Chavez v. NLRC 448 SCRA 478

Facts

Petitioner Pedro Chavez was hired as truck driver of Private Respondent Supreme Packaging, Inc.

Chavez requested to avail himself of the benefits that a regular employees were receiving but his request was denied

Chavez filed before NLRC a complaint for regularization. Later on he was dismissed by SPI

He later on filed an amended complaint for illegal dismissal

Issue1. W/N there existed an employer-employee relationship between SPI and Chavez? 2. W/N Chavez is an independent contractor?

Held1. Yes, there existed an employer-employee relationship between SPI and Chavez

Applying four-fold test, all elements are present

1. selection and engagement of the employee

- it was SPI who engaged the services of Chavez without intervention of third party

2. payment of wages

- that petitioner was paid on per trip basis is not significant, this is merely a method of computing compensation and not a basis for determining the existence or absence of er-ee relationship

3. power of dismissal

- power to dismiss was inherent in the fact that they engaged the services of Chavez as driver

4. power to control employee's conduct

- an employee is subject to employer's power to control the means and method by which the work is to be performed while an independent contractor is free from control and supervision of employer

* Manifestation of Power of Control of SPI to Chavez

1. truck was owned by SPI2. express instruction in the method of delivery

3. instruction on parking of delivery truck

4. instruction on when and where Chavez would perform his task by issuing to him gate passes and routing slips

2. Chavez is not and Independent Contractor

* Proof that Chavez is not an Independent Contractor1. Chavez did not own the truck2. SPI did not have substantial capitalization or investment

3. Delivery was exclusively done for SPI for 10years

* Er-Ee Relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in contract and providing therein that the employee is an independent contractor. Indeed the employment status of the person is defined and prescribed by law and not by what parties say it should be.Posted 15th May 2012 by missireneramilo Labels: chavez employer employee relationship er-ee labor law labor standards nlrc 0

CHAVEZ VS. NLRC448 SCRA 478. January 17, 2005FACTSThe respondent company, Supreme Packaging, Inc. engaged the services of the petitioner, PedroChavez, as truck driver. The respondent company furnished the petitioner with a truck. The petitionerexpressed to respondent Alvin Lee, respondent company’s plant manager, hisdesire to avail himself of the benefits that the regular employees were receiving such as overtime pay, nightshift differential pay,and 13th month pay, among others. Although he promised to extend these benefits to the petitioner,respondent Lee failed to actually do so. Petitioner filed a complaint for regularization with the RegionalArbitration Branch. Before the case could be heard, respondent company terminated the services of thepetitioner. Consequently, the petitioner filed an amended complaint against the respondents for illegaldismissal, unfair labor practice and non-payment of overtime pay, nightshift differential pay, and 13thmonth pay, among others. The respondents, for their part, denied the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the respondent company and the petitioner. They averred that thepetitioner was an independent contractor as evidenced by the contract of service which he and therespondent company entered into. The relationship of the respondent company and the petitioner wasallegedly governed by this contract of service.The respondents insisted that the petitioner had the sole control over the means and methodsby which his work was accomplished. He paid the wages of his helpers and exercised control over them.As such, the petitioner was not entitled to regularization because he was not an employee of therespondent company. The respondents, likewise, maintained that they did not dismiss the petitioner.Rather, the severance of his contractual relation with the respondent company was due to his violationof the terms and conditions of their contract.ISSUE:whether or not there existed an employer-employee relationship between the respondentcompany and the petitioner.RULING:Yes. There was an employer-employee relationship in the case at bar.The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (1) the selectionand engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) theemployer’s power to control the employee’s conduct.All the four elements are present in this case.Of the four elements of the employer-employee relationship,the “control test” is the mostimportant. Although the respondents denied that they exercised control over the manner and methodsby which the petitioner accomplished his work, a careful review of the records shows that the latterperformed his work as truck driver under the respondents’supervision and control. Their right of controlwas manifested by the following attendant circumstances:1. The truck driven by the petitioner belonged to respondent company;2. There was an express instruction from the respondents that the truck shall be usedexclusively to deliver respondent

company’s goods; 3. Respondents directed the petitioner, after completion of each delivery, to park the truck ineither of two specific places only, to wit: at its office in Metro Manila at 2320 Osmeña Street, MakatiCity or at BEPZ, Mariveles, Bataan; and4. Respondents determined how, where and when the petitioner would perform his task byThese circumstances, to the Court’s mind, prove that the

respondents exercised control over themeans and methods by which the petitioner accomplished his work as truck driver of the respondentcompany. The contract of service indubitably established the existence of an employer-employeerelationship between the respondent company and the petitioner.

