Civil Society in the Indian Context: Letting the State off the HookAuthor(s): Dipankar GuptaReviewed work(s):Source: Contemporary Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 3 (May, 1997), pp. 305-307Published by: American Sociological AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2654010 .Accessed: 14/01/2012 06:33

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CONTEAfPORARYSOCIOLOGY 305

INDIA Civil Society in the Inf1ian Context: Letting the State oS the Hook

DIPANKAR GUPTA Celltre for the Study of Social Systems

Jawaharlal Nehru Universit} dipankar@nuniv. ernet. in

Until recently the concept of civil society led an incognito classroom life. Political philoso- phers routinely passed it down from genera- tion to generation, but it aroused no passion, nor did it cry out for a second look. Froln Locke to Hegel, civil society meant the estab- lishment of institutions by a constitutional democratic state that would guarcl ancl enlarge the principles of liberty. Civil society was to the classicists a celebration of freedom from tradition that is, hierarchical and absolutist orders. Civil society and the state calne to- gether, but not as one against or independent of the other. Of course a subject as large as this was bound to harbor many ambiguities, but few bothered much about them.

Now, quite suddenly, all that has changed. Distinguished academics lead eager acolytes into the subtleties of"civil society." In Inost quarters discussions ofthis subject have taken on urgent, practical dimensions as well. Civil society is now linked to social Inovements, cultural assertions, and affirlnative action. Even social activists, who generally sneer at anything with even a remotely acadelnic prov- enance, have been rumored to use it. Conse- quently, the term has taken on a variety of connotations. Because it means different things to different people, it often provides an embarrasslnent of clichds.

There is, therefore, a temptation to knock clown the revival that civil society is now en- joying as yet another fruity obsession by head- line-hunting academics. To yield to that telnptation would be unfortunate, however, for the contemporary debates around the con- cept can tell us a great deal about the sociol- ogy of our times in terms of the options now available to citizens in constitutional clenloc- racies as well as allow us to reflect on the lim- its of liberalism in an age when focalized state politics have lost much of their shine.

Civil society's allure in India, as elsewhere, has roots in a general disenchantment with the state. In developecl Western democracies this disenchantment is largely caused Ly a sur feit of consumerislll that has lecl people to

wonder what happenecl to certain natural sim- plicities. Technological domination crowds the skyline, leaving little room for alternative modalities or lifestyles. Even so, we must ad- mit that alienation froln the state is an out- come of boredom with so much technology. Attention has, consequently, turned to the lilnits of technology and to its lnore unsavory aspects. This is where "new social movements" make their presence felt. In their view, peace, environment, and gender harmony are all under threat because technology clominates not only the heights but also every nook and cranny. Indeed, the state itself, with its gigan- tic instruments of dolnination, coercion, and surveillance, is the largest purveyor of tech- nology. The way out, they argue, is to resur- rect civil society and free it from the clutches of the state. Civil society thus becolnes au- tonomous, independent of the state. Some now urge US to generate alternative meanings that could enrich lives by making freedoln more than just a legal token (see, for instance, AlainTouraine 1992).

In contrast to the Western experience, in India the interest in civil society colnes fronl the state's inability to deliver the fruits of tech- nology ancl modernization to the average citi- zen. A majority of Indians have experienced only the downside of technology, while the state calmly abets the aggrandizelnent of an elite. This nlinority has access to state-of-the- art technology, which it uses to dominate the many. State acquiescence in this process is often blatant. Thus, while in both India and the West the call of civil society is antitech- nology, the reasons for that call are quite dif- ferent. Civil society in India, according to some experts, resides alnong the poor and the downtrodden. Rajni Kothari, the foremost exponent of this position, argues that the cri- sis of governance in contelnporary India comes froln the state's efforts to stifle the initiatives of the poor and the Inarginalized by relying on a "techno-managerial structure." This has led to the emergence of two Indias, one ur- ban, the other rural (Kothari 1988a: 2227).

