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THE llRISTOTEUL\N VIEW OF. TIME IN ·ISLL\MIC PHILOSOPHY*

· P.l'of. Dr. Mehmet DAG

Time, as we use it·~n our everyday l~nguage, is ~elf-evident, and no one 'doubts its existence. But when· we try ot know its quiddity ~nci essence, al t.:xplam;tions and attempts must fail. In this attempt, ı: ll the paradoxe~ inherent in the concept of time manifest themselves. As Sextus Empiı icus, when criticising the various deflnitions of time, says, «if we rely on appearances, time seems to be somethhıg but if

. w~ depend on the various arguıiıents about it, it appears to· be unreal».1

St. Augustine is -=tware of tpe di.ffkuhy in giving a satisfactory answer to the question 'what· is time?'. He· says 'what, then, ·is time? If nobody .asks me; I know; but if I try to explain it to on~ who asks me, I do not know' .2 In modern philosophy Whitehead reflects the same diffi­I'Ulty. when :he:,says; «it is impossible to meditate on 'time and the cr.eative passage of nature without an overwhelming emotion ·at tbe limhations of .human intelligence».3 Therefore, · ~o attempt is final in explaining the nature . of time. ·

.Time is genc::rally considered as a passage and as something ever" .renewing itself, ·never remaining the same. How, then, does sorriet-· lıing constituted cJ successively fleetıng 'nows' whi::h are, iı~ themselves,

( '~) Turkish version of this article w as already published iri the Review of th.e Faculty of Di.vinity, Ankara University (see, vql. XIX, Ankara 1.973,

1. Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math.; X, 169; see also, A. H. Croust. Th~ Meaning · of 'Time in tr.~ Ancient World, in the New Scholasticism (jan., 1947), p. 50.

2. St. Augustine, Confessions, Xl, 14. · 3: Whltehead, The ·concept of Nature, (Cambridge, 1920), p. 73.

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1. ·· f without extensior and consequently have no ~·;tual existence exist~ M~ny seized · up on this point in order to prove the ~İırea}ity of tim( This and other difficulties eoncerniiıg the reality · and unreality .. <>~ time were made the .subjec~ i Of a qiscussion by .Avicenria,; and . later by Fakhr al-Din al,Razl.5 · '

-Difficulties concerning. tlıe r.eality and unreaJity of time-'­Avieenna, in . his systemade treatment ,of the subject in which he

mainly follows Aristotle, makes mention of two factions: .·One group, uccording to him, accepted the tınreality of time. though atlıers held !he contrary vü•w. The former . gmup he ·.further divides into those· according_ to whom time has no external 'existe~ce wha:tsoever, and into those who granted a kind of existence . to time, not . becaiıse . it

·' exis~s in external reality in any way, .but because it exists in ·:the estimative faculty ('amr mutawahham)6

:

Those who denied existence ·to : ·tiine are. kı~own as the Sceptics ~4-th Century, 'B. c.). The representatives , of this philosophical school

• . . 1.

c:ıre Pyrrho, Arc,~silaus, Carneades •. and Sextus Empir~cus . .TheY: · .. · rıuestioned the possibility of objective knowledge of .re.ality. As ·in o.t~ l1er prob~ems, thı:.y. set themselves the task of proyir.g the ·para'doxical ııature of our knowledge of time. The difficulties mentioiıed both by

1. Aristotle and Av·:ceİına a~e indicated by Sextus Ern,piricus7 who sub: i jech. to criticisnı v·arious views on time propo,u\ıded . l;:ıy different : · ! · philosophers. The Sceptics · found their arg1;1ment!5 for.· the unreality · ·

of time on the f:3, t that tiine has !lo existerice in the 'now': Th~y. ı;ırgıiı{ :i hat if 'the .time. existed it would either be soınethirig diVisible • or ., not divisible. If it were indivisible, it would not be . possihle ·-that years; months, hotırs, · ı:ast, and fut'ure ;-;hbuld· proceed ·from ·it.a·· But if Ü

4. Avicenna, ai-Shifa' voL 1, (Teheran 1886) pp. 68-72 . . 5. Fakhr ai-DI,n' al-Razi, ai-Mabahith ai-Mashriqiyyah, (Hyderabad, · 1343 H.), '

tvol. 1, pp, 64 .. ' ff. 6. Avicenna, ai-Shifa', op, cit., voL 1, p. 68; cf. Aristotle, . Physics, IV, 10, 217 1:!: · 7. Sextus Empiriçus, Adv, Math., X, 169 · ff.; cf. Chroust,· op cit., pp:S0,-57. . 8. Avicenna, al-3hifa', op. cil,, voL 1, ~p: 68 f. The re ex'st · vari~tions betw.e~rı

Avicenr'la .and Fakhr al-Din al-Razi who say s· that if time ·w ere indivisible, '1ihere would bı:: nv difference b~tween the time of the event. whi~h has

occured to-day and that of the evenf which occured at the ti~e of inundation; . and . between Avicenna and Aristotle who argues. that if what is before and. what is after are in the same 'now', things whic.h happeried ' ten thousand years ago would be simultaneous w ith · wl')at has haı:ıpened . to-day. There also exists a difference between the account of Avcienna and . that of Sextus Em~iricus, though the po int they

1 want to ~ake is substantially . the s~me.

al-Razi, op, cil., pp, 642 f.; Aristotle, Physiq, IV, 10, 218a, 25-30.

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·were ·divisible, it would eiİher exist with all its parts or with şome of them. The first alternative i~ absuı:d, because, then, ,past ai-ıd futu­re time would ,•,..ist simultaneously. The· second alternative is also ~bsurd, becausc no parts of time exist actually. Supposing, however, that the 'present' actualy exists, then it would efther be divisible into past and .future :which were shown to. be non-existent, or it would

· be indivisible and called 'now' and not time. In any case ·it caı.ı not ı..>xıst actually. But if 'now' ~xists actually, it must either endure or · .b~come non existent. If. it endur~s, then one part of it is prior and the other posterior. But ·· both together do not corı.stitutc · the 'now', since past and (uture would then be in one 'now', which is ·absurd. If ft becomes non-existent, this must either happen in an Gıdjoirling ·now . ~heıe inteı!vening no time between them, or ~n a nm.v there intervening ;ı 1ime between them. If the :second alternative is ~rceptcd, there fol­lows the fact that the 'now' in the 1.İme has a durntion whtch we have already disproven. If it · becomes non-existent in an adjoining now there

. intezyening no 'time' bl.etween t.hem, one 'ı1ow' wm follow the . o~her continually, but this is one of the ihings whiclı those who affirmed the existence of time · denied.9 Consequently there 'i:s no way out of this difficulty.

