decentralisation, development and popular study of...
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DECENTRALISATION, DEVELOPMENT AND POPULARPARTICIPATION IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS: A
STUDY OF THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
A THESIS PRESENTED IN FULFILMENT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTS IN DEVELOPMENT STUDIES AT THE UNIVERSITY OF THE SOUTH
PACIFIC
GORDON LEUA NANAU
The School of Social and Economic DevelopmentThe University of the South Pacific
Suva, Fiji.
DECEMBER 1995
AUTHENTICITY
Except for those sections explicitly acknowledged in the text, this thesis represents myown original work. The thesis contains work I undertook in 1994 and 1995 under thesupervision of Dr Sandra Tarte and Dr Vanessa Griffen of the Department ofHistory/Politics at the University of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji. I hereby declare thatthe contents of this Master of Arts in Development Studies thesis has not beenpreviously submitted to any other university for a higher degree.
Gordon Leua Nanau
December, 1995
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to many people who assisted me personally,professionally and morally in completing this study.
First, I am deeply indebted to my supervisors: Dr Sandra Tarte and Dr Vanessa Griffen.This study could not have been completed without their time, useful comments,suggestions, and patience. Dr Tarte, in particular, spent a great deal of time reading,editing, re-reading and commenting on how the work could be improved, Dr Griffenassisted me in organising and carrying out the field work. Dr Doug Munro, Prof.Crosbie Walsh and Tarcisius Tara Kabitlaulaka helped in editing and making usefulsuggestions on some of my chapters. I learned a lot from their academic experiences,wisdom, encouragement and inspiration.
1 also wish to acknowledge the assistance given to me by many people in the SolomonIslands during my field research. The premiers, provincial secretaries, administrators,provincial assembly and executive members of Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawaprovinces were of great help. I am also obliged to the Permanent Secretary and LegalAdviser of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development and theirofficers, the General Manager of Guadalcanal Development Authority and personnel,and the Director and staff members of the Provincial Development Unit.
Special thanks is rendered to my friends Hunter Masuguria and the late Patterson ItomaeChuchuni for their hospitality at the Kira Kira rest house. I am also grateful for the kindassistance given to me by Patrick Nanau and his family while carrying out researchwork in Honiara. I am also thankful to my friend John Stewart for digitising andcompiling the maps, and my girl friend, Maria Labu for sending needed documents andinformation from Honiara. Special thanks is rendered to my many fellow SolomonIsland students at USP, particularly, Donald Marahare, Chris Siale, Melchior Mataki,Nicholas Pcgoa Scsele, and Basil Scotl Siola for feeding the printer with paper.
To my mother, late father, sisters, brothers and relatives at Ngalitavethi, Tathiboko,Guadalcanal, thank you for all your kindness, love, care, and patience given to me sincechildhood and for showing me that education is one way to live.
To all whose names I cannot possibly mention here, "lakatoba bati nau" for your kindsupport and blessings. Take this thesis as a token of my appreciation of your kind helptowards this study.
Finally, I must thank the Sasakawa Young Leaders Foundation of Japan (USP/Sasakawaaward), and the Solomon Islands Government for the financial support given towardsthis undertaking, This study could have never been carried out without their financialsupport and aid.
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SYNOPSIS
This study of decentralisation focuses on the role of the provincial government systemin the political and economic development of the Solomon Islands.
Important components of the study include a theoretical discussion of the rationales fordecentralisation, especially in the form of the provincial government system. It looksspecifically at the following aspects of the provincial government system in theSolomon Islands: (I) the historical evolution of the system, (2) the structure, tasks andfunctions of the system, (3) the contributions of the provincial government system to theeconomic development of provinces and rural areas, and (4) the provincial governmentsand popular participation in rural development and general government.
The study critically analyses the notion of decentralisation as a uniting force and as away to facilitate development 'from below'. An important rationale of decentralisation isthat such systems would bring the government machinery closer to the people, givingautonomy to distinct groups, giving people the feeling of being part of the nation andthus preventing political fragmentation.
This study highlights the major problems of decentralisation in the Solomon Islands andexamines why the provincial government system is not working as envisaged by itsframers. It highlights the lack of popular participation in rural development and in theprovincial governments, and the fragmented (geographic, cultural and linguistic) natureof the country, tensions between the central government and the provincialgovernments, the inability of the central government and provincial governments tofacilitate and encourage popular participation in the Provincial Development Unit(PDU) funds, Small Islands Communities Projects Scheme (SICOPSA) funds, and theConstituency Development Funds (CDF), In addition, the government is unable tomonitor and evaluate development plans and the progress of projects under theaforementioned rural development funds.
A decentralised system and structure of government in the Solomon Islands can only beviewed as achieving its aims if living standards in the rural areas and the provision ofservices are improved. This study explores why such dreams for a better life are notforthcoming in the Solomon Islands under the present decentralised provincialgovernment system.
I l l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS i
SYNOPSIS ii
LIST OF ACRONYMS x
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 INTEREST AND IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY 4
1.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS 6
13.1 The Physical Environment 111.3.2 Demography 121.3.3 The Economy 13
1.4 POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERSHIP 161.4.1 Traditional Politics and Leadership 171.4.2 The Colonial Administration 191.4.3 The Present Political System and Leadership 391.4.4 The Central Government 211.4.5 The Provincial Governments 23
1.4.6 The Area Councils 27
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALISATION 29
INTRODUCTION 29
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION 29
2.2 DECENTRALISATION, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT 36
2.3 RATIONALES AND JUSTIFICATIONS FORDECENTRALISATION 402.3.1 Decentralisation and Participation 412.3.2 Decentralisation as a Development tool .. 432.3.3 Decentralisation for efficient decision making 442.3.4 Decentralisation as a uniting force 472.3.5 Decentralisation as a form of decolonisation 492.3.6 Decentralisation and Liberalism 50
IV
2.4 CONCLUSION 51
CHAPTER 3THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROVINCIALGOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS 52
INTRODUCTION 52
3.1 THE BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS PROTECTORATE.. 533.1.1 Resident Commissioners 55
3.1.2 District Officers and District Stations . 55
3.2 THE MA'ASJNA RURU MOVEMENT 58
3.3 THE LOCAL COUNCILS 593.4 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLAN OF OPERATIONS 1974-1977 60
3.5 KAUSIMAE REVIEW AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTACT, 1981 66
3.6 POST COLONIAL REVIEWS 683.6.1 The 1979 Government White Paper 683.6.2 The Provincial Government Review, 1987 70
3.7 CONCLUSION 72
CHAPTER 4THE SOLOMON ISLANDS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 74
INTRODUCTION 74
4.1 THE POLITICAL AGENDA: SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS'POLICIES ON THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 75
4.2 THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1981 814,2.1 Service functions versus devolved functions 83
4.3 THE MINISTRY OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND RURALDEVELOPMENT 83
4.3.1 Structure of the Ministry of Provincial Government 844.3.2 Provincial Government Funding , 86
4.4 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES 87
4.5 THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT 884.5.1 PDU Procedures 894.5.2 PDU source and level of funding 92
4.6 SMALL ISLANDS COMMUNITIES PROJECTS SCHEME(SICOPSA) 944.6.1 The Objectives of SICOPSA 954.6.2 Types of Assistance under SICOPSA 954.6.3 Procedures of obtaining SICOPSA grants 97
4.7 CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF) 98
4.8 CONCLUSION 100
CHAPTER 5THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT 101
RECAPTURING THE DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENT 101
5.1 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING 1035.1.1 Provincial Development Planning: Guadalcanal 1045.1.2 Provincial Development Planning: Makira Ulawa 1055.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation of Development Plans 110
5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES 1125.2.1 Makira Economic Development Authority 1135.2.2 The Makira Bell 1165.2.3 Maewo Coconut Products Limited (MCPL) 1175.2.4 The Guadalcanal Development Authority 1195.2.5 Limits to GDA's Performance 1215.2.6 GDA's Future Plans 122
5.3 ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES 123
5.4 THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS 125
5.5 THE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND DEVELOPMENT 130
5.6 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AND DEVELOPMENTACTIVITIES 1325.6.1 The Constilueney Development Fund (CDF) 133
VI
5.6.2 The Provincial Development Unit and Development 136
5.7 CONCLUSION..... 143
CHAPTER 6DECENTRALISATION, PROVINCIAL DECISION MAKING AND POPULARPARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT 145
INTRODUCTION 145
6.1 DECENTRALISATION AND DECISION MAKING 1476.1.1 Informal Decision Making Groups 1486.1.2 Area Councils in Decision Making 1526.1.3 Technical Advice and Decision Making 1556.1,4 Changes in Government and Effects on Decision Making 157
6.2 DECENTRALISATION AND MASS PARTICIPATION INDEVELOPMENT 1616.2.1 Development Authorities in Provincial Development 1616.2.2 People's Participation in Rural Development Funds 1626.2.3 Local Initiatives in Development 163
6.3 DECENTRALISATION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY ANDUNITY 1656.3.1 The Provincial Government System and National Unity 1676.3.2 Provincial Governments and the Provision of Services 171
6.4 CONCLUSION 172
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION 173
INTRODUCTION 173
7.1 CONCLUSION 174
7.2 . APPROACHES TO IMPROVING THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT SYSTEM 178
7.3 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR DECENTRALISATION 183
BIBLIOGRAPHY 186
vii]
APPENDIX 1951. NOTES ON RESEARCH METHODS 1952. LISTS A, B AND C RECOMMENDED BY THE KAUSIMAE
COMMITTEE 2043. PDU CHECK LIST 'D' 2084. NORTH EAST GUADALCANAL CDF APPLICATION
FORM 212
viii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.1: Population by ethnic component, 1976 and 1986 13
Table 1.2: Real Gross domestic Product (1985 = 100) 15
Table 1.3: The Solomon Islands Nine Provinces: Size and
Population 25
TABLE 4.1: Central governments provincial estimates for 1993 and 1994 86
Table 4.2: Contributions from aid donors to PDU in 1992 and 1994 93
Table 5.1: Makira Ulawa Province: Summary of Estimated Revenue and
Expenditures for the year ending 31 March 1995 127
Table 5.2: Guadalcanal Province: summary of Estimates 1994-1995 128
Table 5.3: Number and value of PDU projects by sector 138
Table 5.4: Distribution of PDU Projects by Province and theircorresponding value 138
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1: Structure of the Central Government 22
Figure 1.2: The Provincial Government Structure 26
Figure 4.1: Ministry of Provincial Governments' Structure 85
Figure 4.2: Flow chart for PDU project submission 90
LIST OF MAPS
Map 1: Solomon Islands Provinces- 1995 24
Map 2: Solomon Islands Local Councils, 1974 63
Map 3: Guadalcanal Province Administration, 1995 106
Map 4: Makira Ulawa Province: Administration and PDU Projects, 1995 111
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAO Assistant Administrative Officer
AMU Aid Management Unit
AIP Accelerated Impact Program
CAO Chief Administrative Officer
CBSI Central Bank of Solomon Islands
CDF Constituency Development Fund
CMAF Canada's Mission Administered Fund
EDF European Development Fund
ETO External Trade Organisation
GDA Guadalcanal Development Authority
GNU Government of "National Unity
HRDP Human Resources Development Program
IFI Integrated Forest Industries
MCPL Maevvo Coconut Products Limited
MEDA Makira Economic Development Authority
MP Member of Parliament
MUDC Makira United Development Company
NCP National Coalition Partners
NZSPF New Zealand Small Project Fund
PDF Provincial Development Fund
PDU Provincial Development Unit
RDC Resource and Development Consultancy
SDF Special Discretionary Fund
SGS Small Grants Scheme
SICOPSA Small Islands Communities Project Scheme
SIG Solomon Islands Government
SINURP Solomon Islands National Unity, Reconciliation and ProgressivePali
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Decentralisation and the provincial government system1 was hailed by both its
colonial and post colonial founders as a better way to rule the culturally and
linguistically diverse Solomon Islands. However, the rationales or motives for
decentralisation in these two eras of the country's political history were different. With
the islands' geographical dispersion, and cultural and linguistic diversity, the colonisers
saw decentralisation of administrative tasks, through district officers and stations, as a
way to achieve the objectives of the colonial government, particularly law and order,
and the collection of head tax (see Fox 1967; Keesing and Corris 1980; Healy 1966;
Paia 1975).
The post colonial leaders, on the other hand, saw decentralisation as a better way
to accommodate the country's diversity and at the same time facilitate the involvement
of native Solomon Islanders in the political and economic development of the country
Decentralisation and the provincial government system aretwo related terms. Decentralisation is an umbrella term used todescribe organisations that spread their tasks, functions,physical structures, personnel and legislative power tosubordinate bodies or offices operating in other localities.The provincial government system is a form of governmentorganisation that empowers lower levels of government bodiessuch as provinces, through the constitution or otherlegislation to carry out certain functions and tasks on behalfof and in association with the central authority. As defined inchapter 2, it involves both processes of devolution anddeconcentration.
(Kausimae 1978; Premdas 1982; Bennett 1987; Report of the Solomon Islands
Constitutional Conference 1977; Report: Special Committee on Provincial Government
1979; SIG 1979; Report of the Provincial Government Review Committee 1987).
Democratic ideas introduced to the Solomon Islands by Western colonisers
supported decentralisation as 'rule by the people, for the people and of the people'.
Furthermore, it was maintained that economic development and the consequent
increases in the level of services and standards of living were better achieved or
provided through a decentralised system of government.
This thesis investigates several questions and issues. The grand tour questions
are; (1) Whether the decentralisation of government in the Solomon Islands facilitates
the participation of people in decision making and government? (2) Has the
decentralisation of government promoted development in the Solomon Islands,
particularly in the rural communities?
In exploring these general questions, the study examines the contributions of the
colonial administration in the establishment of the decentralised system of government
in the Solomon Islands. The historical evolution of the provincial government system in
the Solomon Islands is of particular interest in explaining the government system and
structure currently operating in the country.
In exploring the role of decentralisation in post colonial Solomon Islands,
attention is given to the central government's commitment to provincial governments
and other rural development structures and investigates the relationship between
provincial governments and the central government. It highlights the limits to the actual
powers of the provincial governments in terms of financial strength to execute the
devolved functions, control over provincial natural resources, and decision making and
administration,
The study assesses the performance of the provincial government system in
terms of political participation and economic development and explains why this system
is not achieving what it was set up to do.
The data and information used to answer these questions of the thesis are based
on two provinces: Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawa". These were chosen for several
reasons. One reason is that these two provinces were the first to have taken some
initiatives in facilitating the development of provinces by establishing Provincial
Development Authorities. The first was the Makira Economic Development Authority
(MEDA), which was established in 1984 and the Guadalcanal Development Authority
(GDA) which was established in 1988. It was of interest to find out how far these
provinces had gone in provincial development since the establishment of their
development authorities.
2 The methodology used in this study to obtain data andinformation is fully outlined and explained in Appendix 1.
3 There are nine provinces altogether in the SolomonIslands. They are Choisuel, Western, Isabel, Central Islands,Guadalcanal, Rennell and Bellona, Malaita, Makira Ulawa, andTemotu, These are described in more detail later in theChapter.
Second, in all the provinces of the country, the only two provinces with
members who have served in provincial governments continuously since before the
enactment of the 1981 Provincial Government Act, are Makira Ulawa and Guadalcanal
provinces. For instance, the Premier of Makira Ulawa province and the Deputy Premier
of Guadalcanal province, at the time of the research, had been in provincial politics
since the establishment of provincial governments in 1981. This provided insights into
the evolution of the provincial government system since independence,
Finally, there was the factor of time and money, Given the limited amount of
money and lime given for the duration of the field study, it was unrealistic to choose
provinces that were far apart, For one thing, there is the cost of travelling to and from
the provinces of study, and the accommodation expenses in the provincial headquarters.
Furthermore, there is the difficulty of getting transport from Honiara to distant, outlying
provinces. The time spent on travelling by boat from Honiara to some of the very distant
provinces like Temotu, Choisuel, Western province, and Rennell and Bellona province
would be a problem. Therefore, the author resorted to study Makira Ulawa and
Guadalcanal provinces instead of the others because they are close together,
1.1 INTEREST AND IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
This thesis aims to contribute to the existing body of knowledge on
decentralisation and development in both private and public organisations,
Decentralisation is a strategy used by both private and public organisations to achieve
efficiency and effectiveness in the tasks and goals of the organisation.
The Solomon Islands provincial government system is but one example of an
attempt to promote development through decentralisation. This study is important
because it reviews the Solomon Islands provincial government system and identifies the
problems of the system and why provincial governments are not achieving their aims.
This is a case study that may be useful for other island states implementing
decentralisation as their development strategy. Therefore the author approached this
work from the perspective of a rural dweller in the Solomon Islands and as a student of
political and social organisations and structures.
This is the first study by a Solomon Islander of the provincial government
system which has been in operation since the colonial days. Most of the research done
on the Solomon Islands provincial government system can be divided into two
categories: (1) Solomon Islands government reports and reports from organisations
operating under the provincial government system, and (2) articles and essays written by
outside scholars. Government reports written on the Solomon Islands provincial
government system are nornally restricted to their terms of reference. Such reports do
not tend to critically evaluate the problems that affect the performance of the provincial
government system. Examples of such reports are: The Report of the Special Committee
on Provincial Governments, Report of the Provincial Government Review Committee,
and the Provincial Development Unit annual reports,
The other group of writers on the Solomon Islands provincial government
system were outside academics and consultants. Their writings are more
6
historical and descriptive and do not normally give insights into what is actually
happening at the provincial government level. For instance, Premdas' et al (1982)
account of the dissolution of the Honiara Town Council is more historical and
descriptive while the working papers of consultants (Wolfers et al 1982) on the
Solomon Islands provincial government system focussed on identifying the
advantages and disadvantages of the system. These are but two examples of the
type of materials written by outsiders on decentralisation in the Solomon Islands.
While such writings have contributed much to an overall understanding of the
system, there is very little critical analysis of contemporary problems and issues
that hinder the provincial government system.
By undertaking this study, the author has aimed to analyse the problems
of the provincial government system as experienced by Solomon Islanders. This
is reflected in the research methodology used (Appendix 1). This study focuses
on the difficulties faced by the Solomon Islands provincial government system
and the possible remedies to these problems. Furthermore, it contains an analysis
of the fate of rural development funds and projects that has not been undertaken
elsewhere in the literature.
1.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
Most data collected for this thesis were analysed and interpreted at the
University of the South Pacific, Laucala campus, Fiji. Data analysis and
interpretations are divided into seven chapters as outlined below.
7
The remainder of the first chapter gives background on the Solomon
Islands as a nation and as the subject of the study, To a reader with little
knowledge of the country, it is important to provide general and contextual
information about the country on matters such as the physical environment,
location, climate, land area and other important general information. The chapter
also looks at the structure of government in the Solomon Islands. It identifies the
various political systems in traditional Solomon Islands societies and
contemporary government and leadership structures.The study of the two systems
of government (traditional and contemporary) is done to see how the present
system is influenced by the traditional systems of leadership and political
behaviour. Such an exercise is imporlant to an understanding of the evolution and
performance of provincial governments in the Solomon Islands. Unless the reader
is informed about traditional Solomon Islands political organisation, it may be
difficult to see the shortfalls and obstacles to meaningful decentralisation and
development under the present provincial government system.
In chapter two, a theoretical discussion of decentralisation is undertaken.
The discussion includes decentralisation as a way of promoting participation in
development and in other crucial decision making efforts, decentralisation as a
uniting force, decentralisation as a form of decolonisation, and decentralisation
and liberal ethics. These theoretical justifications are important for our
understanding of what decentralisation is and why many countries like the
Solomon Islands have adopted decentralisation in their development efforts.
8
The notions of democracy, decentralisation and development are discussed
in depth. This is due to the fact that decentralisation and democracy are regarded
by some analysts, including Muttalib (1978); Maddick (1975); Ocampo (1991), as
crucial for the development of countries. This raises a number of questions
central to this thesis. Is decentralisation really democratic? Does decentralisation
encourage development? Furthermore, is democracy the only way to develop?
These are important questions that are essential to any consideration of how
development can best be carried out.
The third chapter deals with the evolution and emergence of the provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands. After the theoretical discussion on
the rationales and justifications for decentralisation, it is necessary to have a good
understanding of the emergence of the provincial government system in the
Solomon Islands context. This calls for a chronological discussion of the origins
and stages of decentralisation, the problems encountered and the reviews or steps
taken to make the system more efficient and effective.
The chapter's first part looks at decentralisation since the declaration of
the British protectorate and more specifically, considers the Resident
Commissioner and his rule through district officers in district stations. The aims
behind such decentralisation of stations and officers are important since they
paved the way for the division of islands into local councils and later into
provinces.
9
It is also important to include a discussion of the influences of nationalist
movements in the Solomon Islands, which show us how the people of the day
felt about foreign rule and domination. More importantly, this shows how
Solomon Islanders began adopting the foreign idea of local councils - the first
indigenous attempt to adopt a decentralised system of government. The focus is
on indigenous commitment to decentralisation and the establishment of the local
councils - the forerunner of provincial governments in the Solomon Islands. The
discussion also looks at the various reviews of decentralisation since the
establishment of local councils, including in the post colonial era.
Chapter four discusses the contemporary Solomon Islands provincial
government system. The focus is on the structure of the system that currently
exists in the Solomon Islands. In addition, the different powers of the three levels
of government (national, provincial and area) are identified and discussed. This is
very important because the kinds of political and economic power devolved to
the two lower levels of government largely determine the nature and success of
this decentralised political system,
In Chapter five attention focuses on the provincial government system and
its role in promoting the economic development of the two provinces, Maldra
Ulawa and Guadalcanal (Map 1). To this end, their development budgets, their
sources of income and their allocation of expenditure are examined. The chapter
also considers how development strategies are planned, monitored and evaluated
in the two provinces,
10
The Provincial Development Unit (PDU), the Development Authorities,
and other rural development funding sources are analysed. These funds and
organisations in the provincial government system were established to assist
people in the rural areas to promote economic independence or at least to have a
satisfactory standard of living. This chapter considers how far such organisations
and rural development funds are in fact achieving their objectives,
In Chapter 6, the extent of popular participation in the two provinces is
assessed. The chapter deals with the relationship between the national
government and the two provincial governments, and explores to what extent
there is popular participation in decision making and administration. It suggests
that there is a lack of popular participation in provincial governments - contrary
to the policy rationales of the government and that this often accounts for failures
to achieve development goals. Chapter 6 also looks at the question of
decentralisation as a uniting force. It considers whether the system is promoting
division or unity in the country. In other words, it assesses the relationship
between decentralisation and nation building.
The final chapter contains conclusions and recommendations that are
drawn from the research. The conclusions in this chapter generally argue that the
devolution of functions and legislative power to the provincial governments in
the Solomon Islands has failed to achieve its political and economic development
goals. There has been a failure to bring the goods and services to the rural
populace, unaccountable and closed decision making procedures, and an inability
to facilitate national unity, These problems may be attributed to the lack of
proper monitoring and evaluation of rural development funds and projects, the
complicated structures and procedures under which the system is operating, the
expensive nature of the provincial government system, and the lack of political
commitment. Chapter seven also offers some suggestions and possible solutions
to counteract the problems identified.
1.3 SOLOMON ISLANDS
The remaining seclion of this chapter provides background to the Solomon
Islands. Since the focus of the study is on the provincial government system of
decentralisation, popular participation and development, background information
of the country is restricted to areas necessary for analysis in this thesis. More
specifically, background discussion of the country describes: (1) physical
environment, (2) demography, (3) the economy, and (4) social and political
organisations.
1.3.1 The Physical Environment
The Solomon Islands consists of a double chain of islands with six major
islands and many smaller ones, located between five and twelve degrees South
latitude and 155 and 170 degrees East longitude. The country shares the
international border with Bougainville of Papua New Guinea, and Vanuatu's
Bank Islands. The 900 islands of the Solomon Islands extend a distance of over
1,600 kilometres from the Shortland Islands in the north-west to Tikopia in the
south-east (Kabutaulaka 1993, 48). The islands range from high mountainous big
12
islands like Guadalcanal with 5,340 square kilometres (Douglas and Douglas
1994) to very small artificially built islands and atoll islands like those of Ontong
Java.
1.3.2 Demography
A total population of 285,176 was enumerated at the 1986 census, with a
3.5 per cent annual rate of increase and a sex ratio of 108 males per 100 females.
The total population, broken down into three different age categories and
corresponding percentages was as follows: (1) 0-14 years: 47 per cent, (2) 15-59
years: 48 per cent, and (3) 60 years and older: 5 per cent (SIG 1989). Apart from
Thc country having very few old people, the under 14 portion of the population is
very large and, obviously, entirely dependent on the income and earnings of
those in the age group 15-59 years. The very high proportion of young people,
moreover, constitutes a demographic time bomb that will sustain an already high
crude birth rate that has resulted in a 40 percent increase of the population
between 1 976 and 1986.
The Solomon Islands is mainly populated with Melanesians. Nevertheless,
there are also indigenous Polynesians living on the small outlying islands of
Tikopia, Anuta, Ontong Java, Rennell, Bellona, and Sikaiana (Map 1). The
country also has a population of I-Kiribati and Chinese immigrants and other
races. The table below shows the Solomon Islands population by ethnic
components for the years 1976 and 1986.
14
in recent years economic growth has been very low. The measurement used to
determine this is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The Central Bank of
Solomon Islands (CBSI 1991, 8), defined GDP as "... an estimate of the value of
domestic production, out of which the economy must export, to earn foreign
exchange to pay for imports and satisfy as much as possible of domestic
demand". The basic reason for this low GDP is because a large component of
GDP comprises subsistence or non-cash sector production which sustains the
livelihood of three quarters of the population (CBSI 1993, 8). Douglas and
Douglas (1994, 589) point out that "[o]ver 80 per cent of the work force age
population are engaged in subsistence agriculture which generates very little or
no surplus after household consumption, There is heavy dependence on the
public sector for formal employment which distributes little or nothing to foreign
exchange earnings. As a result, merchandise exports are generated by a very
small portion of the work-force". This is a big obstacle to the economic growth
of the Solomon Islands. Unless it is addressed, the problem of poor economic
growth and low GDP may continue to haunt the domestic economy. There are
several serious stumbling blocks to economic growth in the Solomon Islands. The
most prominent according to CBSI (1993, 5) are the ".,. excessive exploitation of
the natural forest and a continuing expenditure driven fiscal imbalance. More
than two years worth of forest resources were used up in 1993 and log
production has been over twice the sustainable level since mid 1992. The
government's domestic borrowing soared to $61 million dollars in 1993".
The following table gives the real GDP of the Solomon Islands for the years
1989 to 1992 (the most recent statistics available).
16
government's deficits to allow for economic growth, hoping that the central
government, would use the 1995 budget as an opportunity to address these
problems. Unfortunately, this was not the case since the Solomon Islands'
national parliament passed the most expansionary budget ever in 1995. As the
Governor of the Central Bank of Solomon islands pointed out, "[o]f the $113
million total budgeted deficit, the component to be domestically financed is $79
million - more than double the previous high" (CBSI 1995b, 20). The problem of
debt financing and servicing therefore is a serious stumbling block to economic
progress in the country,
1.4 POLITICAL ORGANISATIONS AND LEADERSHIP
In order to appreciate the obstacles and problems of the present provincial
government system, it is important to have an understanding of the social and
political culture of the country and how it influences the behaviour of provincial
leaders and administrators in the Solomon Islands. It is important to touch on
both traditional organisations (elements of which arc still prominent in the
Solomon Island societies) existing prior to the establishment of foreign models
of political organisation, and the modern organisations in the Solomon Islands.
17
1.4.1 Traditional Politics and Leadership
Prior to foreign influences in the Solomon Islands, there was no system of
government administering all the islands, which had their own political
organisations. Two styles of leadership and government were prominent in the
islands during those days, They are commonly known as the 'Big Man System',
a largely Melanesian phenomenon and the 'Chiefly System', which was
widespread in Polynesia. These were the two systems that were found throughout
the Solomon Islands as well as in the South Pacific region. The political
boundaries that became the sovereign boundaries of the existing countries in the
South Pacific were the creation of the imperial powers, The two predominant
systems of social and political organisation found in the Solomon Islands prior to
the establishment of the present political structures are explained below.
