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United States Department o State Publication 11409

Oce o the Coordinator or Counterterrorism

Released April 2007

Country Reports on Terrorism 2006 is submitted in compliance with Title 22 o the United States Code, Section 2656

(the Act), which requires the Department o State to provide Congress a ull and complete annual report on terrorism

or those countries and groups meeting the criteria o the Act.


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Chapter 1. StrategiC aSSeSSment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Chapter 2. Country reportS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

a f r i C a o v e r v i e w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership

The Arican Union

Botswana

Burundi

Comoros

Djibouti

Ethiopia

Kenya

Liberia

Madagascar

Mali

Mauritania

Nigeria

Rwanda

Senegal

Sierra LeoneSomalia

South Arica

Tanzania

Uganda

Zimbabwe

eaSt aSia and paCifiC overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Australia

Burma

Cambodia

China Hong Kong

Macau

Indonesia

Japan

Republic o Korea

Laos

Country reportS on terroriSm 2006table of ContentS


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Malaysia

Mongolia

New Zealand

Philippines

Singapore

TaiwanThailand

e u r o p e o v e r v i e w . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 8

Albania

Andorra

Armenia

Austria

Azerbaijan

Belgium

Bosnia and Herzegovina

BulgariaCroatia

Cyprus

Czech Republic

Denmark

Estonia

Finland

France

Georgia

Germany

Greece

HungaryIceland

Ireland

Italy

Latvia

Lithuania

Macedonia

Malta

Moldova

Montenegro

The Netherlands

Norway

Poland

Portugal

Romania

Russia

Serbia

Kosovo

Slovakia


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Slovenia

Spain

Sweden

Switzerland

Turkey

United Kingdom

Northern Ireland

middle eaSt and north afriCa overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

The Summer War

Algeria

Bahrain

Egypt

Iraq

Israel, West Bank, and Gaza

Jordan

KuwaitLebanon

Libya

Morocco

Oman

Qatar

Saudi Arabia

Tunisia

United Arab Emirates

Yemen

South and Central aSia overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

Aghanistan

Bangladesh

India

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Nepal

Pakistan

Sri Lanka

Tajikistan

TurkmenistanUzbekistan

weStern hemiSphere overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

Inter-American Committee Against Terrorism (CICTE)

Tri-Border Area

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Canada


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Chile

Colombia

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

MexicoNicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Suriname

Trinidad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

Chapter 3. State SponSorS of terroriSm overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

CubaIran

North Korea

Sudan

Syria

Chapter 4. the global Challenge of wmd terroriSm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150

Chapter 5. terroriSt Safe havenS (7120 report) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .156

(Update o Inormation Originally Reported Under Section 7120(b) o the Intelligence

Reorm and Terrorist Prevention Act)1. Terrorist Sae Havens. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 5 6

Strategies, Tactics, Tools or Disrupting or Eliminating Sae Havens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 6 1

International Conventions and Protocols (Signatories) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5

2. Support or Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 4

. Collaboration with Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 8 8

4. Struggle o Ideas in the Islamic World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 2

5. Outreach through Foreign Broadcast Media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 6

6. Visas or Participants in United States Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2

7. Basic Education in Muslim Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1 2

8. Economic Reorm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 6

Chapter 6 . terroriSt organizationS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .236

Abu Nidal Organization (ANO)

Abu Sayya Group (ASG)

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Ansar al-Sunna (AS)

Armed Islamic Group (GIA)

Asbat al-Ansar

Aum Shinrikyo (Aum)

Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA)


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Communist Party o Philippines/New Peoples Army (CPP/NPA)

Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA)

Gamaa al-Islamiyya (IG)

HAMAS

Harakat ul-Mujahedin (HUM)

Hizballah

Islamic Jihad Union (IJU)

Islamic Movement o Uzbekistan (IMU)

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM)

Jemaah Islamiya Organization (JI)

Al-Jihad (AJ)

Kahane Chai (Kach)

Kongra-Gel (KGK/PKK)

Lashkar e-Tayyiba (LT)

Lashkar i Jhangvi (LJ)

Liberation Tigers o Tamil Eelam (LTTE)

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM)

Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MEK)

National Liberation Army (ELN)

Palestine Liberation Front (PLF)

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)

Popular Front or the Liberation o Palestine (PFLP)

Popular Front or the Liberation o Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC)

Al-Qaida (AQ)

Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI)

Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

Formerly Salast Group or Preaching and Combat (GSPC)Real IRA (RIRA)

Revolutionary Armed Forces o Colombia (FARC)

Revolutionary Nuclei (RN)

Revolutionary Organization 17 November

Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C)

Shining Path (SL)

United Sel-Deense Forces o Colombia (AUC)

other groupS of ConCern . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 8 0

Al-Badhr Mujahedin (al-Badr)

Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI)

Alex Boncayao Brigade (ABB)

Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA)

Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF)

Communist Party o India (Maoist)

Communist Party o Nepal (Maoist)/United Peoples Front (CPN/M)

Democratic Forces or the Liberation o Rwanda (FDLR)

East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

First o October Antiascist Resistance Group (GRAPO)

Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami (HUJI)


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Harakat ul-Jihad-I-Islami/Bangladesh (HUJI-B)

Hizb-I Islami Gulbuddin (HIG)

Hizbul-Mujahedin (HM)

Irish National Liberation Army (INLA)

Irish Republican Army (IRA)

Islamic Army o Aden (IAA)Islamic Great East RaidersFront (IBDA-C)

Islamic International Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB)

Jamaatul-Mujahedin Bangladesh (JMB)

Jamiat ul-Mujahedin (JUM)

Japanese Red Army (JRA)

Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (KMM)

Lords Resistance Army (LRA)

Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)

New Red Brigades/Communist Combatant Party (BR/PCC)

People Against Gangsterism and Drugs (PAGAD)

Rajah Solaiman Movement (RSM)Red Hand Deenders (RHD)

Revolutionary Proletarian Initiative Nuclei (NIPR)

Revolutionary Struggle (RS)

Riyadus-Salikhin Reconnaissance and Sabotage Battalion o Chechen Martyrs

(RSRSBCM)

Sipah-I-Sahaba/Pakistan (SSP)

Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR)

Al-Tawhid wal Jihad (TWJ)

Tenrik Miaz-E-Shariah Mohammadi (TNSM)

Tunisian Combatant Group (TCG)

Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA)Turkish Hizballah

Ulster Deense Association/Ulster Freedom Fighters (UDA/UFF)

Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF)

United Liberation Front o Assam (ULFA)

Chapter 7: legiSlative requirementS and Key termS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .317

nCtC StatiStiCal annex . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321

Supplement on terroriSm deathS, injurieS, KidnappingS

of private u.S. CitizenS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331


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Chapter 1.StrategiC aSSeSSment

This chapter highlights terrorism trends and ongoing issues, ocusing on calendar year 2006

that will provide a ramework or detailed discussion in later chapters. Since this issue o the

Country Reports on Terrorism alls ve years ater the attacks o September 11, 2001, the chapter

commences with a review o progress against the terrorist threat to date.

five yearS on, progreSS iS mixed

SignifiCant aChievementS

Five years ater 9/11, the international communitys confict with transnational terroristscontinues. Cooperative international eorts have produced genuine security improvements

particularly in securing borders and transportation, enhancing document security, disrupting terrorist

nancing, and restricting the movement o terrorists. The international community has also achieved

signicant success in dismantling terrorist organizations and disrupting their leadership. This has

contributed to reduced terrorist operational capabilities and the detention or death o numerous key

terrorist leaders.

Working with allies and partners across the world, through coordination and inormation sharing, we

have created a less permissive operating environment or terrorists, keeping leaders on the move

or in hiding, and degrading their ability to plan and mount attacks. Canada, Australia, the United

Kingdom, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, Aghanistan, and many other partners played major roles in

this success, recognizing that international terrorism represents a threat to the whole international

community.

Through the Regional Strategic Initiative, the State Department is working with ambassadors

and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters o operation to assess the threat and

devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations. We have made progress

in organizing regional responses to terrorists who operate in ungoverned spaces or across national

borders. This initiative has produced better intra-governmental coordination among United States

government agencies, greater cooperation with and between regional partners, and improved

strategic planning and prioritization, allowing us to use all tools o statecrat to establish long-term

measures to marginalize terrorists. (See Chapter 5 -- Terrorist Sae Havens (7120 Report) or urther

inormation on the Regional Strategic Initiative.)

