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Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire Review Prescott National Forest, U.S. Forest Service

National Oversight Review

National Incident Management Organization

5/12/2014

Doce Fire Programmatic/Cost Fire ReviewPrescott National Forest U.S. Forest ServiceMay 2014

“We will successfully manage fire on the landscape and fully evaluate risks with a broad perspective and consideration for

the people we serve and the landscapes we protect.”

Thomas L. Tidwell, Chief U.S. Forest Service

Table of Contents

Table of Contents.............................................................................................................................1Purpose............................................................................................................................................2Doce Fire Summary.........................................................................................................................2Doce Fire Chronology.....................................................................................................................5Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations................................................................6Lessons Learned............................................................................................................................14Recommendations..........................................................................................................................14Observations..................................................................................................................................16

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Objective of this Review

The primary objective of these Programmatic/Cost Fire Reviews is to evaluate and document risk management decision processes and actions taken on incidents and their direct or indirect effect on costs. The review and objective analysis provides recommendations to management for incident-specific and programmatic process improvements based on comprehensive analysis of incident documentation.

This allows for improvement of program performance, operations, evaluation of costs, and facilitates the application of focused improvements. In addition, the reviews provide an opportunity to evaluate the clarity of communication of the Chief’s Leader Intent and the effectiveness of implementation in the field.

The results of the reviews provide information crucial to the well-established learning environment and continued improvement in fire management in the U.S. Forest Service.


Purpose

On December 20, 2013, James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry (S&PF), issued a letter identifying ten large fires that occurred in Fiscal Year 2013 to be reviewed by the National Incident Management Organization (NIMO). This letter emphasized the responsibility of the Forest Service to evaluate management actions and assure they were appropriate, risk-based, and effective. The wildfires were selected based on their complexity and national significance. They were specifically intended to provide a cross section of the risk management performance in wildland fires of various costs, sizes, and oversight complexity.

On January 17, 2014, Tom Harbour, Director of Fire and Aviation Management (FAM), delivered a letter to the Regional Fire Director, R3, identifying Judy Palmer, Finance Section Chief, NIMO, as the lead to conduct the reviews on the Doce and Silver Fires. The purpose of selecting these two large fire reviews is to learn from those who were directly involved in decision making and share those lessons based on the 2012 Risk Decision Framework—which was included with the May 25, 2012 Wildfire Guidance letter signed by Deputy Chief James Hubbard.

Upon receipt of the Director’s letter, the Review Team Leader met with the Region 3 Fire Director to discuss the review’s purpose and establish a process for how to best meet the review’s overall objectives. In addition, pertinent fire documentation was identified as well as several individuals who could contribute information and serve as perspective interviewees. Interviews were scheduled and conducted by the review team throughout February and March 2014.

Doce Fire Summary

[This section tells the story of the Doce Fire, including management decision-making regarding objectives, strategy and

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Review Objectives

Objectively look at actions taken by the Incident Management Team and the local Agency Administrator to meet the direction provided by the Forest Service Chief

Asses the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome

Identify best business practices used on fires this past season

Identify how social and political issues factored into our decision making

Identify which current procedures can be enhanced or expanded

Identify improvements that can be made in sharing and clarifying expectations.

Review Team Members

Judy Palmer, Team Lead, Finance Section Chief, NIMO

John Truett, Operations Section Chief, NIMO

Gene Madden, Safety Officer, NIMO

Bea Day, FFMO, Cibola NF

Sue Zahn, Contract Operations Program Manager, FAM, Region 5

Paul Keller, Writer-Editor, Wildland Fire Lessons Learned Center


tactics—how strategy and tactics were always focused on assuring firefighter and public safety and the protection of values at risk.] The human-caused Doce [pronounced “Dough-See”] Fire started June 18, 2013 at 1100 Mountain Daylight Time (MDT) on the Prescott National Forest eight miles northwest of Prescott, AZ. The fire’s origin was near Doce Pit, a popular dispersed recreational shooting area located on the Bradshaw Ranger District off Iron Springs Road near the Granite Mountain Recreation Area.

Initially reported at four acres, the wind-driven fire rapidly grew to 70 acres, spotting and torching across the north side of Iron Springs Road, a two-lane paved county road.

The fire crested the saddle of Granite Mountain, spreading quickly north and east up into the Granite Mountain Wilderness. It was actively burning in heavy timber and brush toward residential areas.

