design strategy in honda

Japanese Society for the Science of Design

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JapaneseSociety for theScience of Design

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Received Apr" 2,2002:Aocepted May 2B, 2002

DESIGN STRATEGY IN HONDA-Case

Study of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEY-

Shin'ya NAGASAWA", Shin'ya IWAKURA'", Masaki IWAIANI'

' Coltege ofBusinessAdministration. Ritsumeikan Univet:sic}L IVoji-higashi. KSatsu, Shiga 525-8577, Japan

#

School ofArt, thmaArt Uhiversic)l }hrimizu, Hachioji, 7bkyo 192-0394. Jopan

Abstract: in this paper we argue the design strategy in Honda Motor Co., Ltd. (Honda) through the case

studies of product develbpment of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEYI ln conclusion, the development

process ofCIVIC yielded the organizational capabilities to Honda: Honda has the mechanism to make a chance

for employee to meet another employee, to reduce the uncertaintyi to investigate the knowledge and ski11 of

employee. The design strategy of the process of product development of 2nd PRELUDE in Honda implies

three design elements: eternality (iinmortality) of design, fashionableness (contemporuneity), and utility

(serviceableness). The design strategy of the process of product development of ODYSSEY in Honda was

based on "the

SWOT (Strength, Weakness, Opportunities, and :freats) Analysis" in the business strategy theoryL

Design management is carried out to make up and direct the organization.

Ktywords: design sn'ateg}l destgn managemen4 ptoduct developmenL Hbndb

1. INTRODUCTION

In this paper we argue the desigri strategy in Honda

Motor Co,, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Honda)

through the case studies of product development of

CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and ODYSSEY.

CIVIC (1972) brought the basic foundation of

"product

development" to Honda, CIVIC was developed

by "pursuit

of the origin of automobile," 2nd

PRELUDE (1982) wiped out the damage and poor

reputation for Honda caused by lst PRELUDE (1978).ODYSSEY (1994) was produced to compensate the gap

between the users' needs and automobiles in the era of

frozen market after the destruction of "the

bubble

economy" in Japan.

In order to intend to look for the implication of the

domain of desigri management, we examine the

development process of CIVIC focusing its sty1ing

design. We examine that of 2nd PRELUDE focusing the

design elements that overlaid in the product development

in Honda and we also examine that of ODYSSEY

focusing the design process of the product development

in Honda.

2. CASE STUDY OF CIVIC

2.1 BackgrouDd of CIVIC

During the early 1970s, Honda was facing a serious

operating crisis, which rnade it diMcult to continue the

production of four-wheeled cars. CIVIC, which was

developed under these circumstances, provided Honda

with the infrastmcture for "Making Products" guided by

the fo11owing two principles. One was to meet the

buyer's 1ikes and social needs, and the other was to form

a foundation for Honda's core competence,

Iwakura, one of the co-authors and the former

managing director of Honda, oversaw the productdeveloprnent of

"the

first CIVIC, 1973 model" as the

project leader ofexterior design.

The purpose of this case study is to understand the

field of design management by studying the process that

was used to develop CIVIC, the result of the pursuit of

car's basic values, with a particular focus on the design,

2.2 CIVIC's Concept: Utility Minimum

Honda began to make inroads into the four-wheeled

car market in 1963, The monthly compact car sales of

N360, introduced in 1967, exceeded those of SUBARU

360 ofFiiji Heavy Industnes only three rnonths after its

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JapaneseSociety for the Science of Design

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Photo 2: [[he Second CIVIC (1979 model)

"z･

Photo 1: The First CIVIC (1972 model)

release. N360 embodied the late Mr. Soichiro Honda's

concept of artfu1 design, that is "designing a small

vehicle which looks like a bigger vehicle and large

vehicles which look like a compact."

However, the H1300 series (sedan coupe) introduced

afier the big hit of the cornpact car had low in sales

because too much stress was placed oll performance.

Such sluggish sales made it difficult for Honda to

continue business as a carmaker.

The first CIVIC model introduced in 1972 helped

Honda out of these dilficulties and was already well

under way to record the fust peak sales for the company

[his model was a product in which Honda's philosophMviz., to make cars refiecting the era, was condensed.

in other words, "product

out" was emphasized from

the viewpoint of having a brand-new shape and a unique

concept.

ln those days the motor industry usually designed

compact cars by simply shrinking 1arger cars.

