comprehensive approach (ca) vs. ( ebao) effect s based approach to operations
DESCRIPTION
Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. ( EBAO) Effect s Based Approach to Operations. LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.) DCOS, Chief Operations 25th ‘ György Klapka ’ Infantry Brigade Hungarian Home Defense Forces Tata, Hungary. CV. EDUCATION: - PowerPoint PPT PresentationTRANSCRIPT
LTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)DCOS, Chief Operations
25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense Forces
Tata, Hungary
Comprehensive Approach (CA) vs. (EBAO)
Effects Based Approach to Operations
EDUCATION:1998-04 Ph.D. in Security Policy, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, Hungary
Dissertation with Summa Cum Laude: “The Five Central Pillars of the European Security”2002-03 #1 Master of Arts in National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA
Thesis: “The role of the Partnership for Peace Program and the State Partnership Program in the Process of NATO Enlargement. The Case of the Hungarian-Ohio Cooperation”
2002-03 #2 Master of Arts in International Security and Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USAThesis: “Regulating the Intelligence System and Oversight in the Hungarian Constitutional Democracy”
1992-95 #3 Master of Arts in Strategic Intelligence, Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, HungaryThesis: “Social Psychological Methods for Cognition of a Personality”
1992-93 Miklós Zrínyi General Staff Collage with concentration in Intelligence, Hungary 1986-89 #1 Bachelor of Arts in Intelligence with concentration in Long Range Special Operations and
#2 Bachelor of Science in Military Automotive Engineering, Lajos Kossuth Military College, HungaryThesis: “Development of Military Intelligence”
ASSIGNMENTS:2009- Chief Operations, Deputy Chief of Staff, 25th ‘György Klapka’ Infantry Brigade, Hungarian Home Defense Forces, Tata, Hungary2005-09 Strategic Representative, Office of the Hungarian Military Representative to NATO and EU, NATO HQ, Brussels2003-05 Chief Consultant, Defense Policy Department, Ministry of Defense2001-03 Postgraduate Student, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, USA2000-01 Deputy Head, Partnership Cooperation Branch, Ministry of Defense1998-00 Deputy Head, NATO Relations Branch, Ministry of Defense1995-98 Senior Military Intelligence Officer, Military Intelligence Office1993-95 Graduate Student, National Defense University1989-93 Long Range Reconnaissance Special Team Commander, Hungarian Defense Forces
COMMISSIONS:2008-09 Dean, NATO Military Committee Strategic Representatives, NATO HQ, Brussels2005-09 Chief Coordinator in Scientific Development
Deputy Chief of Hungarian Transformation2003-05 Chief Coordinator in NATO/EU-Russia, NATO/EU-Ukraine, Mediterranean Dialogue, EUROMED and Iraq affairs
Chief Coordinator of the Political-Military Steering Committee, NATO HQ, Brussels1999- Hungarian Representative to PfP Consortium of Defense Academies and Strategic Studies Institutes1999-01 Chief Coordinator of the NATO Membership Action Plan, Ministry of Defense1999-00 Chief Coordinator of the Western European Union, Ministry of Defense1997-98 Hungarian Representative to Intelligence Working Group on NATO Enlargement, NATO HQ, Brussels
CV
OUTLINE
• Introduction
• ACT-video
• Basic points (ppt)
• Forum-like discussion • Pointing out key elements
• Escalating problems
• Suggesting ways out
TIMELINE
• 2002 – Prague Summit > NATO Transformation > Capabilities
• 2005 – CPG > §17 Effects Based Planning
• 2006 – Riga Summit > CA
• 2006 June 6 – Concept on EBAO by NATO MC/ACT
• 2008 – Bucharest Summit > Plan of Action and CA
• 2009 – Strasbourg-Kehl Summit > Progress Report
1. Planning and conduct of operations2. Lessons learned, training, education and exercises3. Enhancing cooperation with external actors4. Public messaging5. Stabilization and reconstruction
Operational spectrum
Leve
l of i
nvol
vem
ent
Military PowerEffect Based Approach to Operations
Other Elements of Power(political, economic, civil)
Comprehensive Approach
”CA vs./& EBAO”
ReconstructionStabilityWar fighting Security
INTEGRATED ”END STATE” APPOACH
Mechanism (Cause)
Effect (Result)
Mechanism (Cause)
Action (Tasks)
Action (Tasks)
BASIC MODEL
PROCESS
OUTCOME
Better identification of keyPMESII nodes and linkages
within Area of Operation
Better identification andarticulation of key
PMESII effects
Better prediction of PMESIIreactions and behaviorswithin Area of Operation
Better dialog and interactionamong relevant PMESII experts
(Hq staff, JIACG, COEs)
Better identification of actions / capabilities
required for desired effects
