FIRST DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee,- versus -MELISSACHUA,Appellant.G.R. No. 184058Present:PUNO,C.J.,Chairperson,CARPIO MORALES,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,BERSAMIN,andVILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.Promulgated:March 10, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NCARPIO MORALES,J.:Melissa Chua (appellant) was indicted for Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and was convicted thereof by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila.She was also indicted for five counts of Estafa but was convicted only for three.The Court of Appeals, by Decision[1]dated February 27, 2008, affirmed appellants conviction.The Information[2]charging appellant, together with one Josie Campos (Josie), with Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale), docketed as Criminal Case No. 04-222596, reads:The undersigned accuses JOSIE CAMPOS and MELISSA CHUA of violation of Article 38 (a) PD 1413, amending certain provisions of Book I, PD 442, otherwise known as the New Labor Code of the Philippines, in relation to Art. 13 (b) and (c ) of said Code, as further amended by PD Nos. 1693, 1920 and 2019 and as further amended by Sec. 6 (a), (1) and (m) of RA 8042 committed in a [sic] large scaleas follows:That sometime during the month ofSeptember, 2002, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad toERIK DE GUIA TAN, MARILYN O. MACARANAS, NAPOLEON H. YU, JR., HARRY JAMES P. KING and ROBERTO C. ANGELES for overseas employment abroad without first having secured the required license from the Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge or accept directly from:ERIK DE GUIA TAN-P73,000.00MARILYN D. MACARANAS-83,000.00NAPOLEON H. YU, JR.-23,000.00HARRY JAMES P. KING-23,000.00ROBERTO C. ANGELES-23,000.00For purposes of their deployment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees as prescribed by the POEA, and without valid reasons and without the fault of said complainants, failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse expenses incurred in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.x x x xThe five Informations[3]charging appellant and Josie with Estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 04-222597-601, were similarly worded and varied only with respect to the names of the five complainants and the amount that each purportedly gave to the accused.Thus each of the Information reads:x x x xThat on or about . . .in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud xxx in the following manner, to wit:the said accused by means of false manifestations which they made to the said . . . to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit the latter as factory worker to work in Taiwan and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, and by means of other similar deceits, induced and succeeded in inducing said xxxto give and deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to the said accused the amount of . . . on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and were made solely to obtain, as in fact they did obtain the amount of . . . which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage of said . . . in the aforesaid amount of . . ., Philippine Currency.x x x xAppellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.Her co-accused Josie remained at large.The cases were consolidated, hence, trial proceeded only with respect to appellant.Of the five complainants, only three testified, namely, Marilyn D. Macaranas (Marilyn), Erik de Guia Tan (Tan) and Harry James King (King).The substance of their respective testimonies follows:Marilynstestimony:After she was introduced in June 2002 by Josie to appellant as capacitated to deploy factory workers to Taiwan, she paid appellantP80,000 as placement fee andP3,750 as medical expenses fee, a receipt[4]for the first amount of which was issued by appellant.Appellant had told her that she could leave for Taiwan in the last week of September 2002 but she did not, and despite appellants assurance that she would leave in the first or second week of October, just the same she did not.She thus asked for the refund of the amount she paid but appellant claimed that she was not in possession thereof but promised anyway to raise the amount to pay her, but she never did.She later learned in June 2003 that appellant was not a licensed recruiter, prompting her to file the complaint against appellant and Josie.Tanstestimony:After he was introduced by Josie to appellant at the Golden Gate, Inc., (Golden Gate) an agency situated in Paragon Tower Hotel in Ermita, Manila, he underwent medical examination upon appellants assurance that he could work in Taiwan as a factory worker with a guaranteed monthly salary of 15,800 in Taiwan currency.He thus paid appellant, on September 6, 2002,P70,000[5]representing placement fees for which she issued a receipt.Appellant welched on her promise to deploy him to Taiwan, however, hence, he demanded the refund of his money but appellant failed to.He later learned that Golden Gate was not licensed to deploy workers to Taiwan, hence, he filed the complaint against appellant and Josie.Kingstestimony:His friend and a fellow complainant Napoleon Yu introduced him to Josie who in turn introduced appellant as one who could deploy him to Taiwan.On September 24, 2002,[6]he paid appellantP20,000 representing partial payment for placement fees amounting toP80,000, but when he later inquired when he would be deployed, Golden Gates office was already closed.He later learned that Golden Gates license had already expired, prompting him to file the complaint.Appellant denied the charges.Claiming having worked as a temporary cashier from January to October, 2002 at the office of Golden Gate, owned by one Marilyn Calueng,[7]she maintained that Golden Gate was a licensed recruitment agency and that Josie, who is her godmother, was an agent.Admitting having receivedP80,000 each from Marilyn and Tan, receipt of which she issued but denying receiving any amount from King, she claimed that she turned over the money to the documentation officer, one Arlene Vega, who in turn remitted the money to Marilyn Calueng whose present whereabouts she did not know.By Decision of April 5, 2006, Branch 36 of the Manila RTC convicted appellant of Illegal Recruitment (Large Scale) and three counts of Estafa,disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of accused Melissa Chua beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby rendered convicting the accused as principal of a large scale illegal recruitment and estafa three (3) counts and she is sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment.The accused is likewise convicted of estafa committed against Harry James P. King and she is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Six (6) years and One (1)day of prision mayor as maximum; in Criminal Case No. 04-22598; in Criminal Case No. 04-222600 committed against Marilyn Macaranas, accused is sentence [sic] to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, toTwelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 04-222601 committed against Erik de Guia Tan, she is likewise sentence [sic] to suffer anindeterminate penalty of Four (4) years and Two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to Eleven (11) years and One (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.Accused Melissa Chua is also ordered to return the amounts of P20,000.00 to Harry James P. King, P83,750.00 to Marilyn D. Macaranas, and P70,000.00 to Erik de Guia Tan.As regards Criminal Cases Nos. 04-222597 and 04-222599, both are dismissed for lack of interest of complainants Roberto Angeles and Napoleon Yu, Jr.In the service of her sentence, the accused is credited with the full period of preventive imprisonment if she agrees in writing to abide by the disciplinary rules imposed, otherwise only 4/5 shall be credited.SO ORDERED.The Court of Appeals, as stated early on, affirmed the trial courts decision by the challenged Decision of February 27, 2008, it holding that appellants defense that, as temporary cashier of Golden Gate, she received the money which was ultimately remitted to Marilyn Calueng is