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Governance in Co-operatives and the Competitive Business Environment in Africa 1. Danda, Eligius Benjamin 2. Bamanyisa, Justinian Mushumbusi. 1

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Page 1: Danda and Bama Governance 2011 Final Copy Moro

Governance in Co-operatives and the Competitive Business Environment in Africa

1. Danda, Eligius Benjamin

2. Bamanyisa, Justinian Mushumbusi.

Moshi June 2011

Abstract

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Co-operative organizations, mostly agricultural-based, have pioneered the provision of important social and economic services for their members, albeit to some limited extent largely in rural Africa as well as in urban settings. Rural smallholder agricultural producers in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) through their cooperatives, contribute immensely to the overall economic growth, but are in the least remunerative sector in the economy. Most if not all countries in SSA witnessed, in pre and post independence epochs, attempts to tailor co-operatives to become vehicles for development in their countries. Along the path of revitalizing and reforming co-operatives, varied presidential commissions were mandated to advise policy makers with limited successes or in some cases implementation of recommendations resulted in dismal performance. Advent of economic liberalization in terms of Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), brainchild of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF), and ushering in of globalization of the world economic system complicated further the situation of co-operatives.

Like all forms of enterprises, cooperatives create opportunity for income generation employment, increase the availability of goods and services and contribute to economic growth. Most co-operatives are facing vagaries and challenges of changing business environment that demands new business skills, managerial practices and new approaches in co-operative development and management by the government on the one hand forming the external environment, while the internal environment involves principal-agency relationship concerning owners who are co-operative members and agents comprising leaders and management on the other. One critical emerging role is advocacy. Advocacy in its generic sense is increasingly becoming fundamental and takes centre stage now, than at any time in the struggle for member-based co-operative entrepreneurial growth in Africa.

Agricultural cooperatives in SSA lead transformation and modernization of rural economy, national economic growth, sustained reduction of mass poverty and ward off food insecurity; and are associated with agricultural ‘green’ revolutions; given different names like Kilimo Kwanza (Agriculture First) Resolution in Tanzania, which require re-considering the role of cooperatives and the way they carryout their business.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents (i)Abstract (ii)

1.0 Background information4

1.1 Introduction1.2 Co-operative strategies in competitive business

environment

2.0 Co-operative governance perspectives8

2.1 Governance Defined2.2 Defining Co-operative Governance 2.3 Co-operative Governance in Practice

2.3.1 Internal Governance2.3.2 External Governance

3.0 Co-operative governance and the changing business environment

183.1 Pathway of co-operatives 1976 – 1982 3.2 Agricultural marketing and changing business environment3.3 Analysis of findings

4.0 Lessons learnt for African Co-operatives 24

5.0 Policy implications and feedback24

6.0 Conclusion and Recommendations25

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1.0 Background to the study

1.1 IntroductionIn rural Africa, co-operative organizations, mostly agricultural-based, have pioneered the provision of important social and economic services for their members, albeit to some limited extent, similarly to communities within which they operate. The main categories of agricultural co-operatives fall into mainstream activities of agricultural undertaking including supply of agricultural inputs, joint production and agricultural marketing. (http://www.eco-innovation.net.node.113 site visited on 19th May 2011). The most popular agricultural co-operative has historically been the marketing of agricultural produce. In some cases, agricultural co-operatives have combined both input distribution and crop marketing. Agricultural co-operatives are important organizations for sustaining rural development and food security in Africa. They provide a critical organizational framework that is theoretically and ethically needed for the mobilization of isolated small farmers for self directed economic development, independent of state systems (Chambo, 2009).

Co-operatives are value-based and people-based economic enterprises, founded upon the well-defined ethos and principles which include ‘concern for the community’. This dual [social and economic] character is unique to co-operatives which make them ideal and, in fact, the only vehicle to ensure equitable distribution. They have the flexibility to fit into any political system while reinforcing national commitments for equity, democracy and good governance. In spite of the drawbacks and difficulties faced by them, agricultural co-operatives are the best-suited institutions for not only agricultural development but also for food security and poverty reduction. To a great extent they are indispensable for accelerating the development in general and agriculture in particular (Prakash, 2008).

In simple terms a cooperative is an organization of people who work together for economic benefit. Cooperatives bring the idea of cooperation—working together—to the business world. The cooperative idea is one with many applications. Is a business voluntarily owned and controlled by the people who use it—its members. It is operated solely for the benefit of its members, to meet their mutual needs. When groups of people have similar needs—such as the need for lower prices, more affordable housing, or access to telecommunications services—cooperatives offer great potential to meet those needs.

At its core, a co-op is a business. It is subject to the same needs and demands of any business: co-ops require sufficient financing, careful market analysis, strategic and comprehensive planning, well-trained and competent personnel. Co-ops are not immune to the market and economic forces that cause small businesses to struggle and fail.But in several important ways, co-ops are also unique and different. Most distinctly, a cooperative business is owned by the people who use its services—the members. Co-ops may resemble other businesses outwardly, but the

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fact that they are owned by members makes them unique (Zimbelman, 2002).

Although definitions of co-ops vary, they all contain the following elements: Co-ops are owned and controlled by those who use their services (the

members). Co-ops are democratically governed. Co-ops are businesses, not clubs or associations. Co-ops adhere to internationally recognized principles.

Most co-operatives are part of a complex, co-operatively-owned network structures that combine diverse functions such as finance, insurance, marketing, extension and education among regions, branches and sectors (Hanisch, 2005). What set co-operatives apart from other forms of private enterprises are found in their connection to community, underlying values, ethics and democratic principles (Allen and Maghimbi, 2009).

Four major pillars justify formation of ‘genuine’ co-operatives; first, they are formed by groups of people, who have a felt need or problem to solve. Secondly, the organization is formed freely by members after contributing to its assets. Thirdly, the organization formed, is governed democratically in order to achieve desired objectives on equitable norms, and fourthly, it is an independent enterprise promoted, owned and controlled by people to meet their needs (DFID: 2008). It is about peoples’ organization to capture different opportunities in the economy where they can address their economic needs and aspirations. By the same token therefore, co-operatives can be formed in any sector of the economy of a country such as agriculture, mining, industry and service (Chambo: 2009). Worthy to note here is that agricultural marketing co-operatives aim to provide small incomes to a largely cashless rural community. This paper addresses the extent to which co-operative governance in the context of co-operative agricultural marketing is competent to face competitive business environment confronting African economies. It attempts to identify major drivers and constraints largely associate with state of the art of co-operative governance.

1.2 Conditions Necessary for the Success of Agricultural Co-operatives

Results of various studies and accumulated experience with co-operatives for the past 80 years have recognized several factors which are responsible for the success of agricultural co-operatives. The factors include, but not limited to: -(i) Co-operatives are member-driven, member-controlled and

member-responsive organisations; (ii) Design of the co-operatives determines the level of cohesive

governance structure; (iii) Co-operatives are efficiently managed by trained and

professionally-qualified staff under the supervision and control of

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democratically-elected boards of directors, elected board members does not perform executive/business functions.

(iv) Co-operatives have integrated their operations with the needs of their member households;

(v) Well-integrated vertical structures of co-operatives exist and these provide support in order to enable the base level co-operatives to effectively and efficiently service their individual members;

(vi) The federal co-operatives provide advisory services, technical know-how and back-up support services;

(vii) Co-operatives undertake comprehensive programmes for member education in order to facilitate the process of members’ participation, members’ involvement and empowerment; and for training of staff and members of boards of directors;

(viii) Co-operatives undertake value-added operations; choose, assess and employ appropriate and advanced technologies; and forge forward integration in order to gain competitive advantage in the market-place.

(ix) Co-operatives establish viable and strong linkages with external research and development/extension agencies in the field of agriculture and technology;

(x) Co-operatives strive to become self-reliant, accumulate capital and develop other resources in order to remain free from all external controls and directions; and

(xi) Lastly co-operatives are open, value-based, ethical, caring, and socially aware institutions (Prakash, 2008, 1-2).

Tanzania is predominantly an agricultural economy. The sector employed over 80% of the country’s workforce and contributing to GDP at 46% in 1990 and slightly down to 44.1% in 2002 (URT, 2003:10) and further declined to 24% in 2008 according to Poverty and Human Development Report (PHDR, 2009). The economy recorded a real GDP growth of 7.0 percent for 2010, up from 6.0 percent registered in 2009. The analysis of sources of growth in 2010 indicated that trade, agriculture and fishing, transport and communication, as well as manufacturing activities were the main drivers (BoT 2011 March). These data are not aggregated to show concretely the specific contribution of co-operatives to the economy of the country. Since national development depend on agriculture as the lead sector for peoples’ livelihoods, significant poverty reduction will, at least in the short and medium term, depend on the collective actions of producers, government interventions and producer organizations including producer co-operatives (URT, 2010). This relationship will also determine the readiness and resilience of co-operatives to be able to overcome and proactively engage gainfully in the competitive business environment.

Whilst different types of co-operatives in developed countries enhanced members’ benefits, there has been increasing disappointment with co-operatives in developing countries (Munkner, 1996; Banturaki, 2000, Chambo, 2007). The agriculture sector in

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Tanzania, where most agricultural marketing co-operatives are prevalent, has performed less well, averaging 4.4% growth since 2000, well below MKUKUTA’s target of 10% by 2010 (URT: 2009).

ILO (2000) report on co-operatives in developing countries conclude that co-operatives had experienced state-sponsorship and control since their introduction by the colonial powers and subjected to be development tools by governments of the independent states. Co-operatives became vehicles for political patronage, nepotism, subject to capture by local elites, co-operative ministries have had the power to intervene in co-operative board matters by appointing directors and managers, controlling all business operations and making membership of a co-operative compulsory (Shaw, 2006). Modern co-operatives were abolished by the Tanzania government in 1976 and re-established in 1982. The abolition contributed to the current bad state of co-operatives because they lost both capital, personnel and members. By 1976 the co-operatives had built up an encouraging level of goodwill, capital through retained earnings, cash reserves, members' deposits and cash investments in various holdings. These resources were all frozen when co-operatives were abolished (Bantukari 2000).

