community conservancies and payments for wildlife conservation (pwc) as a coping strategy under...

Community conservancies and payments for wildlife conservation (PWC) as a coping strategy under different

conservancy institutional arrangements

Regina Birner and Philip Osano

Enabling Livestock Based Economies in Kenya to Adapt to Climate Change: A Review of PES from Wildlife Tourism as a

Climate Change Adaptation Option, ILRI, Nairobi, 15 February 2012

Presentation Outline

1. Climate Change and Conservancies

2. Criteria for case studies

3. Institutional Arrangements

4. Climate Change Adaptation: Pastoral Coping and Management Strategies

5. Conservancy Effects: Synergies and Trade-offs

6.Concluding Reflections

Temperature Change (1970-2025)

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

Narok

Lodwar

Isiolo

Nanyuki

NAIROBI

Mombasa

Garissa

Marsabit

Lodwar

Narok

Lodwar

Isiolo

Nanyuki

NAIROBI

Mombasa

Garissa

Marsabit

200 0 200 400 Kilometers

N

Temperature change<+0.5 C<+0.7 C<+0.9 C(+ or -) +1.1 C<+1.3 C

Conservancies

1. C

limat

e C

hang

e an

d C

onse

rvan

cies

Precipitation change (1970-2025)

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

#

Narok

Lodwar

Isiolo

Nanyuki

NAIROBI

Mombasa

Garissa

Marsabit

Lodwar

Narok

Lodwar

Isiolo

Nanyuki

NAIROBI

Mombasa

Garissa

Marsabit

Precipitation change

< -150mm< -100mm< -50mm+ or -50mm< +50mm

Conservancies

1. C

limat

e C

hang

e an

d C

onse

rvan

cies

1.C

riter

ia fo

r ca

se s

tudi

es

Kitengela (WLP)

Mara (OOC and Naboisho)

Ol Kiramatian Group Ranch

Land Tenure Private Private CommunalPayment arrangements

Public funding Market funding (private investors)

Market funding

Environmental conditions

Governance Intermediary: NGO (The Wildlife Foundation)

Intermediaries (OOC):Private company (Ol Purkel Ltd) and Land Committee

Group Ranch Committee

Landuse regulations

Restrictions on sale, subdivision, fencing

Restriction on settlements, grazing

Land zonation (irrigated crops, wildlife and grazing)

2. C

riter

ia fo

r ca

se s

tudi

es

Narok

Kajiado

TaitaTaveta

Olare Orok &Naboisho

Kitengela

Ol Kiramatian

IntroductionPayment for Environmental Services (PES)

• Payment for Environmental Services (PES) Paying farmers or livestock for services such as conserving

biological diversity or reducing soil erosion Increasingly important strategy to reach environmental and

development goals Market-based instrument that offers “win-win” solutions

• Challenges of PES schemes Transaction costs involved in reaching large number of

smallholder farmers or livestock keepers Need for smallholders to organize Collective action problems and “elite capture”

Bargaining power of smallholders Organization (collective bargaining) What is a “fair price” for environmental services? 3

. Ins

titut

iona

l arr

ange

men

ts

Research Tool: “Net-Map” (Influence-Network-Mapping)

• Participatory mapping method Invented by E. Schiffer, further developed by IFPRI

Governance Team

• Goal is to visualize Actors Relations / networks between actors Influence of different actors on specified outcomes –

power relations between actors Governance challenges

• Qualitative and quantitative analyses possible Social network analysis

• Tool can also be used to facilitate participatory processes

http://netmap.ifpriblog.org/

UsingNet-Map in

different contexts

Step 1: Identifying actors and their linkages

• Actors, as identified by respondents, are marked with “sticky” notes on a large sheet of paper

• Linkages are drawn on the paper

Types of linkages•Membership•Contracts•Licenses•Flow of funds

Step 2: Identifying the influence level of different actors

Checkers‘ game pieces are used to visualize influence level of actors (three-dimensional map)

Influence perceived by respondent

Influence on specified outcome: Well-managed conservances that meet both environmental andcommunity goals

Step 3: Using the map to discuss governance issues

What is the source of influence of different actors? How can disadvantaged actors be empowered? What governance challenges, such as elite capture

and leakages may

occur?