However, Honda thought that smal1 cars should have

unique functions, appearaiioe and shape and approached

product development from this perspective. NamelM

Honda believed that "Utility

Minimum"･, that is

proyiding necessary functions while avoiding waste, was

essentia] for compact cars and tried to express its concept

in a clear shape.

As a result, the first model of CIVIC shown in Photo 1

had a front engine and front wheel drive (FF), 2 boxes,

and a trapezoidal shape, This stable style was a message

from Honda. It was also designed to conform to energy

saving and exhaust control regulations that came into

force at that time,

The concept of [[Utility

Minimum" or [[Basic

Car" is

still used for compact cars, but it first manifested itself

when Honda developed CIVIC.

2.3 Parallei Hetero-Development for CIVIC

Tb develop the first model of CIVC, at the outset,

Honda gave two engineering teams working alongside

each other complete freedom to exercise their creative

abilities. Deserving special mention is the fact that the

two teams belonged to different generations. NamelM

both the younger and elder geierations tried to develop a

car that met the needs of the times.

This method not only enabled both teams to inspire

each other and to arouse a sphit of competition which

acted as the prime mover for deyelopment but also was

able to combine the ideas and results generated by both

teams.

This parallel development of the two teams for the first .

CIVIC model resulted in the creation of different

concepts, but they had something in common. Trhis was

that the overall ]ength was shorter than in former

compact cars. This meant that a shorter overall length

was desired by both generations. P}is point became clear

thanks to "Parallel Hetero-DevelopmenL"

AocordinglM the overall length was revealed to be an

important issue. ln those days, five square meters was

defined as the area for a mini or compact car. Iwakura,

who was in charge of design. studied this problem and

the balance between engine design and transmission

width.

By using his integration capabilities, Iwakura, an

industrial desigrier, was able to devise a longer whee1-

base in relation to the overall length and an extremely

short overhang. TIiis layout was employed for the first

CIVIC model. The stable, trapezoidal style of this first

model was neither traditionally good looking nor stylish,

but created a design so that no one felt smal1 even though

it was small. This concept was passed on to "Honda

MONKEY" and "DAX

Honda." [[1iis meant that the first

CIVIC was not ignoTed when it sat next to a high-class

car. Moreover, it had a simple, practical desigri having no

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(a) 3-dcor hatchback

(ej CR-X

(b) 4-door sedan

(d) shuttlePhoto 3: The Third CIVIC (1983 model)

additional embellishments. Ihis point was supported by

domesticbuyers,

AccordinglM this first CIVIC was designed by

pursuing a functional and logica1 style instead of being

intuitively good looking, sornething which was difficult

to realize because of the dimensional limitations. The

style was also admired as an intelligent design and the

car was the first one for Honda to be awarded "Car

of the

Year" in 1973.

The universality of the design was proven by the fact

that the model was not changed for seven years, although

model changes were normally made every four years inJapan.

Moreover, since the car incorporated measures which

addressed environmenta] problems, such as the oil erisis,

pollution, and resouroe depletion, its commercial

marketabi]ity was appreciated not only in Japari but also

in the USA.

For exarnple, CIVIC's ISOOcc CVCC (CompoundVbrtex Controlled Combustion) engine, released in 1973,

was certified as the first eco-friendly car that met the

USA's stringent exhaust standards,

2A. Nature of the Honda Organization

As the times were changing, the "product out" concept

applied for the first CIVIC gradually became out-dated.

Therefore, through a new approach "market

in," many

improvements were adopted for the second CIVIC model

shown in Photo 2 released in 1979. However, the attempt

to satisfy too many market needs resulted in a

conservative car that failed to embody the Honda

philosophy As a result, it was not rated very highly

The third CIVIC mode) released in 1984 and shown inPhoto 3 was designed by using what Honda had learned

from the failure of the second model. Tb be more specific,"product

out" and "market

in" were appropriately

balanoed and resulted in the fojlowing four unique

variations geared to different applications: 3-door

hatcliback, 4-door sedan, CR-X, and shuttle.