The most common form of leadership in the Solomon Islands prior to
contact with the outside world was the rule by the mwane kama5 (sometimes
referred to as the mane kaa or mane sule) in the north Guadalcanal languages. In
the case of the 'Big Man' system in the Solomon Islands, the person becomes a
leader through his own hard work and through the display of certain qualities,
Such qualities were identified by Hogbin (1964, 63) as being "... forceful, even-
tempered, hard working, a good speaker, and an able organiser. Previously there
were also advantages in his enjoying renown as a warrior and magician, But the
5 This system of leadership was discussed in depth by IanHogbin, in his study of the Kaoka Speakers of Guadalcanal(Hogbin 1964). He translated the word mwane kama to mean 'bigman' , mwane being man, and kama being 'big' . This system ofleadership became known as the 'Big man system' of government.
18
prime qualification is still wealth in the form of vegetable supplies and pigs". A
'Big Man' is a respected person in his own village or groups of hamlets but may
have very little or no influence at all over the organisation of nearby islands or
even villages.
On the other hand, one finds the existence of chiefs as political leaders in
some of the Solomon Islands societies. Political organisation of the village or part
of an island is usually under the leadership of hereditary chiefs. The position is
not earned or gained but rather transferred from the father to the son. This is the
type of political organisation found in most of the Polynesian Islands of the
Solomon Islands like Tikopia, Rennell and Bellona. The influences of chiefs in
such Solomon Island societies was not extended to other islands. Like in the 'big
man* system, the power of the chief is restricted to the distinct island or islands
or even just to villages. As Kabutaulaka (1993,72) said, "... small communities
not exceeding a few hundred, ruled themselves in their own ways".
It should be noted that political organisation and leadership in the
Solomon Islands is not as simple as described here and that considerable
variations exist within the Solomon Islands. A 'big man' structure found in any
of the Melanesian societies may be different from that in another, in the same
way as there may be differences in the structure of chiefly systems in the
Polynesian communities. Nevertheless, suffice to say that the two commonly
found political structures in the Solomon Islands prior to contacts with the west
were the 'big man' and 'chiefly' systems.
19
1.4.2 The Colonial Administration
The declaration of the Solomon Islands as a British Protectorate in 1893
resulted in the establishment of a government structure, which, for the first time,
set out to govern the whole country. The distinct groups and communities were
subjected to the rule from the central body or individual, the Resident
Commissioner, ruling from the headquarters in Suva, Fiji, and later in Tulagi.
The Resident Commissioner ruled through district officers who were based in the
district stations around the islands, with the assistance of police officers. The role
of colonial administration in fostering the emergence and evolution of the
provincial government system will be discussed in Chapter 3.
1.4.3 The Present Political System and Leadership
Since gaining political independence from Great Britain in 1978, Solomon
Islands has been operating under a three tier system of government, The country
has a central government ruling from Honiara, nine provincial governments and a
municipal authority (Map I), and a number of area councils in each province. All
levels of government have elected members and are supposed to communicate
with each other both upwards and downwards. The powers of the provincial
governments were set out in lists A and B (Appendix 2) by the Kausimae
Committee's recommendations in 1978 as discussed in Chapter 3. The area
councils receive their guidelines from the various provincial assemblies. The
provincial governments act as bodies between the central government and the
different provinces and island groups while the area councils are conduits
between the provincial governments and the different wards on the island or
20
province.
Decentralisation and the various institutions associated with it have
created a hierarchy and procedures which those in the rural areas have to follow.
They have to go through the area councils, then through the provincial authorities
before going to the central government. The nature of this decentralised system
enabled citizens to participate in the development of the country but through
established procedures and authorities. Whether this is decentralisation or a
bureaucratic muddle is debatable. Functions were decentralised but the system
appeared very cumbersome. As it is, provincial governments have been able to
make their own laws, collect their own revenues and influence the development
of their islands. A Ministry of Provincial Government coordinates and formally
looks after the ideas and aspirations of the provinces.
The political structure implemented in the Solomon Islands since
independence differed from what indigenous Solomon Islanders were used to.
The government structure was seen as alien to the Solomon Islands, while the
idea of Solomon Islands as one nation was not appreciated by the people.
Saemala (1982, 65) commented on this by saying "[t]he identity of being a
Solomon Islander is more real outside Solomon Islands. At home, it is more
common for our people to identify themselves with the particular islands, districts
or provinces from which we originated". Hence, since the colonial days and even
since political independence, Solomon Islanders rarely identify themselves as
belonging to one government but see themselves as people from a particular
21
island or district. This is understandable, given the fragmented political systems
and leadership that existed, and are presently existing, in the islands,
As mentioned above, the Solomon Islands' political system is
characterised by three different levels of distinct but supposedly inter-related
political structures, namely the area councils, the provincial governments and the
central government, These political structures and organisations are discussed
separately below.
1.4.4 The Central Government
The Central government is the supreme government structure in the
Solomon Islands. It deals with the overall policies and international dealings of
the country. The national parliament consists of 47 members elected by eligible
voters (18 years and over) from all the constituencies in the Solomon Islands.
These 47 elected national parliament members then elect the prime minister, the
speaker of the national parliament, and the governor general.
The prime minister in turn appoints the 18 cabinet ministers to lead the 18
central government ministries in the country. It is these ministries who employ
public servants who are responsible for the implementation of governnient
policies. Among the central government ministries is the Ministry of Provincial
Governments and Rural Development (figure 4.1) which is responsible for the
activities and decisions of the nine provincial governments. Figure 1.1 depicts the
structure, line of authority and accountability found in the central government.
23
1.4.5 The Provincial Governments
The Solomon Islands is divided into nine provinces and a municipal
authority (Honiara). For the purposes of discussion in this thesis, the Honiara
Municipal Authority is omitted and discussion refers to the nine provincial
governments. The country attained political independence in 1978, and the seven
local councils became provincial governments in 1981 during the First Appointed
Day, which refers to the day on which all of the provinces were legally
empowered to operate under the Provincial Government Act. The Second
Appointed Day is the day on which individual provinces formally obtained and
accepted the functions devolved to them under the Act.
The nine provinces of the Solomon Islands are: 1) Choisuel Province, 2)
Western Province, 3) Isabel Province, 4) Central Islands Province, 5)
Guadalcanal Province, 6) Renncll and Bellona Province, 7) Malaita Province, 8)
Makira Ulawa Province, and 9) Temotu Province (Map 1).
27
As could be seen, the elected provincial assembly members elect the provincial
premier who in turn appoints his ministers, The number of ministries for the
provinces differs from province to province. The ministers become the members
of the provincial executive who make important decisions in the province. The
provincial ministries employ public servants who are either direct employees of
the province or are seconded staff from the central government as employees of
the Public Service Commission. It can be said that the provincial governments
are the smaller versions or imitations of the central government in almost all
respects.
1.4.6 The Area Councils
The area council is the lowest level of government in the decentralised
provincial government system of the Solomon Islands and was established by
section 28 (3) of the Provincial Government Act of 19813. Area councillors are
elected by ward voters into the area councils. The area council members elect
their area council president who becomes the leader of the group. The area
councils are supposed to work closely with the provincial governments, in the
same way as the provincial governments with the central government. The area
councillors are elected every four years and candidates must be over 21 years old
before they are eligible,
3 Section 28 (3) empowered provinces to make their ownlaws governing the are councils and provides for up grading ofarea councils in taking on new functions and new powers fromthe provinces. They may be given power to make by-lawsapplicable only to that area council. These by-laws cannot beenforced unless confirmed by the provincial executive.
28
They are the closest government link with the rural masses. Their
functions and tasks are determined by the provincial governments through Area
Council Ordinances. Under the new SICOPSA arrangement envisaged by the
SINURP government (4.4.8), applications for SICOPSA funding would go
through the area councils administrative officer for appraisal and approval before
being sent to the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development in
Honiara. This is because of the proximity of the area councils to the rural
masses.
From the above discussion, it can be seen that the contemporary political
system in the Solomon Islands is one that is different from its traditional political
system and structure. While traditional politics in the islands was organised
around distinct groups like clans, villages and chieftainships, contemporary
Solomon Islands is governed by a single central government with the help of
nine provincial governments and a number of area councils. Why this
decentralised system of government is favoured in public and private
organisations is an issue examined in the next chapter.
29
CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF DECENTRALISATION
INTRODUCTION
The concept of decentralisation in both private and public organisations
has been extensively written on and there has been a continuing debate amongst
scholars, academics, and employees of organisations on the advantages and
disadvantages of decentralisation. Building on some of this material, the present
chapter is devoted to a theoretical explanation of the concept of decentralisation
and associated terms, and also briefly considers how decentralisation relates to
democracy and the development process. It reviews the justifications and
rationales for decentralisation, in general and also the Solomon Islands. The
justifications for decentralisation are discussed separately although most of them
are inter-related.
2.1 THE CONCEPT OF DECENTRALISATION
The idea of decentralisation can be better understood by associating it
with other terms like centralisation, deconcentration, and devolution.
Dcconcentration is the transfer of some administrative authority and
responsibilities to subordinate agencies or officers (usually stationed outside the
centre or the headquarters), who act in the interest of the superior (Rondinelli et
al 1984, 10; Premdas 1982, 242;). Essentially it refers to the 'shifting of
workload' from the central government's headquarters to its own field staff
30
outside the capital city. The argument is that, although workload may be shifted
to the field staff, the power to exercise discretion in decision making may not be
decentralised (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983, 19). This is viewed as one form of
decentralisation which involves the spreading of government's goods and services
more widely. Shifting the workload from the headquarters to outlying centres and
staff without reallocating power is not considered decentralisation, though it may
be deconcentration. Nevertheless, in many developing countries, where there are
highly centralised governments, this may be a step towards actual decentralisation
in the future.
When referring to deconcentration, administrative action becomes the
main focus of attention. In this respect, Smith (1967, 1) pointed out that
dcconccntration is done within the bureaucracy. This process usually involves
the delegation of authority to those government officers working in the field to
make administrative decisions usually in matters of policy implementation in
their respective jurisdictions. Rigg (1964, 341) puts it more succinctly by saying
that "[i]t involves the retention of central control, but assigns responsibility for
case decisions to subordinate personnel". Therefore, deconcentration can be
taken to refer to administrative action within the bureaucracy in the Solomon
Islands context, involving the transfer of personnel and workloads from the
headquarters to the country's provincial authorities. For example, the central
government transfers its personnel, through seconded staff, to the nine provincial
governments.
31
Devolution, on the other hand, has political and legal meanings attached
to it. Unlike deconcentration, in devolution the recipient of authority (such as a
provincial government) is also given the power and responsibility on matters
stipulated in the decentralisation legislation (Muttalib 1978, 703; Smith 1967, 1),
Devolution can thus be interpreted as the legal conferring of power upon local
units of governments to carry out certain government functions. In devolution,
these local units of government are legally distinct and independent from the
national government although the latter exercises indirect supervisory control
over them (Maddick 1975, 23; Rondinelli et al, 1984, 19). In its pure form,
devolution means local autonomy although the central government may be
superior in certain respects.
Five fundamental characteristics of devolution are identified in Rondinelli
et al (1983, 22). First, local units of government have considerable autonomy and
the central government has less or no direct control over them. Second, there are
legally recognised geographical boundaries within which local governments
function and exercise authority. Third, local governments have corporate status,
which means that they are in a position to mobilise resources to carry out their
functions. Fourth, devolution gives the local citizens a feeling that they have
influence over the local government which in turn provides services that satisfy
their needs. Finally, devolution is an arrangement that should he of mutual and
reciprocal benefit to both levels of government.
32
Centralisation is another term that is usually contrasted with
decentralisation. The meaning of decentralisation in government has been
simplified to mean the opposite of centralisation. As a result, centralisation is one
type of government organisation while decentralisation is another. This is
reflected in Subramaniam's distinction of these two concepts centralisation and
decentralisation:
Centralisation means the concentration of decision making in oneperson or group of persons in... a government department... .Conversely, decentralisation means distribution of decision makingin some suitable manner in several hands in the same organisationregardless of its geographical distribution or location(Subramaniam 1978, 763).
Centralisation is the characteristic of any government that concentrates •
"authority, responsibility, and ability to perform the basic functions in the central
governing unit..."(Ocampo 1991, 193). In a strict or perfect decision-making
process of centralisation, the central government unit has the final say in all
decisions and no lower organs make any decisions. Therefore, information moves
'unidireclionally' in an upward direction and instructions on what the lower units
should do is in a downward top to bottom direction (Kabra 1978, 753).
Despite the general view of centralisation and decentralisation as opposite,
some scholars have advanced a new perspective. Instead of being regarded as
opposite ends of the spectrum, the two are seen as complementary. It is therefore
important to look at the relationship between centralisation and decentralisation in
order to better understand the role of decentralisation in the provincial
government system under investigation.
33
If it is accepted that centralisation and decentralisation are complementary,
an important point to note is that without centralisation, decentralisation is
impossible because decentralisation can only occur in a system that was
previously centralised (Mart 1972, 605; Seshadri 1978, 675). Therefore,
decentralisation is complementary, and it would be wrong to regard it merely as
the opposite of centralisation,
Others again argue that 'centralism' (excessive centralisation) is what is
bad for organisations while centralisation is normal and beneficial for any
organisation up to a certain point. Some theorists argue that in complex open
systems, where there is interaction with and dependence on their environment, it
is normal that progressive centralisation will occur (Ocampo 1991, 192).
Centralisation is therefore considered advantageous and integral to organisational
systems. Some writers have used the paradox that it is sometimes advantageous
to use 'top-down initiative to get bottom-up development' (Werlin 1992, 228).
Whatever the argument, some degree of centralisation is always found in
organisations such as governments.
Centralisation and decentralisation should not be regarded as polar
opposites in theoretical or practical terms for both lay claim to similar objectives.
If decentralisation purports to stand for something, centralisation will also have a
counter claim, For instance, decentralisation claims to stand for participation of
the majority, freedom, equitable share of resources, and so forth, At the same
time, centralisation often stands for the same things. Centralisation lays claims to
34
These same values by acknowledging the importance of majority rule;
"establishing minimum nationwide standards for power-sharing, freedom, and
well-being; and in pursuance of such standards using central authority to ensure
equitable distribution of resources and benefits within and across local units
(Ocampo 1991, 196)", Therefore, there has to be some sort of balance between
the two processes in order to arrive at meaningful development. What should be
centralised or decentralised has to be carefully considered before development
initiatives are taken, and carefully monitored as time goes by.
Decentralisation is a concept encompassing both processes of
deconccntrsition and the devolution of power, Decentralisation can be defined
as the transfer of powers and or functions from the central government to
provincial governments, or from provincial assemblies to the area councils
(Commonwealth Secretarial 1983, 4). It includes the transfer of authority and
responsibility within the bureaucracy to officials stationed outside the
headquarters and at the same time, legally confers power to these lower levels of
government to make policy decisions under specified matters.
Two features of decentralisation can be identified: political
decentralisation (the area approach) and administrative decentralisation (the
sectoral approach). Political decentralisation refers to the devolution of power and
authority from the central government to lower levels of government,
Administrative decentralisation refers to the deconcentration of power and the
delegation of appropriate authority from the national line agencies to the regional
36
Commonwealth of Caribbean States and the Federated States of Micronesia,
sovereignty lies in the hands of the central government. However, a body is
established together with oilier central governments and certain functions and
powers are delegated by all the members of that body. Decentralisation thus can
be operationalised in these three mentioned systems of government.
To summarise, decentralisation involves both processes of
deconccntration and devolution where the former has administrative
connotations and the latter political and legal attachments. Decentralisation can be
better understood by referring to it as the transfer of authority in geographical
terms. Deconcentration is characterised by a transfer of authority from the
headquarters to the field stations and offices, while devolution is the transfer of
authority from central governments to provincial governments. In
deconcentration, accountability is upward while in devolution it is both upwards
and downwards because of the aforementioned characteristics of these two
processes.
2.2 DECENTRALISATION, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
It is important to bear in mind that decentralisation is as much, and
perhaps more of an ideologicai principle as a means of administration. Thus, it
has certain values and objectives attached to it. The political objective of
decentralisation becomes clear when associated with the popular notions of self-
reliance, domestic decision making, popular participation in government, and
accountability of government officials to citizens (Rondinelli et al 1984, 8).
37
Decentralisation from this perspective cannot be divorced from the Western
democratic principles and post colonial notions of participation, self-reliance, and
so forth. Centralisation is regarded as 'evil', by those championing
decentralisation, particularly when associated with highly centralised planning
structures of the Communist countries. The feeling is that the administration of a
great nation cannot be embraced by a single central power, no matter how skilful
it is. Those championing grassroots democracy would agree with Seshadri (1978,
670) who said that 'centralisation is a threat to human spirit everywhere and its
control is a concern of all men who love freedom' .
Decentralisation from this perspective is regarded as the democratically
right thing to do, and is usually regarded as an end in itself rather than a means
to some end. This is sometimes referred to as the doctrinal approach to
decentralisation because it idealises decentralisation as an article of faith
(Battacharya 1978, 772). Decentralisation and democracy are thus regarded by
some as almost synonymous, particularly when individual liberty is associated
with grassroots participation under decentralised systems of government. Muttalib
(1978, 702) presented this perspective when he said "With ethical roots in
democracy, decentralisation has become an idealistic concept, a way of life and
an end in itself, It suggests a system in which people will be given an
opportunity to perform their individual goals to the maximum". Decentralisation
is therefore closely associated in some people's minds with democracy, which
means that decentralised systems are usually identified as more democratic.
38
Participatory democracy is one of the terms closely associated with
decentralisation, Political and social values such as democracy, liberty and
equality are high in the aims of decentralisation. Decentralisation in this sense is
seen to contribute to these values by taking the opinions of those affected by the
decisions into account, and by giving more freedom and 'voice' to the local
institutions and communities in development efforts (Ocampo 1991,195) as will
be elaborated below. Decentralisation means an achievement of a more
participatory democracy that exceeds the normal electoral methods of
representation (Bhattacharya 1978,774). Participatory democracy and
decentralisation are related in the sense that the latter promotes the former.
Decentralisation may also be a strategy used in attempts to break away
from the underdevelopment problems facing most Third World countries.
Decentralisation, democracy and development may be seen as going hand in
hand, at least in the eyes of those advocating 'decentralisation for development',
possibly because they have defined it at their own convenience. It is often argued
that citizen participation in local government is the 'grass roots' of democracy
which allows adjustments in society to benefit the majority of the people
(Maddick 1975, 57). If people can participate in decentralised systems upholding
values of democracy, the system will help them to adjust to the changes which
come with development,
Decentralisation also has an 'efficiency value' attached to it. Some expect
decentralised development programs and activities to be carried out more
39
effectively than centralised programs, and government to be more responsive to
the public and thus improve the quality and quantity of services, Decentralisation
may also be an effective way of providing services and information to
government officers about local conditions (Rondinelli et al 1984, 6), From this
perspective, decentralisation is viewed as a strategy to counter development
problems, particularly in addressing issues such as the neglect of services in rural
areas, and as a means of reaching decisions wilh those who will be most affected
by development projects.
Al the same time, decentralisation is seen to facilitate the removal of the
'deprivation trap'. That is, through decentralisation, people would be free from
feeling powerless, poor, vulnerable and isolated (Ingham and Kalam 1992, 375).
Instead, they would feel more secure, with a sense of oneness that discourages
friction and fragmentation. Decentralisation attempts, in principle at least, to
include people in deciding and defining their destinies, particularly in the areas of
development most likely to affect their lives,
For all these reasons decentralisation and democracy are seen by its
advocates as related. Decentralisation is based on the ethics of democracy, and as
such, equated with it. Accordingly, decisions and development achieved through
decentralisation are regarded as preferable to those arrived at under centralised
systems.
It should be noted, however, that romanticising decentralisation and
40
equating it with democracy may be misleading. Buendia (1991, 115) points out
that decentralisation does not always promote democratic ideals nor do all
democratic actions emanate from decentralisation. With these thoughts in mind, it
is necessary to consider why some hold that decentralisation is favourable and
why decentralisation in government is regarded as one of the better ways for
pursuing political and economic development5.
2.3 R A T I O N A L E S A N D J U S T I F I C A T I O N S FORDECENTRALISATION
There are several reasons for employing decentralisation in economic and
political development. In countries implementing various forms of
decentralisation, the size of the country (land mass and feature) and the just •
claims of local communities for some sort of autonomy are two basic reasons for
decentralisation (Smith 1967, 2). It should, however, be pointed out that
decentralisation in the form of deconcentration has to take place in most
countries because of the nature of services provided. With postal services or
schools, for example, deconcentration has to take place because there has to be
5 These assertions appear very normative. However, therewere studies in decentralised government systems that could becited as empirical evidence. Matthews (1987, 86) in his studyof devolution in Sri Lanka, concluded that the devolution ofpower did not encourage regionalism, but rather separatism. Inhis study of decentralisation in Papua New Guinea, Tordoff(1987, 86) also concluded that the effect of its (provincialgovernment system's) redistribution measures has resulted inthe increase, rather than reduction of economic differencesbetween the provinces. Ingham and Kalam (1992, 379) pointedout that decentralisation in Bangladesh have not removed thepeople from the 'deprivation trap' , but it had been used tochannel development funds into the hands of better offindividuals. See also Vengroff and Salem's (1992) study ofTunisia.
41
people in the outer areas to carry out these functions on behalf of the
government.
In this section, some of the popular justifications for decentralising power
and personnel from the central government to lower levels of government like the
provinces and states will be identified and explained. More specifically, the
discussion will concentrate on: 1) decentralisation and participation; 2)
decentralisation as a development tool; 3) decentralisation for efficient decision
making; 4) decentralisation as a uniting force; 5) decentralisation as a form of
decolonisation; and 5) decentralisation and liberalism. The participatory and
development arguments however are the main focus of analysis in this thesis.
This is because of the conviction that the involvement of more people in decision
making and rural development initiatives would result in development.
2.3.1 Decentralisation and Participation
One of the best known defences of decentralisation is the idea of greater
participation in decision making and in development efforts, This is because
decentralisation is aimed at involving the populace in decision making by getting
the government structure close to the people. Solomon Islands, by devolving
certain powers under the provincial government system, hopes that its citizens
would participate in the decision making processes related to political and
economic development.
Grassroots participation in development is considered an advantage of
42
decentralisation. This is particularly important since most countries embarking on
decentralisation policies usually have a large agricultural rural-based population.
In order for meaningful progress to be attained, the voice of those living with the
natural resources of the country must be heard. Grassroots participation has been
The common rationale supporting the idea of decentralisation for development.
Fernando (1985, 94) justifies this rationale for decentralisation when referring to
the case of Sri Lanka: "Being a land of villages, the destiny of the country
depends on rural development, for rural development and national development
are but two sides of the same coin". Thus, through decentralisation people would
be able to make development decisions in their own villages while focussing on
nation-wide development policies and efforts. Decentralisation in the sense of
development from below, therefore is seen as the better alternative, Community
members feel closer to local bodies like the provincial governments because they
are more open and responsive to their immediate environment (Ocampo 1991,
199) at least in theory.
In this same context Premdas (1984, 121) pointed out that because of the
need to 'mobilise popular support for development initiatives and to define local
priorities', transferring of power to local administrative units must be recognised
and given more credit. Theoretically, the argument is that local government units,
like provincial governments, who operate close to the people are in a good
position to have information that will lead to good development decisions.
Furthermore, the decisions reached would be accepted by most people since they
have been involved in reaching these decisions.
43
Closely related is the normative idea that decentralisation increases citizen
participation which in turn produces a good and healthy society. Participatory
democracy wants nothing less than full citizen participation in policy making.
Decentralisation is expected to produce a good society which can only be
achieved through citizen consensus and not citizen conflict (Hart 1972, 613).
Thus, by realising their potential through participation, people become good
citizens and there is less tension and conflict in society.
2,3.2 Decentralisation as a Development tool
Decentralisation is also justified as a development tool. It is claimed that
development goals and objectives would be better achieved in decentralised
systems. Development plans and programs are more meaningful when drawn up
under decentralised systems of government rather than those drawn up in the
headquarters which is still too oflen the case in many developing countries.
Rondinelli and Cheema (1983, 14) have pointed out that decentralising
power and functions to regional or local levels allows planners to identify the
different groups and conditions in these areas and accommodate these differences
in their plans and programs. In this sense, proper planning done through
decentralised structures and carried out effectively is expected to boost economic
development in the rural areas. Nevertheless, this should not obscure the fact that
proper economic and development planning for rural development also depends
on how well the centre directs and coordinates local and regional level planning.
44
In most developing countries, the majority of the people living in the rural
areas remain poor despite the fact that they mostly live with the nation's richest
natural resource, the land, Furthermore, their contribution to development is often
limited because they do not possess productive assets; they have very little or no
control over the natural resources, and limited access to basic economic and
social services. To facilitate their involvement in development efforts and to help
improve their living standards, writers like Buendin (1991, 124)) claim that the
role of bureaucracies has to change from that of domination to that of supporting
decentralised operations. Others have gone further to suggest that the political
and administrative relations of the central and provincial governments may
remain but the provincial governments should run their own development. This
means that provincial governments should be free to find ways of raising their
financial capabilities. This would enable them to overcome some of their own
development and financial constraints related to establishing and maintaining
'social infrastructure'(such as schools and clinics) which they cannot afford.
Mamaloni (1981, 82), when referring to these problems in the Solomon Islands
said: "The only way for provincial governments to solve some of these problems
is for them to divorce themselves from the central government's economic
empire". Decentralisation in the sense of more autonomy is thus regarded as a
belter alternative in development,
2.3.3 Decentralisation for efficient decision making
Decentralisation is also praised for its role in decision making. For a
decision to be made regarding a particular issue on a particular area, it would be
45
more favourable and accurate if information given to the decision maker also
comes from that area. Decentralisation may be a better way to achieve this kind
of requirement.
It is said that when efficiency is the main consideration in decision
making, decentralisation is preferable to centralisation (Battacharya 1978, 772),
By decentralising decision making power, information from below may be
obtained more easily by those peopie working in concerned geographical areas.
However, it should be pointed out that another view holds that centralised
authority structures may be more decisive and are better able to make decisions.
Nevertheless, decision making on day-to-day matters may be expedited in
decentralised systems
Information obtained for decision making may also be more reliable and
cost effective because it is gathered by those directly involved in the situation or
those affected by the issue at stake. For instance, if the central government wants
to assess cyclone damage in a certain province for rehabilitation purposes, it
would be expensive and time consuming to send officers from the central
government to go and assess it Decentralisation, would allow officers already in
the provinces to carry out this task.
Closely related is the argument that through decentralisation, decisions are
located closer to the scene of action where situations and conditions may change.
As Occampo (1991, 195) points out, "[decentralisation takes advantage of more
46
precise, case-wise, and current knowledge, adaptive skills, and the smaller,
human scale of local institutions and communities in dealing with their
problems". In times of crisis, decentralisation can be very appropriate unless
decisions have wider ramifications or need outside cooperation. In fact, some
people feel that for crisis management, there is no substitute for decentralisation
(Jambunathan 1978, 777). For instance, if a natural disaster hits a certain
province, those people working at the headquarters are not in a good position to
determine what to do or how it should be done because they are not at the scene
or directly affected by the disaster, although they may coordinate disaster relief
and obtain outside aid. Decentralisation provides efficient and quick decisions in
such circumstances.
In big countries, size and distance make administration and decision
making from the centre Lo all parts of the country almost impossible. For efficient
and proper decisions, the country must be divided into viable units and
appropriate personnel deconcentraled and specified power devolved. Even in
relatively small island countries like the Solomon Islands, administration from the
centre is found to be a difficult task because of the distances between the islands
and the poor communication networks, which means that information needed to
make decisions directly from the centre is often incomplete or inaccurate.
Even with better communication, the problem of relating decisions to each
area concerned and how decisions are to be implemented effectively still remains.
