carmen v people

7/28/2019 Carmen v people

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(galon) . . . into the mouth of the boy. Each time the boy struggled to raise his head, accused AlexanderSibonga banged the boy's head against the bench [to] which the boy was tied down. She even heard thebanging sound everytime the boy's head hit the bench. For about five times she heard it. According to thiswitness after forcing the boy to drink water, Eutiquia Carmen and accused Celedonia Fabie alias IsabelFabie took turns in pounding the boy's chest with their clenched fists. All thetime Rey Nuez held downthe boy's feet to the bench. She also witnessed . . . Celedonia Fabie dropped her weight, buttocks first, onthe body of the boy. Later on, Eutiquia Carmen ordered Delia or Deding Sibonga to get a knife from thekitchen. Eutiquia Carmen then slowly plunged the stainless knife on the left side of the boy's body and withthe use of a plastic gallon container, the top portion of which was cut out, Eutiquia Carmen [caught] theblood dripping from the left side of the boy's body. Honey Fe heard the moaningcoming from the torturedboy. Much later she saw Nonoy or Alexander Sibonga, Reynario Nuez, Delia Sibonga,Celedonia Fabie,and Eutiquia Carmen carry the boy into the house.4

Eddie Luntayao, father of the victim, testified that he has five children, the eldest of whom, Randy, was 13years old at the time of the incident. On November 20, 1996, Randy had a "nervous breakdown" whichEddie thought was due to Randy having to skip meals whenever he took the boy with him to the farm.According to Eddie, his son started talking to himself and laughing. On January26, 1997, upon the


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suggestion of accused-appellant Reynario Nuez, Eddie and his wife Perlita and their three children(Randy, Jesrel, 7, and Lesyl, 1) went with accused-appellant Nuez to Cebu. They arrived in Cebu ataround 1 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day and spent the night in Nuez's house in Tangke, Talisay.

The following day, they went to the house of accused-appellant Carmen in Quiot,Pardo,5 where all of theaccused-appellants were present. Eddie talked to accused-appellant Carmen regarding his son's condition.He was told that the boy was possessed by a "bad spirit," which accused-appellant Carmen said she couldexorcise. She warned, however, that as the spirit might transfer to Eddie, it was best to conduct the healingprayer without him. Accused-appellants then led Randy out of the house, while Eddie and his wife and twodaughters were locked inside a room in the house.6

After a while, Eddie heard his son twice shout "Ma, tabang!" ("Mother, help!").Eddie tried to go out of theroom to find out what was happening to his son, but the door was locked. After about an hour, the

Luntayaos were transferred to the prayer room which was located near the main door of the house.7

A few hours later, at around 5 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellants carried Randy into the prayerroom and placed him on the altar. Eddie was shocked by what he saw. Randy's facewas bluish andcontused, while his tongue was sticking out of his mouth. It was clear to Eddiethat his son was alreadydead. He wanted to see his son's body, but he was stopped from doing so by accused-appellant EutiquiaCarmen who told him not to go near his son because the latter would be resurrected at 7 o'clock that

evening.8

After 7 o'clock that evening, accused-appellant Carmen asked a member of her group to call the funeralparlor and bring a coffin as the child was already dead. It was arranged that the body would be transferredto the house of accused-appellant Nuez. Thus, that night, the Luntayao family, accompanied by accused-appellant Nuez, took Randy's body to Nunez's house in Tangke, Talisay. The following day, January 28,1997, accused-appellant Nuez told Eddie to go with him to the Talisay Municipal Health Office to reportRandy's death and told him to keep quiet or they might not be able to get the ne

cessary papers for his son'sburial. Nuez took care of securing the death certificate which Eddie signed.9

At around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of January 28, 1997, accused-appellant Carmen went to Tangke,Talisay to ensure that the body was buried. Eddie and his wife told her that they preferred to bring theirson's body with them to Sikatuna, Isabela, Negros Occidental but they were toldby accused-appellantCarmen that this was not possible as she and the other accused-appellants might


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FINDINGS

Body in advanced stage of decomposition wearing a white shirt and shorts wrappedin printed blanket(white and orange) placed in white wooden coffin and buried underground about 4feet deep.

Contusion, 3.0 x 4.0 cms. chest, anterior, left side.

Fracture, 3rd rib, left, mid-clavicular line.