This argument is supported hy another argument of a different :kind which comes very clos·e to C.D. Broad's objection to Aristotle tecause the latter considered time as a quality of events. Broad says, · i'Weı can not reduce· changes of time .to changes in time, since time · would· then need another time to change in, and so on ad infinitum.'10

The gist of the argument mentioned by· Avicenna and al-Razi is this: E1rery motion must have a specific time, as it has. a speclfic place~ Supposing that certain · motions took place at the same time, all th.ese times . wouİd need another time to comprehend them, and so on ad infinitum. In this case, an infinite number of times would imply an infinite number of motions, time being consequent upon motion; an. infini te number of motions would imply an infini te numl;>er. of .movables, motion depending upon the movable.; and an infinite ·number of rnovables would imply an infinite number of places, every ınovable inhering in a place. But this is abs'urd because an infinitude 6~ dimensions is impossible."

9. Avicenne, ai-ShifA', op. cit., vol. l, pp. 68-69; cf. Aristotle, P'ıysics, IV, ı10,' 218a, 3-30. .

10. Ç.D. Broad, ~c:ientific Thought, (Lon:lon, ·ı 923), p. 65. 11. Avlcenna, ' ai-ShifA', op. cit., vol. 1, p. 69; ai-Rılzi, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 64~.

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. . Another faetion who denied external existenc:e to time are those

who believed that time has existence only in the estimative faculty. ·r n holding this view, they were urged by the . above· mentioned J difficulties on the o:p.e haİıd, and by the necessity that . time .should have some kind of existence on the other. According to Ibn Sina, l th1s faculty perceives :the meaning of the particular sensible objects• . 1 and helps to differentiate between the right inferences and the wrong ories. Our beliefs :md judgements are related to this facul1.y.12 Juc:i" i gı:ments formed by this faculty are, according to ~bn Sina, ge~~rally · · .1 unreHable. It is, therefore, in the · estimative · that the form · of the · j motion which has taken place between the two points is perceived · 1

as a whol~_sınd consequently the ncition to m·easure this passage is formed in this faculty .U

The difficulty which derives from the grammatical analysis of the instant (waqt) is manifested in the view that tinıe is a riıere aggre­gate ~f instants (awqat). When, for example, we. say that such and such an · event will occur two days later, we mark an instarit, because it announces an imagined event by means of a well·known . everit, ı.amely, after the sun has risen . twice. Time is, then, accord4'ıg to . ·ıhi~ vlew the aggregate of such .instants detennined by .the relation . i>etweer. two events, one imagined and the other well-known.14

Those who accepteci the reality of time regardecı it as an eternal ~ .

sLlbstance existing necessarily (wajib al-wujud). This view was held by Iranshahri and Abfı Bakr Zakariyya al-Razi. According to them, every attempt to remove time must in fact establish its reality, since · such removal wocld . imply either a prior or a posterior . pe~iod of time: From this they infer that time must be ıeternal and ~exist nerf"ssarily by itself, without depending on motion. They, then, go oı~ · to distinguish between absolutE~ time· (dahr) and limited time. Absqlute time is th~t which is abstracted from · motion, whereas ıelative time is that which exist together with motiou, in which respect it is the· ineasu~e of motion.15 We see here a · reconciliation between ;.wo concepts which were sharply dis~inguished by "the Aristotelians.

' 12. M.Wali-ur-Rahmım, The· Psyçhology of lbn Sina, in lslamic Culture, voı.· I:X, (Hyderabad, 1935), p. 354; see also S. Pines, Nouveles Etudes sur AwhaJ

· al-Zaman Abu 1-Barakat, {Par:s, 1955), pp. ·47-50 . . 13. Avicenna, a! Shifa', op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 69-70. 14. lbid., vol. 1, p. 70; al-Razi, op. cit., vol. 1, p . 647; see also louis Massignon,

Time in lsla 'l'l·c Thought, in Man and Ti:ne, (Papers from the Eranos Yea.rboo)<s), ed. · by J. Campbell, (lonuon, 1958), p. 1,11.

15. Avi<:enna, .ı: .;ilıif3', op. cit., vol. 1, p. 70; a(-R3zi, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 651-652.

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- Vaı-ious Ul\tenable Deflnit~ons of Time--

. . Various a:ttempts to give a satisfactory definition of time were made in· Antiquity .. Avicenna subsumes them. under four ' categori~s: (..ı) Time is identifi1'!d with motion, (b) .Time is the motion of the ce­lestial sphere (harakat al-falak), (c) it is one complete revolution of the celestial sphere: :(d) it is . the celestial sphere . itself.U At is. appears, the .first · there defil1itions of time are substa~tially the same in that th~y all identify time ~-~th ·motion.

· .. Those).who .peld the firı?t view argued that among the existing

things ~round . ı{s . motion is the only thing which is divicled into past .. ~nd futüre.· That whlch has this description must be time. They further

1 . saiçl ·that time exists ofl'J when . we per~eive motion . . When, for ı i fxample, we · are. distrersed, w~ find the tim~ hanging on because

:rıotion lingers on :in ·oür mem6ry owing to such distress. But in a . s ta te of h~ppiness, mo tion· .pas ses away .quickly in our recollection. He . . \\'hp is not aware.of motioiı is not aware of time This was just the. ,çase with the Companions of the Cave (Ashab al-Kahf). They ·had no

· .:.;cÖİrs.iousness.' of the intervening time .-when they woke up. In Aristotle .·:·t:ftis is exemplified .by the fabled sleepers -of Sardinia. Avicenna menti­~~ıs Ari~totle . saying that . Aristotle' s . sleepers are historically before · ~he Companions of the Cave (Ashab .al-Kahf).17 Avicenna in al-Najah,18

aı1d Aristotle in Physics,19 cite this exaınple for a different ·purpose. 'Jheir rum .'is' to prqve the connection between time and change, not to identify .. tiİn~ with motion. '

Followi,ng' Aristotle, Avicenna · refutes this arguıJ:lent, saying that · th<"re exis'ts a · diff~rence between time and motion. Motion may be fast or. slo~; whereas tim·e is uniform arid it can only b~ short or long. Two· motions may · occur at the same time, whereas two times · cannot be . simultane9us. On the other han d, such expressl.c•ris as «huwadha» · (immediately), «baghtata-q» (all of a sudden), 'now' and . 'previously' l.anncit"be related to motion.2° ·

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16. Avicenna, ai-Shif3', op. cit., vol. ı, p. 70; cf. histotle, Physics, IV, 10, 218 . b, 30f. ~nd e-·20; SP..xtus Empiricu.s, Adv. · .Math'., X, 170ff.; see also for Sextus . Empiricus, ·Chro'ust, op. cit., · pp. 50-51.

