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Decision-Making in Crisis: An IntroductionAuthor(s): Robert C. NorthSource: The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, No. 3, Case Studies in Conflict (Sep., 1962),pp. 197-200Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/172900

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Decision-making in crisis: an introductionDecision-making in crisis: an introductionDecision-making in crisis: an introduction

ROBERT C. NORTHDepartmentof Political Science, Stanford UniversityROBERT C. NORTHDepartmentof Political Science, Stanford UniversityROBERT C. NORTHDepartmentof Political Science, Stanford University

The Stanford University Studies in Inter-national Conflict and Integration emergedfrom a volunteer seminar of faculty membersfrom various disciplines who met fortnightlyduring the academic year 1957-1958 to planmore effective ways of investigating the be-havior of nation states. In the course of thesediscussions it became evident that two kindsof interaction processes-the conflictual andthe integrative-could be identified as char-acteristic of national behavior throughout thecourse of history. On this basis the decisionwas made to undertake a comparative studyof international crises with the intent of clari-fying the relationship between conflict andintegration and, in the long run, testing out aseries of general hypotheses about the be-havior of states. Exploratory investigationswere begun into the 1914 crisis and extendedlater into a number of other conflict situa-tions.

In February 1960 the Ford Foundationawarded Stanford University funds in orderto enlarge the research and graduate trainingthat had already begun to emerge from theseinvestigations. As developed since that time,the Studies in International Conflict and In-tegration have become a systematic programfor applying techniques from several disci-plines to the study of international relations.More recently, under a small contract withProject Michelson of the Naval OrdnanceTest Station, China Lake, the Studies under-took an assessment of the Sino-Soviet con-

The Stanford University Studies in Inter-national Conflict and Integration emergedfrom a volunteer seminar of faculty membersfrom various disciplines who met fortnightlyduring the academic year 1957-1958 to planmore effective ways of investigating the be-havior of nation states. In the course of thesediscussions it became evident that two kindsof interaction processes-the conflictual andthe integrative-could be identified as char-acteristic of national behavior throughout thecourse of history. On this basis the decisionwas made to undertake a comparative studyof international crises with the intent of clari-fying the relationship between conflict andintegration and, in the long run, testing out aseries of general hypotheses about the be-havior of states. Exploratory investigationswere begun into the 1914 crisis and extendedlater into a number of other conflict situa-tions.

In February 1960 the Ford Foundationawarded Stanford University funds in orderto enlarge the research and graduate trainingthat had already begun to emerge from theseinvestigations. As developed since that time,the Studies in International Conflict and In-tegration have become a systematic programfor applying techniques from several disci-plines to the study of international relations.More recently, under a small contract withProject Michelson of the Naval OrdnanceTest Station, China Lake, the Studies under-took an assessment of the Sino-Soviet con-

The Stanford University Studies in Inter-national Conflict and Integration emergedfrom a volunteer seminar of faculty membersfrom various disciplines who met fortnightlyduring the academic year 1957-1958 to planmore effective ways of investigating the be-havior of nation states. In the course of thesediscussions it became evident that two kindsof interaction processes-the conflictual andthe integrative-could be identified as char-acteristic of national behavior throughout thecourse of history. On this basis the decisionwas made to undertake a comparative studyof international crises with the intent of clari-fying the relationship between conflict andintegration and, in the long run, testing out aseries of general hypotheses about the be-havior of states. Exploratory investigationswere begun into the 1914 crisis and extendedlater into a number of other conflict situa-tions.

In February 1960 the Ford Foundationawarded Stanford University funds in orderto enlarge the research and graduate trainingthat had already begun to emerge from theseinvestigations. As developed since that time,the Studies in International Conflict and In-tegration have become a systematic programfor applying techniques from several disci-plines to the study of international relations.More recently, under a small contract withProject Michelson of the Naval OrdnanceTest Station, China Lake, the Studies under-took an assessment of the Sino-Soviet con-

troversy, using the same techniques andconceptual framework that were developedfor the crisis studies.