Continuing ChallengeS

Despite this undeniable progress, major challenges remain. Several states continue to sponsor

terrorism. Iran remains the most signicant state sponsor o terrorism and continues to threaten

its neighbors and destabilize Iraq by providing weapons, training, advice, and unding to select Iraqi

Shia militants. Syria, both directly and in coordination with Hizballah, has attempted to undermine


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the elected Government o Lebanon and roll back progress toward democratization in the Middle

East. Syria also supports some Iraqi Baathists and militants and has continued to allow oreign

ghters and terrorists to transit through its borders into Iraq.

International intervention in Iraq has brought measurable benets. It has removed an abusive totali-

tarian regime with a history o sponsoring and supporting regional terrorism and has allowed a new

democratic political process to emerge. It also, however, has been used by terrorists as a rallying cry

or radicalization and extremist activity that has contributed to instability in neighboring countries.

Aghanistan remains threatened by Taliban insurgents and religious extremists, some o whom are

linked to al-Qaida (AQ) and to sponsors outside the country. In Aghanistan public support or the

government remains high, national institutions are getting stronger and the majority o Aghans

believe they are better o than under the Taliban. But to deeat the resurgent threat, the interna-

tional community must deliver promised assistance and work with Aghans to build counterinsur-

gency capabilities, ensure legitimate and eective governance, and counter the surge in narcoticscultivation.

The Israeli/Palestinian confict remains a source o terrorist motivation. The holding o ree elections

in the Palestinian Territories was a welcome sign o democratization, but HAMAS subsequent

reusal to disavow terrorism or accept Israels internationally-accepted right to exist undermined the

elections impact. Terrorist activity emanating rom the Palestinian Territories remains a key destabilizing

actor and a cause or concern.

UNITED STATES, Washington: US President George W. Bush ( C ) speaks beside Aghan President Hamid Karzai ( R ) and Pakistan

President Pervez Musharra (L) in the Rose Garden ollowing a meeting in the Oval Oce o the White House on 27 September 2006

Washington, DC. AFP Photo/Mandel Ngan


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UNITED NATIONS, New York: US Secretary o State Condoleezza Rice (2R) speaks at a press conerence o the Middle East Quartet group

with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov (L), United Nations Secretary General Ko Annan (2L) and Javier Solana ( R ), European Union

High Representative or the Common Foreign and Security Policy, 09 May 2006 at UN headquarters. AFP Photo/Stan Honda

LEBANON, Shebaa: Lebanese troops are welcomed by civilians

upon their arrival to the Lebanese village o Shebaa, 18 August

2006. AFP Photo/Joseph Barrak

IRAQ, Baghdad: An Iraqi policeman reads a newspaper with the

picture o killed al-Qaida leader in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,

published on the ront page in central Baghdad, 10 June 2006.

AFP Photo/Ali Al-Saadi


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The summer war in Lebanon between Israel and Hizballah was a prime example o how

Hizballahs continued eorts to manipulate persisting grievances along the Israeli/Lebanese border

can quickly escalate into open warare. The confict did orce the international community again

to demand Hizballahs complete disarmament, in UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1701,

and generated a renewed international commitment to support a peaceul, stable, multi-sectarian

democracy in Lebanon. Even so, Hizballah, a designated oreign terrorist organization, in combina-

tion with state sponsors o terrorism Iran and Syria, continues to undermine the elected Govern-

ment o Lebanon and remains a serious security threat in the Middle East.

AQ and its aliates have adapted to our success in disrupting their operational capability by

ocusing more attention and resources on their propaganda and misinormation eorts. They exploit

and interpret the actions o numerous local, pseudo-independent actors, using them to mobilize

supporters and sympathizers, intimidate opponents and infuence international opinion. Terrorists

consider inormation operations to be a principal part o their eort. The international community

has yet to muster a coordinated and eectively resourced counter to extremist propaganda.

Overall, AQ and its loose conederation o aliated movements remain the most immediate

national security threat to the United States and a signicant security challenge to the internationalcommunity.

Key al-qaida trendS

Single terrorist events, like the Askariya mosque bombing in Samarra, Iraq on February 22, 2006,

which provoked widespread sectarian violence and changed the character o the war in Iraq,

can become triggers or broader confict or templates or copycat attacks. Because terrorism is

undamentally political, the political signicance o major events is vital in determining meaningul

responses. Thus, the trends presented in this section are interpretive they provide qualitative

insight to complement the statistical detail covered in later chapters.

tranSition from expeditionary to guerrilla terroriSm

Early AQ terrorist attacks were largely expeditionary. The organization selected and trained terrorists

in one country, then clandestinely inserted a team into the target country to attack a pre-planned

objective. The 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam, the 2000 attack on the

USS Cole, and the 9/11 attacks were examples o this. Improved international border security, trans-

portation security and document control have made this type o attack more dicult. Clandestine

insertion across borders is harder, reconnaissance is more risky, and international movement o

unds and equipment is more likely to be detected.

Thus we have seen a trend toward guerrilla terrorism, where the organization seeks to grow theteam close to its target, using target country nationals. Through intermediaries, web-based propa-

ganda, and subversion o immigrant expatriate populations, terrorists inspire local cells to carry out

attacks which they then exploit or propaganda purposes. This circumvents the need to insert a

team across borders or clandestinely transer unds and materiel. The 2004 Madrid bombing, the

London attacks o July 2005, and the thwarted August 2006 attempt to attack passenger jets oper-

ating rom British airports include elements o this approach.


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Both expeditionary and guerrilla approaches co-exist, alongside true home-grown terrorism

involving local cells acting spontaneously rather than being consciously inspired by trans-national

terrorists. Rather than adopting a single modus operandi, AQ and its aliated movements continue

to be highly adaptive, quickly evolving new methods in response to countermeasures.

terroriSt propaganda warfare

As identied in the 2005 Country Reports, the international communitys success in disrupting

terrorist leadership and operational capacity led AQ to ocus greater eorts on misinormation and

anti-Western propaganda. This trend accelerated this year, with AQ cynically exploiting the griev-

ances o local groups and attempting to portray itsel as the vanguard o a global movement. AQ still

retains some operational capability and the intent to mount large-scale spectacular attacks, including

on the United States and other high-prole Western targets. Overall, however, AQs current

approach ocuses on propaganda warare using a combination o terrorist attacks, insurgency,

media broadcasts, Internet-based propaganda, and subversion to undermine condence and unity in

Western populations and generate the alse perception o a powerul worldwide movement.

the terroriSt Conveyor belt

Radicalization o immigrant populations, youth and alienated minorities in Europe, the Middle East,

and Arica continued. It became increasingly clear, however, that such radicalization does not occur

by accident, or because such populations are innately prone to extremism. Rather, there was

increasing evidence o terrorists and extremists manipulating the grievances o alienated youth or

immigrant populations and then cynically exploiting those grievances to subvert legitimate authority

and create unrest.

Terrorists seek to manipulate grievances represent a conveyor belt through which terrorists seek

to convert alienated or aggrieved populations, convert them to extremist viewpoints, and turn them,

by stages, into sympathizers, supporters, and ultimately, members o terrorist networks. In some

regions, this includes eorts by AQ and other terrorists to exploit insurgency and communal confict

as radicalization and recruitment tools, especially using the Internet to convey their message. Coun-

tering such eorts demands that we treat immigrant and youth populations not as a source o threat

to be deended against, but as a target o enemy subversion to be protected and supported. It also

requires community leaders to take responsibility or the actions o members within their communi-

ties and act to counteract extremist subversion.

a new Kind of enemy

al-qaida aS a global inSurgenCy

The surace events mentioned above highlight a deeper trend: the transormation o international

terrorism rom the traditional orms that Congress intended to address when it established the

annual Country Reports series into a broader, multiarious approach to transnational non-state

warare that now resembles a orm o global insurgency. We have entered a new era o confict that

may demand new paradigms and dierent responses rom those o previous eras.