Therefore, in these circumstances, decentralisation is more favourable and may be
47
a better alternative for eiliciciit decision making.
2.3.4 Decentralisation as a uniting force.
Another claim for decentralisation is that it helps maintain national unity
by recognising the identity of groups or regions within the country. Some
countries become fragmented and unstable because of the presence of separatist
movements. This is especially true for societies that are heterogeneous and
where a weak collective identity exists. These movements look at loosening
political or legal bonds from the central government. Their aim is to assert their
regional, provincial or state autonomy with little or no interference from the
central government (Abedin 1989,224). Decentralisation recognises and usually
grants some sort of autonomy to the different regions or provinces in the
expectation that potential conflicts and tensions from these various groups are
avoided or mitigated.
Thus, decentralisation recognises and defuses opposition from separatist
groups by accommodating them through legislation or Acts of parliament.
Premdas (1984, 135) commented on this by saying: "When diverse local
sentiments and interests are recognised as a legitimate part of the nation's
collective assets, via extending to provinces maximum autonomy in conducting
their own affairs, then the urge to secede would be assuaged if not eliminated".
The devolution of power and functions to provinces in Papua New Guinea and
the Solomon Islands is said to have helped maintain unity and prevented the
48
emergence of an authoritarian system (Samana 1988, 311)6. In this way,
decentralisation maintains unity within the country and discourages fragmentation
fostered by separatist elements.
A related idea is that a decentralised system of government is not only
democratic but it is also consistent with the traditional forms of government such
as those in Melanesia (Wolfers 1985, 11). In traditional Melanesian societies,
political organisation was based on villages, districts, clans and families. Each
political unit had its own trading and other external relationships but it was
literally autonomous and separate from the other groups, Through colonialism,
these different groups were amalgamated into nations which cuts through clans
and other traditional political units. Thus, through decentralisation, these distinct
cultures and political units may be re-asserted, making them more acceptable and
less alien with a modern national framework. Decentralisation therefore, at least
in theory, assists in the maintenance of unity and continuity in a country.
6 This is contradicted by the present situation in PapuaNew Guinea where the North Solomons Province has demandedsecession from the rest of the nation although power wasdevolved to them. It is possible that devolution of politicalpower alone is not enough to contain secessionist behaviour.Political devolution has to come with economic devolutionbefore unity is assured as can be seen in this particularcase. Decentralisation may in fact encourage disunity throughsecession when people, because of decentralisation, beganreasserting their different identities.
In the same way, the people of Rennell and Bellona Islands inthe Central Islands province of the Solomon Islands opted fora separate province claiming that they were different from theother Central Islands communities. Therefore, devolution ofpower to various groups does not necessarily mean that therewill be unity despite the claims made by those championing theidea of decentralisation for unity.
49
2.3.5 Decentralisation as a form of decolonisation
Decentralisation is considered a method of decolonisation. It brings the
remote and 'insensitive' government machinery to the indigenous citizens in the
rural areas and transforms it into a more sensitive arrangement. Colonisation
created a centralised government that was alien and in many instances separated
from the people it colonised. As a consequence, the colonised were belittled and
left with the self-image of being ignorant and incapable of making modern
decisions, In this context, to decolonise means to return the original decision
making powers to the free citizens of the new country. A former Minister of
Decentralisation in Papua New Guinea, John Momis declared:
Power must be returned to the people. Government services shouldbe accessible to them. Decisions should be made by the people towhom the issues at stake are meaningful, easily understood, andrelevant. The existing system of government should therefore berestructured, and power should be decentralised so that the energiesand aspirations of our people can play their full part in promotingour country's development (cited in Premdas et al 1984,122).'
Decentralisation is seen as the best way to ensure 'real' decolonisation and the
return of pride to local communities,
During the days of the colonial powers and the emergence of nationalist
movements in most Third World countries, government powers and authority
were characterised by centralisation. When decentralisation strategies are
implemented, the notion of centralisation that is closely associated with
colonialism withers. This process is seen as a foreign government being replaced
by a responsible indigenous government that focuses on development.
Nevertheless, as Seshadri (1978, 674) points out, the situation in some countries
50
is sometimes lense because power was shared for the first time. Since indigenous
people can have power, they go to extremes in order to have control and
manipulate their own people as was the case with colonial rulers or in many
instances even worse. Despite this situation, decentralisation is regarded a form
of decolonisation because it erodes the centralised characteristics associated with
colonisation.
2.3.6 Decentralisation and Liberalism
There is a pluralist (liberal) conviction that decentralisation is a virtue in
whatever form it takes. This is, of course, not to obscure pluralist differences
over what constitutes centralisation and decentralisation. Decentralisation is
regarded by pluralists as a preventive strategy against 'democratic' despotism.
Moreover, it is viewed as a way of ensuring people control the actions of their
political leaders (Dunleavy and O'leary 1987, 57). To a pluralist, the fear of the
emergence of despotic national leaders is discouraged by decentralisation of
power to the people which is then expected to result in equitable development
and democratic government.
The advocates of decentralisation have a concern that is much more than a
call for participatory government. They want a participatory society where
members participate in organising and governing themselves (Hart 1972, 608). A
participatory society, brought about by decentralisation, prevents the emergence
of despotic regimes, and at the same lime, develops in the individual the
necessary qualities for a good society,
51
2.4 CONCLUSION
Participation, development from below, unity of the diverse country,
upholding democratic principles, efficiency in decision making are general
justifications advanced for the provincial system of government in the Solomon
Islands. It is therefore important in this thesis to critically examine how these
justifications for decentralisation actually operate in practice.
In the case of Solomon Islands, the above justifications for the provincial
government system are used. This is inherent in preamble of the country's
national constitution when it made a commitment to the people. The preamble
stated that it would "... ensure the participation of our people in the governance
of their affairs and provide a framework of our national unity for the
decentralisation of power" (cited in Wolfers et al 1982, 1). This alone illustrates
the justifications for the Solomon Islands government to implement the provincial
government system. The extent to which decentralisation in the Solomon Islands
has achieved these objectives, in the constitution's preamble, are elaborated on in
Chapters 5 and 6 of this thesis. Suffice to say that the decentralised provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands has not been very successful in
achieving these aims.
52
CHAPTER 3
THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF THE PROVINCIALGOVERNMENT SYSTEM IN THE SOLOMON ISLANDS
INTRODUCTION
Like any other form of government, decentralisation in the Solomon
Islands evolved over time and was influenced by events since the declaration of
the Solomon Islands British Protectorate in 1893. The decentralised form of
government that presently exists in the Solomon Islands is the result of colonial
policies and laws imposed on the islands. It was also shaped by internal political
forces and forces outside the colonial power's control. This chapter looks at some
aspects of colonial decentralisation in the Solomon Islands and how the idea of
decentralisation developed. It is a study of the forces and events that moulded the
decentralised system of government that now exists in the Solomon Islands.
The chapter looks specifically at the period from the declaration of the
British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1893 up to the post-colonial reviews of
this provincial government system in 1986. The first part examines the type of
government experienced under the colonial resident commissioners, the district
officers and the district stations. It then examines a nationalist movement which
contributed to a call for a decentralised system of government and leadership, the
Ma'asina Rum Movement. The outcome of this movement and the establishment
of the Local Councils is then explored.
The chapter also analyses the Plan of Operations, which was the colonial
53
government's move to re-evaluate the local governments and the Plan's
contribution to the Kausimae Committee's Review prior to independence in 1978.
The Kausimae Review became the blue print of the provincial government
system in the country after independence. Finally, the chapter looks at the 1979
Government White Paper Review and the 1987 Provincial Government
Review, both of which were undertaken after independence, These post colonial
reviews are important for the purposes of this study because they were the latest
major reviews carried out on the provincial government system and they provide
a more complete picture of the extent to which the system has evolved since its
inception to the present time.
3.1 THE BRITISH SOLOMON ISLANDS PROTECTORATE
Since the declaration of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate in 1893,
three distinct stages in the political development of the Solomon Islands have
been identified. The period 1893-1960 is regarded as the 'stagnation period'
because for 67 years there was no indigenous participation in the politics of the
protectorate (Paia 1975, 81; Bennett 1987). For thirty years since the
establishment of the Advisory Council in 1921, membership was exclusively
European (MacDonald 1976, 248).
This was followed by the 'wakening period' when the colony underwent
three constitutional changes in 1960, 1964 and 1967. Two of these need
highlighting. The 1964 constitution led to the indirect election of eight unofficial
(non civil servant) members into the Legislative Council (Paia 1975, 81). There
54
were only 10 seats that non civil servants could occupy in the legislative council.
The other two were filled by appointed unofficial members. However, the
unofficial members were in the minority and therefore powerless. The 1967
constitution extended the franchise to all Solomon Islanders of 18 years or older
to vote for their representatives in the Legislative Council. As with the 1964
constitution, the elected members remained in the minority.
The third period is regarded as the 'participating period', a decade prior to
political independence in 1978 (Paia 1975, 81). This period saw for the first time,
the Legislative Council with a majority of elected members. Prior to 1964, the
membership of the Legislative Council was 11 official and 10 unofficial
members. The unofficial members were appointed by the Western Pacific High
Commissioner. By 1967, all except one of the unofficial members were elected
through direct elections (MacDonald 1976, 249). Furthermore, the governing
council allowed elected members to participate in policy making in some
committees for the first time.
Solomon Islanders might not have participated politically during the
'participating' period but the activities and the developments that took place
facilitated the idea of a decentralised government. Since World War II, moreover,
resentment towards British rule was demonstrated by the various movements, the
best known of which was the 'Ma'asina Ruru' Movement,
55
3.1.1 Resident Commissioners
Since the appointment of the first Resident Commissioner in 1896 until
the 1960s, a centralised government existed in the colony. It was nevertheless
characterised by 'deconcentration', a term distinguished from 'devolution' in
Chapter 2.
The Resident Commissioners under this 'deconcentrated' system were
responsible to the High Commissioner for the Western Pacific, based in Fiji. The
Resident Commissioner, based in the colony's capital, Tulagi, then had district
officers, police officers and others working under him (Keesing and Corris 1980,
29). This variant of decentralisation was practised in the Solomon Islands because
of the geographic nature of the colony. It would be difficult to ensure law and
order or to pursue imperial interests had the Resident Commissioner been the
only person to see to all these.
3.1.2 District Officers and District Stations
The Resident Commissioner was stationed in Tulagi (the old capital town)
and district officers were appointed to administer colonial activities on other
islands. The district stations that were set up in that period were Gizo (1899),
The Shortlands (1906), Malaita (1909), Guadalcanal (1914), San Cristoval and
Isabel (1918) (Healy 1966, 196)7. It was from these stations that the district
commissioners performed their administrative tasks. These district stations were
"' These dates are different in some accounts. See forexample, Fox (1967, 48) and Bennett (1987)
56
the basis on which the district councils and later the provinces were established,
The reason for establishing these district stations was not to involve
people in development, but rather for administrative purposes. The district
officers with their small detachment of policemen, usually ex-prisoners (Fox
1967, 48), were left to do the best they could and regular administration at the
village level barely existed prior to 1920 (Healy 1966, 197). The use of ex-
prisoners was in line with the type of rule that the colonial government exercised
because these ex-prisoners were usually strong and cruel. The main tasks of the
district officers were to keep law and order and to ensure that the villages were
clean and maintained a healthy standard (Tedder 1970, 21; Fox 1967, 51). This is
not to deny the fact that the district officers later went around collecting taxes
from males between 16-60 years of age under the 1920 Regulation, This taxation
was a standard colonial practice to move the men out of their homes to work for
money somewhere else, in this case plantations (Keesing and Corns 1980, 75). In
short, the British ruled the Solomon Islands in a centralised manner but with
district officers acting on behalf of, and in the interest of, the Resident
Commissioner and the colonial masters.
The 1920 Native Tax Regulation gave way to a statutory structure of
native administration in 1922, which included the appointment of district and
village headmen (Healy 1966, 198). Premdas points out that a centralised
administrative system was slowly emerging around district and sub-district areas
and, until the Second World War, rule was exercised through appointed headmen
57
(1982, 242). Since the 1920 Native Tax Regulation, the appointment of district
and village headmen began to facilitate the collection of taxes.
This marked the beginning of Solomon Islanders' participation in
administration, Solomon Islanders began to exploit their own people through the
collection of taxes. The power was in the hands of the colonial government,
particularly the Resident Commissioner. As Fox (1967, 74) described, "... the
Government appointed Headmen in each village and sometimes one over the
whole island, but these were for the purposes of carrying out the orders of the
District officer ...". Therefore, no Solomon Islander actually had a part to play in
the government but merely did what the colonial administrators wanted.
The late 1930s and 1940s was another interesting period of political
development in the Solomon Islands. This was when the idea of establishing
native courts and councils was mooted, Ian Hogbin, an anthropologist working in
the Solomon Islands promoted the idea of native courts and councils, which
would unite customary and administrative law and enforce it through native
statutory bodies with a traditional base (Healy 1966, 199).
In consequence, district officers were empowered to establish native courts
under the Native Courts Regulation and at about the same time, informal councils
were instituted on sub-district bases (Healy 1966, 199-200). In both cases, the
headmen acted according to the orders of the government, and at the same time
headmen united the people in different units for administrative purposes. The
58
only difference was that locals look part as headmen in the courts and informal
councils, and did not rely entirely on the courts presided over by Europeans as in
Papua New Guinea (Healy 1966, 200).
Nevertheless, everything was done according to guidelines laid down by
the Resident Commissioner. The problem, as identified by Fox (1967, 80) was
the 'spirit of superiority in the ruling race' which included the notion that what
the colonial leaders said was always right and good. But at least, the introduction
of the native courts and councils was motivated by an understanding that the best
way to administer the colony was to decentralise.
3.2 THE MA'ASINA RURU MOVEMENT
The notion of administering the colony through decentralisation was
pressured further by the various movements that emerged after the Second World
War such as the Chair and Rule Movement and the Society for the
Development of Native Races (Bennett 1987, 299). However, the most
influential and notable Nationalist Movement was the Malaita based Ma'asina
Rum (marching Rule, Ma'asina Rule, Ma'asina loa) Movement8.
8 It was regarded by many writers as a 'cargo cult'. Thisis debatable because cargo cults carry the notions of beggingand waiting to be fed, which is contradictory to the lifestyleof Solomon Islanders, especially in those days. It is moreappropriately viewed as a socio - political movement thatexpressed resentment of foreign domination and favoured selfrule especially by native Solomon Islanders. For detaileddiscussion about the Ma'asina Ruru Movement, see Laracy(1983) .
59
Like most other nationalist movements, the formation of this group was a
result of being exposed to similar sentiments in other parts of the world. The
Ma'asina movement was strongly influenced by the American Labour Corps,
during the Battle of Guadalcanal (World War 2). The aim of the Movement was
lo create a united front to negotiate with the colonial rulers on local matters
(Bennett 1987, 293). It was also a variant of radical agitational independence
movements evident in most former colonies that aimed at wresting control of
local councils from the colonial government (Premdas et al 1984, 47), As it
turned out, the leaders of the Ma'asina Rum Movement were arrested but the
message was left plain and clear - that Solomon Islanders must participate in the
governing of their communities, which did not effectively happen until the late
1960s.
The Ma'asina Ruru Movement was regarded as a success since its direct
outcome was the establishment of the first ever appointed local council on
Malaila in 1953 (Kausimac 1978, 42; Mealy 1966, 202). That was a very
important achievement as far as the idea of decentralisation in the Solomon
Islands is concerned.
3.3 THE LOCAL COUNCILS
The Malaila local council and the various councils later established did
not have real power. Nevertheless, the district councils were gradually given
statutory authorisation under the 1953 Native Administration Regulation which
authorised the appointment of headmen and council constitutions (Healy 1966,
60
203). Prom the establishment of local councils, they become involved in looking
after the villages' cleanliness and collection of taxes (Tedder 1970,21). Villagers
were forced to do communal work in cleaning their villages on a regular basis.
Failure to do this resulted in fines.
After the first local council was established, various others emerged, the
boundaries of which were based on language groups or islands. There were a
total of 24 local councils. This was successful in breaking down barriers like
clans. Clans were very strong groupings in Solomon Island societies. Solomon
Islanders for the first time began to be grouped outside their normal clan, family,
and village groupings. However, a problem emerged in terms of size and
financial capabilities of these local councils. For example the largest council was
Malaita with a population of approximately 50,000 people and a revenue of
17,000 pounds while Duff Council was the smallest consisting of 150 people
with an income of 108 pounds per annum (Premdas 1982, 243). Even when the
number of councils increased, political and economic power remained in the
hands of the colonial government because it retained the right to pass by-laws or
approve budgets. This was because the aim of such 'deconcentration1 was for
administrative purposes and to discourage nationalist movements like the
Ma'asina Ruru. It was a small concession to avoid more radical change.
3.4 THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLAN OF OPERATIONS 1974-1977
It was not long before the colonial government realised that there was a
need to re-evaluate the colony's local governments since self-determination was
61
becoming a long term objective for the native Solomon Islanders. In 1963, the
appointed headmen were replaced by elected councillors (Kausimae 1978, 142),
the first real participation by Solomon Islanders in the 'government of the
people'. This was of course in line with the wider decolonising impulses
elsewhere at that time, the so called 'winds of change' (MacDonald 1976, 247).
It was in the 1960s that Britain, for the first time, began to accelerate
decolonisation in its Pacific colonies.
A further development of the idea of decentralisation came in the early
1970s when the Plan of Operation 1974-1977, prepared by a British adviser,
was introduced. This plan basically proposed the amalgamation of the various
local councils into several viable ones. In addition, it aimed to strengthen the role
of traditional leaders and chiefs at district or subdistrict levels (Premdas 1982,
246). The other aims included:
the transfer of control over staff and 11 nance in the fields of districtadministration, agriculture, education, health and public works from thecentral government to local councils; and
the provision by central government of increased untied grants ($2.1million in 1978) to councils (Kausimae 1978, 142).'
This particular plan became the cornerstone of decentralisation found in the post
colonial Solomon Islands and its implementation proved to have long lasting
effects. It paved the way for what would become the provincial government
system where political and economic power were devolved to lower levels of
government with the view that they would look after their own affairs.
62
By 1976, most of the Plan of Operation's recommendations had been
implemented. The 24 local councils were amalgamated to eight including one for
Honiara town (Bennett 1987, 326). The eight new councils were; (1) Western (no
change); (2) Isabel (no change); (3) Guadalcanal (no change); (4) Malaita
(uniting Malaita, Sikaiana, and Onlong Java); (5) Central (uniting Ngella, Savo,
Russells and Renneli and Bellona); (6) Makira (uniting Makira and Ulawa); (7)
Eastern (uniting Santa Cruz, Reefs, Vanikoro, Tikopia, Anuta and Utupua); and
(8) Honiara Town Council' (Premdas 1982, 245) (see Map 2). There was also a
gradual transfer of functions involving administration, agriculture, health, works
and education from the colonial government to the local councils. It is important
to note that the division of islands into councils was similar to the district
stations identified earlier on in this chapter. Furthermore, the same divisions
under the Plan of Operation were carried through to independence and beyond.
The division of islands into different councils was therefore a gradual and
conscious process. Since the amalgamated councils had elected members,
Solomon Islanders took advantage of this process to assert their own power
against colonial politicians and government in Honiara. As Bennett (1987, 326)
puts it; "what had begun as an administrative reform had been transformed into a
political exercise, more by the efforts of Solomon Islander local and national
politicians than those of any back-room British plans in Honiara".
Another key recommendation of the Plan was the establishment of a
government ministry to oversee and coordinate these councils. In 1974, the
64
Ministry of Home Affairs was established. However, its capacity to carry out its
functions was limited due to lack of staff. At the same time, it faced hostility
from the Ministry of Home Affairs and the Public Service because of their loss
of functions through devolution (Premdas 1982, 246). Devolution meant that the
prestigious functions performed by those at the central government ministries
were taken over by the provinces. This caused resentment on the part of those in
the public service.
Traditional leaders did not want to participate in the governance of the
councils since one of the tasks of Councillors was to collect the unpopular head
tax. Furthermore, very few funds were left for projects because most of the
money was used on allowances. The Plan of Operations also created larger units
that grouped together people with different cultures, languages and ways of
living, who felt more comfortable looking after themselves than being ruled by
others (Premdas 1982, 246).
Despite the shortcomings of the Plan of Operation, it installed the
foundation of provincial decentralisation in the Solomon Islands. The
shortcomings of the devolution exercise under the Plan of Operation thus led
the pre-independence fathers of Solomon Islands decentralisation to call for a
closer and more careful study of the system in the colony.
In the report of the Constitutional Conference in 1977, it was proposed
that a special committee should look into the matter. The task of this committee
65
was ". . . to examine the relationship between the National Government,
Provincial Governments and Area Councils and to recommend on measures to
promote the effective decentralisation of legislative, administrative and financial
powers" {Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference 1977, 12),
The leaders at that time were conscious of the kind of relationship that must be
promoted between the central government, the provincial governments, the area
councils and the role of traditional leaders.
At this 1977 Conference, the role of chiefs and traditional leaders was
emphasised. The Conference even proposed the coopling of chiefs into provincial
assemblies or even to have a Council of Chiefs acting as an advisory body
{Report of the Solomon Islands Constitutional Conference 1977, 12), This idea
did not materialise even after independence and the traditional leaders have had
very little or no influence at all on Provincial Governments' decisions, This may
be due to the fact that there was rarely a formal chieftainship system on most of
The islands, as discussed in Chapter 1. Even if there existed some chiefly systems,
they were different from each other, the exceptions being the Polynesian
structures on Tikopia, Anuta and other Polynesian outlying islands. The Solomon
Islands Independence Order (1978, 63) also recognised the role of traditional
chiefs in the provinces but the role of traditional leaders has not been a part of
decentralisation despite this recognition,
66
3.5 KAUSIMAE REVIEW AND THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTACT, 1981
After the 1977 Constitutional Conference, a special committee known as
the Kausimae Committee, toured the islands in an attempt to establish a
provincial government system that would be best suited and most cost effective
for an independent Solomon Islands. This special committee was created to listen
to the views of the citizens of the country on the type of provincial government
system they wanted to have, The committee received individual and group
submissions. The aim of the Kausimae Committee was to devise a provincial
government system that satisfied section 114 of the National Constitution9
(Report of the Provincial Government Review Committee 1987, 17). More
importantly, it sought a system that would be simple and easily operated by •
Solomon Islanders, as well as less expensive to run than the local councils and
more participatory and flexible (Kausimae 1978, 44). The Committee also looked
for ways to increase the law making power of Provincial Governments. The
Kausimae Committee was conscious of the desire for local control in stating that
"[wje need to find ways that the law making powers of provincial governments
might be increased and made more effective (Kausimae 1978, 44)".
The most important outcome of the Committee's recommendation was the
listing of the exclusive and final powers of provincial and central governments, a
9 Section 114 of the Solomon Islands National Constitutionstates that "Solomon Islands shall be divided into provinces,the number and boundaries of which shall be prescribed byparliament after considering the advice of the ConstituencyBoundaries Commission".
67
quasi-federal system. Three lists, A, B and C, proposed by the Kausimae
Committee are stated in Appendix 2 of this thesis, List A contains the Final
powers of the provincial governments and the Honiara Town Council. The list
identifies the areas under which the provincial governments could make laws.
The items of List B include those that the provincial governments could legislate
on, but which Parliament could review (Premdas 1982, 249). List C contains the
functions that were transferred to provincial governments following the Plan of
Operation, and other functions transferred from the other ministries (Report of
the Special Committee on Provincial Governments 1979, 41).
This arrangement had significant implications for decentralisation in the
post colonial Solomon Islands because it empowered provinces to actively engage
in policy formulation, unlike the previous local councils which were de facto
agents of the central government, The provincial assemblies were empowered to
make their own decisions and policies for the first time in Solomon Islands
history. The present powers of the provinces are attributed to the three lists
designated by the Kausimae Committee after independence in 1978 and the
consequent Provincial Government Act that came into effect on 8 December,
1981. Since then, the provincial government system in the Solomon Islands have
only been reviewed twice. The reviews were never taken seriously and the
provincial government system remained as it was at the time of its inception.
These two reviews are discussed below in order to put into perspective the actual
state of the provincial government system that presently exists in the country.
68
3.6 POST COLONIAL REVIEWS
The first review was conducted by a working party set up in 1979 to
consider the recommendations of the Special Committee on how devolution
should be carried out. Their submission became known as the 'Government
While Paper', The other review was carried out in 1986-1987 and was concerned
with the 1981 Provincial Government Act. The document that was produced
became known as the 'Provincial Government Review'.
3.6.1 The 1979 Government White Paper
The Government White Paper recognised that there must be limits to the
degree of devolution under the Kausimae Committee's recommendations. It was
primarily concerned with three areas which had considerable bearing on the
provincial government system, namely law, money and manpower.
The White Paper recommended that the creation of the provincial
governments be brought about by an Act of Parliament or at least a Resolution in
Parliament and not through a constitutional amendment. It further stated that the
executive authority of the provincial governments be vested in a cabinet-style
executive headed by a 'premier', chosen from the elected provincial assembly
members (SIG 1979, 6).
On the issue of money, the White Paper realised that, with devolution,
the provincial governments' dependence on the central government's recurrent
and capital revenue would inevitably increase. It therefore recommended that the
69
provincial governments, by Act of Parliament, have the power to make and levy
the following :
1. basic rate at a uniform or graduated amount per capita, or on immovableproperty, within their areas to provide for specific purposes withintheir areas;
2. taxes on animals and birds owned within their areas;
3. licence fees for sale of liquor;
4. licence fees for tradesmen and professional persons or practitioners;
5. licence fees for taxis, buses and other forms of public transport;
6. licence fees for stores and businesses (SIG 1979, 10),
The While Paper also recommended that the National Parliament should •
make provision for provinces to invest in joint ventures with local businessmen
and companies; overseas businessmen and companies; and Government share-
holding agents. These funds should cater for some of the financial
needs of the provinces as functions are devolved. This gave way to the
empowerment of provincial governments to create and/or establish provincial
development authorities, the financial arms of the provincial governments, which
are discussed elsewhere in this thesis.
The framers of the White Paper also realised that the new provincial
government system would have manpower implications. Therefore, the White
Paper recommended that provincial governments undertake their own recruitment
up to Level 4, and also pay for the salaries, while staff members above this level
would be recruited from the Public Service (SIG 1979, 17). This resulted in the
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categorisation of provincial government employees as either 'direct employee' or
'seconded staff from the central government. Those on Level 4 and below would
be under the disciplinary power of the Provincial Secretaries.
Given all these requirements of the decentralised system to be set up, the
White Paper recommended that there should be at least twelve months period of
planning before the implementation of the provincial government system. This
was based on the premise that if it was not soundly based in the beginning, the
system could be at risk in the future.
3.6.2 The Provincial Government Review, 1987
In 1987, another committee was set up to review the provincial
government system after at least five years of operation. Among other things, it
was to review and advise the central government on the following {Report of the
Provincial Government Review Committee. 1987, 8):
1. possible comprehensive amendments to the Provincial Government Act,1981.
2. the involvement of traditional leaders and chiefs in the provincialgovernment system; and
3. an alternative system of government to the present provincial governmentsystem.
In its recommendations, this review suggested comprehensive amendments to the
Provincial Government Act. It recommended that the status of Honiara be clearly
defined and given full city status and that the boundaries of Guadalcanal and
Honiara be clearly defined. It also recommended that the Provincial Government
71
Act of 1981 be amended so that the allowances and the salaries of the provincial
members would be derived from locally raised revenue (Report of the Provincial
Government Review Committee 1987, 32).
On the issue of involving traditional leaders in the provincial government
system, the Review Committee suggested that the area councils be abolished and
be replaced with Councils of Chiefs. On the other hand, if the area councils were
to be maintained, then the chiefs and traditional leaders should become members
of the area councils automatically (Report of the Provincial Government Review
Committee 1987, 67).
