Deep Geologic Repository (DGR)for L&ILW

UNENE CourseJune 18, 2011

DGR P t ti O tliDGR Presentation Outline

• Background Informationg• DGR Project Overview• Regulatory Milestones/EA ResultsRegulatory Milestones/EA Results• Engagement• GeoscienceGeoscience • Safety Assessment• Summary• Summary

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BACKGROUND INFORMATIONBACKGROUND INFORMATION

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Nuclear Waste StreamsNuclear Waste Streams

Low level waste

Intermediate level waste

4High level waste (not placed in this DGR)

L&ILW W t E lL&ILW Waste Examples

Compactable / Incinerable

twaste

Incinerator ash

Non-processible waste –e.g. old heat exchangers

Water cleanup IX resin beads

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L&ILW A tL&ILW AmountsWaste Category Number of

ContainersContainers

LLWIncinerator ash 1,000Compacted wastes 7 000Compacted wastes 7,000Non-processible wastes 27,000Water cleanup IX resins and sludges 4,000Steam generators segments 500Sub-total LLW 39,000

ILWWater cleanup IX resins 2,000Water cleanup IX resins 2,000Water filters and equipment, core components, misc items 8,000

Retube Wastes (eg. Pressure Tubes ) 1,000Sub-total ILW 11,000

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11,000Total 50,000

W t R di ti itWaste Radioactivity

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OPG’s Western Waste Management Facility

• Over 40 years of safe interim storage• All L&ILW from OPG-owned 20 nuclear

reactors as well as the used fuel from the

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reactors, as well as the used fuel from the Bruce site

Hi t f OPG’ L&ILW DGR P j tHistory of OPG’s L&ILW DGR Project2002: OPG and Municipality of Kincardine (host for the Bruce

nuclear site) signed Memorandum of Understanding tonuclear site) signed Memorandum of Understanding to explore options for long-term management of L&ILW

2004: Completed options study, including international visitsKincardine Council selected Deep Geologic RepositoryKincardine Council selected Deep Geologic Repository (DGR) option for L&ILWOPG/Kincardine signed DGR Hosting Agreement

2005: Community Poll taken by municipality. Results favorable to y y p yundertaking the project.Project Description submitted, EA commences

2006-2009: Detailed project activities managed by OPG 2009: OPG contracted NWMO to conduct activities to obtain EA

approval and Site Preparation/Construction Licence.2010: OPG contracted NWMO to prepare detailed

design/engineering for construction

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design/engineering for construction

DGR PROJECT OVERVIEWDGR PROJECT OVERVIEW

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Aspects of the DGR Project• 200,000 m³ (as packaged)

capacity for low and

Aspects of the DGR Project

capacity for low and intermediate level waste

• Geological conditions are ideal:ideal:– DGR will be constructed in

very low - permeability limestone at 680 metreslimestone at 680 metres(2,230 ft.) beneath a 200-metre-thick (650 ft.) cap of low-permeability shale

– Multiple natural geologic barriers will safely isolate and contain the waste

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contain the waste

T i l L L l W t E l t RTypical Low Level Waste Emplacement Room

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Typical Intermediate Level Waste Emplacement RoomTypical Intermediate Level Waste Emplacement Room

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OPG/NWMO DGR S i A tOPG/NWMO DGR Service Agreement

• OPG is the owner, licensee and operator of DGR , pfor low and intermediate level waste (L&ILW)

• January 2009 - OPG contracts NWMO to provide technical services and other support through the regulatory approvals processregulatory approvals process

• Adaptive Phased Management for used fuel and• Adaptive Phased Management for used fuel and OPG’s DGR for L&ILW are separate projects

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REGULATORY PROCESSREGULATORY PROCESS

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Mil t i EA PMilestones in EA Process2005: Submitted project description to the CNSC to initiate the regulatory processregulatory process

2006: Scoping hearing to determine the level of EA

2007: Federal Minister of Environment supports Panel Environmental Assessment:

• Joint Review Panel process introduced to address EA and application for site preparation and construction license

2009: Final guidelines issued for Environmental Impact2009: Final guidelines issued for Environmental Impact Statement and Joint Review Panel Agreement

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Milestones in EA Process (continued)