Fracture, linear, occipital bone right side extending to the bases of middle cranial fossae right to left downto the occipital bone, left side.

Fracture, diastatic, lamboidal suture, bilateral.

Internal organs in advanced stage of decomposition.

Cranial vault almost empty.

CAUSE OF DEATH: [The victim] could have died due to the internal effects of a traumatic head injury

and/or traumatic chest injury.Dr. Mendez testified that the contusion on the victim's chest was caused by contact with a hard bluntinstrument. He added that the fracture on the rib was complete while that foundon the base of the skullfollowed a serrated or uneven pattern. He said that the latter injury could havebeen caused by the forciblecontact of that part of the body with a blunt object such as a wooden bench.16

On cross-examination, Dr. Mendez admitted that he did not find any stab wound onthe victim's body butexplained that this could be due to the fact that at the time the body was exhum

ed and examined, it wasalready in an advanced state of decomposition rendering such wound, if present,unrecognizable.17

Accused-appellants did not testify. Instead, the defense presented: (a) Ritsel Blase, an alleged eyewitness tothe incident; (b) Maria Lilina Jimenez, Visitacion Seniega, and Josefina Abing,alleged former "patients" ofaccused-appellant Carmen; (c) Dr. Milagros Carloto, the municipal health officerof Talisay, Cebu and; (d)Atty. Salvador Solima of the Cebu City Prosecutor's Office.

Ritsel Blase, 21, testified that since 1987 she had been with the group of accus

ed-appellant Carmen, whomshe calls Mother Perpetuala. She recounted that at around 2 o'clock in the afternoon of January 27, 1997,while she was in the house of accused-appellant Carmen, she saw Eddie Luntayao talking with the latterregarding the treatment of his son. The boy was later led to the kitchen and given a bath prior to"treatment." After water was poured on the boy, he became unruly prompting accused-appellant Carmen todecide not to continue with the "treatment," but the boy's parents allegedly pre


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The defense presented Maria Lilia Jimenez, 20, Visitacion Seniega, 39, and Josefina Abing, 39, whotestified that accused-appellant Carmen had cured them of their illnesses by merely praying over them andwithout applying any form of physical violence on them.20

Milagros Carloto, Municipal Health Officer of Talisay, Cebu, was also presentedby the defense to testifyon the death certificate she issued in which she indicated that Randy Luntayao died of pneumonia.According to her, Eddie Luntayao came to her office on January 28, 1997 to ask for the issuance of a deathcertificate for his son Randy Luntayao who had allegedly suffered from cough andfever.21

On cross-examination, Dr. Carloto admitted that she never saw the body of the victim as she merely reliedon what she had been told by Eddie Luntayao. She said that it was a midwife, Mrs. Revina Laviosa, whoexamined the victim's body.22

The last witness for the defense, Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador Solima, waspresented to identify the

resolution he had prepared (Exh. 8)23 on the re-investigation of the case in which he recommended thedismissal of the charge against accused-appellants. His testimony was dispensedwith, however, as theprosecution stipulated on the matters Solima was going to testify with the qualification that Solima'srecommendation was disapproved by City Prosecutor Primo Miro.24

The prosecution recalled Eddie Luntayao to the stand to rebut the testimonies ofRitsel Blase and Dr.Milagros Carloto. Eddie denied having witnessed what accused-appellants did to his son. He reiterated hisearlier claim that after accused-appellants had taken Randy, he and his wife and

two daughters were lockedinside a room. He disputed Blase's statement that his son was still alive when he was brought into theprayer room. He said he saw that his son's head slumped while being carried by accused-appellants.25

As for the testimony of Dr. Carloto, Eddie admitted having talked with her whenhe and accused-appellantNuez went to her office on January 28, 1997. However, he denied having told her that his son wassuffering from fever and cough as he told her that Randy had a nervous breakdown. He took exception toDr. Carloto's statement that he was alone when he went to her office because it

was Nuez who insisted thathe (Eddie) accompany him in order to secure the death certificate.26

On November 18, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing facts and circumstances, [the] accused are all found guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are hereby [sentenced] to suffer thepenalty of RECLUSION


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PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties of the law; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of thedeceased Randy Luntayao in the sum of P50,000.00; and to pay the costs. The accused, are, however,credited in full during the whole period of their detention provided they will signify in writing that they willabide by all the rules and regulations of the penitentiary.27