During these investigations it became ap-parent that the high stress that is almostuniversally characteristic of internationalcrisis situations tends to have a crucial effectupon the decision-making patterns of theleaderships involved. The question thenarose whether the concepts and techniqueswhich had been developed by the Studieswere appropriate and adequate for relatingand measuring the emotional phenomenaassociated with decision-making in situationsof crisis. It seemed worthwhile to take timefor appraisal.On January 12 and 13, 1962 the Studiesin International Conflict and Integrationheld a seminar on the general topic of"Decision-making in Crises." Participantsincluded members of the staff and also anumber of scholars from other institutionsengaged in conflict research. The purpose ofthe seminar was to compare decision-makingprocesses in a number of specific crisis situa-tions in terms of three general kinds offactors: (1) the calculated or anticipatedelement in decision-making; (2) the miscal-culation, or error, aspect of the decisionprocess; and (3) the emotional or affectivefactor. Participants were encouraged towrite papers emerging from their own re-search, with the consequence that both qual-itative and quantitative approaches were

troversy, using the same techniques andconceptual framework that were developedfor the crisis studies.

During these investigations it became ap-parent that the high stress that is almostuniversally characteristic of internationalcrisis situations tends to have a crucial effectupon the decision-making patterns of theleaderships involved. The question thenarose whether the concepts and techniqueswhich had been developed by the Studieswere appropriate and adequate for relatingand measuring the emotional phenomenaassociated with decision-making in situationsof crisis. It seemed worthwhile to take timefor appraisal.On January 12 and 13, 1962 the Studiesin International Conflict and Integrationheld a seminar on the general topic of"Decision-making in Crises." Participantsincluded members of the staff and also anumber of scholars from other institutionsengaged in conflict research. The purpose ofthe seminar was to compare decision-makingprocesses in a number of specific crisis situa-tions in terms of three general kinds offactors: (1) the calculated or anticipatedelement in decision-making; (2) the miscal-culation, or error, aspect of the decisionprocess; and (3) the emotional or affectivefactor. Participants were encouraged towrite papers emerging from their own re-search, with the consequence that both qual-itative and quantitative approaches were

troversy, using the same techniques andconceptual framework that were developedfor the crisis studies.

During these investigations it became ap-parent that the high stress that is almostuniversally characteristic of internationalcrisis situations tends to have a crucial effectupon the decision-making patterns of theleaderships involved. The question thenarose whether the concepts and techniqueswhich had been developed by the Studieswere appropriate and adequate for relatingand measuring the emotional phenomenaassociated with decision-making in situationsof crisis. It seemed worthwhile to take timefor appraisal.On January 12 and 13, 1962 the Studiesin International Conflict and Integrationheld a seminar on the general topic of"Decision-making in Crises." Participantsincluded members of the staff and also anumber of scholars from other institutionsengaged in conflict research. The purpose ofthe seminar was to compare decision-makingprocesses in a number of specific crisis situa-tions in terms of three general kinds offactors: (1) the calculated or anticipatedelement in decision-making; (2) the miscal-culation, or error, aspect of the decisionprocess; and (3) the emotional or affectivefactor. Participants were encouraged towrite papers emerging from their own re-search, with the consequence that both qual-itative and quantitative approaches were

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ROBERT C. NORTHOBERT C. NORTHOBERT C. NORTHrepresented,andalsocontributionshatwereprimarilymethodological.The intent of the meetings was focusedupon problemsof operationalresearch,andit seemed importantto avoid fruitless dis-cussions about "rationality"and "irration-ality." These termsmaybe useful when usedin a given societal context,but in the inter-national and intercultural pheres the samechoice frequently appears "rational" romone perspective and "irrational"rom an-other. The passage of time also plays itstricks: the decision which seemed "rational"-at the time-to those who made it mayappear increasingly "irrational"as historyunfolds.In an effort to minimize these difficultiesa set of definitions was circulated amongthe seminarparticipantsas a broad frameofreference. A decision was said to be calcu-lated or anticipated, for example, if thedecision-makerperceives the problem ac-curately,selects that alternativewhich leadsto the consequences he desires, and thenacts appropriately and consistently. Thiskindof decision is often called "rational."