Better synchronization of effects and actions across
DIME options
Better prioritization andlinkage of nodes-effects-actions
with Command Intent
Better prediction of 2nd, 3rd-order effects and
unintended consequences
Greater % of targets andeffects within Daily ETO
contribute to Command Intent
Lower % of targets andeffects within Daily ETO
lead to unintended outcomes
More effective and efficientuse of military force
Greater synergy in achievingNational Security Objectives
More accurate and fasterdevelopment of node-effect-
action matrix
Improved Effects-BasedPlanning Process
FocusedCombat Power
ImprovedInformationSuperiority
and KnowledgeManagement
SituationAwareness
SituationUnderstanding
Decision Making
ForceAgility
”Network Centric” Perspective
”Transformational”Perspective
More Effectiveand Synchronized ETO
Command andControl Agility
COMPLEX MIL. STRAT. MODEL
”Dictatorial”Perspective
THEORY OF PLANNING VS. EXECUTION
NATO Effects – Based Approach to Operations
NATO Instruments NON - NATO Instruments
ACTIONS
EFFECTS
OBJ ECTIVES OBJ ECTIVES
NATO END - STATE NON - NATO AIMS
ASSUMED INTERNATIONAL AIM
Military Political CivilEconomic
PLANNING
EXECUTION
NATO Effects – Based Approach to Operations
NATO Instruments NON - NATO Instruments
ACTIONS
EFFECTS
OBJ ECTIVES OBJ ECTIVES
NATO END - STATE NON - NATO AIMS
ASSUMED INTERNATIONAL AIM
Military Political CivilEconomic
PLANNING
EXECUTION
DYNAMIC ”NC” MODULE APPOACH
GRAVITATIONAL MODEL
CAPABILITY APPOACH
~150K Troops
HQ MNF-I
MNC-I
Divisions
BCTs
Battalions
Company/Teams
~1100
Provincial/Local Level Engagement/Operations
National Level GoI Engagement/Operations
USM-I / MNF-I Vertical Integration Structures and Key Tasks
AMB
USM-I
~1000
USAID(~350)
&
25x PRTs (~500)
Policy & StrategyMinisterial Capacity Development
Joint Campaign Plan(Iraqi) Ministerial
Committee for National Security
Iraq Nat’l Sec Strategy
Joint Campaign PlanLegislationCustomsBankingBudgetWTO
ProvincialCapacity
Development
Programs:Agriculture
Micro-FinanceCSP
Vocational-Education
Combat Operations
Tactical Missions:
SeizeSecurePatrolClear
(Coordination)
CIV. VS. MIL. STRUCTURES
Transition Period
Stitch Nation Seams
Integration of NRF
Capabilities
Effects-Based, Collaborative, Network Centric
and Interdependent
DeconflictingDeconflicting CoordinatingCoordinating IntegratingIntegrating CoherenCoherencece
Land Forces
Air Forces
SOF MaritimeForces
Land Forces
Air Forces
SOF MaritimeForces
Land Forces
Air Forces
SOF MaritimeForces
Deconflict Services & Cultures
”EFFECTS BASED TRANSFORMATION”
Attributes of a Transforming NATO Force
GlobalSituation
Awareness
CRISIS
Objectives Tasks TASK
LEVEL
ANALYSIS
Now
Air & SpaceControlForce
Support
Force Application
ForceEnhancement
Bridge 4 Destroyed
Destroy Bridge 4
Disrupt
Delivery of POLEffect
TasksDestroy Bridge 6
Plan
Indicators
Bridge 6 Destroyed
Physical effects that lead to…
…desired behavioral outcomes.
CASE STUDY ”SERBIA”
Expansion West - 2005
Expansion South - Jul 2006
Expansion North - Dec 2003
Start - Kabul - Dec 2001
Finish - Expansion East - 2006 ?
Expansion West - 2005
Expansion South - Jul 2006
Expansion North - Dec 2003
Start - Kabul - Dec 2001
Finish - Expansion East - Oct 2006
CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 1
Source: CSIS Burke Chair, “Developments in NATO and ISAF” Forces available from:http://www.csis.org/images/stories/burke/090423_developments_nato-isaf_and_us_forces.pdf
CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 2
Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf
CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 3
Source: http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat.pdf
CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 4
Expansion West - 2005
Expansion South - Jul 2006
Expansion North - Dec 2003
Start - Kabul - Dec 2001
Finish - Expansion East - 2006 ?
Expansion West - 2005
Expansion South - Jul 2006
Expansion North - Dec 2003
Start - Kabul - Dec 2001
Finish - Expansion East - Oct 2006
CASE STUDY ”AFGHANISTAN” 52011 ???
CASE STUDY ”IRAQ VS. AFGHANISTAN”
”…oooops”
”…now watz da plain?”
• Both military and non-military capabilities must be transformed
• Definition of ”Engagement Space”• Lack of political will will kill both CA and EBAO• An effects based approach to the Comprehensive
Approach is imperative• EBAO is part of CA• Understanding multinationality and sectorial
differences (resources, cultures) in CA/EBAO• Overall integrated CA/EBAO is needed
SUGGESTIONS
The EndLTC Tibor BABOS (Ph.D.)Chief Operations, DCOS
25th György Klapka Infantry BrigadeHungarian Home Defense Forces
Tata, Hungary
Email: [email protected]: +36-34-589-111
”Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. Space we can recover, lost time never.”