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The Greek and Spanish civilwars: A comparisonSpyros Economides aa Lecturer in International Relations andEuropean Politics , London School ofEconomics ,Published online: 20 Sep 2007.

To cite this article: Spyros Economides (2000) The Greek and Spanish civil wars:A comparison, Civil Wars, 3:2, 89-105, DOI: 10.1080/13698240008402440

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The Greek and Spanish Civil Wars: AComparison

SPYROS ECONOMIDES

In contemporary Europe, the complacent consensus of the victory ofliberal democratic values and principles in international relations hasbeen shattered by the tragic and bloodthirsty conflicts of ex-Yugoslavia, which at least in part could be characterized as civilwars. Similarly, in the short timespan of 10 years at the middle of thetwentieth century, and straddling the Second World War, civil conflictin Spain and Greece shattered many illusions as to how internationalrelations could and should be conducted.

The Greek and Spanish Civil Wars occurred at vital historical andintellectual junctures in the context of the evolution of the internationalsystem and the study of international relations. Conflict in Spain, roughlyspeaking between left and right, epitomized the breakdown in Wilsonianvalues and was the final nail in the coffin of the 'idealist' trend whichcharacterized much thought in international relations in the interwar period.It also highlighted the emergence of Fascism as a threat to internationalorder, an immediate precursor to the Second World War. The Greek CivilWar, also roughly speaking a conflict between left and right, was viewed asthe cockpit of the emergence of bipolar, superpower rivalry and the divisionof the international system into opposed ideological camps. It also occurredat a time when 'realism' progressively developed as the predominantapproach both in the practice and understanding of international relations.

In the case of Spain, the major Western democracies abstained fromdirect physical involvement and practised a policy of non-intervention,despite strong public support for action and the direct military interventionof other actors such as Italy and Germany. As will be seen later, this policyof non-intervention finally destroyed any lingering faith in the value ofcollective security and its purported enforcer the League of Nations, andsignalled the re-emergence of realpolitik as the dominant trend ininternational affairs.

In Greece, the major Western democracies opted for direct involvementand practiced an interventionist policy against the perceived threat of Soviet

Civil Wars, Vol.3, No.2 (Summer 2000), pp.89-105PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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sponsored Communist expansionism and despite the lack of clear publicsupport for this policy. Even though this intervention was portrayed in termsof the defence of democratic values and ideals, it too was power politics inpractice at a time in which the post-Second World War international systemwas very much in its formative stages both in practice and in publicperception.

In this context I would like to trace and evaluate three distinct yetinterlinked issues.

First, to briefly compare and contrast the root causes of the respectivecivil wars by way of providing historical background.

Second, to place each conflict in its international context; Greece's civilwar at the beginning of an era and Spain's at the end of an era, and compareand contrast some of the more important responses elicited from the majorWestern actors, primarily Great Britain and the US.

Third, to examine the extent to which there is any link between these twoconflicts, and the international responses to them, with the end of 'idealism'in the Spanish case, and the affirmation of 'realism' in the Greek case,within the boundaries of thinking about international relations. It is arguedthat even though diametrically opposed policies were pursued in Spain andGreece by the Western democracies, that is non-intervention in the firstinstance and intervention in the second, both cases illustrate the return tobalance of power politics following the illusionary hiatus of the hope-filled1920s. In fact it could be said that the Spanish and Greek Civil Wars markthe extremes of the cusp at which this transformation in practice and thoughttook place in international relations.

SPAIN AND GREECE: THE MAIN CAUSES OF CIVIL WAR

SpainTo many, the Spanish Civil War was a microcosm of an evolving Europeanorder which pitted democracy against fascism and was, ' "the last greatcause" and a defining moment on the road to the Second World War'.1 In hismagisterial history of the civil war, Hugh Thomas depicts it as 'the Spanishshare in the tragic European breakdown of the twentieth century, in whichthe liberal heritage of the nineteenth century, and the sense of optimismwhich had lasted since the renaissance, were shattered'.2 Ultimately, as withthe majority of civil wars, the root causes are to be found domestically andthe Spanish case proves no different. As one historian put it, '[the civil warwas] the most recent example of Spain's perennial inability to establish astate with the power to maintain the loyalty of the Spanish people'.3

For many it was the intriguing politics of the Second Republic,

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established in 1931, which was the immediate cause for the rising of thegenerals in 1936 and the outbreak of civil strife. But the confused politicsof the 1930s were bedded down in a series of longer-term tensions, whichplagued the Spanish state and society and which finally resulted in the resortto arms. In short, many of the issues dividing Spanish political life werecarried over from the nineteenth century which was characterized byconstitutional disagreement which, loosely speaking, pitted absolutemonarchists and the Church against the so-called 'constitutionalists', liberalmonarchists and much of the Army. Coupled with this were the constantdemands for autonomy in northern regions of Spain, especially by theCatalans and the Basques.4

By the end of the nineteenth century the return to a constitutionalmonarchy, coupled with the existence of universal male suffrage since 1869,did nothing to change the impression of a parliamentary sham whichstemmed partially from the fact that the vast majority of the peasant vote ofthe latifundias was controlled by the landlords. This mass of disgruntled,poor peasantry was progressively supplemented by growing discontentamong the slowly increasing numbers of industrial workers and miners whowere coming into conflict with the high handed policies of their employers.5That most of the emerging industries were concentrated in northern Spainexacerbated the aforementioned problem of demands for regional autonomy.