AQ and its core leadership group represent a global action network that seeks to aggregate and

exploit the eects o widely dispersed, semi-independent actors. It openly describes itsel as a

transnational guerrilla movement and applies classic insurgent strategies at the global level. AQ


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applies terrorism, but also subversion, propaganda, and open warare, and it seeks weapons o

mass destruction in order to infict the maximum possible damage on its opponents. It links and

exploits a wider, more nebulous community o regional, national, and local actors who share some

o its objectives, but also pursue their own local agendas. Finally, it works through regional and

cross-border sae havens that acilitate its actions while hampering government responses.

diSaggregating the threat

To the extent that AQ succeeds in aggregating this broader constellation o extremist actors, it can

begin to pursue more requent and geographically extensive terror attacks. Thereore, we must act

to disaggregate the threat, through international cooperation, counterpropaganda, counter subver-

sion, counterinsurgency, and traditional counterterrorism.

Disaggregation breaks the links in the chain that exploit ordinary peoples grievances and manipu-

lates them into becoming terrorists. It seeks to provide those who are already radicalized with a

way out and to create pathways or alienated groups to redress their legitimate grievances without

joining the terrorist network. Disaggregation denies AQ its primary objective o achieving leader-

ship over extremist movements worldwide and uniying them into a single movement. It does notremove the threat but helps reduce it to less dangerous local components, which can be dealt with

by individual governments and communities working together.

truSted networKS

Such cooperation requires the creation o trusted networks to displace and marginalize extremist

networks. While killing and capturing key terrorist actors is undamental in combating terrorism,

it can have detrimental eects. These actions do not eliminate the threat and, i mishandled, can

be actively counterproductive. Instead, we must seek to build trusted networks o governments,

private citizens and organizations, multilateral institutions, and business organizations that work

collaboratively to deeat the threat rom violent extremism.

Such networks, over time, help wean at-risk populations away rom subversive manipulation by

terrorists and create mechanisms to address peoples needs and grievances, thus marginalizing

terrorists. Youth organizations, educational networks, business partnerships, womens empower-

ment, and local development initiatives can all play a role, with government as a supportive partner.

leaderS, Safe havenS, underlying ConditionS

To make such active measures eective, the three strategic components o the terrorist threat that

must be neutralized are leaders, sae havens, and underlying conditions. Leaders provide a moti-

vating, mobilizing, and organizing unction and act as symbolic gureheads. Sae havens, which areoten in ungoverned or under-governed spaces, provide a secure environment or training, planning,

nancial and operational support; and a base or mounting attacks. They may be physical or virtual

in nature. In addition, underlying conditions provide the uel, in the orm o grievances and conficts

that power the processes o radicalization.

Treating this new era o confict as a orm o global insurgency implies that counterinsurgency

methods are undamental in combating the new orm o transnational terrorism. These methods

include rstly, a ocus on protecting and securing the population; and secondly, politically and physi-


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cally marginalizing the insurgents, winning the support and cooperation o at-risk populations by

targeted political and development measures, and conducting precise intelligence-led special opera-

tions to eliminate critical enemy elements with minimal collateral damage.

integrating all elementS of national power

All elements o national power including diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence, must be

integrated and applied in a coordinated whole-o-government ashion. The intellectual and psycho-

logical dimensions o the threat are at least as important as its physical dimension, so countermea-

sures must be adequately coordinated and resourced. Thus, the military component o national

power plays only a supporting role in this eort; the primary ocus is on non-military infuence.

Because the enemy is a non-state actor who thrives among disaected populations, private sector

eorts are at least as important as government activity. Citizen diplomacy, cultural activity, person-

to-person contact, economic cooperation and development, and the application o media and

academic resources are key components o our response to the threat. Motivating, mobilizing, and

supporting such privately led activities are key leadership tasks in the new environment.

Commitmentthe Key to SuCCeSS

Experience since 9/11 has shown that the key success actor in conronting violent extremism is

the commitment by governments to work with each other, with the international community, with

private sector organizations, and with their citizens and immigrant populations.

Where governments cooperate, build trusted networks, seek active inormed support rom their

people, provide responsive, eective and legitimate governance, and engage closely with the inter-

national community, the threat rom terrorism has been signicantly reduced.

Where governments have lacked commitment in working with their neighbors and engaging the

support o their people, terrorism and the instability and confict that terrorists exploit remain key

sources o threat.

Summary

This chapter sets the scene or the detailed analysis that ollows. In reviewing events since 9/11, it is

clear that progress has been mixed. Signicant achievements in border security, inormation sharing,

transportation security, nancial controls, and the killing or capture o numerous terrorist leaders have

reduced the threat. But the threat still remains, and state sponsorship, the terrorist response to interven-

tion in Iraq, improved terrorist propaganda capabilities, the pursuit o nuclear weapons by state sponsors

o terrorism, and terrorist exploitation o grievances represent ongoing challenges. Recent trends include

the emergence o guerrilla terrorism in parallel with traditional expeditionary approaches, improved

AQ propaganda warare capacity, and emerging evidence o terrorist conveyor belt that seeks to delib-

erately manipulate and exploit grievances in at-risk populations.

A deeper trend is the shit in the nature o terrorism, rom traditional international terrorism o the

late 20th century into a new orm o transnational non-state warare that resembles a orm o global

insurgency. This represents a new era o warare, and countering this threat demands the application

o counterinsurgency techniques that ocus on protecting, securing, and winning the support o at-risk

populations, in addition to targeting violent extremist networks and individual terrorists.


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Trusted networks o private and government organizations and individuals, and the application o inte-

grated civil-military measures across all elements o national power are keys to this approach. Terrorist

leaders, sae havens, and the underlying conditions that terrorists exploit are the principal strategic

targets that we must address. The key success actor that has emerged so ar is commitment by

governments to work with the international community, their own populations, and at-risk immigrant or

youth populations, to counter the threat collaboratively.


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afriCa overview

We also resolve, as all civilized nations have, to join the global eort to ght

terrorism anywhere in the world recognizing that it is today the most single chal-

lenge to world peace and collective reedom...

EllenJohnsonSirlea, President, Republic oLiberia Remarks, UN General Assembly, 61st

Session New York City, September 19, 2006

A small number o al-Qaida (AQ) operatives in East Arica, particularly Somalia, continued to pose

the most serious threat to American and allied interests in the region. Although elements were

severely disrupted at years end, AQ continued to operate in Somalia and elsewhere in East Arica.

Somalia remains a concern, as the countrys unsecured borders and continued political instability

provide opportunities or terrorist transit and/or organization. AQ remains likely to keep making

common cause with Somali extremists in an attempt to disrupt international peacemaking eorts in

Somalia.

There were ew signicant international terrorist incidents in Arica, but civil confict and ethnic

violence continued in a number o countries. AQ-aliated terrorist groups were present and oper-

ated in Northwest Arica. These groups conducted small scale attacks on host governments andU.S. interests, raised unds, recruited, and conducted other support activities across the Trans-

Sahara. The Salast Group or Preaching and Combat (GSPC) merged with al-Qaida in September

and changed its name to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM/GSPC continued to operate

in the Sahel region, crossing dicult-to-patrol borders between Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Algeria, and

Chad to recruit extremists within the region or training and terrorist operations in the Trans-Sahara

and, possibly, or operations outside the region. Its new alliance with al-Qaida potentially has given it

access to more resources and training.

Hizballah continued to engage in undraising activities in Arica, particularly in West Arica, but did

not engage in any terrorist attacks within the region. Many Arican governments improved their

cooperation and strengthened their eorts in the War on Terror. Both the Arican Union (AU) andArican regional organizations continued initiatives to improve counterterrorism cooperation and

inormation sharing.

tranS-Sahara CounterterroriSm partnerShip (tSCtp)

The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership is a multi-aceted, multi-year strategy aimed at

deeating terrorist organizations by strengthening regional counterterrorism capabilities, enhancing

and institutionalizing cooperation among the regions security orces, promoting democratic

governance, discrediting terrorist ideology, and reinorcing bilateral military ties with the United

States. The overall goals are to enhance the indigenous capacities o governments in the pan-Sahel

Chapter 2.Country reportS on terroriSm


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(Mauritania, Mali, Chad, and Niger, as well as Nigeria and Senegal) to conront the challenge posed

by terrorist organizations in the region and to acilitate cooperation between those countries and our

Maghreb partners (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) in combating terrorism.