Over much of the last century, co-operatives in many developing and post-command economies, despite very different ideological, political, and colonial backgrounds, were subjected to a similar legal framework through which management was accountable to the state rather than the membership (CLARITY, 2006).

1.3 Co-operative strategies towards competitive business environment

Co-operatives like corporate organizations owe their success to the observance of importance and bringing into play the basic principles of good governance. Agricultural co-operatives usually develop in rural economies during the transformation from self-sufficiency farming to full market production thriving where there is good governance. Faced with new challenges of organizing, farmers often start realizing their weak individual economic position in the market. Among the pertinent challenges is putting in place leadership and management of the new enterprise. In the process a new demand in terms of enterprise management comes in the fore resulting in creating an agency to run the business on behalf of the principal (members) who themselves appoint a board to supervise and direct the co-operative. The board goes on to employ professional managers and auxiliary staff. The Principal- Agency Theory (P-A) comes into play where governance of the business is held in confidence by boards and managers on behalf of members.

The P-A theory The agency theory is based on contributions of writers such as Jensen and Meckling (1976) who sought to resolve two major problems; first where the desires and goals of the principal and agent

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conflict and secondly where there is a difficulty in the verification of the work of the agent by the principal. Principal-agent problems arise because the objectives of the agent are usually not the same as those of the principal, and thus the agent may not always best represent the interests of the principal (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Royer, 1999). The agency theory is a branch of transaction costs economics and concerns itself with the principal – agency relationship (Saam, 2007). This theory is based on assumptions of powerful managers. Practices show that the agent tends to be more informed of the market than the principal (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1998). P-A theory delineates three broad relationships in terms of first, members’ influence on the board, secondly, board influence over managers, and thirdly, external factors influencing governance – namely the market for corporate control, legislative/regulatory frameworks and professionalisation processes. The theory explain the influence of members/owners (the principals) over the managers (agents) in democratic member based organizations where the influence of the members (the principal) is not direct, but via a board of directors representing the members and via an annual general meeting, where directors are elected and members transfer certain functions to board and consequently to managers (Spear, 2004).

Governance is a common denominator between the co-operative and corporate organizations. Co-operative governance is about relationships and monitoring performance of the co-operative. This model must provide a framework that enables the organisation to function in keeping with its aims and objectives (Cornforth, 2006).

Governance in co-operatives conceptually demands that the agency adheres to four pillars of co-operatives that empower and emancipate members. They include; first, co-operatives ought to result in guiding members to a specific action determined to bring about positive change. Secondly, co-operatives must strive to transform conditions of life of the members in the areas of food, shelter and clothing. Thirdly, has to address a millennium long question of power in terms of disposition, articulation and who holds absolute power in making decisions in critical areas of production (what to produce, quantity and quality). It involves power to decide on distribution in terms of marketing and the attendant nitty grittiness as well its mundane politics. Important too in power articulation is demonstration of how accrued profit is allocated or distributed among the membership. Fourthly, is ability among membership to remove bottlenecks among the leadership that work against interests of members. In certain cases the leadership might be responsible for failure or retrogression hence the members should be capable of removing such a leader or leaders (Chambo, 2009). The advent of market liberalization, market competition and co-operative policy and legislations of the mid 1980s and mid 1990s, agricultural co-operatives did not fair well resulting into declining

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performance. But some well functioning co-operatives survived the competition, and continue to discover new opportunities where they have comparative advantage (Mchomvu, et al., 2002; Bee, 2004; Danda et al., 2006; King, et al., 2006; Mlowe, et al, 2007; Chambo, 2009).

In this context therefore, agricultural co-operatives needed a new design of entrepreneurship driven co-operatives such as the Second or New Generation Co-operative (NGC) model. Since about 1988 two phenomena have been occurring in the organization of agricultural cooperatives in the US that influenced diverse changes in co-operative organization world-wide: (1) the restructuring and consolidation of conventional cooperatives and (2) the emergence of new generation cooperatives (NGCs) (Cook, 1995). NGCs retain many of the characteristics of conventional cooperatives, but they focus on value-added activities. Member capital contributions are linked to product delivery (marketing) rights which attain value and can be transferred, and membership is closed or restricted. These developments suggest that cooperative strategies are becoming more offensive in nature (Ortmann, et al, 2007). This mode of organization, will be a product of design work, but departs from the traditional co-operative to a member investor mode where the later, has strong motivation factors for membership and the ability to employ highly qualified management (Chambo: 2009). The assertion is based on seeking to emphasize the theoretical underpinnings regarding NGC which demands that the Principal-Agency (P-A) Theory is adhered to unequivocally.

The agency theory sought to resolve two major problems; first where the desires and goals of the principal and agent conflict and secondly where there is a difficulty in the verification of the work of the agent by the principal. Principal-agent problems arise because the objectives of the agent are usually not the same as those of the principal, and thus the agent may not always best represent the interests of the principal. The theory is based on assumptions of powerful managers. Practices show that the agent tends to be more informed of the market than the principal. P-A theory delineates three broad relationships in terms of first, members’ influence on the board, secondly, board influence over managers, and thirdly, external factors influencing governance – namely the market for corporate control, legislative/regulatory frameworks and professionalization processes. The theory explain the influence of members/owners (the principals) over the managers (agents) in democratic member based organizations where the influence of the members (the principal) is not direct, but via a board of directors representing the members and via an annual general meeting, where directors are elected and members transfer certain functions to board and consequently to managers (Spear, 2004).

2.0 Co-operative Governance Perspectives

2.1 Governance defined

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Commission on Global Governance defines it as a sum of many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a continuing process through which conflicting interests may be accommodated and co-operative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements that people and institutions either agree to or perceive to be in their interest (Commission on Global Governance, 1995 p2). Governance is about how governments and other social organizations interact, how they relate to citizens, and how decisions get taken in an increasingly complex world (http://www.iog.ca/publications/govgoodgov.pdf ). As a working definition, governance refers to the process whereby elements in society wield power and authority, and influence and enact policies and decisions concerning public life, and economic and social development.

In studying the operational definition of Governance, we can unbundle its definition into components that can be measured, analyzed, and worked on. There are 3 main components of governance definition: first measurable component (Voice and Accountability and Political Stability and lack of Violence); second analysis component (Quality Regulatory Framework and Government Effectiveness); and thirdly enforcement component (Control of Corruption and the Rule of Law) (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pdf/fy02brief/empirial_annex1.pdf site visited on 10th May 2011).

Nevertheless, typical criteria for assessing governance in a particular context might include the degree of legitimacy, representativeness, popular accountability and efficiency with which public affairs are conducted. Governance has no automatic normative connotation (http://www.gdrc.org/u-gov/work-def.html site visited on 11th May, 2011)).

Civil society organizations assert that exercising power and decision-making for a group of people is called governance. It happens everywhere – from urban centres to rural villages – and the well-being of a community depends on the choices made by people granted this authority. Because of the diversity of organizational structures around the world, people such as land lords, heads of associations, co-operatives, NGOs, religious leaders, political parties and of course, government, are all actors granted the power to govern (http://issues.tigweb.org/civilsociety ) (site visited on 11th May, 2011)). Major characteristics which are the foundation for principles of good governance include participation, transparency, effectiveness, equity, rule of law and accountability.

In sum, governance is about the use of power in organizations. It is the system by which institutions are directed and controlled. It is also about the decisions making process in a co-operative society and how it relates to the long-term growth and development requirement s, desires and benefits that accrue to members.

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2.2 Defining co-operative governance

A definition of co-operative governance borrows mostly from corporate governance. It is a struggle to operationalise good governance which in both public and private organizations like co-operatives addresses the allocation and management of resources to respond to collective problems. Co-operative good governance is the bedrock of success in leadership and management for thriving business enterprises as fittingly demanded for corporate bodies belonging to both public and private domains. Because of the diversity of organizational structures co-operatives leaders are major actors granted the power to govern cooperatives on behalf of members. Adherence of leaders to major foundations and principles of good governance, including participation, transparency, effectiveness, equity, rule of law and accountability, are cornerstones for strong and resilient co-operatives honestly serving members.

2.3 Co-operative Governance in Practice Governance in co-operatives occupies a very important position in determining success or failure of co-operative ventures. It can constrain self initiative individually and or collectively for members to be able to reach their full potential of self reliance and efforts for reduction of poverty significantly. Based on observance of good co-operative governance, in developed economies, specifically Britain, USA, Canada, Scandinavian countries, Russia and Germany to name representative cases, co-operatives took lead in stimulating the poor to fight winning battles against abject poverty.

In our study of co-operative governance we divided the study into three components namely, external, internal and personal governance in order to have insights on how they are functioning and to what extent they influence positively or otherwise in developing competitive business skills and ethos demanded to compete within the framework of global businesses. Two case studies for internal governance were selected using purposive sampling from Rombo District, Mengwe Division. The two contiguous (with a common boundary), rural primary co-operative societies (RPCS) include Mengwe and Mamsera. While contiguous to each other they have all along been producers of traditional cash crop that is coffee and additionally bananas.

Further in the sphere of governance, CLARITY (2006) confirm that it has been recognized and endorsed that government control of co-operatives does more harm than good and all co-operatives, regardless of their level of development or country of origin, should share the same right to democratically and autonomously govern their business. Governance and good governance are determinants of success and relevance for all organizations, both private and public.

Of special importance to co-operative functioning is the leadership provided by competent managerial and technical personnel to ensure maximum economic advantages to the producers and to ensure that

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the co-operatives are member-centred. The staff and board members of co-operatives often lack managerial skills mainly due to inadequate training support available from within the Movements (Prakash, 2008: 1). Tying-up the bond is leadership component of the Boards of co-operative societies who are also members, together with local initiative and autonomy and participative membership are crucial for co-operative success though are conspicuous by their total absence for a long period (2 to 3 decades) resulting in wastage of precious resources, rampant corruption, technical inefficiency and institutional paralysis (Quoted by Prakash (2008:307) from Beviskar, et al., and as quoted in Dr. S. P. Seetharaman, 1997).