2011: Submitted Environmental Impact Statement and

Milestones in EA Process (continued)

pPreliminary Safety Report – April 14th

Following submission: g• Six-month public review period for DGR will be announced

• Profile of DGR will be heightened during comment period with more media attention, both locally and internationally

• Strong public support is necessary for success of DGR Project

2012: Public hearings before Joint Review Panel• Final decision by Federal Government expected

Sit ti d t ti li t d t b t d

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• Site preparation and construction license expected to be granted

Data Gathered in Support of the EAData Gathered in Support of the EA• Four-year geologic

i ti tiinvestigation• Design/engineering• Safety Assessment• Environmental field workEnvironmental field work • Public consultation program

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f th L&ILW DGRResults of EA of the L&ILW DGR• Four years of investigations, analyses and

studies with independent peer review

• Interaction between Valued Ecosystem Components (e.g. flora and fauna) and DGR Project were assessedDGR Project were assessed

• Conclusion:

All studies indicate that the DGR Project will not have any significant adverse effects on the public or environment

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ENGAGEMENT AND TWO-WAYAND TWO-WAY DIALOGUE

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• Community relationship building

• Transparency and opennessTransparency and openness

• Multi-faceted approach

•Two-way dialogue y g

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GEOSCIENCEGEOSCIENCE

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R i l G l (1)Regional Geology (1)

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R i l G l (2)Regional Geology (2)

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R i l G l C S ti ViRegional Geology Cross Section View

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S i i M it iSeismic Monitoring

26University of Western Ontario (POLARIS)/Geologic Survey of Canada

N t l R Oil/GNatural Resources – Oil/Gas

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G l i Att ib t f DGR SitGeologic Attributes of DGR Site

1. Predictable2. Multiple Natural Barriers3. Contaminant Transport

Diffusion DominatedDiffusion Dominated4. Seismically Quiet5. Natural Resource

Potential Low6. Shallow Groundwater

Resources IsolateResources Isolate7. Geomechanically Stable

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SAFETY ASSESSMENT

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Safety Case (1)

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Safety Case (2)

Safety Assessment- Quantify potential impacts- Considers likely and unlikely scenarios- Compares against regulations- Verifies safety margin & supports optimization

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Regulatory Context

• Federal EIS Guidelines• Federal EIS Guidelines • CNSC policy P-290 – Managing radioactive wastes• CNSC guidance G-320 – Assessing the Long TermCNSC guidance G 320 Assessing the Long Term

Safety of Radioactive Waste Management• Nuclear Safety and Control Act and associated

applicable regulations• Canadian regulations and guidance consistent with

international recommendationsinternational recommendations (especially IAEA – International Atomic Energy Agency)

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Operational (Preclosure) Safety

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Accidents – Hazard Identification

 

Operating Initiating Events

Initiating Events Equipment Hazardous Materials

Hazardous Events

Consequences

Cause

Operating Initiating EventsPower failure

Equipment failureCage failureHuman error

Vehicle accidentWaste Containers

ILWLLW

Waste typeILWLLW

Inadequate shielding

Breach

Fi

Radiological

RadiologicalChemical

Radiological

Geotechnical Initiating EventsSeismic activity

Rock fall TruckForklif tCrane

Fire

Explosion

RadiologicalChemical

RadiologicalChemical

External Initiating EventsSevere rainfallExtreme wind

Extreme snow loadUnderground f looding

E t l f i

CraneHoist

Power failure

H2 and CH4 in emplacement Explosion Radiological

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External f ireAirplane crash

LightningMeteor impact

emplacement rooms

Explosion Chemical

B di A id tBounding Accidents

• FireFire• Container Breach (Low Energy)

C t i B h (Hi h E )• Container Breach (High Energy)• Inadequate Shielding• Ventilation System Failure

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Example Accident analysisExample – Accident analysis

Release Transport Effects

Q = MAR x DR x ARF x RF x LPF

Q – Amount Released

MAR – Material (Containers) At Risk

DR – Damage Ratio

ARF – Airborne Release Fraction

RF – Respirable FractionAtmospheric Dilution

LPF – Leak Path Factor VENTILATION RATE

QCP

Air Concentration

Cw

36PUBLICWORKER

Operational Safety: Summary

Normal operationsN li ibl di l i l i t t bli• Negligible radiological impacts to public

• Doses to worker within targets, and below limits.