A very aggressive Initial Attack (IA) response was nearly immediate at the Type III level with commensurate organization and qualifications on this fast-moving fire as it burned toward numerous subdivisions with multiple homes. Many of the fire personnel assigned to IA were local resources who also served on the Southwest Type 1 Incident Management Team (IMT) that was ultimately ordered for the Doce Fire. Consequently, this enabled these personnel to better understand the local effect of fire, weather, and fuels. They were also familiar with the affected communities.

By the end of the Doce Fire’s first day, it had already encompassed 5,000 acres. Due to the fire’s complexity and critical values at risk, the Type 1 IMT was ordered by the Forest on June 18, 2013. On the morning of June 19, 2013, the Type 1 IMT took command of the fire. The IMT’s transition was expedited due to the fact that many of the Type 1 IMT members had been involved in the fire’s IA.Type 3 IMT Initial Strategy

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Within the first hours of Initial Attack, the Doce Fire—seen here on its first day—spreads to 600 acres—threatening homes and evacuating residents. Temperature is in the mid-80s, humidity is only eight percent, and from 12 to 30 mph winds are pushing the fire.

Photo taken on the Doce Fire’s first day, June 18, 2013. As the fire approaches several communities, structure protection around communities and evacuation of residents becomes a top priority.


The initial strategy on the Doce Fire was to use air tanker retardant drops along the fire’s flanks going direct along the fire’s flaming front. The strategy’s objective was to tie the fire into Blair Pass, an area of rocks and low-fuel loading. This strategy proved effective where the retardant was applied along the fire’s flanks.

At the head of the fire, due to prior extreme drought and dry fuel conditions, the fire continued to burn through Blair Pass and made a downhill run toward the Wildland Urban Interface (WUI) area. Realizing the threat the fire now posed, the Prescott National Forest’s Agency Administrator (AA), various cooperators, and the Type 3 managers met to discuss values at risk and the potential strategies and tactics to be implemented.

Indirect Strategy AttainsMultiple Benefits

During the fire’s first few shifts, an indirect strategy, focused primarily on the fire’s head and northern end, was planned and implemented. At the same time, direct strategies were being implemented, where appropriate, elsewhere on the fire.

This strategy and tactic: Allowed firefighters time to prepare indirect fire lines ahead of the main fire and

initiate strategic burnout operations where they could be safely conducted; Ensured protection of the Prescott National Forest’s resources; Ensured structure protection to be in place around the evacuated communities.

By the Doce Fire’s third day, June 20, 2013 the wildfire was estimated at 6,732 acres with an additional 400 acres resulting from firing operations. At this time, the IMT had achieved a containment of 10 percent at an estimated cost of $1 million primarily due to aviation assets. On this third day, hundreds of residents had been evacuated. Additional subdivisions were put on notice for possible evacuation.

Due to favorable changing conditions, by the end of this third day, the IMT was able to implement a direct suppression strategy on those

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Initial strategy on the Doce Fire included using air tankers to drop fire retardant along the fire’s flanks to slow the fire’s progress.

The Doce Fire’s flame front burns toward the Wildland-Urban Interface on the fire’s first day. Due to extreme fire behavior and exceptionally rugged terrain, firefighter and public safety is immediately identified as the primary value at risk on this incident.


portions of the fire that had previously undergone an indirect strategy. At this time, the fire was basically contained. (It would increase another 35 acres before official containment.)

Critical Values at Risk

Due to extreme fire behavior and exceptionally rugged terrain, firefighter and public safety was identified as the primary value at risk on the Doce Fire. Multiple communities were threatened by this fire. During IA, evacuations were ordered for hundreds of residents. Because of these evacuations, per pre-season planning, an evacuation center was opened. Animal disaster services also provided shelter for animals.

Doce Fire Chronology

Day(s) Date Command

Size [From209s] Actions

PercentContained Cost

1 06/18 Type 3 6,500

Doce Fire starts and T-1 IMT

ordered0 $250,000

2-806/19

-26 Type 1 6,767T-1 IMT assumes command 6/19 90 $6,495,330

9-20

06/27-

07/08 Type 3 6,767T-3 IMT assumes

command on 6/27100 $6,877,285

21-2307/09

-11 Type 4/5 6,767 District 100 $6,877,285

“We assess, analyze, communicate, and share risk before, during, and after incidents.”

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Heavy or Type 1 water-dropping helicopters work the Doce Fire on its sixth day. Due to the successful—appropriate, risk-based, and effective—management actions, by the fire’s second and third burning periods, the outer fire perimeter became secure and the threat to the Wildland-Urban Interface was reduced.