It bears stressing that the

4. Respondents determined how, where and when the petitioner would perform his task byissuing to him gate passes and routing slips

existenceof an employer-employee relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract andproviding therein that the employee is an independent contractor when, as in this case, the factsclearly show otherwise. Indeed, the employment status of a person is defined and prescribed by lawand not by what the parties say it should be.

CONSULTA vs CA Case Digest

[G.R. No. 145443. March 18, 2005] RAQUEL P. CONSULTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAMANA PHILIPPINES, INC., RAZUL Z. REQUESTO, and ALETA TOLENTINO, respondents. 

FACTS: Consulta was Managing Associate of Pamana. On 1987 she was issued a certification authorizing her to negotiate for and in behalf of PAMANA with the Federation of Filipino Civilian Employees Association. Consulta was able to secure an account with FFCEA in behalf of PAMANA. However, Consulta claimed that PAMANA did not pay her commission for the PPCEA account and filed a complaint for unpaid wages or commission. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was an employee of PAMANA. 

HELD: The SC held that Pamana was an independent agent and not an employee. 

The power of control in the four fold test is missing. The manner in which Consulta was to pursue her tasked activities was not subject to the control of PAMANA. Consulta failed to show that she worked definite hours. The amount of time, the methods and means, the management and maintenance of her sales division were left to her sound judgment. 

Finally, Pamana paid Consulta not for labor she performed but only for the results of her labor. Without results, Consulta’s labor was her own burden and loss. Her right to compensation, or to commission, depended on the tangible results of her work - whether she brought in paying recruits. 

The fact that the appointment required Consulta to solicit business exclusively for Pamana did not mean Pamana exercised control over the means and methods of Consulta’s work as the term control is understood in labor jurisprudence. Neither did it make Consulta an employee of Pamana. Pamana did not prohibit Consulta from engaging in any other business, or from being connected with any other company, for as long as the business or company did not compete with Pamana’s business. The exclusivity clause was a reasonable restriction to prevent similar acts prejudicial to Pamana’s business interest. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that “[t]he contracting parties may establish such stipulation, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. 

There being no employer-employee relationship between Pamana and Consulta, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had no jurisdiction to entertain and rule on Consulta’s money claim. Consulta’s remedy is to file an ordinary civil action to litigate her claim Petition is dismissed.

Philippines Bank of Communications vs. NLRC{G.R. No. L-66598, December 19, 1986Facts:Petitioner Philippine Bank of Communications and the Corporate Executive Search Inc.(CESI) entered into a letter agreement dated January 1976 under which (CESI) undertook toprovide "Tempo[rary] Services" to petitioner Consisting of the "temporary services" of eleven( 1 1 ) m e s s e n g e r s . T h e c o n t r a c t p e r i o d i s d e s c r i b e d a s b e i n g " f r o m J a n u a r y 1 9 7 6 — . " T h e petitioner in truth undertook to pay a "daily service rate of P18, " on a per person basis.Attached to the letter agreement was a "List of Messengers assigned at Philippine Bank of  Communications" which list included, as item No. 5 thereof, the name of private respondent Ricardo Orpiada.Ricardo Orpiada was thus assigned to work with the petitioner bank. As such, he renderedservices to the bank, within the premises of the bank and alongside other people also renderings e r v i c e s t o t h e b a n k . T h e r e w a s s o m e q u e s t i o n a s t o w h e n R i c a r d o O r p i a d a c o m m e n c e d rendering services to the bank. As noted above, the letter agreement was dated January 1976.However, the position paper submitted by (CESI) to the National Labor Relations Commissionstated that (CESI) hired Ricardo Orpiada on 25 June 1975 as a Tempo Service employee, andassigned him to work with the petitioner bank "as evidenced by the appointment memo issuedto him on25 June 1975." Be that as it may, on or about October 1976, the petitioner requested(CESI) to withdraw Orpiada's assignment because, in the allegation of the bank, Orpiada's services "were no longer needed."On 29 October 1976, Orpiada instituted a complaint in the Department of Labor (now Ministry of Labor and Employment) against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and failure to pay the 13thmonth pay provided for in Presidential Decree No. 851. This complaint was docketed as CaseNo. R04-1010184-76-E. After investigation, the Office of the Regional Director, Regional OfficeNo. IV of the Department of Labor, issued an order dismissing Orpiada's complaint for failure of Mr. Orpiada to show the existence of an employer-employee relationship between the bank andhimself.Accordingly, on 2 April 1984, the bank filed the present petition for certiorari with this Courtseeking to annul and set aside (a) the decision of respondent Labor Arbiter Dogelio dated 12S e p t e m b e r 1 9 7 7 i n L a b o r C a s e N o . R B - I V - 1 1 1 8 - 7 7 a n d ( b ) t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e N L R C promulgated on 29 December 1983 affirming with some modifications the decision of the Labor Arbiter. This Court granted a temporary restraining order on 11 April 1984. The main issue as litigated by the parties in this case relates to whether or not an employer-employee relationshipexisted between the petitioner bank and private respondent Ricardo Orpiada. The petitioner  bank maintains that no employer-employee relationship was established between itself andRicardo Orpiada and that Ricardo Orpiada was an employee of (CESI) and not of the bank.Issue:Whether or not Orpiada is an employee of the bank or the Agency?Decision:Turning to the power to control Orpiada's conduct, it should be noted immediatelyt h a t O r p i a d a p e r f o r m e d h i s s e c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e b a n k ' s p r e m i s e s , a n d n o t w i t h i n t h e o f f i c e premises of (CESI) As such, Orpiada must have been subject to at least the same control andsupervision that the bank exercises over any other person physically within its premises and rendering services to or for the bank, in

