civpro digest feb 11

7/29/2019 CivPro Digest FEB 11

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1. TIU V. MIDDLETONIMPT: Pre-trial is an essential device for the speedy disposition of disputes. Hence, parties cannot brushit aside as a mere technicality. Where the pre-trial brief does not contain the names of witnesses and thesynopses of their testimonies as required by the Rules of Court, the trial court, through its pre-trial order,

may bar the witnesses from testifying. However, an order allowing the presentation of unnamed witnessesmay no longer be modified during the trial, without the consent of the parties affected.

Facts: Silvestre Tiu assails two Orders rendered by RTC Oroquieta City in a civil case. The first Order,which was issued in open court, reads: Considering the written arguments of both parties herein, theCourt finds that the witness of defendant Silvestre Tiu, Ms. Antonia Tiu, who is the aunt of the defendant,

whose name was not disclosed in the pre-trial brief is ordered excluded pursuant to the provisions of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure wherein it is required that all names of witnesses must be stated in the Pre-Trial Brief.

The parties are also required to submit a pre-trial brief, which must contain the following:(a) A statement of their willingness to enter into amicable settlement or alternative modes of dispute

resolution, indicating the desired terms thereof;(b) A summary of admitted facts and proposed stipulation of facts;(c) The issues to be tried or resolved;

(d) The documents or exhibits to be presented, stating the purpose thereof;(e) A manifestation of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery proceduresor referral to commissioners; and

(f) The number and names of the witnesses, and the substance of their respective testimonies.

The trial ensued, Hernandez presented their witnesses in due course. When his turn came, Tiu called

Antonia Tiu as his first witness. Citing Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Court, Hernandezobjected, arguing that the witness could not be allowed to testify because Tiu had failed to name her in hisPre-trial Brief. Sustaining respondents, the lower court then issued its assailed Orders.

Issues: Whether a judge can exclude a witness whose name and synopsis of testimony were not includedin the pre-trial brief. (YES)

Held:Tiu argues that the Rules of Court merely requires that witnesses be named in the pre-trial brief, butit does not authorize a judge to exclude a witness who was not identified. Furthermore, he maintains that

neither the trial court nor the respondents required during the pre-trial that unnamed witnesses be barredfrom testifying. Finally, he urges this Court to brush aside as wholly trivial and indecisive allimperfections of form and technicalities of procedure.

Pre-trial and its governing rules are not technicalities which the partie evidence each of them is expectedto give, as well as to (b) formally disclose the number of the documents and things to be submitted and to

furnish copies thereof or a short description of the nature of each. The tenor or character of the testimonyof the witnesses and of the writings to be adduced at the trial being thus made known, in addition to the

particular issues of fact and laThe TRO issued by this Court is hereby lifted and the trial court is

ORDERED to proceed with the hearing and to allow petitioner to present his six witnesses. Nopronouncement as to costs.

2. GOLDLOOP PROPERTIES V. CAFacts: The Robles spouses instituted a complaint for reformation of instrument with damages againstGoldloop, asserting that the contract they entered into was a mortgage and not an absolute sale. They also

prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to stop Goldloop from encumbering or disposing of theproperties.

During the hearing for the prelim injunction, the parties manifested the possibility of an amicable

settlement, so they were given a certain period to present the agreement before the court. No such

agreement was presented. After a couple of months, the court motu proprio dismissed the complaint forfailure to prosecute.

The Robles spouses went to the CA, and the CA annulled the order of dismissal.

Issue: W/N the TC was correct in dismissing the complaint. (No)W/N the CA erred in annulling the order of dismissal and not applying the rules strictly. (No)

Held:

First Issue:No. The trial court should have suspended the proceedings instead. In this case, when the trialcourt ordered the parties to present their compromise agreement to the court, such order did not include a

warning that failure to do so would warrant the dismissal of the complaint. The rules provide that beforethe pre-trial, the court may order the suspension of the proceedings if the parties could possibly enter intoan amicable settlement. And if such settlement is not reached, the proceedings should be continued as if

the suspension has not taken place.

Second Issue: No. The Court should not allow a party to lose a property worth 4M by reason of

technicalities. The court held that although the order became final and executory for being filed outsidethe period to perfect an appeal, the rules must be liberally applied. If the rigid application of the rules willresult in manifest injustice, the rules must be relaxed.

3. CITIBANK N.A. V. CHUAFacts:Facts acc to Respondents: Respondent Spouses Cresencio and Zenaida Velez alleged that Citibankextended to them credit lines secured with real estate and chattel mortgages on equipment. Further,

Citibank offered them special additional accommodation of Php 5M in exchange for the Spousespurchase of Citibank checks by exchanging their managers checks. It started on Sept 4, 1985 until March11, 1986, when Spouses tried to exchange with Citibank 6 checks work Php3M, but bank refused. Instead,

Citibank suggested to Spouses that the total amount covered by arrangement be restructured to 30 months.Respondent Spouses agreed to such proposal. However, Citibank failed to comply so respondent Spousesfiled a complaint for specific performance against Citibank.