17. Avicenna, ai-Shifa', op. cit.;' vol. 1, , p. 70; cf. ai-R3z\', op. cit., vol. 1, p. 653 .. 18. Avicenna, · al-1'-ajlllı, ed. by Kurdi; · (Cairo, 1357/1938), p. 116. · :'1~. Ar!stotle, Phy~t..is; IV, 11, · 21815;-20-25. 20. Avicenna, al-..ihif3', op. cit., vol. 1, p. 71; al-Razi, op. cit., . vol. · ı , p. 653; cf:

Aristotle, Physics, IV, 11, Z18b, 15-20.

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The second view, according to· Simplicius, was WfOD;gly_ attribu- .. tt c:i to Plato by Eudeihus, Theophrastus, and Aleximdet. · Simpliciu_s · mgues that Pl~to, like Aristotle, held tim~ to be only the measure .of motion.21 Those· who held that time ~s the prime mot~on of the celestial' 1>phere (harakat al-'ula al-falak) believed that it ~s ·-the. fastest. of mo~ tion&, since the highest celestial_ sphere traverses ~~ longer distance 1han -the other celestial spheres dut~ng the same interval of ' time. Aı cording. to Avicenna this simultaneity indicates something . other than the celestial motions.· Rather it indicates' an entity to ·wlıich all ..-e.t.stial motions are related. This entity, namely time, is, therefore; t-ssentially different from the celestial motio~s.21

In the same vein, Avicenna 'eliminates the view that the concur­rcııce 'of two events, one being well-known and the other imagineq, is indicative':. of and identical with time.23 ..

..... ...._-.....

The. identificatlons . of time with on~ compl~te revolution of 'the ceİestial sphere is refuted by. Avicenna, as also by Aristotle, by the tact. that every part of time is time, whereas a p~rt o(the revolution is not a revolutiqn.24

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Simplicius reports that the Pythagoreans hcld that time is the sp here itself. He is also of the opinion that the P;ıthagoreans probably

· .derived this notion from the assertion of Archytas who said thati -~e universal ·time is the interval of the nature of the universe.25 Aristotle holds this view to be too naive to require a refutation/6 L~ter, the Neo - Platonist Plotin.us offers a sunimary refutation of this :View, saying that this· can. hardly be true if time is not ~e. motion of the · sphere, since it was thought i ~o be the sphere on ·accoUn.t of' tlie motion.27 Avicenna and al-Razi's refutation is 'somewhat different. Both argue that their. view· depends on the premise that everything hıheres both in the sphere and in time. But this premise 'is wrong for the f~ct - that the sphere· itself is also hı time, whereas the sphere. is. not i'n anather sphere.25

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21. H.A. Wolfson, Crescas' Cirtique of Aristotle, (Camb. Mass. :1929}., pp; 634~ 22. Avicenna, ai-Sh'ifa', op. cit., voL ı, p. 71. · ' 23. lbidem. 24. lbidem; of. Aı istotle, Physics, IV, 10, 218b, 1 ~5.

25. 11.A. Wolfson, Crescas' Critique., op. · cit., p. 635. 26. Aristotle, Physics, IV, 10, 218b, 4. -27. Plotinus, Enne3ds, lll, 8, 2.0. 28. Avicenna, ai-Shifll', op. cit., vol. 1, p. 71; .ai-Rilz?, op. cit., yol. 1, p. 653.

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The above mentioned definitions of time are variously found · in Antiquity, Neo-platonists, and in Muslim and Jewish philosophical

-literature: Aristotle ·mentions two untenable view held by the earlier wr:iters: (a) Time · is the motion of the whole, (b) It is the sphere itself.29 . The former view is generally accepted to be that of · Plato . Th.is is a controversial point. Since the cosmological motive plays an im portant role iiı Plato' s philosophy both the above definition and the Aristotelian one are inherent in his plihosophy. Accorcling' to him, the celestial movements not only measure time, but also a~tually · c'onstitute it . .ıo .

The Sceptic, Sextus Empiricus31 mentions the earlier views, a~d subjects. them to .a pungent )criticism. He mentions (a) the Stoic view

· that time is the interval 6f the ··motion of ,the whole, (b)' the view attributed by some to Plato that· it is the actual motion. of the tiniverse, (c) the Arlstotelian view that it is the number of .'before· and 'after' in motion, (d) the Arjstotelian, Strato's view that' time is the measure cf motion and rest, (e) the Epicurean view that it is a coiıtigent pro­duct of . contingent products, (f) Aenesidemus' view tha~ it is corporeal.

Plotinus32 mentions three views, narriely, that (a) time is motion, (b), it is that which is :ın,oved, and (c) it is somte'hing pertainiiıg to

. . motion. \ .

. · ın 'the phiJosophical encyclopedia of the Ikhwan al-Şafa' we en-.counter. the mention· of four views, namely _(a) the popular view that time is the passage of years, months, days and hours, (b) it is the number of .the r~peated motion of the celestial sphere, (c) it is th~ duration numbered by the motions of the _celestial spherc, aııd (d) time does not bei~ng· t~ the realm of existing thiİı~s.33 •

The JeWish philosopher al-Tabrizi mentions four · views: ·(a) time exists in itself, is neither a body nor anything beionging ~o body, but ·is something which- has necessary existence in virtue of. itself, (b). it

1 is th~ duration which becomes numerically determincd by the motion of ' the celestial sphere, (c) jt is the body 'that encompasses all the

29 . . Aristotle, Physic's, IV, 10, 218b, 1. 30. Plato, Timaeu~, 37e, 1ff; 38b, 6fr; 39b, 2ff; see also F: Solm.sen, Aristotle's

System of th'.! Phy!>ical World, (lthaca-New York, '1960); p. 145. ~1. S. Empiricus, Adv. ll!'atb., X, 170ff, see cılso Chroust, op. cit.,· pp. 50-53. 32. Plotinus, En n ~ad s, lll, 7, 6. 33. Rad'il lkhw~rı· ai-Şaf3', (Beirut, 1376/1957)( vol. ll, o. 17:

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bodies. of the universe, namely the celestial equator (da'irah : mu'addil al-n~har), and (d) -it is .the motion of the ·celestial· equator.34

·

' 1 Abü'l-Baralcat differentiates ten views: . (a). time is a term without ıneanirıg (innahu jsm la ma'nallah), (b) it . has an enti'ty perceived by the senses, namely motion, (c) it is not perceived by the senses, but is conceived in the · mind as the measiıre .of mot~on (miqdar al­harakah), (d) it isa substance, (e) it is ·an accident, (f) it is rieither substance nor accident (g) it. exists, (h) it does not ıexist, (i) it ha~ ~ permanent existence, (j) it haş. an unenduring existence (lahu wujudan ·. ghayr qarr).35

I. The Aristotelian View6 of Time-1 .

a) Time and Motion.

