Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of

about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were

shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the

houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those

women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have

produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by

affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or

(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to

be present.

Issue:

1) Whether or not the respondents had authority to deport the women to Davao; and

2) Whether or not the City of Manila has jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to Davao

Held:

The Supreme Court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was

commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force Filipino women to change their domicile from

manila to another place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still filipino

citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The right to

freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered tantamount to slavery.

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for

nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in

the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the

municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that

the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

The true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his

power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be

compelled to do so.

Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before

the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of

police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao,

the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.

The essential object and purpose of writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary

restraint, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. If the mayor and the chief of

police could deport the women, they must have the means to return them from Davao to Manila. The

respondents may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her

domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts. The great writ of liberty may not be easily

evaded. No one of the defense offered constituted a legitimate bar to the granting of the writ of habeas

corpus.

The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her

liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the

person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not

thus be easily evaded.

Senate of the Phils. v Executive Secretary

G.R. No. 169777  April 20, 2006

Facts:

1.     Assailed in this petition was the constitutionality of Executive Order 464 issued by the President.

Petitioners contend that the President abused its power and prayed that said law be declared null and

void. EO 464 requires that heads of departments obtain the consent of the President before they can

validly appear before investigations including the one conducted in the Senate. It also grants executive

privilege on all classified or confidential information between the President and the public officers

covered by the EO.

2.       The Senate conducted an investigation and issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive department as resource speakers in a public hearing on the North Rail project. Said public

hearing was sparked by a privilege speech of Sen.  Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the alleged

overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the said project. The Senate

Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations to officials of the AFP.

3.       Executive Ermita sent a letter to the Senate requesting postponement of the hearing. On the

same day (Sept 28, 2005) the President issued EO 464.  Despite this development, the investigation

pushed through, with only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited

attending. Both were subsequently relieved for defying the President’s order.

4.      Hence, three petitions (Bayan Muna, Sen. Chavez, Alt.. Law Group), for certiorari and

prohibition and TRO, were filed before the Supreme Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.

ISSUE 1: Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress

YES. EO 464 bars the appearance of executive officials before the Congress, hence it deprives it of

the information in possession of these officials.

1.       The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Sec. 21 Article VI of the Constitution.

This power is incidental to the legislative function. The power of inquiry – with process to enforce it -- is

an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate

wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting conditions which the legislation is

intended to affect or change; and when it does not possess the required information, recourse must be

had on others who possess it. This power is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch.

The operation of the government is a proper subject for investigation, as held in Arnault case.

2.     Although the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of

inquiry, which fall under the rubric of ‘executive privilege’.  It is defined by Schwartz as “the power of

the government to withhold information from the public, the courts and the Congress.” (e.g. state

secret privilege, informer’s privilege, generic privilege)

3.     The power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the

lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive

branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by

refusing to comply with its demands for information. The oversight function of Congress may be

facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is

consistent with the intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.

4.     Congress undoubtedly, has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought

in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is

privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.

The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional

requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons

therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. 

5.       Executive privilege, whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized

only in relation to certain types of information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a

constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it

and the context in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are

exempt from the duty to disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the

extraordinary character of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against

executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.

Sec. 21 (Inquiry in Aid of Legislation) vs Sec. 22 (Question Hour)

6.       A distinction was made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While

attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of

legislation. These are two distinct functions of the legislature. Sec. 21 and 22 while closely related

does not pertain to the same power of the Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct

inquiries in aid of legislation with the aim of eliciting information that may be used in legislation while

the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain

information in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function. Hence, the oversight function of Congress may

only be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.

7.       When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for the department heads to exempt

themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege, and not by the mere fact that they are department

heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power – the president on whom the

executive power is vested, hence beyond the reach of the Congress except by the power of

impeachment. Members of SC are likewise exempt from this power of inquiry. This is on the basis of

separation of powers and fiscal autonomy, as well as the constitutional independence of the judiciary.

On the constitutionality of EO 464

8.       Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the

absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its

application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of

said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances

must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional. Section 1 cannot,

however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is

not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such inquiry,

unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the

Executive Secretary.

9.     Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated. Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore,

cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it sanctions claims of executive privilege.

This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege authorized by the Order to determine

whether it is valid. The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus

invalid per se. It is not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons

for the claim, it merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not

given her consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of

information is justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry

of Congress.

10.  The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, just as

direct as its violation of the legislature’s power of inquiry.

11.   Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought

in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is

privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm

provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for

information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By

the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of

legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. Resort to any means then by which officials of the

executive branch could refuse to divulge information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall

not have merely nullified the power of our legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but

we shall have given up something of much greater value – our right as a people to take part in

government.