The need or TSCTP stemmed rom the potential or expansion o operations by Islamic terrorist

organizations in the Sahel. TSCTP was developed as a ollow-on to the very successul Pan-Sahel

Initiative, which ocused solely on the states o the Sahel. Ongoing concern that Islamist terroristscontinue to seek to create sae havens and support networks in the remote expanses o the Sahel,

as well as the public aliation o some terrorist groups with AQ, led to its ormal approval by the

U.S. Government in early 2005.

TSCTP is a ve-year program o counterterrorism, democratic governance, and military assistance

and includes a public diplomacy component. Its main elements include:

Counterterrorism (CT) programs to create a new regional ocus or trans-Saharan cooperation,

including use o established regional organizations like the Arican Union and its new Center

or the Study and Research on Terrorism in Algiers. These programs include training to improve

border and aviation security and overall CT readiness;

Continued specialized Counterterrorism Assistance Training and Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP)

activities in the trans-Sahara region and possible regional expansion o those programs;

Public diplomacy programs that expand outreach eorts in the Sahel and Maghreb regions,

Nigeria, and Senegal and seek to develop regional programming embracing this vast and diverse

region. Emphasis is on preserving the traditional tolerance and moderation displayed in most

Arican Muslim communities and countering the development o extremism, particularly in youth

and rural populations;

Democratic governance programs that strive, in particular, to provide adequate levels o U.S.

Government support or democratic and economic development in the Sahel, strengthening thosestates ability to withstand internal threats; and

Military programs intended to expand military-to-military cooperation, to ensure adequate

resources are available to train, advise, and assist regional orces, and to establish institutions

promoting better regional cooperation, communication, and intelligence sharing.

the afriCan union

The Arican Union (AU) has several counterterrorism legal instruments, including a Convention on

Prevention and Combating o Terrorism (1999), a 2002 Protocol to the Convention, and a 2004 Plan

o Action. The Addis Ababa-based AU Commission provided guidance to its 5 member states on

ratication and implementation o continental and international counterterrorism commitments, and

coordinated assistance to cover member states counterterrorism gaps. The AU maintained that

Aricas colonial legacy made it dicult to accept a denition o terrorism that excluded an excep-

tion or reedom ghters. Still, the AU is on record strongly condemning acts o terrorism, such

as those that occurred in Sharm El Sheik, Egypt, and London, England. Although AU Commissions

political will to act as an eective counterterrorism partner was strong, capacity remained relatively

weak. The AU sought to create a counterterrorism unit at its headquarters to promote member

state counterterrorism eorts more eectively. The AU welcomes technical and nancial assistance

rom international partners/donors to bolster both AU headquarters and Arican Centre or the Study

and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) activities approved by member states.


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botSwana

Botswana established its National Counterterrorism Committee to address issues pertaining to

terrorism and weapons o mass destruction and regularly participated in Antiterrorism Assistance

(ATA) Programs oered at the International Law Enorcement Academy in Gaborone. The Botswana

Deense Forces designated a squadron as its counterterrorist unit and several o its ocers had

counterterrorism training. The Bank o Botswana listed suspected terrorist assets and inormed all

banking institutions in the country by circulating an updated list o suspicious accounts. Although

Botswana had no Financial Intelligence Unit, the Directorate on Corruption and Economic Crimes

had a dedicated unit investigating suspicious transactions. As a member o the Southern Arica

Development Communitys (SADC) Organization on Politics, Deense, and Security, Botswana

was responsible or the organizations counterterrorism eorts. SADC capabilities and its eorts in

ghting terrorism were limited, however.

burundi

The Government o Burundi attempted to improve its domestic eorts in the ght against interna-

tional terrorism. With assistance rom the United States, Burundi endeavored to pass new legisla-

tion on terrorist nancing and other statutes that would specically outlaw terrorist acts. Although

members o the security sector were responsive to requests to assist the United States, their

training and meager resources severely limited their ability to prevent international terrorist acts.

Burundis porous border, coupled with daily incoming fights rom East Arica, could allow terrorists

easy entry into the country. Through its participation in the Tripartite Plus One group, Burundi joined

with Rwanda, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic o Congo to identiy and prevent regional insur-

gent orces rom operating in its territory.

ComoroS

International terrorism concerns in Comoros ocused on Comorian national Fazul Abdullah

Mohammed (a.k.a. Harun Fazul), who is suspected o involvement in the 1998 bombings o U.S.

embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. His whereabouts were unknown, but he was believed

to have maintained contacts in Comoros. The Comorian governments security orces had limited

resources and training in counterterrorism and maritime security, so the country remained vulner-

able to terrorist transit or sae haven. Comorian police and security orces continued to participate in

U.S. antiterrorism assistance programs and cooperated with the Rewards or Justice Program.

President Sambi, a devout Muslim democratically elected in May, reconrmed Comoros rejection

o terrorism and, with Comoros religious leaders, publicly rejected Islamist extremism. President

Sambi has sought close partnership with the United States to develop Comoros and to create

opportunities or the countrys youth. In September, President Sambi and agreed to establish a joint

committee to improve bilateral relations, including cooperation on counterterrorism.

djibouti

Djibouti hosted the only U.S. military base in Sub-Saharan Arica or U.S. and Coalition Forces

and remained a staunch supporter o U.S. counterterrorism eorts. Djibouti was one o the most

orward-leaning Arab League members supporting ongoing eorts against terrorism. President


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Ismail Omar Guelleh and many top leaders in Djibouti repeatedly expressed their countrys ull and

unqualied support or the War on Terror. Djibouti was one o the very rst Arab League nations to

do so ollowing September 11, 2001, even in the ace o adversity and criticism rom its neighbors.

U.S. security personnel continued to work closely with Djiboutian counterparts to monitor intel-

ligence and ollow up on prospective terrorism-related leads. Although the governments capabilities

were limited, Djiboutian counterparts were very proactive, and were highly receptive and respon-sive to U.S. requests or cooperation. The Djiboutian National Security Services took extraordinary

measures with its limited resources to ensure the saety and security o American citizens, the U.S.

embassy, and the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonier.

ethiopia

Although a developing nation with constrained resources in a tough neighborhood, Ethiopia

demonstrated political will and intent to tackle the problem o terrorism. Ethiopias counterterrorist

capabilities were limited, but increasing. The government agreed to a number o new initiatives and

cooperated in eorts to collect and share intelligence on terrorist groups.

In response to increasing threats against its security in December, the Government o Ethiopia

conducted a counteroensive in support o the internationally recognized Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) o Somalia against the extremist dominated Council o Islamic Courts (CIC).

Mid-year, the CIC gained control o Mogadishu and in a series o oensives in the second hal o

the year, extended its control over most o southern Somalia. The CIC made claims to large areas o

Ethiopia and Kenya inhabited by ethnic Somalis. By the end o the year, Ethiopian and TFG advances

routed the CIC out o Mogadishu, though there was concern that some CIC extremists would

continue to reject peace overtures and could initiate an insurgency with AQ support.

The highest levels o the Ethiopian government recognized Ethiopias vulnerability to nancial crimes

including terrorist nancing and countereiting. The Penal Code adopted in early 2005 criminal-ized money laundering and a number o other nancial crimes. The Central Bank (National Bank o

Ethiopia) drated specic anti-money laundering legislation, which included the establishment o a

Financial Intelligence Unit.

Ethiopias National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), with broad authority or intelligence,

border security, and criminal investigation, was responsible or overall counterterrorism manage-

ment. Federal and local police counterterrorism capabilities were primarily ocused on being able to

respond to terrorist incidents. Drat counterterrorism legislation was beore Parliament at years end.

Ethiopia was an active participant in Arican Union (AU) counterterrorism eorts, was nominated as

a ocal point or the AUs Center or Study and Research on Terrorism, and participated in meetings

o the Committee o Intelligence and Security Services o Arica.

Kenya

Kenya and the United States maintained generally good cooperation against terrorism throughout

2006, to the mutual benet o both countries. Kenya was a capable and willing partner and took

steps to interdict and apprehend terror suspects. Its cooperation, however, was uneven and

constrained by domestic political pressures and considerations. Key among these were Kenyan

Muslim and ethnic-Somali communities unsympathetic to cooperation with the United States, an

inadequate legal and regulatory ramework, and concerns about possible retribution rom Somali

Islamic extremists.