The authority of government and the social unity of the Spanish statewere further damaged by the legacy of defeats in the Spanish-AmericanWar of 1898 and the campaigns in Morocco at the beginning of thetwentieth century. The first proved to be a national humiliation while thesecond linked in to the growing social tension in Spain as poor conscriptswere called up to defend Spanish mining concessions in North Africa.

Thus the period of the so-called 'Restoration' was beset by social,regional, economic, constitutional and international problems which resultedin the breakdown of the political consensus and the emergence of rival powergroups in the early 1920s. 'Radicals', Republicans, the Trade Unions(primarily the CNT and the UGT), Basque and Catalan nationalists andultimately the Army all started eating away at the fabric of government anderoding its authority and legitimacy until General Primo de Rivera carriedout a coup d'etat in 1923. His tenure in power until 1931 was characterizedby a repression that was directed at politicians and not the public at large.

On the eve of his coup he proclaimed that, '[O]ur aim is to open a briefparenthesis in the constitutional life of Spain and to re-establish it as thecountry offers us men uncontaminated with the vices of politicalorganization.'6 With the authority of the King, Primo took on the politicians,regional autonomists, labour unions, the fiscal system and foreign policy

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with a mixture of repression, economic interventionism and reform. In theend it was the loss of support from the right, the Army and the Church, andPrimo's own personal failings, which brought down his regime in 1930 andwith it the monarchy which had sponsored him.

The Second Republic, created in 1931, inherited all the problems facedby Primo, and was confronted both by the extreme right and therevolutionary left. Between 1931 and 1933 the Republic attempted reformof the Church, the Army, the latifundios and granted some regionalautonomy to Catalonia. In doing so, the Republic created powerful enemiesamong clerics, soldiers, agricultural landlords and nationalists, which intandem with the international economic crisis of the late 1920s, the rise inunemployment among the peasantry and industrial workers, and a fall intheir standards of living, meant a bewildering array of adversaries.

Ultimately it was the perplexing divisions among the Republicansthemselves which led to the political impasse of 1936 and the interventionof the generals, resulting in civil war. Electoral systems produced coalitiongovernments which were divided as to how Spain should be ruled; whetherRepublicanism meant rule by consent of the people or simply governmentby the anti-monarchists and those who opposed the interference of Churchand Army. The left was split between the reformers and radicals, andundermined not only by the strong anarchist movement but also primarilyby splits in the Socialist Party itself which as it drifted from reformism torevolutionism sealed the fate of the Second Republic. The inability of thebroader left to accept rightist republicans (paradoxically from the majorityparliamentary group), in government in October 1934 which they had beeninvited to join, sparked off a socialist rebellion in the area of Asturias and aseparatist uprising in Barcelona. The rebellion in Asturias was violentlysuppressed by the Army and the uprising in Barcelona petered out.

But the 'October revolution' signalled the beginning of the end of theSecond Republic. What ensued was a year of untenable coalitiongovernments and the total breakdown of co-operation between left and rightwing republicans culminating in the victory of the Popular Front in theelections of February 1936. The Popular Front government relied on thesupport of the Socialists to stay in power, but the latter were riven byinternal disputes between those reformers and revolutionists. In short theswing to the revolutionary wing in the Socialist movement, in unison withthe revitalization of a right wing bent of confronting the left rather than co-operating brought violence to the streets of Spain in double quick time.

The immediate spark for the military coup resulting in full-blown civilwar was the murder of Calvo Sotelo, a leading right-wing politician, in July1936. This gave the pretext to Francisco Franco and his fellow generals of

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the Spanish Army of Morocco to intervene in political life and restore orderto a state that was under the threat of both radicalism and disintegration. TheRepublican experiment perished among a morass of contradicting politicalgroupings and personalities, let alone class distinctions and regionalisttendencies, which encompassed so many inherent contradictions that it wasno longer possible for it to refrain from resorting to violence to resolvedifferences. This in turn brought to the fore the re-emergent right and thebacking of the Army, which took the law into its own hands.