AccidentsAccidents• Very small radiological impacts to public and workers• Below limits• Below limits

Overall consistent with WWMF experience

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Long-term (postclosure) Safety

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Scenarios Assessed

Normal Evolution ScenarioNormal Evolution Scenario• Likely future evolution of site• Assume people live on site in future.Assume people live on site in future.

Disruptive (“what if”) Scenarios• Human Intrusion:

Inadvertent intrusion into DGR via exploration borehole• Poorly Sealed Borehole:

P l l d it i ti ti b h lPoorly sealed site investigation borehole • Severe Shaft Seal Failure• Vertical Fault:

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• Vertical Fault:A vertical fault in rock opened by a large earthquake.

Illustration of Pathways Analysed forIllustration of Pathways Analysed for Normal Evolution Scenario

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Normal Evolution Scenario - Results

• Slow water seepage into DGR; full saturation expected to take more than 1,000,000 years.

• Organic wastes and steel containers degrade slowly; resulting in formation of gas, mostly methane.Almost all radioacti it is retained ithin and deca s• Almost all radioactivity is retained within, and decays within, the repository and surrounding rock.

• Negligible amounts may be released after long timesNegligible amounts may be released after long times.• Nuclides of interest: Carbon-14 as gas; Chlorine-36,

Iodine-129, Niobium-94 and Zirconium-93 in water.

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,

Example of Detailed Model ResultsProfile of Cl-36 concentration, showing

Cl-36 is retained in the rocks around DGR

42(NE-RS case)

Calculated Peak Dose Rates:Normal Evolution Scenario

Reference Case, water limitedReference Case, final preliminary design

Reference Case

Alternative critical groupsSimplified Base Case

Instant resat. & release, no sorption, no gas gen.100 m surface erosion

Instant resaturation, no gas generationIncreased inventory

Tundra climate state

r Nor

mal

Evo

lutio

n

Bac

kgro

und

Rad

iatio

n

I d ti tInstant resat. & release, no sorption, no gas gen.

Increased permeability of shaft and repository EDZsDecreased degradation rates

Simplified Base Case, water limitedNo methanogenic gas reactions

Horizontal g/w flow in Guelph and Salina A1 upper carbonateAlternative critical groups

Dos

e C

riter

ion

for

Dos

e fr

om N

atur

al B

1.0E-15 1.0E-12 1.0E-09 1.0E-06 1.0E-03 1.0E+00

Increased gas gen. & reduced shaft seal performanceIncreased gas gen. & reduced shaft seal perf., final prelim. design

Increased gas generation rates

Maximum Calculated Effective Dose (mSv/a)

Reference Case and variant cases

Simplified Base Case and variant cases

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Calculated Peak Dose Rates:Disruptive Scenarios

Severe Shaft Failure

Human Intrusion

Normal Evolution Scenario: Reference Case

grou

nd

Vertical Fault

Poorly Sealed Borehole

Severe Shaft Failure

Dos

e C

riter

ion

for

Dis

rupt

ive

Eve

nts

Dos

e fr

om N

atur

al B

ackg

Rad

iatio

n

1.0E-15 1.0E-12 1.0E-09 1.0E-06 1.0E-03 1.0E+00Maximum Calculated Effective Dose (mSv/a)

D

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SUMMARY

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DGR SummaryDGR Summary• Long-term management facility for low and intermediate nuclear waste

only. Used fuel will not be placed in the DGR.

• Extensive regulatory process is one of several mechanisms to ensure safety of public and the environment.

• Extensive community support dialogue and engagementExtensive community support, dialogue and engagement.

• Bruce nuclear site is ideally suited for DGR because of the natural attributes of the rock.

• DGR is consistent with OPG’s long-standing record of safety excellence.

• DGR will be constructed if it is safe to do so, and only with regulatory approval and community support.

• The completed peer-reviewed studies validate the safety case; the regulatory process provides oversight to confirm.

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Th kThank-you

FFor more information, please visit

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, pwww.opg.com/dgr