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Kenya proved itsel a solid and proactive partner during the Somali crisis that began in December,

when Islamic extremists feeing the Ethiopian advance threatened Kenyas national security. Kenyas

borders remained porous and vulnerable to movement o potential terrorists as well as small arms

and other contraband. In response to the crisis in Somalia, Kenya deployed its orces along its

border with Somalia and at sea to apprehend feeing CIC extremist ghters and prevent them rom

establishing sae haven in Kenya. Beginning in late 2006, the Kenyan government banned all fightsto and rom Somalia except or humanitarian aid fights and fights to the TFGs center o Baidoa.

The order remained in eect, despite objections rom growers o miraa, or qat, who were deprived

o their main market (Somalia) by the ban.

Important Kenyan ocials spoke out publicly about the dangers o terrorism and key elements o

the Kenyan security apparatus took concrete steps to increase counterterrorism eorts, including

the ormation o an interagency Coastal Security Steering Committee. At the same time, however,

political and bureaucratic resistance remained to the ormation o an interagency Kenyan Joint

Terrorism Task Force (JTTF).

Kenya still lacked counterterrorism legislation. In April 200, Kenya published a drat Suppression

o Terrorism Bill, only to withdraw it ater harsh criticism rom human rights groups and KenyanMuslim communities. The Kenyan government wrote another drat o the bill in May, according to

the UN Oce on Drugs and Crime, but did not ocially publish the document or submit it to Parlia-

ment. In the absence o such legislation, it is dicult to detain terror suspects and to prosecute

them eectively. Nonetheless, ATA-trained police investigators and counterterrorism prosecutors

were credited with the re-arrest and successul prosecution o Kikambala bombing suspect Omar

Said Omar ater his acquittal on the main terrorism charge.1 Omar was subsequently ound guilty on

April 4 and sentenced or illegal possession o a rearm, ammunition, and explosives.

The government made some progress on combating money laundering and terrorist nancing. In

November, the government published the text o the Proceeds o Crime and Money Laundering Bill

or public comment and it is expected to be submitted to Parliament in March 2007. The CentralBank o Kenya issued guidelines eective January 1, 2007, under Section K o the Central Bank

o Kenya Act, to strengthen controls over oreign exchange bureaus to regulate their use o third

party checks and telegraphic transers, transactions that may have previously been used or money

laundering or terrorist nance. Kenya took a major step to combat money laundering through the

closure o Charterhouse Bank.

Senior Kenyan ocials made clear their desire to achieve a Sae Skies agreement, but much work

remained to be done to bring Kenya up to international standards. U.S. Federal Aviation Administra-

tion and Transportation Security Administration training eorts in recent years improved aviation

security, but consistent planning and enorcement o security procedures remained a challenge in

2006, particularly at Wilson Airport in Nairobi. Security improved, however, at Kenyas main air entry

point, Nairobis Jomo Kenyatta International Airport.

liberia

Despite limited resources, untrained personnel, and a weak judicial system, all products o 14 years

o civil war, the Government o Liberia demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the United

States and the international community to combat terrorism. Through rule o law and security sector

reorm assistance programs, the United States supported a number o initiatives that addressed

Liberias vulnerabilities, which included porous borders, rampant identication document raud, lax

1 Fiteen people were killed in the 2002 bombing o the Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Kenya.


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immigration controls, wide-scale corruption, and underpaid law enorcement, security, and customs

personnel. The Liberian government was eager to engage the United States on counterterrorism,

international crime issues, and security sector reorm.

There have never been any acts o transnational terrorism in Liberia. O concern, however, were

reports that hundreds o Middle Eastern businessmen purchased legitimately issued but raudu-

lently obtained Liberian diplomatic passports rom Ministry o Foreign Aairs (MFA) ocials. Thesedocuments would permit ree movement between the Middle East and West Arica. The govern-

ment took steps to stop this Charles Taylor-era practice by requiring that diplomatic passports be

issued only by the MFA in Monrovia.

The governments ailure to surrender ugitives or extradition was a source o rustration in bilateral

relations. In January, a circuit court erroneously held that the bilateral extradition treaty between the

United States and Liberia expired in 1944. The Government o Liberia appealed that decision, and it

is pending in the Supreme Court.

Since 200, there has been a resurgence in the number o visits by oreign Islamic proselytizing

groups, overwhelmingly Sunni organizations rom Pakistan, Egypt, and South Arica. Liberian secu-

rity services reported that none o these groups publicly espoused militant or anti-U.S. messages.

Liberias indigenous, war-weary, and predominantly Sunni Islamic community, which represented

roughly 20 percent o the countrys population, has demonstrated no interest in militant strains o

Islam to date. That said, outstanding land disputes negatively aecting large numbers o Muslim

land owners in Nimba and other counties could an ethnic and religious tensions with the predomi-

nantly Christian central government.

As in other West Arican states, reports o possible Hizballah connections within the Lebanese

community in Liberia indicated that Lebanese businessmen provided nancial support and engaged

in undraising activities or Hizballah. There were no other terrorist groups known to be operating

within Liberia.

madagaSCar

International terrorism was a concern in Madagascar because o the island nations inadequately

monitored ,000 mile coastline. Limited equipment, personnel, and training or border control

increased the risks o penetration. The Ministry o Deense and the U.S. Embassy co-hosted an

International Maritime Security Conerence in July with military and civilian participants rom ten

countries in the Indian Ocean and along the east coast o Arica. Malagasy police, military, intel-

ligence, and security orces have not had much training in counterterrorism and maritime surveil-

lance, but despite limited resources, government ocials were willing to cooperate with the

United States; the international maritime conerence and the Rewards or Justice Program were

two examples o cooperative ventures. At the main port in Tamatave, which handled 80 percent o

maritime trac and more than 90 percent o container trac, access control and overall security

improved substantially. The U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Liaison removed Tamatave Port rom its

Port Security Advisory or Madagascar, with an acknowledgement that the Port met minimum stan-

dards under the International Ship and Port Facility (ISPS) Code.


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mali

Inadequate resources continued to hamper the Malian governments ability to control its long and

porous borders, thus limiting the eectiveness o military patrols and border control measures. Mali

cooperated with U.S. eorts, and remained one o the largest recipients in the sub-region o military

training and assistance through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership and other U.S. assis-

tance programs. Northern Mali served as a potential sae haven or terrorists, trackers, and smug-

glers due to the regions remoteness, harsh desert climate, and size. The AQIM/GSPC maintained

a regular, small-scale presence, moving essentially without hindrance in the northern part o Malian

territory, although it did not maintain any permanent acilities and was constantly on the move. In

September and October, a group o Malian Tuareg rebels, known as the Alliance or Democracy and

Change (ADC), engaged in two reghts with the AQIM/GSPC in northern Mali. The Malian govern-

ment did not announce an ocial position on the violence between the ADC and AQIM/GSPC, nor

did it attempt to conront AQIM/GSPC elements in the North or prevent their use o Malian territory.

There were no conrontations between the Malian military and the AQIM/GSPC in 2006.

mauritania

Mauritanian leaders continued to cooperate with the United States in the War on Terror. The tran-

sitional government took several positive steps toward creating an inclusive political environment

that allowed moderate Islamic groups to participate in the political process. While the government

continued not to recognize Islamic political parties, it did allow these groups to submit legislative

and municipal candidates on independent lists.

On April 26, three suspected terrorists escaped rom the central prison and apparently fed the

country. Between May and August, the government arrested approximately ten individuals it

claimed had links to terrorist groups. This brought the number o suspected terrorists in custody to

approximately 20. The government did not try any o the suspected terrorists it held. Mauritanian

ocials dismantled a AQIM/GSPC network in May and June. The government did not tolerate

the presence o AQIM/GSPC members on its territory, and several AQIM/GSPC members who

attempted to inltrate the country were arrested. In contrast with the previous year, there were no

terrorist attacks on Mauritanian soil. However, ghting between the AQIM/GSPC and Tuareg rebels

in Northern Mali occasionally threatened the border region. The Mauritanian Group or Preaching

and Jihad (GMPJ) was not active during the year because most o its members were arrested in

May 2005. Although eight o its members were released this year, the groups leaders remained in

Mauritanian custody.

nigeria

Although Nigeria wanted to be viewed as taking a leading counterterrorism role in West Arica,

its security agencies remained reactive. Nigerian intelligence and security services worked hard,

however, to improve intelligence sharing on counterterrorism issues, and the Nigerian military

worked to establish units with counterterrorism capability. Nigerian security services were coopera-

tive when asked to investigate potential terrorist threats to U.S. interests.