immaterial, she having failed to prove the existence of an employment relationship between her and Marilyn, as well as the legitimacy of the operations of Golden Gate and the extent of her involvement therein.CitingPeople v. Sagayaga,[8]the appellate court ruled that an employee of a company engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as principal together with his employer if it is shown that he, as in the case of appellant, actively and consciously participated therein.Respecting the cases for Estafa, the appellate court, noting that a person convicted of illegal recruitment may, in addition, be convicted of Estafaas penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, held that the elements thereof were sufficiently established,viz:that appellant deceived the complainants by assuring them of employment in Taiwan provided they pay the required placement fee;that relying on such representation, the complainants paid appellant the amount demanded;that her representation turned out to be false because she failed to deploy them as promised;and that the complainants suffered damages when they failed to be reimbursed the amounts they paid.Hence, the present appeal, appellant reiterating the same arguments she raised in the appellate court.The appeal is bereft of merit.The term recruitment and placement is defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code of the Philippinesas follows:(b)Recruitment and placementrefers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged inrecruitment and placement. (emphasis supplied)On the other hand, Article 38, paragraph (a) of the Labor Code, as amended, under which appellant was charged, provides:Art. 38. Illegal Recruitment.(a)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code.The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. (emphasis supplied)From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that anyrecruitment activities to be undertaken by non-licensee or non-holder of contracts, or as in the present case, an agency with anexpiredlicense,shall be deemedillegal and punishable under Article 39 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.And illegal recruitment is deemed committed inlarge scale if committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.Thus forillegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential elements, to wit: (1) the accused undertook arecruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in therecruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group.[9]In the present case, Golden Gate, of which appellant admitted being a cashier from January to October 2002, was initially authorized to recruit workers for deployment abroad.Per the certification from the POEA,Golden Gates license only expired onFebruary 23, 2002and it was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies onApril 2, 2002.Appellant was positively pointed to as one of the persons who enticed the complainants to part with their money upon the fraudulent representation that they would be able to secure for them employment abroad.In the absence of any evidence that the complainants were motivated by improper motives, the trial courts assessment of their credibility shall not be interfered with by the Court.[10]Even if appellant were a mere temporary cashier of Golden Gate, that did not make her any less an employee to beheld liable for illegal recruitment as principal by direct participation, together with the employer, as it was shown that she actively and consciously participated in the recruitment process.[11]Assumingarguendothat appellant was unaware of theillegal nature of therecruitment business of Golden Gate, that does not free her of liability either.Illegal Recruitmentin Large Scalepenalized under Republic Act No. 8042, orThe Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, is aspecial law, a violation of which ismalum prohibitum,notmalum in se. Intent is thus immaterial.And that explains why appellant was, aside from Estafa, convicted of such offense.[I]llegal recruitment ismalum prohibitum,whileestafaismalum in se.In thefirst, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction.In the second, such an intent is imperative.Estafaunder Article 315, paragraph 2, of the Revised Penal Code, is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, orbymeans ofsimilar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission offraud.[12](emphasis supplied)WHEREFORE, the appeal is herebyDENIED.

Republic of thePhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Petitioner,-versus-RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT,Accused-Appellant,FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO,Accused.G.R. No.187730Present:CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,VELASCO, JR.,LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,DELCASTILLO, andPEREZ,JJ.Promulgated:June 29, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NVELASCO, JR.,J.:The CaseThis is an appeal from the Decision[1]dated December 24, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 entitledPeople of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant), Fides Pacardo y Jungco and Pilar Manta y Dungo (accused), which affirmed the Decision[2]dated March 15, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30 in Manila which convicted the accused-appellant Rodolfo Gallo y Gadot (accused-appellant) of syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 andestafain Criminal Case No. 02-206297.The FactsOriginally, accused-appellant Gallo and accused Fides Pacardo (Pacardo) and Pilar Manta (Manta), together with Mardeolyn Martir (Mardeolyn) and nine (9) others, were charged with syndicated illegal recruitment and eighteen (18) counts ofestafacommitted against eighteen complainants, including Edgardo V. Dela Caza (Dela Caza), Sandy Guantero (Guantero) and Danilo Sare (Sare). The cases were respectively docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-2062936 to 02-206311. However, records reveal that only Criminal Case No. 02-206293, which was filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta for syndicated illegal recruitment, and Criminal Case Nos. 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308, which were filed against accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta forestafa, proceeded to trial due to the fact that the rest of the accused remained at large. Further, the other cases, Criminal Case Nos. 02-206294 to 02-206296, 02-206298 to 02-206299, 02-206301 to 02-206307 and 02-206309 to 02-206311 were likewiseprovisionallydismissed upon motion of Pacardo, Manta and accused-appellant for failure of the respective complainants in said cases to appear and testify during trial.It should also be noted that after trial, Pacardo and Manta were acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308 for insufficiency of evidence. Likewise, accused-appellant Gallo was similarly acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206300, the case filed by Guantero, and 02-206308, the case filed by Sare. However, accused-appellant was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, both filed by Dela Caza, for syndicated illegal recruitment andestafa, respectively.Thus, the present appeal concerns solely accused-appellants conviction for syndicated illegal recruitment in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 and forestafain Criminal Case No. 02-206297.In Criminal Case No. 02-206293, the information charges the accused-appellant, together with the others, as follows:The undersigned accuses MARDEOLYN MARTIR, ISMAEL GALANZA, NELMAR MARTIR, MARCELINO MARTIR, NORMAN MARTIR, NELSON MARTIR, MA. CECILIA M. RAMOS, LULU MENDANES, FIDES PACARDO y JUNGCO,RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT, PILAR MANTA y DUNGO, ELEONOR PANUNCIO and YEO SIN UNG of a violation of Section 6(a), (l) and (m) of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Workers Act of 1995, committed by a syndicate and in large scale, as follows:That in or about and during the period comprised between November 2000 and December, 2001, inclusive, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with one another, representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement abroad to FERDINAND ASISTIN, ENTICE BRENDO, REYMOND G. CENA, EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, RAYMUND EDAYA, SANDY O. GUANTENO, RENATO V. HUFALAR, ELENA JUBICO, LUPO A. MANALO, ALMA V. MENOR, ROGELIO S. MORON, FEDILA G. NAIPA, OSCAR RAMIREZ, MARISOL L. SABALDAN, DANILO SARE, MARY BETH SARDON, JOHNNY SOLATORIO and JOEL TINIO in Korea as factory workers and charge or accept directly or indirectly from said FERDINAND ASISTIN the amount of P45,000.00; ENTICE BRENDO P35,000.00; REYMOND G. CENA P30,000.00; EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA P45,000.00; RAYMUND EDAYA P100,000.00; SANDY O. GUANTENO P35,000.00; RENATO V. HUFALAR P70,000.00; ELENA JUBICO P30,000.00; LUPO A. MANALO P75,000.00; ALMA V. MENOR P45,000.00; ROGELIO S. MORON P70,000.00; FEDILA G. NAIPA P45,000.00; OSCAR RAMIREZ P45,000.00; MARISOL L. SABALDAN P75,000.00; DANILO SARE P100,000.00; MARY BETH SARDON P25,000.00; JOHNNY SOLATORIO P35,000.00; and JOEL TINIO P120,000.00 as placement fees in connection with their overseas employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than those specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the POEA Board Resolution No. 02, Series 1998, and without valid reasons and without the fault of the said complainants failed to actually deploy them and failed to reimburse the expenses incurred by the said complainants in connection with their documentation and processing for purposes of their deployment.[3](Emphasis supplied)In Criminal Case No. 02-206297, the information reads:That on or about May 28, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping with [sic] one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made to the latter, prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, to the effect that they had the power and capacity to recruit and employ said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in Korea as factory worker and could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof; induced and succeeded in inducing said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA to give and deliver, as in fact, he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of P45,000.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations, said accused well knowing that the same were false and untrue and were made [solely] for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain the said amount of P45,000.00 which amount once in their possession, with intent to defraud said [EDGARDO] V. DELA CAZA, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of P45,000.00 to their own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said EDGARDO V. DELA CAZA in the aforesaid amount of P45,000.00, Philippine currency.CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]When arraigned on January 19, 2004, accused-appellant Gallo entered a plea of not guilty to all charges.On March 3, 2004, the pre-trial was terminated and trial ensued, thereafter.During the trial, the prosecution presented as their witnesses, Armando Albines Roa, the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) representative and private complainants Dela Caza, Guanteno and Sare. On the other hand, the defense presented as its witnesses, accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo and Manta.Version of the ProsecutionOn May 22, 2001, Dela Caza was introduced by Eleanor Panuncio to accused-appellant Gallo, Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes, Yeo Sin Ung and another Korean national at the office of MPM International Recruitment and Promotion Agency (MPM Agency) located in Malate, Manila.Dela Caza was told that Mardeolyn was the President of MPM Agency, while Nelmar Martir was one of the incorporators. Also, that Marcelino Martir, Norman Martir, Nelson Martir and Ma. Cecilia Ramos were its board members. Lulu Mendanes acted as the cashier and accountant, while Pacardo acted as the agencys employee who was in charge of the records of the applicants. Manta, on the other hand, was also an employee who was tasked to deliver documents to the Korean embassy.Accused-appellant Gallo then introduced himself as a relative of Mardeolyn and informed Dela Caza that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Together with Pacardo and Manta, he also told Dela Caza about the placement fee of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (PhP 150,000) with a down payment of Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) and the balance to be paid through salary deduction.Dela Caza, together with the other applicants, were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their application papers for job placement inKoreaas a factory worker and their possible salary. Accused Yeo Sin Ung also gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company and the salary.With accused-appellants assurance that many workers have been sent abroad, as well as the presence of the two (2) Korean nationals and upon being shown the visas procured for the deployed workers, Dela Caza was convinced to part with his money. Thus, on May 29, 2001, he paid Forty-Five Thousand Pesos (PhP 45,000) to MPM Agency through accused-appellant Gallo who, while in the presence of Pacardo, Manta and Mardeolyn, issued and signed Official Receipt No. 401.Two (2) weeks after paying MPM Agency, Dela Caza went back to the agencys office in Malate,Manilaonly to discover that the office had moved to a new location atBatangas Street, Brgy.San Isidro,Makati. He proceeded to the new address and found out that the agency was renamed to New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc. (New Filipino). At the new office, he talked to Pacardo, Manta, Mardeolyn, Lulu Mendanes and accused-appellant Gallo. He was informed that the transfer was done for easy accessibility to clients and for the purpose of changing the name of the agency.Dela Caza decided to withdraw his application and recover the amount he paid but Mardeolyn, Pacardo, Manta and Lulu Mendanes talked him out from pursuing his decision. On the other hand, accused-appellant Gallo even denied any knowledge about the money.After two (2) more months of waiting in vain to be deployed, Dela Caza and the other applicants decided to take action. The first attempt was unsuccessful because the agency again moved to another place. However, with the help of the Office of Ambassador Seeres and the Western Police District, they were able to locate the new address at 500 Prudential Building, Carriedo,Manila. The agency explained that it had to move in order to separate those who are applying as entertainers from those applying as factory workers. Accused-appellant Gallo, together with Pacardo and Manta, were then arrested.The testimony of prosecution witness Armando Albines Roa, a POEA employee, was dispensed with after the prosecution and defense stipulated and admitted to the existence of the following documents:1.Certification issued byFelicitasQ.Bay, Director II, Licensing Branch of the POEA to the effect that New Filipino Manpower Development & Services, Inc., with office address at1256 Batangas St., Brgy.San Isidro,MakatiCity, was a licensed landbased agency whose license expired on December 10, 2001 and was delisted from the roster of licensed agencies on December 14, 2001. It further certified that Fides J. Pacardo was the agencys Recruitment Officer;2.Certification issued byFelicitasQ.Bayof the POEA to the effect that MPM International Recruitment and Promotion is not licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment;3.Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1999 regarding placement fee ceiling for landbased workers.4.Certified copy of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 09, Series of 1998 on the placement fee ceiling forTaiwanand Korean markets, and5.Certified copy of POEA Governing Board Resolution No. 02, series of 1998.Version of the DefenseFor his defense, accused-appellant denied having any part in the recruitment of Dela Caza. In fact, he testified that he also applied with MPM Agency for deployment toKoreaas a factory worker. According to him, he gave his application directly with Mardeolyn because she was his town mate and he was allowed to pay only Ten Thousand Pesos (PhP 10,000) as processing fee. Further, in order to facilitate the processing of his papers, he agreed to perform some tasks for the agency, such as taking photographs of the visa and passport of applicants, running errands and performing such other tasks assigned to him, without salary except for some allowance. He said that he only saw Dela Caza one or twice at the agencys office when he applied for work abroad. Lastly, that he was also promised deployment abroad but it never materialized.Ruling of the Trial CourtOn March 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision convicting the accused of syndicated illegal recruitment andestafa. The dispositive portion reads:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:I.Accused FIDES PACARDO y JUNGO and PILAR MANTA y DUNGO are hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293, 02-206297, 02-206300 and 02-206308;II.Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 02-206293 of the crime of Illegal Recruitment committed by a syndicate and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00) PESOS. He is also ordered to indemnify EDGARDO DELA CAZA of the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND (Php45,000.00) PESOS with legal interest from the filing of the information on September 18, 2002 until fully paid.III.Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT in Criminal Case No. 02-206297 is likewise found guilty and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of FOUR (4) years ofprision correccionalas minimum to NINE (9) years ofprision mayoras maximum.IV.Accused RODOLFO GALLO y GADOT is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206300 and 02-206308.Let alias warrants for the arrest of the other accused be issued anew in all the criminal cases. Pending their arrest, the cases are sent to the archives.The immediate release of accused Fides Pacardo and Pilar Manta is hereby ordered unless detained for other lawful cause or charge.SO ORDERED.[5]Ruling of the Appellate CourtOn appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated December 24, 2008, disposed of the case as follows:WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-206293 and 02-206297, dated March 15, 2007, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 02-206297, forestafa, appellant is sentenced to four (4) years ofprision correccionalto ten (10) years ofprision mayor.SO ORDERED.[6]The CA held the totality of the prosecutions evidence showed that the accused-appellant, together with others, engaged in the recruitment of Dela Caza. His actions and representations to Dela Caza can hardly be construed as the actions of a mere errand boy.As determined by the appellate court, the offense is considered economic sabotage having been committed by more than three (3) persons, namely, accused-appellant Gallo, Mardeolyn, Eleonor Panuncio and Yeo Sin Ung. More importantly, a personal found guilty of illegal recruitment may also be convicted ofestafa.[7]The same evidence proving accused-appellants commission of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale also establishes his liability forestafaunder paragragh 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).On January 15, 2009, the accused-appellant filed a timely appeal before this Court.The IssuesAccused-appellant interposes in the present appeal the following assignment of errors:IThe courta quogravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate despite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.IIThe courta quogravely erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty ofestafadespite the failure of the prosecution to prove the same beyond reasonable doubt.Our RulingThe appeal has no merit.Evidence supports conviction of the crime of Syndicated Illegal RecruitmentAccused-appellant avers that he cannot be held criminally liable for illegal recruitment because he was neither an officer nor an employee of the recruitment agency. He alleges that the trial court erred in adopting the asseveration of the private complainant that he was indeed an employee because such was not duly supported by competent evidence. According to him, even assuming that he was an employee, such cannot warrant his outright conviction sans evidence that he acted in conspiracy with the officers of the agency.We disagree.To commit syndicated illegal recruitment, three elements must be established: (1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art. 34 of the Labor Code; (2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers;[8]and (3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another.[9]When illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate or in large scale,i.e., if it is committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group, it is considered an offense involving economic sabotage.[10]Under Art. 13(b) of the Labor Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.After a thorough review of the records, we believe that the prosecution was able to establish the elements of the offense sufficiently. The evidence readily reveals that MPM Agency was never licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for overseas employment.Even with a license, however, illegal recruitment could still be committed under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (R.A. 8042), otherwise known as theMigrants and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,viz:Sec. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall, likewise, include the following act, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:(a)To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;x x x x(l) Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and(m)Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the workers fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage.Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable.In the instant case, accused-appellant committed the acts enumerated in Sec. 6 of R.A. 8042. Testimonial evidence presented by the prosecution clearly shows that, in consideration of a promise of foreign employment, accused-appellant received the amount of Php 45,000.00 from Dela Caza. When accused-appellant made misrepresentations concerning the agencys purported power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process, collected money in the guise of placement fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.[11]Such acts were accurately described in the testimony of prosecution witness, Dela Caza, to wit:PROS. MAGABLINQ:How about this Rodolfo Gallo?A:He was the one who received my money.Q:Aside from receiving your money, was there any other representations or acts made by Rodolfo Gallo?A:He introduced himself to me as relative of Mardeolyn Martir and he even intimated to me that their agency has sent so many workers abroad.x x x xPROS. MAGABLINQ:Mr. Witness, as you claimed you tried to withdraw your application at the agency. Was there any instance that you were able to talk to Fides Pacardo, Rodolfo Gallo and Pilar Manta?A:Yes, maam.Q:What was the conversation that transpired among you before you demanded the return of your money and documents?A:When I tried to withdraw my application as well as my money, Mr. Gallo told me I know nothing about your money while Pilar Manta and Fides Pacardo told me, why should I withdraw my application and my money when I was about to be [deployed] or I was about to leave.x x x xQ:And what transpired at that office after this Panuncio introduced you to those persons whom you just mentioned?A:The three of them including Rodolfo Gallo told me that the placement fee in that agency is Php 150,000.00 and then I should deposit the amount of Php 45,000.00. After I have deposited said amount, I would just wait for few daysx x x xQ:They were the one (sic) who told you that you have to pay Php 45,000.00 for deposit only?A:Yes, maam, I was told by them to deposit Php 45,000.00 and then I would pay the remaining balance of Php105,000.00, payment of it would be through salary deduction.Q:That is for what Mr. Witness again?A:For placement fee.Q:Now did you believe to (sic) them?A:Yes, maam.Q:Why, why did you believe?A:Because of the presence of the two Korean nationals