The four types of the third CIVIC model were visually

distinguished and collectively referred to as "VVdnder

CIVIC," 1[lte third model became so pepular that it

received not only `CCar

of the Year" in Japan but also the"Car

Desigri Award [brino-Piemonte" in Italy

Because the development of CIVIC had such a big

impact on the organization, Honda had the creative

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energy to overturn preconceived concepts. TIhis energy

was generated by vigorous debate within the company

created when a variety of engineers having a common

purpose met together under the unifying idea of "Parallel

Hetero-Development."

Sucli vigorous debate includes three factors, all of

which point to the nature of Honda.

First, each staff member called upon to participate in a

development project has hislher own specialty as well as

unique aspirations and personalitM Therefore, opinions

from one individual wi11 inevitably come into

competitive - and ereative - confiiet with the opinions of

others in the various processes associated with making a

product, such as design, engine, body, and testing.

Next, it is important for all staff members when

entering into an argument or debate to have the sarne

level of awareness. Honda thinks that opposing opinions

provide a chaiice to understand a colleague's viewpoilt.

Participating in debate on areas outside of an individual's

specialized knowledge leads not only to learning about

these fields but also means that Honda produces

designers familiar with engines and erigineers familiarwith design.

FinalIM as the cohesion and morale of the team is high,

they are able to work positively and cheerfu11y This is

the third factor.

1[These factors were the prime mover and the "CIVIC"

was developed by engineers who understood and pursuedthe Honda philosophy ln this process, the best ideas and

solutions distilled through debate and exchange were

found and cornbined in order to make an improvement so

that the value of the final product was maximized.

It was essential to rnake these improvements and

modifications from a design point of viewL Soichiro

Honda never deviated from this belief. in brieC it shows

that a mind focused on design has taken root in the

Honda organization,

2.5 Conclusion

At the time of the development of the first CIVIC,

Honda was the last maker in Japan to join the automobileindustry and had few engineers with experience in

manufacturing cars.

Tl}erefore, late Mr. Soich iro Honda tried to ereate the

knowledge and know-how to make cars by extracting

many ideas from each staff mernber.

"Vigorous

Debate" was the most suitable means of

addressing this point. Engineers having different

backgrounds inspirod each other, which enabled them to

recognize and trigger their potential capabilities.

ln this waM Honda has developed a system where

engineers have many opportunities to meet each other,

unce'rtainty is reduced, and personal acumen is improved.

As a result, the evolution of the first CIVIC has lead to

the creation of superior organizational capabilities.

3. CASE STUDY OF SECOND PRELUDE

3.1 Background of Second PRELUDE

During the first half of the 1980s, Honda overcame the

damage and eriticism received in relation to the first

Prelude model released in 1978 by introducing the

second rpodel released in 1982. The success of this

second model hinged on the design strategy

Iwakura, one of the co-authors and a former managing

director of Honda, oversaw the product development of"the

second PRELUDE" as the manager of productstrategies in the Honda Motor Laboratory Ce. Ltd.

(hereinafter referred to as the Lab).

This case study describes what product strategies

Honda established for the second PRELUDE in order to

study under}ying design elements.

3.2 Evatuation of the First PRELUDE

During the 1970s, Honda sucoessfu11y manufactured

the first models of CIVIC and ACCORD, which were the

main 1ines of its four-wheeled business.

:Miis gave designers and engineers the extra motivation

they needed to make innovative products. There was a

natural desire to design a sports car having dilferent

qua]ities from a basic family car,

[[he first PRELUDE shown in Photo 4 clearly refiects

the Honda spirit that searches for new designs and

technical directions and it was this spirit that was

rnanifested in the final product. 'IIhe

first PRELUDE

designed employing this approach embodied a lot of new

ideas and desigris. Moreover. VI!iRNO shops were

deployed as one of the sales channels and this was a sign

of Honda's high aspirations,

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Photo 4: Tlie First PRELUDE (1978 model)

However, the US regarded this car as a typical

Japanese vehicle from both a good and bad point of view;

and Europeans called it an American car,

This means that the first PRELUDE was a productwhere the designers and engineers placed too much

emphasis on "product

out."

Japanese car magazines also called this car "Kawagoe

Benz." Kawagoe is an old-fashioned town in Saitama

Prefecture which developed a technique of producingsweet potatoes and which flourished in the past.