2.3.1 Internal governance for co-operativesThe study involved appraisal of issues including society profile, society business, and management of primary society, co-operative reforms and changes in the society and feedback mechanism.

Two contiguous primary co-operative societies were purposively sampled to determine and compare changes of governance in managing and diversification of society business due to changing business environment. The new play-field was ushered in during the era of economic liberalization and privatization of the mid-1980s, where the government practically withdrew from doing business and remained with responsibility of policy development and legal mandates. Under this a scenario, organized businesses are key to the agricultural rural populace. Chambo: (2011) emphatically affirm the future belongs to the organized that make use of strengths of cooperation and pull together their meager financial muscle and other productive resources to face the world vagaries of competitive business, where the big fish eats the smaller ones. He attributes strength of the organized is in their proactive approach that militates against the depressing effects and influences of emerging global challenges associated with competitive business environment.

The comparative study was carried out with the intention to determine to what extent good co-operative governance contributes to entrepreneurial competences and ability to adapt mitigating factors of Structural Adjustment Programmes’ conditionalities including market liberalization that ushered in the competitive environment. The study attempts to identify governance drivers that contributed and continues to contribute to the state of affairs of two societies distinctly applying polarized approaches in governance.

The society profile of the two societies show that, in the case of Mamsera which adopted co-operative good governance through participatory member empowerment in co-operatives (MEMCOOP), is a vibrant, has increase in membership, membership participate in annual general meetings, ensure higher prices, unrelenting and constant increase in volume and quality of marketed coffee. The Mamsera society has a strategic plan and business plan; acquired a coffee pulpery machine capable of curing all coffee from the society and

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surrounding societies. Evidence of diversification is plentiful in terms of essential farm inputs and fertilizers which are provided on loan to members.

The leaders available and interviewed regret and admit to trade with Mamsera with a caution that the Chairman who resides and operate businesses in Dar es Salaam does not know. The society failed to give us records of business transactions even the number of members. They admitted all records point out of a worsening situation from membership, quantity traded with Kilimanjaro Native Co-operative Union (KNCU, 1984 Ltd), a co-operative union for Siha, Hai, Moshi Rural and Rombo district with a total of 94 primary co-operative societies (PCS). Among the members, 32 PCS does not sell their coffee to KNCU. The group of 32, as they are referred to, is a bonafide or valid in membership to KNCU, paying their annual dues and lively participates in AGM.

The member empowerment approach was conceived and tested as a pilot project in Kilimanjaro and Arusha Regions from 1996 to 2003 facilitated by the then Co-operative College current Moshi University College of Co-operative and Business Studies, Ministry of Co-operatives (MUCCoBS). By then the project was directed primarily to members of primary co-operative societies, societies’ secretaries and leaders. Today it has spread, albeit to a limited extent, to other parts of the country involving not only members of primary co-operative societies and other self help organizations (groups), but also other key stakeholders, notably the and Marketing, Tanzania Federation of Co-operatives, SCCULT, COASCO as well as Co-operative Officers under the President’s Office, Ministry of Regional Administration and Local Government.

Mengwe remains a devoted supporter of union doing business on behalf of PCS. In terms of basic documents guiding management of the co-operative, Mengwe does not have strategic and business plans. Their Bylaws are outdated from the 1980s without review. Mamsera has reviewed its bylaws two times and most recent when they had to diversify the business and accepting customers who can sell to Mamsera but are not members nor are they eligible to subsequent payments after the initial payments. Leadership of the Mengwe co-operative shunned away the MEMCOOP training and argued unwaveringly that they are pro-union.

Comparison of prices of coffee for the past 10 years between Mamsera and Mengwe PCS are evidently clear that Mamsera has had an upper hand. MEMCOOP pilot intervention began in 1999 and was carried up to 2003 when the pilot ended. CRMP recognized strengths and logic of MEMCOOP despite sidelining it during implementation. CRMP recognizes the inherent empowering potential to members and leadership strengthening whereby provides some details on the MEMCOOP program implemented in Kilimanjaro and Arusha regions goes further to confirm its usefulness as follows in Box 1 below.

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Box 1: MEMCOOP PILOT PROJECT IN KILIMANJARO REGIONMEMCOOP is Member Empowerment in Co-operatives. This is a capacity building program through education and action. Previously, co-operative education which was provided was more general and emphasized awareness on how good the co-operative enterprise was to the ordinary small farmers and other producers. It also believed that co-operative training was more important to the leaders than to the general membership. Co-operative education content was based on general marketing skills, the co-operative philosophy, leadership and a bit of business skills. Previously, co-operative education, did not give the members the practical tools to evaluate the performance of their co-operatives and the co-operative effect.

MEMCOOP has proved to be a sustainable way for building the capacity of members to assume responsibilities of running their co-operative societies. The education process is directed to the members, leaders and staff. It emphasizes awareness and planned action. It exposes leadership knowledge to the members so that the members as a whole assume leadership position and give direction to the elected leaders. Six levels of education are provided: - General co-operative knowledge, production improvement and quality, general business education, organizational development, entrepreneurship and empowerment for good governance. The bottom-line of member empowerment is the fact that if the engine of development of any co-operative system is the membership, then the members must be entrepreneurs who practice cost effective business, leadership and put in place the basic instruments and procedures of good governance.

Today, in Kilimanjaro region, it is very clear to see marked differences between primary societies where MEMCOOP has been put into effective practice and where it has been taken for granted as one of those external interventions:-

Some primary societies in Rombo, Hai, Same and Mwanga districts, have taken major decisions to carry out the business of their members to the final buyer. All these societies deal with the coffee crop. They are negotiating bank credit from the Co-operative Bank, they negotiate transport, curing alternatives and financing alternatives. By making such alternative business decisions, these societies have brought more business information to their members. The members in the societies are aware of all auction prices, quality that fetches the best price and which buyers offer the best prices.The members are well informed about transport costs, and other types of costs so that they can now discuss about how to carry out a cost-effective coffee business. This business process has made the MEMCOOP-driven primary societies develop the capacity to generate sustainable business solutions because all what they do, is practically generated by the members.Source: CRMP 2005, p. 20

Further, CRMP alludes to the fact that MEMCOOP is not only contributory to governance but more important in preparing co-operatives to face the competitive market environment in the era of economic liberalization. A look at the development of both societies, by Society business was probed showing both societies at the beginning of 2000 were poorly performing being unable to pay competitive prices for coffee, facing same context of government intervention, union unable to address the fate of members in the new competitive economic environment of doing business. More serious was the continued unions traditional relationships with PCS where all business

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was carried on behalf of members, the owners of the coffee. Indeed, members were continuously disengaged and divorced from their coffee collected by union, disengaged from the process of neither business negotiations nor information sharing between the co-operative societies and union. This signifies and fosters a scenario suggestive of “too much politics”, “decision making too slow”, “apathy”, “equity capital returned too late”, “organizational inefficiencies” and “bloated management” (Cook et al., 1999). Those are typical traditional co-operative limitations. New approach (NGC, is capable to determine to cause withdrawal of monopolistic tendencies born and nurtured during the Ujamaa era of the mid-1970s and thereafter in mid-1980s through 1990s where government intervention and salvaging of co-operatives much for political ends, made co-operatives very weak institutions and were accused of being formed and ‘owned’ by the government.

Management of primary society in the same token is determined by organizational propensity to change. Meetings are planned and executed with guarantee in Mamsera PCS than Mengwe PCS. Leaders in Mengwe confirm that few members attend and hardly raise any questions whereas Mamsera AGM is vibrant and members participate in raising issues on co-operative business for the past year and audit report presented cause questions for leaders to respond in the meetings. Mamsera admit that sitting arrangement for members is still a problem as there is lack of an appropriate and convenient meeting hall hence open space meeting around the society office premises.

Major agenda for Mamsera and Mengwe are all pre-determined where the arrangement begins with a long list of administration leaving business agenda for the afternoon when members are tired or have effectively retired to their homes. Audit reports are generally presented late and structure of reports follow laid down procedures without care for members if they will be able to comprehend messages from audit and whether what is the status of the business for the past one year. The difference between the two PCS is that Mamsera has updated its audit to 2010 and dully requests COASCO to undertake audit. Suffice here to note that, most or majority PCS in the country do not bother to ask for audit, rather the government mandated CDD to ensure that audit is effected.

Feedback from members and leaders from Mengwe are that change must start now only that they fear two things. First if they withdraw from doing coffee marketing business with the union, they will be unable to find an alternative financing mechanism since KNCU pre-finances PCS during collection of coffee. Secondly, leadership of Mengwe PCS fears political backlash from some of the old guards in the coffee within KNCU who have succinctly vowed to defend the old model.

Members of Mengwe further were aggrieved that their leaders were also trading their coffee with Mamsera and this is on a secret manner.

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They were open to declare that now Mamsera is qualifying to be a union competing with non-reforming KNCU.

Mamsera succession plan is not an agenda now. The successes attained are looked with a celebratory mindset which hypothesizes of a rosy future. This needs further research to iron out the shortfalls associated with this compassion as a basis for a sustainable PCS.

2.3.2External governance for co-operativesCo-operatives are living in a context of other organizations and institutions. We set out to attempt to document some of the influences and challenges co-operatives receive from working with other organizations in the external environment. Organizations and institutions have been in place to support co-operative development by representing and advocating on behalf of members of primary co-operative societies. These are referred to as co-operative support institutions. They include Department of Co-operative Development (DCD) headed by Director and doubling as Registrar of Co-operatives; Moshi University College of Co-operative and Business Studies (MUCCoBS); Savings and Credit Union League of Tanzania (SCCULT) and Tanzania Federation of Co-operatives (TFC). The last two are co-operative societies registered by DCD although they have representatives as their partners in co-operative development from primary co-operative societies.