Thomas L. Tidwell, ChiefU.S. Forest Service

Meeting the Six Review Objectives – Key Observations

1) Objectively Look at Actions Taken by the Incident Management Team and the Local Agency Administrator to Meet the Direction Provided by the Forest Service Chief.

Pre-season meetings were conducted between several cooperating agencies. Through these meetings, open dialogue and a line of communication was established between the Forest Service, Prescott Fire Department, Central Yavapai Fire District, multiple other fire districts, Prescott Police Department, Yavapai County Sheriff’s Department, Yavapai County Emergency Services, Arizona Game and Fish Department, Arizona Public Service, Arizona Division of Forestry, and the Prescott Area Wildland Urban Interface Commission (PAWUIC), as well as various other groups.

Key discussion items at these pre-season meetings included: values at risk, fuels treatment, and planning and coordinating county-wide full-scale wildland fire drills in preparation for the upcoming fire season. These exercises (structure triage and complex incident response) involved the Forest and the local fire and emergency management agencies’ assets. These pre-season drills have strengthened relationships and demonstrated the variety of skill sets and resource capabilities of the agencies involved in this beneficial collaboration. Additionally, these drills and pre-season meetings helped establish an across-the-board familiarity with the potential values at risk and enhanced working relationships and trust.

The Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season and the 2012 Risk Decision Framework, along with the “Five Rights”1, have become standard operating procedures on the Prescott National Forest. Therefore, Leader’s Intent from the AA on the Doce Fire was very clear from the start: 1) Keep the fire small, 2) Protect private property, and 3) Minimize damage to private lands.

“Safety is not just how we do our work; it is the essence of how we

make decisions.”

1 The “Five Rights” from James Hubbard, Deputy Chief for State and Private Forestry, U.S. Forest Service; 2012 Wildfire Guidance: “Effective interaction between agency administrators and incident commanders is essential to safe, efficient and effective management of incidents, utilizing: 1) The Right Plan (as informed by the Risk Decision Framework); 2) in the Right Place (where we have a reasonable probability of success); 3) at the Right Time (when we have favorable conditions for efficient and effective suppression); 4) with the Right Assets (those suppression assets needed to safely implement tactics in support of reasonable objectives);5) for the Right Duration (release resources as soon as they are no longer needed).”

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“We do not accept unnecessary riskor transfer it to our partners.”


Using Liaison Officers (LOFRs) and having stakeholders meeting during the Doce Fire proved beneficial to all agencies and residents involved. The LOFRs served in various constructive capacities to the communities. First, they were able to immediately address and listen to the citizens’ concerns and communicate these issues to the appropriate parties. By having a public “face” the community knew, anxiety levels were kept to a minimum. When the IMT held community meetings to explain strategy and tactics, the LOFRs were able to help people understand and accept the provided information.

2) Asses the consideration and effectiveness of applying risk management concepts to incident cost through the associated decisions and expenditures as an outcome.

Many of the IA personnel were local resources with extensive knowledge of the Doce Fire area. This expertise included potential fire behavior in this area especially when burning in the chaparral as well as “knowing” the community.

The IMT and AA held frequent discussions on both direct and indirect strategies and building opportunities to do both, while always ensuring that contingencies were in place. At every critical decision point, they also worked to ensure that key partners and cooperators had an opportunity to provide input and share their thoughts. Risk management, safety of personnel, and cost containment proved to be the overriding priorities in these management discussions.

Throughout the chronology of the Doce Fire, the IMT was tasked with effectively managing costs of the incident by: “Planning strategies and tactics aimed toward achieving a high probability of success in meeting incident objectives; and seeking opportunities to reduce costs or be smart in their spending throughout the duration of the incident without jeopardizing success or impacting risk mitigation.”

While many of the fire strategies and tactics planned for and implemented on this incident, such as the decision to go from indirect to direct, addressed exposure concerns (such as steep, rugged terrain; rolling debris; etc.) these management decisions also helped in overall cost effectiveness.

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To illustrate, decisions made in the field to limit firefighter exposure were based on areas scouted by interagency hotshot crew superintendents and division supervisors prior to inserting personnel into these identified high-risk areas. At the same time, optimum areas were identified based on firefighter safety and protecting values at risk where indirect fire tactics could best be implemented.

These successful strategies helped to shorten the duration of the fire and firefighter exposure which, in turn, helped to reduce the costs of these actions and return critical suppression resources back into the availability pool.