In finding accused-appellants guilty of murder, the trial court stated:

Killing a person with treachery is murder even if there is no intent to kill. When death occurs, it ispresumed to be the natural consequence of physical injuries inflicted. Since thedefendant did commit thecrime with treachery, he is guilty of murder, because of the voluntary presenceof the qualifyingcircumstance of treachery (P v. Cagoco, 58 Phil. 530). All the accused in the case at bar had contributeddifferent acts in mercilessly inflicting injuries to the victim. For having immersed the head of the victiminto the barrel of water, all the herein accused should be held responsible forall the consequences even ifthe result be different from that which was intended (Art. 4, par. 1, RPC). It is pointed out that in P. v.

Cagoco, 58 Phil. 524, even if there was no intent to kill[,] in inflicting physical injuries with treachery, theaccused in that case was convicted of murder. In murder qualified by treachery,it is required only that thereis treachery in the attack, and this is true even if the offender has no intentto kill the person assaulted.Under the guise of a ritual or treatment, the accused should not have intentionally immersed upside downthe head of Randy Luntayao into a barrel of water; banged his head against the bench; pounded his chestwith fists, or plunged a kitchen knife to his side so that blood would come outfor these acts would surely


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cause death to the victim. . . .

One who commits an intentional felony is responsible for all the consequences which may naturally andlogically result therefrom, whether foreseen or intended or not. Ordinarily, when a person commits a felonywith malice, he intends the consequences of his felonious act. In view of paragraph 1 of Art. 4, a personcommitting a felony is criminally liable although the consequences of his felonious acts are not intended byhim. . . .

. . . .

Intent is presumed from the commission of an unlawful act. The presumption of criminal intent may arisefrom the proof of the criminal act and it is for the accused to rebut this presumption. In the case at bar, thereis enough evidence that the accused confederated with one another in inflictingphysical harm to the victim(an illegal act). These acts were intentional, and the wrong done resulted in the death of their victim. Hence,they are liable for all the direct and natural consequences of their unlawful ac

t, even if the ultimate resulthad not been intended.28

Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellants allege that the trial court erred in convicting them of murder.29

First. It would appear that accused-appellants are members of a cult and that the bizarre ritual performedover the victim was consented to by the victim's parents. With the permission ofthe victim's parents,accused-appellant Carmen, together with the other accused-appellants, proceededto subject the boy to a"treatment" calculated to drive the "bad spirit" from the boy's body. Unfortunat

ely, the strange procedureresulted in the death of the boy. Thus, accused-appellants had no criminal intent to kill the boy. Theirliability arises from their reckless imprudence because they ought that to knowtheir actions would notbring about the cure. They are, therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not ofmurder.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, states that reckless imprudenceconsists in voluntarily, butwithout malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage resultsby reason of inexcusable

lack of precaution on the part of the person performing such act. Compared to intentional felonies, such ashomicide or murder, what takes the place of the element of malice or intention to commit a wrong or evil isthe failure of the offender to take precautions due to lack of skill taking intoaccount his employment, oroccupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other circumstancesregarding persons, time, andplace.


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to the time when accused-appellants undertook their unauthorized "treatment" ofthe victim. Obviously,such an evaluation of the case cannot be allowed.

Consequently, treachery cannot be appreciated for in the absence of intent to kill, there is no treachery orthe deliberate employment of means, methods, and manner of execution to ensure the safety of the accusedfrom the defensive or retaliatory attacks coming from the victim.33 Viewed in this light, the acts which thetrial court saw as manifestations of treachery in fact relate to efforts by accused-appellants to restrainRandy Luntayao so that they can effect the cure on him.

On the other hand, there is no merit in accused-appellants' contention that thetestimony of prosecutioneyewitness Honey Fe Abella is not credible. The Court is more than convinced ofHoney Fe's credibility.Her testimony is clear, straightforward, and is far from having been coached orcontrived. She was only afew meters away from the kitchen where accused-appellants conducted their "pray-over" healing sessionnot to mention that she had a good vantage point as the kitchen had no roof nor

walls but only a pantry. Hertestimony was corroborated by the autopsy findings of Dr. Mendez who, consistentwith Honey Fe'stestimony, noted fractures on the third left rib and on the base of the victim'sskull. With regard to Dr.Mendez's failure to find any stab wound in the victim's body, he himself had explained that such could bedue to the fact that at the time the autopsy was conducted, the cadaver was already in an advanced state ofdecomposition. Randy Luntayao's cadaver was exhumed 24 days after it had been buried. Considering thelength of time which had elapsed and the fact that the cadaver had not been embalmed, it was very likely

that the soft tissues had so decomposed that, as Dr. Mendez said, it was no longer possible to determinewhether there was a stab wound. As for the other points raised by accused-appellants to detract thecredibility of Honey Fe's testimony, the same appear to be only minor and trivial at best.