2.3.2.1 The Department of Co-operative Development

The government emphasize the department should distinguish between administration and public services provision. The department started to develop a service charter and it defined its mission. However, the shift to probably an agency has halted the efforts.

(i) Why the Department of Co-operative Development?In theory departments are formed by the president. It’s not easy to see the mission of the department only that it works to meet the promises of the president. Therefore no independent analyst who confirms what the ministry is supposed to do. In the absence of this since independence, Presidents have formed several ministries and departments as they so wished. This has affected co-operative governance too.The President decided to form an Agency or some other form since 2009. The charter for the agency was reviewed but it has never been in place for public consumption.

(ii) Decentralization by Devolution (D by D) application in Co-operative Development

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Since 1997, Tanzania Government has been engaged in transferring the duties and financial resources for delivering public services from central government ministries to local government authorities (LGA) – a process of decentralization by devolution (D by D) (URT, PHDR, 2009:xxiv). Theoretically this was a major shift in 1972 when implementation started. Soon after, decentralization on the ground took a new turn into decentralization by deconcentration. The fact of the matter was that power was not devolved but structures were built with unchanged central government controls and dictation. This was supposed to transfer power to those close to the people and power articulation by the grassroots.

The central government was supposed to have remained with general guidance by developing and overseeing implementation of policies, legislations and regulations. This had touched most of the departments (with the exception of the army and the police). Programmes are identified at grassroots level i.e. village level, ward levels and eventually one gets district development plan. All sectors were involved including the co-operative sector. Potentially D by D can address the co-operative issues at the grassroots level for it gives an opportunity for co-operative officers to not only supervise but also identify and prepare projects.

The study revealed weaknesses on the co-operative sector. Apart from not being properly represented, not all co-operative issues are given priority compared to other sectors. This is mainly for three scenarios: -

Weaknesses of co-operative officers: in district plans co-operative issues do not feature, revenue for co-operatives are only for salaries and stationeries.

Co-operative education at the grassroots is taken for granted ending in a situation that Co-operators are dormant.

The department has distanced itself from district-based cooperative interventions. Thus decentralization does not include co-operatives and the department does not argue the case. The District Development Directors give a cold shoulder to the needs of co-operatives though interested with the use of skills of co-operative staff mostly accountants.

It is becoming promising that D by D will slowly address the co-operatives. Extension officers not only supervise but also identify and prepare projects for the council.

(iii) Priorities not set prudentlyIn principle, there are differentiated approaches to co-operative supervision and support. There a school of thought that emphasizes completion of writing of books of accounts as primary and not development issues. As such the co-operative officers are there to supervise writing of books of accounts while departments are having dynamic functions such as planning, diversification of business, supply

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of cheaper inputs, education and training and service to the community.

(iv) Changing Focus in promoting co-operativesCDD promotional role has received limited attention as it used to be in the 1970s. Training of promotion officers ceased in the 1990s when no more officers were trained in co-operative development management and accounting were very much encouraged. Similarly, there was a major shift with the advent of microfinance movement that CDD emphasized their development while significantly marginalizing AMCOS. In the political front, the SACCOS agenda became a battleground to achieve social and political capital. SACCOS are hijacked and has become a political issue. They are formed on political bases and not from felt needs of the members.

(v) Government intentionsThe government still intends to support development of co-operative sector. In 2008 the President recognized the role of co-operatives in development and promised to form a vibrant body that will address co-operative issues. Started by engaging consultants to work with the Ministry responsible for co-operative development but the department had a different structure from that of the Ministry, as a result CDD came up with a structure which was not approved by the government. The name is yet to be agreed between an agency and commission? What are the powers of DCD and when is a Commission or Agency will be formed?? This has taken time with no end insight. This attests to the thesis that government administrative co-operative functions take precedence to co-operative societies’ development.

(vi) Current Structure of CDDIn the current organization structure, Director is also Registrar, chief of the department. There are misunderstandings on who will be appointed to the post on permanent terms. Currently there is an acting DCD who is stationed in Dar es Salaam with another office and staff in Dodoma.

Co-operative department at district level is answerable through the DED to Regional Administration and Local Government with Kiswahili acronym of TAMISEMI which is a division in the Prime Minister’s Office dealing with local government. Likewise the other extension officers for most departments are under TAMISEMI. This makes it difficult to operate efficiently. In reaction to this situation, recently the President of the United Republic of Tanzania (URT), demanded change of status of departmental heads at regional and district levels from mere advisors and reinstate them to their former titles and with mandates of their technical competences in all departments such as agriculture, livestock, health, engineering, co-operatives, fisheries and others (URT:2010).

(vii) Employment of co-operative officers

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Year 2009/2010 District Directors were responsible for recruiting co-operative officers. Experience showed that co-operative officers were used to fill the gap in the council. For example if the DED needed 6 accountants and allowed to employ only 4 those employed as co-operatives officers were recategorized into accountants. In Kibaha district, the co-operative officer is the town council executive. Shinyanga district council the co-operative officer was shifted to the audit department. For Nzega the co-operative officer was shifted to the accounts department. In Hai district too the co-operative officer was shifted to the account department, the Moshi rural co-operative officer is working as an accountant. This is due to the fact that co-operative training is comprehensive; graduates are used in many sectors as marketing officers, management, accountants or planning officers. They are thus taken to areas/sectors with gaps in staffing.

The DEDs inmost districts have sometimes employed some staff to work as co-operative officers without a co-operative background. This is an indication that such co-operative officers cannot carry their duties proactively. The ministry is after standards but the department has left this to the employer (District Council chief, the DED).

Currently, government employment has been centralized for quality check. DED no longer employs, but the employment commission will do that. It is anticipated that as a result of this, more co-operative officers employed will have no background in the functioning of co-operatives. Hence the co-operative department needs to be proactive!

(viii) Shifting locus of the Co-operative DepartmentThe department has been moving from one Ministry to the other as policies changed or change of President. In the four governments since independence the Co-operative Development Department has changed Ministries more than five times since independence. To be able to implement its mandate efficiently and effectively, the CDD depends on the locus ministry where the department belongs. This shifting saga, to a greater extent has negatively impacted on the operations of the department. The duties of the department remain as they are stipulated in the Act and Rules. Performance of the department has depended on a number of variables including but not limited to attitude of minister and other ministry senior staff where the department is placed at the time and overall the parent ministry perspective on co-operatives.

Table 2: Changing Locus of the Co-operative Department among different Ministries since independence in 1961

No. Name of Ministry and Ministers

Year Number of years department was located in the Ministry

Head office for the Ministry

1. Ministry of Trade and Co-operatives

1961

N.A Dar es Salaam

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2. Ministry of Trade and Co-operative Societies(Hon. Abdulrahman Babu).

1964

N.A Dar es Salaam

3.

Prime Minister’s Office(Hon. Anna Abdallah)

1985 -1990

5 Dodoma

4. Ministry of Agriculture and Co-operatives(Kusila)

1990 – 2000

10 Dar es Salaam

5. Ministry of Co-operatives development and Marketing

2000-2005

5 Dodoma

6. Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Co-operatives (MAFC)

2005 – 2011

6 Dar es Salaam

Implications of the location of the CDD are many including but not limited to: -

(a) Escalating costs of transfers and transporting office working tools.

(b) Costs of travel and subsistence allowance for a number of officers;

(c) Loss or damage of valuable documents;(d) Marginalization or inclusion depending on attitude of Minister

and the Administration responsible for co-operative development at the time;

(e) Shift in priorities and maybe replacement or misplacement; and

(f) Risk of loss of institutional memory associated with staff and documentation.

(ix) Working relations with other co-operative bodiesCo-operative Development Department and COASCO serve the same client and you would envisage seeing them working very closely. To your surprise the opposite is the case. There is no close working relationship between the two. COASCO has its own board and is accountable to the Principal Secretary of the Ministry responsible for co-operative development (now Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Co-operatives – MAFC). They are the external auditors of co-operative societies and they are only accountable to the department on quality of the audit report. The registrar has to be satisfied by their work. Financial budget is under the co-operative vote.

2.3.2.1 Tanzania Federation of Co-operatives (TFC) and Savings and Credit

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Co-operative Union of Tanzania (SCCULT)

These belong to the category of co-operative societies. The only factor that differentiates them with other co-operative societies is that they are apex societies and their functions are not for working directly with members but through the registered co-operative bodies.

2.3.2.2 Co-operative Audit and Supervision Corporation (COASCO)Co-operative societies as business entities needs checks and balances, thus the department later needed an external auditor in the sense of establishing financial status of members’ co-operatives. COASCO was formed to carry out functions of external audit. It is parastatal organization under the ministry responsible for co-operatives. In brief, COASCO is overburdened with audit work demanded mostly by government through CDD and minister. Reports of those audited are in areas of an average three business seasons except for hot spots such as cashewnuts co-operatives and some traditional cash crops and to a greater extent SACCOS.

2.3.2.3 MUCCoBSSince becoming MUCCoBS more attention has been shifted to campus training concentrated more on university education. While ICCDE sis charged with roles of providing to reach the cooperative albeit at a slow pace. This has made ripples of expression of grief among co-operative clients on weaknesses co-operative training for co-operative clients in the movement a secondary arrangement far from what the training were offered by the Co-operative College. “The famous correspondence courses are neither there nor run as the days of Co-operative College, where are the 12 letters?” questioned by a senior auditor with COASCO.

2.3.3Personal governanceThe subject has its roots in recognition that a cooperative without entrepreneurs as the case that entrepreneurship is rarely mentioned in connection with cooperative development, which reflects the state of entrepreneurship in conventional economic thinking, where the entrepreneurs are more often than not a missing category (Ropke, 1992). Intrapreneurship for members and their succinct participation in the P-A theoretical underpinnings and associated leadership had demonstrated positively towards institutional and members’ success stories. Entrepreneurship at the level of associative relations has to be related to higher levels of entrepreneurship. Cooperatives have to move to higher entrepreneurship involving innovation while desisting to remain in the problem solving or fixing a problem function from arbitrage or equilibrium function under conditions of perfect competition (Ropke, 1992: 2-11).