Once the fire front either slowed or its progression was impeded, a discussion was immediately held among Operations, the IMT’s Incident Commander, and the Forest regarding opportunities for implementing a more direct suppression strategy.

Due to these successful appropriate, risk-based, and effective management actions, by the second and third burning periods, the outer fire perimeter became secure and the threat to the WUI was reduced. In addition, this significant transition enabled the IMT to place more emphasis on tactics and strategies aimed at protecting the Granite Mountain Wilderness values and resources.

The option to burn out in the lower country also limited the more expensive use of aircraft. This option, as opposed to going with direct fire suppression in the higher country, also meant the need for less personnel and interagency hotshot crews.

Another cost saving and risk reducing tactic included using contract masticators and chippers to prep roads in the chaparral reducing the need for fire crews to prep this vegetation.

Generating Positive Cost Containment through Resource Awareness and Management

Early in the incident, a demobilization plan was developed. As fire and suppression conditions warranted, resources were released and reassigned. Aerial resources were also released rapidly. The Call When Needed (CWN) helicopters were released early and replaced with the less expensive Exclusive Use helicopters, reducing the incident’s overall costs.

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Throughout the duration of the Doce Fire, close coordination and communication was always maintained with the Southwest Coordination Center (SWCC) regarding resource needs on this incident as well as other ongoing incidents in the Region. A constant evaluation of resource need and what resources could be released from the Doce Fire was a top priority.

Early Decision to Transfer Fire Management Back to Local Unit Helps Reduce Incident Costs

While some areas of heat and portions of uncontrolled fireline still existed within the Doce Fire, it was determined that the fire’s escape potential was low. Discussions continued to be held with stakeholders. The decision was made, rather than keep the (large) Type 1 IMT in place, management of the fire would be transferred back to the local unit. This appropriate risk-based and effective decision/strategy helped to reduce the incident’s overall costs.

The understanding and trust developed between the Forest and its stakeholders and cooperators, that had been established during the pre-season meetings [see previous Objective 1] helped all interested parties agree to and appreciate this cost-saving management transition.

3) Identify Best Business Practices Used on Fires this Past Season

On April 15, 2013, two months prior to the Doce Fire, the Prescott National Forest held a meeting to share and discuss the importance of the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season with local stakeholders, local fire departments, the Arizona Game and Fish Department, Forest Line Officers, District Rangers, and Fire Management Officers.

Cooperation and support of each other’s role was a strong, common theme at this meeting. Healthy discussions focused on values at risk and land resources that were a high priority to each agency/cooperator/partner. A key objective was to strive for a common understanding and identify these different values. Forest Service policy and the use of managed fire on the landscape was also part of the discussion. Shared risk and the Line Officer’s decision space were explained and discussed. This also permitted the Prescott National Forest to share the limited areas where large-scale managed fired can be utilized.

“We assess, analyze, communicate, and share risk

before, during, and after incidents.”

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Thomas L. Tidwell, ChiefU.S. Forest Service

Providing Cost Information Prior to the Fire Season and During Incidents

Every year prior to the fire season, the Prescott National Forest puts together a virtual kit which includes a template for a Delegation of Authority (DOA) letter for high-complexity fires for incident management teams. Specific language in the DOA is included to provide cost information to assist in developing Cost Share agreements by apportioning costs by resource ownership, jurisdictional effort, or by operational period. On incidents, this information is also addressed at the in-briefing, as well as during subsequent discussions such as releasing resources as conditions allow.

Intergovernmental Involvement

For the past two decades, the Prescott National Forest has built a solid foundation for encouraging and continuing its strong history of intergovernmental involvement. This includes involvement with County Emergency Service, local fire departments, Arizona State Division of Forestry, Arizona Department of Air Quality, the surrounding cities, the Bureau of Land Management, and other miscellaneous government and quasi-government entities.

Prescott Area Wildland-Urban Interface Commission

The PAWUIC is focused on fire protection within the area’s communities and has a healthy involvement with the National Fire Protection Association’s “Firewise” Communities Program.

Scenario-Based Drills

For more than a decade, Federal, State and local and private agencies/organizations in this area have been meeting and coordinating annual “Basin Operation Drills” in which they conduct a “scenario-based” mutual-aid incident exercise.

“Before, during, and after every fire we enhance relationships.”