. Two motions within the same distance and at the same velocity take pJace simultaneously, but with a diferent velocity one traverses less and the other longer distim.ce in the same period of time. br • • . . . • . 1 one may start earlier and the other later at the same velocity, . and 1he former, then, reaches the terminating . ·poiiıt before the lattei" in the same period of time. Tl;erefore there exists the possibility ~of

. their maving with gr'eater.( equal or less vel<;>city, and consequently 'of their traversing ionger, equal or less distance. This possibHity has' a corresponding measure and is connected with motion. This m~asur~ · may be t hat of distance, or that of movable. It can not be the measure of distance, for otherwise equal distances · would alw~ys be travers~d at the same time. It can not · be the measure of the movable either, for, otherwise, with the increase and decrease of this nieasure, there . would b<::· a corresponding increase or decrease of the movable. Then it is neither the measure of that which :ıs Iİloved nor that of dist~nce. On the other hap.d, it. is commonly known that this meası~re js not the motion itself, nor is it the . fastness or slowness. Similarly H can not subsist by itself, since it is liable to. elapse and everythi:rig

. which is liable to elap~.e is corruptible (fasad). Therefore this measure needs a substratum. We have already shown that its prime substratum cannot . be the matter of· the ıno,vable. It ınust, then, inhere in a.

34. 35. 36.

WoHson, Cresc&s' Crituque .. , op cit., pp. 635-636, AbOI'I-Bara~M, · K.ai-Mu'tabar, vol. lll, · (Hyderabad, 1357 /1938) p. 36. · For the deta'led analysis of Aristotı'e's view of time see J.F. ·. Callahan, Four views of Time i.n Ancient Philosophy, (Camb~idge, Massachusettes, i1948), pp. 38-86. .

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substratum through the medium of a disposition. It is not the measure. of a permanent 'dispcsition Jollowing matter. It is, then, the me~sure

· 0l aıı · unenduring dispositian ,namely motion.37 In this connection Avicenrıa ıiıentions the Companions of the Cave .

. Ibn Sina is yery emphatic on the fact that time has no connection . with rest, nor does · it measure it except accidentally ('amma al-sukfın fa'l-zaman la yata'alhıqu bihi .wa la yuqaddiruhu .'illa bi'l-'arad). As we have seen, both in Avic'enna and Aristotle, rest ·is not the absolute privation ·of mpiion. Something is · said to be at rest when it is deprived of motion, though it is .capable of motion .. It is, therefore, this kind of rest which is measured by time.38 •

Motion is divisibJe into prior and P<?steriqr. Prior C!nd posterior are manifested in dbtance by means of motion, since prior and pos- · terior in motion are irreversible, though it · is not so in distaİıce:

·In so far as ~otion posse~ses prior and posterior, it is numerable. Tt is this m.imerable aspectl of motion that. is called tiriıe. Theref0re Üine is .the nuıriber ' ('adad) bf ·motion in so ' far as the latter is divided . into prior, and posterjor: Motion and tiı~e are, according to Ibn Sina, inseparable; time would· not exist without motion, and motion without time.39 As in Aristotle, motion irp.plies every kind of change. Ibn· Sina even · goes so· far as to say that the natural bodies (al-jism al-tabi'i) are in time not in virtue of their essences but because they are in ıİıotion.40

b) Time as Measure and as Number. Aristotle generally uses . in his clefinition of time the term 'num­

be_r'41 and occasionally the word 'measure'.42 His use of the term 'x:ıumber' was made . the subject of criticism. His disciple, Strato ,of

· T .ampsacus argues that any number as . s,uch is definite and finite .,uantity; time, however, is a continuous and, hence indefinite quan­tity or rdation which for this. very reason cannot be counted in the same manner as . we count, for instanGe, finite and definite ~umbers.43

In Muslim Philosophy, 'the Ikhwan al-Şafa', among the various definitions of time; cite the one. which conforms to the Aristotelian delinition; mimely, that it is the iıumber of the motion of the celestial

. '

' 37. Avicenna, ai-Shifa', op. cit., vol. 1., p. 72; cf. ai-Najllh, op. cit., pp. 115-1;1.5 3~. Avicenna, ai-.Siıifa' op. cit., vol. 1., p 80; 'Uyun ai-Hikmah, ed. by A. BadaNi,

(Cairo, 1954), p. 28; cf. Aristotle, physics, IV., 12, 221 b, 5-20. . . :-19. Avicena, ai-Shifa', op. clt., vol. 1, p. 73: 40. lbid., p. 8Q; -'Uyun al-Hikmah, op . . cit., p. 28; cf. Aristotle, Physics, IV, ı.<.,

. 221b, 25-39. 41. Aristotle, Phv,s!cs, IV, ;11, 219b, 1-2.

· 42. Aristotle, Phy~ .es, IV, ;112, 220b, 15 .. 43. Chroust, op. ~it., p. 37 .

·48 . '

D00095s1y1986.pdf 19.01.2010 11:56:27 Page 26 (1, 2)

. :

' •i

ı: ı ·

·sphere.44 · Al-Kindi has the definition . that time is the number whlch numbers motion. He, however, specifies what he ineans by number iıı · ı his context. According to him nu~ber has tWo aspects. It is known tv be either discrete Or· continuous (muttasil). Time, he says', cannot ·be a discrete quantity, then. it must be a ·continuous qüantity.45

Ibn Sina, in his earlier work, K. al-Shifa' uses both 'number' ('adad) and 'measure' (miqdıir) in his definition of time. However, according to him, time is a continuous quantity. Time numbers motion· by means of prior . and posterior · in it. Therefore, time numbers acccir­·<.ling to that which is numbered, namely, the prior and posterior iİı · rriotior,. Time is not · a number· in the way an abstract , number is, ·for examplt. ten.46

,

The reason for calling time as the messure or the number. ac­cording· to prior and posterior is that .prior and posterior endows

· 'time with nuniber or with a measure. Prior ai:ıd posterior are, on the ·other hand, de~erri:ıined' in relation to the present ;now'. ·In this respect 'now' is considered as the unit which numbers time. Avicenna, in hi~

· ı::.ıer·books, · such as al~Najah47 and 'Uyun al-Hikmah,48 drops the word 'number' and uses instead 'measure'. This is, I think, to show that time·

·is continuous, and what is ~ontinuous cannot be numbereq. but only measured.

c) Time and the Now. . · ' As we have already indicated, for Avicenna, as for .Aristotle, tim~,

distance and motion ~re cor~sponding entities: Continuity is predi­nıted of them. Time, being contin.uous (muttasil), has a limit (hadd) perceived in the imagination. This limit is called 'now' . Does the 'now' actu'ally exist? If it has no actual exjstence, in what sense doe.;; it ex!st? Tlıese are the questions to which Avicenna tries to· answet·. ·!\ccording to. him, it has no actual existence, because if time had a !imi( · the continuity 'of time would ?e disrupted, · which is absu~d.49

