consti law 5

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I

File No. 5

III.POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Judicial Review – the power of the courts to test the validity of

executive and legislative acts in light of their conformity with the

Constitution.

CASES

• This case establishes the Supreme Court's power of judicial review.

That means that the Court has the right to review acts of Congress

and, by extension, actions of the President. If the Court finds that

the law is unconstitutional, it can overrule the law. Marshall argued

that the Constitution is the “supreme law” of the land and that the

Supreme Court has the final say over the meaning of theConstitution. He wrote, “it is emphatically the province and duty of

the judicial department to say what the law is (Marbury vs. Madison, 5

US 137, 2 L.Ed. 60).”

• In the regular course, the regional trial courts and the Supreme

Court have concurrent jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for

quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and

a basic deference to the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such

petitions in the lower tribunals. However, for special and important

reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in thepresent case, the Supreme Court has allowed exceptions to this

doctrine. In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition,

mandamus and quo warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like

the Senate President and the Speaker of the House have been

recognized as exceptions to this rule. In this country the judicial

supremacy is established, with the Supreme Court as the final



arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government

transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable but political

questions as well(Defensor-Santiago vs. Guingona, GR 134577, Nov. 18, 1998).

• The Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial

branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present

1987 Constitution. The "moderating power" to "determine the proper

allocation of powers" of the different branches of government and "to

direct the course of government along constitutional channels" is

inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial

power itself, which is "the power of the court to settle actual

controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable." The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in

our system of government. It obtains not through express provision

but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of thegovernment has exclusive cognizance of matters within its

jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not

follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and

distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely

unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has

provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure

coordination in the workings of the various departments of the

government. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as

the final arbiter, effectively checks the other departments in the

exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare

executive and legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution

(Francisco vs. House of Representatives, GR 160261, Nov. 10, 2003).

1. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY VS. CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY

Doctrine of Judicial Supremacy

Although holding neither purse nor sword and so regarded as

the weakest of the three departments of the government, the

Judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to annul the acts of

either the Legislative or the Executive department or both when

not conformable to the fundamental law(Asso. Of Small Landowners of

the Philippines vs. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).



When the judiciary allocates constitutional boundaries,

it neither asserts superiority, non-nullifies an act of the legislative,

it only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by

the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under

the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual

controversy the rights which that instrument secures and

guarantees to them(Laurel, Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139).

Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

If a law or contract violates any norm of the constitution, that law

or contract whether promulgated by the legislative, or by the

executive branch or entered into by private persons for private

purpose is null and void and without any force or effect.

CASES

• That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual

and appropriate cases and controversies, and is the power and duty

to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends

the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.

The power of the courts to test the validity of executive and legislative

acts in light of their conformity with the Constitution. This is not an

assertion of superiority by the courts over the other departments, but

merely an expression of the supremacy of the Constitution(Angara vs.

Electroral Commission, 63 Phil.139).

2. POLITICAL VS. JUSTICIABLE QUESTION

Political Question -has two (2) aspects:

1. Those questions which, under the Constitution are to be decided by

the people in their sovereign capacity, or



2.In regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to

the legislature or executive branches of government(Tanada v. Cuenco,

100 Phil 1101).

Justiciable Question –a definite and concrete dispute touching on thelegal interest which may be resolved by a court of law through the

application of a law(Cataran v. DENR, GR No. 134958, January 3, 2001).

CASES

• Justice William J. Brennan reformulated the political question

doctrine, proposing a six-part test for determining which questions

were "political" in nature. Cases which are political in nature are

marked by:

1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department;" as an example of this,

Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and executive war powers,

arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political

questions"

2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards

for resolving it;"

3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy

determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion;"

4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent

resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate

branches of government;"

5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political

decision already made;"

6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious

pronouncements by various departments on one question(Baker vs.

Carr, 396 US 186).”