A miscalculateddecision was defined asone which failed to recognizeor consider allof the alternatives,orwhichfailedto identifyor properlyassessall of the attendantconse-quences. During the summerof 1914, forexample, the Austro-Hungarianeadership,feeling threatened by the spectre of Pan-Slavism,put forward he preservationof theDual Monarchyat all costs as their majorpolicy goal. In pursuitof this goal they thenproceededto activate with considerablecon-sistency and purposefulnessthe followingmeans-endchain:mobilize-> invade Serbia-> punish Serbia-> check Pan-Slavism. Infact, of course,the Austro-Hungarianeaderswere puttingin motiona sequenceof eventsover which they soon lost control and whichled to the destructionof the Empire-the

represented,andalsocontributionshatwereprimarilymethodological.The intent of the meetings was focusedupon problemsof operationalresearch,andit seemed importantto avoid fruitless dis-cussions about "rationality"and "irration-ality." These termsmaybe useful when usedin a given societal context,but in the inter-national and intercultural pheres the samechoice frequently appears "rational" romone perspective and "irrational"rom an-other. The passage of time also plays itstricks: the decision which seemed "rational"-at the time-to those who made it mayappear increasingly "irrational"as historyunfolds.In an effort to minimize these difficultiesa set of definitions was circulated amongthe seminarparticipantsas a broad frameofreference. A decision was said to be calcu-lated or anticipated, for example, if thedecision-makerperceives the problem ac-curately,selects that alternativewhich leadsto the consequences he desires, and thenacts appropriately and consistently. Thiskindof decision is often called "rational."

A miscalculateddecision was defined asone which failed to recognizeor consider allof the alternatives,orwhichfailedto identifyor properlyassessall of the attendantconse-quences. During the summerof 1914, forexample, the Austro-Hungarianeadership,feeling threatened by the spectre of Pan-Slavism,put forward he preservationof theDual Monarchyat all costs as their majorpolicy goal. In pursuitof this goal they thenproceededto activate with considerablecon-sistency and purposefulnessthe followingmeans-endchain:mobilize-> invade Serbia-> punish Serbia-> check Pan-Slavism. Infact, of course,the Austro-Hungarianeaderswere puttingin motiona sequenceof eventsover which they soon lost control and whichled to the destructionof the Empire-the

represented,andalsocontributionshatwereprimarilymethodological.The intent of the meetings was focusedupon problemsof operationalresearch,andit seemed importantto avoid fruitless dis-cussions about "rationality"and "irration-ality." These termsmaybe useful when usedin a given societal context,but in the inter-national and intercultural pheres the samechoice frequently appears "rational" romone perspective and "irrational"rom an-other. The passage of time also plays itstricks: the decision which seemed "rational"-at the time-to those who made it mayappear increasingly "irrational"as historyunfolds.In an effort to minimize these difficultiesa set of definitions was circulated amongthe seminarparticipantsas a broad frameofreference. A decision was said to be calcu-lated or anticipated, for example, if thedecision-makerperceives the problem ac-curately,selects that alternativewhich leadsto the consequences he desires, and thenacts appropriately and consistently. Thiskindof decision is often called "rational."