3 Co-operative challenges in the changing business environment

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The challenges faced by agricultural co-operatives in the era of globalization and liberalized economy according to Prakash (2003:10), can be enumerated as under:

(i) Need to improve professional management skills of those who provide advisory or guidance services to co-operatives and of the managers and some key members of primary level co-operatives;

(ii) Establishment of a marketing intelligence system within the Co-operative Movement to enable the farmer-producers follow market trends and plan their production and marketing strategies;

(iii) Assured supply of farm inputs [quality seeds, chemical fertilisers, farm chemicals, credit and extension services];

(iv) Establishment of business federations through co-operative clusters to undertake primary agro-processing, marketing of local products and to cover financial requirements;

(v) Be aware of quality controls and standardisation of farm products to be able to compete effectively in the open market;

(vi) Participate in efforts to conserve natural resources which directly and indirectly, influence farm production and rural employment;

(vii) Need for providing information to the farmers and farmers’ organisations on the implications of restructuring, globalisation and WTO agreements.

(viii) Overall massive reorganisation.

The above challenges have been documented and confirmed based on evidence from East Asian experiences and as African co-operative laws were modified and imported into African countries, as a corollary, have had near similar pathways of co-operative development. With a milliard of reforms, abolition and or government withdrawal followed by support from a distance interpreted as a ‘sitting on the fence’ or ‘wait and see attitude’ yet ending into a series of failures and dispossess and total depriving of the hard won successes of cooperatives such as National Co-operative Development Bank (NCDB) by government without requisite compensation. The deliberate policies, laws and actions by governments are evidence of lack of advocacy and defence for the voiceless membership. This is evidence and conclusively that, the predicament of co-operatives in SSA countries corroborate the fact that they were and still are lagging behind in entrepreneurial creativity and innovations. Evidence from survey made in Tanzania is a case in point as presented below.

3.1 Pathway for Co-operatives 1976 to 1982(i) Abolition of co-operatives in 1976 Co-operative movement in Tanzania was upset. Every village was recognized a co-operative village. The sad story came as no surprise to co-operative organizations rather it came at the time when co-operatives were at their height of success. The NCB had already been confiscated by 1972 and all assets taken by the government. The abolition took a dramatic route when all co-operatives at union level were disbanded while agricultural primary co-operative societies

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(AMCOS), entered a new arrangement of one village one co-operative with all people aged 18 and above were ‘automatically’ members. This was follow-up to previous year 1975 enactment of Ujamaa and Ujamaa Villages Act of 1975, hence for most co-operators saw early enough that the doomsday was around the corner. All co-operative unions were dissolved. Crop boards replaced co-operative societies (AMCOS). SACCOS survived this avalanche-like episode.

The 1968 Cooperative Act was not repealed until 1982 despite of enacting of other laws on rural development. Similarly, since 1972 up to 1982 the local governments were dissolved though the act was not repealed. Everything cooperative was governed through the Ujamaa and Villages Act of 1975 which recognized a village as an entity and every villager who had attained age of 18 years was automatically eligible to be member of a co-operative. In 1982 local government authorities were re-established by government. Concurrently the President formed a task force to revamp co-operatives and followed by the enactment of Co-operative Act and thereafter Audit and Supervision Act which led to the formation of COASCO. Its role was supervisory and responsible for auditing and monitoring progress of co-operatives. SACCOS were not dissolved in 1976 but they were negatively affected. They could not thrive.

The 1982 – 1999 period was a co-operative revival period, but in practice revival did not take off. Assets and properties were not handed back; as co-operatives were dissolved politically they were also revived politically. Thus co-operatives in Tanzania started without preparations. Most of the co-operatives societies like KNCU, BCU (later KCU) started with overdraft to operate. This was a difficult situation whereby with overdraft they couldn’t buy assets, renovate and run daily operations. This scenario had contributed to obvious results which was accumulation of debts!

(ii) Market liberalization 1986Competition with private buyers was not fair given the prevailing debt situation of co-operatives. Equally important co-operatives were unaware and not prepared to stand on themselves. Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) were ushered in hurriedly against a background of co-operatives that had monopolistic climate in centrally planned economies enjoying government handouts and debt management.

3.2 Post-independence business environment in Africa. Post independence African countries have experimented different marketing systems along with adoption of the colonial marketing infrastructure influenced by the colonial regime based on subsistence smallholders cash crop peasants, private plantation estates. Along these, was a strong, voluntary and independent co-operative movement working in a market-oriented type of agricultural marketing system, which was dominated by private traders. Government policies

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before emergence of market liberalization SAPs of the early 1980s accentuated by the World Bank (WB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF), moved towards consolidating colonial and post-colonial economic structures established in Africa where agricultural marketing systems continued to be unregulated. There have been unregulated markets for co-operative based marketing system and centralized crop authorities in different African countries in the immediate two decades after independence. IMF and WB pushed the Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) countries to undertake reforms (Chambo, et al., 2007).

3.3 Post – SAPs business environment for co-operatives(i) Marketing Policy Regimes in some African countriesA set of governments in post-SAPs had adopted a private sector and market oriented system, as in Kenya. Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe adopted the government controlled marketing system.

(iii) Post 2000 a new turnYears 1992 to 2000 were the most challenging with donors averse to support co-operatives; a late intervention of Member Empowerment in Co-operative Programme (MEMCOOP) salvaged the day. On a sounder note, the Presidential task force born out of the Mwanza Congress took the challenges further afield. The task force appreciated efforts already in place and went further to identify what went wrong, how, when and with what effect. The Kahama Report sought to address tripartite key issues of Revival, Strengthen and Develop co-operatives (popularly known as 3Ks in Kiswahili: kufufua, kuimarisha na kuendeleza ushirika Tanzania) identified by Kahama Report (2000). The 3Ks were identified by Kahama Report (2000) as imperative inroads towards resolving what they termed as ‘fundamental’ issues if the ministry was to tackle effectively the ‘chronic’ problems prevalent in the co-operative movement.

Ten issues were identified by the report branded ‘chronic problems in co-operatives’ as they are presented below.

Box 2: Chronic Problems Identified by Kahama Report (2000)1. Co-operatives that are unable to fulfill member needs;2. Lack of capital;3. Poor leadership, mismanagement and theft;4. Poor co-operative structure;5. Weak government co-operative support institutions;6. Poor co-operative education;7. Mistakes associated with unprepared to face challenges of

free market economy; 8. Limited spread of co-operatives in few sectors of the

economy;9. Co-operatives considered marginal in national development

plans; and 10. Co-operative Policy and Act unable to address new

demands.Source: Presidential Co-operative Task Force Report, 2000.

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President’s challenges were founded on the realities of failure of co-operatives. The President chaired the Co-operative Congress of March 2000 which took place in Mwanza. Among the major outputs of the workshop was the formation of Kahama Committee, a Presidential Committee, one among many for co-operatives since independence.

Kahama Report (2000) proposed first, formation of a separate Ministry of co-operatives. The president agreed and formed Ministry of Co-operatives and Marketing end of 2000. The identified 10 problems, presented in Box 2 above, were distinguished as a priority and critical in the realization of the objectives set forth.

(iv) Kahama’s reportIdentified areas for strengthen to start with co-operative support institutions these are the DCD, COASCO and MUCCoBS. In governance, good will is important, since this was lost, and for years never was it compensated; rekindling hope and trust were paramount.

(v) Political interferencePresident fund, why directed through co-operatives, why join co-operatives in order to access Presidential fund? Who should market co-operative movement? this also has given co-operative wrong concept.

(vi) RealityIn reality the co-operative movement has nothing to do with government leadership. Who are the true owners of co-operatives? Beneficiaries of co-operatives are many. The co-operative department should only be the regulator. We have been misled that everything should be done by the government and forget that co-operatives are private entities. The registrar ought only to inspect, to see if what belongs to him area of jurisdiction is okay. The registrar is there to register. For example most of the SACCOS are not member-initiated but by the government. The co-operative societies to be good business entities should stand on their own; refer the CRMP. Co-operatives have supervisory committees, but they are there for three years without knowing what they are supposed to do! The co-operative society is not viable if it does not have an internal auditor and an accountant!

3.4 Co-operative Reform and Modernization Programme (CMRP 2005- 2015)

Reforms of the Co-operative Movement have become essential in the era of globalisation. Co-operative marketing system must adjust to increased competition for the co-operatives to prosper or they will gradually stagnate and eventually get extinguished. To be competitive, co-operatives must be efficient – both price-efficient and technical-efficient. Many successful co-operatives prospered and carved visible niche in the business world encountering the pressures of private enterprises because they reformed their ways of doing business. They learnt from others how to reach the customers by encouraging their

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personnel and adopting modern business management techniques (Prakash, 2008: 1).

The process of change management in co-operatives set in by Kahama Report (2000) involved crafting of three related documents namely the Co-operative Development Policy (2002), the supporting law Co-operative Societies Act No. 20 of 2003 and Co-operative Reform and Modernization Program (CRMP). The CRMP establishes workable strategies and plans and translates in practical terms how the overall vision can be achieved, the desired form which the present co-operative movement has to take, the role of various stakeholders in the implementation, and linkages which need to be established or strengthened to kick-off the Co-operatives’ transformation process. CRMP to has necessitated the preparation of a

CRMP identify chronic problems confronting Tanzanians’ Co-operatives include inflexible structures, poor management systems, inability to cope and compete in a liberalized market economy, lack of adequate working capital and the problem of indebtedness. The general objective of the CRMP is to initiate a comprehensive transformation of Co-operatives to become organizations which are member owned and controlled, competitive, viable, sustainable and with capability of fulfilling members’ economic and social needs (CRMP, 2005: (iii) – (iv)).

CDD, with marginal participation of other implementing partners, implements the programme. Also addresses the issues raised in the Co-operative Development Policy (CDP, 2002) and Co-operative Society Act (2003). In 2004 co-operative regulations were ready and CRMP Road Map was ready in 2005.

