DEPENDENT ELITES IN POST-SOCIALISM: ARE LAND-BASED POST-COLONIAL SYSTEMS SO

DIFFERENT FROM THE TRANSCONTINENTAL ONES?

byPal TAMAS [Institute of

Sociology, HAS Budapest]

STRUCTURE OF THE PAPER

1. STATE PROBLEMS. DESTINIES AND POLICIES

2. THE MODEL DEBATE [LA]3. EURASIAN ELITE’S AUTONOMIES

IN THE 2000ES.

DEPENDENT ELITES- WEAK STATES

dependent elites = political class with shortage internal, country based legitimacy [in weak states]

Weak states- min-max - unable to control its territory - limited „violence management” -limited tax collection and financial control mechanisms -military insecurityCases: Belorus- stong dependency, but relatively strong, Ukraine- dependent, but weaker state, Georgia, Moldova- strong dependency, very weak

state

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS

a. Who does generate Post-Soviet underdevelopment?

b. What are the tools of a low cost „energy imperialism” in comparison with the classical „imperialism of free trade” [Ru-EU?] in this region?

c. How do networks, webs, or circuits of foreign origin divide the new political class?

d. Are members of the Post-Soviet intelligentsia still modernization zealots?

POSTCOLONIAL TERRITORIES

• The postcolonies can be divided into settler, nonsettler, and mixed.

• Settler postcolonies include countries that are dominated by European settlers with only sparse native populations (e.g., Australia)

• Nonsettler postcolonies are characterized by large native populations and only a small number of Europeans (e.g., India).

• Mixed postcolonies refer to countries with both sizable native and European populations (e.g., South Africa and Kenya)

POST-SOVIET ANALOGIESSETTLERS- Belorus? Ukraine?NON-SETTLERS- Georgia, UzbekistanMIXED- Moldova, Kazahstan

POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES I

Soft state (Myrdal)

• Lack of social discipline: general inclination to resist public controls / rules– both officials and citizens

• Why?– traditional authority structures destroyed by

colonialism– ‘habit’ to oppose colonial authorities

• soft state = non state

POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES II

Overdeveloped state (Alavi)

• State not grown from its social, political, economic structure

• but imposed from outside– to promote outsiders interests– by controlling and subordinating the indigenous

• This state was inherited after colonialism, an instrument:– to controll and subordinate the people– to promote the interests of the successors of the

colonizers

POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

III

Weak state (Migdal)

• low capacity of state to penetrate society– regulate social relationships– extract and use resources

• Why?

• state versus other sources of social control: – organizations / actors– which can be precolonial, colonial or postcolonial– but do originate from society and are rooted and therefore

strong– no state autonomy from these powers

POST-SOVIET STATE BUILDING- DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES

IV

Predatory State

• State as engine of predation– without providing collective goods in return

• Matter of degree, depending on relative bargaining power– social groups that control resources– state structure (democracy, etc.)– strategies:

• increase patrimonial power• smash alternative sources of power

DEVELOPMENT PARADOXES- ELITE STRATEGIES

Development malaise of the 90ies: 2x2 matrix and look at internal and external factors.

· Domestic-Destiny [structural characteristics]

· Domestic-Policy

· External-Destiny

· External-Policy

THE MODEL DEBATE

PRECONDITION OF THE SUCCESS- PRACTICAL MODELS NOT FOR COPIES, BUT FOR COMPARISONS

THE POST-SOVIETS:a. are not ready-made nation statesb. are not natural resource exportersc. not FDI heavensd. very weak internal cohesion in their

societiese. in the shadow of a regional power

without a really interested strong competitor from outside

AVAILABLE MODELS FOR POLICY DEVELOPMENTS

Applied, but inadequate: RU, EUDisscussed, but nor really applied:

Visegrad 4 [and now in their political crises?]

Not discussed, but applicable: Latin America

LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO I

LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO II

LA STATE MODELS- CARDOSO III

LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL I

LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL II

LA STATE MODELS- O’DONNELL III

LA AS A METAPHOR IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

Superficial analogies as starting points for model building:

Belorus- Mexico in the 50-60iesUkraine of Juchenko- Argentina of

PeronGeorgia- Nicaragua of the 80iesMoldova – post-civil war Central

American states [Salvador, Honduras]

SOCIETAL Networks

Routes, Capacities

Velocities and Magnitudes of trade

Organizational transformationof nodes

STATES MARKETSfrom factions & coalitions from structurally cohesiveto sovereignty - emergent k-components - emergent Spatiopolitical units Network units (overlap)

state attributes and distributions

Pop. Size Hierarchy

Urban Industries plus

Commerce, Finance

Hinterland Productivity

Dynamics from

Structural Cohesion

Unit Formation (e.g. polities)

Demography/Resources

Conflicts

CO-EVOLUTION OF POST SOVIET STATES AND SOCIETAL NETWORKS

Interference and attempts at regulation

Sources of boundary conflicts

Economic institutions and economic performance (1)

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CONCLUSIONS I

1. „Core” metropolitan interests. Ukraine, Belorus in the RU-EU energy interface, Georgia- Larger Middle East”s Rim, Moldova- only local-small borderland interests

2.Selective adaptation of „informal techniques of free trade” in each periphery

3.New cultures of „official mind” [Robinson-Gallagher] and minimalistic programs in public goods deliveries.

CONCLUSIONS II

4. reversibility/irreversibility of imperial impact and the autochthonous local histories

5. New dependencies of the core on peripherical elites. The Israeli-US Syndrom in Eurasia [relative autonomy of Lukashenko and even Transdnistria]