• The Court held that the question whether or not the Senate rule

violated the US Constitution was nonjusticiable since the

impeachment clause expressly granted that the “Senate shall have

sole Power to try any impeachment.” The clause laid out specific

regulations that were to be followed and as long as those guidelines

were observed the court would not rule upon the validity of other

senate procedures regarding impeachment. Chief Justice William

Rehnquist observed that while the Supreme Court was the “ultimate

interpreter of the Constitution,” a matter would be deemed

nonjusticiable when there was “a constitutional commitment of the

issue to a coordinate political department(Nixon vs. US, 506 US 224).”

• Without oral argument, the divided justices found that the case

was not justiciable. Rehnquist lead a group of four (4) others who

believed that the issue involved a political question, namely, how thePresident and Congress would conduct the nation's foreign affairs.

Justice Powell did not find the case ripe for judicial review. Congress

had not formally challenged the Carter's authority, technically there

was no conflict for the Court to resolve (Goldwater vs. Carter, 444 US 996,

62 L.Ed.2d 428).

• It is now an ancient rule that the valid source of a statute —

Presidential Decrees are of such nature — may be contested by one

who will sustain a direct injury as a result of its enforcement. At the

instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public

funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of

public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an

unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. The

interest of the petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of

these amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that

personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees appropriating said

funds.

The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question. This is especially true in cases where the power of

the Presidency to initiate the amending process by proposals of

amendments, a function normally exercised by the legislature, is

seriously doubted. Under the terms of the 1973 Constitution, the

power to propose amendments to the Constitution resides in the

interim National Assembly during the period of transition (Sec. 15,



Transitory Provisions). After that period, and the regular National

Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments

becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the regular National Assembly

(Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 Constitution). The normal

course has not been followed. Rather than calling the interim

National Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly, the

incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and

submitted the proposed amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033

to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably,

the regularity of the procedure for amendments, written in lambent

words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a

contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,

1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and

effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the

validity of said Decrees is plainly a justiciable one, within thecompetence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2) Article X of the

new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality of

a treaty, executive agreement, or law shall be heard and decided by

the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or

law may be declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at

least ten Members. . . .." The Supreme Court has the last word in the

construction not only of treaties and statutes, but also of the

Constitution itself. The amending, like all other powers organized in

the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so

that the Supreme Court is vested with that authority to determine

whether that power has been discharged within its limits.

Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, not the

legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the controversy refers

to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely

justiciable or non-political. What is in the heels of the Court is not

the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing

amendments to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to

perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to

propose amendments is therefore a downright justiciable question.

Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would

merely he a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may

be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that Constitution, can



declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was

valid or not.

Whether, therefore, that constitutional provision has been followed or

not is indisputably a proper subject of inquiry, not by the people

themselves — of course — who exercise no power of judicial review,

but by the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested

that power, a power which includes the competence to determine

whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been

observed or not. And, this inquiry must be done a priori not a

posteriori, i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the

people.

As to the question on whether or not the Pres. Marcos may propose

amendments to the Constitution in the absence of a grant of suchconstituent power to the President, the Court held that he could. If

the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative

functions of the Interim Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot

validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose

amendments to the Constitution, which is an adjunct, although

peculiar, to its gross legislative power(Sanidad vs. COMELEC, 73 SCRA

333).

• The Court, through former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, held

that political questions refer "to those questions which, under the

Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign

capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been

delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It

is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of

a particular measure." To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has

narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it

expanded the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable

and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has beena grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government.

Heretofore, the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the

Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction. With the

new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to

determine what it can do to prevent grave abuse of discretion



amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch

or instrumentality of government. Clearly, the new provision did not

just grant the Court power of doing nothing. In sync and symmetry

with this intent are other provisions of the 1987 Constitution

trimming the so called political thicket. Prominent of these provisions

is section 18 of Article VII which empowers this Court in limpid

language to "x x x review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any

citizen, the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of

martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ (of habeas

corpus) or the extension thereof x x x." (Estrada vs. Arroyo, GR 146738,

March 2, 2001).

• Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution expands the

concept of judicial review by providing that:

SEC. 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and

in such lower courts as may be established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle

actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable

and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

The Court does not agree with the posture of the respondent

COMELEC that the issue involved in the present petition is a political

question beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to review. As the

leading case ofTañada vs. Cuenco put it, political questions are

concerned with “issues dependent upon thewisdom, notlegality of a

particular measure.” The issue raised in the present petition does not

merely concern the wisdom of the assailed resolution but focuses on

its alleged disregard for applicable statutory and constitutional

provisions. In other words, that the petitioner and the petitioners-in-

intervention are questioning the legality of the respondent

COMELEC’s administrative issuance will not preclude this Courtfrom exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether or

not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess

of jurisdiction on the part of the respondent COMELEC in issuing

Resolution No. 6712. Indeed, administrative issuances must not

override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain consistent

with the law they intend to carry out. When the grant of power is



qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether

the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met or the

limitations respected, is justiciable – the problem being one of legality

or validity, not its wisdom. In the present petition, the Court must

pass upon the petitioner’s contention that Resolution No. 6712 does

not have adequate statutory or constitutional basis.

An administrative body or tribunal acts without jurisdiction if it does

not have the legal power to determine the matter before it; there is

excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the

power to determine the matter, oversteps its authority as determined

by law. There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of

the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical

exercise of his judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction

(Brillantes vs. Concepcion, GR 163193, June 15, 2004).

3. PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

o

Laws are presumed constitutional. To nullify nullification of law, there

must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. The theory

is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law

is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be

constitutional before it was finally enacted.

CASES

• The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are

presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by

this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution

states:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,

letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent

with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed

or revoked.



There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771

has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or

presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative

powers(Lim vs Pacquing, GR 115044, Jan. 27, 1995).

4. REQUISITES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

1. Actual case or controversy

a. ripeness

b. mootness

2. Proper party

3. Question must be raised at the earliest possible time

4. Constitutional Question Must Be the Very “Lis Mota” of the Case

a. Actual Case or Controversy

Actual case or controversy – a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of

opposite legal claims susceptible of judicial determination.

CASES

• An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversythat is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or

anticipatory. It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or

controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one

hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the other, with respect to

rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050.(Board of Optometry vs. Colet,

GR 122241, July 30, 1996).

• The requirements before a litigant can challenge the

constitutionality of a law are well-delineated. They are: (1) there must

be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality

must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question

must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the

decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the

determination of the case itself.



Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The

petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events,

i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty

elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he

would seek re-election for the same post in the 1998 elections.

Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,

petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to

an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig

(except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract

issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for

declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction(Mariano vs.

COMELEC, 242 SCRA 211).

• In actions involving constitutional issues, the firmly settled rule is

that a constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by thecourts unless the following requirements of judicial inquiry are met:

(1) the existence of an actual case or controversy;

(2) the party raising the constitutional issue must have a personal

and substantial interest in the resolution thereof;

(3) the controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable

opportunity; and

(4) that the resolution of the constitutional issue must, be

indispensable for the final determination of the controversy. 3

Appraising the present proceeding in terms of the foregoing

requirements, the Solicitor General urges that the petition at bar does

not present a justiciable controversy for having been filed

prematurely:

". . . petitioners, who claim to be performing artists, had not

previously applied with the Secretary of Labor for exemption from the

coverage of the Circular in line with the aforequoted provision. Said

provision connotes that the prohibition is not at all permanent orabsolute. It admits of exception . . . But to repeat, there is no

allegation in the petition that petitioners had previously sought

exemption from the Secretary of Labor, from the coverage of the

Circular, before filing the instant petition. Obviously, the petition

must fail for prematurity."



The Court agrees with the Solicitor General(Fernandez vs. Torres, 215

SCRA 489).

• An actual case or controversy means an existing case or

controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not

conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would

amount to an advisory opinion. The power does not extend to

hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only

lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile

conclusions unrelated to actualities.