other words, any employee or staff member of the bank.It seems unreasonable to suppose that the bank would have allowed Orpiada and the other  persons assigned to the bank by CE SI to remain within the bank's premises and there render s e r v i c e s t o t h e b a n k , w i t h o u t s u b j e c t i n g t h e m t o a s u b s t a n t i a l m e a s u r e o f c o n t r o l a n dsupervision, whether in respect of the manner in which they discharged their functions, or inrespect of the end results of their functions or activities, or both.Under the general rule set out in the first and second paragraphs of Article 106, an employer who enters into a contract with a contractor for the performance of work for the employer, doesnot thereby create an employer-employes relationship between himself and the employees of  the contractor. Thus, the employees of the contractor remain the contractor's employees and hisalone. Nonetheless when a contractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordancewith the Labor Code, the employer who contracted out the job to the contractor becomes jointlyand severally liable with his contractor to the employees of the latter "to the extent of the workp e r f o r m e d u n d e r t h e c o n t r a c t " a s s u c h e m p l o y e r w e r e t h e e m p l o y e r o f t h e c o n t r a c t o r ' s e m p l o y e e s . T h e l a w i t s e l f , i n o t h e r w o r d s , e s t a b l i s h e s a n e m p l o y e r - e m p l o y e e r e l a t i o n s h i p between the employer and the job contractor's employees for a limited purpose, i.e., in order toensure that the latter get paid the wages due to them.The definition of "labor-only" contracting in Rule VIII, Book III of the Implementing Rules must beread in conjunction with the definition of job contracting given in Section 8 of the same Rules.The undertaking given by CESI in favor of the bank was not the performance of a specific — jobfor instance, the carriage and delivery of documents and parcels to the addresses thereof. There appear to be many companies today which perform this discrete service, companies witht h e i r o w n p e r s o n n e l w h o p i c k u p d o c u m e n t s a n d p a c k a g e s f r o m t h e o f f i c e s o f a c l i e n t o r   customer, and who deliver such materials utilizing their own delivery vans or motorcycles to theaddresses. In the present case, the undertaking of (CESI) was to provide its client-thebank-witha certain number of persons able to carry out the work of messengers. Such undertaking of  CESI was complied with when the requisite number of persons were assigned or seconded tothe petitioner bank. Orpiada utilized the premises and office equipment of the bank and notthose of (CESI) Messengerial work-the delivery of documents to designated persons whether  within or without the bank premises — is of course directly related to the day-to-day operationsof the bank. Section 9(2) quoted above doesnot require for its applicability that the petitioner must be engaged in the delivery of items as a distinct and separate line of business.W H E R E F O R E , t h e p e t i t i o n f o r c e r t i o r a r i i s D E N I E D a n d t h e d e c i s i o n p r o m u l g a t e d o n 2 9December 1983 of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. The TemporaryRestraining Order issued by this Court on 11 April 1984 is hereby lifted. Costs against petitioner.

7 February 2007 l Labor Standards

Illegal Dismissal – Separation Pay – Appeal by Employer – Death of a Party – Strained Relations Principle – Employer-employee Relationship

Bilon, Brazil and Pagaygay are jeepney drivers driving jeepneys owned by Melencio Gabriel. They are paying P400/day for their boundary. Later, the drivers were required to pay an additional P50.00 to cover police protection, car wash, deposit fee, and garage fees.

The three drivers refused to pay the additional P50.00. On April 30, 1995, when the drivers reported to work, they were not given any jeepney to drive. Eventually, they were dismissed. The three drivers sued Gabriel for illegal dismissal.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the drivers and ordered Gabriel to pay the drivers their backwages and their separation pay amounting to about a total of P1.03M.