Accused-appellants contend that the failure of the prosecution to present the testimony of Frances ClaireRivera as well as the knife used in stabbing Randy Luntayao puts in doubt the prosecution's evidence. Wedo not think so. The presentation of the knife in evidence is not indispensable.34

Finally, accused-appellants make much of the fact that although the case was tried under Judge Renato C.Dacudao, the decision was rendered by Judge Galicano Arriesgado who took over the case after theprosecution and the defense had rested their cases.35 However, the fact that thejudge who wrote thedecision did not hear the testimonies of the witnesses does not make him less competent to render adecision, since his ruling is based on the records of the case and the transcrip


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t of stenographic notes of thetestimonies of the witnesses.36

Second. The question now is whether accused-appellants can be held liable for reckless imprudenceresulting in homicide, considering that the information charges them with murder. We hold that they can.

Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent parts:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there isvariance between theoffense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offenseas charged is included inor necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which isincluded in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included inthe offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes theoffense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former,as alleged in the

complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offenseproved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part ofthose constituting the latter.

In Samson v. Court of Appeals,37 the accused were charged with, and convicted of, estafa throughfalsification of public document. The Court of Appeals modified the judgment andheld one of the accusedliable for estafa through falsification by negligence. On appeal, it was contended that the appeals courterred in holding the accused liable for estafa through negligence because the information charged him with

having wilfully committed estafa. In overruling this contention, the Court held:


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While a criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, as we held in Quizon v. Justice ofthe Peace of Bacolor, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955, but a distinct crime in itself, designated as a quasioffense in our Penal Code, it may however be said that a conviction for the former can be had under aninformation exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greaterincludes the lesser offense. This is the situation that obtains in the present case. Appellant was charged withwillful falsification but from the evidence submitted by the parties, the Courtof Appeals found that ineffecting the falsification which made possible the cashing of the checks in question, appellant did not actwith criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity ofthe real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts whichcharge willful falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered bythe rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof. . . .

The fact that the information does not allege that the falsification was committ

ed with imprudence is of nomoment for here this deficiency appears supplied by the evidence submitted by appellant himself and theresult has proven beneficial to him. Certainly, having alleged that the falsification has been willful, it wouldbe incongruous to allege at the same time that it was committed with imprudencefor a charge of criminalintent is incompatible with the concept of negligence.

In People v. Fernando,38 the accused was charged with, and convicted of, murderby the trial court. Onappeal, this Court modified the judgment and held the accused liable for reckless imprudence resulting in

homicide after finding that he did not act with criminal intent.

Third. Coming now to the imposable penalty, under Art. 365, reckless imprudenceresulting in homicide ispunishable by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in itsmedium period. In thiscase, taking into account the pertinent provisions of Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused-appellantsshould suffer the penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2)months of prision correccional, as maximum.

As to their civil liability, accused-appellants should pay the heirs of Randy Lu

ntayao an indemnity in theamount of P50,000.00 and moral damages also in the amount of P50,000.00.39 In addition, they should payexemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 in view of accused-appellants' gross negligence inattempting to "cure" the victim without a license to practice medicine and to give an example or correctionfor the public good.40

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City, is AF


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FIRMED with theMODIFICATION that accused-appellants are hereby declared guilty of reckless imprudence resulting inhomicide and are each sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arrestomayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional,as maximum. In addition,accused-appellants are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Randy Luntayao indemnity inthe amount of P50,000.00, moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, and exemplary damages in theamount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 125066 July 8, 1998ISABELITA REODICA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doa Soledad

Avenue, Better Living Subdivision, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her


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van hit the car of complainant Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, whilethe damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.

Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint 1against petitioner with the Fiscal's Office.

