JOSEPH SAMALA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANTONUITTI K. PALAA, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N AZCUNA, J.: This is a complaint filed by Joseph Samala against respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa for alleged fraudulent activities that violate the Code of Professional Responsibility. Sometime in February 2001, complainant was looking for a company where he could invest his dollar savings. He met Raymond Taino, a trader-employee of First Imperial Resources, Inc. (FIRI), a company located at Legaspi Village, Makati City. Taino introduced him to FIRI Manager Jun Agustin, Chief Trader Diosdado Bernal, and Legal Officer Antonuitti K. Palaa, the respondent herein. Complainant expressed his concern to the said three officers of FIRI about having been warned of numerous fraudulent businesses in the Philippines. Respondent assured him that through FIRI he would be directly putting his investment with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited, a reputable company based in the Virgin Islands which has been in the foreign exchange business for 13 years. The three officers presented to him their company profile and documents purporting to establish their relationship with Eastern Vanguard Forex Limited. Due to the personal representations and assurances of respondent, Agustin, and Bernal, complainant was convinced and he invested his dollar savings with FIRI on March 9, 2001. Subsequently, complainant decided to pull out his investment. On April 5, 2001, he sent FIRI a letter requesting the withdrawal of his investment amounting to US$10,000 and giving FIRI 10 days to prepare the money. On April 15, 2001, complainant asked Agustin when his money would be returned. Agustin told him that the request was sent to Thomas Yiu of Eastern Vanguard at Ortigas Center. Complainant went to see Thomas Yiu at his office. Yiu was surprised when he saw the documents involving complainants investment. Yiu phoned Agustin and demanded an explanation as to where the money was. Agustin said that he would return complainants investment at FIRIs office in Makati. On the same day, in the presence of respondent, Agustin delivered to complainant a check in the amount of P574,045.09, as the peso equivalent of complainants investment with FIRI. On May 2, 2001, the said check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds. Complainant informed respondent of the dishonor of the check. Respondent assured him that the check would be replaced. On June 1,

2001, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a check in the amount of P329,045.09. Respondent told complainant that the check was signed by FIRI President Paul Desiderio in his (respondents) presence and assured complainant that the check would be funded. But on June 28, 2001, the check was dishonored because it was drawn against insufficient funds. On July 14, 2001, complainant charged Paul Desiderio of Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 at the Prosecutors Office of Makati. On November 4, 2001, Judge Evelyn Arcaya-Chua of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Makati City, issued a warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio. On March 5, 2002, complainant joined three police officers in serving the warrant of arrest against Paul Desiderio at No. 10 Damascus St., Northeast Executive Village, B.F. Homes, Paraaque City. Complainant got the said address of Paul Desiderio from the documents of FIRI. Although there was a street named Damascus in the said village, there was no residence numbered 10. The police officers checked the existence of the said address and resident at the office of the subdivision association. They were told that no such address existed and that no resident named Paul Desiderio lived in the subdivision. Complainant alleged that respondents act of representing himself to be the legal officer of FIRI and his assurance that the check he personally delivered to him was signed in his presence by FIRI Officer Paul Desiderio, when no such person appears to exist, is clearly fraudulent and violative of the Canons of Professional Ethics.[1] Complainant requested the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for a thorough investigation of respondent as a member of the bar. In an Order dated January 27, 2003, Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez required respondent to submit his Answer to the Complaint within 15 days from receipt thereof. Despite receipt of said order as evidenced by a registry return receipt dated February 3, 2003, respondent did not submit an Answer. The case was referred to Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro of the Commission on Bar Discipline for investigation. Respondent failed to appear when the case was set for hearing on April 8, 2003, despite due notice. Hence, respondent was declared in default and the case was heard ex parte. Based on the evidence adduced, Commissioner Navarro reported, thus: [R]espondent was instrumental in the issuance of the check signed by the alleged President of FIRI, Paul Desiderio, whose whereabouts could not be