GreeceAs with the Spanish case, many saw civil war in Greece as a microcosm ofthe broader international situation: '[S]hots are being fired and men killedin Greece in the same war which is elsewhere waged with words - a warbetween eastern totalitarianism and western democracy'.7 Of course, thisreference is to the so-called 'Third' and final 'Round' of the Greek CivilWar, but it was this part of the conflict that captured the attention of thebroader public and the major involvement of foreign powers. It could beargued that while the Spanish Civil War was the 'last great cause' on theroad to the Second World War, the latter stages of the Greek Civil War were,in many eyes, 'the first great cause against Soviet expansionism' and adefining moment in the development of the early Cold War.8

Yet as with Spain, where the involvement of foreign powers was to playa major role in the outcome of the conflict, in Greece the root cause of civilwar is also primarily to be found domestically. Even though in the Greekcase, civil war was to erupt in the form of fighting between rival resistanceorganizations during the years of occupation, the origins of the conflictpredate the Second World War. In addition, some of the main causes of civilwar share much in common with the features of the Spanish experiencewhich have been outlined above. Without wishing to overstate the case, orbeing reductionist to the extreme, one could point to a series of similarfeatures that have comparable effects in the breakdown of the politicalsystems of the respective countries.

The most obvious and strongest parallels can be found in the divisionsbetween right and left and the related and intertwined issue of the'constitutional question' separating monarchists from republicans. In Greece,as in Spain, the divisions between right and left came to the fore in theinterwar period (mainly in the 1930s), and were to later find expression inmilitary confrontation. The emergence of a prominent communist party inGreece did not occur until 1936 when the KKE captured just under six percent of the vote in the general election of that year. Working within theframework of the Popular Front which had captured 15 crucial seats in a hung

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parliament, the KKE became a vital actor on the Greek political stage. Thisoccurred at a time of political instability and a growing public disillusionmentwith politicians who it seemed were always indulging in intrigue rather thanaddressing the nation's problems.9 Hence, the KKE's sudden emergence intoprominence and its potential involvement in a coalition government, eitherwith the Liberals or the Populists, precipitated through a tortuous process thecoming to power of General Ioannis Metaxas, the abrogation of elements ofthe constitution and the installation of the dictatorship.

In the longer-term, this growing support for the left accounted for theability of the KKE-dominated National Liberation Front (EAM), and itsarmed wing, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS), to become thepivotal domestic actor in the context of the civil war itself. Within this risein support for the left is also embedded the second feature mentioned above,which allows for comparisons with the Spanish case, namely the splitbetween monarchists and republicans.

Much of the political history of Greece from the turn of the century hadbeen coloured by the so-called 'Great Schism' that ultimately pittedrepublicans against monarchists. In its inception it was a political strugglebetween Eleftherios Venizelos and King Constantine I over which side toback in the context of the First World War. But in essence it encapsulatedthe perennial great divide which existed in Greek politics over the questionof the monarchy and its legitimacy and desirability. As with Spain thiswould lead to immense political cleavages, enhance the left-right divideand, in addition, allow EAM in its republican guise to pick up supportamong those disenchanted by the monarchy and its internal and externalsupporters, who were not necessarily left wing in their political outlook.Thus to many, the onset of civil strife in Greece can be attributed as muchto the divide between monarchists and republicans as to ideologicaldifferences between right and left.

In terms of sketching out other possible contributing factors to theorigins of civil war in Spain and Greece one has to consider three otherpoints. In the case of Spain, autonomist movements in Catalonia and theBasque region, foreign misadventures in the Spanish-American War andMorocco, and the world economic situation in the interwar period, allplayed a part in the creation of ripe conditions for civil discord. Similarly,in Greece, foreign misadventure and international economic turmoil playeda considerable role in the rise in popularity of the left, hence indirectlycontributing to the civil war; the issue of autonomy, in this case ofMacedonia is more debatable but a case could be made for it.

In brief, the pursuit of the 'Megali Idea' led to the disastrous militarydefeats in Asia Minor in 1922 at the hands of Kemal Attaturk, and the influx

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of some 1,300,000 refugees into Greece which would have immenseimplications on the country's socio-political and economic life.10 In effect,this massive shift in population brought with it political and economicinfluences which arguably gave a dramatic impetus - in the longer term - tothe rise of the Greek left and republicanism.

Similarly, in the longer term it also exacerbated the effects of the GreatDepression on what was already a relatively underdeveloped, non-industrialized economy, giving rise to economic grievances which couldonly but contribute to social and political tensions in the future.

Finally, the question of autonomy of Macedonia, even though totallydifferent in nature and impact to those of Catalonia and the Basque region,also figured highly in the internal politics of the KKE and featured somechanges of position on this issue which were clearly geared to attractpopular support. The most clear-cut of these reversals was the decision bythe KKE to abandon the old 1924 position of, 'a united and independentMacedonia' and move, in 1935, to a position of 'equal rights to allnationalities'." This would remain the position until early 1949, when theCommunists went back to a policy of Macedonian autonomy. Nevertheless,it could be argued that the change of 1935 was a contributing factor to theability of the KKE to garner votes among the refugees of Asia Minor whootherwise would not have a supported a less nationalist position.