On 13 January 1988, an information 2 was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketedas Criminal Case No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage toProperty with Slight Physical Injury." The information read:

The undersigned 2nd Asst. Fiscal accuses Isabelita Reodica of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resultingin Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury as follows:

That on or about the 17th day of October, 1987 in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro Manila,Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused, IsabelitaVelasco Reodica, being then the driver and/or person in charge of a Tamaraw bear

ing plate no. NJU-306,did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive, manage and operate the same in a reckless,careless, negligent and imprudent manner, without regard to traffic laws, rulesand regulations and withouttaking the necessary care and precaution to avoid damage to property and injuries to person, causing bysuch negligence, carelessness and imprudence the said vehicle to bump/collide with a Toyota Corollabearing plate no. NIM-919 driven and owned by Norberto Bonsol, thereby causing damage amounting toP8,542.00, to the damage and prejudice of its owner, in the aforementioned amount of P8,542.00.

That as further consequence due to the strong impact, said Norberto Bonsol suffered bodily injuries whichrequired medical attendance for a period of less that nine (9) days and incapacitated him from performinghis customary labor for the same period of time.

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial then ensued.

On 31 January 1991, the RTC of Makati, Branch 145, rendered a decision 3 convicting petitioner of the"quasi offense of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with sligh

t physical injuries," andsentencing her:

[t]o suffer imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto mayor, and to pay the complainant, Norberto Bonsol yAtienza, the sum of Thirteen Thousand Five Hundred Forty-Two (P13,542), Philippine Currency, withoutsubsidiary impairment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. 4

The trial court justified imposing a 6-month prison term in this wise:


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As a result of the reckless imprudence of the accused, complainant suffered slight physical injuries (Exhs.D, H and I). In view of the resulting physical injuries, the penalty to be imposed is not fine, butimprisonment (Gregorio, Fundamental of Criminal Law Review, Eight Edition 1988,p. 711). Slightphysical injuries thru reckless imprudence is now punished with penalty of arresto mayor in its maximumperiod (People v. Aguiles, L-11302, October 28, 1960, cited in Gregorio's book,p. 718). 5

As to the sum of P13,542.00, this represented the cost of the car repairs (P8,542.00) and medical expenses(P5,000.00).

Petitioner appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.14660. After her motions for extension of time to file her brief were granted, she filed a Motion toWithdraw Appeal for Probation Purposes, and to Suspend, Ex Abundanti Cautela, Period for FilingAppellant's Brief. However, respondent Court of Appeals denied this motion and directed petitioner to file

her brief. 6After passing upon the errors imputed by petitioner to the trial court, respondent Court of Appeals rendereda decision 7 on 31 January 1996 affirming the appealed decision.


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Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration 8 raising new issues,thus:

NOW THAT AN ACQUITTAL SEEMS IMPOSSIBLE, MAY WE REVISIT THE PENALTY AND MOVETHAT IT BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE SINCE IT IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED TO BEERROR TO COMPLEX DAMAGE TO PROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, AS BOTHARE LIGHT OFFENSES, OVER WHICH THE RESPONDENT COURT HAD NO JURISDICTION ANDEVEN ASSUMING SUCH JURISDICTION, IT CANNOT IMPOSE A PENALTY IN EXCESS OFWHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW. 9

xxx xxx xxx

REVERSAL OF THE DECISION REMAINS POSSIBLE ON GROUNDS OF PRESCRIPTION ORLACK OF JURISDICTION. 10

In its Resolution of 24 May 1996, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration forlack of merit, as well as her supplemental motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court premised on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS' DECISION DATED JANUARY 31, 1996 AND MORE SO ITS

RESOLUTION DATED MAY 24, 1996, ARE CONTRARY TO LAW AND GROSSLY ERRONEOUS INTHAT THEY IMPOSED A PENALTY IN EXCESS OF WHAT IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW FOR THECRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES, ON THEBASIS OF A CLERICAL ERROR IN A SECONDARY SOURCE.