Thus, "Kawagoe

Benz" means a potato professingitself to the world's No. 1 or a country bumpkin posingas a sophisticated person,

Kawagoe is also the last stop on the Tbbu-Tbjo line

and farther from the center of Tbkyo than Wako-shi in

Saitama Prefectvre where the rnain factory and

laboratory of Honda are situated. Thus the epi!het"Kawagoe

Benz" contains the derisory attitude that [`both

Wiiko-shi and Kawagoe are rural areas of Saitama

equa]ly far removed from the center of Tk)kyo."

3.3 Enhancing Design Capability

Criticism aimed at the first PRELUDE caused real

damage, particularly to industrial designers, and became

a serious obstacle that had to be overcome. It is not an

exaggeration to say that calling the first mode] "Kawagoe

Benz" resulted in the advent of the second Prelude.

The negative rating of the first PRELUDE had a

severe impaet on Iwakura's thinking and design concepts,

resulting in the determination that "even

a potato can be

beautifu1 if thoroughly cleaned and refined."

Tb make PRELUDE more sophisticated, he decidedthat it was necessary to add

t`deteTgent"

(manpower,information, etc.) to remove the superfiuous features.

By carrying out refinements in this manner, the surface

became beautiful and it became possible to feel "the

wind." The wind was seen as a symbol of world trends,

Pheto 5: [1ie Second PRELUDE (1982 model)

Iwakura had the deep conviction that staff members

can have their talents honed and developed through

focusing on diversity and change,

This means that staff members who focus on change

can develop their expertise and through their desigris can

create better products. lndustrial designers who

developed in this environment and refined their design

capabilities formed the core of product development, and

it was this that became the key factor in the sucoess of

Honda's design strategies.

Unlike the first PRELUDE, the second PRELUDE

shown in Photo 5 fu11y utilized the human resources

available and was consequently rated very highly by the

market.

ln the process of developing the second PRELUDE,

Honda thoroughly investigated the problems of the first

PRELUDE not only to address thern but also to gain aclearer understanding of the expectations held by

potential buyers of Honda's sports cars.

As a result, it ereated an image for the Honda sports

Car comprising "the

smartrless of a sports car;" "the

utility of a passenger car," and t`affOrdable

price" and in

this way Honda made a fresh start in its pursuit of the

"Honda

philosophY"

The resulting second PRELUDE was born out of a

harmonization between "product out" and

"market

in"

and presented simple sophistication (beautifu1 body) as

wel] as appealing new elements.

The second PRELUDE featured a low bonnet,

retractable headlights and reasonable price. Put another

waM the car had the fo11owing attributes.

(1) Simple and good-looking sports car

(2) Cornfortable ride (at least four seats) and utility

(effective air conditioning) of passenger cars

(3) Not high]y prioed considering the above

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3.4 MM (Man-Maximum Meeha-Minimum) Concept

For the second PRELUDE, Honda lowered the height

of the bonnet Cwhere the enghe is) by 100 mm to

accommodate a design goal of ereating a silhouette that wi]1 still allow room to seat four adults.

[Miis made the PRELUDE a very exceptional case in

the history of car development where designers and

engineers ofien seramblejust to make 1 mm differences.

lmplementing such a drastic FF layout was an attempt

to simultaneously attain the silhouette of super cars such

as Ferrari and Lamborghini and the utility of sedans such

as ACCORD. This was because makers needed to be

able to recognize it as a sports car at a glance without

additional deseription and to attraet buyers via its shape,

Design strategies refieeting such a brand-new concept

were ereated by 1earning many things from the failure of

the first PRELUDE.

The success of the second PRELUDE resulted fromthis organizational learning whicii allowed the developersto orientate themselves in the same direction to clarify

the goal of the car.

in the actual deyelopment process, this unMed

awareness enabled the height of the engine to be reduced

by 100 mm to lower the bonnet, and this cliange ailowed

the engine to be positioned "mid-ship"

by tilting itbackwards. Tliis mid-ship engine (lecated in the center of

the body) rnade it easy to give buyers a sports car image.

This is because the engine, the heaviest of car

components, by being Iocated in the center of the body

can balariee the total weight to provide superior steering.

Moreover, lowering the bonnet reduces air resistance and

creates a lower silhouette.

If this silhouette was to be pursued, as anext step, itwas necessary to devise a way of preventing thesuspension from protruding, to determine where all the

devices such as an air conditioner were te be installed,and to create spaces for the passengers' feet.

This process produced both creative conflict and

coordination between designers and engineers.