Hence the fear of the KKE's entry into government was the immediatespark which precipitated the actions of Metaxas, with the support of bothking and armed forces. The outbreak of civil war in Greece would occur withthe onset of the Axis occupation, a wholly different set of circumstances thanthat in Spain. Nevertheless, as argued above, there did exist a series ofcomparable factors and features, which allow for a meaningful comparisonof the domestic origins of civil conflict in both countries.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT OF AND RESPONSES TO CIVIL WAR

ContextThe international context within which the Spanish Civil War took place,was one of heightened disillusionment with the inability of the League ofNations and other international institutions to deal effectively with thechallenges provided to the Versailles Peace settlements and the lofty idealsmeant to be upheld. Furthermore, the growing, and increasingly aggressive,challenge of Fascism in the form of Mussolini and Hitler provided amassive threat to European peace and stability and few wished to confrontthe dictators and thus tempt the possibility of another general European war.

The early and mid-1930s saw a series of hostile actions by Italy and

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Germany which totally undermined the letter and spirit of the post-warsettlements and provided a harbinger for the descent into a generalEuropean war. Italy's invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 was not only a blatantviolation of international law but also a clear-cut case for the triggering ofthe League's mechanism of collective security. But the collective responseof the western world was one of diplomatic and moral indignation yetultimately one of inaction.

Similarly, Hitler indulged in a series of provocative and bellicose acts towhich the West reacted meekly under the veil of appeasement in the hope ofaverting a war. The Versailles Treaty was openly flouted with thetransgression of disarmament clauses through the reactivation of theLuftwaffe and the reintroduction of conscription as a part of a broader policyof the rearmament and militarization of Germany. This was swiftly followedby the reoccupation of the Rhineland, in March 1936, and the creation of the'greater German Reich' following 'Anschluss' with Austria just two yearslater. Hitler then turned his sights to the East and the Sudetenland inCzechoslovakia, commencing a process which resulted in the ignominy ofthe Munich agreements, provoking Churchill to comment in having to chosebetween shame and war, 'we have chosen shame and will get war'.12

This was truly the end of an era in which the hopes and ambitions ofthose who suffered through the Great War, and put their faith in a new formof international relations epitomized by the League of Nations, founderedagainst the rocks of aggression and expansionism, and the unwillingness oftheir leaders to empower the system they had fought for and created. Thespirit of disarmament, peaceful resolution of disputes, non-aggression pactsand the outlawing of war, and collective security was now overshadowed bythe relentless march toward a confrontation with the Fascist powers.

Amid this dramatic decline in the idealist principles and institutions ofthe interwar era, we have the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War that bothcontributed to and signalled the end of this era, short of the outbreak of warin September 1939. In the later section on the international responses to warin Spain we shall see the more detailed reversion of the Westerndemocracies, including Great Britain, France and the US, to a policy of non-intervention in the hope of maintaining a European balance of power. Thiswas a distinct move away from the democratic ideals of 'Wilsonianism' andthe institutional mechanisms for collective response against aggressionembodied in the League of Nations.

The international context within which the Greek Civil War took placecan be divided into three separate stages: first, the occupation years of theSecond World War; second, the end of the war and liberation; and third, thedecline of British influence and the emergence of the US as an

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interventionary superpower. For our purposes, it is the third phase which isof relevance as it indicates the beginning of a new era in internationalrelations.13 As in the Spanish case, this third phase of the Greek conflict alsoformed part of a period of disillusionment. In this instance thedisillusionment stemmed from the frustration of not being able to reach anequitable and sustainable accommodation with a former ally, the USSR,over the future of Germany and Europe at large.

This disillusionment was tempered by an optimism in the spirit of theAtlantic Charter and the fledgling United Nations to put right all thoseelements of international co-operation, law and collective security whichhad failed so miserably in the 1930s. It was also accompanied by a grimdetermination emerging in the Western powers, and especially the US, todefend democratic rights and institutions wherever deemed possible if notnecessary. Western experiences at Yalta and Potsdam in negotiations withthe USSR were early indications of the difficulties that lay ahead.

Growing Soviet intransigence over the future of Germany and a host ofOther issue areas progressively reinforced these indications. The resolutionof the matter of the Polish government and generally free elections inEastern Europe were major sticking points, as was the increasing Sovietpressure to force a review of the provisions of the Montreux Treatyregulating passage through the Dardanelles. Furthermore, Soviet actions inIran indicated that the newly emergent adversary would not hesitate to useforce to achieve objectives.