A. IN THE CASE OF PEOPLE V. AGUILAR, 11 THE SAME CASE WHERE THE COURT A QUOBASED ITS FINDING OF A PENALTY WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF THE REGIONALTRIAL COURT, WHAT WAS STATED IN THE ORIGINAL TEXT OF SAID CASE IS THAT THEPENALTY FOR SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES THROUGH RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE IS ARRESTOMENOR AND NOT ARRESTO MAYOR. IT IS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE RESPONDENT COURT TOPUNISH PETITIONER MORE THAN SHE SHOULD OR COULD BE PUNISHED BECAUSE OF ACLERICAL ERROR COPIED FROM A SECONDARY SOURCE.B. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT

COMPLEXED THE CRIME OF RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING IN DAMAGE TOPROPERTY AND SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES IMPOSING A SINGLE EXCESSIVE PENALTY INITS ELLIPTICAL RESOLUTION OF MAY 24, 1996.C. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIALCOURT'S DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE DEFENSE OF PRESCRIPTION AND LACK OFJURISDICTION.Anent the first ground, petitioner claims that the courts below misquoted not only the title, but likewise theruling of the case cited as authority regarding the penalty for slight physicalinjuries through recklessimprudence. Concretely, the title of the case was not People v. Aguiles, but People v. Aguilar; while theruling was that the penalty for such quasi offense was arresto menor not arresto

mayor.

As regards the second assigned error, petitioner avers that the courts below should have pronounced thatthere were two separate light felonies involved, namely: (1) reckless imprudencewith slight physicalinjuries; and (2) reckless imprudence with damage to property, instead of considering them a complexcrime. Two light felonies, she insists, "do not . . . rate a single penalty of arresto mayor or imprisonment of


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six months," citing Lontok v. Gorgonio, 12 thus:

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to propertyamounting to P10,000.00 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did noterr in filing a separatecomplaint for the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menos graves and damage


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to property (Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365).

The case of Angeles vs. Jose, 96 Phil. 151, cited by investigating fiscal, is different from the instant casebecause in that case the negligent act resulted in the offenses of lesiones menos graves and damage toproperty which were both less grave felonies and which, therefore, constituted acomplex crime.

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through recklessimprudence should have been charged in a separate information.

She then suggests that "at worst, the penalties of two light offenses, both imposable in their maximumperiod and computed or added together, only sum up to 60 days imprisonment and not six months asimposed by the lower courts."

On the third assigned error, petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through recklessimprudence, being punishable only by arresto menor, is a light offense; as such,it prescribes in two months.

Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988, or almost three months from the date thevehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed, again citing Lontok, thus:

In the instant case, following the ruling in the Turla case, the offense of lesiones leves through recklessimprudence should have been charged in a separate information. And since, as a light offense, it prescribesin two months, Lontok's criminal liability therefor was already extinguished (Arts. 89[5], 90 and 91,Revised Penal Code in relation to sec. 2[e] and [f], Rule 117, Rules of Court).The trial court committed a

grave abuse of discretion in not sustaining Lontok's motion to quash that part of the information charginghim with that light offense.

Petitioner further claims that the information was filed with the wrong court, since Regional Trial Courts donot deal with arresto menor cases. She submits that damage to property and slight physical injuries are lightfelonies and thus covered by the rules on summary procedure; therefore, only thefiling with the properMetropolitan Trial Court could have tolled the statute of limitations, this timeinvoking Zaldivia v. Reyes.13

In its Comment filed on behalf of public respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) agrees withpetitioner that the penalty should have been arresto menor in its maximum period, instead of arresto mayor,pursuant to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

As to the second assigned error, the OSG contends that conformably with Bueranov. Court of Appeals, 14which frowns upon splitting of crimes and prosecution, it was proper for the tri


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Teleron 19 and Lontok v. Gorgonio, 20 two informations should have been filed. She likewise submits thatCuyos v. Garcia 21 would only apply here on the assumption that it was proper to"complex" damage toproperty through reckless imprudence with slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Chico v.Isidro 22 is likewise "inapposite," for it deals with attempted homicide, whichis not covered by the Rule onSummary Procedure.

Petitioner finally avers that People v. Cuaresma 23 should not be given retroactive effect; otherwise, itwould either unfairly prejudice her or render nugatory the en banc ruling in Zaldivia 24 favorable to her.