Methodically solving these conflicts allowed every

component to be lowered and the clay model to becompleted.･

However, in this modeling step, the height of the head-lamps did not meet the safety standards of the Ministry

yollng American women. and elderly European cotiples

who bought it as a second car.

The reason for the popularity irrespective of age or sex

arose from the establishment of the concept called "MM"

(Man-Maximum Mechanism-Minimum) during the

development of the second PRELUDE. Ihis was

Honda's fundamental concept of making products"minimizing

mechanical parts maximizes human-used t:spaces,

3.5 Conclusion

Tlie design strategies deployed in the development of

the second PRELUDE included the following three

elements, al1 of which were regarded as essential by

Iwakura.

The first one was universality <stabilityi of design.

This means what it should essentially be (intrinsiccharacteristics) and, in the case of vehicles, it should be

regarded as a tool for moving humans and things.

[[herefore, design work must appeal to the common

elements of taste and good sense shared by all peoplewithout distinction as to nationality or generation, and

must pursue a universal elegance.

Ihe second is advanoernent (in advance of time) indesign. A variety' of values are attached to things, so

design should reflect the preferences of people and

should be in concert with the mood and tastes of the

tirnes. Advanced design needs to matcii not only the

present time but also anticipate the future. 1[he realizationof this dictum will yield totally unique creations never

before seen. Suci] noyelty is essential for design.

The third is service (utility) in design. This means that

design must contribute in a real way to improying thelives of people both materially and culturally Tb do this,

it is necessary to have a certain goal when designing

things that will be used in a practical way For design tobe serviceable, it is necessary to enhance the positiveelements of really necessary functions and to elirninate

the negative elements as far as possible. [[he MMc6ncept reflects this perfectly

The second PRELUDE was a car that had universality

and utility and was in perfect harmony with its time.

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Photo 6: The Fifth ACCORD (1993 model)

4. CASE STUDY OF ODYSSEY

4.1 Background of ODYSSEY

in 1994 during the stagriant market following the

collapse of the Japariese bubble economM Hondaintroduced ODYSSEY to the market in order to bridgethe gap in buyer's needs.

A"he erest of the bubble economy'there was a boom

in ]arge high-class cars headed by CIMA, a Nissan

deluxe car. It was catled the "CIMA

Phenomenon,"

luxurious things went mainstream, and 1arge, deluxe cars

became popular with buyers,

Under such circumstanoes, how did Honda come to

make ODYSSEY? This case study examines the design

strategies deployed in the development of ODYSSEY;

Honda's first reereational yehicle (RV).

4.2 Creating Strategies through SWOT Analysis

Since having no car 1ike CIMA in the middle of the

bubble economM Honda introduced 1arge cars by

widening INSPIRE and VIGOR in order to allow themounting of a 1arger engine (2.5 liters).

However, such unimaginative expedients were not

suthcient to impress buyers.

in the automobile market during and after the bubble

period, instead of sedans, buyers started to focus on one-

box cars based on commercial motor vehicles ]ike

Toyota's HIACE and Mitsubishi's PAJERO as well as

non-passenger cars tieep-like off-road vehicles), s}

called RVs (called mini-vans or SUVs (Sports UtilityVehicle) in the US).

However, Honda had been mainly manufacturing

highly ethcient cars, such as CIVIC and AocORI)

shown in Photo 6, and did not have any vehicles fitting

this new category.

Sinoe the facilities of the production 1ines in Honda's

factories were desigried to elificiently manufacture

passenger cars with a Jow rooC Honda cou]d not make

Photo 7: The First ODYSSEY (1994 rnodel)

of [[ransport because the bonnet was too lo-; resulting in

no oertification for sales.

Therefore, Honda quickly changed to a mechanism

where the headlights popped up when they were turned

on.

As significant as it was, the pop-up function was very

attractive and came into a sort of fashion. Had thisfeature not been made, the seoond PRELUDE would not

have been supported by buyers.

Coming out of these processes, the design of the

second PRELUDE had a significant irnpact on fashionand its cliarm and sophistication cast a spell over a broadrange of buyers. These included young Japanese men,

high-roof cars. 'ln

addition, Honda had neither dieselengines nor commercial motor vehicles which could bethe base for the development of an RVL

in this situation where Honda did not have any productthat met the needs of the .time, the company saw

domestic sales of its four-wheel vehicles decrease. The

worst domestic annual sales recorded fe11 below six

hundred thousand units.