located and whose identity was unknown[,] for respondent was the one who handed personally to the herein complainant the check which was dishonored due to insufficient funds, when it was the very respondent, Atty. Palaa, who allegedly assured that the check was funded. Respondent was also one of those alleged officers of FIRI who assured complainant that his investment was directly placed in a re[p]utable company. Further investigation by the complainant with the assistance of NBI officers showed that respondent Palaa was also linked with Belkins whose activity was the same as the FIRI and the SEC has on file the By-Laws of FIRI wherein it was stated that[,] to wit: the primary purpose of which is to act as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on. And the corporation shall not engage in the business as securities advisor, stockbroker or investment house[:] Q. x x x A. First Imperial is prohibited from engaging in foreign exchange business. Q. x x x A. And despite [. . .] this prohibition, they went on and engaged in activities which are prohibited specifically in their by-laws (TSN pages 16 and 17 of July 17, 2003, CBD Case No. 02-1048). It is evident from the foregoing that respondent and his cohorts violated the main purpose of the FIRI By-Laws particularly investment or foreign exchange business which must have been the reason why Yiu was surprised and got mad when complainant approached him about his dollar savings investment of USD10,000 received by the respondent as Legal Officer and the two (2) other alleged officers Agustin and Bernal of the FIRI[,] a transaction expressly prohibited by the FIRI By-laws.[2] Respondent was found to have violated Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states: Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Commissioner Navarro thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. In its Resolution dated July 30, 2004, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with the modification that respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years. This Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.[3] To this end, nothing should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which

might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.[4] In this case, respondent assured complainant that by investing his dollar savings with FIRI, his investment was in a stable company, even if, as it was later discovered, the by-laws of FIRI prohibited it from engaging in investment or foreign exchange business and its primary purpose is to act as consultant in providing professional expertise and reliable data analysis related to partnership and so on. When complainant decided to withdraw his investment from FIRI, the first check given to him in the amount of his total investment bounced. Thereafter, respondent, as legal officer of FIRI, gave complainant P250,000 in cash and a check for P329,045.09. Respondent assured complainant that the second check was a good check and that it was signed by Paul Desiderio, the alleged president of FIRI. However, the said check bounced because it was drawn against insufficient funds, and the drawer of the check, Paul Desiderio, could not be located when sought to be served a warrant of arrest since his identity was unknown and his residential address was found to be non-existent. Hence, it is clear that the representations of respondent as legal officer of FIRI caused material damage to complainant. In so doing, respondent failed to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and lessened the confidence of the public in the honesty and integrity of the same.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Antonuitti K. Palaa is found GUILTY of violating Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this resolution be spread on the records of respondent, and furnished to all courts, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978 In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

R E S O L U T I O N

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines. On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which reads: .... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned. On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution. At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws

(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads: SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court Rule: SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court. The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule: SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ... The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,

Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was ... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ... Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court. An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers. 3 Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good, to the

extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502). When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom. But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: xxx xxx xxx (5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ..., and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads: SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of the Philippine

Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the public with an interest in his concerns. On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall. The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim. 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6 Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8 Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of

improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers. 9 Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10 2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11 3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12 But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities. 4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14 In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed

and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court. We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court. Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

A.C. No. 2505 February 21, 1992 EVANGELINE LEDA, complainant, vs. ATTY. TREBONIAN TABANG, respondent. PER CURIAM: Complainant, Evangeline Leda, squarely puts in issue respondent Atty. Trebonian Tabang's good moral character, in two Complaints she had filed against him, one docketed as Bar Matter No. 78 instituted on 6 January