The pleadings thus raise the following issues:

I. Whether the penalty imposed on petitioner is correct.II. Whether the quasi offenses of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount ofP8,542.00 and reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries are light felonies.III. Whether the rule on complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Co

de applies to the quasioffenses in question.IV. Whether the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time on appeal.V. Whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over the offenses in question.VI. Whether the quasi offenses in question have already prescribed.I. The Proper PenaltyWe agree with both petitioner and the OSG that the penalty of six months of arresto mayor imposed by thetrial court and affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, we cannot subscribe to theirsubmission that the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period is the proper

penalty.

Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any actwhich, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor inits maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less gravefelony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall beimposed; if it would haveconstituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period s

hall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwiseconstitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if itwould have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall beimposed.


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When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property ofanother, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount equal to the value of saiddamages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than 25 pesos.

A fine not exceeding 200 pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who,by simple imprudenceor negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony.

In the imposition of these penalties, the courts shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to therules prescribed in Article 64.

The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable:


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1. When the penalty provided for the offense is equal to or lower than those provided in the first twoparagraphs of this article, in which case the courts shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than thatwhich should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply.According to the first paragraph of the aforequoted Article, the penalty for reckless imprudence resulting inslight physical injuries, a light felony, is arresto menor in its maximum period, with a duration of 21 to 30days. If the offense of slight physical injuries is, however, committed deliberately or with malice, it ispenalized with arresto menor under Article 266 of the Revised Penal Code, with aduration of 1 day to 30days. Plainly, the penalty then under Article 266 may be either lower than or equal to the penalty prescribedunder the first paragraph of Article 365. This being the case, the exception inthe sixth paragraph of Article365 applies. Hence, the proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is publiccensure, this being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor. 25

As to reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00, the third paragraph

of Article 365, which provides for the penalty of fine, does not apply since thereckless imprudence in thiscase did not result in damage to property only. What applies is the first paragraph of Article 365, whichprovides for arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods (1 month and 1 dayto 4 months) for an actcommitted through reckless imprudence which, had it been intentional, would haveconstituted a less gravefelony. Note that if the damage to the extent of P8,542.00 were caused deliberately, the crime would havebeen malicious mischief under Article 329 of the Revised Penal Code, and the penalty would then bearresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months

which is higher thanthat prescribed in the first paragraph of Article 365). If the penalty under Article 329 were equal to or lowerthan that provided for in the first paragraph, then the sixth paragraph of Article 365 would apply, i.e., thepenalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in itsminimum period or imprisonment from 21 days to 2 months. Accordingly, the imposable penalty forreckless imprudence resulting in damage to property to the extent of P8,542.00 would be arresto mayor inits minimum and medium periods, which could be anywhere from a minimum of 1 month and 1 day to a

maximum of 4 months, at the discretion of the court, since the fifth paragraph of Article 365 provides thatin the imposition of the penalties therein provided "the courts shall exercise their sound discretion withoutregard to the rules prescribed in article 64."

II. Classification of the Quasi Offense in Question.Felonies committed not only by means of deceit (dolo), but likewise by means offault (culpa). There isdeceit when the wrongful act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is f


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ault when the wrongful actresults from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill. 26

As earlier stated, reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries ispunishable by public censureonly. Article 9, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code defines light felonies as infractions of law carryingthe penalty of arresto menor or a fine not exceeding P200.00, or both. Since public censure is classifiedunder Article 25 of the Code as a light penalty, and is considered under the graduated scale provided inArticle 71 of the same Code as a penalty lower than arresto menor, it follows that the offense of recklessimprudence resulting in slight physical injuries is a light felony.

On the other hand, reckless imprudence also resulting in damage to property is,as earlier discussed,penalized with arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. Since arresto mayor is a correctionalpenalty under Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code, the quasi offense in question is a less grave felony not a light felony as claimed by petitioner.

III. Applicability of the Rule on Complex Crimes.

Since criminal negligence may, as here, result in more than one felony, should Article 48 of the RevisedCode on complex crimes be applied? Article 48 provides as follows:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less gravefelonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for committing the other, thepenalty for the most serious


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crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

Clearly, if a reckless, imprudent or negligent act results in two or more graveor less grave felonies, acomplex crime is committed. However, in Lontok v. Gorgonio, 27 this Court declared that where one of theresulting offenses in criminal negligence constitutes a light felony, there is no complex crime, thus:

Applying article 48, it follows that if one offense is light, there is no complex crime. The resulting offensesmay be treated as separate or the light felony may be absorbed by the grave felony. Thus, the light feloniesof damage to property and slight physical injuries, both resulting from a singleact of imprudence, do notconstitute a complex crime. They cannot be charged in one information. They areseparate offenses subjectto distinct penalties (People vs. Turla, 50 Phil. 1001; See People vs. Estipona,70 Phil. 513).