Nigeria took the lead in the Economic Community o West Arican States (ECOWAS) and the AU in

sponsoring joint intelligence and security conerences on counterterrorism. The New Partnership

or Arican Development (NEPAD), an organization ounded by Arican heads o state, condemned

terrorism and called or Arican nations to take concrete measures to combat it. Nigeria initiated

legislative and regulatory steps to shore up its anti-money laundering regime to ght terrorism.


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While Nigerias current criminal law did not contain specic counterterrorism provisions, the penal

code proscribed acts o violence that included terrorism. In August, the Nigerian cabinet approved

a drat counterterrorism bill and sent it to the National Assembly or consideration. Under the new

legislation, anyone convicted o a terrorist oense could be sentenced to as much as 5 years in

prison. The National Assembly had not acted on the bill by years end.

There was no special examining magistrate with specic powers in the counterterrorism area. InNigeria, suspects by law must be charged within 48 hours, but in practice were held as long as

deemed necessary. Most criminals were photographed and ngerprinted by security elements, but

DNA samples were not taken due to resource constraints and a lack o scientic inrastructure.

While the Nigerian government did not support international terrorism or terrorists, there were

some individuals and private groups in Nigeria with ties to probable terrorist elements in Sudan,

Iran, Pakistan, and Libya. Members o terrorist groups, including al-Qaida and the AQIM/GSPC, have

operated and recruited in Nigeria.

rwanda

The Rwandan government made eorts to combat terrorism nancing and continued to increase

its border control measures to identiy potential terrorists. Rwanda had an intergovernmental

counterterrorism committee and a counterterrorism reaction team in the police intelligence unit.

Central Bank and Ministry o Finance ocials continued to provide outstanding cooperation on

terrorist nancing issues. While the Government o Rwanda had not yet ully developed its laws

and regulations in accordance with international conventions and protocols concerning terrorism,

it had the authority under local law to identiy, reeze, and seize terrorist-related nancial assets.

Rwanda participated in regional initiatives on international counterterrorism cooperation, including

active participation in the East Arican Stand-by Brigade. In September, it hosted the Third Regional

Counter-Terrorism Conerence or Chies o Security and Intelligence Services in Kigali, and it

assumed the chairmanship o the organization. In October, Police Commissioner General AndrewRwigamba was appointed the World Regional Chair or sub-Saharan Arica or the International

Association o Chies o Police (IACP).

The Democratic Forces or the Liberation o Rwanda (FDLR)2, an armed rebel orce that included

ormer soldiers and supporters o the previous government that orchestrated the 1994 genocide,

continued to operate in the Democratic Republic o the Congo. Rwanda pressed or international

action to pursue the FDLR. A unit o this organization was responsible or the kidnapping and

murder o nine persons, including two American tourists, in Bwindi Park in 1999. The Rwandan

government assisted U.S. law enorcement ocials in an attempt to prosecute three individuals,

suspected in the 1999 attack, who were transerred to the United States in 200.

Senegal

The Government o Senegal cooperated with the United States in identiying terrorist groups oper-

ating in Senegal. More work remained to be done, however, to develop rst responder services, to

acilitate the quick sharing o inormation between agencies, and to control porous borders where

police and security services are undermanned and ill-equipped to prevent illicit cross-border tra-

cking. The Government o Senegal armed its commitment to United States government-assisted

eorts to augment its border security.

2 The Democratic Forces or the Liberation o Rwanda was known as the Army or the Liberation o Rwanda (ALIR) until 2001.


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Senegal continued to enhance its ability to combat terrorism, prosecute terror suspects, and

respond to emergencies. Despite advances, however, Senegal lacked specic counterterrorism

legislation and current laws made it dicult to prosecute terror suspects. As participants in the

Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership, more than 180 Senegalese government ocials took

part in ATA programs. Senegalese military ocials attended a counterterrorism seminar in Algiers

and attended the Chies o Deense and Directors o Military Intelligence conerences. The DeenseInternational Institute o Legal Studies, the U.S. Treasurys Oce o Technical Assistance, and the

United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) gave separate seminars on the legal aspects o

ghting terrorism.

During the year, President Wade met again with Imam Mamour Fall, a Senegalese deported rom

Italy in 200 or praising Usama bin Laden, to counsel moderation. President Wade also criticized

members o the Senegalese press or exaggerating the level o public support or extremism.

Sierra leone

Sierra Leones armed orces ocused on border control because potential unrest in neighboring

countries remained a threat. The government did not detect any radical Islamic activities.

There were no identied terrorist groups or organizations in Sierra Leone, however, there were

allegations that members o the Lebanese business community in Sierra Leone, many o whom

are diamond traders, were sympathetic to and made nancial contributions to Hizballah. The Bank

o Sierra Leone established a Financial Investigations Unit, but it lacked the capacity to eectively

monitor nancial transactions. Financial constraints, corruption, and insucient capacity continued

to hinder Sierra Leones counterterrorism and law enorcement capabilities.

Somalia

Somalias weak central government, protracted state o violent instability, long unguarded coastline,porous borders, and proximity to the Arabian Peninsula made it a potential location or international

terrorists seeking a transit or launching point or conducting operations in Somalia or elsewhere. The

rise o the Council o Islamic Courts (CIC) and their expansion o control into southern and central

Somalia created a more permissive operating environment and sae haven or oreign terrorists. In

June, the CIC gained control o Mogadishu and were initially welcomed as bringing a modicum o

peace and stability to the city. Over the course o the ollowing months, the broader CIC organiza-

tion was hijacked by al Shabaab (The Youth), a small, extremist group aliated with AQ that consists

o radicalized young men, between 20 and 0 years o age. Many o its senior leaders are believed

to have trained and ought with AQ in Aghanistan. The CIC began to pursue an increasingly hostile

strategy o military expansion and aggression designed to provoke a broader regional confict. Al

Shabaab militia participated in CIC military oensives and served as something akin to a specialorces unit or the CIC. Although not ormally a part o the CIC structure, members o al Shabaab

held senior positions within the CIC, particularly in the security, nance, and education departments.

The group was reputed to be extremely violent and brutal, and its members are suspected o

murdering an Italian nun in Mogadishu in September, targeted assassinations o dozens o Somali

nationals inside Somalia, including the murder o peace activist Abdulqadir Yahya Ali in July 2005

and the murder o oreign aid workers in the sel-declared Republic o Somaliland in late 200 to

early 2004. In late June, the CIC elected Hassan Dahir Aweys chairman o the CIC Shura Council.

Aweys is designated as a terrorist by the United States and the United Nations because o his links

to AQ, the Taliban, or Usama bin Laden.


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Among the oreign AQ operatives believed to have enjoyed protection by the CIC and al Shabaab

leadership are individuals wanted or the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania and a2002 hotel bombing in Kenya, including Fazul Abdallah Mohammed (aka Harun Fazul), Abu Talha

al-Sudani, and Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan. At the end o the year, the Transitional Federal Government

(TFG), backed by Ethiopia, succeeded in ending CIC control o Mogadishu and southern and central

Somalia. Regional eorts to bring about national reconciliation and establish peace and stability in

Somalia are ongoing. Although the capability o the TFG and other Somali local and regional authori-

ties to carry out counterterrorism activities was limited, some have taken actions.

South afriCa

South Arica continued to publicly support global eorts to combat terrorism and shared nancial,

law enorcement, and limited intelligence inormation with the United States. President Mbeki

reiterated his support or such cooperation during his December meeting with President Bush. On

several occasions President Mbeki voiced his opinion that no circumstances whatsoever can ever

justiy resorting to terrorism. Members o Parliament rom other parties, including Muslim legisla-

tors, have echoed Mbekis sentiments.