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Assisting on Type 3 All-Hazard Scenarios

Members of the Prescott National Forest have also served as coaches on Type 3 All-Hazard Scenarios in part, to build local capacity and capability. In addition, the Forest and its Districts participate in the County Chiefs’ Association’s meetings on training and planning. This has led to numerous trainings and sand table exercises held with local fire departments, as well as partnering on prescribed burns with these multiple cooperating agencies.

Identifying Values at Risk – Life and Property Number One Priority

The annual “Fire Refresher” for the Resource Advisor (READ) and the annual review of the Wildland Fire Decision Support System (WFDSS) were combined in 2013 on the Prescott National Forest. Among several benefits, this allowed for a larger group outside of fire leadership to become familiar with the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season. Additionally, this enabled the Forest to acquaint the Resource Advisors with the values at risk in the Forest within a variety of functional areas including discussions on common values and priorities. It was agreed and noted that, over all, life and property is the number one priority.

Other Successful Practices in Preparing for a Fire Incident

In addition, the Prescott National Forest at the Forest and District levels conducted a tabletop simulation and WFDSS exercise with the key focus on READs and fire. The Forest’s Acquisition Management Staff worked on pre-season agreements, had them in place and had already initiated conversations with local landowners. The Forest also preplanned and identified potential fire camp locations.

These pre-season meetings helped prepare the acting Forest Supervisor for a larger fire with an IMT. Furthermore, prior to the Doce Fire, the Prescott National Forest acting Forest Supervisor took advantage of an off-Forest AA “shadow” assignment. The Region had set up such opportunities for Line Officers to shadow others on fires that occurred within the Region.

The Region had also established a pool of coaches from the Region for less experienced Line Officers who wanted the benefit of having experience on incidents. When the Doce

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Fire started, a neighboring Forest Supervisor was assigned to the Prescott National Forest to coach the acting Forest Supervisor.

Throughout the Doce Fire, the acting Forest Supervisor (or his representative) and Incident Commander met daily at 1300 MDT to discuss the current fire, values, concerns, costs and planned actions. This proved to be an excellent method for working and collaborating with the IMT keeping communications open and establishing vital, effective relationships and trust throughout the incident. Moreover, the acting Forest Supervisor and the Forest’s acting fire staff were well engaged beyond these daily 1300 MDT meetings. They also attended evening planning meetings, morning briefings, and participated in other informal discussions with the Incident Commander and IMT members.

4) Identify How Social and Political Issues Factored Into Our Decision Making

The acting Forest Supervisor attended a pre-season strategy meeting with Yavapai County, local fire departments, and Forest Service staff and fire personnel on his first day. This enabled him to immediately tap into these positive relationships with partners and stakeholders.

Topics discussed at this pre-season meeting included the Chief’s Letter of Intent for the 2013 Fire Season and values at risk. The Yavapai County representative was very involved and had a broad knowledge of the area’s values including economics and tourism. Good collaboration and a clear understanding of everyone’s values was a prevalent theme at this meeting. The Yavapai County Fire Management Plan was also discussed.

Aggressive Initial Attack had Buy-In from City of Prescott, Partners and Cooperators

During the first 48 hours on this incident, the decision was made to utilize aviation resources to increase the ground resources’ ability for protection of values at risk. While this IA strategy added to the fire’s overall cost, this initial use of aerial retardant helped keep the fire from entering into the WUI.

The Doce Fire was located just west/southwest of thousands of homes west of the city of Prescott. During the summer fire season, southwest winds are the predominant winds. Therefore, this fire was positioned in an area of concern for local officials. This was due primarily to the impact the fire could have upon the residential communities

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and the potential negative impact upon the economy. Fortunately, due to existing long-term relationships and pre-season engagement sessions that expanded the community’s partners and cooperators into the decision making process, no one was surprised or in disagreement with the strategies employed on the Doce Fire, which included: 1) The initial strategies and tactics using available air resources to check the rapid spread of the fire, 2) Burn out operations, and 3) Direct attack when/where it could be safely conducted.

5) Identify Which Current Procedures Can Be Enhanced or Expanded

Cost Apportionment with State of Arizona

For the last two years, the Region has been working with the State of Arizona on using a cost apportionment model that all parties consider fiscally fair. Incoming IMTs should be aware of this model. They should begin to track resources and costs as soon as they take command of an incident. Continued efforts need to ensure that IMTs understand the cost apportionment guidelines/process and how to apply it.

6) Identify Improvements That Can Be Made In Sharing and Clarifying Expectations

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A public meeting is held on the Doce Fire’s second day.