A miscalculateddecision was defined asone which failed to recognizeor consider allof the alternatives,orwhichfailedto identifyor properlyassessall of the attendantconse-quences. During the summerof 1914, forexample, the Austro-Hungarianeadership,feeling threatened by the spectre of Pan-Slavism,put forward he preservationof theDual Monarchyat all costs as their majorpolicy goal. In pursuitof this goal they thenproceededto activate with considerablecon-sistency and purposefulnessthe followingmeans-endchain:mobilize-> invade Serbia-> punish Serbia-> check Pan-Slavism. Infact, of course,the Austro-Hungarianeaderswere puttingin motiona sequenceof eventsover which they soon lost control and whichled to the destructionof the Empire-the

precise outcome they were seeking to fore-stall.It was postulatedthat one expects to findmiscalculationor error emerging generallyfrom incorrect or insufficientinformation.An emotionaldecisionwas defined as onein which, as a function of high affect, analternative s chosenwhich is not the best ofthose availablein light of the decision-mak-er's own goal. For example, an analysisofthe documentsjust priorto the outbreakofWorld War I reveals that Germanyrecog-nized thathermilitaryestablishmentwas notpreparedfor a major war. Yet Germany'smost salientperceptionat that time was nother lack of power or capability,but her per-ceptionsof hostility,of being endangeredorthreatened-a tendency not uncommon inconditionsof extremecrisis (Zinnes, North,and Koch, 1961, pp. 469-82).It was recognized,of course,that virtuallyall decisions are to one degree or anothershaped by emotionalelements,and that onemight find a considerableoverlap of deci-sionsfittingthe emotionaland miscalculationcategories. Indeed, one would expect astrong correlation, n a given decision-mak-ing situation,between high negative affectand insufficient information-or misinter-preted information. On the other hand, itshouldbe entirelyfeasible, also, for a calcu-lated decision to emergefromcircumstanceshighly chargedwith emotion.There was no expectation,of course,thatthe seminar participantswould necessarilyaccept these definitions. The intent was toprovidea commonfocus for the papersandfor the ensuingdiscussions.Among professional decision-makersatthe nationaland internationalevels there isa strong tendency to perceive of oneself as"hardheaded," "realistic,"and "controlled"in crisis. Empirical evidence persuasivelysuggests, however, that the "realist" s alsovulnerable to the dynamics of fluctuating

precise outcome they were seeking to fore-stall.It was postulatedthat one expects to findmiscalculationor error emerging generallyfrom incorrect or insufficientinformation.An emotionaldecisionwas defined as onein which, as a function of high affect, analternative s chosenwhich is not the best ofthose availablein light of the decision-mak-er's own goal. For example, an analysisofthe documentsjust priorto the outbreakofWorld War I reveals that Germanyrecog-nized thathermilitaryestablishmentwas notpreparedfor a major war. Yet Germany'smost salientperceptionat that time was nother lack of power or capability,but her per-ceptionsof hostility,of being endangeredorthreatened-a tendency not uncommon inconditionsof extremecrisis (Zinnes, North,and Koch, 1961, pp. 469-82).It was recognized,of course,that virtuallyall decisions are to one degree or anothershaped by emotionalelements,and that onemight find a considerableoverlap of deci-sionsfittingthe emotionaland miscalculationcategories. Indeed, one would expect astrong correlation, n a given decision-mak-ing situation,between high negative affectand insufficient information-or misinter-preted information. On the other hand, itshouldbe entirelyfeasible, also, for a calcu-lated decision to emergefromcircumstanceshighly chargedwith emotion.There was no expectation,of course,thatthe seminar participantswould necessarilyaccept these definitions. The intent was toprovidea commonfocus for the papersandfor the ensuingdiscussions.Among professional decision-makersatthe nationaland internationalevels there isa strong tendency to perceive of oneself as"hardheaded," "realistic,"and "controlled"in crisis. Empirical evidence persuasivelysuggests, however, that the "realist" s alsovulnerable to the dynamics of fluctuating