The Government o South Arica supported multilateral counterterrorism eorts and bolstered its

enorcement agencies. Resource constraints, however, limited the extent to which South Arica

could und its security orces or counterterrorist initiatives. The South Arican government is sensi-

tive to distinctions between terrorist organizations and liberation movements, since the ruling

Arican National Congress was long branded a terrorist group during the struggle against apartheid.

SOUTH AFRICA, Pretoria: Hundreds o Muslims protested outside the Danish Embassy in Pretoria 10 February 2006 demanding an

immediate and unwavering apology rom the Danish Government to the global Muslim community. AFP Photo/Fati Moalusi


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The Government o Uganda and the LRA began peace negotiations in July. The process yielded a

Cessation o Hostilities Agreement (CHA) on August 26 that was poorly monitored and repeatedly

violated. The CHA was renewed with strengthened monitoring provisions on November 1. The

Government o Uganda remained committed to the ongoing peace process.

zimbabwe

Despite the Government o Zimbabwes sel-imposed isolation on most diplomatic issues, local

intelligence and criminal investigative agencies were responsive to U.S. needs in the War on Terror.

Government agencies routinely provided assistance by conducting investigative inquiries, traces,

and border checks o individuals thought to be threats to U.S. government acilities or personnel.

In May, the Reserve Bank o Zimbabwe (RBZ) released new guidelines on anti-money laundering

and combating the nancing o terrorism or nancial institutions and non-nancial businesses

and proessionals. In August, Zimbabwe assumed the Presidency or the Eastern and Southern

Arica Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG) or the 2006/2007 administrative year and, in

this capacity, hosted the groups Council o Ministers o Finance meeting in August. In August,

Zimbabwe and the Republic o South Arica signed a memorandum o understanding or the

exchange o inormation in combating money laundering and the nancing o terrorism.

eaSt aSia and paCifiC overview

Our cause is a just cause. Terrorism respects no value system; terrorism does not

respect the tenets o the great religions o the world; terrorism is based on evil,

intolerance, and bigotry. And no ree societies, such as Australia and the United

States, can ever buckle under to bigotry and intolerance.

JohnHoward,Prime Minister o Australia Remarks at the

White House Washington, DC, May 16, 2006

The Jemaah Islamiya regional terrorist network remained a serious threat to Western and regional

interests, particularly in Indonesia and the Southern Philippines, although its capabilities were

degraded due in large part to regional counterterrorism successes in 2005-2006. As 2007 began,

DNA analysis conducted by the FBI conrmed the death o Abu Sayya Groups (ASG) nominal

leader, Khadday Janjalani, at the hands o the Armed Forces o the Philippines (AFP). Early in 2007,

Philippine orces also eliminated ASG spokesperson, Abu Solaiman. In August, the AFP killed a

signicant ASG sub commander, Ismin Sahiron. These deaths represented a major blow to JI, but

did not eliminate the overall threat to U.S. interests in the Philippines. JI bombers Dulmatin and

Patek remained on the run, probably on Jolo Island. Other terrorists remained at large in Southeast

Asia, such as key JI operative Noordin Mat Top, in Indonesia.

Geography makes eective border control problematic or archipelagic states like Indonesia and

the Philippines. Monitoring remote locations among the thousands o islands in the Sulawesi Sea

and Sulu Archipelago that span the boundaries between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines

is extremely dicult, which makes this tri-border area well suited to terrorist activities, including

movement o personnel, equipment, and unds. Thereore, regional capacity building has emerged

as a priority goal, in addition to bilateral cooperation and national capacity building. Institutes like the


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U.S.-Thailand International Law Enorcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok and the Southeast Asia

Regional Center or Counterterrorism (SEARCCT) in Malaysia continued to expand their activities

to provide eective counterterrorism training to law enorcement ocers throughout the region.

Likewise, the Australian-Indonesian Jakarta Center or Law Enorcement Cooperation (JCLEC) is

a promising additional regional center or capacity building. Multilateral ora, including the United

Nations Security Councils Counterterrorism Committee (UNCTC), the G8s Roma-Lyon Group andCounterterrorism Action Group (CTAG), the Asia-Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC) orum, the

Association o Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which adopted a new ASEAN Convention on

Counterterrorism pending ratication, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), continued their impor-

tant roles as key organizations or regional counterterrorism cooperation.

Australia worked to strengthen the Asia-Pacic regions counterterrorism capacity through a range

o initiatives, both bilaterally and in regional ora such as APEC, the ASEAN ARF, and the Pacic

Island Forum (PIF). Australia increased its our-year counterterrorism assistance to the region by

about $70 million to boost the capacity to combat terrorism, bringing the total amount committed to

oshore counterterrorism activities since 2004 to $50 million. In March, Australian police arrested

three suspected terrorists in Melbourne as part o an ongoing counterterrorism operation, disrupting

a signicant threat to the city.

China supported several operational and logistical aspects o the War on Terror. China participates

in the United States Megaports Initiative designed to improve the security o U.S.-bound cargo.

Container Security initiative programs are operating in the ports o Shanghai and Shenzhen. China

increased its eorts to build its domestic counterterrorism capabilities with a ocus on improving

security or the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing continued to express concern that terrorists operate

on Chinese territory and has asserted that some members o the Uighur minority in Xingjiang Prov-

ince pose a threat to Chinas domestic stability.

Japan strengthened its own security by contributing to counterterrorism capacity-building among

Asian countries and by participating in a second trilateral counterterrorism dialogue with the UnitedStates and Australia in October. Japan is using Ocial Development Assistance (ODA) grants to

expand counterterrorism capacity building in Southeast Asia. This $60 million dollar annual program,

initiated in FY-2006, includes projects aimed at increasing maritime and port security. The Republic

o Korea is shiting its attention to possible acts o terror beyond the Korean Peninsula. Refecting

this shit, the Ministry o Foreign Aairs and Trade (MOFAT) appointed its rst Director or Interna-

tional Counterterrorism Cooperation in February.

Thailands military staged a coup in September. An interim government has been attempting to

address the ongoing violence connected to a separatist movement in the ethnic Malay, Muslim

south. Although the roots o the problem are ethnic and not religious, there is concern that southern

unrest has the potential to attract international terrorist groups such as JI and al-Qaida that may

attempt to capitalize on the increasingly violent situation or their own purposes.

auStralia

In addition to its substantial ongoing eorts to combat domestic and international terrorism,

Australia launched new initiatives working with its regional neighbors to assist in building their

resolve and capacity to conront terrorism. The Australian Federal Police (AFP) Joint Counterter-

rorism Teams (JCTT) multi-agency eort to address domestic and international terrorism concerns

in Australias six largest cities became ully operational this year. In March, Australian police arrested

three suspected terrorists in Melbourne as part o an ongoing counterterrorism operation, disrupting


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responding to terrorist attacks, and commencing activities to promote tolerance and counteract

terrorist propaganda. Key programs included unding or enhancing law enorcement counterter-

rorism capacity and liaison networks, expanding intelligence cooperation capabilities, improving

border control capability and coordination in Southeast Asia, urther developing the APEC Regional

Movement Alert System, enhancing Indonesias border alert system at major ports, building regional

awareness o the terrorist WMD threat and strengthening regional controls on chemical, biological,radiological, and nuclear materials, and improving regional emergency response capacity and coor-

dination. In July, Australia became an initial partner nation in the U.S. Global Initiative to Combat

Nuclear Terrorism and, in October, it participated in a second Trilateral Counterterrorism Dialogue

with the United States and Japan.

Australia continued to provide legal drating assistance to regional states, including the South Pacic

islands, seeking to adopt international conventions and protocols against terrorism and to bring their

domestic laws into conormity with these conventions. In February, Australia opened the upgraded

Transnational Crime Centre in Jakarta which was rst established as a joint initiative between

Australia and Indonesia in the atermath o the 2002 Bali bombings. The center housed Indonesias

rst national intelligence database, linking 0 locations throughout the country. The joint Austra-

lian-Indonesian Jakarta Centre or Law Enorcement Cooperation (JCLEC) located in Semarang,

Indonesia has oered more than 50 courses and trained more than 1,200 ocers to date. The AFP

committed additional agents to Jakarta and Manila to work closely with those governments and the

FBI to apprehend JI ugitives.

