l o o k make goods e n s e i n t h e l i g h t of U. S. p l a n s f o r a m a s s i v e s t r a -t e g i c s t r i k i n g f o r c e composed mainly ,o f Minuteman andP o l a r i s b a l l i s t i c missi les?There is a b e l i e f among Weste rn s tu de nt s of m i l i -t a r y s t r a t e g y t h a t a s t h e s i z e o f t h e U. S. long- ranges t r i k i n g f o r c e grows and i t s v u l n e r a b i l i t y d e c r e a s e s ,t h e a dv a nt ag es o f s t r i k i n g f i r s t d i m in i sh . T h i s r ea so n-i n g is p e r f e c t l y s ou nd , it would seem, as r e g ar d s t h eq u e s t i o n of d e t e r r i n g t h e USSR from i n i t i a t i n g a "pre-v e n t i v e " war. I n d ee d , t h i s r ea s o n i n g p r o p e r l y u nd er -l i e s t h e U.S. s t r a t e gy o f de t e r r e n c e : t h e enemy c an -no t hope t o knock out a l l or even most of our s t r a -t e g i c a t t a c k f o rc e s w it h t h e f i r s t blow and is conse-

q u e n t l y d i s c o u r a g e d from embarking on t h e p a t h ofpr e m e d i t a t e d war to a t t a i n : h i s f o re i gn p o l i c y aims.

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- 1( B u t , i n o u r o p i n i o n , s uc h r ea s o n i ng does n o tmake the choice of a pre-emptive s t r i k e a n y t h e l e s sd e s i r a b l e t o t h e S o v i e t s . On t h e c o n t r a r y , i t seemst o u s t h a t a n i m p o r t a n t r e a s o n why t h e y are s e e k i n ga pre-empt ive s t r i k e c a p a b i l i t y is because t h e UnitedS t a t e s h a s u n d e r t a k e n t o b u i l d an immense m i s s i l e a t -t a ck force- -even though i t w a s conce ived h e r e as p r i -m a r i l y a r e t a l i a t o r y o n e . R a t h e r t h a n d i s c o u r a g et h e S o v ie t s from p l a n n i n g f o r p re -e m pt iv e a c t i o n , t h et rend toward more powerful and l e s s v u l n e r a b l e U.S.n u c l e a r fo rces compels S o v i et m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s t ot a i l o r t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t h e i r s t r a t e g i c f o r c e s

t o t h e t a r g e t r e qu i re m e nt s . One e f f e c t t h a t t h e t r e n d i nU. S. weapons idevelopments has had on t h e USSR a l -r e a d y is t h e s t e pp i ng - up of t h e S o v i e t A B M program.The S o v i e t s p r ob a bl y r e a s o n t h a t t h e U.S. nu-c l e a r m i s s i l e fo r ce s a re becoming s o power fu l t h a tt he r e may n o t be a r e l i a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e t o s t r i k i n gf i r s t . In o t h e r words, s h o u l d t h e U ni te d S t a t e ss uc ce ed i n s t r i k i n g f i r s t w i t h i t s mass ive f o r c e s ,t h e USSR may n o t hav e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o s t r i k eback w i t h t h e f o r c e n e c e s s a r y t o c o n t in u e i n t h ewar. On t h e o t h e r h a nd , s h o u l d t h e USSR succeedi n s t r i k i n g t h e f i r s t blow, w h i l e i t w o u l d s u r e l ybe s u b j e c t e d t o powerful s t r i k e s from numerous

s u r v i v i n g U . S . f o r c e s , it migh t be a f fo rded t h eo p p o r t u n i t y of c a r r y i n g on t h e war and winning it.I t c o u l d b e s a i d , i n s h o r t , t h a t t h e U.S.weapons program is hav ing a d u a l e f f e c t on t h eUSSR: On th e one hand, i t r e du c es t h e l i k e l i h o o dof war by a s s u r i n g t h e S o v i e t l e a de r s of widespreadn u c l e a r d e v a s t a t i o n s h o u ld t h e y e l e c t t o l a u n c hprem ed i t a t ed w a r ; on t h e o t h e r hand, i t t e n ds t oh e i g ht e n S o vi e t co nc er n o ve r t h e f i r s t n u c le a r a t -t ack a nd e l e v a t e s t h e i m po rt an ce i n t h e i r e y e s ofa s t r a t e g y of pre-emption.>T o 'b e f e a s i b l e , a pre -emptive a t t a ck need no tr e s u l t i n t h e a b s o l u t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t he enemy 'smeans o f n u c l e a r a t t a c k . The a v a i l a b l e e v i d e n c e s ug -g e s t s t h a t S o v i et m i l i t a r y p l a n n e r s w i l l s e t t l e f o r

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pimmFl much less t h a n t h e a b s o l u t e d e s t r u c t i o n o f t h e enemyi n t h e f i r s t massed n u c l e ar s t r i k e . Nowhere i n t h e" S p e c i zl C o l l e c t i o n " m a t e r i a l s or i n t h e o p en s o u r c e shas t h e t h o u gh t be en e x p re s s ed t h a t t h e USSR mighte m e r ge ba r e ly s c a the d f r om a n u c l e a r w a r - - s t a r t e du n d er a ny c o n d i t i o n s . The o ne c o n t r i b u t o r t o t h etop-secre t " S p e c i a l C o l l e c t i o n " who c a l l e d f o r d e a l -i n g c oun t r y - bus t i ng b low s t o t h e enemy (he had Euro-p ea n c o u n t r i e s i n mind) fr am ed h i s s t r a t e g y o n t h ea s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e USSR would be s t r u ck f i r s t .( C s l . G e n . G a s t i l o v l c h , , f i r s t i s s u e f o r 1960.) Otherc o n t r i bu to r s who a ddr e s s e d t he ms e lve s t o t he que s -t i o n i n t h e " S p ec i al C o l le c ti o n " wrote t h a t a s u c c e s s -f u l pre-emptive blow c o u ld s u b s t a n t i a l l y b l u n t("weaken") enemy r e t a l i a t o r y s t r i k e s and "under fav or -a b l e c on d i t i o ns " e ve n c a us e t h e enemy t o cease a c t i v em i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . And a Colone l Genera l Tolkonyukmade t h e b a l d s t a t e m e n t , w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o s t r a -t e g i c pre -empt ion , a l t ho ugh he may have had t h i s i nm i n d , t h a t i t is n e i t h e r p o s s i b l e n or n

caesar 30 - soviet strategic doctrine at the start of war

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