Iwakura, one of the corauthors and a former managing

director of Honda, was a planning director at that time

and organized a working team to study the causes of the

slump, devise realistic countermeasures, and set goals.

The working team analyzed h(rw Honda responded to

both sucoess and failure in order to cornpile a reservoir of

hints and ideas to assist the advanoement of the company

Tliis means that Honda tried to find a way out by lookingback over the past.

in the field of business strategy this is called "SWOT

Analysis." This rnethod allows a company to identify its

strengths and weaknesses, to understand in-house core

competencies, and to recognize opportunities and threatshidden in the external enyironrnent in order to establish

strategies. This approach can coordinate or adapt a

company's capabilities and potential so that these may

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manifest themselves in the market.

Strategies developed in this fashion resulted in the

development of ODYSSEY shown in Photo 7.

ODYSSEY was a product born out of Honda learning

about their own history of prodllct development by

employing SWOT analysis.

4.3 Destroying the Commercial One-Box Concept

When developing ODYSSEY; Honda focused on

meeting the buyer's realistic needs in order to identify

any opportunities that may have remained hidden in the

market, The source of these needs was to be found in the

US that was looking at the mini-van markeL As typified

by Chrysler, American･mini-vans had a big bodM V6

engine, and seven to eight seats.

Honda then had ACCORD whose price was around

that of the vehicles referred to above (22 to 23 thousand

dollars). However, it was a sedan having a four-cylinder

engine and four to five seats.

Therefore, Honda started to study how to design a

seven-seat car with the same price as ACCORD. FinalIM

Honda tried to make an American-sized car based on

ACCORD, using the V6 engine of LEGEND.

[[his was product development that tapped inio the

company's existing strengths. ln this development

process, to evaluate this heavier car, Honda used the

ACCORD wagon with an additional weight of about 100

kg to conduct a driving test on a variety of roads around

bos Angeles.

The results of the test in the US showed that the test

car was better thari American V6 cars in terms of driving

performarlce.

The next problem was whether or not mini-van-sized

cars could be manufactured using the existing productionlines of the factories. Among all the factories across the

world, Honda looked fOr a factory where the height of

the production 1ines (particularly the painting 1ine) could

be changed.

FinaliM the answer was the Sayama factory in Saitama

where it seemed that the height problem could be

addressed.

in this waM ODYSSEY was designed through adding

a variety of practical features to the ACCORD wagon.

Meanwhile, the sales departments had the fol]owing

requirements: (1) diesej engine, (2) sliding door, (3)rotating face-to-face seats, and (4) high roof However, the development team reviewed the

functionality of each requirement and arrived at the

following a]ternative solutions.

(1) A diesel engine was common for the one-box cars of

other carmakers and had the advantages of costs and fuel

efficiency On the other hand, there were problems of

vibration and black exhaust. As a result, Honda decided

to employ a gasoline engine.

(2) instead of a sliding door, Honda adopted four swing

doors which were more stable and easy to handle.

(3) lnstead of rotating face-t"face seats, Honda

employed a center aisle and walk through seats which

allowed passengers to move and third-row built-in seats

which could be folded away into thcrfieor.

(4) Concerning the height, Honda pursued driving

stability and handling comfort in the selection of a design

which allowed passengers to rnove inside the car even

though the roof was lowL

As mentioned above, ail the elements that were not

met demands ofthe sales departments were improved.

AccordinglM ODYSSEY was a car that creatively

destroyed the prevailing concept of cornmercial one-box

cars. Compared with mini-vans in the US and one-box

cars in Japan, ODYSSEY had a two-rank smaller size

and lower roofi

4.4 How to Sell Multiple-Passenger Cars

Just as the preparation for selling ODYSSET in the US

was about to be completed, the yen increased in strength.

AccordinglM Honda searched for a market in Japan.

However, a survey carried out by the company

indicated that sales might be low in the Japanese market

because all the common-sense points of commercial one-

box cars hag been changed.

However, assuming that the scope for one-box cars

was wider than that for commercial one-box cars

generally defined in Japan, and provided that the one-box

cars were defined as a multiple-passenger car like a

wagon or mini-van and as a little fun car, there was stil] a

possibility for suocessfu1 sales.