How can they be

addressed?

OutsideLandowner

s

Naboisho Landholding

Company

Land owners (518)

Narok County Council

Community projects

NEMA

Ministry of Tourism and

Wildlife

Board of members

(23)

Auditor

Private banks

Enkutotos(customary)

Local administration

incl. police

Naibosho Tourism Partners

Company

Tour operators

(5)

Other offices issuing licenses (~10)

Executive Board (5)

Tourists

Donors

Seyia Ltd.

Base Camp Foundation

Lands Office

KenyaWildlifeService

Insurance companies

ProjectbenefitsFines

FundsContractsLicensesMembership

Maasai Mara

Reservie

Manco Naboisho

Conservation Ltd.

OutsideLandowner

s

Naibosho Landholding

Company

Land owners (518)

Community projects

NEMA


Wildlife

Board of members

(23)

Auditor

Private banks

Manco Naibosho

Conservation Ltd.

Enkutotos(customary)

Local administration

incl. police

Naibosho Tourism Partners

Company

Tour operators

(5)

Executive Board (5)

Tourists

Donors

Seyia Ltd.

Base Camp Foundation

Lands Office


Insurance companies

5

6

x

Perceived influenceon outcome

(Scale 0-6)

4

44

2

1

“Balance of power”

Maasai Mara

Reservie



OutsideLandowner

s

O.C.C. Ltd.

O.C.C. Land

owners (157)

Community projects

NEMA


Wildlife

Private banks

Tour operators

(5)

Tourists

DonorsO.C.C. Trust

Lands Office


Insurance companies

Motorogiland

owners(119)

Motorogi Conservan

cy Ltd.

Tusk Trust

Northern Rangelands

Trust

Board of Trustees

Guiding School

Orpunkel Ltd.

(5 directors)

Research

Maasai Mara

Reservie




OutsideLandowner

s

O.C.C. Ltd.

O.C.C. Land

owners (157)

Community projects

NEMA


Wildlife

Private banks

Tour operators

(5)

Tourists

DonorsO.C.C. Trust

Lands Office


Insurance companies

Motorogiland

owners(119)

Motorogi Conservan

cy Ltd.

Tusk Trust

Northern Rangelands

Trust

Board of Trustees

Guiding School

Orpunkel Ltd.

(5 directors)

6

x

Perceived influenceon outcome

(Scale 0-6)

4

6

22

1

1

Research

Maasai Mara

Reservie


Why is a “balance of power” possible?

• ... in spite of unequal basic conditions of tourism operators and pastoralists In terms of capital, formal education, etc.

• Secure land rights of the pastoralists They are the formal owners of the land. Tourism operations not possible without their consent

• Collective bargaining Organization of the land owners in a landholding company Makes it possible for them to speak with one voice

(in spite of considerable heterogeneity)• In case of Naibosho: Joint company by land owners and

tourism operators Outsourcing of management tasks to private operator (who is

in charge of “unpopular measures”, e.g., demanding fines)

Questions for discussion

• How important is the role of private foundations / indvidiuals to make these arrangements work? How sustainable are the arrangements in the absence of

committed indvidiuals?

• How dependent is the system on funds from donations vis-a-vis the income generated from tourism? What is the relation between profits and donations? What share do the land owners get? What share do the community members without land in

the community conservancy get? How is the risk distributed – ultimately? Is there a need to improve transparency?


• Is the institutional design too complex? What are the transaction costs involved? Is there a trade-off between complexity and balance of

power? Are there gains from moving to larger units? For

examples, having one Trust Fund for an entire region?

• Does the state play an adequate facilitating role? Analysis suggests that role of the state is mainly

regulatory – issuing licenses. Could the licenses system be streamlined (one-stop-

shop)? Will the government start to tax the new income streams

generated? (e.g., payments to farmers)? What is the danger of “state capture”?


• Are there missing links? Is there a need to have strongter links with the

management of the Maasai Mara Reserve? Should community conservancies play a role in

addressing the management challenges of the Reserve?