Facts acc to Petitioner Bank: Since 1985,Cresencio Velez deposits his unfunded personal checks with hiscurrent account with Citibank. But prior to depositing said checks, he would present his personal checks to

a bank officer asking the latter to have his personal checks immediately credited as if it were a cashdeposit and at the same time assuring the bank officer that his personal checks were fully funded. Havingalready gained the trust and confidence of the officers of the bank because of his past transactions, the

bank's officer would always accommodate his request. After his requests are granted which is done byway of the bank officer affixing his signature on the personal checks, private respondent Cresencio Velezwould then deposit his priorly approved personal checks to his current account and at the same time

withdraw sums of money from said current account by way of petitioner bank's manager's check. Privaterespondent would then deposit petitioner bank's manager's check to his various current accounts in othercommercial banks to cover his previously deposited unfunded personal checks with petitioner bank.

Naturally, petitioner bank and its officers never discovered that his personal check deposits wereunfunded. On the contrary, it gave the petitioner bank the false impression that private respondent'sconstruction business was doing very well and that he was one big client who could be trusted.On March

11, 1986, he deposited various unfunded personal checks totalling P3,095,000.00 and requested a bankofficer that the same be credited as cash and after securing the approval of said bank officer, deposited hisvarious personal checks in the amount of P3,095,000.00 with his current account and at the same time

withdrew the sum of P3,244,000.00 in the form of petitioner's manager's check. Instead of using theproceeds of his withdrawals to cover his unfunded personal checks, he ran away with petitioner bank'smoney. Thus, private respondent Cresencio Velez's personal checks deposited with petitioner bank onMarch 11, 1986 in the total aggregate amount of P3,095,000.00 bounced.

Citibank filed complaint against Spouses for violation of BP22 and estafa. Citibank also submitted its

answer to the complaint by Respondent Spouses. The case was set for pre-trial and Citibank was directed


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to submit its pre-trial brief at least 3 days before the pre-trial conference. However, Citibank filed its pre-trial brief only on the date of the pre-trial conference itself.

On the date of the pre-trial conference, the counsel for Citibank presented a special-power-of-attorney(SPA) in his favor executed by Citibank to bind the bank at the pre-trial. Notwithstanding this, the counsel

for Spouses Velez moved to declare Citibank in default on ground that the SPA was not executed by theBoard of Directors (BOD) of Citibank. Respondent Judge Chua declared Citibank in default on groundthat the bank has no proper representation during the pre-trial.

Citibank filed MR (denied), then petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with CA (dismissed)

Issues:

a.) WON a resolution of the BOD of the bank necessary for granting authority to an agent to represent thecorporation in court cases? ( NO)

b.) WON the by-laws of Citibank, foreign corporation which has been previously granted a license to dobusiness in the Philippines, are effective in this jurisdiction? (YES)c) WON SPA presented by Citibank authorizing Atty Julius Neri and/or JP Garcia & Associates to appear

in behalf of bank during pre trial is valid. (YES)

Held:

a.) No. Since the by-laws are a source of authority for corporate officers and agents of the corporation, aresolution of the BOD of Citibank appointing an attorney in fact to represent and bind it during the pre-trial conference of the case at bar is not necessary, because its by-laws allow its officers, the Executing

Officer and the Secretary Pro-Tem, ** to execute a power of attorney to a designated bank officer,William W. Ferguson in this case, clothing him with authority to direct and manage corporate affairs. Thegeneral power of attorney allows Ferguson to delegate his power in whole or in part so theres an

assurance that the special power of attorney constitutes a valid delegation of Fergusons express power.

b.) Yes. The Court ruled that SEC grants licenses in favor of a foreign corporation only when it has

complied with all the requirements of law, it follows that when it decides to issue such license, it issatisfied that the applicant's by-laws meet the legal requirements. This, in effect, is an approval of theforeign corporations by-laws. In the case at bar, SECs granting of a license to Citibank implies that its

by-laws, though originating from a foreign jurisdiction, are valid and effective in the Philippines.

c.) Yes.Under Rule 138, Section 23 of the Rules of Court, an attorney has authority to bind his client in

any case by an agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and this authority would include takingappeals and all matters of ordinary judicial procedure. But he cannot, without special authority,compromise his client's litigation or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in

cash. The special powers of attorney separately executed by FlorenciaTarriela and William W. Fergusongranted to J.P. Garcia & Associates are very explicit in their terms as to the counsel's authority in the caseat bar.

It even acceded to private respondent's insistence on the question of proper representation during the pre-trial by presenting not just one, but 3 SPA. But the respondent trial court judge disregarded all these and

issued the assailed default order. There is nothing to show that petitioner bank "miserably failed tooblige"; on the contrary, three special powers of attorney manifest prudence and diligence on petitioner

bank's part.

The Court also reiterated their stand against orders of default as these have the effect of denying thelitigant the chance to be heard. The party must be given every reasonable opportunity to present his side

and to refute the evidence of the adverse party in deference to due process of law.