Where the single act of imprudence resulted in double less serious physical injuries, damage to propertyamounting to P10,000 and slight physical injuries, a chief of police did not err

in filing a separate complaintfor the slight physical injuries and another complaint for the lesiones menor graves and damage to property[Arcaya vs. Teleron, L-37446, May 31, 1974, 57 SCRA 363, 365].

Hence, the trial court erred in considering the following felonies as a complexcrime: the less grave felonyof reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property in the amount of P8,542.00 and the light felony ofreckless imprudence resulting in physical injuries.

IV. The Right to Assail the Duplicity of the Information.Following Lontok, the conclusion is inescapable here, that the quasi offense of

reckless imprudenceresulting in slight physical injuries should have been charged in a separate information because it is notcovered by Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. However, petitioner may no longer question, at this stage,the duplicitous character of the information, i.e., charging two separate offenses in one information, to wit:

(1) reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property; and (2) reckless imprudence resulting in slightphysical injuries. This defect was deemed waived by her failure to raise it in amotion to quash before shepleaded to the information. 28 Under Section 3, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,

when two or more offensesare charged in a single complaint or information and the accused fails to objectto it before trial, the courtmay convict the accused of as many offenses as are charged and proved and imposeon him the penalty foreach of them. 29V. Which Court Has Jurisdiction Over theQuasi Offenses in Question.The jurisdiction to try a criminal action is to be determined by the law in force at the time of the institution


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of the action, unless the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to operateas to actions pending before its enactment. 30

At the time of the filing of the information in this case, the law in force wasBatas Pambansa Blg. 129,otherwise known as "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." Section 32(2) 31thereof provided thatexcept in cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts and of theSandiganbayan, the Metropolitan Trial Courts (MTCs), Municipal Trial Courts (MTCs), and MunicipalCircuit Trial Courts (MCTCs) had exclusive original jurisdiction over "all offenses punishable withimprisonment of got exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos,or both fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or otherpenalties, including thecivil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value or amountthereof."

The criminal jurisdiction of the lower courts was then determined by the duration of the imprisonment and

the amount of fine prescribed by law for the offense charged. The question thusarises as to which court hasjurisdiction over offenses punishable by censure, such as reckless imprudence resulting in slight physicalinjuries.


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Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run fromthe day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities,or their agents, and shall beinterrupted by the filing of the complaint of information, and shall commence torun again when suchproceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by anyreason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)

Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filingof the complaint or information," does not distinguish whether the complaint isfiled for preliminaryexamination or investigation only or for an action on the merits. 33 Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals34 and People v. Cuaresma, 35 this Court held that the filing of the complaint even with the fiscal's officesuspends the running of the statute of limitations.

We cannot apply Section 9 36 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases coveredthereby, such as offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as

in the instant case, "theprosecution commences by the filing of a complaint or information directly withthe MeTC, RTC or MCTCwithout need of a prior preliminary examination or investigation; provided thatin Metropolitan Manila andChartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information." However, this Section cannot betaken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing ofa complaint or information


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directly with said courts.

It must be stressed that prescription in criminal cases is a matter of substantive law. Pursuant to Section5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution, this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed todiminish, increase or modify substantive rights. 37 Hence, in case of conflict between the Rule onSummary Procedure promulgated by this Court and the Revised Penal Code, the latter prevails.

Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was aviolation of a municipal ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91of the Revised Penal Code,but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for ViolationsPenalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin toRun." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only whenjudicial proceedings areinstituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not

interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did notconstitute a judicial proceeding; what could have tolled the prescriptive periodthere was only the filing ofthe information in the proper court.

In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof andthe rulings in Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses inquestion was interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the fiscal's officethree days after the vehicularmishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this case. We cannot, ther

efore, uphold petitioner'sdefense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenge decision of respondentCourt of Appealsin CA-G.R. CR No. 14660 is SET ASIDE as the Regional Trial Court, whose decisionwas affirmedtherein, had no jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 33919.

Criminal Case No. 33919 is ordered DISMISSED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.


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