How strong are the links to the institutions providing support services to livestock keepers (e.g., veterinary services, livestock extension services?)

What is the role of customary authorities? What role can they play in addressing current and future challenges, e.g., of organizing inclusive collective action?


• How inclusive are the institutional arrangements? Strong voice for land owners,

but low share of female land owners (approx. 5 %). Idea to make both spouses members of the respective

institutions? Question of how funds are distributed within the

households, if women lose income, say from milk. How about non-land owners?

They benefit from community projects. But how strong is their voice in the selection and

management of the projects Idea to have them represented in the Trust Funds?

To what extent are the community projects in any case tasks that the government needs to support? (e.g., schools, drinking water).

How do the institutional arrangements influence opportunities to use PES for climate adaptation?

• Key features of the institutional design Livestock owners have individual property rights to plots of

land. Community conservancies are the outcome of voluntary

collective bargaining.

• Key question: How does climate change affect ...the economic opportunities of pastoralists and tourism

operators (in absolute terms, and relative to each other)? ... the bargaining power of the parties concerned? What role do other factors play (such as globally increasing

land values)?

• Does climate change affect the parties differently? Might create incentives to withdraw if alternative uses of

land become more profitable under climate change

Strategies to make PES in conservancies “climate-smart”

• Including adaptation to climate change in community projects (Task of the Trust Funds) Would require stronger link to agricultural/livestock

research and extension (current focus is on social projects).

Some examples, however, already exist: Fodder bank Explore the possibilities to raise additional funds from

climate mitigation financing opportunities.

• Adjusting income streams to buffer variation in other income sources Should this be left to the land owners - using the existing

banking and insurance system? Should it be part of the contracts – considering that the

tourism operators already have access to the banking and insurance system?

4. C

opin

g an

d ris

k m

anag

emen

t str

ateg

y

10) Diversification

•Salaries

•Remittances

•PES

•Crops

11) Savings and other assets

•Human capital

•Collateral for loans

•Political capital

13) Exiting pastoralism

1) Mobility (negotiations)

2) Species composition

3) Stocking levels

4) Livestock market participation

5) Breeding/feeding

Herd related Herd related6) Investments in water infrastructure

7) Social networks

8) Insurance

9) Buying/selling/leasing land

Climate Change Adaptation

5. C

onse

rvan

cy E

ffect

s: S

yner

gies

and

T

rade

-offsSocial

•Cultural heritage

•social cohesion and conflicts

•Empowerment

•Community projects

•Gender

•Inter-generational

Income

•Amount

•Stability

•Security

•Predictability

•Distribution

•Access to financial institutions

•Market creation/access

Land management

• Land sales

• Restrictions

1. Grazing

2. Settlements

3. Firewood collection

4. Water

5. Fencing

6. Crops

7. Mining

8. Access

9. Burning

Ecosystem Services

•Wildlife

•Tourism

•Biomass supply

•Carbon storage

5. C

onse

rvan

cy E

ffect

s: S

yner

gies

and

T

rade

-offs

Synergy: Fencing and mobility

5. C

onse

rvan

cy E

ffect

s: S

yner

gies

and

T

rade

-offs

Synergy: storage and market creation

5. C

onse

rvan

cy E

ffect

s: S

yner

gies

and

T

rade

-offs

Trade-off: cropping and diversification

http://www.pbase.com/image/41391886

6. C

oncl

udin

g re

flect

ions

Public (State) Private (Market) Civic (civil society)

Types of institutions

Government agencies (local, national and global levels)

Service organisations

Private business

Membership organisations

Co-operatives

NGO’s

PES “Users” /Buyers

1. The Global Environmental Facility/World Bank

2. Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS)3. The Nature Conservancy (TNC)

Public

PES IntermediaryThe Wildlife Foundation (TWF)

Civil society

Households (participants, non-participants and ex-participants)

Individual land owners

community conservancies and payments for wildlife conservation (pwc) as a coping strategy under...

Technology

wildlife tourism

linkages actors

wildlife board of members

community conservancies

temperature change

wildlife conservation

actors relations networks

private company ol purkel