and they keep on telling me that they have sent abroad several workers and they even showed visas of the records that they have already deployed abroad.Q:Aside from that, was there any other representations which have been made upon you or make you believe that they can deploy you?A:At first I was adamant but they told me If you do not want to believe us, then we could do nothing. But once they showed me the [visas] of the people whom they have deployed abroad, that was the time I believe them.Q:So after believing on the representations, what did you do next Mr. Witness?A:That was the time that I decided to give the money.x x x xPROS. MAGABLINQ:Do you have proof that you gave the money?A:Yes, maam.Q:Where is your proof that you gave the money?A:I have it here.PROS. MAGABLIN:Witness is producing to this court a Receipt dated May 28, 2001 in the amount of Php45,000.00 which for purposes of record Your Honor, may I request that the same be marked in the evidence as our Exhibit F.x x x xPROS. MAGABLINQ:There appears a signature appearing at the left bottom portion of this receipt. Do you know whose signature is this?A:Yes, maam, signature of Rodolfo Gallo.PROS. MAGABLINQ:Why do you say that that is his signature?A:Rodolfo Gallos signature Your Honor because he was the one who received the money and he was the one who filled up this O.R. and while he was doing it, he was flanked by Fides Pacardo, Pilar Manta and Mardeolyn Martir.x x x xQ:So it was Gallo who received your money?A:Yes, maam.PROS. MAGABLINQ:And after that, what did this Gallo do after he received your money?A:They told me maam just to call up and make a follow up with our agency.x x x xQ:Now Mr. Witness, after you gave your money to the accused, what happened with the application, with the promise of employment that he promised?A:Two (2) weeks after giving them the money, they moved to a new office inMakati, Brgy.San Isidro.x x x xQ:And were they able to deploy you as promised by them?A:No, maam, they were not able to send us abroad.[12]Essentially, Dela Caza appeared very firm and consistent in positively identifying accused-appellant as one of those who induced him and the other applicants to part with their money. His testimony showed that accused-appellant made false misrepresentations and promises in assuring them that after they paid the placement fee, jobs inKoreaas factory workers were waiting for them and that they would be deployed soon. In fact, Dela Caza personally talked to accused-appellant and gave him the money and saw him sign and issue an official receipt as proof of his payment. Without a doubt, accused-appellants actions constituted illegal recruitment.Additionally, accused-appellant cannot argue that the trial court erred in finding that he was indeed an employee of the recruitment agency. On the contrary, his active participation in the illegal recruitment is unmistakable. The fact that he was the one who issued and signed the official receipt belies his profession of innocence.This Court likewise finds the existence of a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other persons in the agency who are currently at large, resulting in the commission of the crime of syndicated illegal recruitment.In this case, it cannot be denied that the accused-appellent together with Mardeolyn and the rest of the officers and employees of MPM Agency participated in a network of deception.Verily, the active involvement of each in the recruitment scam was directed at one single purpose to divest complainants with their money on the pretext of guaranteed employment abroad.The prosecution evidence shows that complainants were briefed by Mardeolyn about the processing of their papers for a possible job opportunity inKorea, as well as their possible salary. Likewise, Yeo Sin Ung, a Korean national, gave a briefing about the business and what to expect from the company. Then, here comes accused-appellant who introduced himself as Mardeolyns relative and specifically told Dela Caza of the fact that the agency was able to send many workers abroad. Dela Caza was even showed several workers visas who were already allegedly deployed abroad. Later on, accused-appellant signed and issued an official receipt acknowledging the down payment of Dela Caza. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MPM Agency clearly show unity of action towards a common undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present.InPeople v. Gamboa,[13]this Court discussed the nature of conspiracy in the context of illegal recruitment,viz:Conspiracy to defraud aspiring overseas contract workers was evident from the acts of the malefactors whose conduct before, during and after the commission of the crime clearly indicated that they were one in purpose and united in its execution. Direct proof of previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary as it may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated or inferred from the acts of the accused pointing to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. As such, all the accused, including accused-appellant, are equally guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment since in a conspiracy the act of one is the act of all.To reiterate, in establishing conspiracy, it is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.[14]EstafaThe prosecution likewise established that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime ofestafaas defined under Article 315 paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code,viz:Art. 315.Swindling(estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by any means mentioned hereinbelowx x x x2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; or by means of other similar deceits.The elements of estafa in general are: (1) that the accused defrauded another (a) by abuse of confidence, or (b) by means of deceit; and (2) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.[15]Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.All these elements are present in the instant case: the accused-appellant, together with the other accused at large, deceived the complainants into believing that the agency had the power and capability to send them abroad for employment; that there were available jobs for them in Korea as factory workers; that by reason or on the strength of such assurance, the complainants parted with their money in payment of the placement fees; that after receiving the money, accused-appellant and his co-accused went into hiding by changing their office locations without informing complainants; and that complainants were never deployed abroad. As all these representations of the accused-appellant proved false, paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code is thus applicable.Defense of Denial Cannot Prevailover Positive IdentificationIndubitably, accused-appellants denial of the crimes charged crumbles in the face of the positive identification made by Dela Caza and his co-complainants as one of the perpetrators of the crimes charged.As enunciated by this Court inPeople v. Abolidor,[16][p]ositive identification where categorical and consistent and not attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses on the matter prevails over alibi and denial.The defense has miserably failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses as to falsely testify against him.Therefore, between the categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses, on the one hand, and bare denials of the accused, on the other hand, the former must prevail.[17]Moreover, this Court accords the trial courts findings with the probative weight it deserves in the absence of any compelling reason to discredit the same. It is a fundamental judicial dictum that the findings of fact of the trial court are not disturbed on appeal except when it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have materially affected the outcome of the case. We find that the trial court did not err in convicting the accused-appellant.WHEREFORE, the appeal isDENIEDfor failure to sufficiently show reversible error in the assailed decision. The Decision dated December 24, 2008 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02764 isAFFIRMED.No costs.