The Co-operative Development Department (CDD) is overseeing implementation of the programme, and experience of the first five years of running the programme, CDD seems to be going it alone.

Inspite of distribution of implementation responsibilities for carrying out CRMP activities little was done to allow other institutions other than CDD to access resources and undertake their functions. According to the CRMP (2005: pp. 44-46) Successful implementation of the CRMP is dependent upon the degree of collaboration among the key actor. The role of key actors is explained briefly below:Implementation responsibilities are detailed as presented below.

Box 2 Implementation Arrangement of CRMP(i) The Central Ministry with mandate on Co-operativesThe Central Ministry will have the following main responsibilities: Overall coordination of the implementation of the program while working closely with

other actors; Mobilizing the required resources and allocating such resources to the requisite

activities; Over all policy guidance, supervision and monitoring of implementable activities; Capacity building of Co-operative support Institutions; Facilitate training of the membership in business skills and entrepreneurship; Facilitating the interface between the national program and activities implemented by

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LGAs.(ii) The Moshi University College of Co-operative and Business Studies (MUCCoBS)MUCCoBS will have the following main responsibilities: Overall coordination of training and empowerment activities; Oversee the conduct of research and consultancy in the requisite areas; Center for analysis and dissemination of information to end users.(iii) The Co-operative Audit and Supervision Corporation (COASCO)COASCO will have the following responsibilities: Undertake professional audit and supervision of co-operatives; Provide advice on accounting system and interpretation of audit and management

reports; Collaborate with other partners in undertaking research and consultancies on various

issues of co-operatives.(iv) The Tanzania Federation of Co-operatives (TFC)TFC will have the following responsibilities: Mobilize Co-operatives at various levels (Apex, Union, Primary Society) to effectively

participate in the transformation process; Collaborate with other partners in information collection, processing and dissemination; Coordinate the setting up of an effective Management Information system (MlS) for Co-

operatives and their stakeholders; Effectively represent the co-operative movement in both internal and external fora; Spearhead the formation of a National Co-operative Bank.(v) The Savings and Credit Co-operative Union League of Tanzania (SCCULT)SCCULT will have the following responsibilities: Promote innovations and modernization of SACCOs; Collaborate with other partners in effective set up of data base and MIS on SACCOS; Guide SACCOS in improving management and exploiting investment opportunities.(vi) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) Involved with Co-operative mattersNGOs will have the following responsibilities: Collaborate with relevant partners in providing training and other relevant services to

the co-operative sector Participate in sensitization of co-operatives and the general public on the envisaged

transformation.(vii) Local Government Administration (LGAs)LGAs will have the following responsibilities Collaborate effectively with the Central Ministry in the implementation and monitoring

of the proposed interventions. Mobilize additional resources required in the implementation of the Program in the

respective areas.(viii) Development PartnersDevelopment Partners are expected to assist as follows; Effectively raise the required resources for the implementation of the CRMP Provide the necessary technical and capacity assistance to enable implementation of

the proposed activities Participate in guidance and monitoring of the Program.(ix) Other ActorsThere are a number of other players who will play vital roles in the implementation of the Program as already summarized in the Project Implementation Plan (Annex 2 of this Document).

3.5 Analysis of findingsMeasured against determinant factors for successful agricultural co-operatives in Tanzania, cooperatives and cooperative support institutions with current staff need to position themselves to scale through a tough pathway from a reformation to transformed co-operative movement.

3.5.1Realities of government controlThere is nothing accidental with regard to the state of the art with good co-operative governance in Tanzania since the external and internal environment does not promote nor allow its implementation. There is a problem somewhere to be solved, if the concept and

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practice of co-operative governance is to take proactive roots in the conscience of co-operative department staff; political will by leaders of co-operatives and polity to allow co-operative members to set agenda for development of their purported organization. More important is the need for de-schooling among co-operative officers to reform from the current punitive approach in working with co-operatives to a proactive and promotional role of an extension staff and adopt its attitude and modus operandi. We need a fair and level playground for members and for them to take the drivers seat in determining the future of their organisation. COASCO for instance should be there for weak co-operatives, the giant ones should work on their own.

3.5.2Education and Training for Co-operative SectorCo-operative movement needs experts at all levels; right from the primary level. The public too needs basic co-operative knowledge. The work of creating co-operative experts was done by the Co-operative College Moshi, now MUCCoBS. Further reminded that “the bookkeeping system which was used was one, but today every co-operative society and regions have own system. According to COASCO its only 25% of the co-operative accountants who can keep records the rest (75%) can not!! This is a sad situation in the overall governance of co-operatives”(COASCO interview, 2011).

Chapter 6 of the Co-operative Policy addresses co-operative education should start at the grassroots a role that belongs to MUCCoBS as lead facilitator. MUCCoBS prepared a proposal for implementation that has yet to receive funding. Co-operative Reform and Modernizations Programme (CRMP) contribution for implementation from MUCCoBS was a proposal titled: Empowerment and Enterprise Development for Co-operatives in Tanzania: Contribution by Moshi University College of Co-operative and Business Studies (MUCCoBS) of 2006. Nothing was put to realization. If you have informed members, informed board members and workers you don’t need the department of co-operatives. You only need a regulatory body.

3.5.3Marginalization of grassroots co-operatives and members Increasingly co-operatives are receiving less attention and support from co-operative support institutions including CDD, MUCCoBS, COASCO, TFC and SCCULT. Vibrant connectivity has reached a point of disintegration each going own way. Whereas their mandate is to work for co-operative development, there is evidence that they are invariably concerned with survival of their institutions especially financial. They have abandoned their primary role to question government policies, law and actions they have adapted a wait and see attitude. To make matters worse, the support institutions have yet kept pace with reform in co-operatives. The reform agenda focus at least on paper is grassroots development for effective member benefits.

The support institutions have taken the business as usual stance. They have no specific interventions in co-operatives despite an elaborate

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logical framework and specification of roles and functions stipulated in an action plan presented in CRMP documentation and partly presents in Box 2 Implementational roles of CRMP above. Non-reformed and archaic in approach, in case of co-operative support institutions are likely major bottleneck in reforming co-operative to face a competitive business environment today in Africa. There is a strong and direct correlation between effectively reforming co-operatives and ability to answer to an age-old question of capability and contribution of co-operatives to poverty reduction. Similarly, with reformed co-operatives there is a better chance to instill earnest good co-operative governance as an ethical question in enabling members to set their own development agenda.

Looking at the co-operatives we have today one can be tempted to say that we do not have a true co-operative movement because there is no felt need from the co-operators. The old co-operatives, the pre 1976 stemmed from a felt need.

4 Lessons Learnt for African Co-operatives

4.1 Proof is quite evident that time for governments to take a back seat has come. Benevolence and sympathy have all made co-operators to pay a heavy price.

4.2 Politicizing co-operative development has had a negative backlash since promises are not met. In most cases next set of elections incumbents are voted by ‘the feet’ out of power. Members of such communities do punish governments and parties that free ride on the co-operatives to gain political capital.

4.3 Co-operative Departments in Africa have amassed conflicting authority in terms of legal and promotional roles. One person is on the one hand a Director or Commissioner while on the other hand a Registrar. Registration is a legal role one and still the same person has supervisory and pre-audit roles. Is no wondering that the government is confirmed to be interfering in co-operative matters of concern.

5 Policy Implications5.1 Inspite of the elaborately planned progressive process, most

programmes fail to revamp co-operatives, like many other development programmes, because they fail to address the basic principles as they apply to member benefits in case of co-operative fail to address those of ICA.

5.2 Inspite of the government of Tanzania’s resolve on revamping the co-operative movement, we see dismal outputs and impacts. Indeed there are no indications that in the coming five more years the CRMP will propel the co-operative movement significantly. Rethinking CRMP ought to be done by undertaking midterm evaluation and establish meaningful monitoring mechanism.

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5.3 Co-operatives are still a power base where governments may need to invest prudently by genuinely investing in workable and sustainable legal framework and leadership codes that are concerned about enabling members to see tangible benefits.

5.4 Co-operative auditing of reform programmes by a neutral organization is needed in order to provide feedback preferably through a formative feedback process.

5.5 Government and movement to commission a study to look at ways CDD can share roles in order to eliminate conflict of roles with key stakeholders in the family of co-operative support institutions. Current state has inflicted a blow on associates who decided to adapt a ‘wait and see attitude’. CRMP has been interrupted for a long while without implementation and worse no one has questioned that. The apathy says louder.

5.6 Lack of monitoring and evaluation of programmes by neutral and credible evaluation organizations for the co-operative movement.

6 Conclusion and recommendations Agricultural cooperatives provide all types of economic and social services to their members. They demand effective, enlightened and skilled leaders (Prakash, 2000). They need initiatives and services to sustain the interests of their members through the provision of education, training, guidance, extension and farm inputs, farm credit and marketing opportunities. They have to be run on democratic lines. They operate within the framework of national guidelines, but at the same time fulfil the demands of domestic and international markets. Agricultural cooperatives, to be effective and acceptable, must take the members’ views and their felt-needs into consideration. An active communication has to be established and sustained between the management and the members, and between the leadership and the management. Agricultural cooperatives have no reason to be afraid of the open market pressures if their members remain united and respond to the needs of the market. The unity of members is the strength of the cooperative business (ibid).

6.1 ConclusionLife is a journey. We ought to be realistic in our journey. Success comes about based on a well thought growth route (roadmap) focusing on potentials of smaller goals geared up to suit members.

Getting new generation co-operatives in the agricultural sector is important for the sustainability of agricultural co-operatives in future. Such member-investor co-operatives, will cultivate the required risk-taking by the members and will not allow free riding while on the other hand, the co-operators will get the right incentives to sustain the co-operative enterprise in Africa. Such an arrangement will attract qualified leadership and management capacity expected in agricultural co-operatives.