306 COIV'17tIPORAJRY SOCIOLOGY

Kothari's sylnpathies are clearly witla the lat- ter, for it is in the villages ancl in "sublllerged civilizations" (Kothari 1988b: 3) that the iln- pulses towarcl civil society lie.

Ashis Nancly, another ilnportant figure in this fielcl, enclorses Kothari's position force- fully in a nulalber of wiclely reacl and quotecl pieces. According to Nandy, the Western- educated elite in India look first to the state, and adjust their culture accordingly. This is why the state is hostile to those with indig- enous cultural Inoorings (Nancly 1984: 2078- 208 0; s ee also N ancly 198 9: 9) . Civil society is therefore supposecl to protect the Inany pre- cious cliversities alnong colnlllunities and op- pose the state's grand holllogenization project, which is carriecl OUt in the nalne of Inodern- ization (ibicl.).

Civil society thus becollles identifiecl with traclition ancl ascriptive bonds yet another difference between this conception of civil society and the clominant conception in the West. Civil society in the West is not nostal- gic. It cloes not seek to return to tradition, as it is fully anvare of tradition's Inany iniquities. In Inclia there is quite a rolnantic revivalisln uncler the aegis of civil society. It has even encouragecl a species of interpretation of tra- ditional Hinclu texts like the Yugnz7valky(ls7tlriti ancl the Munus7rlriti, which is, at the very least, surprising, for these texts are staples of Hindu chauvinist j ustifications of caste hierarchy ancl the subordination of wolllen. Now, quite s ucl- clenly, from self-professecl secularist quarters they are being upheld as models of harlnony and uncolnplicated good will (see Kishwar 1994)

It is this position that I believe Andrd Beteille is prilnarily reacting against. His is a lone voice, for which his vast acaclelaic repu- tation more than colalpensates. With Beteille, once again the classics frolll Locke to Tocqueville to Hegel ancl Gralnsci are re- callecl. Beteille, however, takes a nontracli- tional approach in opting for a Tocquevillian notion of civil society. Though Tocqueville dicl not directly acldress this subject, his stucly of Alnerican delnocracy led him to develop the concept of interlnecliate institutions free of both church and state, froln which Beteille takes his cue. In the Inclian context, he ar- gues, these institutions shoulcl be free frolll state control ancl traclitional loyalties, both strong presences in the subcontinent. The institutions that Bel eille has in Inind are uni-

versities, hospitals, juclicial courts, econolllic corporations, ancl the like (Beteille 19'91, 1996).

For Beteille, civil society is lllacle up of these instittltions. As interlllecliate between the state and prilllordial collllllunities, they are Lest equippecl to function on Illodern organi- zational and rational principles. While this conception of civil society appears closer to earlier European conceptions, it really bears little reselllLulance to either Locke or Hegel. This is Lecause Beteille, inspirecl Ly Tocqueville, cloes not see these institutions as integral to a clelllocratic constitutional state. They are, rather, Loulwarks against the state that would alllass excessive power. It is in this sense that these institutions are interlnediate, which is why they should not Le cralllped Ly the logic of state politics or the sway of pri- mordial loyalties . They should function ac- corcling to their own rules. Because these rules promote rational efficiency, they alone can safeguard the institutional well-Leing of these organizations. Beteille also believes that if these institutions are not perjurecl, then they will eventually help Laring aLsout social cle- veloplllent ancl jtlstice. For this reason he is cautious aLsout recollllllencling any liind of affirlllative action policies, for lllany of these are unlllinclful of institutional well-being.

