edoren thematic research on ˜identifying, recruiting and … · executive summary this literature...

EDOREN Thematic Research on “Identifying, Recruiting and Deploying Effective Teachers”Phase 2 Literature Review: “How should the system be reformed to better ensure effective teachers are recruited and deployed to priority schools?”

Victor SteenbergenAugust 2016

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TableofContentExecutive Summary 2

1 Introduction 51.1 Use of This Paper 51.2 Methodology 51.3 Overview 5

2 Recruitment and Deployment Processes in Northern Nigeria 62.1 Introduction 62.2 Formal teacher recruitment and deployment process (through SUBEB) 62.3 Informal teacher replacement process through local government 82.4 Temporary Teachers Recruited through the Federal Teachers Scheme. 102.5 Summary and Implications 11

3 Policy Options on Recruitment and Deployment Processes 123.1 Recruitment 123.2 Deployment 193.3 Summary and Implications 24

4 Putting It All Together: Four Policy Options 254.1 Introduction 254.2 Four Policy Options 254.3 Summary and Implications 28

5 How Best to Utilise Policy Options 295.1 Where to Get Policy Ideas From 295.2 A Framework for Assessment – The Three A’s 305.3 Taking Your First Step: Trying it out and Learning 33

References 34

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ExecutiveSummary

ThisliteraturereviewispartofawiderpieceofThematicResearchconductedbyEDOREN(EducationData,ResearchandEvaluationinNigeriainitiative)on“Identifying,recruitinganddeployingeffectiveteachers”.ThisoverallstudyisconductedbyStateResearchTeams,consistingofeducationpolicymakersandacademicsfromKanoandKadunaState.Tosupportthisprocess,EDOREN’sisprovidinganoverviewof“policyoptions”,illustratedthroughdifferentcountryexamples,toimproveteacherrecruitmentanddeployment.Byprovidingbroadideas,theaimistostimulatediscussionanddebatewithinStateResearchTeamstogetinspirationfromothercontexts,thatcanfeedintotheirresearch.

Chapter2:CurrentRecruitmentandDeploymentProcesses

Inchaptertwo,abriefdescriptionisprovidedofthecurrentprocesstorecruitinganddeployingteachersinNorthernNigeria.Thisshowsthatwhilerecruitmentisofficiallystructuredaroundastate-basedprocessofformalexaminationsandinterviews,inpracticeitisdominatedbylocalgovernmentsandinfluencedbypressuresfromlocalpoliticalelites.Unqualifiedteachersareemployedbasedontheirrecommendations,passingofffakecertificatesorimpersonatingotherteachers.Allthewhile,thereislittlespaceforotheractors,suchasheadteachers,toensureadequatequalitystandardsandensureappropriatematchingofcandidatestoeachschool’sneeds.Thissuggeststhatthesystemwouldbenefitfromreform,forinstancebymakingitmoreresponsivetoheadteachers’views,orbymovingrecruitmentawayfromlocalgovernmentdiscretionaryhiringandensuringitmovestowardsaformal,test-basedrecruitmentsystem.

Thischapteralsoshowstheimpactthatdifferentrecruitmentsystemshaveondeployment.Whenthestateisresponsibleforrecruitmentand‘blindly’poststeacherstoruralschools,thisoftenleadstolargelevelsof‘refusals’.Moreover,itunderminestheformalsystem,asteacherstendtousetheirinformalinfluencingchannelstogetmovedtoadifferentlocation.Whenlocalgovernmentsselecttheirowncandidates(ashashappenedde-facto,inmanystates),thisimprovestheiroverallamountofteachersemployed,thoughthisisoftenrealisedbyrecruitinglocalswhoareunqualifiedtobeteachers.

Chapter3:PolicyOptionsonRecruitmentandDeployment

Inchapter3,weprovideanoverviewofdifferentpolicyoptionsfromaroundtheworldtoimprovingrecruitmentanddeployment.Notably,verydifferentrecommendationscomeoutofeachsection.