“Legal standing” orlocus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or

will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is

being challenged,alleging more than a generalized grievance. The gistof the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such personal

stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete

adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which

the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional

questions.” Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his

constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has

no standing(La Bugal B'laa, Tribal Assn. vs. DENR Secretary, GR 127882, Jan.

27, 2004).

•

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the groundthat it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a

justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is

seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not

only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the

dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political.

The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the

Constitution is upheld." Once a "controversy as to the application or

interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court

(as in the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide." The jurisdiction of this

Court to adjudicate the matters raised in the petition is clearly set

out in the 1987 Constitution which emphasizes the judicial

department's duty and power to strike down grave abuse of discretion

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government including

Congress. As the Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in



either 1) that all Los Angeles police officers always choked citizens

with whom they had encounters, or 2) that the City ordered or

authorized officers to act in such a manner. Lyons was thus limited

to suing the police and the city for individual damages.

Lyons’ case is not ripe because of the speculative nature of his claim.

Predictions of future behavior are beyond the court’s functions. The

rule is that, ripeness arises when an actual case has ripened or

matured into a controversy worthy of adjudication.(City of Los Angeles

vs. Lyons, 449 US 934).

ii) Mootness

CASES

• A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable

controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration

thereon would be of no practical use or value. Generally, courts

decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of

mootness. The Court holds that President Arroyo’s issuance of PP

1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic.

During the eight (8) days that PP 1017 was operative, the policeofficers, according to petitioners, committed illegal acts in

implementing it. Are PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitutional or valid?

Do they justify these alleged illegal acts? These are the vital issues

that must be resolved in the present petitions. It must be stressed

that “an unconstitutional act is not a law, it confers no rights, it

imposes no duties, it affords no protection; it is in legal

contemplation, inoperative.”

The “moot and academic” principle is not a magical formula that can

automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will

decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if:

first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;

second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount

public interest is involved;



third, when constitutional issue raised requires formulation of

controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and

fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet evading review

(David vs. Macapagal-Arroyo, GR 171396, May 03, 2006).

• After being denied admission to a state-operated law school,

petitioner brought this suit on behalf of himself alone for injunctive

relief, claiming that the school's admissions policy racially

discriminated against him in violation of the Equal Protection Clause

of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that because

petitioner will complete law school at the end of the term for which he

has registered regardless of any decision this Court might reach on

the merits, the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations of Art.

III of the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues,

and the case is moot.

(a) Mootness here does not depend upon a "voluntary cessation" of

the school's admissions practices but upon the simple fact that

petitioner is in his final term, and the school's fixed policy to permit

him to complete the term.

(b) The case presents no question that is "capable of repetition, yet

evading review," since petitioner will never again have to go through

the school's admissions process, and since it does not follow that the

issue petitioner raises will in the future evade review merely because

this case did not reach the Court until the eve of petitioner's

graduation(DeFunis vs. Odegaard, 416 US 312, 40 L.Ed. 343).

b.Proper Party

Constitutional question must be raised by the proper party – one who

has sustained or in imminent danger of sustaining an injury as a result

of the act complained of.

i)

Conventional Standing



CASES

• The court was tasked to determine if the rules of standing should

be considered part of the 'case or controversy' clause of Article III ofthe Constitution or, apart from that, if the court can hear cases on

"generalized grievances" or in the interest of third parties where none

of the complaintants have standing. The court found that as none of

the plaintiffs could demonstrate any injury actually done to them by

the defendants, the plaintiffs were third parties to the issue and had

no standing to sue. The plaintiff's descriptions of their own meager

financial situations and subsequent inability to live in Penfield were

found by the Court to be the consequence of the economics and

housing market of the area rather than any wrong doing by the

defendants(Warth vs. Seldin, 422 US 490, 45 L.Ed.2d, 343).