· If the 'now' actuaJJy existed, the proper place for it would · eithe'r be ·at the l:ieginning or at the .en d of time. But ' it can . not be at the beginning of ·time, because time would then exist after a non~existent prior (la qabla lah), which is absurd. · Therefore it has a prior period with which it is coritinuous (muttasilan· bihi) .. ·This ' limit, .then, :. does

44. Rasıl'il lkhwıln al-Saf&', op. cit., vol. ll, p. 36. 45. Ras&'il ai-Kind'j' a i-Falsafiyyah, ~d. by AbO Ridah: (Ca i ro, 1953), vol. ll, p. 34 4-6. Avicenna, al-:>h'if!l', ep. cit., vol. ·ı, pp. 74 and 78; ·cf: · Aristotle,: Physi~s,

IV, 12,. 220b, 10-20. 47. Avicenna, ai-Naj!lh, op: cit., p. 116. 48. Avicenna, U'yOn 'ai-Hikmah, op, cit. p. 28. 49. Avicenna, al-::.hifa', op .. cit., vol. 1, p. 74.

49

. i

i · ı

ı ı

.• 1

ı !

· ı

D00095s1y1986.pdf 19.01.2010 11:56:27 Page 27 (1, 1)

,• ;

. not · divide the - p~ior and posterior, rather it ·connects tbeıp.. Nor c~n 1·his limit be at. the end of time. If this Ilmit .had no posterior period, neither the .Necessary Be~ng (wajib al-wujftd); nor : the absolute pos· . sibility would have any existence. But the fact is · that the Necessray Being and the absolute possibility -cannot' be removed. Therefôre iL inust ·have a posterior .perioı;l. In this respect 'now' -would. again be the connecting link, and not the dividing principle.50

. Time, therefore, .h;:ı.s no -actual 'now', but a potenÜal 'now'. This ,pdtentiality of the

. ··'now' is proximate .to actuality (al-quwwat al-qar!b niin al-fi'l), . that · is, t ime is i:ı,lways capable of .:being imagined as :having in itself a ·. ·'now' 'either. ex hypothesi, or by nieans of ·motion, . like . the beginning of sunrise and that of sunset.51

'Now',. when considered in relation to time, is-always ata beginning and an .end; and it is in). continuous flux, having no beginning . . That · which is in motion, that whioh is at rest, that :w hi ch is generateel , or cornipted have no initial now in·· which 'to. ı:nove ·or ·to -be at rest, gene­rated· or corrupted, for ·tiine can ·potentially be divided· ad infinitum.52

. . 'Now' ·is encompassed by 'past' ·and :future' which constitute time. ,.\nd tiİne is limited by 'now': In . this respect, now may be corripared 1o th~ extremity of a moving body.53 This ext~emity ~onstit~ting a

. point is imagi~ed to produce by its motion a liiıe. In th~ smrie way, it· may be said that. in time and in motion there ii ' something corres-

. ponding t~ a point which. produces time and mo tion. As. the extremity of the mbyipg body prodüces a continuous motion, so the 'now' pro­duces a contim.İous time. Therefore, to · the extremity of ·the moving · body. corresponds a point in çlistance and 'a 'now' . in time. SincG the extremity · of the moving body may be thought' to be indivisible, the 'now' which we have considered may ~ccôrdingly be c~nsidered to be indiv}'sible. It is by me!lns of 'now.' that · the prior and. posterior ·in

. time · can . be·. distinguished. hı this . sense, 'now' ' is ·most · · deserving t.o be a uıi.it by }Vhich to number .. 54 . . . · . • . ·

· : · : As we have already . seen, the prior : and posterior · are ··produced by·_ mot.ion in. relation to dista.nce: Therefor~ motion numbers . time by 'İ>röducing the . number . of time, namely, . the piior and posteı:ior,

so

50 Ib id ., . 'pp. 74 .75. 51 lbid., p. 75.' '52 lbidem. · ·. 53 . lbid., p. '76. 54. lbid., p. 77.

-·~ o# •

D00095s1y1986.pdf 19.01.2010 11:56:27 Page 27 (1, 2)

.... ,·

and time nurnbers motion because it i~ the number of motion. Ac­cording ıto !Ön · Şi~a, time nurn]?ers motion in two ways: Firstly it endows mo tion with a measure, and secondly ·it determines more or

1 .

1ess the quantity of its extension .(kammiyyat qadrilia). Similarly, . motic.n measures time in ·. the way that it determines its duration in ::u far as it brings into being in time the prior and posterior. · . . This is ·likt: signifying the m.easure ·with ·the meas'ured . and the. measured

· with the measure. For example, sometimes distance deterıtıines . the •.!xtent of motion and som~times mo.tioii that ()f distance. This is the casc when we say, the motion of two parasangs and the distance ct one ramyalı (the distance of a bow~shot). However, one .of. them endows the -other with a measure, that· thing being essentially the• · measure. Since time is, in .essence; continuous, · it can be said io be Jong or short, and in so far as it . is the numb~r in relation .to prior and 'posterior, it can be said to be much or. little.55

d) The Reality of Time. . , . .

Leaving as ide. the theories conçerning the unreality. · of time, we may, now, ask: does time have alı existence in external reality? Or does it only exist ·in the mind? ·Aristotle attempts to compromise thes~ two a~pects. According to · him,· ~me is :real because it exists togetper w ith motion, ·and it is conceptual because. the soul or- the mind is · a means qf judging the number of · mo tion.. Even when. ·he tries to ·show 1he re!ation . .between the 'mind and the existence of time, he speaks · ii:ı tcrms :of change which occur in thoughts·. For him·, ·such cha.İıge ]n our thoughts is adequ,.te- for the perception of tiine. However; this change in our thouglits has no better place than .the . change in ~eneral. Airstotle's intentio~ is, therefore; that motion ançl · time· are

' inseparable whether the former occurs in the mind or in · external reality.56

.

Avicenna accentuates the reality of time. For this he .resorts' to the ·relation subsisting between motion and time. If time, he.\says, did r;ıot exist in external' reality, there · woul~ exist no possibility of ·

. motion' !:i traversing distances ·at different speeds. This possibility has ::ı corresponding measure, namely, time. Therefore, the existence . of time is not due to the esti~ative faculty; it is reaP7

5'\ lbid. ı vol~ 1, ~- 77. S6. Aristotle, Phy~ics, IV, 114, 2;23a, . 25-30. 57 Avicenna, a1·5hifA', op. cit., vol. ı, p. 78.

·.5.1

' ' " ·!