precise outcome they were seeking to fore-stall.It was postulatedthat one expects to findmiscalculationor error emerging generallyfrom incorrect or insufficientinformation.An emotionaldecisionwas defined as onein which, as a function of high affect, analternative s chosenwhich is not the best ofthose availablein light of the decision-mak-er's own goal. For example, an analysisofthe documentsjust priorto the outbreakofWorld War I reveals that Germanyrecog-nized thathermilitaryestablishmentwas notpreparedfor a major war. Yet Germany'smost salientperceptionat that time was nother lack of power or capability,but her per-ceptionsof hostility,of being endangeredorthreatened-a tendency not uncommon inconditionsof extremecrisis (Zinnes, North,and Koch, 1961, pp. 469-82).It was recognized,of course,that virtuallyall decisions are to one degree or anothershaped by emotionalelements,and that onemight find a considerableoverlap of deci-sionsfittingthe emotionaland miscalculationcategories. Indeed, one would expect astrong correlation, n a given decision-mak-ing situation,between high negative affectand insufficient information-or misinter-preted information. On the other hand, itshouldbe entirelyfeasible, also, for a calcu-lated decision to emergefromcircumstanceshighly chargedwith emotion.There was no expectation,of course,thatthe seminar participantswould necessarilyaccept these definitions. The intent was toprovidea commonfocus for the papersandfor the ensuingdiscussions.Among professional decision-makersatthe nationaland internationalevels there isa strong tendency to perceive of oneself as"hardheaded," "realistic,"and "controlled"in crisis. Empirical evidence persuasivelysuggests, however, that the "realist" s alsovulnerable to the dynamics of fluctuating

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DECISION-MAKINGIN CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTIONECISION-MAKINGIN CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTIONECISION-MAKINGIN CRISIS: AN INTRODUCTIONaffect-and that there may well be a closecorrelationbetweenthe high"emotional on-tent" of a crisis situation-and also thedeeply nourishedhopes and fears of the de-cision-maker-and a tendency to misper-ceive and miscalculate.In developing his revised "two-factor" r"two-step"approachto behavior,0. HobartMowrerhas introducedfear and hope (andother related affects) as intervening or"mediating" ariables between the environ-mental stimulus and the behavior of thesubject. "Thus, where Behaviorism re-stricted itself to the simple, one-step S-Rformula," ccording o Mowrer,"wearehereconfrontedby the necessity of postulating,minimally, a two-step, two-stage formula:S-r: s-R, where S is the dangersignal, r theresponseof fear which is conditionedto it,and where s is the fear, experienced as adrive, which elicits (after learning) re-sponse, R" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 77). Ingrossly oversimplifiedfashion the stimuluscan be viewed as increasingor decreasingthe level of a given affect which, in turn,shapes the organism'sconsequentbehavior.If at all applicable to interational rela-tions and the behavior of states, this basichypothesissuggests that it is at least as im-portantto study the interveningaffect vari-ables as it is to analyze the environmentalstimuli or the record of decisions reachedand actions taken. Indeed, it is preciselyinthe affect phases of the interactionsystembetween two or more states that one wouldexpect to find the pulsingdynamicsof inter-national behavior. Hostile states-tradingreciprocally hreateningor punishingstimuli-build explosive accumulations of affectwhich, by a kind of reaction process or"Richardsonprocess,"give rise to increas-ingly provocative decisions and actions(Boulding,1962, pp. 25-40).The papers presentedin this issue-par-ticularlythe quantitativeones-are frankly

affect-and that there may well be a closecorrelationbetweenthe high"emotional on-tent" of a crisis situation-and also thedeeply nourishedhopes and fears of the de-cision-maker-and a tendency to misper-ceive and miscalculate.In developing his revised "two-factor" r"two-step"approachto behavior,0. HobartMowrerhas introducedfear and hope (andother related affects) as intervening or"mediating" ariables between the environ-mental stimulus and the behavior of thesubject. "Thus, where Behaviorism re-stricted itself to the simple, one-step S-Rformula," ccording o Mowrer,"wearehereconfrontedby the necessity of postulating,minimally, a two-step, two-stage formula:S-r: s-R, where S is the dangersignal, r theresponseof fear which is conditionedto it,and where s is the fear, experienced as adrive, which elicits (after learning) re-sponse, R" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 77). Ingrossly oversimplifiedfashion the stimuluscan be viewed as increasingor decreasingthe level of a given affect which, in turn,shapes the organism'sconsequentbehavior.If at all applicable to interational rela-tions and the behavior of states, this basichypothesissuggests that it is at least as im-portantto study the interveningaffect vari-ables as it is to analyze the environmentalstimuli or the record of decisions reachedand actions taken. Indeed, it is preciselyinthe affect phases of the interactionsystembetween two or more states that one wouldexpect to find the pulsingdynamicsof inter-national behavior. Hostile states-tradingreciprocally hreateningor punishingstimuli-build explosive accumulations of affectwhich, by a kind of reaction process or"Richardsonprocess,"give rise to increas-ingly provocative decisions and actions(Boulding,1962, pp. 25-40).The papers presentedin this issue-par-ticularlythe quantitativeones-are frankly