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaSECOND DIVISIONCLAUDIO S. YAP,Petitioner,- versus -THENAMARIS SHIPS MANAGEMENTand INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.,Respondents.G.R. No. 179532Present:CARPIO,J.,Chairperson,NACHURA,PERALTA,ABAD, andMENDOZA,JJ.Promulgated:May 30, 2011

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:Before this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorari[1]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[2]dated February 28, 2007, which affirmed with modification the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) resolution[3]dated April 20, 2005.The undisputed facts, as found by the CA, are as follows:[Petitioner] Claudio S.Yapwas employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT on 14 August 2001 by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited.The contract of employment entered into byYapand Capt. Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months.On 23 August 2001,Yapboarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician.However, on or about 08 November 2001, the vessel was sold.The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on 06 December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento.Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.They were also informed about theAdvisorysent by Capt. Constatinou, which states, among others:PLEASE ASK YR OFFICERS AND RATINGS IF THEY WISH TO BE TRANSFERRED TO OTHER VESSELS AFTER VESSEL S DELIVERY (GREEK VIA ATHENS-PHILIPINOS VIAMANILAFOR CREW NOT WISH TRANSFER TO DECLARE THEIR PROSPECTED TIME FOR REEMBARKATION IN ORDER TO SCHEDULE THEM ACCLYYapreceived his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus.However, with respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage.He insisted that he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from employment.He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made.[Respondents], for their part, contended thatYapwas not illegally dismissed.They alleged that following the sale of the M/T SEASCOUT, Yap signed off from the vessel on 10 November 2001 and was paid his wages corresponding to the months he worked or until 10 November 2001 plus his seniority bonus, vacation bonus and extra bonus.They further alleged that Yaps employment contract was validly terminated due to the sale of the vessel and no arrangement was made forYaps transfer to Thenamaris other vessels.[4]Thus, Claudio S. Yap (petitioner) filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Labor Arbiter (LA). Petitioner claimed that he was entitled to the salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his contract. Subsequently, he filed an amended complaint, impleading Captain Francisco Adviento of respondents Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. (Intermare) and Thenamaris Ships Management (respondents), together with C.J. Martionos, Interseas Trading and Financing Corporation, and Vulture Shipping Limited/Stejo Shipping Limited.On July 26, 2004, the LA rendered a decision[5]in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally dismissed by respondents.Moreover, the LA found that respondents acted in bad faith when they assured petitioner of re-embarkation and required him to produce an electrician certificate during the period of his contract, but actually he was not able to board one despite of respondents numerous vessels. Petitioner made several follow-ups for his re-embarkation but respondents failed to heed his plea; thus, petitioner was forced to litigate in order to vindicate his rights. Lastly, the LA opined that since the unexpired portion of petitioners contract was less than one year, petitioner was entitled to his salaries for the unexpired portion of his contract for a period of nine months. The LA disposed, as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, a decision is hereby rendered declaring complainant to have been constructively dismissed.Accordingly, respondents Intermare Maritime Agency Incorporated, Thenamaris Ships Mgt., and Vulture Shipping Limited are ordered to pay jointly and severally complainant Claudio S. Yap the sum of $12,870.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment.In addition, moral damages ofONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and exemplary damages of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)are awarded plus ten percent (10%) of the total award as attorneys fees.Other money claims areDISMISSEDfor lack of merit.SO ORDERED.[6]Aggrieved, respondents sought recourse from the NLRC.In its decision[7]dated January 14, 2005, the NLRC affirmed the LAs findings that petitioner was indeed constructively and illegally dismissed; that respondents bad faith was evident on their wilful failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel; and that the award of attorneys fees was warranted. However, the NLRC held that instead of an award of salaries corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section 10[8]of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,[9]as enunciated in our ruling inMarsaman Manning Agency, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission.[10]Hence, the NLRC ruled in this wise:WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter finding the termination of complainant illegal is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION. Complainant[s] salary for the unexpired portion of his contract should only be limited to three (3) months basic salary.Respondents Intermare Maritime Agency, Inc.[,] Vulture Shipping Limited and Thenamaris Ship Management are hereby ordered to jointly and severally pay complainant, the following:1.Three (3) months basic salary US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.2.Moral damagesP100,000.003.Exemplary damagesP50,000.004.Attorneys fees equivalent to 10% of the total monetary award.SO ORDERED.[11]

Respondents filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[12]praying for the reversal and setting aside of the NLRC decision, and that a new one be rendered dismissing the complaint.Petitioner, on the other hand, filed his own Motion for Partial Reconsideration,[13]praying that he be paid the nine (9)-month basic salary, as awarded by the LA.On April 20, 2005, a resolution[14]was rendered by the NLRC, affirming the findings of Illegal Dismissal and respondents failure to transfer petitioner to another vessel. However, finding merit in petitioners arguments, the NLRC reversed its earlier Decision, holding thatthere can be no choice to grant only three (3) months salary for every year of the unexpired termbecause there is no full year of unexpired term which this can be applied.HenceWHEREFORE, premises considered, complainants Motion for Partial Reconsideration is hereby granted.The award of three (3) months basic salary in the sum of US$4,290.00 is hereby modified in that complainant is entitled to his salary for the unexpired portion of employment contract in the sum of US$12,870.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.All aspect of our January 14, 2005 DecisionSTANDS.SO ORDERED.[15]Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the NLRC denied.Undaunted, respondents filed a petition forcertiorari[16]under Rule 65 ofthe Rules of Civil Procedurebefore the CA. On February 28, 2007, the CA affirmed the findings and ruling of theLA and the NLRC that petitioner was constructively and illegally dismissed. The CA held that respondents failed to show that the NLRC acted without statutory authority and that its findings were not supported by law, jurisprudence, and evidence on record. Likewise, the CA affirmed the lower agencies findings that the advisory of Captain Constantinou, taken together with the other documents and additional requirements imposed on petitioner, only meant that the latter should have been re-embarked. In the same token, the CA upheld the lower agencies unanimous finding of bad faith, warranting the imposition of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. However, the CA ruled that the NLRC erred in sustaining the LAs interpretation of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042. In this regard, the CA relied on theclauseor for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is lessprovided in the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 andheld:In the present case, the employment contract concerned has a term of one year or 12 months which commenced on August 14, 2001. However, it was preterminated without a valid cause. [Petitioner] was paid his wages for the corresponding months he worked until the 10thof November. Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 10, [R.A. No.] 8042, therefore, the option of three months for every year of the unexpired term is applicable.[17]Thus, the CA provided, to wit:WHEREFORE,premises considered, this Petition for Certiorari isDENIED.TheDecisiondated January 14, 2005, andResolutions,dated April 20, 2005 and July 29, 2005, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission-Fourth Division,CebuCity, in NLRC No. V-000038-04 (RAB VIII (OFW)-04-01-0006) are herebyAFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONthat private respondent is entitled to three (3) months of basic salary computed at US$4,290.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of actual payment.Costs against Petitioners.[18]