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. . · Time, however., has a weaker existence rhan motion, because it ·· ·d~pencl.s ·upoh .. motion. lts existence is aiways 'in the proc~ss of beco­rning, in the serise that between the two . imaginary 'nows' th~.re is ı,oniething we call time . . Therefore, those ·who cons~dered time as

. having an existerice. merely in the .'now' are in the \vrong, since-time in no way exists in the 'İıow' .58 N or does . time exist in time, since 1here are things which do not exist in place, and things which do not exist-in time: time belongs to the second category and place to the first.59

. e) The Ultima te Cause of Time

As w~ have :already.seen, Aı:istotle and Avicenna agree on the fact that time is ~m accident of motion. What kind of'.motion is ·it of which time is an accident? Time does not depend for its existence on. eve:cy :no tion, or else\ every mo tip n would have a time. specific to it and consequently there would exist many times. Time, therefore,

· depends for its existen~e 1,on that motion which is uniform and has no limits.60 By the uniform and unlimited motion. Avicenna means celestiar motion.6ı · ·

Avieelina is well aware of the difficulties involved in accepting the uniform celestial: mo tion ·as the basis for · the existence of time. · So­meont.· may ask, he says; -'if such a motion did not e~ist, would· not

· tim~ be ·non-existent? (yafqid~)'. Avicenna encounters the a~gument by saying ·that. the circular . motion is due to a round 'body in virtıie of: which. dire;ctiöns exist. ·. Therefore, the remaining categories of motion, namely, · the rectilinear, natural and violeıit motions, depend for ,their existence on the circular motion. If we rely, he goes on, on the -imagination for . the fact that we remove the circular mo tion ·in ~he.: imagination .and prove :the reality of a finite · rectilinear mo tion; in this -way will :be established the reality of the limited time (zaman riıahdud). However, the data obtained form the imgination

. are not r~liable ·and are contradictory to the facts of external r:eality. Theref0re, time is. dependent for i ts·· existence ön the circular ·mo tion. ·It nu:Qıbers this motion ·as well as others.62

~-· .

: ','< ' ..... ... • • ••• • ; '·· "/ . . ' ..

58. lbidem. 59 Ibi dem·. 60. lbid., vol. ı, pp. 78-79. 61. . Avicenna, .ai-Naj3h,_ op. c it. p. 118; cf. Aristotle, Phy. sc, . IV, 14, 2~3b, 15~24. 6~. Avicenna, al-~hiW, op. c it., vol. ı, p. 79 ..

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Is time created or etern~l? Like Aristotle, .Avlceıi~~ is. o{tht{opi~Üoi-i . . , ·. tlıat it is eter~~: and argues from the infini te divisibÜity · 'or ~~tÜ:>h · :md time·. Only God prec~des theİn. But God's priority to .'tinle_· and· lUOtion is not a temporal priority, rather it is a priority ~ essen~e. · 1'his :is like . the . effusion of the light from the sun, and like. ~h.e . ..

. mavement of the key with the mavement of the hand: If -time were ·· · cı eated in tiıne, i ts. creat.ion would be after a period· of non-existe.nce, namely after a non - · exjstent: before. It would, , .then, · be . a.fter..' ~ before and- before an after; and .what is so, is not the beginning .of . . before, and w hat is not the . beginning of .before, is not .the ı beginniJ?.g. of time. Time,. then, has an original creation (ibdA'), not. preceded.' b any1hing except God. This. is the case with rnotion, particularly wi~h, th~ cİ1(c~hır. ıpotipn.~ · · ..

Aristotle, sympathising with. the ·Heraclitean .view, makes inention · ·· ul the cyclical nature of time. According to him, human ... affa~rs fqr_~ a circle, and that there is a circle in other things that have a movement' . acco~dihg to nature.64 The same opinions recur in rotatiqn ~m<;nıg rrıen, . not once or _twice or occasionally but infinitely often.65 The · reason \:Vhy Ar.istotle mc_ı:ıtions this is that. there is . a close connection. :.- bet­ween tim~ a,n4 .. the circıilar motipn. Aristotle, therefore, differs ~~­damentally from Heraclitus in that the latteı:; insists on the eternity of motion as well as the never-ceasing alternation of a cyclit : dest.rtic- · tion and regeı:ıeı:ation of infinite, ~o- existing or succeeding worlds . or .. , .. world-periods. The univeı;-se is alternately bom from fire . and again dissolved .. .into fire in rigidly fixed periods to all eteri?-ity.66 , This lat.ter · view was later ,incorporated ·into the Isma'ilian cosmo~o.ny:6~ • ·

1 .. • .

. . By connecti.ng tjme wi~h the' circular motion, Aviceİın~, like :Aris- · .

totle, is undeı: the influence of the older cosmologicı;tl d~eories çleriv~d _from Babylonian astroıy. .... ./ · ., · ·

Avicenna, like Aristotle, goes on to . stulticy the mythological theories that time 'is the great changer and destroyer.01

- This. 'idea· is

, r · ·. t-.. ---'--'--'----'---65. Avidmna, ai-Naj&l1, op._ cit.~ p. 117. 64. Aristotle, Phy~ ii:s, IV, 14, 223b, 24-30: 65. Aristotle, Meteordlog ka; . 1, 33, 339b, 2Sff. · · · 66 · ChroiJst, · op. .:ı l., pp.' 4-5. . 67. ·H. Corbin, Cycliı:ıll Time in Mazdaism and lsmallisim,. ln Man a~{l .Time,

· · ' · , (Papers from . the Errnos Yearbooks). ed. by J . . Compb~ll, . (lon~ion, ' 1958) , · ' ~pp.t r 115ff. . · · .

68'. Aristotle, Ph.~ ;cs, ıV. 14, 222b.-.15.'2S;, Avicenna, ai-Sh,tli', op. cit.,_ vol . .1, p. S:

53

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fri'up,d : iiı. 'Gr~k· ~}1hç>lo~y. as well as. :in . Irap.icı:n philosophico-religious system~; :ı:n . G~·eek:'.mythoıogy Chrm;u~~·~· \vho .i.s identified ·. wi~h tb,e infiilitc·time, devö'urs· his· own children.~9 In Iran, Zur.van, .the Supreme Deity, : ·i~ idertiiqaf With . . the İnfinite 'Tim~ who .creates Oh~azd aıid Al'ıiiitıan. But Zu,rvanisiİı p~s. a touch of opt~mism, since Ohrmazd,· wii9 . ~~·.: Fhe' priri;ciple ·of Goo4, will reign: in et.~rrial futurity.70

. . . ' ı · .. ·· . ,· . . . . . . .