affect-and that there may well be a closecorrelationbetweenthe high"emotional on-tent" of a crisis situation-and also thedeeply nourishedhopes and fears of the de-cision-maker-and a tendency to misper-ceive and miscalculate.In developing his revised "two-factor" r"two-step"approachto behavior,0. HobartMowrerhas introducedfear and hope (andother related affects) as intervening or"mediating" ariables between the environ-mental stimulus and the behavior of thesubject. "Thus, where Behaviorism re-stricted itself to the simple, one-step S-Rformula," ccording o Mowrer,"wearehereconfrontedby the necessity of postulating,minimally, a two-step, two-stage formula:S-r: s-R, where S is the dangersignal, r theresponseof fear which is conditionedto it,and where s is the fear, experienced as adrive, which elicits (after learning) re-sponse, R" (Mowrer, 1960, p. 77). Ingrossly oversimplifiedfashion the stimuluscan be viewed as increasingor decreasingthe level of a given affect which, in turn,shapes the organism'sconsequentbehavior.If at all applicable to interational rela-tions and the behavior of states, this basichypothesissuggests that it is at least as im-portantto study the interveningaffect vari-ables as it is to analyze the environmentalstimuli or the record of decisions reachedand actions taken. Indeed, it is preciselyinthe affect phases of the interactionsystembetween two or more states that one wouldexpect to find the pulsingdynamicsof inter-national behavior. Hostile states-tradingreciprocally hreateningor punishingstimuli-build explosive accumulations of affectwhich, by a kind of reaction process or"Richardsonprocess,"give rise to increas-ingly provocative decisions and actions(Boulding,1962, pp. 25-40).The papers presentedin this issue-par-ticularlythe quantitativeones-are frankly

experimental,and we shall not be taken bysurprise f they attract criticismand contro-versy. In the attemptto go beyond hypoth-esis building-to test our propositionsempirically-we have run into unforeseendifficulties at every stage. After a year ofcontentanalysiswe discardedour 1914 data,amounting to several thousand units, andbegan all over again because our originaldefinitionshad provedtoo fuzzy. In seekingthe best available counsel on scaling tech-niques and on statistical methods we havemorethan once been confrontedby conflict-ing advice from equally competent sources.In some instanceswe have had to "invent"methodology; n otherswe have been forcedto make operationaldecisions almostby theflip of a coin.More and more, then, we perceive thatthere is frequently something to gain andsomething to lose whatever technique isadoptedor developed. In this connectionitis worth noting, for example, that Holsti,Zaninovich,and (in worksubsequentto thatreportedin her present paper) Zinneshaveused separatemethodsof scaling-each withsomethingto be said for it and somethingto be said against it. Under these circum-stances we consider multiple approacheshighly appropriate o the pioneering phasesof ourresearch.

Finally, it should be kept in mind thatmost of the quantitative work representsthousandsof hours of work by numbers ofunidentified collaborators-coders, scalingjudges, key punchers, programmers,and awide variety of consultants. The authorswouldbe amongthe firstto acknowledge hevast amountof teamworkbehind the presen-tation of their reports.