1982, and the present Administrative Case No. 2505, which is a Petition for Disbarment, filed on 14 February 1983. It appears that on 3 October 1976, Respondent and Complainant contracted marriage at Tigbauan, Iloilo. The marriage, solemnized by Judge Jose T. Tavarro of Tigbauan, was performed under Article 76 of the Civil Code 1 as one of exceptional character (Annex "A", Petition). The parties agreed to keep the fact of marriage a secret until after Respondent had finished his law studies (began in l977), and had taken the Bar examinations (in 1981), allegedly to ensure a stable future for them. Complainant admits, though, that they had not lived together as husband and wife (Letter-Complaint, 6 January 1982). Respondent finished his law studies in 1981 and thereafter applied to take the Bar. In his application, he declared that he was "single." He then passed the examinations but Complainant blocked him from taking his Oath by instituting Bar Matter No. 78, claiming that Respondent had acted fraudulently in filling out his application and, thus, was unworthy to take the lawyer's Oath for lack of good moral character. Complainant also alleged that after Respondent's law studies, he became aloof and "abandoned" her (Petition, par. 5). The Court deferred Respondent's Oath-taking and required him to answer the Complaint. Respondent filed his "Explanation," dated 26 May 1982 which was received on 7 June 1982. Said "Explanation" carries Complainant's conformity (Records, p. 6). Therein, he admitted that he was "legally married" to Complainant on 3 October 1976 but that the marriage "was not as yet made and declared public" so that he could proceed with his law studies and until after he could take the Bar examinations "in order to keep stable our future." He also admitted having indicated that he was "single" in his application to take the Bar "for reason that to my honest belief, I have still to declare my status as single since my marriage with the complainant was not as yet made and declared public." He further averred that he and Complainant had reconciled as shown by her conformity to the "Explanation," for which reason he prayed that the Complaint be dismissed. Respondent also filed a Motion to Dismiss, dated 2 June 1982. Attached to it was Complainant's Affidavit of Desistance, which stated that Bar Matter No. 78 arose out of a misunderstanding and communication gap and that she was refraining from pursuing her Complaint against Respondent.

Acting on the aforesaid Motion and Comment, the Court dismissed Bar Matter No. 78 and allowed Respondent to take his Oath in a Resolution dated 20 August 1982. On 14 February 1983, however, Complainant filed this Administrative Case, this time praying for Respondent's disbarment based on the following grounds: a. For having made use of his legal knowledge to contract an invalid marriage with me assuming that our marriage is not valid, and making a mockery of our marriage institution. b. For having misrepresented himself as single when in truth he is already married in his application to take the bar exam. c. For being not of good moral character contrary to the certification he submitted to the Supreme Court; d. For (sic) guilty of deception for the reason that he deceived me into signing of the affidavit of desistance and the conformity to his explanation and later on the comment to his motion to dismiss, when in truth and in fact he is not sincere, for he only befriended me to resume our marriage and introduced me to his family, friends and relatives as his wife, for a bad motive that is he wanted me to withdraw my complaint against him with the Supreme Court. Attached to Complainant's Petition for Disbarment, as Annex "F," is an undated and unsigned letter addressed to Complainant, allegedly written by Respondent after he had already taken his Oath stating, among others, that while he was grateful for Complainant's help, he "could not force myself to be yours," did not love her anymore and considered her only a friend. Their marriage contract was actually void for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code, among them the minimum cohabitation for five (5) years before the celebration of the marriage, an affidavit to that effect by the solemnizing officer, and that the parties must be at least twenty-one (21) years of age, which they were not as they were both only twenty years old at the time. He advised Complainant not to do anything more so as not to put her family name "in shame." As for him, he had "attain(ed) my goal as a full-pledge (sic) professional and there is nothing you can do for it to take away from me even (sic) you go to any court." According to Complainant, although the letter was unsigned, Respondent's initials appear on the upper left-hand corner of the airmail envelope (Exh. "8-A-1"). Respondent denied emphatically that he had sent such a letter contending that it is Complainant who has been indulging in fantasy and fabrications.