Toensurerecruitmentofthebestteachers,itoftenhelpstocentralisethesystemandadoptastructured,formalrecruitmentprocess.Suchanapplicationofanentryexam,aninterviewwithscoringsheets,oramarkedteacherclassroomobservationcouldbedoneatanyofthethreeselectionstages:atentryofateachertrainingcollege,whenapplyingforateachingposition,orduringone’sprobationinordertoentertheteachingprofession.Thekeyistoofferclearandtransparentminimumteachercompetencies,avoidaninformalsystemtodominate,andensurethesystemisrobustenoughagainstexternalinfluences.Suchpoliticalinterferencebothunderminesthequalityofselection,andlowersteachereffectivenessbyreducingtheiraccountabilitytoschools.

However,thedeploymentcasesuggestthatthemorecentralisedthesystemis,themorepronouncedthedisparitieswillbebetweenurbanandruralschools.Forcedtransfersrarelywork,andcanbedamagingtoteachermorale.Localisingthesystemoftenleadstothemostequitabledeploymentsystem,howeveritcomesatthepriceofteachereffectiveness.Morequalifiedteacherswillapplyforpositionsinurbanareas,whileruralschoolswilloftenendupwithunqualifiedindividuals.Alternativestothissystemcanwork,butrequiresignificantfinancialinvestmentsonthesideoftheMinistryofEducation.Thisoftenincludesbotharuralhardshipschemeandtheprovisionofteacherhousinginlocalitiesthatotherwiselacksuchamenities.

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Chapter4:FourPolicyOptionstoImprovingRecruitmentandDeployment

Theliteraturesuggeststhatthereisoftenatrade-offbetweenpoliciesfocusedonrecruitingeffectiveteachers,andensuringmoreequitabledeployment.Findingabalancebetweenthetwoisthuscrucial.Wewillpresentfourdifferentoptionshere,focusedondifferent‘entrypoints’toteacherselection.Notethattheseareofferedonlytostimulatediscussion,andshouldnotbeseenasdirectrecommendations.

• Option1:Formalisethelocalrecruitmentsystemandadoptaruralteachingallowance

Thefirstoptionistorationalisetheinformalrecruitmentsystemthatcurrentlydominatesrecruitment.Underthisreform,allprimaryteacherrecruitmentbecomesformalresponsibilityoftheLocalGovernment.Toimprovetherecruitmentstandard,LocalGovernmentCouncils(LGCs)arerequiredtohaveadesignated‘event’wheretheyconductteacherselection.Astate-SUBEBrepresentativehastoattendtoensureallstandardsareupheld.Allheadteachersfromschoolswithproposedpostingsarealsoinvitedtotakepartintheteacherselectionprocess.Othermembers,suchastheTeacherUnionandGovernor’srepresentativescouldalsobeinvitedas‘observers’.Tofurtherbenefitdeployment,aaruralteachingallowanceshouldalsobeintroducedbasedonatransparentrule(e.g.distancefromthepavedroad).Thisamountshouldbesignificantandshouldincreasethefurtherawaytheruralpostingis.

• Option2:CentralisetherecruitmentsystemtoSUBEB;applicantsindicateanLGApreference.

TheoptionthatislikelytoallowselectionofthebestteacherswouldrequirecentralisingtherecruitmentprocessandmakingitthefullresponsibilityoftheSUBEB.Toenticeapplicantstoruralareas,anannualstate-basedrecruitmentcampaignwillclearlypostthetotalnumberofpositionsthatareavailableineachLGA.Applicantsthenhavetoapplytothestateindicatingafirst,andsecondpreferenceforLGA.Applicantsarethenrequiredtoconductastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andpossiblyalsoasmall,graded,teachingdemonstration,basedonasetofpre-specifiedcriteriaofeffectiveteaching.Anoverallgradeisthengiventoeachteacher.Tofurtherbenefitthosewillingtoteachinruralareas,pointsareaddedtoapplicants’scoresiftheychoosetoteachinaruralLGA(andmorepointsifitisaveryruralLGA),whilepointsaresubtractedforapplicantspreferringtoteachinanurbanarea(andmorepointsaresubtractedifit’saveryurbanLGA,suchasthecapital).ThestateallocatesindividualstoLGAsbasedontheirindicatedpreference,startingwiththehighestscoringteacherandmovingdownthelinetocovereveryone’sfirstchoice.Remainingapplicantswhowerelower-downandnotselectedfortheirfirstchosenLGA,arethenofferedplacesfortheirsecondchoiceLGA(ifstillavailable)orotherwise,anotherLGAwithinsufficientapplicants.ThelistofrecruitedteachersisthenprovidedtotheLGEA,whichwillworktogetherwithallheadteachersfromschoolswithproposedpostings,tojointlydecideonthefinalschooldeployment.