Therefore it became increasingly apparent in the West, that idealisticforeign policy could possibly lead to the same ignominy that accompaniedthe disasters of the interwar period, if it were not accompanied by a distinctphysical commitment. Concessions would have to be made to the balanceof power accommodations which had been reached with the USSR at themeetings at Yalta and Potsdam, and which delineated certain distinctspheres of influence. Security needs had eroded the Wilsonian idealisttradition that dominated the foreign policy of the US - the guarantor ofWestern interests - and progressively Western leaders became convincedthat foreign policy goals would have to be pursued by principled powerrather than either principle or power. Churchill best encapsulated this at his1946 Fulton speech, made famous by his reference to the 'Iron Curtain',when he stated that, 'our Russian friends ... admire nothing so much asstrength'. This strength would be applied selectively in the defence ofinterests and principles but none the less there would be little hesitation inconfronting the emergent Soviet threat.

This was the general context within which the last phase of the GreekCivil War took place. It was the beginning of an new era in which British

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power was on the wane, to be replaced by the US, and the Soviet Union wasemerging as a rival as potent and threatening as the recently defeated Fascists.It was an era in which those who had fought for a freer and fairer internationalsystem in the Second World War were confronted with the dawning of a newconfrontation which would come to be known as the Cold War. This wouldbe as equally bloody and divisive as the decade beginning with the onset ofcivil war in Spain. It was an era in which force would be considered a validand valuable tool of statecraft and in which realism would replace idealismas the basis for foreign policy in the pursuit of order and stability.

ResponsesThe reaction of the major international actors to the outbreak of civil war inSpain was in keeping with the general changes occurring in the internationalsystem at the time. According to Hugh Thomas, '[T]he Spanish Civil Warremained throughout 1937 the main international crisis, an irritant to thedemocracies, an opportunity to the dictators."4

The response of Hitler and Mussolini to the outbreak of hostilities inSpain, and Franco's requests for military assistance, was immediate and inline with their respective policies throughout the 1930s, as outlined in theprevious section. In fact, by late July 1936 both Italy and Germany weresupplying the Nationalist forces with military materiel, and especiallyairplanes, which were vital in transporting the main elements of the SpanishArmy of Morocco across the Straits of Gibraltar and into the fray on theIberian peninsula.15 This pattern which was to continue throughout theconflict and would include not only the dispatch of weaponry andammunition but also technicians, and the especially memorable example ofthe German air force element, the Kondor Legion. It is estimated thatGermany sent up to 732 combat aircraft and 110 training aircraft to theNationalists during the three years of civil war.16

The reasons for Axis intervention are explicable in terms of theopportunism highlighted by Hugh Thomas above.

For the lesser of the Fascist allies, Italy, a kindred regime in Spain wouldnot only provide another potential ally in the general European balance ofpower, but also bolster Mussolini's attempts to rekindle Italian hegemonyover the Mediterranean and in realising his dream of re-establishing MareNostrum.

Hitler's motivations for involvement in Spain were manifold anddominated by the desire to see a friendly regime in Madrid which couldprovide another link in the Fascist chain encircling France. A pro-Germangovernment in Madrid would provide a constant thorn in the side of France,politically, economically and militarily, and could have the added benefit ofdestabilizing the rather shaky government of Leon Blum.

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Secondary considerations for German involvement, included the desireto see a friendly regime controlling the Straits of Gibraltar, access toSpanish mineral resources and other raw materials, and a useful testingground for German armaments and military tactics." All in all, the actionsof Germany were very much in line with all the other provocative actionscarried out in the mid-1930s in terms of destabilizing the Europeaninternational order established at Versailles.

The response of the Soviet Union to civil war in Spain has beendescribed as a, 'disinterested internationalism'.18 In fact, Stalin performed acomplicated juggling act between officially affecting a policy of non-intervention by joining the Non-intervention Committee, 'in the interests ofworld peace',19 and pandering to the ideological sensibilities of the left bothwithin the USSR and beyond. The Soviet regime 'succumbed' to the will ofthe workers of the Soviet Union who, '[were] doing no more than their dutyin rendering all possible aid to the Revolutionary Masses of Spain'.20

Aid did indeed flow from the USSR to the Spanish Republicans both interms of soldiers in the International Brigades and military hardware in vastamounts. It is estimated that the Republicans transferred 75 per cent of thenation's gold reserves to the USSR both for payment of weaponry but alsofor safekeeping. This amounted to over 510 tons of gold at an estimatedvalue of $518 million, a massive sum in a period when Spain maintained thefifth largest gold reserves internationally.21

In essence, Stalin's policy was not born out of idealism but rather out ofa deep desire to ensure that France, a potential ally against the growingGerman threat, was safeguarded from the threat of fascism in neighbouringSpain. His fundamental position was one of maintaining the balance ofpower in Europe and to do so he had to ensure that France was notthreatened; 'Stalin had no ideals ... [he was] a realist and an opportunist'.22

And it was this balance of power which characterized the policies of thetwo other major Western European actors, France and Great Britain. Thevast part of Great Power politics were played out in the framework of theNon-intervention Committee set up in September 1936. This was acommittee comprising 27 member states with the duties of monitoring armssmuggling, discovering violations of the arms embargo and creating generalmeasures to forestall foreign intervention in Spain. In short, the main aimunderpinning the creation of this compromise measure was to contain theconflict in Spain, thus limiting the possibility of a general European warresulting from rival foreign intervention, and to make a show of actioninternationally while actually sitting on the sidelines.