In his Comment in the present case, Respondent avers that he and Complainant had covenanted not to disclose the marriage not because he wanted to finish his studies and take the Bar first but for the reason that said marriage was void from the beginning in the absence of the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code that the contracting parties shall have lived together as husband and wife for at least five (5) years before the date of the marriage and that said parties shall state the same in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. He could not have abandoned Complainant because they had never lived together as husband and wife. When he applied for the 1981 Bar examinations, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single. On 7 May 1984, the Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. On 5 March 1990, the Solicitor General submitted his Report, with the recommendation that Respondent be exonerated from the charges against him since Complainant failed to attend the hearings and to substantiate her charges but that he be reprimanded for making inconsistent and conflicting statements in the various pleadings he had filed before this Court. On 26 March 1990, the Court referred the Solicitor General's Report to the Bar Confidant for evaluation, report and recommendation. In an undated Report, the latter recommended the indefinite suspension of Respondent until the status of his marriage is settled. Upon the facts on Record even without testimonial evidence from Complainant, we find Respondent's lack of good moral character sufficiently established. Firstly, his declaration in his application for Admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was "single" was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar." That false statement, if it had been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably exhibits lack of good moral character. Respondent's protestations that he had acted in good faith in declaring his status as "single" not only because of his pact with Complainant to keep the marriage under wraps but also because that marriage to the Complainant was void from the beginning, are mere afterthoughts absolutely wanting of merit. Respondent can not assume that his marriage

to Complainant is void. The presumption is that all the requisites and conditions of a marriage of an exceptional character under Article 76 of the Civil Code have been met and that the Judge's official duty in connection therewith has been regularly performed. Secondly, Respondent's conduct in adopting conflicting positions in the various pleadings submitted in Bar Matter No. 78 and in the case at bar is duplicitous and deplorable. The records show that in Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent had submitted an "Explanation," in paragraph 1, page 1 of which he admits having been "legally married" to Complainant. Yet, during the hearings before the Solicitor General, he denied under oath that he had submitted any such pleading (t.s.n., p. 21) contending instead that it is only the second page where his signature appears that he meant to admit and not the averments on the first page which were merely of Complainant's own making (ibid., pp. 59-60). However, in his Comment in this Administrative Case, he admits and makes reference to such "Explanation" (pars. 3[f]) and [g]; 4[b]). Again, while in said "Explanation" he admitted having been "legally married" to Complainant (par. 1), in this case, however, he denies the legality of the marriage and, instead, harps on its being void ab initio. He even denies his signature in the marriage contract. In Bar Matter No. 78, Respondent also averred that the fact of marriage was not to be made public so as to allow him to finish his studies and take the Bar. In this case, however, he contends that the reason it was kept a secret was because it was "not in order from the beginning." Thirdly, Respondent denies that he had sent the unsigned letter (Annex "F," Petition) to Complainant. However, its very tenor coincides with the reasons that he advances in his Comment why the marriage is void from the beginning, that is, for failure to comply with the requisites of Article 76 of the Civil Code. Fourthly, the factual scenario gathered from the records shows that Respondent had reconciled with Complainant and admitted the marriage to put a quick finish to Bar Matter No. 78 to enable him to take the lawyer's Oath, which otherwise he would have been unable to do. But after he had done so and had become a "full-pledge (sic) lawyer," he again refused to honor his marriage to Complainant. Respondent's lack of good moral character is only too evident. He has resorted to conflicting submissions before this Court to suit himself. He has also engaged in devious tactics with Complainant in order to serve his purpose. In so doing, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 1001 thereof which states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them (Chavez v. Viola, Adm. Case No. 2152, 19 April 1991, 196 SCRA 10). Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. It cannot be overemphasized that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law (People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 692). As so aptly put by Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm: "As good character is an essential qualification for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline him (Piatt v. Abordo, 58 Phil. 350 [1933]). WHEREFORE, finding respondent Trebonian C. Tabang grossly unfit and unworthy to continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately. Copies of this Decision shall be entered in his personal record as an attorney and served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator who shall circulate the same to all Courts in the country for their information and guidance. SO ORDERED.