On April 18, 1997, the LA promulgated its decision and on the same day sent a copy thereof to Gabriel but Flordeliza (wife of Gabriel) refused to receive the copy. Apparently, Gabriel died on April 4, 1997. The copy was resent via registered mail on May 28, 1997. Flordeliza appealed to the LA on June 5, 1997.

The LA dismissed the appeal; it ruled that the appeal was not on time because the promulgation was made on April 18, 1997 and that the appeal on June 5, 1997 was already beyond the ten day period required for appeal.

The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the LA. It ruled that there was no employee-employer relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC but it ruled that the separation pay should not be awarded but rather, the employees should be reinstated.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appeal before the LA was made on time. Whether or not there was an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. Whether or not there was a strained relation between Gabriel and the drivers.

HELD: The appeal was made on time because when the promulgation was made Gabriel is already dead. The ten day requirement to make an appeal is not applicable in this situation because Gabriel was not yet properly substituted by the wife. The counting of the period should be made starting from the date when the copy was sent via registered mail. Therefore, the appeal filed on June 5 was made on time.

There exists an employer-employee relationship between the drivers and Gabriel. The fact that the drivers do not receive fixed wages but get only that in excess of the so-called “boundary”

[that] they pay to the owner/operator is not sufficient to withdraw the relationship between them from that of employer and employee.

The award of the separation pay is not proper. It was not shown that there was a strained relationship between Gabriel and the drivers so as to cause animosity if they are reinstated. The Strained Relations Principle is only applied if it is shown that reinstatement would only cause antagonism between the employer and the employee; and that the only solution is separation and the payment of separation pay.

Investment Planning vs. SSS Case Digest

Investment Planning v. SSSFACTS:

Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in business management and sale of securities. It has 2classes of agents selling investment plans: 1) salaried employees who have fixed hours of work under the control of the company; 2) registered representatives are on commission basis.Petitioner applied to SSS for exemption of coverage of these registered representatives. However, it wasdenied on the ground that these registered employees are employees of the petitioner.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner’s registered representatives are employees

HELD:

No. These representatives are in reality commission agents. They are not required to report for workanytime. They shoulder their own selling expenses as well as transportation and they are paid with commissionbased on a certain percentage of their sales.Where there is no element of control and where a person who works for another is not subject to definitehours of work and in turn compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount thereof, there is noemployer-employee relationship.

MylaRuth N.Sara

Manila Golf & Country Club, Inc., vs IAC andFermin Llamar (1994) G.R. 64948Facts:Respondents were caddies and employees of Manila Golf & Country Club who originally filed a petition withtheSocialSecurity Commission (SSC) for coverage and availment of benefits under theSocialSecurityAct.They alleged that although the petitioners were employees of the Manila Golf and Country Club, a domesticcorporation, the latter had not registered them as such with theSSS.In the case before theSSC, the respondent Club alleged that the petitioners, caddies by occupation, wereallowed into the Club premises to render services as such to the individual members and guests playing theClub's golf course and who themselves paid for such services; that as such caddies, the petitioners were notsubject to the direction and control of the Club as regards the manner in which they performed their work;and hence, they were not the Club's employees.Issue:WON there exist an employer-employee relationship between the cadies and the Golf Club?Held:No existence of employer-employee relationship.In the very nature of things, caddies must submit to some supervision of their conduct while enjoying theprivilege of pursuing their occupation within the premises and grounds of whatever club they do their workin. For all that is made to appear, they work for the club to which they attach themselves on sufferance but,on the other hand, also without having to observe any working hours, free to leave anytime they please, tostay away for as long they like.I

t is not pretended that if found remiss in the observance of said rules, anydiscipline may be meted them beyond barring them from the premises which, it may be supposed, the Clubmay do in any case even absent any breach of the rules, and without violating any right to work on their part.All these considerations clash frontally with the concept of employment.TheIAC would point to the fact that the Club suggests the rate of fees payable by the players to the caddiesas still another indication of the latter's status as employees.It seems to the Court, however, that theintendment of such fact is to the contrary, showing that the Club has not the measure of control over theincidents of the caddies' work and compensation that an employer would possess. Court agree that thegroup rotation system so-called, is less a measure of employer control than an assurance that the work isfairly distributed, a caddy who is absent when his turn number is called simply losing his turn to serve andbeing assigned instead the last number for the day.Moreover, as pointed out by petitioner which was never refuted that: has no means of compelling thepresence of a caddy.Acaddy is not required to exercise his occupation in the premises of petitioner. He maywork with any other golf club or he may seek employment a caddy or otherwise with any entity or individualwithout restriction by petitioner.