On the idea of an alternative system of government, the Review
Committee, recommended a federal system where the provinces are changed into
States with powers of the central government and the states clearly defined. The
argument was that historical and geographical factors, social structures,
differences in languages and dialects, religion and population, imbalances in
economic resources and economic development, and political factors, meant that
federalism would be the best alternative for Solomon Islands (Report of the
Provincial Government Review 1987, 53-54). The review called for the Provincial
Government Act of 1981 to be repealed and revoked. Nevertheless, none of the
recommendations of this Review has been implemented or even seriously
debated.
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3.7 CONCLUSION
Decentralisation in the Solomon Islands may be viewed as an historical
process influenced by various events and reviews since the establishment of the
British Protectorate in 1893. History has shaped a system of government that
Solomon Islands presently has. The 1920 Native Tax Regulation led to the
appointment of Headmen to enable the collection of the head tax in the colony,
thus giving a statutory structure to native administration. This in turn facilitated
talks aimed at establishing native courts and local councils which materialised
several years later.
Decentralisation was further consolidated after the Second World War
when the first formal local council was established on Malaita in 1953 following
the pleas of the Ma'asina Ruru Movement. This led to the formation of another
23 local councils. At first these councils had no powers but the 1953 Native
Administration Regulation authorised the appointment of headmen and for the
drafting of council constitutions which laid out the roles of the local councils.
These twenty four local councils were then amalgamated into eight bodies
in 1974 under the Plan of Operation devolution exercise, in an attempt to make
them economically viable entities. These eight local councils were maintained as
provinces after independence with the one recent change being the addition of
two new provinces. Shortly before independence, the Kausimae Committee
reviewed the Plan of Operation by holding meetings throughout the country. It
recommended that certain powers be given to the provincial governments and the
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central government. This enabled the provincial governments to make their own
legislation and decisions in some areas of their development.
The next Chapter discusses the functions and tasks of the provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands. It also looks at the provincial
government structure and procedures and identifies some of the rural
development funds and structures operating under the provincial government
system.
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CHAPTER 4
THE SOLOMON ISLANDS PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
INTRODUCTION
The provincial government system was established to facilitate and cater
for the development needs of the country. The Provincial Government Act of
1981, which established the Solomon Islands provincial government system, was
enacted in the hope that decision making bodies of the country would be closer
to the people. Through 'devolution' of power and the 'deconcentration' of
authority to the lower levels of government, national development funds would
incorporate policies made by the provinces.
Chapter 2, discussed these theoretical and political rationales for a
decentralised provincial government. This chapter considers these in the context
of Solomon Islands government policy. It looks at the policies of successive
central governments since independence,
It also looks at the framework and structure of the provincial government
system as stipulated under the Provincial Government Act of 1981 and shows
some of the complex procedures in the system. Finally, it examines the tasks and
functions of provincial governments and identifies the issues pertaining to the
provincial government system and why the system is very complicated, complex
and cumbersome,
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4.1 THE POLITICAL AGENDA: SUCCESSIVE GOVERNMENTS'POLICIES ON THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
Successive governments since 1980 adopted policy objectives that aimed
at facilitating the effective functioning of the provincial government system. The
successive government's policies identified here were hardly put into effect.
The government under the leadership of Sir Peter Kenilorea that led the
country in 1980 strongly believed that provincial governments should be fully
involved in development planning and implementation. It realised that
development planning involved people and people's influences were particularly
strong at the provincial government level. In order for planning and development
to be successful, people and their needs were held to be of greater importance
than the overall national plan. As a result, the 1980-1984 national development
plan emphasised the importance of rural and provincial development as a pre-
requisite to national development. Therefore, the major objective of this particular
government was ",,, to improve opportunities for the rural population and
improve the distribution of these opportunities. With an excellent natural resource
base (land, forest, fishing) and with a mainly rural population, it follows that
rural, natural resources based development must take priority at the provincial
level" (SIG 1980, 1).
The policy of the government at that time was to have the provincial
indicative plans combined into a national development plan. The following were
required for the provincial indicative plans:
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Publication of a resource study for each province in which developmentopportunities were identified;
requests to provincial assemblies for plan proposals;
consultation between provincial assemblies and central planning office;
plan writing with the general context of the 1980-1984 nationaldevelopment plan" (SIG 1980, 6).
Provincial government plans were seen as indicative of the development needs of
the province since people at the provincial level were involved in formulating
those plans, This was a type of development planning that emphasised the need
to involve the provinces as the focus of development, especially in the rural
areas.
In the latter part of the 1980's, the Alliance Government set out the
following as its policy for improving and developing of the provincial
government system:
1. review the provincial government system and the Provincial GovernmentAct to strengthen the institutional framework for governmentadministration in the provinces;
2. continue the process of devolving functions and responsibilities toprovinces;
3. encourage provinces to increase their level and efficiency of revenuecollection so as to supplement the national governments annualgrants for devolved functions;
4. encourage regular consultation between national and provincialgovernments on matters of mutual concern (SIG 1985, 221).
rfhe government of the day set up some strategies to achieve its policy objectives.
The government firstly sought to review the Provincial Government Act of 1981
77
with the intention of improving the local government system in the country. The
aim was to improve and strengthen the framework for provincial government
administration. Part of this was to establish a commission to draw up entitlement
regulations, In addition, the Boundaries Commission would review and amend
the existing provincial boundaries if necessary (SIG 1985, 221).
Another strategy was to encourage provincial governments to raise
revenues of their own to reduce their dependence on central government grants.
Provinces were encouraged to establish their investment and trading corporative,
which were to become the financial arms of the provinces. This actually gave
way to the establishment of various development corporative such as the Makira
Economic Development Authority (MEDA) and the Guadalcanal Development
Authority (GDA), discussed in this chapter. In addition, revenue collection was
delegated to area councils directly in touch with the people.
Furthermore, a program on staff secondment and training was undertaken.
The aim was to have a vigorous training program for technical staff in the
provinces especially in financial and management control, and in planning. These
areas were seen to be lacking qualified personnel but were crucial to provincial
governments' success.
Finally, the government sought to revitalise the Provincial Development
Fund (PDF) to finance capital projects initiated by the provincial governments. In
addition to the reviews and amendments on the directives governing PDF,
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requests were also made to PDF donors to increase their contributions (SIG 1985,
221).
In 1993, Che National Coalition Partner (NCP) government led by Francis
Billy Hilly came to power. The government was formed by different political
parties so development documents, such as development plans, was not easily
agreed to. Nevertheless, the NCP government made some changes to the
provincial government system, particularly on the funding to provincial
governments. The SICOPSA grant that was normally given to provinces was
abolished and Stabex funds under the Ministry of Provincial Governments was
transferred to the Ministry of Finance. At the same time, the government
introduced the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which deals with rural
development but is under the discretionary power of the constituency's member
of parliament. It was introduced on a trial basis and is an undisciplined type of
rural development fund in the sense that there are no guidelines on how CDF
should be spent. In 1994, the NCP government was toppled by a constitutional
crisis (see 6.1.1) in the country and the Solomon Islands National Unity,
Reconciliation and Progressive Pati Government (SINURP) came to power.
The SINURP Government, currently ruling the country as of December
1995 basically has three policy objectives. First, the SINURP Government aims
to create certain changes to the Provincial Government Act of 1981 in order to
give provinces more power over their resources. Second, it aims to allocate and
transfer certain proportions of state revenue to the provincial governments
79
through the above proposed amendment. Third, it aims to put more emphasis on
rural development. These are the basic policy goals declared by the government
(SINURP 1994, 28). These are not new objectives since previous governments
stated these in their development plans of action, For instance the 1985 - 1989
Annual Plan of Action hinted at similar objectives (SIG 1985b, 126-127). These
statements and objectives reflect the belief on the part of the central government
that decentralisation would enable development (rural development) from below,
the principal rationale for the provincial government system.
In order to achieve these policy objectives, the SINURP government set
up several development strategies. First and foremost was the amendment of
relevant provisions of the Provincial Government Act of 1981, to ensure that
provinces benefit more from their natural resources. In order to help provinces
benefit from their resources, the central government has placed more emphasis on
infrastructure development such as the building of bridges, roads and wharves in
the provinces (SINURP 1994, 28). Infrastructure developments are considered
vital to controlling resources and may lead to economic development. In other
words, with better support infrastructure, provinces would be able to harvest their
natural resources more easily and transport them to their respective markets. At
the same time, infrastructure development facilitates efficiency in decision
making either at the provincial government level or between provinces and the
central government. With better transportation and communication infrastructure,
information and contacts to very important destinations may be facilitated.
Furthermore, the provision of goods and services would probably be enhanced.
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In addition, the SINURP government was committed to re-introducing the
Provincial Government Funding Scheme (SICOPSA) and the Revolving Fund
which were suspended by the former Billy Hilly led National Coalition Partners
(NCP) government. This policy was implemented early in 1995. At the same
time, with the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), a set amount allocated for
each constituency would continue and be transferred to the National Parliament
Office. The amount allocated for each constituency would be increased based on
population. The government hoped that these development strategies would all be
implemented by the year 1998 (SINURP 1994, 29). The aim is to encourage rural
areas to develop by making available funds that would be used for development
activities.
Successive governments since the enactment of the 1981 Provincial
Government Act had been paying lip service to the importance of popular
participation in rural development through the provincial governments. Policy
documents were prepared by the various governments that pointed to this need,
However, actually implementing these policies and strategies had not been
impressive. Therefore, the provincial government system stayed the same after 14
years of operation. The above discussion shows that the governments' position on
the provincial government system stayed the same since the Provincial
Government Act was enacted in 1981. Successive governments realised the need
to review the provincial government system but none ever carried this out
seriously. Generally, different governments that led the country since
independence were saying the same things in different ways.
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4.2 THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT ACT OF 1981
The Provincial Government Act, 1981 is the pillar of the provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands. After the Special Committee on the
Provincial Government (Kausimae Committee) came up with the recommendation
to devolve legislative power to the provincial governments, in accordance with
the provisions in the national constitution, the government decided that the
provincial government system be established by an Act of Parliament rather than
a constitutional review. As a result, a provincial government bill was tabulated in
parliament and was passed in 1981. It divided the functions and law making
powers of the provincial governments as stated under the lists A, B, and C
(Appendix 2).
The Provincial Government Act of 1981 aimed to create a new system of
government in each province, consisting of a legislature and an executive, which
would be responsible for the administration of the province. The Act separates
the executive and assembly in the same way the national executive and
legislature are separated by the constitution (figure 1.1). It established a program
of devolution of powers, functions and procedures, The Act came into force in
two stages referred to as the 'first' and 'second' appointed days. The first
appointed day was when the provincial assemblies and provincial executives were
established on February 1, 1982, The second appointed day was when new
functions were actually transferred to the provincial governments and the end to
the local governments. From the second appointed day onwards, the provincial
governments have the power to enact their own legislation for provincial matters.
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The second appointed day is not the same for all the provinces in the Solomon
Islands,
The Act also empowered the executives rather than the provincial
assembly to appoint and recruit provincial staff members up to Level 4. The bulk
of the provincial government workers are provided by the Public Service
Commission of the central government. This means that the very influential
positions in the nine provincial governments are under the power of the central
government.
The Provincial Government Act of 1981 also stipulated how provincial
grants were to be paid to the various provincial governments, The most important
stipulation is that income be paid into the Provincial Fund. No money could be
withdrawn from the Provincial Fund for payment except under the authority of a
warrant given by the Premier as authorised under Section 36 (3) of the Provincial
Government Act10. The provincial governments under the Act were given very
limited power to borrow money, Key functions or tasks given to the provincial
governments were classified either as service functions or devolved functions.
10 Section 36 (3) stated that "An Appropriation Ordinancemay provisionally authorise the payment out of the ProvincialFund in advance of appropriation of sums not exceeding in theaggregate such amount as may be specified in the Ordinance".
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4.2.1 Service functions versus devolved functions
There are two types of functions that provincial governments perform : 1)
service functions, and 2) devolved functions. Service functions are Agency
Agreements whereby the provinces carry out functions decided by the central
government. For instance, the Ministry of Education decides on what curriculum
to be used in schools and the Ministry of Health decides what health services to
be rendered. Agency Agreements therefore are duties that provincial governments
have to perform on behalf of the central government at the provincial level.
Devolved functions are functions given to the provincial governments
under the Provincial Government Act. Provinces pass laws that apply in their
own provinces. They can also decide on what business or licence fees to be
collected and how much fees to be charged. For instance, the fee to operate a
trade store is not the same throughout the country because each provincial
government has its own right to legislate on the amount to be charged under
devolved functions, The provincial governments have the right to do what they
want with the functions devolved to them as long as they do not contradict the
national constitution. This devolution of functions is the pillar of decentralisation
and provincial government in the Solomon Islands.
4.3 THE MINISTRY OF PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND RURALDEVELOPMENT.
The Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development is the
central government's ministry responsible for the nine provincial governments
established under the Provincial Government Act of 1981. It's role is to
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coordinate the development of these provincial governments and to ensure the
proper execution of functions devolved to these governments.
4.3.1 Structure of the Ministry of Provincial Government
At the top is the Minister who controls policy and directions as
established by the central government from time to time. Under the Minister is
the Permanent Secretary who is the most senior officer of the ministry. Next in
line is the Under Secretary, who is directly responsible for the Provincial
Development Unit (PDU).
The Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development at the
lime of research is divided into three major departments. The Provincial .
Development Unit (PDU) comes under the coordinating power of the Under
Secretary. The other two departments are the Accounts Department and the
Provincial Affairs Department. There are three Chief Administrative Officers
(CAO) responsible for the affairs of the nine provincial governments, each
responsible for three provinces. At the same time, there is a CAO responsible for
headquarter administration and the Legal Adviser who looks after the
decentralisation unit - a single person.
The Accounts Department deals with money given to provincial
governments and to rural development. This section is headed by the financial
controller, assisted by an assistant accountant. The PDU is controlled by a
director and under the supervision of the ministry's under secretary. Since it
coordinates bilateral aid, it operates quite independently. Therefore, it could
for each province. For example, the net total estimates expenses for 1993 was
$20,273,905.00 while the one for 1994 was $23,327,015.00 (SIG 1995).
Prom the above table, it is obvious that the approved provincial grants for
1994 were lower than those for 1993. These decreases are due to the transfer of
Health Services grant to the Ministry of Health and Medical Services and the
Cattle Development Grant to the Development Budget. These two grants used to
be controlled by the provinces. At the same time, the 1994 NCP government
abolished the SICOPSA Grant, which contributed to the decrease in provincial
grants.
4.4 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES
Apart from grants obtained from the central government, the provincial
governments established statutory authorities under Section 3211 of the
Provincial Government Act. Development Authorities were established to act as
the business arm or the money making body of the provincial governments. They
are integral to successive central government policy on decentralisation.
Expressed in a more ambitious manner, the central governmentfeels that what it creates for itself at the centre such as numerousstate companies and statutory corporations, it wishes also to createfor its agents, the provincial authorities. It aims to enhance theideology of more devolved functions and powers to localgovernments (Guadalcanal Province 1988a, 1).
11 Section 3 2 of the Act empowers the provincialgovernments to pass laws through Provincial Ordinances. Suchlaws are only applicable to the province that enacts them.
88
Two examples of this are discussed in the research findings and analysis chapters
of this thesis - the Makira Economic Development Authority (MEDA) and
Guadalcanal Development Authority (GDA). Development Authorities are a
move towards giving economic power to the provinces. Political devolution
rarely succeeds, if at all, without economic devolution. Since economic
devolution is not forthcoming in the Solomon Islands, development authorities
were seen as the answer. The idea was most likely imported from neighbouring
Papua New Guinea.
4.5 THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT UNIT
The Provincial Development Unit (PDU) is a unit under the Ministry of
Provincial Governments and Rural Development that is responsible for the
coordination of bilateral aid to the provinces. It works on provincial development
projects that are funded by aid donors in line with the central government's
policy directives. The policy guidelines under which PDU conducts its operations
arc:
1. Decision making should be decentralised increasingly to theprovinces;
2. An emphasis in income generating projects in line with theGovernment's stated policy objective to promote income earningopportunities in rural areas;
3. Projects should be fairly distributed so as to reach the entirecountry (PDU 1993, 1).
In 1990, the Ministry of Provincial Governments was charged with the
coordination of bilateral aid and the priority development projects in the
provinces. A new division, Bilateral Aid Management Division (BAMD) was
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established with the following functions :
1. To assist the sectoral ministries and provincial governments in theidentification and formulation of project proposals in line withnational and provincial policies.
2. To appraise project proposals prepared by sectoral ministries,provincial governments and Statutory Authorities on the basis oftheir consistency with SIG development policy, their feasibilitywith respect to available resources and manpower, and theirgeneral economic feasibility.
3. To assist provinces to secure funding for increased directinvestments in the village economies and facilitate implementationof community projects by rural people.
4. To co-ordinate the efforts of all concerned in implementing thedevelopment policy formulated by government within the BilateralAid Program.
5. To assemble and disseminate information and advice from whichgovernment can formulate development policy.
6. To monitor and evaluate bilateral aid programs and projects inconsultation with sectoral ministries and provincial governments.
7. To negotiate and control the inflow of bilateral aid. (PDU 1993, 1)
The Provincial Development Unit basically derives its functions and tasks from
the major function (3) above since most of its efforts were directed towards
funding projects that would assist the development of rural areas.
4.5.1 PDU Procedures
As alluded to earlier, PDU is charged with the task of approving projects
submitted from the provinces and to secure the appropriate funds and funding
agents. In order to get funding under PDU coordinated funds, a formal
application procedure must be followed. Money is available for use in
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The first stage of the application process is that PDU receives a check list
from the Provincial Secretary or Provincial Planning Officer. There is a standard
check list, 'Check List D, used in applying for PDU funding (Appendix 3), PDU
officers ensure that the check list is properly completed including maps, sketches
or even photographs. They appraise the project to see the viability of the project,
that is, whether land, labour, materials and transport are available for the project
and whether the capital cost estimates and current cost estimates are realistic. At
this point, PDU would also determine the benefits of the proposed project, that is,
why it should be considered greater than other submitted projects, and whether it
would increase the material standard of living for the beneficiaries (Workshop on
Provincial Planning 1986, 6).
After PDU has appraised the project and is satisfied with its viability,
benefits and development priorities of the Solomon Islands government, the
project proposal is submitted to PDU's Committee of Management. The
committee comprises members from the Ministry of Provincial Governments and
the Ministry of Development Planning. The Committee does a final check on the
project and gives it the final 'blessing' before sending it off to any of the donor
funds controlled by PDU.
The donor would consider the application and may either reject or
approve it. Donors have their own criteria for the types of projects they would
fund. If a particular donor rejects a project proposal, PDU would submit it to
another donor. If the donor accepts it, the funds are sent to PDU to be lodged
92
with the Ministry of Finance. Project holders can claim advances of up to 25% of
the cost of the project but subsequent claims must be made on the basis of work
completed, Projects could start 6 months after the proposal is submitted if there
are no complications but this is rarely the case. The mere fact that the check list
'D' requires a lot of information and goes through different procedures
discourages rural dwellers from applying for grants. This alone is a stumbling
block to efforts in rural development funding.
4.5.2 PDU source and level of funding
In 1980, the Provincial Development Fund (PDF) was established to
replace the General Development Allocation which operated since independence.
PDF aimed at providing an efficient, flexible and controlled source of funds for
provinces to finance small infrastructure projects within their general
development program. PDU administers this PDF, During the first two years of
operation, the PDF received $1.0 million from the Solomon Islands Government
(SIG); United Kingdom 250,000; and Australia $202,000, totalling $1,452,440
(PDU 1983, 3). Contributions to the Provincial Development Unit coordinated
funds originated from five different funds. These were:
1. New Zealand's Small Project Fund (NZSPF)
2. Australia (ADAB) Small Grant Scheme (SGS)
3. Canada's Mission Administered Fund (CMAF)
4. EEC's European Development Fund (EDF) - micro projects
5. USAID Small Scale Development Assistance Grants(SSDAG) or Accelerated Impact Program (AIP).
94
promoted the democratic and equal distribution or accessibility to money for
equal rural development.
4.6 SMALL ISLANDS COMMUNITIES PROJECTS SCHEME(SICOPSA)
The Mamaloni-led government in 1989 came up with a new Provincial
Government Funding system known as the Small Island Communities Project
Schemes (SICOPSA) grant. The objectives of this new funding system are :
1. To increase the volume of funds by way of special grants fromSIG, aid donors, new forms of licences and fees through legislationor regulations which are payable to provincial treasuries.
2. To rationalise the development profile of the rural sector by use offunds in (1) above.
3. To enable provinces to receive a fair share of funds which arederived from natural resources.
4. To attract high - calibre manpower to work in provinces.
5. To attract increased commercial activities by local and foreigninvestors into the provinces.
6. To aim to make provincial authorities become self-sufficient ineconomic development, and
7. To expand and diversify development activities in the rural sectorsthroughout the country (MPG 1989, 1).
In an attempt to achieve these aims, the central government proposed the
removal of the Provincial Development Unit and the establishment of Provincial
Revolving Funds, Each province would have its own revolving fund. Bilateral aid
funds would be diverted into provincial development estimates through the
Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development. The government
proposed the establishment of an Aid Management Unit (AMU) to replace the
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PDU (MPG 1989, 1). Under this new arrangement, all foreign aid solicited from
multilateral sources would be managed and coordinated by the Ministry of
Finance while aid Funds from bilateral sources would become the responsibility
of the AMU in the Ministry of Provincial Governments. The balance of the funds
in PDU would be disbursed equally to all the provinces' revolving funds.
4.6.1 The Objectives of SICOPSA
The basic aim of the SICOPSA project is to try and bridge the gap of
development between various areas in the country, particularly, the rural
subsistence sector. More specifically SICOPSA attempts to :
1. identify and provide the means (finance, equipment, and materials)of fulfilling small isolated communities needs;
2. thoroughly assess the problems and difficulties peculiar to smallisolated communities and provide the necessary solutions;
3. institute a new formula of direct grants to the Provinces and AreaCouncils based on population; and
4. introduce a new system of resources levy for provinces based oneach province's annual production of commodities (MPG 1989, 3-4).
4.6.2 Types of Assistance under SICOPSA
Under SICOPSA, assistance was given to certain types of projects like the
improvement of crop varieties and yield, transport and communication, health and
sanitation needs, water supplies, and viable and sustainable commercial ventures
in provinces, particularly those small isolated communities (MPG 1989, 5).
96
Apart from that, the provincial governments receive an export levy from
the exporters on round logs, sawn timber, minerals, copra, palm oil (semi-raw
and refined), and, raw and processed marine products. These levies were paid
directly to the province from which the commodity was exported and do not go
through the SIG Consolidated fund.
A very important component of SICOPSA is the Population grants12. In
accordance with the objectives stated above, the Central government through the
National Budget Allocation from the Consolidated Fund, pays the provinces a
particular grant based on population.
SICOPSA is an attempt by the Solomon Islands government to
decentralise financial power to the provinces to assist rural people to contribute
to the national economy. This is in line with the argument of decentralisation as a
development tool. It was implemented for a while but when the Hilly-led
National Coalition Partner (NCP) government came into power, the SICOPSA
funding system was scrapped. At the time of field research, SICOPSA was
abolished. However, with the new Mamaloni-led government in power, the
SICOPSA grant was also reinstated at the beginning of 1995. Since its
12 The government pays the provincial population $20 perperson for the first 10,000 persons. The next 20,000 peopleare paid $10 per head. The next 3 0,000 persons in thepopulation are paid $8 per head and the remainder at the rateof $5 per person. Under this population grant, the provincesare required to pay the area councils at the rate of $8 perhead to carry out their tasks (MPG 1989, 6). Nevertheless, thetypes of projects, activities or development under SICOPSAgrants are at the discretion of each province.
97
reinstatement, the government has decided to pay the grants through the Ministry
of Provincial Government rather than through the nine provincial governments.
4.6.3 Procedures of obtaining SICOPSA grants
There are certain stages which are normally followed when applying for
SICOPSA grants, This procedure was outlined by Felix Quanimae, Permanent
Secretary for the Ministry of Provincial Governments over the Solomon Islands
Broadcasting Corporations' program 'World Blong Iumi' on 7 June, 1995:
1. coltect form from area councils' administrative officer. Two formsmust be filled - the application and the appraisal form.
2. return the completed forms to the administrative officer.
3. SICOPSA screening Committee screens the applications
4. approved projects sent to the provincial governments to checkbefore commencement of project.
The S1NURP government with the new SICOPSA arrangement
encourages the funding of income generating projects such as piggery and
poultry. As a policy, the maximum amount that can be paid to an applicant is
$5,000. Only materials for the project are given and not money as was usually
the case. This is a move that attempts to avoid the excessive misuse of SICOPSA
grants by the provincial governments as experienced in the earlier years of
SICOPSA grant operations. Nevertheless, for bigger projects, approved SICOPSA
grants could be used as securities for loans from the commercial banks up to
$14,000.
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4.7 CONSTITUENCY DEVELOPMENT FUND (CDF)
The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was yet another move by the
former NCP government to involve people in the development of rural areas. It
was a name devised by the NCP government but prior to that, it was called the
Special Discretionary Fund (SDF). Up to 1993, the SDF for each MP amounted
up to $100,000 but by 1994 the NCP government approved its increase to
$200,000 {Solomon Voice, February 17 1995, 11).
The current SINURP government maintains this funding scheme and is
planning to increase it according to population. CDF, according to the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Provincial Governments, arose from the pressure of
rural people who were unable to get commercial loans because of the banks'
lending policies'3. The banks' policy on security led to the inability of rural
people to get money for their small commercial projects. In order to get a
commercial loan, one has to put in a certain amount and something (usually land
or property) to act as security against unpaid loans. This caused the government
to come up with a funding scheme that has rural orientation with no strings
attached.
This fund comes under the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural
Development and it is given out to all constituencies in the country. Under the
13 This was a claim made by the Permanent Secretary of theMinistry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development,Milner Tozaka, during a personal interview with the author on25 July 1994.
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CDF, each Member of Parliament (MP) is entitled to $200,000 per annum to
develop their respective constituencies. The CDF has no strings attached to it and
is a payment done directly from the national parliament's purse, Individual MPs
are entirely responsible for their constituency's funds.
It is a common practise that each constituency has a CDF committee that
approves projects and authorises funding. However, this is not compulsory. The
MPs and their CDF committees also drew up their own CDF application forms
and reports hack to the Ministry of provincial governments if they think it is
necessary. An example of a typical CDF application form is shown in Appendix
4. Looking closely at the North East Guadalcanal Constituency Development
Fund application form (Appendix 4), it actually calls for a 5% fee before funds
can be released for income generating projects. Although this may be a very
small service fee, it contradicts the basis on which the CDF was established - the
burden of commercial bank policies. Furthermore, CDF is at the discretion of the
parliament member himself, as can be seen in Part 10 of the North East
Guadalcanal CDF application form. This means that there are strings attached to
CDF funds, although they may not be in the form of cash as in loan repayments.
The types of projects funded range from income generating to capital projects
like schools, water supplies and similar projects.
The present SINURP government wanted to carry out a total review of the
CDF for the future. The government felt that factors like population, distance and
the degree of development in any constituency should be considered when giving
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out CDF money to individual MPs (Solomon Voice February 17, 1995, 11).
Constituencies with big populations, that are less developed or isolated should be
given more money than the others. This may cater for equitable distribution of
resources, especially development funds in the country. This is the basis for
SINURP's review of the Fund. So far, no reviews have been undertaken and the
administration of the fund remains the same.
4.8 CONCLUSION
The present structure of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and the
Provincial Government system in the Solomon Islands was established to cater
for the structure and system stipulated in the Provincial Government Act of 1981.
Within the Ministry and the provinces there are various bureaucracies and
hierarchies; in other words, bureaucracies within bureaucracies. This raises
questions about efficiency in decision making, grassroots participation,
democracy and development, which are all justifications for the provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands. Mow effective is the provincial
government system in promoting economic development and income generating
projects for rural communities? The next chapter considers this question in terms
of the experiences in Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawa provinces.