The British attitude to war in Spain, and the ensuing intervention byGermany and Italy, has been depicted as falling under the broader umbrella

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of appeasement.23 Yet there were many divisions within the British politicalestablishment as to what course of action to pursue. The British right saw theNationalists in Spain as anti-Bolshevik counter-revolutionaries who, 'wereconcerned with internal politics of Spain and had no aggressive fascisticambitions to revise the international status quo'.24 Many in the Labour Party,such as Philip Noel-Baker, an MP and sometime Professor of InternationalRelations at the London School of Economics, spoke out against Franco andhis 'international fellow-conspirators', and called for the sale of British armsto the Republicans stopping short of advocating direct intervention.25

However, for the most part the British position was united around theposition of Stanley Baldwin's National government which supported non-intervention and a solid arms emargo to be imposed and policed against allsides. Fundamentally, Britain wanted a mediated solution and a negotiatedarmistice which would not threaten British interests.

The great conundrum faced by Britain was that a Republican victory, itwas feared, would mean a victory for Bolshevism which could spread'contagion' into France, hence destabilizing relations with Britain andweakening the stand against the emerging Fascist threat. On the other hand,a Nationalist victory would lead to a threat to the seafaring lines ofcommunication to the Empire through the Mediterranean and lead to, 'atemporarily working combination of dictators, major, minor and minimus'.26In an attempt to minimize the importance of the Axis involvement in Spain,Churchill referred to the Fascist volunteers in Spain as 'armed tourists' ,27

Therefore, British attitudes toward Spain make clear the completebreakdown in the support of the democratic cause of 'Wilsonianism', itsidealism, and its accompanying international institutions. Despite being facedwith an issue of conscience and principle, in which a democratically electedgovernment was being attacked from within but with external support of rivalstates, in Britain realpolitik prevailed. What was at stake were not theprinciples of international law and peace but the reality that any directinvolvement could lead the division of Europe into two distinct blocs and anexplicit threat to British interests. The famous call to arms of the First WorldWar, 'to make the world safe for democracy' was superseded by the defenceof narrower national interests, despite a great public demand for action.

This was much the case in the US and France. The US, undergoing oneof its periodic isolationist phases played no substantial official role in theSpanish conflict, despite being a rich arms market which the combatants inthe Spanish Civil War both attempted to exploit.

The position of France was much more delicate both in geographic andpolitical terms. France under the premiership of Leon Blum and his ownPopular Front government was under immense public pressure to come to

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the assistance of the Republic. Strategically, if the Nationalists were to bevictorious, France would be surrounded by three Fascist states, henceBlum's initial reaction in deciding to allow arms sales to fellow Republicansin Spain.28 This decision was immediately rescinded in favour of one of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states which proved paradoxicalas the Spanish Republicans had requested assistance.29 Ultimately, underextreme pressure from the French right and the strategic arguments withwhich the British government bombarded him as outlined above, Blumrelented and pursued the path of neutrality, non-interference and thebanning of the sale of arms to both sides.

Thus while the Republicans in Spain had the right of law and democraticprinciple on their side, as well as a groundswell of public support among thepopulations of democratic Western Europe and beyond who provided muchof the 60,000-strong International Brigades to fight in Spain, support fromthe West was not forthcoming. This was in my view a clear sign that theWestern democracies had abandoned the more idealistic policies of theinterwar period in favour of a return to realist, balance of power politics.This did in reality epitomize the end of an era in international relations.

The international response to the outbreak of internecine strife in Greeceis well known. In my view there was a case to be made for the defence ofthe Greek state (and democracy in general), in the face of a possibleCommunist expansion, indirectly sponsored by the Soviet Union. But theintervention of both primary international actors, Great Britain and the USwere determined by narrow national interest and balance of powerconsiderations in the light of the perceived emerging Communist threat. Itwas the dawning of a new era, in which force would be met by force in thedefence of defined spheres of influence, and realpolitik would be thedefining order of the day; the defence of democratic values in the peripheryof the sphere of influence would be an incidental benefit.

The third major, if less involved international actor in the Greek CivilWar, namely the USSR, understood this line of action as witnessed in theaforementioned quotation on Stalin's 'realism' and ' opportunism'.30 Thislanguage is very similar to that employed by George Kennan in his 'LongTelegram', which laid the foundations for his thinking on the policy ofcontainment, and is clearly relevant to the general Soviet attitude toward theconflict in Greece.31 Stalin was an opportunist, willing to make best use ofany weakness or chink in the Western armour, but he also understood thepolitics of realism and the working of a balance of power system based onagreed spheres of influence.