Petition is granted. Decision of CA set aside. Case is remanded to court of origin.

4. PHILIPPINE TRABSMARINE CARRIER INC. V. CAFacts: Private respondent Julie P. Song filed a complaint for attempted parricide against her husband,Hernane Song. They entered into a compromise agreement with respect to the civil aspect of the case.They filed the compromise agreement stating the ff: that they are husband and wife although they have

been estranged and living apart from each other, that they have a five year old daughter, that the accused(Hernane Song) is a licensed seaman. They have also agreed to settle the civil aspect of the case in that the

basic salary of Hernane song shall be divided as follows: 40% shall be allocated, remitted or paid to Julie

Song, 40% shall be retained by Hernane Song and 20% to a trust fund under the name of their daughter,for her support and education.

Hernane Song failed to comply with his obligation so a Notice of Garnishment was issued by the TC toherein petitioner Philippine transmarine Carriers (petitioner-company) as Hernane Songs employer. Thenotice was served on petitioner-company. According to the sheriffs return, petitioner-company only

released two checks. The amounts indicated in the Notice of Garnishment were not satisfied. Privaterespondents Julie Song filed a complaint for damages against petitioner-company and its officers. Thecomplaint alleged in part:

Despite the Notice of Garnishment, the salaries of the accused for the remaining contract monthswhich were in the possession and under the control of the defendants (Phil. Transmarine) were not

being duly garnished; that the allotments of Hernane Song were withheld

That defendants (Phil Transmarine) released the remaining 40% of the salaries together with theLeave of pay because it disregarded the Notice of Garnishment and it contravene the Notice that itshould not deliver, transfer or otherwise dispose such properties in their possession or under thecontrol belonging to the accused to any person or entity except to the Deputy Sheriff.

Petitioner-company file their answer alleging that, after receiving the notice of garnishment, the defendantcompany stopped the remittance of allotments of Hernane Song to the bank of his designated alottees, that

subsequent to the receipt of the notice defendant company made its own verification with the court on theactual existence of the case filed against Hernane Song and the actual issuance of the notice ofgarnishment, and that the plaintiff (Julia Song) was the one who failed to come and get her share in the

garnished salaries of Hernane Song.

Petitioner claimed that the P50, 000.00 leave pay released to Hernane Song was not basic salary. Private

respondent filed her reply and answer. The TC then required the parties to submit their pre-trial briefs andscheduled he pre-trial conference on Oct. 1, 1993. On Oct. 7, Atty. Marcia, on behalf of Atty. Aquinas(petitioners counsel) filed an Urgent Motion for Re-setting of the pre-trial conference on the ground

that Atty. Aquinas was on sick leave and petitioners themselves were not available on the scheduled date.TC denied her motion and petitioners were then declared as in default on the gorund that no medicalcertificates had been attached to the motion. Petitioner asked the court to set aside its order of default

attaching duly notarized medical certificate. The case was considered submitted for decision on the basisof private respondents motion. TC ruled against defendant-company. Herein petitioners, (Phil.

Transmission) filed an MR but were denied. CA affirmed the decision of the TC. Herein petitioners, (Phil.Transmission) filed an MR but were denied. CA aff irmed the decision of the TC.

Issues:

1) W/N CA erred in affirming the orders of the TC declaring petitioners as in default and denied to liftthe odder denying their motion to lift said order of default? YES

2) W/N Ca erred in affirming the TCs award of actual, moral and exemplary damages and attys fees to

Julie Song? YES

Held:

1) The 1964 Rules of Court provides that the trial judge has authority to declare as in default partieswho fail to appear at the pre-trial conference. They may also be declared in default for their failure

to file their pre-trial briefs at least three days before the pre-trial conference. In deciding to grant ordeny a motion for postponement of trial, the court must take into account a) the reason for

postponement, b) merits of the case of movant. In this case, there is no showing that petitioners,

sought merely to cause unjustifiable delay in the proceedings.


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While it may be true that counsel for petitioner failed to attach to said motion a medical certificate toattest to his illness, the court should have lifted its default order after a duty authorized certificate.

Moreover, the presence of another lawyer from counsels law firm during the scheduled pre-trialconference negates any suggestion of bad faith or wanton disregard of the rules on the part of

petitioners.

Private respondent cannot validly seek to obtain satisfaction of the writ of execution in this case.Precisely, garnishment proceedings are the means by which the judgment creditor seeks to subject to

his claim the property of the judgment debtor in the hands of a third person; such proceedings mustbe had in the trial court which has jurisdiction over r the suit in which the judgment creditorprevailed.

2) Actual damages must be proved by the best evidence available to the injured party. The court cannotrely on the uncorroborated testimony of a witness, particularly if he was not cross-examined. If it

was true that private respondents was the one who failed to collect the monthly allotments due herand her child, then there will be no basis for the award of moral and exemplary damages to privaterespondent.

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civpro digest feb 11

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