• Tanada vs. Angara, GR 118295, May 2, 1997, supra.

ii)Representative

Standing

iii)Jus Tertiistanding

CASES

• The Supreme Court was called upon to determine whether a

statute that denies the sale of beer to individuals of the same age

based on their gender violates the Equal Protection Clause.

Additionally, the Supreme Court examined jus tertii (third party

rights), in this case the vendor of the 3.2% beer. The Court held that

the gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were

unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were

insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute

and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court

found that analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had



not been changed. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on

the doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be

economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to

males between 18 and 20. To have standing, one must show a "nexus"

of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of the

statute. In this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig.

Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party.

The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other vendors have

standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who

seek access to their market or function"(Craig vs Boren, 429 US 190, 50

L.Ed.2d. 343).

iv) Transcendental importance to the

public

CASES

• Respondents claimed that petitioners had no legal standing to

initiate the instant action. Petitioners, however, countered that the

action was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as

taxpayers. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow

taxpayers to question contracts entered into by the national

government or government-owned or controlled corporations allegedly

in contravention of the law and to disallow the same when only

municipal contracts are involved. For as long as the ruling in

Kilosbayan onlocus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to

follow it and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to

institute the present action(Tatad vs. Garcia, 243 SCRA 436).

• On the locus standi of the petitioners, the Court resolved the issue

in their favor. A party's standing before the Court is a proceduraltechnicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in

view of the importance of the issues raised. In the landmark

Emergency Powers Cases, the Court brushed aside this technicality

because "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases

demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside,

if we must, technicalities of procedure. (Avelino vs. Cuenco, G.R. No.



L-2821)." Insofar as taxpayers' suits are concerned, this Court had

declared that it "is not devoid of discretion as to whether or not it

should be entertained," or that it "enjoys an open discretion to

entertain the same or not(Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110).”

• Issue: Whether or not petitioners possess the legal standing to file

the instant petition. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because some

cases are brought not by parties who have been personally injured by

the operation of the law or by official action taken, but by concerned

citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public interest.

Petitioners do not in fact show what particularized interest they have

for bringing this suit. And they do not have present substantial

interest in the Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) as would entitle

them to bring this suit(Kilosabayan vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540).

• It is insisted that this Court has in the past accorded standing to

taxpayers and concerned citizens in cases involving "paramount

public interest." Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators

have indeed been allowed to sue but then only

(1) in cases involving constitutional issues and

(2) under certain conditions. Petitioners do not meet these

requirements on standing.

Taxpayers are allowed to sue, for example, where there is a claim of

illegal disbursement of public funds, or where a tax measure is

assailed as unconstitutional. Voters are allowed to question the

validity of election laws because of their obvious interest in the

validity of such laws. Concerned citizens can bring suits if the

constitutional question they raise is of "transcendental importance"

which must be settled early. Legislators are allowed to sue to

question the validity of any official action which they claim infringes

their prerogatives qua legislators. Petitioners do not have the samekind of interest that these various litigants have. Petitioners assert an

interest as taxpayers, but they do not meet the standing requirement

for bringing taxpayer's suits as set forth in Dumlao v. Comelec, 95

SCRA 392, 403 (1980), to wit:



While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of

public moneys,nowhere in their Petition do said petitioners allege that

their tax money is"being extracted and spent in violation of specific

constitutional protections against abuses of legislative power", or that

there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent COMELEC , or

that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose.

Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting

public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or

unconstitutional law.Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per

se, is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in Tan vs.

Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief

Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or not a

taxpayer's suit should be entertained. Petitioners' suit does not fall

under any of these categories of taxpayers' suits(Kilosbayan vs. Morato

(Recon), GR 118910, Nov. 16, 1995).

v) Standing of

members of Congress

CASES

• Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess

of the authority vested on the President by the Constitution, the

issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain

of the Legislature arises. It is true that the Constitution provides a

mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said remedy,

however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on

policy or political considerations but not when the veto is claimed to

be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the duty of the Court to

draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends andthe bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin(Philconsa vs. Enriquez, 235

SCRA 506).