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CHAPTER 5
THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT SYSTEM AND ECONOMICDEVELOPMENT
. . . power without finance and manpower does not work toachieve the development needs of the people in the rural areas(Solomon Nius 16 May 1989, 8).
RECAPTURING THE DEVELOPMENT ARGUMENT
As discussed in Chapter 2, the decentralised provincial government system
presently existing in the Solomon Islands was established to facilitate and assist
development efforts in the country. It was the hope of leaders during the period
leading up to independence that a decentralised form of government would be
appropriate for the development needs of a heterogeneous country like the
Solomon Islands. The extensive work done by the Special Committee on
Provincial Government and its recommendations pointed to this conviction.
Devolving power to the provinces meant that planning of development
activities could accommodate the distinct conditions in these different provinces.
Development planning was seen as the basis for development in the whole
country. Plans drawn from information gathered through the decentralised system
of government, when properly implemented would boost economic development,
particularly in rural areas, With the provincial government system, the majority
of Solomon Islanders living in the rural areas would be able to take part in
development efforts and also benefit from such undertakings. In order to get
Solomon Islanders involved in developing their own localities, a decentralised
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system of government should make funds accessible to the rural dwellers, This
gave rise to the development of funds such as those available through the
Provincial Development Unit (PDU), Small Islands Communities Project Scheme
(SICOPSA), and Constituency Development Fund (CDF) which were outlined in
the previous chapter.
The decentralised provincial government system also gave rise to
provincial development authorities that aimed to generate income to supplement
central government grants. Devolution of power through the Provincial
Government Act of 1981 allowed provincial governments to establish provincial
development authorities that would enable them to overcome their financial
difficulties. Decentralisation, in the form of devolution also enabled provinces to
look, at their specific development needs and to plan and make appropriations or
budgets for such needs. The general wisdom is that these provincial budgets are
in a better position to detect the development needs of the provinces compared to
a budget that is made by those at the central government headquarters who may
not actually know the needs of a particular province (SIG 1980, 1).
As discussed in Chapter 2, a key rationale is that decentralisation allows
planners to identify the different groups and conditions in the provinces and to be
conscious of this in their development plans, programs and budgets. In the
Solomon Islands, the overall government policies and plans of action are issued
and coordinated by the central government but the provincial governments are
left on their own in terms of provincial development planning. The five year
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provincial development plans prepared by each province attested to this.
This chapter examines the contributions of the provincial government
system in the Solomon islands to development in the country by analysing the
provincial development planning process. It focuses on the provincial budgets
and various rural development funding schemes which are channelled through the
provincial government system. Development in this context is measured by how
well development plans and strategies are produced, implemented and evaluated,
how successful provincial development authorities are in generating money in the
provinces, and how successful the various rural development funds have been in
achieving their aims to develop rural areas.
5.1 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT PLANNING
Development plans are principal guidelines for any government's
development activities. In the case of the Solomon Islands, provinces usually
formulate objectives and priorities of the province in line with those of the
national government. More importantly, the plans normally include strategies to
achieve such objectives and how they are going to be evaluated14. The two
provinces used in this study present contrasting examples of planning in the
Solomon Islands as one has development plans and priorities on paper, while the
other does not, as explained in the following section.
14 For a detailed explanation of development planningprocedures in the Solomon Islands, see SIG (1986)
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5.1.1 Provincial Development Planning: Guadalcanal
Guadalcanal province has a five year (1993-1997) development plan
currently in place. Guadalcanal province works according to priority lists.
However, during the author's interview with the Guadalcanal provincial executive
, it was pointed out that their primary focus was to make enough money, to be
self-sufficient and to enable the proper execution and provision of the most
needed services and maintenance in the province.
The previous (since 1981) revenue sources of the province, basically
business licences, did not improve the financial health of the province so
attention has turned to economic development, particularly in the field of joint
ventures and resort development. For example, at present the province is planning
to develop its 'Doma Beach' (Map 3) into a tourist resort and there has been a
move to build a house, to be called the Guadalcanal house, to be rented out.
During an in-depth interview with the Guadalcanal executive, the author was
informed that final arrangements are also being made to enter into a joint venture
agreement between the Berjaya company of Malaysia and the province in the
timber industry. The province's priorities also include the relocation of the
provincial headquarters from Honiara to Tasifarongo, West Guadalcanal,
upgrading of health and medical services, the return of all alienated land, and
education. Looking at the previous provincial development plan, such as that for
the period 1988-1992 (Guadalcanal Province 1988b), these priorities were also
included but were never achieved.
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The provincial executive explained the difficulty in achieving development
plans' objectives, arguing that feasibility studies on some of the development
projects were not carried out properly. There has also been difficulty in
identifying the right consultants in some of the capital projects like the relocation
of the provincial headquarters. At the same time, feasibility studies were not clear
on how to develop these studies into detaiEed plans of action. Even if they are put
into detailed plans, the pressure from, the provincial executive and employees to
achieve them is not there.
5.1.2 Provincial Development Planning: Makira Ulawa
Makira Ulawa, unlike Guadalcanal province, does not have written
development plans. The province once had a development plan covering the
period 1988-92. But this was the only period since 1981 that a different person
led Makira Ulawa province. Prior to and after this particular leadership was
toppled, the same group of provincial politicians, particularly the premier and
deputy premier, led the province. The aforementioned provincial development
plan was approved and endorsed by the provincial assembly under the leadership
of another political party. When the present government came into power, it
ignored the development plan and went its own way. The document was
approved under the leadership of another premier, Gad Haga, and when the
government at the' time of research came into power they did not want to follow
the development priorities laid down in that particular document for political
reasons.
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The author was told that this is how they operate but no explanation was
given for this diversion from the normal government practice, The executive
instructs the administrators what to do and the administrators just have to do it.
This actually made a lot of senior administrators of the province question the
direction of development in the province. Provincial administrators agreed that
there is uncertainty in what they are supposed to do since they have to listen to
directives from the politicians as they go along. This resulted in difficulties in
coordination of development efforts and a kind of fragmented development.
Makira Ulawa province thus works according to what the provincial
politicians order. That is, administrators list the types of projects that they see as
needing emphasis and the politicians determine how these undertakings are to be
achieved. Health services are emphasised because of an agency agreement (4.3.1)
with the central government. The Solomon Islands with the help of the European
Economic Community established clinics around the province.
Apart from that, the province at its own initiative wanted to improve
transport and communication in the whole province. The reason for this is
because a large portion of the province is still without roads. Except for the
island council of Ulawa, Ugi island, Santa Anna and Santa Catalina islands, and
a large portion of'Makira island have no roads. Only about 66 kilometres of road
on Makira could be used by motor vehicles. Shipping is the only other form of
transportation which the province has control over. However, Makira province is
actually having difficulties with the shipping service and it cannot satisfy the
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local people's demands.
Several reasons were given for the poor shipping service in the
province15. First of all, there are financial difficulties. The province does not
allocate funds for the running of the shipping service. At the same time, most of
the money raised by the only ship owned by the province (MV Bulawa) is used
by the province. Therefore when the boat needs refuelling, the provincial
shipping division has to go back to the provincial executive and request money to
do this. This is a major cause of inefficiency in the shipping sector of the
province. Secondly, there is the unfavourable geographical factor. Makira Ulawa
province does not have many good harbours, although there are exceptions.
Furthermore, there are not enough wharves for easy and quick unloading and
loading of cargo.
A third problem is meeting its schedules. With one boat and a provincial
population of 23,000 people, the shipping service of the province is over
stretched. Finally, there is too much political interference by provincial politicians
in the shipping service. According to the shipping manager of the province,
Rolland Titiulu, provincial politicians normally go to the office and direct the
ship to go where they want it to go. The schedules suit the politicians own
interests rather than the interest of people in the province. With these stumbling
blocs, the Makira Ulawa provincial shipping service, which is the basic form of
15 These reasons were identified and explained by theShipping Manager of Makira Ulawa province, Rolland Titiulu.
109
transport in the province is not very successful. Therefore, the claim by the
Makira Ulawa politicians that transportation and communication improvement is
a major priority is questionable.
The central government is actually assisting Makira Ulawa province to
achieve its aim to improve the roads on the main island. The province believed
that people are knowledgeable and are eager to venture into development
activities but the difficulty of transportation and communication is a real
stumbling block. A clear example is a 30 acre Mahamoi cocoa plantation in the
Arosi 2 district of the island (Map 4). Due to its lack of access to roads and
markets, the cocoa project is going nowhere and is actually deteriorating as
identified by the PDU officer's progress reports on the project (Masuguria 1993).
Transportation difficulties hinder the realisation of the economic benefits of this
cocoa plantation. This is just one of the numerous examples that pointed to the
need for an improved transportation and communication in the province.
The provincial premier explained that they do not have development plans
because the province knows what it needs and what development activities it can
carry out. The central governments' policies determine the provincial
development priorities. He pointed to the development of the Maewo Coconuts
Product Limited (MCPL) as an example of the province's development aim that
was not put in paper but was carried out in line with the central government's
policy on import substitution (5.3.3). Since the government is looking at
encouraging import substitution, the province embarked on copra crushing and is
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looking at possibly introducing coconut products that are manufactured in the
province like soap, paper and other products. Provincial development planning
takes into account the available resources in the province and the benefit it will
derive from such undertakings. In the case of the MCPL, the province utilises the
copra and coconut which is found throughout the province. When you look at the
number of people who benefit, it would be those who own coconut trees, which
includes almost everybody in the coastal areas.
5.1.3 Monitoring and Evaluation of Development Plans
As far as the evaluation of development plans is concerned, there is no
proper mechanism for such evaluation. The present practice is that once a year
the divisional heads come up with progressive reports which are submitted to the
provincial assembly for citing. Proper monitoring and evaluation of development
plans is non-existent, This is supposed to be done by economic or development
planners but at the time of this research there was no provincial planner for
Guadalcanal province, Makira province on the other hand has an economic
planner but there was no mechanism available for such activities. Unwritten
development plans gave way to a kind of fragmented development where the
leaders determine what should be done and how it should be done without a
guiding document. Development activities in the provinces are extremely difficult
or impossible to evaluate without written development objectives and goals, The
provincial politicians pointed out that evaluation is done by the planning unit of
the province.
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From the above, it is evident that there is no formal mechanism for
evaluation of development projects in the two provinces studied. It is not possible
to evaluate the impact of development efforts without the original targets or
objectives, Therefore evaluation is virtually non-existent in Makira Ulawa
Province and has never been properly done in Guadalcanal, except for the annual
divisional reports.
5.2 THE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES
Development Authorities were a new move in the provincial government
system of the Solomon Islands to improve the economic strength of the
provincial governments. Development authorities are nothing more than
commercial arms of the provinces. They are supposed to look after the business
interests of the provinces in commercial spheres and investments. More
importantly, they are established outside of the regular government departmental
system. All development authorities are formed under the decentralisation and the
devolution of power by the Provincial Government Act of 198116. The Makira
Economic Development Authority (MEDA) and the Guadalcanal Development
Authority (GDA) are analysed below.
16 Under section 32 of the Provincial Government Act,1981, laws may be made for a province by Ordinance of theProvincial Assembly as long as it is within the provincialgovernments' legislative competence. Therefore, theestablishment of Provincial Development Authorities throughProvincial Ordinances is in line with the provincialgovernments' power to exercise the legislative functionsdevolved to them by the Act.
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5.2.1 Makira Economic Development Authority
The Makira Economic Development Authority (MEDA) was enacted in
1984 by the Makira Ulawa provincial assembly. It was actually the first province
to have a development authority in the Solomon Islands. Like any other
development authority, MEDA was charged with the task of making money for
the province. However, at the time of the research, MEDA was defunct and the
province had not insisted on its revival. The author found out at the beginning of
the research that in addition to MEDA, there was also the Makira United
Development Cooperation (MUDC) which emerged and acted as the coordinating
body of the province prior to the establishnient of MEDA,
The present Makira Ulawa executive and the premier pointed to a change
in the leadership in the provincial government in 1987 that led to the closure of
MEDA's role as a development authority. There was a change in the provincial
government and also in the central government in 1987. The argument was that
the group that led Makira Ulawa province in 1987 wanted to do things
differently, so they facilitated MEDA's closure.
However, the opposition groups and the administrators in the province
claimed that MEDA went defunct due to mismanagement and was defunct long
before the change of government in 1987. At the emergence of MEDA, a
Filipino by the name of Caesar Nohay was the general manager. Due to some
political disagreements with the provincial executive, he was removed and a
provincial politician, Aona Taisia was installed as the new General Manager, It
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was at this time that things went wrong for MEDA as a development authority.
The main problem that led to the termination of MEDA's activities was financial
mismanagement. Politicians and close friends owed money to MEDA. Although
the list of those who owed money is unavailable (possibly destroyed), there is
evidence that some politicians owed up to $1,000 and were never able to make
repayments'7.
During that period when Taisia was at the helm, a small company
developed between MEDA and a Fijian company known as the External Trade
Organisation (ETO). The company that emerged was known as the Resource and
Development Consultancy Limited (RDC), The chairman of this newly
established RDC was Paul Freeman, who was also the president of the ETO, Fiji
Limited. Mr Freeman was empowered and authorised or endorsed by the Makira
Ulawa provincial executive to negotiate and make decisions on the resources of
the province. His sole role was to negotiate and attract foreign companies to
invest in Makira. This resulted in companies like the Star Harbour Timbers and
Integrated Forest Industries (IFI) operating in the logging and timber industry of
the province,
RDC being a joint venture between MEDA and ETO collected
consultancy fees which could be shared equally between MEDA and ETO. But
his was never possible for several reasons. MEDA had never been registered
17 Interview with the Provincial Planner 24 August, 1994;Honourable Dickson Aghosi 25 August, 1994; and the provincialOpposition group on 26, August 1994.
115
officially or legally as a company until it became defunct in 1984. Therefore, it
had never been a statutory authority or a legal business arm of the province,
although it acted as one, Furthermore, MEDA came out of a company known as
Makira United Development Company (MUDC). It is interesting to note that
MUDC never liquidated when MEDA was formed and took its place. Legally,
MUDC should first have been liquidated before a new company took over.
MEDA was thus not registered until it ceased operations. This meant that if there
were consultancy fees between the investors and RDC, MEDA never had a share
of that. To make things worse, Paul Freeman was also a shareholder in the RDC.
Makira Ulawa province never benefited from RDC and the consultancy fees
possibly went into the chairman's account.
Since MEDA ceased operating, the provincial executive has been carrying
out the functions of the development authority. All development activities and
investment arrangements of the province are carried out by the provincial
executive. The provincial premier acknowledged that MEDA could have been
valuable in acting as an organisational umbrella in coordinating various
development undertakings of the province. However, the provincial executive
does all the negotiations and development arrangements. Two very interesting
development arrangements that took place in the province after MEDA were the
joint fishing agreement between the province and a Filipino company, and the
Makira Ulawa province's attempt to establish the Makira Copra Product Limited
(MCPL). These two ventures are discussed separately below.
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5.2.2 The Makira Bell
The Makira Bell is a joint venture between Makira Ulawa province and
the Frower Bell of the Philippines to harvest the fisheries resources of the
province. In the original agreement, profits would be divided equally between the
two share holders. In actual practice, the province only collected 5% profits while
the Frower Bell collected 95%. This 5% represented the provincial contribution
to the Makira Bell company. Makira Ulawa Province never purchased any shares
in the initial capitalisation of the company. Thus anything that is earned from the
5% will be returned into the capital until it accumulates to a 50% share holding.
This 5% is paid on a quarterly basis (three months) to the province by Makira
Bell from the total catch.
In the agreement, this 5% never comes through the provincial treasury but
rather under the discretionary powers of the Provincial Minister of Finance or the
Premier. What appears in the provincial treasury is the paper amount of the 5%
while the actual cash goes into a nominated account under the prerogatives of the
premier. He has the power over the use of that money. Besides this 5%, the
province also receives $35,000 as annual licence fees. However, it was not clear
how this money was used because it was under the discretionary powers of the
premier, Makira Bell also has private shares and two people in the province have
one share each. They are the premier himself and the minister of fisheries - the
deputy premier's brother. The rest of the private shares (48%) are owned by the
Frower Bell family.
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It is also important to note that the province had no control over the
catches. Makira Bell had a mother ship and small catcher boats loaded the
mother ship out in the ocean, not at the ports like Honiara. At these ports, the
normal practice was for customs officers to record how much was caught. But
since exports were transhipped through the mother ship instead of Honiara, it was
not possible to record catches.
In June 1993, Frower Bell withdrew from the company. Makira Ulawa
province was left on its own to try and run the operation. The reason given for
the withdrawal was that the company accumulated a huge loss in the catches
amounting to $11 million dollars since the beginning of its operations18.
5.2.3 Maewo Coconut Products Limited (MCPL)
Another development project that has been talked about as an investment
effort by the Makira Uiawa province is the MCPL project. The MCPL emerged
as the result of the premier's experience as a member of the copra board in the
late 1980s to early 1990s. He was so dissatisfied with consultants' reports
claiming that copra milling in the province was not viable that he asked a close
ally, the provincial clerk, to resign from the province and obtain a job with the
Levers Solomons Limited. After a while, the premier pulled this person out of
Levers, compensated for the breach of contract, and sent him together with a
18 The figure and claim was shared by Hunter Masuguria,the provincial planning officer, during an interview with theauthor on 24 August 19 94 and Fr. Dickson Aghosi, a formerMinister of Lands in the province during an interview with theauthor on 25 August 1994,
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retired marine engineer on an attachment to a coconut crushing mill in Ponphei,
Federated States of Micronesia, for almost a month. When they returned to
Malcira, the province bought the copra milling and crushing machines, installed
them, and the MCPL was born.
MCPL is still in operation and the provincial executive boasts of its
potential to grow and generate money at the local market and possibly the
international market. Despite this, questions have been raised about some aspects
of MCPL as a provincial investment body. The present general manager was
hand picked by the premier and his colleagues. At the same time, he is closely
related to the deputy premier (a brother). More importantly, the settlement of the
land site on which the copra crushing mill was situated was made under a private
agreement. It involves an annual rent of $6,000, but there are no formal
agreements in the provincial Ministry of Lands. Therefore, the motives of the
leaders may be genuine but the deals were not actually done through the formal
provincial procedures and structures. Ethics in development undertakings,
becomes a major concern. The development of the province in such undertakings
is confusing.
The above discussion on the various development bodies of the province
brings to light the most striking problems that affect the development efforts of
the province. There is the question of accountability. Before any meaningful
development can take place, provincial leaders need to be clear that they are
accountable to the people of the province and to the central government, The
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above events and issues pointed to the fact that interests of individuals in the
province often over-ride the interests of the rural population and their
development needs. Furthermore, ethical issues must be adhered to if
decentralisation is to achieve its development goals. The above examples pointed
to the need to make decisions according to the structures laid down by the
Provincial Government Act of 1981. This means that the appointment and
recruitment of people into influential positions in the province should be done on
merit rather than on political or family affiliations.
5.2.4 The Guadalcanal Development Authority
The Guadalcanal Development Authority (GDA) was established by the
Guadalcanal Development Authority Ordinance of 1988. Like MEDA it was
charged with the task of coordinating investments and provincial economic
development activities. The functions of GDA stipulated under the 1988
Ordinance include the following:
1. to provide financing to persons of the Solomon Islands carrying on orproposing to carry on any enterprises within the province by investing inthe share capital of such enterprises as may be approved in writing by theexecutive;
2. to co-operate with other persons in establishing and carrying on any jointventures within the province by investing in the share capital enterprisesas may be approved in writing by executive;
3. to participate in the management, control and operation and operation ofany enterprise in which the authority has a financial interest;
4. to provide goods and services to the people of the province byestablishing and carrying on any enterprise within the provision;
5. to initiate, invite and induce investments and to seek and accept grants,donations, appropriations and any other form of assistance, financial or
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otherwise, from any source;
6. to make such grants and loans, provide such guarantees and secure suchother credit facilities on such conditions as may be approved by executiveto persons carrying on any enterprise in which the Authority has afinancial interest;
7. to undertake studies, surveys, investigations and research into any matteraffecting any enterprise within the province and to provide training,education and consulting services to persons engaged in such enterprises;
8. to carry on such other functions as are conferred on the Authority underthe Ordinance on any other law (Guadalcanal Province 1988a, 2).
As the financial arm of the province, GDA looks after the provincial
investments and financial dealings. If Guadalcanal province has investments,
GDA would be responsible for those investments once all decisions are finalised
by the Guadalcanal provincial executive. Being a commercial arm of the
province, one would expect financial grants to be allocated to GDA by the
provincial government. This is not the case since no grant is given by the
province, At the same time, GDA lacks the properly trained and qualified
manpower to manage and implement its operations, For example, the past two
terms (1988 to 1993) of GDA's operation ran without accountants so the general
manager himself undertook the tasks of the accountants. Therefore all GDA
financial reports have never been audited.
According to Richard Pauku, the General Manager, GDA's task as the
financial supporter of the province is an illusion. GDA did not have the money to
support the province and was not making enough money since its inception to do
so, Nevertheless, GDA is capable of giving advice to the provincial assembly on
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commercial and financial matters because of its experience in negotiations for
investment and trade since 1988. This is seen as a possible contribution that
GDA could offer if it cannot financially support the province.
5.2.5 Limits to GDA's Performance
One limit to GDA's performance is its organisational structure. At the top,
there is the provincial executive that regulates policies and gives directions.
Below the executive, you have the board of directors. The membership of the
board is as follows: five voting members, each from one of the four major area
councils of the province (map 3) and one at-large member; three ex-officio
members as follows: 1) the provincial secretary or other officer nominated by
him, 2) the general manager, and 3) the premier or other executive member
nominated by him. Note that two of the ex-officio members are the premier and
the provincial secretary (Guadalcanal Province 1988b). They are both from the
provincial executive. At the same time, the general manager is answerable to the
board and liaises with the executive.
All decisions of GDA are therefore controlled and influenced by the
politicians of the provincial assembly, GDA as a separate legal entity is actually
an illusion since all decisions are controlled by the provincial executive, given
their number in the membership at the board and their policies and directives
given to GDA. Both GDA officials and the Guadalcanal provincial executive
admitted that there exists an unhealthy relationship between the executive and the
management of GDA.
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Apart from the politicians' influence on GDA's dealings, there are other
financial problems. GDA obtains its revenue from two basic sources. One is the
Doma provincial plantation which has cocoa and coconuts on west Guadalcanal
(map 3) and the other is a commercial property (Chinatown plaza) in Honiara.
GDA does not receive grants from the province to assist in its operation. This
does not necessarily mean that the province has deliberately ignored GDA but is
perhaps because the province does not have sufficient cash reserves. At the same
time GDA has cash flow problems due to a lack of proper management. The
problem is that GDA seems to have difficulty in identifying and strengthening
income or revenue. The lack of working capital has contributed to this difficulty.
The central government does not provide financial and / or technical assistance to
GDA.
More importantly, GDA is understaffed. This may be attributed to the lack
of money to employ qualified staff or may be because it could not attract
qualified personnel. It lacks adequately qualified people to man key posts in the
organisation. In fact only the general manager has a tertiary qualification in the
organisation. According to the general manager of GDA, in order to carry out the
job properly and effectively, the organisation needs the right number of staff with
the right qualifications.
5.2.6 GDA's Future Plans
Despite these short comings, GDA as the financial arm of Guadalcanal
province is looking at further developments. One of GDA's future plans is to
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develop Doma into a tourist resort. This has the central government's backing.
The only stumbling block at the moment is the lack of qualified staff. There is
also the question of how to attract tourists from around the world. Nevertheless,
it is a project GDA and the Guadalcanal province are directly involved in,
The manufacturing and processing of secondary products has also been
mooted and opportunities exist given the location of the province and its
proximity to local and international routes, and infrastructure. Nevertheless, there
remains a lack of qualified staff and capital to get the projects started. In order to
venture into manufacturing and processing, GDA must rehabilitate the existing
main revenue sources (copra, cocoa, and the rented building) and make them
profitable before venturing further afield.
5.3 ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITIES
From the performance of the two development authorities studied, it is
obvious that the efforts of development authorities are entangled in the politics of
the province, Provincial politicians have significantly influenced the activities of
development authorities. Looking at development efforts of Makira Ulawa
province, provincial politicians actually assumed the work that was supposed to
be the prerogative of MEDA. GDA, with its board of directors' membership,
pointed to the same problem.
In order to address problems that have hindered the success of
development authorities, one important step would be to have 'politics free'
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development authorities. Ordinances that establish development authorities could
be made in such a way that authorities are free from politics, Politicians would
not be directly involved with the running of development authorities, they would
issue clear directives saying that the management of development authorities
should be left to the development authorities' management alone. More
importantly, the board of directors would include people with adequate
qualifications and the right type of experiences. Other provincial experiences
have shown that this is vital to the success of development authorities that
politicians leave them to professional management19.
Although development authorities do not deal directly with the
development of rural areas, they have a lot to offer to rural development. One of
the development authorities functions is to help rural people undertake business
activities. For example, if rural farmers want to export cocoa or fish but do not
have a licence to do so, they can export through these development authorities.
This is one way which development authorities can assist rural people,
19 A few examples of development authorities that were runprofessionally were the Malaita Development Corporation andthe Western Province's Development Authority. These twoprovinces have success stories in their shipping sectorbecause the management is left to professionals. Although theystill cannot satisfy the shipping needs of their respectiveprovinces, they are answering the shipping needs of theirprovincial population. Both provinces now have two vesselseach serving their provinces and giving competition in theshipping sector. The Western Province now own the WesternQueen and the Western Express while Malaita province ownsRamos 1 and 2.
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5.4 THE PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT BUDGETS
Another way of looking at the role of the provincial government system in
development is to look at provincial development budgets. Development budgets
of the various provincial governments come from, both grants from the
government and revenue raised internally by the province. Financial assistance
that comes from the central government covers a bulk of the money used in the
development of the provinces and these grants are paid to the provinces on a
quarterly basis. The central government passes its annual budget, and then the
provincial governments present their estimates to the government for approval.
When grants come in from the central government, they normally go into
the recurrent expenditure under an account, normally called a general account,
before it is disbursed to the various provincial ministries and departments. The
amounts to the various departments appear in the provincial budgets. Most of
these funds are used for the continuation of programs and projects that are
carried out year after year. For provincial development activities, the provinces
try to get assistance external to the annual grants, Sometimes they had to resort
to asking the central government for extra financial assistance. Since the
government has an allocation for this under the Provincial Development Unit, the
provinces normally resort to that rather than getting money from the recurrent
expenditure.
What the provinces do with the grants given by the central government is
not the central government's concern. The provincial assemblies themselves make
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their guidelines through the provincial budgets that show how much would be
spent on certain areas. Previously, provinces were given what was known as
'labelled grants'. That is, grants were given for a specific purpose. For example,
there were grants such as school grants, road maintenance grants, or general
grants given to the provinces. However, since the National Coalition Partner
(NCP) government came into power, all tied or labelled grants were cancelled.
What they have now is a grant given as a package and the respective provinces
use it according to their own budgets. Therefore, where the money is spent is at
the discretion of the provincial governments. The following tables summarise
provincial budgets of Makira Ulawa and Guadalcanal provinces for the years
1994 to 1995 to illustrate the revenue sources and expenditures of these two
provincial governments.
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provincial assembly members, and provincial secretaries of the two provinces
studied, there was common agreement that the assistance given by the central
government was insufficient. They felt that insufficient money given to carry out
the devolved functions under the Provincial Government Act prevented the
proper provision of services. The central government hoped that the provinces
would raise their internal revenue to supplement the annual grants. However,
raising funds in the provinces has not been very successful as can be seen in the
case of development authorities. These two provinces claimed that they could
only raise funds through business licences, basic rates and some fees which they
have legal competence over and these are paid once a year. Apart from that, they
have no other sources of revenue. At the same time, the geographical conditions
of the islands themselves made the collection of such fees extremely difficult. On
Guadalcanal province some of the fees that are below $500 have been devolved
to area councils to collect for their budgets.