The AFP received unding to expand its investigative and specialist training, currently delivered to

regional law enorcement partners through acilities like JCLEC. Funding was also targeted toward

conducting oshore exercises and training with regional partners, increasing the number o coun-

terterrorism advisers working in the AFPs international liaison ocer network, introducing to high

priority locations a custom-built Case Management and Inormation System developed or use in

overseas jurisdictions, and enhancing specialist orensic and technical training or law enorcement

agencies in the region. The Australian government substantially increased the AFPs InternationalDeployment Group by over 400 personnel and created an Operational Response Group ready to

respond on short notice to emerging law and order issues and to conduct stabilization operations.

Australia contributed an additional 500 troops to Aghanistan as part o a Dutch-led provincial recon-

struction team. By years end, there were 1,000 Australian troops in Iraq and 800 in Aghanistan.

Australia designated a total o 19 terrorist organizations under its domestic criminal code.

The Government o Australia and its Muslim advisory body, the Muslim Community Reerence

Group, continued eorts begun in 2005 to develop and implement a National Action Plan to promote

social cohesion, harmony, and security. The plan committed almost $0 million or a range o

activities to address extremism and intolerance in the Australian community. Activities will include

integration enhancement and crisis management training or Muslim communities, and education

and employment programs that work to bring law enorcement agencies and Muslim communities

together to resolve issues o confict and discrimination.

burma

Bilateral relations between Burma and the United States remained strained. The Burmese regimes

willingness to cooperate and coordinate on counterterrorist activities within the country and

throughout the region remains limited. However, Burma has cooperated with the United States on


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both transnational terrorist threats and law enorcement eorts to stem narcotracking and money

laundering. Burmese Special Branch police created a new counterterrorism unit headquartered in

Rangoon.

The Burmese judicial system lacked independence and transparency and suered rom corruption.

The government dened almost all anti-regime activities acts o terrorism and made little distinc-

tion between peaceul political dissent and violent attacks by insurgents or criminals. Suspectedperpetrators o any acts that opposed the regime were subject to lengthy detention without trial or

due process. The government was quick to characterize dissident groups as aligned with terrorist

organizations and used this as justication to scrutinize and disrupt their activities. The regime regu-

larly labeled exile leaders and political activists as terrorists. No reliable evidence existed that any

terrorists, terrorist organizations, or aliations, were using Burma as a sae haven.

No known anti-American terrorist groups were operating in Burma. However, some observers

posited possible links between known terrorist organizations and two local insurgent groups: the

Rohingya Solidarity Organization, and the Arakan Rohingya National Organization. There were ew

signs that either group remained active inside o Burma, although the Burmese regimes severe

repression o the Rohingya Muslim population inside Burma could oster sympathy with extremistmethods and objectives.

Indigenous violence in Burma generally was targeted against the ruling regime. Various insurgent

groups in ethnic minority areas near borders with China, India, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand

conducted small-scale actions against the Burmese authorities. The Government o Burma attrib-

uted several recent bombings in the capital and elsewhere to anti-regime elements, but did not

publicly le charges against specic individuals.

On January , two small-scale bombings occurred in Bago. No deaths or injuries were reported.

Police conducted an initial investigation and blamed ethnic Karen groups or attempting to disrupt

the National Convention and Burmese Independence Day, which is January 4. On April 20, ve

small improvised explosive devices went o in downtown Rangoon; police reported minimal

damage and no injuries. On September 21, Embassy contacts in the Burmese Special Branch Police

reported that a small bomb exploded inside a womens bathroom at the Teachers Training College

in Rangoon, but that no one was injured and the explosion caused very little damage. The Burmese

police politely reused the Embassys request to view either the scene or any remaining ragments.

As in most such incidents, the Government o Burma claimed the incident was a subversive act,

committed by a group o insurgent destructive elements who wanted to disturb and destroy

stability o the state. Authorities did not make public any evidence o a genuine investigation or

identiy the specic perpetrator(s).

CambodiaCambodias ability to investigate potential terrorist activities was limited by a lack o training and

resources. An absence o comprehensive domestic legislation to combat terrorism also hindered

the governments ability to arrest and prosecute terrorists. Cambodias political leadership, however,

demonstrated a strong commitment to take aggressive legal action against terrorists.

There were no indications that specic terrorist groups operated in Cambodia, but porous borders

and endemic corruption could make the country vulnerable to a terrorist presence. The Cambo-

dian government believed that the Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF), which carried out an


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armed attack in November 2000 that killed eight people, are still capable o carrying out attacks in

Cambodia. The leader o this group was arrested in Caliornia in 2005. The Cambodian government

was working with the FBI to bring the leader o the CFF to trial in the United States.

Various ocials were identied to take positions in Cambodias National Counterterrorism

Committee (NCTC), a policy level decision-making body established by the government in 2005 and

chaired by the prime minister. The Australian military conducted a conerence with the NCTC inAugust and expressed its intention to ollow-up with a tabletop exercise with the Center.

In addition to providing assistance or the NCTC, the Australian government was helping Cambodia

drat a new counterterrorism law. The drat law was being reviewed by the relevant legislative

committee and the national legislature was expected to adopt it. The Australian and U.K. govern-

ments jointly sponsored a National Seminar on Counterterrorism in April to help train the Cambodian

military and police. The Malaysian government cooperated with the Cambodian government on

Malaysia-specic cases.

In December, ollowing the visit o the Sri Lankan prime minister, the Cambodian government

announced that a Sri Lankan military intelligence ocial would work with police and deenseocials on intelligence matters. His announcement ollowed Prime Minister Hun Sens assurance

to his Sri Lankan counterpart that the Tamil Tiger rebels would not receive arms smuggled rom

Cambodia, although the government acknowledged it was likely this has occurred in the past.

Cambodia has destroyed 200,000 small arms over the last several years with EU assistance, and,

with U.S. assistance, has destroyed its stockpile o MANPADS.

With U.S. assistance, the Government o Cambodia installed computerized border control systems

at Phnom Penh and Siem Riep airports and at the land border crossing o Poipet and Koh Kong. The

Cambodian government also cooperated ully with U.S. requests to monitor terrorists and terrorist

entities listed as supporters o terrorist nancing.

China

As Beijing prepares to host the 2008 Olympics, China increasingly reached out to the United States

and other nations on counterterrorism cooperation. No acts o terrorism were committed in China this

year, but Chinese citizens were victims o terrorist acts in Aghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan.

China participated in the United States Megaports Initiative designed to improve security or United

States-bound cargo. The U.S. Department o Energy and its Chinese counterparts made progress

toward implementation o the November 2005 agreement allowing the installation o equipment at

Chinas ports to detect hidden shipments o nuclear and other radioactive materials. China became

an initial partner nation in the U.S. Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, attending the rst

meeting o the Global Initiative in Rabat, Morocco in October. China also continued its participationin the Container Security Initiative.

Chinese ocials signed statements with counterterrorism counterparts in the Association o South-

east Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), Asia Pacic Economic Cooperation (APEC), and

the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In April, China co-hosted the Fourth ARF Meeting

on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime in Beijing. China is a ounding member o the SCO

and has made counterterrorism one o the groups main objectives. In June, China hosted an SCO

summit in Shanghai that included India, Iran, Pakistan, and Mongolia as observers. At the summit,

the member states agreed to hold joint counterterrorism military exercises in Russia in 2007, with

troops rom all six SCO member states participating. In August, China and Kazakhstan held their


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rst-ever joint counterterrorism exercises in Kazakhstan. In August, China signed agreements with

Pakistan on border control, terrorism, and crime and, in December, held joint counterterrorism exer-

cises in Pakistan.

China ratied the UN International Convention or the Suppression o the Financing o Terrorism

in February and worked to expand its international cooperation on terrorist nance through mutual

legal assistance agreements with oreign jurisdictions. In October, China passed a new Anti-MoneyLaundering Law, which took eect January 1, 2007, broadening the scope o existing anti-money

laundering regulations to hold a greater range o nancial institutions liable and to expand the

powers o the Peoples Bank o China (PBOC). With the PBOC as the lead agency or all anti-money

laundering activities in China, the Ministry o Public Security (MPS) is responsible or criminal

investigations, and t

country reports terrorism 2006

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