In the Greek case, Stalin had made his 'deal' with Churchill in theMoscow 'Percentages Agreement', and was not willing to undermine his

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own gains in Eastern Europe by an explicit grab for Greece in the face ofBritish, but more importantly American military might. Tacit, and'opportunist' support for the Greek communists, would be provided, but thereality of power politics would govern policy on Greece. In Stalin's ownwords, '[T]his war is not as in the past; whoever occupies a territory alsoimposes on it his own social system. Everyone imposes his own system asfar as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.'32 The USSR would notintervene directly in a civil war in which it would have to take on the mightof its major adversary, irrespective of the desire to defend fellow'revolutionaries', and especially in the adversary's defined and agreed tosphere of influence. This was ideology giving way to realist foreign policy.

Great Britain's role in the Greek Civil War is a lengthy and welldocumented one, as is that of the US. Suffice it to say that British involvementin Greece was always dominated by British interests, which subordinated thedefence of democracy and the protection of the Greek people to, an important,but secondary role. In the first two 'rounds' of the Greek Civil War, the roleof Britain as the leading foreign power involved was of massive importanceto subsequent events. Despite the mediating factor of the Second World Warand the occupation of Greece, foreign intervention in the Greek Civil War wasa feature from the outset of the conflict.

This intervention took the form of British assistance to the resistanceorganizations on the ground in Greece which were very quickly involved infighting each other as much as attacking the occupying forces. The Britishrole was initially one of guiding, and supplying the material for operationsagainst the Axis occupiers irrespective of their political colour. Theunderlying aim of this policy was to support any group conductingoperations against the enemy; the support of Tito's Partisans inneighbouring Yugoslavia is another case in point. Ideology was relegated tothe back burner in the face of the bigger enemy, the occupying forces andthe war effort in general. In brief, the British found themselves having tosupport groups like EAM/ELAS for short-term military reasons andwanting to defeat them in the interests of longer-term political objectives.

Therefore, for short-term balance of power considerations, the Britishwould support any viable resistance group while, in the longer term, thepost-war balance of power dictated the support of politically friendly forces.Churchill made this perfectly clear in correspondence with ForeignSecretary Anthony Eden in 1943, 'EAM/ELAS must be starved to death andmust be hit with every means in our possession'.33 And this wasprogressively to be the policy of the British in the Greek conflict, wantingto ensure that the 'right' side emerged victorious following occupation.

This was highlighted, of course, by the actions of the British during the

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so-called Second Round of the Greek Civil War in which they physicallyconfronted the forces of the left and ensured they did not capture the seat ofpower in Athens. At stake for the British was not simply the well being ofa country and people for which there was much admiration and respect forits ancient glories and more contemporary role in the struggle against theAxis, but also (as previously seen with regard to Spain), a deep interest inprotecting the Eastern Mediterranean and its strategic importance withrespect to the Middle East and the lifeline to the Empire east of Suez.

British influence, was none the less steadily waning, as is evidenced inthe constant correspondence between Churchill and Roosevelt, and theformer's constant demands for support from the US in its 'Greek policy'. Infact if it were not for the active assistance of the US Navy in transportingBritish troops to Greece, the events of December 1944 would have taken acompletely different turn.

Between December 1944 and the declaration of the Truman Doctrine inMarch 1947, when the US finally assumed the mantle of the leadinginterventionary force in Greece, US perceptions of the war in Greece took adramatic turn. While this was partially influenced by a realization that thecivil conflict was not one simply between republicans and monarchists as ithad been portrayed in the past, it was primarily influenced by the changingbroader international context in which the Soviet Union, and henceCommunism, was emerging as a threat. Within the short space of two yearsGreece had been elevated to the status of a crucial outpost of democracy inconfronting Communism. In the words of Dean Acheson, '[L]ike apples ina barrel infected by one rotten one ... the corruption of Greece would infectIran and all to the East. It would carry infection to Africa ... and to Europethrough Italy and France, already threatened by the strongest communistparties in Western Europe.'34

The US, which had up to then deplored British imperialism andcolonialism in the Near East, took up the mantle of protector of the areas ofstrategic importance, supplanting British dominance and influence, anddesignating Greece as the proving ground for its strategic confrontationwith the USSR; '[O]ur interest in Greece is by no means restricted tohumanitarian or friendly impulses. If Greece should dissolve into civil warit is altogether possible that it would re-emerge as a Communist state underSoviet control.'35

What ensued under the Truman Doctrine, was a massive economic andmilitary effort by the US to defeat the Communist forces in Greece, and indoing so to score a massive victory against perceived Soviet expansionism.We were now entering an era in which realism would dominate the thinkingbehind US foreign policy ambitions and hence have an inordinate influenceon the broader international system. Balance of power considerations would

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hold sway over idealist principles - even though those would beincorporated in policy.