REFERENCESBOULDING, KENNETH E. Conflict and Defense.New York:Harper& Bros., 1962.MOWRER,0. HOBART. Learning Theory and

experimental,and we shall not be taken bysurprise f they attract criticismand contro-versy. In the attemptto go beyond hypoth-esis building-to test our propositionsempirically-we have run into unforeseendifficulties at every stage. After a year ofcontentanalysiswe discardedour 1914 data,amounting to several thousand units, andbegan all over again because our originaldefinitionshad provedtoo fuzzy. In seekingthe best available counsel on scaling tech-niques and on statistical methods we havemorethan once been confrontedby conflict-ing advice from equally competent sources.In some instanceswe have had to "invent"methodology; n otherswe have been forcedto make operationaldecisions almostby theflip of a coin.More and more, then, we perceive thatthere is frequently something to gain andsomething to lose whatever technique isadoptedor developed. In this connectionitis worth noting, for example, that Holsti,Zaninovich,and (in worksubsequentto thatreportedin her present paper) Zinneshaveused separatemethodsof scaling-each withsomethingto be said for it and somethingto be said against it. Under these circum-stances we consider multiple approacheshighly appropriate o the pioneering phasesof ourresearch.

Finally, it should be kept in mind thatmost of the quantitative work representsthousandsof hours of work by numbers ofunidentified collaborators-coders, scalingjudges, key punchers, programmers,and awide variety of consultants. The authorswouldbe amongthe firstto acknowledge hevast amountof teamworkbehind the presen-tation of their reports.

REFERENCESBOULDING, KENNETH E. Conflict and Defense.New York:Harper& Bros., 1962.MOWRER,0. HOBART. Learning Theory and

experimental,and we shall not be taken bysurprise f they attract criticismand contro-versy. In the attemptto go beyond hypoth-esis building-to test our propositionsempirically-we have run into unforeseendifficulties at every stage. After a year ofcontentanalysiswe discardedour 1914 data,amounting to several thousand units, andbegan all over again because our originaldefinitionshad provedtoo fuzzy. In seekingthe best available counsel on scaling tech-niques and on statistical methods we havemorethan once been confrontedby conflict-ing advice from equally competent sources.In some instanceswe have had to "invent"methodology; n otherswe have been forcedto make operationaldecisions almostby theflip of a coin.More and more, then, we perceive thatthere is frequently something to gain andsomething to lose whatever technique isadoptedor developed. In this connectionitis worth noting, for example, that Holsti,Zaninovich,and (in worksubsequentto thatreportedin her present paper) Zinneshaveused separatemethodsof scaling-each withsomethingto be said for it and somethingto be said against it. Under these circum-stances we consider multiple approacheshighly appropriate o the pioneering phasesof ourresearch.

Finally, it should be kept in mind thatmost of the quantitative work representsthousandsof hours of work by numbers ofunidentified collaborators-coders, scalingjudges, key punchers, programmers,and awide variety of consultants. The authorswouldbe amongthe firstto acknowledge hevast amountof teamworkbehind the presen-tation of their reports.

REFERENCESBOULDING, KENNETH E. Conflict and Defense.New York:Harper& Bros., 1962.MOWRER,0. HOBART. Learning Theory and

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ROBERT C. NORTHOBERT C. NORTHOBERT C. NORTHBehavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons,1960.

ZINNES,DINA A., NORTH, ROBERTC. and KocH,HOWARD., JR. "Capability,Threat and the

Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons,1960.ZINNES,DINA A., NORTH, ROBERTC. and KocH,HOWARD., JR. "Capability,Threat and the

Behavior. New York: John Wiley & Sons,1960.ZINNES,DINA A., NORTH, ROBERTC. and KocH,HOWARD., JR. "Capability,Threat and the

Outbreak of War." In JAMES N. ROSENAU(ed.), International Politics and ForeignPolicy. New York:The Free Pressof Glencoe,1961.

Outbreak of War." In JAMES N. ROSENAU(ed.), International Politics and ForeignPolicy. New York:The Free Pressof Glencoe,1961.

Outbreak of War." In JAMES N. ROSENAU(ed.), International Politics and ForeignPolicy. New York:The Free Pressof Glencoe,1961.

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