Past Incidents Should Not Bias Our Expectations and Management Actions on Current Fires

Due to the proximity of the WUI, the initial strategy on previous fires in this area has always been aggressive IA.

In 1990, another large fire occurred here, also called the Doce Fire. Many IMT members on the 2013 fire had also been on the 1990 fire. They, therefore, had a previous conception of potential fire behavior in this area. However, the 2013 fire did not meet their previous mental models. The 1990 fire died down the first evening and never crossed the top of Granite Mountain. The 2013 fire spread rapidly over the top of Granite Mountain late on the incident’s first day, June 18, 2013.

Doce Fire Provided Fuel Treatment in Chaparral Areas that will have Future Positive Impacts

The footprint from the 2013 Doce Fire has now provided effective fuel treatment in areas that should allow for more fire resistance for the next two decades. In the future, fires in this area may be successfully managed with different tactics and strategies that will be less costly and more conducive to firefighter safety.

Lessons Learned

Recommendations

Continue to Improve on Communication with Cooperators and Stakeholders

Continue to improve on communication with cooperators and stakeholders to manage fuel loading, improve efficiencies, reduce risk to firefighters/communities, and provide coordinated response to incidents as provided in the National Cohesive Strategy.

Ensure a Forest PAO is Always Available During Fire Season

When the Doce Fire started, the Forest’s Public Affairs Officer was on leave. An acting PAO had not yet been identified. Thus, until the Forest was able to get a PAO onboard no one was specifically assigned to handle this position’s duties, roles and the production of various products. This oversight presented challenges as to who was responsible for getting critical information out in a timely manner. In the future, during the fire season, the Forest should always ensure that it has a PAO or acting in place.

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Need an Interagency Guideline for Cost Appropriation Protocols

There was a Cost Apportionment Team in place on the Doce Fire that consisted of Forest Service and State employees.

It would assist the AA and IMTs if everyone had a better understanding of and general guidelines regarding cost appropriation and protocols. During the pre-season, it should also be ensured that expectations on this subject are understood and agreed upon across agencies.

Need for Cost Apportionment Process Training

In 2012, the Region collaborated with the State of Arizona on cost apportionment, the Doce Fire was the third incident since this effort was initiated. Under this cost apportionment model, costs are based on effort. This process is modeled after the Region 5 cost apportionment system.

Future efforts should focus on cost apportionment process training for AAs, Line Officers, Fire Managers, and cooperators. IMTs should also be included in this training effort, with a focus on Division Supervisors and Operations Section Chiefs.

Assign a Lead Resource Advisor to Serve as Liaison between Resource Advisors and IMT

Initially there was confusion and some mixed messages between the READs and the IMT. This was resolved by having a lead READ serve as a liaison between the READs and IMT to ensure the same message was communicated.

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Observations

Short Duration Fire with Very Good Outcome

The Doce Fire was a short duration wildfire with a very good outcome. Everyone involved, including the Mayor, the county commissioners, and emergency management administrators and personnel, all believed that the IMT effectively met the desired end state.

Use of Aviation Resources on this Fire

During the Doce Fire’s IA there was a rapid spread and a strong aerial suppression presence due to values at risk located to the fire’s northeast. Thus, within the fire’s first 30 hours, heavy retardant use in conjunction with ground crew efforts occurred on the fire’s flanks. This strategy proved very effective in this fuel type, keeping the fire out of the WUI.

The majority of the retardant use occurred during the first Type 3 IMT’s management of the fire. The Type 1 IMT continued with the plan that had been established by the Type 3 IMT. (The Type 1 Incident Commander served as Operations on the Type 3 IMT.)

It should be noted that the Forest’s Prescott Fire Center (air tanker base) was located less than five minutes flight time away from the Doce Fire. This permitted rapid turnaround for air tankers.

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A DC-10 applies aerial retardant on the Doce Fire.


Reconsider the Timing of this Fire Review

Both the Forest and Region felt that this fire review could have been done earlier, either during the incident or in the fall. The earlier review would have also lent itself well to being available for learning prior to the calendar year 2014 fire season. As of November 2014, final review of draft is occurring for use as a tool in calendar year 2015 fire season. Delay concerns are two-fold: 1) difficulty to conduct review in spring, and 2) delayed available lessons for 2014 fire season. Spring is a very busy time for Region 3, with seasonal fire hiring and spring fire training occurring. When this review is released, the Forest therefore needs to be given the appropriate lead time to ensure that they have talking points prior to it going public on the web.

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