Central government's commitment to, and the development of, the
provincial government system also depends very much on the motives and
policies of the government of the day in both its statements and actions. So far,
no single government since independence in 1978 has come out clearly
committed to the provincial governments. There were verbal supports on the part
of the central government but there was no actual support.The national budget
speaks for itself. Most of the money in the national budget is channelled back to
the central government and a small percentage of the money is given to the
provinces where most of the people are living.
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The Guadalcanal Provincial executive, during an interview with the author
in September 1994, claimed that the central government was not really committed
to the provincial government system because it would not release funds. They
claimed that Guadalcanal province contributed approximately seventy million
Solomon Island dollars to the national economy, through primary resources such
as palm oil, timber, minerals, copra and cocoa produced within the province but
only one million dollars was returned to the province. They also cited the 1994
provincial budget of S3 million out of which the central government only gave
$1,994,300.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the central government may have
wanted to commit more funds but is torn between the needs of a province and
the welfare of the whole country. Both provinces investigated felt that the annual
grants from the central government should be increased. But there is the question
of whether the government has the money to make an increase. Any increase
would also require the provincial governments to use the funds for provincial
investments and development. As discussed earlier, there are indications that
provincial governments the provincial governments are not using funds
effectively.
5.5 THE BUDGET ALLOCATION AND DEVELOPMENT
It is clear from the budgets that funds are used for recurrent expenses
rather than development initiatives. Capital expenses cover only a minor portion
of the development budgets. For instance, Guadalcanal provincial estimates
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provided $426,850.00 and Makira Ulawa province reserved only $229,510.00 for
their development projects. This means that very little is given to various
development projects, either on-going or newly established, If items like capital
purchases are subtracted, such as the purchase of trucks and canoes, the amount
for development projects is even lower.
The provincial government system itself is actually an employment
agency. It is a large bureaucracy that directly employs many people. The
provincial governments are thus responsible for the wages and salaries of their
employees. Almost half of the total expenses of the two provincial governments
studied are spent on the salaries, wages, entertainment and overtime allowances
of the provincial members and workers. For example, out of the total $3,991,906
expenditures of Guadalcanal province, at least $1,473,436 is spent on salaries,
wages and overtime allowances in 1994. That is about 37% of all expenses.
Similarly, $671,419.00 out of the total $2,079,353,00 expenses of Makira Ulawa
province is spent on salaries and wages of the provincial workers in 1994. This is
also about 32% of all provincial expenses. This appears contrary to the rationale
for decentralisation which emphasises development, in the sense of making
available funds to develop rural areas and the provinces. In fact, a large portion
of money in the provincial budgets is spent on less productive expenses such as
that of salaries,' allowances and entertainment of the ministers. If the
decentralised provincial government system in the Solomon Islands has achieved
anything in the development of the country, it is the development of the
provincial bureaucracy with job opportunities.
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The provincial government system from this analysis does not generate
money nor does it direct available resources to development efforts. The author
observed during the period of research that most officers in these two provincial
headquarters (both direct employees and seconded staff) did not have the
commitment to work. In the Makira Ulawa province headquarters, provincial
employees spent most of the official working hours telling stories outside their
offices and chewing betelnut20. The same is true for those in the Guadalcanal
provincial headquarters. Guadalcanal provincial workers also have the advantage
of being located in Honiara so it is not uncommon to see them arriving late to
work and leaving early for lunch. Sometimes, lunches are treated as the end of a
official working day. A commitment to work appears absent in most respects.
The common explanation given for this behaviour is the excuse that everybody
else is doing it.
5.6 PROVINCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUNDS AND DEVELOPMENT
ACTIVITIES
The decentralised system of government in the Solomon Islands made
available certain funds to assist development in rural areas as part of its rural
development effort, Three of these development funds: the Provincial
Development Unit (PDU), the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), and the
Small Islands Communities Projects Scheme (SICOPSA) were identified in
Chapter 4 which discussed their objectives and proposed goals, Decentralisation
20 Betelnut is a fruit chewed by Solomon Islanders as aform of drug and is an important component of both formal andinformal meetings. It is normally chewed with calciumcarbonate and a particular type of leaf. This combinationproduces a red liquid that leaves the teeth black for ages.
133
aims to facilitate development from below, that caters for the needs of people at
the grassroots level. The establishment of such funds was an attempt by the
Solomon Islands provincial government system to foster development from
below.
At the time interviews were carried out, the SICOPSA grant had been
abolished by the NCP government in an attempt to cut government costs and
because of mismanagement. When the SINURP government came into power in
1994 after a constitutional battle with the NCP government, SICOPSA was re-
instated. Previously, the SICOPSA fund was paid out into the area councils
accounts and the area councils approved and paid out money to whoever they
recommended. Under the new system, the Ministry of Provincial Governments
and Rural Development will pay successful applicants with materials rather than
cash. This was a move to tighten the governments reins on management and
administration of SICOPSA since it now pays the grants through the ministry
rather than through the provincial governments (Solomon Star April 26,1995).
Two funds that are still functioning in the country, PDU and CDF, are discussed
below.
5.6.1 The Constituency Development Fund (CDF).
The Constituency Development Fund (CDF) is a type of fund given to all
members of parliament for the development of their own constituencies, The
Ministry of Provincial Governments approves the fund but has no control over it.
Under this fund, Members of Parliament (MPs) receive $200,000.00 per annum.
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CDF is not aid money but rather money from the central government's 'money
bag' paid under the ministry of provincial governments. As such it has no strings
attached.
Individual MPs appoint their own committee members and fund projects
which the committee has approved. The government bureaucracy tries to keep out
of the administration of CDF, Individual MPs established committees which
screen projects and even have application forms which require the applicant to
pay a certain amount of money and to attach other items such a proformas as in
the North East Guadalcanal constituency application form (Appendix 4).
Given the central government's position towards the CDF, individual MPs
have total control over the administration of this fund. Therefore, decisions about
projects are left entirely to the individual MP's discretion. This is not to deny
that the concept and the ideas behind the establishment of CDF were genuine. As
discussed earlier, CDF aimed to assist the rural population in financing their
development projects, The types of projects funded by CDF can either be 'service
projects' such as schools and hospitals, or 'income generating1 projects funded on
community or family basis. In the two provinces studied, the author did not come
across a single CDF service project but only income generating projects such as
chainsaw projects and transportation.
The Guadalcanal province executive, the Makira Ulawa provincial premier
and secretary, and most other informants agreed that most CDF money in these
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two provinces is spent on income generating projects, such as trade stores, canoes
and outboard motor engines, and setting up petrol buying points21, These
projects do not actually develop the areas because they are 'dead income earning
projects'. Such income generating projects do not create jobs or benefit many
people and do not have the potential to grow. They benefit only a few
individuals.
Instead of being a financial source for development activities, CDF has
become a kind of campaign fund to secure votes for future elections. It was
evident from the responses of the interviewees that individual MPs had to satisfy
any commitments they made to their voters. The CDF is potentially a good
source of development funding but it has never been put to proper use. As the
premier of Makira Ulawa province put it, 'It (CDF) is there for the asking',
CDF could be improved. First of all, it would be more beneficial for the
constituencies if the money is spent on service projects such as building of
classrooms, hospitals, water supplies, maintenance of roads and bridges and so
forth, instead of income generating community or family projects. Service
projects benefit communities rather than a minority of the constituencies'
population. If income generating projects are to be funded, then it should be
21 These claims could not be substantiated. This isbecause no proper records were kept by the central governmentexcept that the 47 members of parliament are entitled toSI$200,000. per annum. How the money is used is the businessof individual members of parliament. Furthermore, the centralgovernment does not require the MPs to keep records.Therefore, statistics could not be presented to support suchclaims.
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noted that community living that existed in the Solomon Islands is rapidly
changing. CDF could be better utilised if individuals are given the money rather
than a community or family. A person would rather go and do his or her own
activity instead of working for community projects. Individuals could better
utilise the CDF if they have access to it, More importantly, CDF should be used
for development rather than buying votes and of course, there should be some
kind of control by the government over CDF instead of leaving it entirely to the
MPs. In its 1994 report, the Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI 1995, 46)
pointed out that the result of disbursement of the $200,000 received by each MP
to develop rural areas was disappointing. This raises questions about the
accountability of the politicians and the role of CDF in rural development. If
CDF was set up for rural development, implementation and funding of projects
should be done after proper evaluation and monitoring of development needs and
problems to ensure that the rural masses actually benefit.
5.6.2 The Provincial Development Unit and Development
The policy objectives and structures of the Provincial Development Unit
(PDU) were outlined in Chapter 4. PDU was set up under the Ministry of
Provincial Government and Rural Development by the central government to
disburse bilateral aid assistance to rural areas. The aim of PDU was to assist the
development of rural areas and provinces financially with aid money. Therefore,
the benefactors of PDU are supposed to be those in the rural areas.
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It should be pointed out that since PDU deals with foreign aid, the
Solomon Islands government has very little or no say over the policies of the
unit. PDU draws up its policies in line with the donors' policies and expectations.
Of course, donors work closely with the central government but the donors
themselves set out guidelines on how their funds are to be used. In this respect,
donors control PDU's operations and the level of funding depends very much on
the success of PDU funded projects.
PDU also assists provincial governments in their bigger projects such as
health and education projects. In their development plans, the provincial
governments identify projects for the PDU to fund. PDU officers appraise and
approve such provincial capital projects. It should be pointed out that compared
to rural income generating projects, provincial capital projects comprise a very
small portion of PDU fund. For instance, in 1990 income generating projects
were allocated 78% compared to only 22% on social and administrative
infrastructure, 86% to 14 % in 1991, and 81% to 19% in 1992 (PDU 1993, 4).
The author has focused on rural income generating projects since those were the
only projects that have some kind of records and feedback from the province.
Tables 9 and 10 illustrate the number and value of projects by sector, and
distribution of projects by province and their corresponding value respectively for
1992.
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The concept that established PDU and the projects is noble. However, in
most cases, the recipients misused funds, materials and equipment obtained from
PDU. According to the PDU officer responsible for Makira Ulawa projects,
individuals use the name of a community to obtain funds and materials but the
community did not benefit from the project. This may be attributed to the rapidly
changing nature of communal living in the Solomon Islands. People now tend to
prefer working for their individual needs rather than for the needs of the
community. In this respect, the Makira Ulawa provincial premier referred to PDU
projects as 'a big pain in the back'. This is because many rural people wanted
this financial assistance which many did receive. However, after a while, many
liquidate the investment. Since PDU funds are given as grants, they take the
projects for granted because they see it as a free hand-out. Compared to those
with commercial loans, PDU project holders do not work really hard because
there is no pressure for repayments.
The PDU office acknowledged that in the previous years, about 80% of
all PDU projects failed. This is due to several reasons. In most cases, rural
people lacked the management skills needed to run PDU funded projects. For
example, when people get fishing projects (outboard motor engines and canoes),
they do not use the equipment for the said use (fishing). Thus, there is no money
for maintenance because they were not making money from the project. This
according to the PDU director explained why Australia and Canada pulled out
from funding income-generating projects and are now concentrating on
infrastructure projects and the consequential reduction of their financial
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contribution to the PDU funds22.
Part of the reason for failure Lies with the PDU provincial committees.
What those in the provinces recommend is taken up to the PDU committee and
the donors, Thus, the chances of project failure is high if recommendations are
not sound.
PDU officers at the central government ministry are also part of the
problem. Both the 1991 and 1993 progress reports of PDU projects on Makira
Ulawa province identified this as a problem. Those at the PDU head office
tended to trim the number of items or requirements as requested by the applicant
communities. This led to non-completion of projects during implementation stage.
Furthermore, the PDU head office tended to ignore the priority list sent to them
for further appraisal, If the provincial screening committee has approved the
priority list, those at headquarters should see the list as genuine since the
provincial committee understands the applicant community and project sites well.
Therefore, failures could be minimised if PDU headquarter officers take action
on the advice or information provided by the provincial screening committee and
provincial PDU officers.
Two key obstacles that hindered the contribution of PDU to development
were lack of manpower and finance. The central government has inadequate
22 This explanation was given by the Director of PDU,Ethel Sigimanu and her Deputy, Brown Baraisi during aninterview with the author on 29 July 1994.
141
money to monitor PDU projects in the provinces. Since monitoring funds are
paid into the provincial grants, it is used for other purposes in the provinces,
meaning that some provinces do not have these monitoring funds. At the same
time, the demand for money in the Solomon Islands may be six or seven times
more than the money available from the donors. The highest amount PDU
received from the donors in the past was $3.9 million in 1990 while the value of
projects received was $12 million. At the time of the research, only about $1,3
million was available from donors. This is a big problem because PDU cannot
fund what the rural dwellers have asked for. Since the Solomon Islands
Government (SIG) does not give money to PDU but relies entirely on donors, the
donors control the type of development taking place in the country, For instance,
if the donors do not want to fund income-generating projects PDU has no choice
but to follow the donors' policies. According to the director and deputy director
of PDU, tied aid is prominent in PDU because donors dictate where the money is
to be spent.
There is also a problem of manpower and skills. Compared with the
number of applications coming from the nine provinces, the PDU staff suffered
from a manpower shortage. In some provinces like Guadalcanal, at the time of
the research, there were no planning officers, responsible for monitoring and
evaluating PDU projects in that province. Other provinces have planning officers
who are the wrong type of people, meaning that they were trained and qualified
in other areas. At the time of the research, there were only three officers for nine
provinces. PDU would be better served with an officer for each of the three big
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provinces of Malaita, Guadalcanal and the Western province.
Apart from these factors, the PDU Director and her Deputy blamed the
failures partly on the absence or lack of supporting infrastructure. For example,
the market to sell the produce from the various projects is lacking and even the
infrastructure linking the projects to the market is inadequate. Given the poor
supporting infrastructure, projects fail because they cannot make money or
survive and sustain themselves. For example, the PDU fishing projects of Makira
Ulawa province (Map 4) failed because they had a very small local market and
the shipping service to Honiara, which has the biggest fish market in the country,
was not efficient.
There is the fundamental problem of poor relations between the central
government and provincial governments. For instance, provincial governments
tend to ignore the monitoring part of the project, treating that as PDU's task. But
this function is supposed to be carried out by the provincial governments. It is
clear that provincial governments are more concerned with their bigger projects
like education and health, while other projects in the rural areas are not taken
seriously. Since there is no proper feedback from the provincial governments,
PDU staff at the headquarters are not informed about these problems and
weaknesses.
From the above discussion, it can be argued that the PDU's efforts to
assist in the development of rural areas have not achieved their aims. This is due
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to the failure of recipients to effectively utilise the resources given to them and
the lack of management skills to profitably operate such undertakings.
Furthermore, the amount of money needed by those in the rural areas for
development is insufficient and is determined by the policies of the aid donors
and not the Solomon Islands Government. Coupled with the lack of qualified
staff, which resulted in the absence of proper monitoring and evaluation, PDU
became another case where money was wasted. Nevertheless, it has great
potential if the monitoring aspects, financial support, proper staffing, and
improved central government and provincial government relationships are
achieved. The PDU and the aims establishing it are sound. If the identified
weaknesses are addressed, PDU would be a very useful force behind rural
development efforts in the Solomon Islands.
5.7 CONCLUSION
The above analysis, highlighted major problems in the way the provincial
government system facilitates development especially the delivery of goods and
services to the rural people. These problems of decentralisation may be attributed
to poor provincial planning and evaluation, the high cost of maintaining the
organisational structure, the inability of provincial development authorities to
supplement provincial budgets, and the failure of rural development funds and
projects to involve the rural population in development initiatives.
This leads to the question of popular participation in decision making. To
what extent does lack of popular participation and accountability explain the
144
problems of development identified and discussed in this chapter? The next
chapter examines this question and the related issues of national unity, democracy
and equality.
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CHAPTER 6
DECENTRALISATION, PROVINCIAL DECISION MAKING ANDPOPULAR PARTICIPATION IN DEVELOPMENT
INTRODUCTION
A fundamental rationale for decentralisation and the provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands is that the system would facilitate
grassroots participation in the decision making process of development. The
importance of grassroots participation is based on the premise that for meaningful
development to take place, the voice of those living with the natural resources
must be taken into account. Government policy would be more responsive to the
needs of the people if it is closer to the people, either through the area councils
or the provincial governments, The decentralised system would help planners to
identify different conditions and groups within the country and would
accommodate such differences in national development plans. This would in turn
cater for equal development and may hopefully avoid instability brought about by
inequality. Equality in this sense means that people are accorded the same kind
of treatment in terms of access to resources and services, and in terms of their
input into activities and decisions implemented by either the central government
or the provincial governments.
Decentralisation is also seen as a form of decolonisation where through
devolution of power to the provincial governments, citizens would feel part of
the government, and participate in it, instead of viewing it as something alien. In
addition, the provincial government system would recognise and grant some kind
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of autonomy to the provinces and this is expected to avoid potential conflicts and
tensions emanating from various and distinct groups within the country. National
unity would be facilitated.
Finally, decentralisation is regarded as democratic since it recognises and
gives power to the masses. Participation by a majority of citizens in making
decisions for development programs in the country is taken to mean that
democracy is being upheld. Democracy in this sense is associated with popular
participation in decision making.
This chapter analyses decision making within the provincial government
system in the Solomon Islands and assesses the extent to which popular
participation is facilitated. The discussion considers associated issues of unity,
decolonisation and democracy. It examines how well the decentralised
government structure utilises information from the provinces and the rural areas
in making decisions and whether the people's views are taken into account in
decision making.
This chapter looks first at the issues and problems of decision making at
the provincial and central government levels. Later sections of the chapter discuss
the problems and impact of popular participation in rural development funds and
projects.
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6.1 DECENTRALISATION AND DECISION MAKING
Decentralisation aims to bring the decision making bodies, the area
councils and provincial assemblies, closer to the people. This aim was based on
the argument that arose during the colonial era that the effectiveness of
development efforts, if administered directly from Honiara (the Capital), would
be undermined given the diverse nature of cultures, ethnicity, languages and
geographical characteristics. Recalling the colonial experience, Premdas et al
(1984, 46) commented, "separated by parcels of island territory, truncated by
language diversity, and residing in thousands of communities, Solomon Islanders
presented a formidable challenge to colonisers".
Decentralisation, through the establishment of various provinces, is seen
by the Solomon Islands government to foster political unity and stability. Political
unity and stability are the pre-requisites for participation because only if the
country is united and is stable that people can actually freely participate. This
means that people would participate in decision making processes that affect their
lives, However, according to Rohini Goonewardene, the legal adviser of the
Ministry of Provincial Governments, participation in Solomon Islands
decentralised system of government, actually means that people elect their
representatives into the area councils, provincial governments or the central
government and these representatives govern on behalf of the people. The
provincial government members make decisions on behalf of the people they
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represent instead of people directly participating23.
This argument differs from that given by those championing
decentralisation on the grounds that it would result in a participatory society
where people directly participate in the final decisions (Hart 1972; Werlin 1992).
The extent to which the decentralised system in the Solomon Islands promotes
popular participation in decision making either directly or indirectly is assessed
below.
6.1.1 Informal Decision Making Groups
In the two provincial governments studied, it was suggested that decision
making was not carried out by the provincial executive but rather by informal
'core groups' within provincial executives or by individuals. The core groups
make the decisions which are then brought to the executive for its 'blessing'. A
former Lands Minister of Makira Ulawa province claimed that executive
decisions on areas like investments, are not based on written material on the
nature of the investment or potential benefits and side-effects of the undertaking.
Such important matters are addressed verbally and only then does the secretary to
the executives take the minutes, Therefore, decisions are not adequately
scrutinised because of a lack of background information on the decision to be
made, Tentative decisions made by core groups and individuals, as discussed
23 This is an explanation given by the Legal Adviser ofthe Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development,Rohini Goonewardene, during an interview with the author inJuly 1994.
149
below, almost always became the accepted decisions.
Although Guadalcanal province may have a core group within the
executive as hinted by interviewees, there are no clear examples to back the
claim. The Makira Ulawa province case represented an example of a core group
within the executive making important decisions on behalf of the executive.
In Makira Ulawa province at the time of this research, it was claimed that
only three to four people in the provincial executive made important decisions.
The executive includes the premier and all the provincial ministers as explained
in Chapter 1 (figure 2). But the key decision makers were the provincial premier,
his deputy, the speaker, and a senior minister''. It is possible that the other
executive members did not have much influence on decisions because of
inadequate education or traditional respect. Most of the executive members in the
province are either primary school or secondary school leavers. Therefore, their
ability to critically analyse decisions is quite weak. More importantly, there is the
factor of traditional respect which hindered the ability of provincial members to
criticise those at the helm. The premier and his core group have been in their
positions for so long that other members feel incapable of challenging their
decisions. When occasionally someone comes up with criticisms, everybody sees
24 This claim was made by a number of people in theprovincial headquarters who were interviewed. They includeDickson Aghosi, a provincial MP, Hunter Masuguria, theprovincial planning officer, and Rolland Titiulu, theprovincial shipping manager. The provincial secretary alsohinted at this when referring to why there were no developmentplans written as discussed in Chapter 5.
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below, almost always became the accepted decisions.
Although Guadalcanal province may have a core group within the
executive as hinted by interviewees, there are no clear examples to back the
claim. The Makira Ulawa province case represented an example of a core group
within the executive making important decisions on behalf of the executive.
In Makira Ulawa province at the time of this research, it was claimed that
only three to four people in the provincial executive made important decisions.
The executive includes the premier and all the provincial ministers as explained
in Chapter 1 (figure 2). But the key decision makers were the provincial premier,
his deputy, the speaker, and a senior minister24. It is possible that the other
executive members did not have much influence on decisions because of
inadequate education or traditional respect. Most of the executive members in the
province are either primary school or secondary school leavers. Therefore, their
ability to critically analyse decisions is quite weak. More importantly, there is the
factor of traditional respect which hindered the ability of provincial members to
criticise those at the helm. The premier and his core group have been in their
positions for so long that other members feel incapable of challenging their
decisions. When occasionally someone comes up with criticisms, everybody sees
24 This claim was made by a number of people in theprovincial headquarters who were interviewed. They includeDickson Aghosi, a provincial MP, Hunter Masuguria, theprovincial planning officer, and Rolland Titiulu, theprovincial shipping manager. The provincial secretary alsohinted at this when referring to why there were no developmentplans written as discussed in Chapter 5.
150
him as a threat to the interest of the province. The decisions of the core group
are therefore very much respected but tend to deprive the province of more
accurate information.
Two examples25 are discussed here to illustrate the types of decisions
made by the core group without proper consultation with the provincial executive
and assembly, One is the decision to purchase a piece of land on Guadalcanal
(see Okea: map 3) belonging to a former national government MP, Philip Kapini,
Makira Ulawa province bought this land for SIS 150,000.00. The executive does
not have any idea how the money was paid out because it did not go through the
province for approval. The transaction was only done between Kapini and the
premiers' core group, After the money was paid out in 1992, a few problems
emerged. First, the land lay idle with no development efforts put into it. Second,
it was later discovered that the land purchased by the Makira Ulawa province
was jointly owned by Kapini and some other people, including Sir Peter
Kenilorea, a former prime minister. As a result, after valuation work was carried
out on the Okea land in 1994, it was divided between Kapini and Kenilorea. The
land bought by the Makira province was thus reduced, although the money paid
remained the same. To date, nothing has been done to the land.
25 The figures and names in these two examples were given by DicksonAghosi, a former provincial Lands minister, who was forced to resign after amotion of no confidence he moved against the Ramoni government in 1994. Thefigures were nevertheless cross checked with those given by the premier and theprovincial secretary to ensure consistency.
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Another case decided by the informal decision making group of the
province was a house belonging to a Chinese national by the name of Robert
Leong who was deported from the country due to his political involvement.
Makira Ulawa province bought his Honiara residence for SI$210,000.00. The
first payment was SI$110,000.00, and after Robert Leong received the cash, he
left the country and the last place he was known to be residing was in Canada.
The Makira Ulawa province paid the remaining SI$100,00.00 into his account in
1994. However, Makira Ulawa province found out that same year that the
ownership of the house is in the hands of his brother. Besides that, the house was
mortgaged with the National Bank of Solomon Islands. Up till now, the province
got nothing from that house because it is now owned by Leong's brother.
Similarly, the province also bought a house from its owners in Kira Kira in 1992
for SI$120,000.00. At the time of the payment, the house was incomplete, and
during the period of this research, the house remained as it was. Given the fact
that grants from the central government have no guidelines, the provincial
governments are free to use these funds according to their needs. Although these
examples may be seen as exceptions, they illustrate the way provincial
governments spend their funds on assets that do not benefit the lives of rural
people in the province.
The above examples also demonstrate the way informal groups in the
provincial government system may be very influential in provincial government
decision making. Such groups work against the interests of "efficiency" which is
one goal of decentralisation. Wasteful use of the most needed provincial funds
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could be reduced, or at least acknowledged by people in the province, if the
decision making procedures of the provincial governments through executive and
provincial assembly structures are followed. The examples demonstrated the
provincial governments' neglect of the decision making structures and
mechanisms in the Solomon Islands decentralised government system.
6.1.2 Area Councils in Decision Making
Apart from provincial executives, area councils also have a mandate to
make decisions on behalf of the people for development of their own localities.
But the area councils in the two provinces studied actually contribute very little
to rural development. The administration of the Constituency Development Fund
and the Provincial Development Unit falls under the responsibility of the area
councils (as explained in Chapter 5) yet the area councils have yet to be
consulted. Their existence in the country's decentralised system is hardly noticed.
Perhaps part of the reason that led to the central government and provincial
governments ignoring area councils is because of the illiteracy or at least very
low educational background of area council members. Most area council
members are either junior secondary school leavers or primary school leavers.
For example, of the members of the Bolomona Area Council of Guadalcanal
(Map 3), none has received education up to or beyond form five level. This was
a claim agreed to- by the Guadalcanal Provincial members from the Bolomona
region, and the same was true for other area councils of Guadalcanal. Highly
educated people were not attracted to the jobs because of rural locality and the
low level of wages offered.
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It is also apparent that the executives and members of provincial
governments were envious and suspicious of the area councils' tasks and
responsibilities, For instance, the Guadalcanal provincial executive felt that the
area councils should be abolished because they do not know what they are doing
and that they duplicate the functions of the provincial governments26. It is
interesting to note that the provincial executive, which is supposed to give
guidelines and directives to the area councils, claims that area councils duplicate
their tasks. This could either mean that the provincial executives resent the
existence of area councils or they are envious of the power that area councils
may have over rural people.
This difficult relationship between the area councils and provincial
governments was evident in 1992, when most Small Island Communities Project
Scheme (SICOPSA) grants paid to provincial governments for the area councils
were not received by the area councils for unknown reasons (Solomon Star, 24
March 1995, 15). SICOPSA grants that were rightfully the area council's funds
for their tasks were never released by many provincial governments with no
reasons given.
It is important to note that the area councils are not very
respected at the village level because of the existence of important bodies like
church organisations, sports organisations, school committees, and village leaders
26 This view was expressed by members of the Guadalcanal provincialexecutive during a group interview with the author on 9 September, 1994.
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that have more force and say in the activities and development of the rural areas,
especially in village politics. The Polynesian Rennell and Bellona province is a
special case. Since it has a very strong chiefly system, chiefs have filled the new
roles of carrying out area council tasks, in place of area council members. There
have been strong recommendations from the premier of the province, Mr Jasper
Angelon Nasiu, that chiefs should take over the roles of area councils. As a
result, the Rennell and Bellona executive in 1993 decided to abolish the area
councils since ward representation in the assembly of 10 members was sufficient,
given the smallness of the province (Solomon Voice, 17 February 1995, 2). In
other words, with the area councils, the tiny province would be over-governed.
Why the action of this particular province was not legally challenged is another
matter but the fact is that Rennell and Bellona abolished the area councils and
installed chiefs in their place.