By steering clear of Locke, Rousseau, and particularly Hegel, Beteille's civil society rests on logical grouncls indifferent to consicler- ations of citizenship. If the interlllediate in- stitutions that Beteille has in lllind function purely along elitist and lnanagerial principles, then on what grouncls can he fault theln? As long as these institutions are efficiently run, questions of citizenship ancl contract neecl not arise. Large corporations ancl lllanagelllent agencies, as well as universities ancl hospitals, can relllain intermecliate institutions, but with very little responsibility toward citizens. This is not harcl to illlagine for econolnic and en- trepreneurial institutions. But in a constitu- tional democracy even these are managed by executives who are constrained to act as citizens. In the cases of institutions that are supposecl to contriLvlte to Leasic social wel- fare, efficiency can be attained without fac- toring in citizenship in any meaningful way. Indeecl, in Inclia we have lllany instances of private hospitals ancl eclucational establish-

ents that have no concern for people as citi- zens. Their attention is riveted instead on

CONTEMPORARY SOCIOLOGY 307

those with llloney. These institutions otlaer- wise llleet Beteille's stanclarcls, for they acllllin- ister to the sick and provicle quality education. But, since they cater to a very slllall lllinority, they can hardly be regarded as agencies for realizing the hulllan potential of freedom as conceived by both Locke and Hegel. These institutions, then, cater not to citizens Lout to clients.

In a country with scarce resources, the di- version of such vital services away frolll the public is surely retrogracle cleveloplllent. I have no doubt that Beteille, too, woulcl strongly reject such elitist institutions, but his uncler- standing of civil society does not ultilllately nake these interlllecliate institutions answer- able to citizens in a delllocratic society.

In Partha Chatterjee we have a clearer es- pousal of civil society without citizenship. For Chatterjee all modern institutions, even those set up by the colonial regillles, are instrulllents of civil society (Chatterjee 1997). Like Kothari ancl others discussed earlier, and *lnlike Beteille, Chatterjee is openly averse to lllod- ern institutions. But unlike Kothari, who sees civil society resicling outside the state, Chatterjee locates it in the heart of the Least. Yet Chatterjee's civil society has nothing to do with citizenship and everything to do with modernity and with the elites whom it has benefited.

When civil society is thus separated froln citizenship, the state is let off the hook. No longer is there pressure on the state to Le re- sponsible to the people. The state is now con- ceptually free to roal< about capriciously. The attention, instead, is on how to keep the state away from various bailiwicks. Kothari ancl Nandy would like to protect traditional soli- darities and primorclial ties, turning a Lulind eye to their lnany repressive attributes. Chatterjee, who sees civil society as uncon- nected with citizenship and connected only with modern institutions, would also like to separate the realm of the political from that of the state and its apparatuses. Only Beteille takes seriously the inevitability of the mod- ern state. As Mar>; said in the Grtendrisse, it is

illlpossiLule for us to return to ancient Greece, as we are no longer so naive. But Beteille, true to Tocqueville, does not link his understand- ing of civil society ancl interlnecliate institu- tions to citizenship. As long as interlnediate institutions assulne rational organizational forlns ancl are internally efficient, Beteille would find little reason to colnplain. This is what his argulnent, stretchecl to its lilnits, ap- pears to enclorse. The state is once again let off the hook, for citizenship is not a critical social status essential for the functioning of interlnediate institutions.

This would be a very serious denouelnent, especially in a developing country like In- dia. Unlike in developed societies, where some can incleed afford to scoff at technol- ogy and state-centered developmental pro- gralus, such an attitucle in poor countries seems thoroughly anachronistic. Even the "new social lnovements'' in the West clo not run away froln involvement with the state. They simI)ly laave no alnbitions for power and are content, instead, to influence the state froln the outside with lavish lashings of lneaning derived froln cultural sensitivi- ties. Looked at this way, the conceptions of civil society in India seeln to have gone fur- ther than in the West in denying the valid- ity of the state altogether, and in this process they have allowed the notion of citizenship to languish. This is surely surprising given India's backwardness, where the state is ex- pectecl to act as a Inobilizing agency. To dis- tance the constitutional clemocratic state froln citizenship is conceptually risky and in practice fraught with many dangers. If the state is no longer expectecl to perform, then why should it? People cease to Le citizens and instead turn their attention either to grassroots organizations and voluntary agen- cies, or else to interlnediate institutions that run on the principles of pure internal effi- ciency. If current tendencies continue, then the crass lnyrlnidons of the state in coun- tries like India have a worlcl to gain-a world free from countervailing pressures from an active citizenry.