computer security tran, van hoai department of systems & networking faculty of computer science...
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Computer Security
Tran, Van HoaiDepartment of Systems & Networking
Faculty of Computer Science & EngineeringHCMC University of Technology
2009-2010 2
Outline
• Introduction to security• Secure channels• Access control• Security management• Example: electronic payment systems
Security concerns in distributed systems
the rest of
email server
Web server
Desktopcomputers
File server
router/firewall
print and other servers
other servers
Local areanetwork
email server
the Internet
SECURE CHANNELSauthentication
message integrityconfidentiality
ACCESS CONTROLauthorization
What are security threats ? (1)
• Interception: an unauthorized party has gained access to resource– communication between 2 parties has been
overheard by someone else– data illegally copied after breaking into private
directoty• Interrupt: resources unavailable, unusable,
destroyed,…– Denial of Service
What are security threats ? (2)
• Modification: unauthorized changing of data or tampering with a service so that it loses original specifications– changing program to log secretly user’s activities
• Fabrication: additional data or activity generated that would normally not exist– add an entry to password file
Security policy & security mechanisms
• Building a secure system is not to protect against all threats– First, security policies must be created
Security policy = to describewhich actions the entities are allowed to take
and which ones are prohibitedSecurity mechanism = to enforce
security policies
Security mechanisms
• Encryption– hacker cannot understand (cryptography)– provide confidentiality, integrity
• Authentication– verify a claimed identity
• Authorization– check permissions (rights) to perform actions
• Auditing– trace clients’ access
Design issuesFocus of control – protection on data
Data is protected against wrong or invalid operations
InvocationMethod
State
Object
Operations can be performed, but main concern is data integrity
Design issuesFocus of control – protection on invocation
Data is protected against unauthorized invocations
InvocationMethod
State
Object
Main concern is access control mechanisms
Design issuesFocus of control – protection on user
Data is protected by checkingthe role of invoker
InvocationMethod
State
Object
Main concern is defining roles that users have
Design issuesLayer of security mechanisms
Application
Middleware
OS Services
OS kernel
Hardware
Transport
Network
Datalink
Physical
Application
Middleware
OS Services
OS kernel
Hardware
Transport
Network
Datalink
Physical
network
low-levelprotocols
high-levelprotocolsMain concern is
where security mechanisms are placed
IDEA: TRUSTdepending on the trust a client has in how secure
the services are in a particular layer
Trust on different layers
SMDS
Encryption device
Different LANs trust each other, but do not trust SMDS
Trust router(encryption device)
If not Use SSL
In distributed system, security mechanisms often placed in middleware
Design issuesDistribution of security mechanisms
• Middleware-base distributed system trusts local OS it depends on– If not, part of functionality of OS must be
integrated in distributed system• Use the approach “Reduced Interfaces for
Secure System Components”servers running secure services
no direct access from other machines
access control device
Design issuesSimplicity
• Few, simple security mechanisms easily understood and trusted to work, the better it is– It is not easy in practice
• Applications are inherently complex, therefore security services, protocols should be simple
Cryptography
Encryption methodPlaintext, P
Encryption key, EKSender
Decryption method
Plaintext, P
Decryption key, DK
Receiver
CiphertextC=EK(P)
Passive intrudersonly listen to C
Active intruderscan alter messages
Active intruderscan insert messages
Symmetric cryptosystems: DESPublic-key cryptosystems: RSA
Hash functions: MD5
Secure channels
• Protecting clients and servers against– interception: ensureing confidentiality– modification, fabrication: mutual authentication
and message integrity• authentication and message integrity must go together• Ex: A sends B a message m. A and B both authenticated,
but how guaranteeing m is not modified
Authentication based on shared secret key
ALICE
BOB
A
RB
KA,B(RB)
RA
KA,B(RA)
1
2
3
4
5
Challenge-response protocol- RA, RB: challenge from A, B respectively- KA,B: secret key shared by A, B
- Key distribution center can reduce number of keys- No longer used because defeated by reflection attack
Authentication based on public-key cryptography
ALICE
BOB
KB+(A, RA)
KA+(RA,RB,KA,B)
KA,B(RB)
1
2
3
-KA+, KA
-: public and private keys of A respectively- KA,B: session key shared by A, B
Digital signatures
• Example:– Bob sells Alice an item with price $500– Alice sends Bob an email to confirm– Two issues happen
• Alice needs to be sured Bob maliciously change to price to higher value
• Bob needs to be sures Alice cannot deny the price (preventing second thoughts)
Require a signature associated with the email’s content