Based of this surveM Honda reviewed the appeal of

ODYSSEY as a mu]tiple-passenger sedan, compared to

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ACCORD. ODYSSEY had two more seats than

ACCORD but both were designed for famiJies and the

prices were almost the same,

Moreover, the approach to selling ODYSSEY was

changed drastically Prior to this time, Honda had

ernployed a sales strategy which classified their products on the basis of characteristics, that is, the Honda outlets

were divided into the CLIO shop (conservalive), the

PRIMO shop (casual), and the VERNO shop (sporty).This system resulted in a sales monopoly situation and

ethciency was not high as a consequence.

Tb address this problem, Honda decided to sell

ODYSSEY through the three sales channe]s. One reason

why this cliange was accepted at that time was thatODYSSEY was the only new car ayailable, so naturally

all three channels wanted it However. three-channel

sales raised the danger of different prices, inconsistent

service, and a drop in qllality [[herefore, Honda issued an

ordeT to prohibit the CLIO shop invested mostly frem

makingdiscounts.

This policy also affected the PRIMO and VERNO

shops, resulting in no channel making discounts.

AccordinglM the three channels competed with each

other through the provision of services such as night and

ho]iday main' tenance, courtesy cars, free tune-up of cars

being used, etc. rather than through discounts.

4.5 Conclusion

The development of ODYSSEY fo]lowed definite

strategies based on the SWOT analysis. The important

elements are to formulate such strategies through a

process of compromise and reconciling internal and

external evaluations, to assess them througli the vision

and values of the executive body, and to select an

appropriatedirection.

Strategies chosen through the process above must be

implemented, This is because corporate strategies are

very creative activities and only through harmony

between internal and external parties can they berealized.

Tlte key factors are to be sensitive to g]obal trends and

human psychologM and for companies, products, and

designers to measure up to the expectations set by society

and customers.

THE

Tb do this, every person in an organization must have

a mind focused on design, which means that individua]s

must understand what good products and corporate

actiyities are.

Tb establish such an organization and to successfully

direct it to a realizable goal are the essenoe of design

management.

5 CONCLVDING REMARKS

ln thjs paper we argue the design strategy in Honda

Motor Co., I;td. (Honda) through the case studies of

product development of CIVIC, 2nd PRELUDE and

ODYSSEYL

ln order to intend to Jook for the implication of the

domain of design management, we examined the

development process of CIVIC 'focusing

its styling

design. in conclusion, we found out that the development

process of CrVIC yielded the organizational capabilities

to Honda; Honda has the mechanism to make a chance

for employee to meet another employee, to reduce the

unceriaintM to investigate the knowiedge and skill of

employee. As a result, the evolution of CIVIC has 1ead tothe creation of superior organizational capabilities.

VVe examined the developrnent prooess of 2nd

PRELUDE focusing the design elements that overlaid in

the product development in Honda. We understood that

the design strategy of the prcrcess of. produetdevelopment of 2nd PEUiLUDE in Honda implies three

design elements: eternality (immortalit" of design,

fashionableness (contemporaneity), and utility

(seryiceableness). We also examined the deyelopment process of

ODYSSEY focusing the design process of the productdevelopment in Honda. We pointed out that the design

strategy of the process of product development of

ODYSSEY in Honda was based on "the

SWOT

(Strength, VVeakness, Opportunities, and Tteats)

Analysis" in the business strategy theoryL The important

elements are to formulate sucli strategies through a

process of cornpromise and reconciling internal and

external evaluations.

in Honda, design management is carried out to make

up and direct the organ ization.

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Acknowledgment

All of photos are presented by Honda Motor Co., Ltd..

Ilie authors would 1ike to show their deep appreciation to

Honda Motor Co., I:td. for the courtesy

REFERENCES

1. S. Nagasawa, S. Iwakura, M. Iwatani, Design Strategy

in Honda (1) -Case Study of CIVIC-, Ihoceedings of

48th Cotijlerence ctfJ4panese Society for the SZience ctf

Design, pp.176-177, 2001

2. M, Iwatani, S. Nagasawa, S. Iwakura, Design Strategy

in Honda (2) -Case Study of 2nd PRELUDE -, ibid.,

pp.178-179.20013. S. Iwakura, S. Nagasawa, M. Iwatani, Design Strategy

in Honda (3) -Case Study of ODYSSEY-, ibid.,

pp.180-181, 2001

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