Both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration, which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution[19]dated August 30, 2007.Unyielding, petitioner filed this petition, raising the following issues:1)Whether or not Section 10 of R.A. [No.] 8042, to the extent that it affords anillegallydismissed migrant worker the lesser benefit of salaries for [the] unexpired portion of his employment contractorforthree (3) monthsfor everyyearof the unexpired term,whichever is lessis constitutional; and2)Assuming that it is, whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting petitioner only three (3) months backwages when his unexpired term of 9 months isfar shortof theevery yearof the unexpired term threshold.[20]In the meantime, while this case was pending before this Court, we declared as unconstitutional the clauseor for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is lessprovided in the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 in the case ofSerrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.[21]on March 24, 2009.Apparently, unaware of our ruling inSerrano, petitioner claims that the 5thparagraph of Section 10, R.A. No. 8042, is violative of Section 1,[22]Article III and Section 3,[23]Article XIII of the Constitution to the extent that it gives an erring employer the option to pay an illegally dismissed migrant worker only three months for every year of the unexpired term of his contract; that said provision of law has long been a source of abuse by callous employers against migrant workers; and that said provision violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution because, while illegally dismissed local workers are guaranteed under the Labor Code of reinstatement with full backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld from them up to their actual reinstatement, migrant workers, by virtue of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042, have to waive nine months of their collectible backwages every time they have a year of unexpired term of contract to reckon with. Finally, petitioner posits that, assuming said provision of law is constitutional, the CA gravely abused its discretion when it reduced petitioners backwages from nine months to three months as his nine-month unexpired term cannot accommodate the lesser relief of three months for every year of the unexpired term.[24]On the other hand, respondents, aware of our ruling inSerrano, aver that our pronouncement of unconstitutionality of the clauseor for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is lessprovided in the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 inSerranoshould not apply in this case because Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is a substantive law that deals with the rights and obligations of the parties in case of Illegal Dismissal of a migrant worker and is not merely procedural in character. Thus, pursuant to the Civil Code, there should be no retroactive application of the law in this case. Moreover, respondents asseverate that petitioners tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the award as petitioners basic salary, as provided under his contract, was only US$1,300.00. Respondents submit that the CA erred in its computation since it included the said tanker allowance. Respondents opine that petitioner should be entitled only to US$3,900.00 and not to US$4,290.00, as granted by the CA. InvokingSerrano, respondents claim that the tanker allowance should be excluded from the definition of the term salary. Also, respondents manifest that the full sum ofP878,914.47 inIntermares bank account was garnished and subsequently withdrawn and deposited with the NLRC Cashier of Tacloban City on February 14, 2007. On February 16, 2007, while this case was pending before the CA, the LA issued an Order releasing the amount ofP781,870.03 to petitioner as his award, together with the sum ofP86,744.44 to petitioners former lawyer as attorneys fees, and the amount ofP3,570.00 as execution and deposit fees. Thus, respondents pray that the instant petition be denied and that petitioner be directed to return to Intermare the sum of US$8,970.00 or its peso equivalent.[25]On this note, petitioner counters that this new issue as to the inclusion of the tanker allowance in the computation of the award was not raised by respondents before the LA, the NLRC and the CA, nor was it raised in respondents pleadings other than in their Memorandum before this Court, which should not be allowed under the circumstances.[26]The petition is impressed with merit.Prefatorily, it bears emphasis that the unanimous finding of the LA, the NLRC and the CA that the dismissal of petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the tribunals unanimous finding of bad faith on the part of respondents, thus, warranting the award of moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees. What remains in issue, therefore, is the constitutionality of the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 and, necessarily, the proper computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.Verily, we have already declared inSerranothat the clauseor for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is lessprovided in the 5thparagraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, inSerrano, pertinently held:The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.[27]Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioners right to equal protection, but also his right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.[28]Consequently, petitioner therein was accorded his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.We have already spoken. Thus, this case should not be different fromSerrano.As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides:Art. 7.Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary.The doctrine of operative fact serves as an exception to the aforementioned general rule. InPlanters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,[29]we held:The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.[30]FollowingSerrano, we hold that this case should not be included in the aforementioned exception. After all, it was not the fault of petitioner that he lost his job due to an act of illegal dismissal committed by respondents. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.In the same vein, we cannot subscribe to respondents postulation that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 should not be included in the computation of the lump-sum salary to be awarded to petitioner.First. It is only at this late stage, more particularly in their Memorandum, that respondents are raising this issue. It was not raised before the LA, the NLRC, and the CA. They did not even assail the award accorded by the CA, which computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the basic salary of US$1,430.00, and which clearly included the US$130.00 tanker allowance. Hence, fair play, justice, and due process dictate that this Court cannot now, for the first time on appeal, pass upon this question. Matters not taken up below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. They must be raised seasonably in the proceedings before the lower tribunals. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties; consequently, issues not raised before the lower tribunals cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.[31]Second. Respondents invocation ofSerranois unavailing. Indeed, we made the following pronouncements inSerrano, to wit:The wordsalariesin Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in whichsalary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work performed on designated rest days and holidays.[32]A close perusal of the contract reveals that the tanker allowance of US$130.00 was not categorized as a bonus but was rather encapsulated in the basic salary clause, hence, forming part of the basic salary of petitioner. Respondents themselves in their petition forcertioraribefore the CA averred that petitioners basic salary, pursuant to the contract, was US$1,300.00+US$130.00 tanker allowance.[33]If respondents intended it differently, the contractper seshould have indicated that said allowance does not form part of the basic salary or, simply, the contract should have separated it from the basic salary clause.A final note.We ought to be reminded of the plight and sacrifices of our OFWs.InOlarte v. Nayona,[34]this Court held that:Our overseas workers belong to a disadvantaged class. Most of them come from the poorest sector of our society. Their profile shows they live in suffocating slums, trapped in an environment of crimes. Hardly literate and in ill health, their only hope lies in jobs they find with difficulty in our country. Their unfortunate circumstance makes them easy prey to avaricious employers. They will climb mountains, cross the seas, endure slave treatment in foreign lands just to survive. Out of despondence, they will work under sub-human conditions and accept salaries below the minimum. The least we can do is to protect them with our laws.WHEREFORE, the Petition isGRANTED. The Court ofAppeals Decision dated February 28, 2007 and Resolution dated August 30, 2007 are herebyMODIFIEDto the effect thatpetitioner isAWARDEDhis salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine months computed at the rate of US$1,430.00 per month. All other awards are herebyAFFIRMED.No costs.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and SERAPIO ABUG,respondents.CRUZ,J:The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as follows:(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code.1Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. "2Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17, 1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari.3The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should involve dealings with two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall beprima facieevidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or ofprima facieevidence of engaging in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of theirown countrymen.WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four informations against the private respondent reinstated. No costs.SO ORDERED.Teehankee, CJ, Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr. and Paras, JJ., concur.