The problem with the area council system is that there are no clear
directives from the Provincial Government Act of 1981 or the provincial
government executives as to what they are supposed to do. As a consequence,
area council members are elected on a fixed term basis and remain in their
offices, doing very little or nothing at all, despite earning a salary, until the next
elections. The provincial executives and provincial members realised that the area
councils did not actually have anything to do and were not helping out in the
development of rural areas, Even Constituency Development Fund (CDF)
committees of various central government Members of Parliament (MPs) do not
recognise the existence of area councils. For example, the North East
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Guadalcanal CDF committee was chaired by the member of parliament for that
constituency and the committee members, whether deliberately or not, excluded
area council members from the committee27. Lack of trust on the part of central
government MPs and provincial government members may explain why new
CDF committees without 'area council member' membership are appointed in the
constituencies. It would be appropriate for a review of the Provincial Government
Act to be undertaken to either improve or abolish the area councils since their
existence appears to be a total waste of funds and they were unable to participate
fully in the development of rural areas.
6.1.3 Technical Advice and Decision Making
In decision making circles, it is often said that expert advice should be
sought in technical or policy areas. Technical advice is quite important in dealing
with complex development issues. The public service and other bodies could
assist provinces in identifying and deploying such experts to the provinces in the
Solomon Islands.
However, it was apparent from the research that most bodies in the
decentralised political system do not have proper technical advisers in their
offices. The provincial development authorities, according to Richard Pauku,
GDA's general manager, lack technical advisers on some of the most important
undertakings they carry out. Part of the reason for their failures could be this
27 This could have changed recently because a new group of area councillorswas elected into this area council early in 1995.
156
factor although there are other contributing factors such as excessive political
interference, lack of financial capital, and the absence of financial assistance from
the provincial governments, as identified and discussed in Chapter 5.
By the same token, the deputy director of PDU, Mr Brown Baraisi
pointed out that even with PDU, which controls bilateral aid and rural
development, there has not been a technical adviser since 1991. In the past, PDU
had technical advice from the Human Resource Development Program (HRDP)
and the United Nations, which he acknowledged was very important assistance.
The HRDP worked closely with the provinces and the central government.
However since the removal of the HRDP from PDU in 1991, no technical adviser
has been posted to PDU and there were no indications that any would be
available soon.
The provincial governments also lacked or ignored expert advice on
important areas such the viability of undertaking joint ventures and shipping
operations. Both provinces stated that expert advice is in Honiara with the central
government ministries and could be made available whenever there is a need28.
Nevertheless, according to the Provincial Secretary of Makira, Benson Ha'amori,
such expert knowledge was rarely utilised when important decisions, such as
those dealing with the viability of logging operations, were made. At the same
time, the posts of advisers like the provincial legal adviser, the environment
28 This was acknowledged by both the provincial secretary of Makira Ulawaand Guadalcanal provinces. The advisers are available and could be used by theprovincial governments whenever they need them.
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adviser or commercial adviser have been vacant in the two provinces for many
years now, This could be blamed on the central government since it is
responsible for the posting of such experts into the provinces. If the central
government believed that the provincial governments were not doing their job,
then it should address this issue.
6.1.4 Changes in Government and Effects on Decision Making
Changing or improving the provincial government system has been an
issue since the enactment of the 1981 Provincial Government Act. Since then,
nothing much has been done to this provincial government system. This is
despite recommendations of the Kausimae committee in 1979, which established
the Provincial Government Act, that a review should be made after five years of
its implementation (Report of the Special Committee on Provincial Government
1979, 95). The only reviews undertaken were the provincial government review
of 1986 and in-house reviews in 1991 and 1992 (see Chapter 3).
One reason for the difficulty in reviewing the system has been the
constant change in government. In 1988, for instance, a review of decentralisation
was undertaken. The review, known as the Government Review White Paper,
aimed at institutionalising the role of traditional chiefs into the provincial
government system (Solomon Nius 22 August 1988, 3). The review, which
involved premiers, came to a halt when the Mamaloni government came to power
in 1989 and insisted on the maintenance of the present system. The Mamaloni led
Alliance government wanted the system to remain the same except that more
158
powers relating to fisheries resources, forestry, mining, foreign investment and
taxation be devolved to the provinces by 1990 {Solomon Nius 6 Feb. 1990, 1).
The Alliance government was toppled again in 1990, and replaced by a
'Government of National Unity', The reviews were again disrupted.
The National Coalition Partner (NCP) government that was in power
during the period of this research was in favour of the involvement of chiefs on
the grounds that chiefs have the ultimate power in the villages over land issues, a
determinant of development29. In the two provinces studied, the NCP
government's idea of institutionalising chiefs was highly criticised. The
executives felt that there was no place for this idea in Solomon Islands politics
because the chiefly system would eventually die out in the country.
This argument is understandable since these two provinces do not have
chiefly systems such as those found in the Rennell/Bellona province or the
29 It should be noted that there was a personality in the NCP Government andalso in the Alliance Government that always pushed for the recognition of therole of chiefs - Andrew Nori. He was the Finance Minister in the Hilly-led NCPGovernment, and the Minister of Provincial Governments and Rural Developmentin the Mamaloni led Alliance Government. He is an MP from the Are Are regionof Malaita, one of the very few places where the chiefly system was recognisedand practiced. It should also be pointed out that under devolved functions (localmatters), the provinces are also responsible for the chiefs' administration.Although the issue of traditional leaders was mentioned in section 114 of thenational constitution, no particular legislation on this matter was made. However,there are provisions in the 1981 Act, schedule 4, section 8, subsection 8, whichgives the provinces the right to legislate another ordinance, the Area CouncilOrdinance. In the case of Guadalcanal province, this ordinance gave the chiefs an'appointed status' member to the area councils. They do not have the voting rightbut they can contribute when discussing matters.
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Tikopians and Anutans of Temotu, or the Southern part of Malaita and Ulawa
Island. Makira Ulawa and Guadalcanal provinces argue that time and money
should only be spent on a structure that will survive in the future, The chiefly
system, they believe, is dying out and in most places, it is non-existent. Further, a
chiefly system means that the chief would remain in power until his death.
Therefore, young people with fresh ideas would be denied the right to use their
knowledge, because they would never be in control.
The NCP government was overthrown in 1994 by a constitutional crisis
challenged in the High Court by the Prime Minister and the Governor General30.
In early October, 1994, the Deputy Prime Minister, a government backbencher,
and four ministers of the NCP Hilly led government resigned and joined the
SINURP opposition, complaining of a power struggle within the NCP camp and
excessive overseas trips made by government ministers (Solomon Star, 5 October
1994, 1). During the same period, the Finance Minister, Andrew Nori also
resigned because of a controversial financial deal he made in early September.
The deal included the transfer of SIS1.185 million from the central government
to an account in Australia. In this transaction, there was a transfer of SI$59,259
from a cheque account into the minister's local bank account with the National
Bank of Solomon Islands (Solomon Star, 12 October 1994, 2). He was forced to
resign and the NCP government was left ruling with a minority.
30 It is interesting to note that in 1981 the same situation happened under theleadership of Sir Peter Kenilorea. He was ruling with a minority governmentbecause of the resignation of his deputy prime minister (the 1994 troubled PM),Francis Billy Hilly. Kenilorea eventually stepped down after consultation with theGovernor General.
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On 13 October, the Governor General announced from his residence that
he had removed the Prime Minister from office because he had lost majority
support of the MPs, a violation of section 33(1) of the constitution (Solomon
Star, 14 October 1994, 1), The Prime Minister rebuffed the order and said that he
was still the legitimate Prime Minister of the country. The constitutional crisis
ended in the High Court for a ruling. The Prime Minister's removal by the
Governor General, was supported by the High Court and a new group, the
Solomon Islands National Unity, Reconciliation and Progressive Pati (S1NURP),
under the leadership of Solomon Mamaloni won office in 1994 after an election.
The NCPs bid to review the provincial government system was abandoned.
Nevertheless, the SINURP government, at present ruling the country, is also
planning to review the provincial government system and the 1981 Act that
established it.
The only bill on provincial governments so far implemented was the 1991
Provincial Government Bill which restricted the number of elected Assembly
members (Solomon Nius 30 July 1991, 5). A more recent bill passed in
parliament calls for the same salary scale for all provincial MPs and ministers
throughout the country. This aims to reduce the amount allocated in the
provincial budget for the salaries of many executive members31. These are the
only changes to the provincial government system since the 1981 Provincial
Government Act,
31 Previously, the provinces in the Solomon Islands set their own salaryscales. Amongst the highest were Guadalcanal and the Western provinces.
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6.2 DECENTRALISATION AND MASS PARTICIPATION INDEVELOPMENT
A new development that attempts to solve the financial difficulties of
provincial governments is the establishment of Development Authorities by each
province. These are the business arms of the provinces and are run as businesses
as explained in the previous chapter. The idea was most likely adopted from
Papua New Guinea. In the Solomon Islands, these development authorities
operate plantations, shipping and even trade relations with other countries like the
one between Guadalcanal and Guandong province of China that recently broke
down. Like Papua New Guinea (May 1986, 5) most of these development
authorities are expensive to operate and are normally unsuccessful undertakings.
The inability of development authorities to raise revenue means that the
provinces would continue to rely on funds from the central government (Solomon
Nius 16 May 1989, 8) unless the authorities are improved.
6.2.1 Development Authorities in Provincial Development
One of the obstacles to the successful operation of development
authorities is the Solomon Islands land tenure system. Development projects
engaged in by the provinces take place on customary land since much of
Solomon Islands is owned by different groups of people. Acquiring a piece of
land from customary owners for the purposes of development is difficult because
of communal ownership of land. This is an obstacle to the improvement of
financial capacities of the various provinces.
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Development authorities also failed as could be seen in the case of the
Guadalcanal Development Authority (GDA) and Makira Economic Development
Authority (MEDA) because they did not encourage local development or
investments. Both GDA and MEDA attempted to build a foundation for
economic development not on local investments but on foreign, especially Asian
investments, For example, investors in Makira Ulawa and Guadalcanal provinces
are mostly Asians such as the Guandong Province of China and Guadalcanal
provinces' joint venture in shipping; Makira Bell's Filipino investments; or the
Malaysian Berjaya investments with these two provincial governments.
Therefore development authorities in these two provinces became nothing more
than bodies in which Asian investments are channelled to the country in the
name of development.
6.2.2 People's Participation in Rural Development Funds
Rural development funds were a move by the central government to allow
for rural participation in development activities. Such funds would enable rural
people to take an active role in developing their own area with financial
assistance from central government and the provinces. In the two provinces
studied, the participation of grassroots people in these funds (CDF, PDU, and
SICOPSA) was restricted. For instance, in 1994, PDU funded 19 projects worth
$300,000 dollars, as opposed to 37 projects worth $1 million dollars in 1993.
Most of the money (85%) went to income-generating projects in agriculture,
fisheries and forestry sectors (CBSI 1995a, 45), The inability of these projects to
develop rural areas, as explained in Chapter 5, and the improper use of such
163
funds, instigated the withdrawal of donors like Australia from the Small
Schemes' funds32,
Rural development funds do not engage rural dwellers to actively
participate in rural development because of the nature of the funds. People
become involved in development efforts that are not developing their localities
(eg. canoes, chainsaws, trade store etc) but fostering dependence and lack of
initiative. As the Makira Ulawa premier commented, people's minds are geared
towards depending more on handouts, instead of being initiators of their own
projects and funds33,
6.2.3 Local Initiatives in Development
Despite the mixed outcomes of government initiatives in rural
development, some local initiatives look promising and may be showing the right
32 The PDU management was not at all pessimistic about the failures of PDU.They saw failure as just the other side of the development coin. The argumentwas that PDU had assisted a lot in terms of the improvement of schools, healthand sanitation, and that not all income generating projects failed. Brown Baraisi,PDU's Deputy Director, referred to an example of a fishing project which PDUfunded in 1991. The group was given a boat, an out-board motor engine, and twoeskies. By 1994, this group managed to obtain another boat with its engine, andan additional two eskies. Therefore, income-generating projects do succeed. ThePDU director, Ethel Sigimanu, also pointed out that at times, projects wereregarded as failures simply because they were using the project equipment givenfor different purposes, instead of the purpose intended in the first place. Forinstance, instead of using PDU funded boats for fishing, they were used to makemoney through the transportation of people. She argued that this should not beseen as a failure but rather a diversion of the assets (interview with the author 29July, 1994).
33 This view is shared by the premier and secretary of Makira Ulawa provinceand the Guadalcanal provincial executive,
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track for development efforts to be pursued in the Solomon Islands. It is
important to note that local initiatives on development could be very successful if
only the provincial governments supported the initiatives undertaken by local
people. Local participation in development has never been encouraged even by
the central government. For instance, the government levies $20,000 license fee
on timber exports. This discourages local participation in this area, and allows the
provincial government with foreign companies to monopolise timber exports. The
types of development that the provincial governments rely are rarely successful
so rural development continues to be a distant dream. Some of the success stories
in the development of the provinces come not from foreign investors, or the
projects funded by PDU, SICOPSA or CDF but the projects designed and
implemented by the locals themselves.
A very good example of a successful local rural development initiative
was the Star Harbour boat building project in Makira Ulawa province. These boat
builders used their skills to build boats that would assist the province in
improving shipping service and their rural economy. The Makira Ulawa
provincial government did not financially assist these builders but offered them
encouragement to look for external funding. The builders looked for money
themselves with the help of the central government. The central government
assisted them financially with $600,000, which included the boat engine and
construction costs (Solomon Star 26 April 1995, 2). This local initiative
succeeded in easing the shipping problems of the province and assisting in the
development of the province through improved transportation.
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Development in this context was quite successful because it was initiated
by people from within the provinces and who actually lived in the villages that
faced difficulties and problems. The need to develop has to come from within
and not be something that external groups like the aid donors, provincial
government or central government planners think is right.
6.3 DECENTRALISATION, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY ANDUNITY
The aim of most decentralised systems, as discussed in Chapter 2, is to
enable people to have a say in issues affecting them and in the general
government of their country. This is the rationale on which the post colonial
provincial government system in the Solomon Islands was based. National unity
was the main concern of the framers of this system. The aim was to encourage
political and economic stability, which would be facilitated by encouraging
people to feel part of the development process; unlike the centralised colonial
bureaucracy that favoured the urban population (Premdas et al 1982, 40).
Decentralisation during the colonial days, in the form of Local Councils, was set
up especially for administration rather than to promote self rule for development.
Decentralisation through the provincial government system strengthened
the identification of people to a particular area. Milner Tozaka, the Permanent
Secretary of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development at
the time of this research, claimed that Solomon Islanders are now identifying
themselves as people from a certain province rather than as people from a certain
district. On national issues, they identify themselves as Solomon Islanders
166
because the provincial government system provides for that national identity34,
Decentralisation provides provincial unity which in turn leads to national unity.
This national identity and national unity is considered a good thing
because it discourages secessionist sentiments. However, certain aspects of the
system need to be considered. It should be noted that there is also the possibility
of the reverse occurring. Devolution of powers to provinces and the grouping of
different groups into administrative entities may encourage different provinces to
attempt to break away from the country, basing their argument on their identity
as people sharing similar characteristics, especially when the central government
is not satisfying their needs and aspirations. An example of this would be the
western breakaway movement or the Bougainville crisis. Another possibility is
the conflict within the province itself when it does not satisfy certain segments of
its population.
The following section assess these arguments with examples from the
other provinces of the Solomon Islands. This would give a more complete picture
of the issue of national unity and popular participation in the country, The last
sections of this chapter, which discusses development authorities, people's
participation in rural development funds, and local rural development initiatives
are based on the two provinces studied.
34 This is a view given by Milner Tozaka, the Permanent Secretary of theMinistry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development in an interview withthe author on 25 July 1994.
167
6.3.1 The Provincial Government System and National Unity
Despite these arguments for the provincial government system and unity
given above, it appears that both national identity and provincial identity are
rarely acknowledged. People continue to identify themselves at district or village
level. National identity only becomes apparent when a person goes out of the
country. When in Honiara, or in other parts of the country, the provincial identity
may become obvious (Saemala 1982; Feignberg 1990). Therefore, the national
identity and unity that was supposed to be brought about by decentralisation is
not always apparent.
Provinces themselves have unity problems, particularly when there are
inefficiencies in services or when people feel that they have not been fairly
treated. Some Islands in the Solomons have attempted to secede from provinces
and some managed to form their own provinces. The motive has always been to
look after one's affairs (through their own province) with the hope that things
would be better that way. For example, some islands like Ulawa talked of having
a separate province from Makira or Sikaiana from Malaita. Differences in the
cultures of these unique groups, amalgamated into one administrative and / or
political body explains these problems within provinces,
Groups like the Kwaio of Malaita and the Tikopians and Anutans from
Temotu have boycotted elections and refused to pay taxes (Feinberg 1990, 24)
because of unfavourable responses from provinces and central government to
their grievances. Problems within provinces may continue to haunt the
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decentralised government in the Solomon Islands just as that between provinces
and the national government. This is not an insignificant problem given the fact
that two provinces were established due to their dissatisfaction with their former
provinces. Rennell and Bellona islands were granted a new province of their own
after years of pressurising the government. They claimed that they were not
properly served by the Central Islands province and that they are Polynesians
with distinct customs and cultures from the Central Islands group. Similar claims
of neglect in terms of the provision of services were made by the new Choiseul
province from the Western province, Nevertheless, it is important to note that
even these new provinces have different groups within them so the move could
be a stepping stone for further demands.
A notable problem with the provincial government system is the tension
between national politics and provincial politics. The first and probably the most
obvious is the problem of national integration. Once people have identified
themselves with a particular province, they start comparing the receipts from and
contribution to the national economy against those of other provinces. The
welfare of the province becomes more important than the welfare of the whole
nation. This may be attributed to the fact that the provincial government system
reinstated the traditional characteristics of societies as smaller societies within the
big islands. What was important in traditional Solomon Islands societies was the
welfare of the distinct communities or groups and not the whole island, especially
in the larger mountainous islands.
169
This attitude continues to prevail in Solomon Islands politics today. On
his 1989 tour of the Western Province, the Governor General was reminded that
the province contributed more than any other province to the national economy
but development plans and resource allocation always favoured densely populated
areas. In his reply the Governor General stressed unity and political stability and
said that equality would result in political instability (Solomon Nius 6 February
1989, 5). By this he meant that giving more does not mean receiving more
because the other provinces also need government support. If the needs of other
provinces are not satisfactorily met, instability may occur in the country, which
may have grave consequences.
This raises a dilemma because the same consequences are possible if
provinces are giving more but receiving less from the national economy. Both
Makira Ulawa and Guadalcanal provincial premiers felt that unity in the country
can only be maintained if the central government is dedicated to equal treatment
in terms of development and resource allocation35. If this is not forthcoming,
then the provincial government system could be a stepping stone to disintegration
of the whole country. Nevertheless, at present, there is very little evidence to
support the claim for the possible disintegration of the country.
35 The Guadalcanal province premier, Gideon Moses pointed out during aninterview with the author that the amount of money received by his provincefrom the central government is minimal, compared unfavourably to itscontributions to the central government's purse. He regarded this as an injusticedone by the government to his province. At the same time, Makira Ulawa'spremier pointed out that if some provinces feel that they are being unfairlytreated economically, then unity problems would emerge.
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Lack of national consciousness has led to suspicions, animosity and fear
of domination by other islanders. Because of this resentment of 'strangers' and
fear of being dominated, some provinces called for more legislative power to
control the movement of persons. A most recent case of this was in March 21,
1995 when an interim committee in Munda, in the Western province, called a
meeting over squatters from other islands and districts living illegally in the area
(Solomon Star, 5 April 1995, 12), The problem stemmed from the past decade
when some people were hired to clear the area for a development project. After
the job was done, those people continued to stay and built houses illegally on the
customary land in the area, Some people in these squatters were working for the
fish cannery in the area (Solomon Taiyo Cannery at Noro) but most are
unemployed and are suspected to be the source of criminal activity in the area,
The customary land owners realised the possible loss of their land so they
organised the meeting, aimed at regaining their land and the removal of squatters,
The two provinces that were evidently calling for this were Guadalcanal
and Western. These provinces have industries that have attracted people seeking
employment, some of whom are engaged in criminal activities and illegal
settlements. However, such provincial control over movement of people would
contradict the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of movement. These calls for
more autonomy are, according to Premdas (1983,51) based on "Charges of
alleged discriminatory treatment, ethnic colonialism ... , land alienation, and the
over-centralisation of powers and function held by the national government".
Lack of national consciousness and the feeling that the central government was
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not protecting their interests, encouraged provinces to call for more autonomy,
6.3.2 Provincial Governments and the Provision of Services
The performance of tasks and provision of services under the provincial
system of government has also proven problematic. In particular, the cost of
functions devolved to provinces are sometimes unbearable, Under List A of the
provincial government powers (Appendix 2), provinces are responsible for
building and maintaining roads, bridges and other infrastructure, In 1983, Malaita
province was thinking of returning the task of maintaining its roads to the central
government (Larmour 1985, 85) since it was becoming too costly.
To give another example , Lata, the main centre of Temotu province was
out of contact with the whole world for several weeks in the 1980s. No ships
served the province for six months which led to the closure of flights due to
shortage of fuel to enable return trips and consequently, postal services were
closed (Solomon Nius February 1990, 25), Such problems undermine the basis for
decentralising power to the provinces and thus question the integrity of
development efforts under the provincial governments,
Many central government Members of Parliament (Solomon Citizen, 22
March 1995, 4) argued that the provision of goods and services in the provinces
was becoming unsatisfactory. Speaking on two government orders to transfer
more power to Makira Ulawa and Rennell/Bellona provinces in 1995, the MP for
Auki Langa Langa, Francis Saemala, pointed to his province, saying that despite
172
the devolution of functions, assets, and power to Malaita, the quality of life in
Auki had deteriorated {Solomon Citizen, 22 March 1995, 4). He wanted
parliament to not transfer power to provinces simply so someone could sit on
them. In other words, provinces were supposed to be doing certain tasks rather
than relying heavily on the central government. Furthermore, the provincial
governments were not supposed to be 'luxury posts' enjoyed by politicians
empowered by the central government. Rather, they should be the key players in
rural development efforts using the power they have through the devolution
orders from the central government. Nevertheless, whether the provincial
governments could possibly do that goes back to the questions of financial
strength as discussed above.
6.4 CONCLUSION
The above discussion questioned whether decentralisation, through the
provincial governments, promotes popular participation, in decision making.
Decentralisation, through the area councils, development authorities, and rural
development funds has not facilitated the creation of a more participatory society,
in terms of development efforts. The decentralised provincial government system
in the Solomon Islands does not encourage participation of the rural population in
decision making in areas aimed at developing the rural areas. Moreover, popular
participation is not encouraged in development initiatives such as those under the
various rural development funds. As a result, economic and political development
goals are not being realised, and unity not promoted under the Solomon Islands
provincial government system,
CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
. . . decentralisation is not a 'quick fix' for the managementproblems of developing countries. The factors that make it such anattractive policy are usually the same ones that make it difficult toimplement. (Rondinelli et al 1984, 4 ).
INTRODUCTION
The objectives of this study centre around two main questions. First, has
decentralisation of government mechanisms, through the devolution of power,
resulted in the development of the rural areas in the Solomon Islands? Second
has the decentralisation of government structures through the establishment of the
provincial governments, facilitated popular participation in decision making and
general government?
The decentralised provincial government system in the Solomon Islands is
attractive but ther& are numerous stumbling blocks and problems that undermine
it. The fragmented nature of the country's political culture, language, and
physical geography meant that decentralisation through the provincial government
structure was seen by colonial administrators and post colonial leaders of the
Solomon Islands as a solution to the political and economic development needs
of the country. Nevertheless, these factors were also the ones that make the
implementation of the provincial government structures and system cumbersome.
After thirteen years of operation, the provincial government system has achieved
very little in raising the standards of living in the villages and is becoming a
174
financial and administrative burden on the Solomon Islands.
7.1 CONCLUSION
Based on the analysis of the provincial governments in Malcira Ulawa and
Guadalcanal provinces, the following conclusions are made. Decentralisation does
not result in bringing the government structure closer to the masses. What it does
is establish another structure based on provincial boundaries, that does the same
things as the central government. Instead of people feeling part of, and taking
part in, the decision making and development process, they see the provincial
government as an alien institution that works exactly like the central government
or even the colonial administration. Decentralisation does not bring goods and
services closer to the masses, though it may devolve functions to lower levels of
government,
Decision making is often monopolised by a few executive members or
close friends such as those identified in the case of Makira Ulawa and
Guadalcanal provinces. It should be noted that the traditional decision making
structures in the Solomon Islands differ from place to place, and even from time
to time as described in Chapter 1 of this thesis. It is important to be conscious of
these differences if the decision making potential of lower levels of government
is to be fully utilised. The provincial government system has ignored the way
rural people perceive their development interests, both as individuals and as part
of a community. The large failure rate of PDU projects may be attributed to this
factor,
175
The provincial government system brought about or at least accentuated
discrepancies in levels of economic development and the provision of services.
Decentralisation thus failed to facilitate national unity since distinct islands and
groups have called for separate identities. This is well illustrated by the creation
and devolution of provincial powers to the newly created provinces of Rennell
and Bellona and Choisuel.
Decentralisation of rural development funds through the Constituency
Development Funds (CDF), the Provincial Development Unit (PDU) and the
Small islands Communities Project Scheme (SICOPSA) were not successful in
facilitating rural development. Monitoring and evaluation of these projects in
rural areas were the greatest stumbling blocks to successful implementation and
analysis of rural development. Staff inadequacies in monitoring projects such as
those under PDU and CDF are a major problem. One consequence of this is a
lack of progress reports which has led to provinces, the central government, and
aid donors being uninformed of the progress of projects implemented. There is a
lack of coordination and communication between the various levels of
governments. This resulted in the failure of rural development efforts because of
the inability to detect problems of such projects and to identify strategies for
improvements.
The CDF in particular has been regarded by some people as a campaign
fund for parliamentarians to win the next elections. This is because the power to
use the CDF is not controlled by the central or provincial governments but by
176
individual members of parliament. The extent to which CDF has become a
campaign fund cannot be determined because no central body coordinates such
funds. Only individual members of parliament know where the money is spent.
Suffice to say that from information obtained from those at the Ministry of
Provincial Governments and Rural Development and the provincial headquarters
of the two provinces studied, there is general agreement on this claim.
Decentralising government structures and functions does not necessarily
bring about democratic practices and ideals. In fact, in the case of the Solomon
Islands, the opposite has occurred because of informal groups (informal core
groups or individuals), such as those identified in the Makira Ulawa province that
work against democratic processes. Democratic processes in this context refer to
the proper channels through which provincial decisions should be made, such as
those through the provincial assemblies and executives. This study revealed that
decentralisation is different from and is actually separate from democracy.
Without prior commitment to democracy, decentralisation can be very
undemocratic in the sense that decision making avenues established by the
Provincial Government Act of 1981 are not followed, and informal decision
making groups or individuals dictate decisions,
Participatory democracy means that people fully participate in the
government of their affairs. This can only happen if the citizens themselves
participate. People only participate in activities which they think will benefit
them and on a structure which they feel part of. The absence of the feeling of a
177
national identity within the Solomon Islands has meant that participation in the
country's decision making is done indirectly through elections. Therefore, popular
participation that was envisaged by those championing decentralisation is
indirect, through voting for area councillors, provincial assembly members and
national parliament members. The provincial government system does not allow
the ordinary villager to influence the decisions made by those in the provincial
assemblies and executives.
In addition, there is no evidence that the distribution of political power
has become more equal, nor indeed is there any evidence that the overall ability
of rural communities to achieve their individual and collective goals has
improved, despite devolution of power and the emphasis put by successive
governments on participatory development efforts, whereby rural people have a
say in the use of the resources they live with.
The provincial government system in the Solomon Islands is inefficient
and cumbersome because of various processes and levels of government that
often duplicate each other. The central government makes laws and plans for
development for the nation just as the provincial assemblies and area councils
make laws for their respective areas of influence. Instead of these three levels of
government working together and coordinated by a central body, they are
operating quite independently from each other. The lack of a coordinating
mechanism meant that each level of government has its own development plans
and projects rather than working towards a common end. Plans alone do not
178
result in development. The lethargic nature of the area councils points to the need
to improve or abolish them through amendments to the Provincial Government
Act of 1981.