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Policy and legal framework for co-operatives need more design and constant review guided by the members. It will require reduction if not do away with government controls in the co-operative movement so that the members are free to mobilize resources for expansion of the agricultural enterprises in Africa.

Results of this research indicate strongly that, where good co-operative governance is upheld, the co-operative provide higher benefits and give power to membership who dare to take lead in setting own membership agenda and equally dully provide better marketing opportunities through accruing higher prices. Analyses of results associated with CRMP are dismal. Promises of policy and legal framework focusing on member benefit have failed to confirm. Review and rethinking of institutional roles and functions should be led by an independent consultant who is a seasoned co-operator and expert in the field of programme design and implementation.

6.2 Recommendations

6.2.1 Opportunity for CRMP to succeed is abound if caution is taken to redistribute roles and functions among the implementing partners. CDD has allocated itself too much conflicting roles which goes against the principle of checks and balances.

6.2.2 CRMP should have been essentially a co-operative movement programme, although in the implementation framework and roles of key actors set for CDD competes with roles of other partner organizations, prompting to recommend for a major rethinking and logical allocation of roles and delegating financial decisions to those leading the implementation of specific actions and functions.

6.2.3 Participatory Co-operative Development (PCD) is key to making CRMP galvanize the co-operative department and other support institutions in changing mindsets and inculcate new work culture from statist cum punitive co-operative officers to supportive extensionists in empowering co-operators.

6.2.4 Both government and donors have a share in shaping the current co-operative state of affairs, the next step is for all of them to forge efforts towards supporting revitalization process through a reengineered CRMP led by the TFC with close support of MUCCoBS, SCCULT and COASCO, CDD taking a back seat as backstoppers on goals of policies, legal matters and to facilitate realization of the programme objectives through commissioning effective and credible monitoring and evaluation results to be used in improving future implementation.

6.2.5 TFC led rethinking for re-establishing strong education and training network between and among co-operatives including formal requirement for all co-operative unions to employ

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Cooperative Education Publicity Officers (CEPOs), which were functional until 1990s, with a view to provide members with first updates on union business and secondly enhancing co-operative knowledge and skills among members in the functioning of the society and ability to assert and evaluate leadership performance on sound indicators.

6.2.6 There is a great need to re-evaluate and reform co-operative employees’ training programme, infrastructure and supply of quality training material. It is also envisioned to establish a proper career development system to enable the co-operatives to retain managers and inspire them to have faith in co-operative enterprises.

6.2.7 Together with professionalization of management, there is a dire need for creating among the members who own and manage their co-operative institutions. They need to understand the meaning and purpose of a co-operative institution and have faith in them. Faith is generated by a faithful presentation of accounts and transparent accounting system. Members have, therefore, to be brought closer to their institutions by a process of regular and intensive member education activity so that they participate in the organisational and business activities without being deceived or ignored.

7 Way Forward

7.1 Governments ought to take deliberate steps to commit, movement leadership, to takeover roles of Commissioner of Co-operatives.

7.2 Governments will always need co-operatives, interference has no place. Proactive participation in supporting co-operatives still provides room and an opportunity for dialogue and not current powerful government – weak co-operatives relationship and punitive co-operative officers roaming the countryside and sometimes associated with conniving with leaders and managers in mismanagement and corruption practices. Invest more in co-operatives to be able to take lead as was the case in late 1960s and early 1970s.

7.3 Member empowerment and emancipatory capability form the bedrock of a successful co-operative movement where members on their own volition will set agenda for development of their institution.

7.4 Co-operatives are important because they are a way in which people can more fully achieve their potential as human beings. Orderly and appropriate roadmap involving owners will determine the success of co-operatives.

7.5 Opportunity for redressing the situation lies in rethinking about finding ways of building a bridge between co-operative unions and

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primary societies. TFC and CDD to give a directive making it compulsory to re-employ Cooperative Education and Publicity Officers (CEPOs) for each union. Likewise the CDD must employ experienced Co-operative Development Officers, to form a forefront task force responsible for promotional work and protecting interests of members in their dealing with unions and COASCO. In addition, Tutor Study Organizers (TSOs) should join the frontline task force in defense of members’ interests in co-operatives from production to marketing. Extension staff will have to be part of this team including department (promotion), TFC or Union (education and information) and TSO (Education and Skills development) to enable members to be able to negotiate with the union as well as to follow society agenda that benefits members. The tripartite team saw its disintegration in between 1982 and 2000; necessitating its revival soonest.

7.6 Advocacy by TFC, SCCULT and Unions and Networks

Advocacy for co-operative entrepreneurial growth is increasingly becoming fundamental. An appropriate social advocacy for the co-operative enterprise could thrive well and sustained, may be if it is one that shall be led and facilitated by TFC, SCCULT and Co-operative Networks in influencing policy, review cooperative status and determining a pathway for the cooperatives of the future. These may probably be the cooperatives that will be youth managed, democratically driven, adherence to basic ICA principles that emphasize and advocate earnestly for independence from government intervention and control.

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References

AgriTV (2003). Are large agricultural co-operatives a dying species? [http://www.agritv.co.za/co_vs_corp.html ] (Site visited on 6/9/2008).

Amin, M. E., (2005). Social Science Research: Conceptions, Methodology & Analysis, Makerere University Printer, Kampala: 462.pp.

Banturaki, J. A. (2000). Co-operatives and Poverty Alleviation, Tema Publishers, DSM: pp 158.

Bank of Tanzania (2011). Financial Sector Stability Report, March 2011, pp. 16.

Bee, F. K., (2004). Rural Producer Organizations and Policy Formulation in Tanzania. Working Paper 2004: 114, Oslo: NIBR.

Chambo S. A. (2008). Co-operative Education and Training in Africa: A Continental Perspective, Paper presented to the National Co-operative Conference, Pretoria, South Africa 2/7/2008.

Chambo,S., Mwangi, Mary and Oloo, O. “An Analysis of the Socio-economic Impact of Co-operatives in Africa and Their Institutional Context, ICA Regional Office for Africa, Nairobi, 2007.

CLARITY (2006). The Co-operative Law & Regulation Initiative: Enabling Principles for Legal Reform.

Cook, M. L. (1995). The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives: A neo-institutional approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(5):1153-1159.

Cook, M. L. and Iliopoulos, C., (1999). Beginning to Inform the Theory of the Co-operative Firm: Emergence of the New Generation Co-operative, Graduate Institute of Co-operative Leadership and Agribusiness Research Institute, University of Missouri – Columbia, LTA 4/99, pp 525 – 535.

Cornforth, C. (2004). The Governance of Co-operatives and Mutual Associations: A Paradox Perspective; Annals of public and Co-operative Economics. 75:1 2004; 11-32.

Danda, E. B. (1992). MA Thesis: State Policies, Co-operative Education and Sustainability of Co-operatives in Tanzania, Institute of Development Studies, The Hague the Netherlands.

DFID, 2008. “How to Leverage the Co-operative Movement for Poverty Reduction” Growth and Investment Group.

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Develtere, P., Pollet, I. and Wanyama F. (eds) (2008). Cooperating out of poverty; The Renaissance of African co-operative movement, Coop Africa, ILO, Geneva: pp 372.

Hanisch, M., 2005. A Governance Perspective on the Role of Co-operatives in Rural Development, p.13.

ILO, (2003). The Role of Co-operatives in Designing and Implementing Poverty Reduction Strategies; Report on a Regional Workshop held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

International Co-operative Alliance (ICA) and Canadian Co-operative Association (CCA), (2008). An Analysis of the Socio-Economic Impact of Co-operatives in Africa and Their Institutional Context, Noel Creative Media Ltd. Nairobi, Kenya, pp. 168.

Mchomvu, A. S. T., Tungazara, F. S. K. and Maghimbi, S. (2002). Journal of Social Development in Africa Vol. 17 No. 2 (2002): 63 pp.

Mlowe, L. H. K., Towo, E. N., Bamanyisa, J. (2007). Crop Diversification: An emerging Opportunity among Rural Producer Organizations in Tanzania, in Special Issue: BEEP Research Report, Vol. 2: 1-41.

Ngalula, D. M. (1994). Co-operative Member Education for Mainland Tanzania: An Inquiry into Co-operative Member Education and Training Needs for mainland cooperators, Co-operative College printing Press, Moshi, 151pp.

Ortmann G. F. and King R. P. (2006) Small-scale farmers in South Africa: Can agricultural co-operatives facilitate access to input and product markets, 76 pp.

Ortmann G. F. and King R. P. (2007). Agricultural Cooperatives: History, Theory and Problems Agrekon, Vol 46, No 1 (March 2007), 40-68.

Philip, K (2003). Co-operatives in South Africa: Their role in job creation and poverty reduction. [http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000786/index.php] site visited on August 8, 2005).

Porvali, H. (ed.) (1993). The Development of Co-operatives, Agriculture and Rural Development Series, No. 8, The World Bank, Washington, D. C.

Prakash, D. (2000). Development of Agricultural Cooperatives - Relevance of Japanese Experiences to Developing Countries. The Institute for the Development of Agricultural Cooperation in Asia [IDACA] 4771 Aihara-Cho, Machida-Shi, Tokyo 194-02. Japan.

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Prakash, D. (2008). Management Capacity Building for Strengthening Co-operative Enterprises, New Delhi.

Prakash, D. (2003). Rural Women, Food Security and Agricultural Co-operatives. Rural Development and Management Centre, ‘The Saryu’, J-102 Kalkaji, New Delhi, India.

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Websites

1. http://www.agritv.co.za/co_vs_corp.html

2. (http://www.nrcan.gc.ca/cfs/crc/english/docs_e/asmnt1_e.pdf) site visited on 16 May 2011.

3. (http://issues.tigweb.org/civilsociety ) site visited o 14 May 2011.

4. (http://www.eco-innovation.net.node.113) site visited on 19th May 2011.