[G.R. No. 109583.September 5, 1997]TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO,NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON, VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE,RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO,respondents.D E C I S I O NROMERO,J.:The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency, scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong.Private respondents sought employment as domestic helpers through petitioners employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille.The applicants paid placement fees ranging fromP1,000.00 toP14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them.Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus, they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a)[1]of the Labor Code, as amended.Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants.Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents.Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not to give any money to unauthorized individuals.POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment abroad.He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told him that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants.Manliclic, however,denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was perfectly alright to collect fees.On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following claims:1.Rosele CastigadorP14,000.002.Josefina Mamon3,000.003.Jenelyn Casa3,000.004.Peachy Laniog13,500.005.Verdelina Belgira2,000.006.Elma Flores2,500.007.Ramona Liturco2,500.008.Grace Sabando3,500.009.Gloria Palma1,500.0010.Avelyn Alvarez1,500.0011.Candelaria Nono1,000.0012.Nita Bustamante5,000.0013.Cynthia Arandillo1,000.0014.Sandie Aguilar3,000.0015.Digna Panaguiton2,500.0016.Veronica Bayogos2,000.0017.Sony Jamuat4,500.0018.Irma Sobrequil2,000.0019.Elsie Penarubia2,000.0020.Antonia Navarro2,000.0021.Selfa Palma3,000.0022.Lenirose Abangan13,300.0023.Paulina Cordero1,400.0024.Nora Maquiling2,000.0025.Rosalie Sondia2,000.0026.Ruby Sepulvida3,500.0027.Marjorie Macate1,500.0028.Estelita Biocos3,000.0029.Zita Galindo3,500.0030.Nimfa Bucol1,000.0031.Nancy Bolivar2,000.0032.Leonora Caballero13,900.0033.Julianita Aranador14,000.00The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby dismissed in view of their desistance.The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:1.Jiyasmin Bantillo6.Edna Salvante2.Rosa de Luna Senail7.Thelma Beltiar3.Elnor Bandojo8.Cynthia Cepe4.Teresa Caldeo9.Rosie Pavillon5.Virginia CastroverdeThe complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:1.Aleth Palomaria5.Mary Ann Beboso2.Emely Padrones6.Josefina Tejero3.Marybeth Aparri7.Bernadita Aprong4.Lenia Biona8.Joji LullRespondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34 (a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months.Considering however, that under the schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the penalty of cancellation,the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.SO ORDERED.[2](Underscoring supplied)On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Orderof Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign principals, but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments.Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be denied.Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioners license pending resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991.On January 30, 1992, however, petitioners motion for reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.Petitioner contends that Secretary Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative grounds,viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987 regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.Under Executive Order No. 797[3](E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247),[4]the POEA was established and mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB), and the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES).Petitioner theorizes that when POEA absorbed the powers of these agencies,Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment.Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:ART. 35.Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority. - The Minister of Labor shall have the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of Instructions.In the case ofEastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,[5]we held that:The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above quoted provisions, among others.And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies, but also to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions governing said activities.Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the Secretary of Labor gave the POEA,[6]on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request for investigation by any aggrieved person, x x (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity for certain enumerated offenses including -1)the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and2)any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations.[7]The Administrator was also given the power to order the dismissal of the case or the suspension of the license or authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof.[8](Underscoring supplied)This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed inPeople v. Diaz,[9]viz.:A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor,or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Underscoring supplied)In view of the Courts disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.As regards petitioners alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesors explanation, to wit:On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of the Labor Code, as amended.The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules and regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic).Indeed, the questioned schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses.It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employmentbut only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some enumerated prohibited acts.Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties.[10]WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED.No costs.SO ORDERED.Regalado, (Chairman), Puno Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISIONREPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 167639represented by the ADMINISTRATOROF THE PHILIPPINE OVERSEASEMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION(POEA),Petitioner,Present:Panganiban,C.J. (Chairperson),- versus -Ynares-Santiago,Austria-Martinez,Callejo, Sr., andChico-Nazario,JJ.PRINCIPALIA MANAGEMENT ANDPERSONNEL CONSULTANTS,Promulgated:INCORPORATED,Respondent.April 19, 2006x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.:Petitioner assails the September 20, 2004 Resolution[1]of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86170, dismissing outright the petition for certiorari for failure to attach copies of all relevant pleadings and transcripts of the hearings, as well as the March 29, 2005 Resolution[2]denying the motion for reconsideration.This case stemmed from two separate complaints filed before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against Principalia Management and Personnel Consultants, Incorporated (Principalia) for violation of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations.The first complaint dated July 16, 2003 filed by Ruth Yasmin Concha (Concha) was docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1497.The second complaint dated October 14, 2003 filed by Rafael E. Baldoza (Baldoza) was docketed as POEA Case No. RV 03-07-1453.In the first complaint, Concha alleged that in August 2002, she applied with Principalia for placement and employment as caregiver or physical therapist in the USA or Canada.Despite paying P20,000.00 out of the P150,000.00 fee required by Principalia which was not properly receipted, Principalia failed to deploy Concha for employment abroad.[3]In its March 15, 2004 Order,[4]the Adjudication Office of the POEA found Principalia liable for violations of the 2002 POEA Rules and Regulations, particularly for collecting a fee from the applicant before employment was obtained; for non-issuance of official receipt; and for misrepresenting that it was able to secure employment for Concha.For these infractions, Principalias license was ordered suspended for 12 months or in lieu thereof, Pricipalia is ordered to pay a fine of P120,000.00 and to refund Conchas placement fee of P20,000.00.Baldoza initiated the second complaint on October 14, 2003[5]alleging that Principalia assured him of employment in Doha, Qatar as a machine operator with a monthly salary of $450.00.After paying P20,000.00 as placement fee, he departed for Doha, Qatar on May 31, 2003 but when he arrived at the jobsite, he was made to work as welder, a job which he had no skills.He insisted that he was hired as machine operator but the alternative position offered to him was that of helper, which he refused.Thus, he was repatriated on July 5, 2003.On November 12, 2003, Baldoza and Principalia entered into a compromise agreement with quitclaim and release whereby the latter agreed to redeploy Baldoza for employment abroad.Principalia, however, failed to deploy Baldoza as agreed hence, in an Order dated April 29, 2004,[6]the POEA suspended Principalias documentary processing.Principalia moved for reconsideration which the POEA granted on June 25, 2004.[7]The latter lifted its order suspending the documentary processing by Principalia after noting that it exerted efforts to obtain overseas employment for Baldoza within the period stipulated in the settlement agreement but due to Baldozas lack of qualification, his application was declined by its foreign principal.Meanwhile, on June 14, 2004, or before the promulgation of POEAs order lifting the suspension, Principalia filed a Complaint[8](Complaint) against Rosalinda D. Baldoz in her capacity as Administrator of POEA and Atty. Jovencio R. Abara in his capacity as POEA Conciliator, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City forAnnulment of Order for Suspension of Documentation Processing with Damages and Application for Issuanc