The Study of International RelationsHere I have tried to trace not only the primary reasons for civil war in Spainand Greece, but also to evaluate international responses to the conflicts inthe context of the prevailing notions of conduct in foreign policy andinternational relations. It is no coincidence that in the study of internationalrelations, one of the major texts was published in 1939, and it constituted amassive attack on the dominant trend in international relations thought, thatof 'Idealism'. E. H. Carr's The Twenty Years' Crisis was a devastating,broad ranging, critique on interwar idealism which was now deemedbankrupt. While Carr's work was primarily a trenchant critic of, 'a richvariety of progressivist ideas', it struck a chord with the mood of the timein light of the coming of the Second World War in which the events in Spainhad played an important political and psychological role.36 Carr's work,apart from having significant intellectual and pedagogic merit, alsosymbolized the end of the idealist era as has been repeatedly argued above.

It is also no coincidence that with the emergence of the US as asuperpower in 1945, and its assumption of the role of the protector of thefree world, we have a swing in the thinking behind the conduct ofinternational relations. The publication of Hans Morgenthau's Politicsamong Nations in 1948, really sets the scene for a return to 'strict' politicalrealism based on national interests and balance of power politics. It isargued above that US intervention in Greece was a manifestation of thiskind of thought and was indicative of the shift that was taking place.

In conclusion, civil wars in Spain and Greece are viewed as two separateevents grounded in different eras and eliciting different internationalresponses. What this essay has tried to show, in a schematic fashion, is therange and breadth in similarity between the two conflicts, in their origins,the international responses they elicited and the intellectual and politicaleras in which the occurred. There is still much work to be done in this field,but hopefully this will present a useful starting point.

NOTES

1. Introduction by Paul Preston in idem and Ann L. Mackenzie (eds.) The Republic Besieged:Civil War in Spain 1936-1939 (Edinburgh UP 1996) p.v.

2. Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, 3d edn (London: Penguin 1986) p.947.3. Harry Browne, Spain's Civil War (London: Longman 1996) p.81.4. The clearest exposition of the political process and problems in nineteenth century Spain is

found in Raymond Carr, Spain 1808-1975 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1982). The first tenchapters deal almost exclusively with the constitutional twists and turns in nineteenth century

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THE GREEK AND SPANISH CIVIL WARS COMPARED 105Spain in the most lucid and readable of ways.

5. For a brief exposition of the part industrialisation of (northern) Spain at the beginning of thetwentieth century see Carr (note 4) pp.398-9.

6. Ibid. p.564.7. A.C. Sedgwick, 'The Plot Against Greece', Foreign Affairs 26/3 (April 1948) p.486.8. See note 1.9. For a brief expose of the KKE's rise and its role in 1936 see Richard Clogg, A Short History

of Modern Greece (Cambridge: Cambridge UP 1979) pp. 130-2.10. Ibid. pp.121-2.11. For a fuller account of the Macedonian issue in the Greek Civil War and especially in the

international context see Spyros Economides, 'The International Implications of the GreekCivil War: The Interaction of Domestic and External Forces' (unpub. PhD thesis, U. ofLondon 1990) Ch.3.

12. Quoted in among other places, Norman Davies, Europe: A History (London: Pimlico 1997)p.990.

13. There will be reference to events in the other two phases, as there are emerging patternswithin them which are also relevant to the argument.

14. Thomas (note 2) p.734.15. For details of the initial German and Italian decision to come to the assistance of the

Nationalist forces see the account in the marvellous book by Gerald Howson, Arms forSpain: the Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (London: John Murray 1998) pp.17-20.

16. Ibid. p.19.17. For a succinct discussion of German and Italian motivations see, Browne (note 3) pp.48-53.18. Denis Smyth, 'Soviet Policy Toward Republican Spain: 1936-1939', in Preston and

Mackenzie (note 1) p.89.19. Howson (note 15) p.123.20. Ibid. p.124.21. Ibid. p.121.22. Alexis Leger, Secretary-General of the French Foreign Ministry at the time cited in, Smyth

(note 18) p.103.23. Howson (note 15) pp.246-7.24. Cited in Enrique Moradiellos, 'The Gentle General: the Official British Perception of

General Franco during the Spanish Civil War', in Preston and Mackenzie (note 1) p.6.25. Ibid. p.5.26. Ibid. p.11.27. Thomas (note 2) p.572.28. For details on tisdecision and its reversal see Howson (note 15) p.21.29. Ibid. pp.25-33.30. See note no.22.31. For a fuller exposition on Kennan, 'Containment' and the Greek Civil War, see Economides

(note 11) Ch.4.32. Cited in Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (NY: Harcourt, Brace and World 1962)

p.114.33. PRO FO 371/37207 R11098.34. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (NY: Norton 1969) p.219.35. Foreign Relations of the United States, Vol.3 (1947) p.226.36. Peter Wilson, 'The Myth of the "First Great Debate'", Review of International Studies 24

(Dec. 1998) p.1.

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