• PETRON questions thelocus standi of petitioners to file the action

(Rollo, pp. 479-484). Petitioners however, countered that they filed the

action in their capacity as members of Congress.



In Philippine Constitution Association v.Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R.

No. 113105, August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress

have the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the

Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of

Congress to which they belong. In the latter case, the acts cause

derivative but nonetheless substantial injury which can be

questioned by members of Congress (Kennedy v. James, 412 F. Supp.

353 [1976]). In the absence of a claim that the contract in question

violated the rights of petitioners or impermissibly intruded into the

domain of the Legislature, petitioners have no legal standing to

institute the instant action in their capacity as members of Congress.

However, petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as

taxpayers under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v.

Guingona, 232 SCRA 110 (1994). Under said ruling, taxpayers may

question contracts entered into by the national government or

government-owned or controlled corporations alleged to be in

contravention of the law. As long as the ruling inKilosbayanonlocus

standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and uphold

the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present

action(Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization, GR 112399, July 14, 1995).

vi) Standing of Integrated Bar of the

Philippines

CASES

• The IBP has not sufficiently complied with the requisites of

standing in this case.

"Legal standing" or locus standi has been defined as a personal and

substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is

being challenged. The term "interest" means a material interest, an

interest in issue affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere

interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The

gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such

personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that



concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon

which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional

questions. In the case at bar, the IBP primarily anchors its standing

on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the

Constitution. Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no

other basis in support of its locus standi The mere invocation by the

IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more, while

undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this

case. This is too general an interest which is shared by other groups

and the whole citizenry.

Having stated the foregoing, it must be emphasized that this Court

has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy

the requirement of legal standing when paramount interest is

involved. In not a few cases, the Court has adopted a liberal attitudeon the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft

an issue of transcendental significance to the people. Thus, when the

issues raised are of paramount importance to the public, the Court

may brush aside technicalities of procedure. 18 In this case, a

reading of the petition shows that the IBP has advanced

constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this Court in

view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents. Moreover,

because peace and order are under constant threat and lawless

violence occurs in increasing tempo, undoubtedly aggravated by the

Mindanao insurgency problem, the legal controversy raised in the

petition almost certainly will not go away. It will stare us in the face

again. It, therefore, behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing

and to resolve the issue now, rather than later(IBP vs Zamora, GR

141284, Aug. 15, 2000).

vii) Standing of the

Government to

question its own laws

CASES



• Issue: Whether the People of the Philippines, through the Solicitor

General and Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a proper party in present

case. The Court held that the People of the Philippines, represented

by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila, is a

proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged rule is

that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has

sustained, or will sustained, direct injury as a result of its

enforcement. It goes without saying that if Act 4221 really violates the

constitution, the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present

action is brought, has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of

greater import than the damage caused by the illegal expenditure of

public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law

by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the well-settled rule

that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws(People vs. Vera,65 Phil. 56).

viii) Taxpayer’s Suits

Two (2) requisites of Taxpayer’s suits:

1. Public funds are disbursed by a political subdivision or

instrumentality, and

2. A law is violated or some irregularity is committed and that the

petitioner is directly affected by the allegedultra vires act.

CASES

• In the case before us, petitioners failed to show, to the satisfaction

of this Court, that they have sustained, or are in danger of sustaining

any direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the VFA. Astaxpayers, petitioners have not established that the VFA involves the

exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending powers. On this point,

it bears stressing that a taxpayer's suit refers to a case where the act

complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public

funds derived from taxation.



Notwithstanding, in view of the paramount importance and the

constitutional significance of the issues raised in the petitions, this

Court, in- the exercise of its sound discretion, brushes aside the

procedural barrier and takes cognizance of the petitions, as we have

done in the early Emergency Powers Cases, 20 where we had

occasion to rule:

". . . ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the

constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President

Quirino although they were involving only an indirect and general

interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the

objection that they were not proper parties and ruled that

'transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands

that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we

must, technicalities of procedure(Bayan vs. Zamora, GR 138570, Oct. 10,2000).”

• Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of

sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the

Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR). In other

words, petitioner must show that he is a real party in interest — that

he will stand to be benefited or injured by the judgment or that he

will be entitled to the avails of the suit. Nowhere in his pleadings does

petitioner presume to make such a representation. If at all, it is only

Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any "injury" in this case

since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the

legislature's powers to create a public office and to propose

amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. A taxpayer is

deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is

established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged

contravention of the law or the Constitution. Thus, a taxpayer's

action is properly brought only when there is an exercise by Congress

of its taxing or spending power(Gonzales vs. Narvasa, GR 140835, Aug. 14,

2000).

c. Question must be raised at the earliest possible

opportunity.



General Rule : must be raised in the pleadings.

Exceptions :

a. criminal cases – at any time at the discretion of

the court; b. civil cases – at any stage of the proceedings if

necessary for the determination of the case itself;

c. every case (except where there is estoppel) – at

any stage if it involves the jurisdiction of the court.

d. Constitutional question must the very "lis

mota" of

the case

lis mota – a controversy begun.

Determination of constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to a

final determination of the case(People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56).

Therefore, the following must be avoided:

Political questions;

Advisory opinions;

Moot and academic issues;No standing.

4.DOCTRINE OF PURPOSEFUL HESITATION

CASES

•

In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection, bearing in mind the consequences

of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no

less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned

act is usually the handiwork of the legislative or the executive

departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of

a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in



the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a

thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence

of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.

It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is

charged with the duty of a purposeful hesitation before declaring a

law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first

carefully studied by the executive and the legislative departments and

determined by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law

before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The

presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest

showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and

only when such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may

the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape,

that the challenged act must be struck down(Drilon vs. Lim, GR 112497, Aug. 04, 1994).

5. EFFECTS OF DECLARATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY

The law is either:

1. void – if on its face it does not enjoy any presumption of validity

because it is patently offensive to the Constitution. It produces noeffect creates no office and imposes no duty. (Igot v. Comelec, 95

SCRA 392).

2. voidable – if on its face it enjoys the presumption of

constitutionality. The law becomes inoperative only upon the

judicial declaration of its invalidity; the declaration produces no

retroactive effect (Serrano de Agbayani v PNB, 38 SCRA 429).

Doctrine of Operative Fact

Realizes that in declaring a law or rule null and void, undue harshness

and resulting unfairness must be avoided.

CASES



• The strict view considers a legislative enactment which is declared

unconstitutional as being, for all legal intents and purposes, a total

nullity, and it is deemed as if had never existed. Here, of course, we

refer to the law itself being per serepugnant to the Constitution. It is

not always the case, however, that a law is constitutionally faulty per

se. Thus, it may well be valid in its general import, but invalid in its

application to certain factual situations. To exemplify, an otherwise

valid law may be held unconstitutional only insofar as it is allowed to

operate retrospectively such as, in pertinent cases, when it vitiates

contractually vested rights. A judicial declaration of invalidity, it is

also true, may not necessarily obliterate all the effects and

consequences of a void act occurring prior to such a declaration.

Thus, in our decisions on themoratorium laws,6 we have been

constrained to recognize theinterim effects of said laws prior to theirdeclaration of unconstitutionality, but there we have likewise been

unable to simply ignore strong considerations of equity and fair play.

So also, even as a practical matter, a situation that may aptly be

described as fait accompli may no longer be open for further inquiry,

let alone to be unsettled by a subsequent declaration of nullity of a

governing statute(Republic vs. CA, GR 79732, Nov. 8, 1993).

6. RELATIVE CONSTITUTIONALITY

CASES

• The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be

determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable

provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be

constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its

application to another.

A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because

of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation

becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed

by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the



light of changed conditions(Central Bank Employee Assn, Inc. vs. BSP, GR

148208, Dec. 15, 2004).

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