. · Time~. according to Ibn ·Sina, is ·not the cause ·of anything. . Since ~- thing: exists·. and becon'ıes non-.existentwith· the şubsistence "of time; and~:-since'::people see no manifest 'ca use for · it, they · relate it to time. · lfthat.:thing is prais~wor.thy, they pr?tise:tiine; but if it is blameworthy,· they blame :time·.' . . However, things existing in :external ·reaHty have, in ·:most cases', (fi akthar al-'amr), manifest causes .· ·(zahirai al-'ilal), whereas non-existence and destructİori h?tve hidden cau'ses (khafl ai-. illalı): It is for this reason that. most of ·the .. things .. which they relat~ to"time 'a:r.e :tra~sitocy thiiıgs, ·nke,. for exımıple,' forgetfulıies·s (nisyan), · . . . .. .. . ı . .· ' . .· . . . . ruination, . old· age; destruation, ·.and .. so on.71 . . . . .

•:··· · . . : . \ . . .:·· · ., . . . . .

·.:·f>.:Thlngs 'that are· in T~e .. . : .. 'In,...:what . sense is -a ·. thing in time? This . question is . the starting .

i?oirit -of ·both Aristotle72 and· Avicenna. According to 'Avicenna, · a· thing : ls in time· .:in so far as the' riıotions of pdor arid posterior are predi~ ·cate.d . of ii.:. That · which . passesses · the prior and posteri ör. is 'either r,Ootioh . or something involving möt.ion. If. h ·is mo tion, the motion·s qf·. priot. and- posterior belong .to irs essence; if' it is ·s~mething whiCh

. · possf·sses mo tion, its :being prior and ' posteri ör is due· to · ınci tion. })ince sametimes · ... the spedes, ·parts and end. ·of a ' thing are said to

· be r in . that thing, 'priör' · and ~posterior', 'now', 'hours' anel 'years' ·. a:r:~ · also said to be. in time. 'Now' in· time :is like the unit in number,

... . . . . .. ·. . ~ . . ~9.:· Chroust; op.·· Git., · p. 2. . .

· 10 .. · R.C . . Zaehner, Zurvan, a .Zoroastrian Dilemma (Oxford ·1.955). p. 107. ·. 71. ' Avlcenn~, ·al-Shif&', op. cit., vol. 1, 'p, 8-. There exists a sfriking similarıt:y

between him and a seventeenth. century philosopher, Gassendi who states that ·if time ıs not a source of destrüctlon; it cannot ·be. ıı: -~ource of fertil'ıt\· or a power That ripen~ and reveals either. ·.The most . ı·robable ~ .eason why i·~ the ·seventeenrh centı.;ry time itself was · regarded .as ~ c;;ıuse. pro.yoking admi-

.. , .. _. . ratio.ri·· or· horror . . accord ing · as · .the · result~ of its all ege:! age·ncy were beneficıc.ı . :: ... :.' or harpıfu ı · ·~as thal knowledge. of tl;ı~ . real caus~s of events w as ofter ' ı'acking.

· See W. von · i.eyden, Seventeenth ca'ıituıy Metaphysics (london .1968), p. 23?. ' 72 •. Aristotle, Phyrıcs, · ıv · 12, 22.1a, Sff .

... \

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: "

1

-' /

and prior and posteri or are ' !ike· ' the . odd and ev~~- .. nuriibers; aO:d hours and days are .. like two, three and ·.ten . in num,ber.?l ·

1 • • • 1 . . . . ~

Rest is. ·also in time. · Avicenı:ia distinguishes ~o: 'ki~ds ·. of .. rest. First, it is persistent, .enduring and !eternal, .and second -the. priot anel posterior occur ·to it accide~tally, becatise prior and posterior to rest there exists motion. In . the · latter sense, rest is · not ·an :absoh.ite · privation of motion, but .is the privation ·of the ~otion · ôf · a: thing ı .1f whose function it is· to bedn mqtion. Therefore such ::rest is·: İnore ·likely .to be in 'time accidentally.74 · · · · ·:: ·

Varioiıs kinds of changes ·.wihç:h .rese~ble İ~como~io~ ·i.n: th~t -thıy · have a beginniİlg' and end are' in time, because they . .'have the: prior and posten_ 'or.75 • .• ' .. ••

'ı .

The things in w1üch exist no prior and. n~ posterior ;are .. ıiot. Un Üme, though they co-exi1!t' ~ith time,' just .as o the . ~orld: is ccrel(isteİit

o • • • .. • ı

with a mustard-seed (al-lclıardalah), brit is riot in it.76 · . . : : •

' . ' . . . . ' . •

· A thing may be in time in one respeç:t,' that is,· in·' so.' far as· ithas prior and posterior, and · not · in time in .aiıotheı: respect, . ~hat is, in··so . i·ar as it is an essence or a substance.'7 · · ''

'i ı ı 1·

ı ı

ı

ı' 1 1

That ~hich is . co-existent with .th~e out n~t . i~ ·~e is , shld. to .. .. be the .eternal duration (dahr). ·uncha.P,g~abl~ beings 'sub~ist . .ir.:. eieriıal

. duration.78 Here, Avicenna, Iili.:e. Aristoile relates time ·to eteriıity~ .. as h had al~ady · b~en done •by Plato according to ·whom·. time ·is. the . i.noving ·image ·of eternity.79 • • • • ••.• • : . . • : • .' · •. :

The relation subsisting between the periml.rient' .thl,ng~ ~d· th~ir co:existence with each other co,nstitutes a· .notion above · eternal dura­tion. It is fitting to .call ·it sahnad (perpetuity). Iri." other: words, , the subsisteiıce of o every being· without any change and .. ~ithÖtit·· aiiy,.i-ela:-tion to time - period is called sanİıad.80 · -. ·.· .

. / /

.. :_r ••• =· •• ı ..

.. '.:-. , · ... .. . :

n . Avic'enna, al-!:.hif3', 'op çit., vol. 1·, p. BO;' ai-Naj!\h-, ·~;:>. clt.,: p. 11&.' .. 74 Avicenna·, al-5hif!\', op, cit, vol. ı, p. 80; Aristotle, Phvslcs, IV, 12, . 2211:), . 5-19 : 7:.-· Avicenna, al-!>hif~', op. cit., .vol. · ı, p. 80; ·cf. Arlst~tle, .. Phys.,· .IV, : 14, .. 22iıa.. , 1~1~ 7,(:. . Avicenna, ai .. Shif3', op. 'cit., v0 !. 1, . p. 'eo. . . .. . . ;. : . .' : : ,. .: .. . . ' 77. Avicenna, al-~hifa', op.' cit., v~l. ı, so; cf. al-Naj3h, op; .clt., p ... ·116; 'UyOn ·

. al-hikmah, op. cit., p. aa. .. . \. . . . 78. Avicenna, ai-Shif!\', op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 80-81; ct. Aristotle, · f'~vsics1 IV, 12,

221b, 3-5. . o •

7~ Plato, ·Tim., 37cı, 6f.