Appendix 1 Key problematic issues The CRMP identified to be addressed

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(1) Inflexible Co-operative structures;(2) Weak co-operative leadership and management;(3) An indifferent, submissive, and small membership;(4) Weak economical base and lack of strategic planning;(5) Lack of adequate capital and sustainable financing;(6) Weaknesses in Co-operative support institutions; and(7) Cross cutting issues of gender, environment and HIV/AIDS

Appendix 2 CRMP expected Output and ImpactsThe CRMP is a ten year (2005 – 2005) program. Its implementation started in 2005. It is envisaged that during the life span of the program the following outcomes will be attained.

1. Economically strong co-operative societies which are capable of facing competitive challenges

2. Strong Savings and Credit Co-operative societies and Co-operative banks which will provide better financial services to their members and be source of capital for other types of co-operatives

3. An empowered membership through acquisition of education, new knowledge and skills

4. Good governance and accountability in co-operative societies which will in turn minimize the problems of theft, misappropriation and corruption in co-operatives

5. Co-operative societies with sufficient and cost effective structures which can easily respond to the needs of members

6. An efficient information exchange system between co-operatives and other stakeholders.

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Appendix 3 CRMP Expected OutcomesExpected outcomesOverall desired outcomes of CRMP implementation include having in place the following; Economically strong co-operative societies which are capable of facing

competitive challenges; Strong savings and credit co-operative societies and co-operative banks which

will provide better financial services to their members and be a source of capital for other types of co-operatives;

A large and empowered co-operative membership through acquisition of education, new knowledge and skills;

Good governance and accountability in co-operative societies which will in turn minimize the problems of theft, misappropriation and corruption in co-operatives.

Co-operative societies with efficient and cost effective structure which can easily respond to the needs of the members;

Efficient and effective co-operative support institutions.

REVIEW OF APPROACHES FAILLING TO ALLEVIATE POVERTYWHAT WAS WRONG WITH PREVIOUS APPROACHES TO ALLEVIATE POVERTY?Some of the reasons for failures in the past were:

1. A low level of participation by the poor. Rural poor are often denied a voice in the formulation and even in the execution of a poverty programme;

2. Programmes have tended to rely on grants and subsidies as the main tools for serving the poor;

3. Too little attention has been given to strengthening the negotiating capacities of the poor, to enhancing their power to participate meaningfully in policy formulation and in the marketplace;

4. Most poverty alleviation programmes have had a single vector of intervention and have failed to confront the multi-dimensionality of poverty;

5. Priorities usually have been set from ‘the outside’, thus being supply-driven rather than demand-driven and unable to respond to the particular needs and potentials of the poor.

Source: Dr. Daman Prakash, 2003. Rural Women, Food Security and Agricultural Co-operatives, p.15.

Source: Dr. Daman Prakash, 2003. Rural Women, Food Security and Agricultural Co-operatives, p.15.

BASIC REQUIREMENTS FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATIONPoverty alleviation is facilitated by:

Increased access to productive assets for the poor such as land and water, credit and education, extension and public health services;The active participation of the poor and their representative bodies in decision-making. They must be provided with an enabling environment that encourages collective self-help action, personal investments and accumulation. Programmes need to be designed on a demand-driven basis rather than be imposed from the outside;Government institutions and the incentives that make them accountable to the general public should be reformed. They must become more responsive to the needs of the poor. Decentralisation and privatisation of government services and administration can assist in that process, and the NGO and private sectors have a crucial role to play. Transaction costs must be kept low;The building of sustainable capacities for poverty alleviation requires a well-defined and long-term development approach.

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Appendix 4 STATUS OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AS AT 31ST DECEMBER 2004

S/N REGION

TFC &

UNION

AMCOS

SACCOS

CONSUMERS INDU-

ANIMAL BEE

MINNING IRRI

HOUSING

FISHERIES TRANS-

SERVICES

OTHERS

TOTAL

   APEX        

STRIAL

KEEPING

KEEPING  

GATION    

PORTATION      

1 Arusha   1 42 77 16 8 6 - - 1 - - - 4 1 156

2Dar es Salaam 1 3 22 223 20 23 5 - - - 7 6 2 106 1 419

3 Dodoma     1 99 2 1 1 7 1 6 - 1 5 3 - 127

4 Iringa   2 122 116 11 17 2 - - - - - - - 6 2765 Kagera   4 223 151 4 2 27 1 1 1 3 9 3 8 30 4676 Kigoma     52 34 2 1 3 - - - - - - - 16 108

7 Kilimanjaro   3 130 122 10 7 11 1 3 17 - - 1 4 14 323

8 Lindi   1 76 24 11 1   - - - - - - 2 7 122

9 Manyara   1 45 43 2 3 7 - 2 1 - - - - - 104

10 Mara   4 144 86 1 1 2 - 1 - 1 6 - - 2 24811 Mbeya   6 134 159 3 9 23 - - 6 - 24 5 - 9 378

12 Morogoro 1 3 81 70 6 8 3 - 1 4 - - - - 25 20213 Mtwara 1 2 135 41 - 9 - - - - - - - - 28 216

14 Mwanza 1 2 287 171 13 6 1 - 2 7 5 22 1 20 12 55015 Pwani   2 113 43 56 29 13 - - 3 - 18 - 8 109 39416 Rukwa   2 11 21 1 - - 1 - - - 6 - - 5 47

17 Ruvuma   3 113 31 4 - - - - 1 - - - - 1 153

18 Shinyanga   3 514 66 8 9 13 - 1 - - - - 4 3 621

19 Singida   2 55 31 1 3 2 3 2 10 1 - - - 2 112

20 Tabora   2 239 64 8 4 1 3 2 7 - 6 - 2 8 346

21 Tanga   2 49 47 3 7 11 - - 8 1 1 - 6 10 145

  Jumla 4 48 2,588 1,719 182 148 131 16 16 72 18 99 17

167

289 5,514

Source: Department of Co-operative Development - DodomaAppendix 5 STATUS OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AS OF NOVEMBER 2007

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REGION AMCOS SACCOSAnimal Keeping Fisheries Housing Mining Industrial Irrigation

Consumers

Services

Transportation Unions

APEX/TFC

Others Total

Arusha 42 209 6 0 0 0 8 3 15 5 0 1 0 3 292Dodoma 5 145 2 0 0 1 1 4   2 1 0 0 16 177DSM 19 457 0 4 0 0 16 4 18 127 0 3 1 26 675Iringa 134 139 2 4 0 0 11 1 0 0 0 2 0 13 306Kagera 225 232 29 13 4 1 1 0 6 19 2 4 0 21 557Kigoma 48 178 1 1 0 0 6 0 4 2 0 0 0 8 248Kilimanjaro 121 179 8 0 0 3 4 19 16 0 1 3 0 21 375

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Lindi 79 112 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 1 0 5 201Manyara 50 114 1 0 0 3 2 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 176Mara 132 178 6 8 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 0 2 334Mbeya 133 261 25 23 0 0 6 5 2 1 4 6 0 13 479Morogoro 85 300 3 3 2 1 2 3 0 3 2 3 1 18 426Mtwara 139 111 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 2 0 10 268Mwanza 344 592 0 26 0 0 10 7 9 14 0 1 0 24 1027Coast 112 257 15 16 0 0 9 2 0 10 0 1 0 38 460Rukwa 16 90 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 1 0 4 120Ruvuma 114 76 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 0 0 198Shinyanga 528 373 7 0 0 2 3 0 4 0 0 2 0 11 930Singida 47 100 2 1 0 2 1 9 4 8 0 2 0 9 185Tabora 248 187 1 6 0 2 6 7 13 3 0 2 0 12 487Tanga 49 155 11 2 0 0 10 7 0 10 0 2 0 11 257

TOTAL 2,670 4,445 119 113 7 16 101 77 96 209

10

44 2

269

8,178

Source: Department of Co-operative Development – Dodoma

Appendix 6 STATUS OF CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETIES AS OF JUNE 2008

S/N REGION AMCOS SACCOSAnimal Keeping Fisheries Housing Mining Industrial

Irrigation

Consumers

Services

Transportation

Unions

APEX/TFC

Others Total 1 ARUSHA 42 224 6 0 0 0 8 3 16 5 0 1 0 3 308 2 DSM 19 457 0 4 5 0 17 4 18 94 4 3 1 23 649 3 DODOMA 9 158 2 0 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 0 0 12 189 4 IRINGA 118 185 0 4 0 0 5 5 5 4 0 2 0 5 333 5 KAGERA 226 262 0 20 0 0 0 2 5 19 0 4 0 48 586 6 KIGOMA 48 178 1 1 0 0 3 0 4 2 0 0 0 8 245 7 K'NJARO 103 212 8 0 0 1 5 32 8 5 0 3 0 22 399

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8 LINDI 87 112 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 3 0 1 0 0 207 9 MARA 50 114 0 0 6 0 4 3 1 0 0 4 0 5 187 10 MANYARA 141 226 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 1 0 15 394 11 MBEYA 150 298 25 23 0 0 8 6 1 9 0 6 0 10 536 12 MORO 73 314 0 2 0 0 2 3 4 0 0 3 1 22 424 13 MTWARA 175 138 0 5 0 0 8 3 0 11 0 2 0 0 342 14 MWANZA 341 606 0 23 0 0 7 4 4 29 0 1 0 71 1,086 15 COAST 113 271 16 16 0 0 90 2 6 10 0 1 0 34 559 16 RUKWA 8 95 0 6 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 1 0 10 123 17 RUVUMA 114 81 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 3 0 3 206

18SHYINYANGA 524 387 2 0 0 2 4 0 4 6 0 2 0 8 939

19 SINGIDA 47 95 0 10 0 0 2 9 2 4 0 2 0 1 172

20 TABORA 180 193 0 6 0 0 7 7 17 3 0 2 0 28 443

21 TANGA 46 174 11 2 0 0 10 6 3 9 0 2 0 7 270

  TOTAL 2,614 4,780 71 129 11 3 185 98 103 218 4 44 2 335 8,597

Source: Department of Co-operative Development, Dodoma

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