Poor planning, monitoring and evaluation of provincial development
strategies, unethical and undemocratic decision making, and financial deficiencies
hindered provincial development opportunities. Despite the establishment of
development authorities, unclear lines of responsibilities were drawn between the
provincial government bodies and the development authorities. This normally
resulted in confusion, At times, political interference from provincial politicians
hindered development strategies of the provincial development authorities.
The provincial government system and structure in the Solomon Islands is
becoming more of a stumbling block to rural development, It is a very expensive
structure since large portions of the provincial budgets are spent on salaries,
allowances and entertainment of provincial politicians and administrators rather
than on development activities. This is inherent in the budgets of Makira Ulawa
and Guadalcanal provinces. The system is budgeting money to maintain the
structure rather than to develop rural areas. Consequently, the status quo of rural
underdevelopment is maintained,
7.2 APPROACHES TO IMPROVING THE PROVINCIAL
GOVERNMENT SYSTEM
The analysis has highlighted ways of addressing some of the problems
inherent in the provincial government system. These are discussed below.
179
Strict controls from the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural
Development need to be placed on the Constituency Development Fund (CDF),
the Provincial Development Unit (PDU), and the Small Island Communities
Project Scheme (SICOPSA) grants, Such grants would be more effective if they
were channelled to projects such as water supplies, schools and roads that do not
create profits but that improve the lives of a relatively large section of
population. A department within the Ministry of Provincial Governments and
Rural Development should perhaps be set up to deal with these funds, especially
CDF and SICOPSA to monitor and evaluate the implementation of such funded
projects. This new department, would need to have clear lines of responsibilities
and be dedicated to feasibility studies, monitoring and evaluation of rural projects
to ensure that they function adequately. This would reduce the wasteful spending
of money by individual members of parliament and provincial governments and
would keep the provincial governments and central government informed about
the progress, successes and failures of implemented projects. This is important to
identify the weaknesses and strengths of rural development efforts.
Decisions need to be made by provincial executives and assemblies
according to the decision making procedures laid down by the Provincial
Government Act of 1981. Where developments affect rural people, it is important
that they be consulted and properly informed about the effects of the decisions
before such decisions are implemented.
Provincial governments' spending must be more closely monitored by the
180
budget controls of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural
Development together with the Ministry of Finance. If more financial power is
given to the provinces, as favoured by Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawa provinces,
the delegation of financial power must be audited by both the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Provincial Governments to ensure that ethical and
democratic standards are maintained in provincial government decisions and
spending.
Provincial development authorities should also be encouraged to assist the
provincial governments in financing development projects. The ordinances
establishing such development authorities would need to ensure minimal political
interference in the day to day running of such authorities. By clearly separating
professionals running development authorities from the, often unnecessary,
influence of provincial politicians, development activities of these provincial
development authorities would be enhanced. To ensure sound spending standards,
the accounts of the various development authorities should be surrendered for
auditing by the Accounts section of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and
Rural Development at the end of every year.
In order to solve the issue of duplication of duties and unnecessary
spending of money on a structure that is not functioning, the Provincial
Government Act of 1981 would need to be amended and area councils be
abolished. Churches, communities, village leaders and sports organisations could
take care of the area councils' tasks, as some have already been doing. This
181
would be a cost cutting measure and one that would streamline decision making.
If provincial assembly members assumed the responsibilities of area councils,
with the help of non-formal community based organisations, the provincial
members would be more fully utilised - identifying development needs and
reporting them directly to the provincial assemblies.
The CDF and SICOPSA schemes should be removed from the hands of
the individual parliamentarians and provinces and the money given to the
provincial governments under the direct supervision of a unit, as identified above,
within the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural Development, This
money should be given to the provincial governments together with the list of
specific capital projects which such funds should be spent on. The CDF and
SICOPSA grants should only be used for non-profit oriented capital projects like
water supplies, building new classrooms, upgrading roads and other related
projects that benefit communities rather than individuals for profit. Since income
generating communally- based projects do not normally succeed, it would be
more appropriate to redirect such funds to non-profit, communally- based projects
that increase the standards of living of people in the communities,
To minimise the number of failed projects a more effective monitoring
and evaluation mechanism needs to be established for PDU projects. Since PDU
deals with bilateral aid, it would be more appropriate if the PDU is transferred to
the Ministry of Finance which deals with all other forms of foreign aid money,
The creation of an effective evaluation and monitoring section for PDU would
182
discourage wasteful spending of foreign bilateral aid. Monitoring of projects
should be carried out by provincial PDU officers at least once a year to ensure
that the project owners are given the feeling that they are being monitored. This
may pressurise them to put more efforts in getting the project profitable.
One approach to restructuring the provincial government system would be
to link the provincial executives directly to the central government through the
provincial affairs section. This could include an annual meeting with all
provincial premiers and senior officers - something more constructive than the
annual premiers' conference. Instead of using the annual meeting as a chance to
negotiate for grants, it could be used as a time to evaluate and analyse progress
in provincial and rural development. This would allow the Ministry of Finance
and the Accounts section of the Ministry of Provincial Governments and Rural
Development to give professional advice on spending and suggestions on
improvements. This would also allow for the evaluation of provincial plans and
targets and to share information on the ways to improve the effectiveness of the
provincial government system, based on individual provinces' experiences that
year.
The Solomon Islands provincial government system would perhaps be
better off if it recognised the distinct groups within the country and within the
provinces. Unless people have control of their land, resources, and feel safe
where they live, the provincial government system could not achieve unity within
the country. If the principal obstacles to unity such as land issues, the movement
183
and resettlement of people, and unequal distribution of national benefits are
addressed the decentralised provincial government system may promote more
meaningful development. This calls for a total review of the national constitution
and the Provincial Government Act of 1981. The reviews would have to
compromise on such issues as the freedom of movement of people and the rights
of privacy and property. These are issues which the country has to address if
progress and stability are to be facilitated.
7.3 FUTURE PROSPECTS FOR DECENTRALISATION
While a new structure of decentralisation must be found in the Solomon
Islands, it would need to be based on a study carefully carried out and
considered. There are two competing perspective in the Solomon Islands on what
the future direction should be for the provincial government system.
There are those, particularly at the provincial government level, who
prefer to maintain the existing provincial government system, but with the central
government demonstrating more commitment to it. This view was held by the
provincial premiers, executives and administrators in the two provinces studied.
They argue that if the central government could realise the essence of the
provincial government system and accord it more legislative power and funds
(not necessarily cash but areas to generate revenues), then this system of
decentralisation would be effective. In other words, the central government
should increase actual provincial grants or devolve powers to provinces which
could enable them to generate funds. For example, the central government should
184
entrust in provincial governments the legislative power to control land and the
movement and resettlement of people into other provinces.
On the other hand, there are those who argue that there are no future
prospects of giving more power to the provinces. The National Coalition Partner
Government mooted the introduction of a two-tier system at area council level
that would facilitate a direct link with the rural population36. This would be
difficult to implement because there are differences in the political organisation
and customs of different islands in the country. Some prefer the inclusion of
chiefs and 'big men' in area councils because they have control over land matters
for development. However, chiefs are non-existent in some parts of the country.
In communities with 'big man' structures, the 'big man' may have no control
over land matters because land is owned by distinct groups like clans. The chiefs'
functions and powers in other parts of the country is diminishing depending on
the community's exposure to outside influence and development levels. Those
who argue from this perspective believe that the provincial government system or
decentralisation would achieve its development objectives in the rural areas if a
majority of the population, particularly those at the grassroots level, is engaged in
development initiatives and activities.
These two perspective on the Solomon Islands provincial government
system represent different visions for the future of decentralisation in the
36 This view was held by administrators working at the Ministry of ProvincialGovernments and Rural Development, particularly, the Legal Adviser and thePermanent Secretary of the ministry.
185
Solomon Islands. Instead of debating whether to give the lower levels of
government more legislative and financial power, the country would perhaps be
better off if it looks for a decentralised system of government that gets the rural
population more involved in development activities. The subsistence sector of the
country should be encouraged to undertake development activities through rural
development projects and funds. Emphasis should not be on the actual
organisation of government but on the mechanism of participation.
The underlying problem of the Solomon Islands provincial government
system is the fact that leaders preach decentralisation and popular participation
but do not practice it, The provincial government system may work if the leaders
themselves are committed to it. The present Solomon Islands provincial
government system was meant to be a development strategy but it has
unfortunately never been seriously implemented, The author penned this verse to
summarise the nature of decentralisation in the Solomon Islands.
Development From Below
It is a new strategy they sayIt capacitates Government Machinery
To function properly.
Participation from belowInformation from belowDecisions from below
Development from below
The system is so belowedThat development is even lowered
We no longer talk 'trickle down' welfareSo we speak 'fuming up benefits'
That cannot profit the lowlySo we tarry low on the underdeveloped roll.
186
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195
APPENDIX
1. NOTES ON RESEARCH METHODS
This study was carried out between July and September 1994 and
information on new developments in this area of study were collected up to mid
1995. Research methods used include library research at the University of the
South Pacific, Laucala campus, the National and Public libraries in Honiara,
Government Information Service, Honiara, Solomon Islands National Parliament
library, and the Ministry of Provincial Governments in Honiara. Interviews were
carried out at the central government and provincial government levels.
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVAL RESEARCH
A good part of this thesis is based on information contained in secondary
sources in the form of books, journals, magazines, news papers and official
documents such as those in government and provincial reports. Most information
used in the theoretical discussions were obtained from the University of the
South Pacific, Laucala campus' library. The official reports and information were
collected mostly from the Solomon Islands' National Parliament Library, the
Honiara National Library, and from the Solomon Islands Government
Information Office. Information on the two provincial governments studied,
Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawa, were obtained from their respective headquarters
and offices. Government programs over the Solomon Islands Broadcasting
Corporation (SIBC) on related issues were also used and semi-official documents
such as magazines and newspapers were used in parts of the study's discussion.
INTERVIEWS
Interviews were carried out at the Ministry of Provincial Government head
office in Honiara'and at Guadalcanal and Makira Ulawa provincial headquarters.
Given the nature of the topic, no formal questionnaire was used. General
questions were nevertheless prepared as guidelines and specific questions were
then put to interviewees for detailed answers and information. Williamson et al
(1977, 166) when referring to this type of interviewing said that "[t]he format is
196
usually flexible, with the types and order of questions, the setting, and even the
manner of the interviewer being governed not only by the study objectives and
the cumulative information flow, but also by a continuing assessment of what it
will take to make the interviewee maximally responsive". The absence of a
standard questionnaire was due also primarily to the fact that different groups of
people, with different tasks and localities were used as the informants in this
research. Thus, in-depth interviews were used instead of standardised
questionnaires.
Interviews were carried out at two levels: the central government's
Ministry of Provincial Government and Rural Development, and the provincial
headquarters of the two provinces used in this study, The interviews at the central
government level were geared towards general discussions in the thesis of
decentralisation and provincial government. These interviews enabled the author
to have an understanding of the national overview or opinions of the central
government on decentralisation and the development and political issues
associated with it. The aim was to obtain the views of those at the national level
(administration) on what they see and experience as the general problems of
decentralisation and provincial governments. Questions aimed at identifying the
political problems and justifications of decentralisation as viewed by those in the
upper levels of government. Development issues and political problems of
decentralisation, such as national unity, were the focus of interviews at the
central government level. At the same time, the author obtained information on
the types of assistance, services and manpower rendered to the provincial
governments by the central government.
At the provincial level, the author carried out interviews at the
headquarters of the two provinces identified above. Apart from the reasons
behind choosing these two provinces, the author specifically looked at the role of
provincial governments in development, decentralisation and popular
participation. Interviews and the data collected focussed on the issues of rural and
provincial development, resource allocations, questions of accountability, expert
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and technical advises, and the provision of services. One of the aims was to see
how development authorities function to promote development in their respective
provinces. In other words, how do these authorities assist their provincial
governments and their communities to develop?
It is also important to see how successful the provinces have been in
performing the specified functions devolved to them or what obstacles there are
to successful implementation of development programs. In this sense, it is
interesting to see how resources allocated from the centre are used and spent. At
the same time, questions of accountability are examined. Resources may be
allocated from the centre but what guidelines are there for provincial
governments to follow when allocating such resources for provincial
development? In other words, who is accountable to whom and how? Resources
may be allocated from the centre but how these resources are used and how these
two provincial governments monitored resource use are of prime interest.
Questions of accountability in resource use, and the impact and effectiveness of
such resource use at the provincial level are important in assessing
decentralisation and development.
The amount of expert and technical advice these two provinces receive on
development projects and decision making, and the subsequent implementation
process is also the focus of study in these two provinces. Questions focus on the
amount of advice that provincial governments and authorities get from the central
government, regional organisations, or international organisations. Closely related
is the issue of provincial planning, implementation and reviews, How do these
two provinces implement and review their plans at the provincial government
level?
More importantly, the author attempted to determine how well these two
provinces have performed in providing services and the functions devolved to
them from the central government. How do provinces, with the help of the
various rural development funds like the Provincial Development Unit Funds
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(PDU), the Small Island Communities Projects Scheme Funds (SICOPSA), and
the Constituency Development Funds (CDF), assist in the improvement of living
standards in these two provinces? These were the basic areas within which data
collection from the provincial governments Focussed. As a result, the research
methodology used was more of a qualitative orientation, although there are
aspects of the quantitative method as inherent in the use of statistical data in the
analysis to substantiate and evaluate some of the points raised.
Defending Qualitative Research: in-depth interviews
Given the nature of the study and the guiding questions that are posed, it
is maintained that a qualitative approach which does not limit the type of replies
from the informants is best suited for this particular undertaking. The term
'qualitative research' refers to a broad research strategy which Vulliamy et. ai
(1990, 25) defined as an approach that "... encompasses differing blends of prior
epistemological assumptions and the use of specific qualitative research
techniques". With different levels of government and organisations included in
the study it would be impossible to use a standard questionnaire that would
satisfy all the questions posed for investigation at the beginning of the study.
At the same time, qualitative research is appropriate in this case because it
allows for the experiences and feelings of the interviewees, rather than controlled
responses through highly structured questionnaires that may restrict the responses
of the people directly involved in the decentralised system and processes. At the
same time, a qualitative approach allows for research questions to evolve and
change at the time when the researcher is out in the field. As Creswell (1994, 71)
puts it, "[o]ften in qualitative studies, the questions are under continual review .
and reformulation". This allows the author to venture further into interesting and
sometimes sensitive issues that would not have been brought out by quantitative
designs, such as those found in the highly structured questionnaires. Lancy (1993,
25) when referring to educational research pointed out that, "[quantitative
research may oversimplify what is patently complex. And although one can
detect a clear trend in educational research
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to move from simple ,., to complex model, all these procedures require variables
that can be scaled, that are numerically scored or rated in some way, whereas the
qualitative researcher insists that not all of the reality that constitutes education is
in fact reducible to variables". Thus, it was decided in this study to use in-depth
interviews as a major data gathering technique,
Validity and Reliability of Data
An important part of any research paper or academic undertaking is the
reliability and validity of data or information obtained from the sources. The
most important concern here is the validity of data obtained from secondary
sources and the ones obtained through in-depth interviews at the different levels
of government and provincial organisations. In the case of secondary sources,
where possible, data is verified simply by cross checking with other secondary
sources. The use of several different sources to determine the authenticity of data
given by one source is the verification technique used this thesis.
Attempts were also made to verify data collected through in-depth
interviews and to minimise the weaknesses of in-depth interviews. The stages of
interviews described above - those carried out at the central government level and
the provincial government level - were also used as the basis for the assessment
of the strengths and weaknesses of the provincial government system, in line with
the issues and concerns of this study. At the beginning of the study, the author
was planning to use Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) to evaluate the
provincial government system. However, at the actual research period, it was
obvious that this was not possible given the very limited involvement of NGOs
in the politics and decision making processes of provincial governments. Thus,
the best available mechanism for assessment was to use the different levels of
governments and the different provincial bodies such as the provincial
development authorities, the Provincial Development Unit (PDU) and individuals
in these different government levels and provincial arms involved in the
interviews.
200
The nature of the study and the technique of 'unstructured or in-depth'
interviews used to obtain data are in line with the method of evaluating or giving
credibility to the data obtained. The unstructured, although controlled and guided
interviews, allowed for the upholding of the most important reliability concept of
'consistency'. Consistency of information or data could be ensured with the help
of 'internal criticism'. Charles (1995, 103) pointed out that one way of doing this
is "... to compare what the informant says against what is said by the other
informants, or against records or written accounts. Logical interpretations plays a
strong role in internal criticism, and the researcher must answer for themselves
questions such as : Do these contentions make sense? Could the events have
happened? Can persuasive arguments be made for or against them?" This
technique of internal criticism was used in this thesis. For example, one particular
amount of money spent by Makira Ulawa province to purchase a piece of land at
Okea (map 3) discussed in Chapter 5, was given by one informant. Although the
author did not have a proof of the real transaction, the amount was cross-checked
with the premier, the provincial secretary, and a former provincial minister of
lands. In other cases, data given by interviewees on expenses were cross-checked
on written sources such as provincial budgets. This ensures that the information
obtained from one source is verified with another source to achieve consistency.
Another method used to minimise the weaknesses of data collected
through unstructured or in-depth interviews was the use of individual interviews.
Individual in-depth interviews' objective is "... to carry on a guided conversation
and to elicit rich, detailed materials that can be used in qualitative analysis. Its
object is to find out what kinds of things are happening, rather than to determine
the frequency of predetermined kinds of things that the researcher already
believes can happen" (Lofland 1971, 76). During the course of the research, the
author interviewed individuals in both the central and provincial governments and
other provincial bodies like the provincial development authorities and the PDU.
In doing so, information was verified using what the other individuals said. For
instance, the claims of the permanent secretary of the Ministry of Provincial
Governments and Rural Development were cross checked against what the
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provincial premiers and secretaries said. In other cases, what the provincial
premiers said were cross checked with information obtained from PDU or from
the development authorities. The nature of unstructured interviews allowed for
this verification and assessment of data to take place.
Similarly, the author used 'group interviews' as a method of obtaining
data and verifying what individuals say. As Burgess (1982, 109) pointed out
"[s]uch a situation provides informants an opportunity to discuss their world and
to argue over the situations in which they are involved. These interviews may
afford glimpses of competing views and how consensus or differences are arrived
at". The views and information given in groups are pursued further through
individual interviews or vice-versa. For instance, at the time of the interview, the
author went through an in-depth interview with the deputy premier of
Guadalcanal province before conducting an in-depth interview with the provincial
executive. At the same time, interviews with two informants in Makira Ulawa
province, the provincial planner together with a provincial assembly member, was
carried out before interviewing the provincial premier and secretary. Group
interviews were used not only to verify what individuals said but in some cases,
informants maximise responses in group situation.
Finally, the verification of data was assisted by a method whereby the
interviewees were asked more than one question that would yield some kind of
information on the same issue. The following demonstrated the technique used.
In trying to obtain information on the central government's assistance to
provincial governments, the author asked the following question, First, the author
asked this: What types of resources does this province receive from the central
government? Later on, the interviewer asked this: How does the central
government assist this province? As can be seen, these two questions were
directed at the same issue. This is how the author attempted to verify data and to
have some kind of consistency in the information obtained. Because of the
flexible nature of in-depth interviews used in this research, questions that were
not properly understood by the informants or questions that barely received
202
responses were reworded in an attempt to obtain maximum response, Williamson
et al (1977, 166) commented on this by saying that "while standardised questions
may be asked of every respondent, the interviewer takes account of every
respondents individuality in deciding what to ask as well as when and how to ask
it11. Therefore, in-depth interviews enabled the author to ask several questions on
the same issue as a strategy to verify information and allow for consistent data.
RECORDING OF DATA AND INTERVIEWS
When carrying out in-depth interviews in the country, the author used
both the note-book and a tape recorder. The tape recorder was used as an aid to
allow the author to probe into questions that were not clearly answered, At the
same time, it was a useful aid that avoided recording the wrong things in the note
book. It should be pointed out that in most of the in-depth interviews, the
language used for questioning was the 'Solomon Islands pidgin'. This was due to
the fact that 'pidgin' is the commonly used language of day-to-day
communication in the Solomon Islands. In order for the informants to properly
understand the questions asked, and to properly answer such questions, pidgin
was used. The use of pidgin allowed both the author and informants to
understood and talk freely with each other.
The danger of misinterpretation could not be ignored. In the process of
recording what the informants were saying the author was recording in English.
To minimise the weaknesses of data associated with the misinterpretation of
pidgin words into English, the author used the help of Solomon Island friends.
Instead of just relying on his own interpretations and understanding, the author
used the tape recorded interviews and with the help of others, recorded the
information into another book which were then used in the final analysis.
Analysis of data obtained from the interviews and the secondary sources
used in this thesis was carried out almost exclusively at the University of the
South Pacific in Fiji, although some parts were analysed in the Solomon Islands
at the time of the research, The interpretations and analysis of data obtained from
203
the research (apart from the use of other techniques and methods mentioned
above) was greatly assisted by the personal experiences and observations of the
author, who has lived in the rural villages under the decentralised provincial
government system in the Solomon Islands.
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APPENDIX 2
2. LISTS A, B AND C RECOMMENDED BY THE KAUSIMAECOMMITTEE
LIST A: PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS AND HONIARA CITYCOUNCILS FINAL POWERS
sale and distribution of liquor;
local government;
declaration of one provincial holiday annually;
agricultural extension;
cultural and custom matters;
libraries other than the national library;
museums other than the national museum;
reef fisheries;
forestry extension and replanting;
small scale mining and prospecting;
business advisory services;
co-operative advisory services (not registration);
employment security for directly employed staff;
information and public relations about the provinces, includingprovincial government publications, but not so as to obstruct collectionof news for national and independent media;
land use and dealings in customary land;
location of electricity supply facilities;
location, construction and maintenance of schools and clinics andhospitals;
preparation of provincial plans and town planning;
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resettlement projects within a province undertaken by theprovincial government;
location, construction, maintenance and standards of public works,including housing, roads, bridges, water supplies, ports and wharves.
LIST B:
SUBJECTS ON WHICH BOTH GOVERNMENT HAVE POWER
animal husbandry;
land use;
establishment of religious organisations new to the country inparticular areas;
large - scale mining;
planning;
primary education other than aspects on list A;
location / construction of Secondary schools;
aspects of school curriculum relating to local custom / history;
adult / vocational / technical education;
towns, public works, projects or facilities declared to be nationalconcern;
shopping;
motor traffic speed limits, parking, load limits, etc;
agricultural research, policy, experimentation;
veterinary and animal husbandry research, policy andexperimentation;
resettlement policy;
national forestry, mining, fisheries projects, but not so as to affect thenational governments' legal obligations, and subject to provincialveto;
206
boards of survey;
statistics;
taxes;
licences;
fees for services.
LIST C: TRANSFERRED FUNCTIONS
provincial administration, including administration of licences, fees,loan schemes, specified taxes, businesses and grants (other thansalaries), staff and elections;
agricultural field services;
medical services;
engineering and works;
educational administration;
social development and library service
crewing ships, except for those in the national fleet;
disciplining crews except for those in the national fleet;
control and scheduling of ships except for those in the national fleet;
the determination of agriculture priorities;
land use and land administration;
cooperatives and business development;
labour;
mechanical engineering including transport and pools;
fisheries other than highly migratory species;
forestry extension;
207
forestry replanting except where such replanting is part of a national
project;
information;
registration of births, deaths and marriages;
maintenance of electoral rolls;
drafting of provincial and local government bye-laws;
primary and secondary education
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APPENDIX 3
3. PDU CHECK LIST 'D'
Date of Submission
1. GENERAL
1.1 Name of the Project. Give a brief description of the project, including itslocation.
1.2 State reason why this project is required. What is the present situation andwhat problems or difficulties exist? Please give details.
1.3 What alternative solutions to the problems in 1.2 have been considered?Why were they rejected?
1.4 What alternative locations were considered and why were they rejected.
2. PLAN
2.1 Give the location of the project, Show the location and other infrastructureon a map to be attached to this checklist.
2.2 Provide plans giving dimensions for facilities (eg, clinics, warehouses,etc). Show clearly any modifications to existing buildings. For watersupplies, give nature of source, type of supply (eg. gravity feed, tank),distance to source and whether or not water needs treatment beforeacceptance for drinking.
2.3 Has the project been surveyed by - MWPU staff?- Provincial staff?
When was the survey done?
2.4 What priority does this project have over the construction of otherprovincial projects?
2.5 How does this project fit in with the overall development plan of theprovince?
209
3. INPUT
3.1 LAND
1. How much land will be needed?
2. Has agreement been reached with the land owners? When and wherewas the meeting held? Were payments for compensation required?
3. What is the existing land tenure and what tenure system isproposed?
4. Is resettlement involved?
3.2 List the tools, machinery, etc, required for construction and the sourcesfrom which this equipment will come.
3.3 Does the province have sufficient labour? Give the number of labourersrequired for this project, the time required and their salary per day for:-
(i) Supervisory labour(ii) Skilled labour(iii) Unskilled labour
3.4 Are there sufficient materials in the following categories:
(i) materials available locally?(ii) materials to be shipped from Honiara. Attach the list of materialrequired and their costs
3.5 How long will it take to construct this project? Please give an estimate ofthe time needed for each phase of the project,
210
4, CAPITAL COSTS
4.1 Who prepared the capital cost estimates and when were they prepared?
4.2 Capital Costs
1. Compensation / Purchase
(i) land
(ii) other
2. Construction
(i) labour(ii) local materials
(iii) Plant / vehicles
3. Transport
(i) freight(ii) other (fares etc)
4. Other Costs(i) preparation(ii) design(iii) surveying(iv) miscellaneous
5. Administration - 5%
Total Estimated Cost
5. RECURRENT COSTS
5.1 Who prepared the recurrent costs and when were they prepared?
5.2 Recurrent Costs per year
1. Labour2. Local materials3. Imported materials4. Plant / Vehicles
Total Annual Costs
21
5.3 Are those costs already covered by your recurrent estimates? If not, whatprovision will you make to find these recurrent costs? How many officersare needed to staff the project and where will they come from?
6. LINKAGES AND BENEFITS
6.1 What areas and how many people will this project serve? List villagesserved by each water supply, clinic etc. and their populations?
6.2 Give other nearest locations where similar facilities exist.
6.3 What benefits will this project provide?
1. directly to the area and people served? eg cashincomes, health, food crops, housing, etc.
2. to other projects in the area - ie, list other projects,nature ofprojects, ownership, and how it is related to this new project.
Please try to give details of the economic and social benefit which willcome from this project. Donors are not aware of the problems of theprovinces and need details of the expected benefits
This Checklist should be signed by PDF liaison officer to indicateprovincial approval of the project.
PDU - OCTOBER 1986
212
APPENDIX 4
4. NORTH EAST GUADALCANAL CDF APPLICATION FORM
1. Name of Community:
2. Name of Project:
3. Location:-
(a) Ward:
(b) Zone:
(c) Village:
(d) Address: .
4. Information on Project (Description):
5. Supervisors:
Name: Position: Sign:
Name: Position: Sign:
6.Amount Requested:
7. Community Contribution:
8. Recommendation By Local Leader (Chiefs,Priests/Pastors, Area Council Member, ProvincialMember):
213
9. Endorsed/Not Endorsed, By Constituency DevelopmentCommittee:
Sign By Chairman (CDF): Date:
10. Approved/Not Approved By MP North EastGuadalcanal Constituency:
Sign: Date: 19...
Comments:
NOTES: (I) ZONES
1.2.3.4.5.6.7.8.9.
DadaeKolosuluNorth ParipaoRekoRuavatuTathibokoKolona/BerandeTutumuRarata
(II) (a) No cash payment to be made.
(b) Attach proforma invoices with submission.
214
(c) No refund of receipts or invoices.
(d) Supervisors must be directly concern and involvewith the project.
(e) Each project must be in a separate form andmust be original and not photocopies.
(f) (i) None generating income projects likeschools and churches at t ract noadministrative fee.
(ii) Income generating approved projects willattract an administrative fee of 5% to bepaid before the project is released.