.. ss

.!

. 1

J. ı ' 1

" ı

o o ı

D00095s1y1986.pdf 19.01.2010 11:56:27 Page 30 (1, 1)

... ·g) .Th~ Attrl~utes of 'İ'tme.· .

ı\mong: the · thingş which are · considered to . be in time · are the .. attributes (al-a.'rAd) of time wbich are represented by certain terms.

.. ... j':·· ı • ,ı • . .

. · . ·By. ~~ow' is generally un derstood the . term coııiıiıon ·to 'both past rind future. 'Now'~ acc~rding to ·Aristotle ·and Avicenna, ·has two as­pects: ·First it is · every coriımon dividing limit, thmİgh 'it inheres in the ' division-s of ·both .past and future. Second it ~s the limit ·of. time without 'indicating a connection (al~ishtirak), ·and is rightly· considered in the: ixri~gimiltion to be the ·dividing term ·and· ;not the ·cortrrecting

, · ~i~~c. 'İ'herefore ~he dividing and uniting occur. in the same· ~now', :· . ~~ough .. they .are d~fferently defined. In external reality, 'now' . is the

·~oİıne~tfug Jink."·Here Avicentıa is inainly interested in the structure of time as ~ continuous quantity .81 . · · · :

' . !· ·'Now; is :also ' used in \ he sense of a short . tim~ whieh · is most Jr6xim:aie 'to ·· tJ:ie ' ptesent i'now' . .Sometimes the duration between these two nows are 'petceptible to \ the ' min d, just as the p~iority im.d :posteriority of two iıows to one· day or · to one hour. And sol'netimes. these two .'•nows'· are so near to each other tliat the 'dtiration öetwe'en the~ . is 1niperceptible to · the · nıind.82 .

. _'All of a sudden1 (l)aghtatan) refers to a time in which an event · ,·occiırs \yh~tı .. ;i(is not expected :to occur, ··arid its duration is so :shöi·t ;-that 'it can riot . be :apprehended.83 . . : ~ ~.. . . .. '

·:: · 'In no time,. . (daf'atari) ' 11as . two ·meanings: (a) it refers to the occuretıce of an event 'ın the. 'now', and (b) it is the ·opposite of

: . gra4udly (qalil~ qa1ilan).14 . . ~ .: . ;· . . . . ; .

··.·. "Huwadha .(inünediately). refers to ·a future now .in the proximity . .qf; the:· pr~sent.: now. The .duration between these two !nciws' cannot

· really be · cUscern~d.85

Qubayl Gust) refers to a past 'now' which is near ·the preseİıt ·~ow'. Thedur!ltion between them can .be perceived. Bu'ayd (presently)

'' ' ' '

eo. ' Avi;cMıne,' ~lJShifA', Öp. c'it., 'vol. ı, p.' 81; .ct.' 'ÜyOn <'1 -Hikmah, op. cit., p. l!a \ ' .:~1.; : .~~ice'ı:iiıo, 'el;Siiif&', op . . ~it.,, · vol.. ı, p. 'S1. .

· "S!!· ·:Avicehna,· -et-Shfta', . op. ··cıt., vol. ı. p. 81; ~f . . Aristotle, _Physics, IV, 13, 222s,. 10-24 .

. si 'A.;,Jceiıne, ~1-Shifft', op. cit., vol. 1. p . . 81 . 04. lbidem. .

· · 85 _lbidem.

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is the counterı:>a.rt of qubayl and reters to the future.86 · ..

Prior (mutaqaddim) in the past · refers · to ·i past t~mc . ·fartlier troiİı the present 'now', Posterior (İm1ta'akhkhir) : in the .past . .is the opposite of the prior ·in 'the · past: Prior 'in the futu.re·· refers. · ~(): · the !Jart of time which is prc:.ıximate to the present . 'no-c.y'. _And pos'terior in thı:· future is the opposite of the prior in the future. In · the absolute _sense, prior is identic'al · w ith . the past arid posteri or wit_h · tpe f~tui·e.87

. • . , .. • • 1. • • •

Al-Qadi~ with r~spect to time is that "wl~ie'h has ~ :ıo~g· d~ration. Avicenna ~ uses this : term here in the sense of '~üicient, ··oid.'·.' In -the absolute sense, it. is that for whose · ag~ there was no begining.88

h) Time and Aviceıına's Philosophy.

Aristotle and A vicenna · confine time to the Cosmos.-. S ince the . worid is eternal, time and mo tion must · al so be eternal either accor" ding to essence, 0r with respect to İime. That which · is eternal w~th respel't ro essence is tJıat whose essence has no origin from which it exists. That which is eternal with respect to time is that for whose

. age there ~ is no beginning. · He also differentiates between the twô distinct meanings of the word 'created'. Firstly, it is that for whosc

, ' · essen cc .' there was -an origin 'by which it exists, and secondJy it is :h.at for whose age_ there was a beginning, ançl ther.e was a time .when it ' did not exist. In other words, there was a prior period

1 .

(qabJiyyah) during whkh it did not exist, and that prior period was terminated. Everything that carne to be in time must have been prece­ded by time and matter. The existence and the non-existence of this

· thing cannot be simultaneous. Therefore, its existence must be prece­;ded' by i ts non-existence. What constitutes this · period · is either ..a, quiddity partaining to i ts essence which in this case is time,· or a quicldity pertaining to something other than itself which is its time. In both cases it is a proof of the existens~ of time.09 He does not mean by non-existence absolute privation, 'dtther it is that which is capable of . existence. Avicenna gives an on,.t~logical meaning to the logical tl~rms such as posible, necessary, and impossible. The possibility of exi~tence inheres in' a substratum. This substratum is the First Matter . (hyle). Matter is the recipient of forms. That whidı is _not

86. lbidem. Cl7 lbidem; cf. A•istot!e, Physics, IV, 14, 223a, 4-15.' 8!'\ Avicenna, al-5hifa', op. cit., vol. · 1, p. 81 . e9 Avicenna, ai-Najılh, op. cit., pp . . 218-219.

r

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·preceded by the existenee of a recipient (wujud· al-qabil) cannot come to be.90 ''İ'herefore, matter, together with motion and time, is eternaL They are not preceded . by anythlng except by God. God precedes · matter, motion, · and time, not in time, but in essence. By creation

, it' must be underestood .the original creation (al-ibda'): In such creation .·time has· no·place. Seperate intelligences are ~ot in time; they precede

· each otheı: only in rank and ordcr, one being more to be preferred than the .other.91 Even in substantial things, the element of. time is to 'be belittled, sinGe change in substance occurs in no time.

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90 lbid., pp. 21 ·).4~20.

91 lbld., pp. 277f.'

,)

. , ...

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