• Option3:RecruitmentbecomesthejointresponsibilityofSUBEBandCoEs;loan-scholarshipsareprovidedtothosewillingtotemporarilyteachinthemostruralcommunities.

Athirdpolicyoptiontoimproveteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentisthroughselectionintoteachertraining.Forthistowork,SUBEBwillhavetosetoutthelikelynumberofcandidatesitiswillrecruitintwoyearstime.Allstate-levelteachertraininginstitutesarethenprovidedwithacapontheirNCEentrythatislinkedtotothisrecruitmenttargeted(orpossiblyanextra15-20%highertoaccountforteacherdropout).Theywillonlyreceivestatefundingforthisselectnumberofcandidates.TheSUBEBwillplaceadditionalrequirementsonteachertraininginstitutestoimprovetheirselectioncriteria.Applicantsareselectedbasedonanoverallscorebasedonastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andasmall,gradedteachingdemonstration.Toimprovedeployment,applicantswillingtoteachinarurallocationareprovidedwithaloan-scholarshipthatcoversalltheirtuitionfeesandlivingexpenses.Thisisturnedintoagrantwhentheygraduateandhavecompletedtwoyearsofteachinginarurallocation.Aftertwoyears,theseteachersareallowedtoselectwhichofLGAswithoutstandingteacherneedstheywishtobetransferredto.

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Attheendofthetwoyear-cohort,theSUBEBwillagaintestallapplicantsonstandardisedrequirements.TheythenprovidealargebonustothecollegeforeveryteachercomingoutoftheNCEprogrammethatmeetsminimumteachingstandards.Thiswillfurthermakesurecollegesseriousaboutselectingonlythemostcapablecandidatesandpossiblyincentivisesremedialeducationtotakeplace.Thistestalsodoublesastheformalprocesstorecruitingteachers(thoughexternalcandidatesarealsoabletoapplyduringthistime).TeachersaredeployedtotheLGEAonthebasisoftheirstatedpreferenceandopenvacancies.TheLGEAthenworkswithallheadteachersfromschoolswithopenpostings,tojointlydecideondeployment.

• Option4:Schoolscanrecruitteachersonprobation.Theseteachershavetopassaminimumteacherstandardstestwithinthreeyears,whichisadministeredannuallybytheState.

Thefourthpolicyoptionistofullydevolverecruitmentanddeploymentprocessestotheschool.Underthissystem,theSUBEBmakesanassessmentoftheschoolswhichmosturgentlyneedteachers,andthetotalnumberofrecruitsthatarefinanciallyaffordable.Itthen‘grants’suchnewpositionsdirectlytotheschool,whichcanstartitsownselectionprocess.Byrecruitinglocalcandidates,itwilllikelyquicklyfilltheposition,thusaddressingoverallteacherdeploymentdisparities.However,toensuremoreeffectiveteachersarerecruited,anynewteachingrecruithastomeetcertainminimumteacherstandardswithinthreeyearsoftakingtheir‘probationary’post.Thisassessmentisconductedannuallybythestate,whichincludesastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andasmallgradedteachingdemonstration,basedonasetofpre-specifiedcriteriaofeffectiveteaching.Thosewithanoverall‘pass’markarethenpromotedtotheregularteachingservice.If,afterthreeyearstheteacherhasstillnotpassed,theyareletgo,andtheschoolhastostartrecruitmentofareplacementcandidate.

Chapter5:HowBesttoUtilisePolicyOptions

Thesefourdifferentpolicyoptionsthusfocusondifferentpointsofentryandwithdifferentemphasesonrecruitmentordeployment.Theyalsorangefromminortweakstothecurrentsystem(e.g.formalisinglocalrecruitmentandimprovingthecurrentselectionprocessoftheteacherrecruitmentcommittee)tolargeoverhauls(e.g.makingschoolsresponsiblefortheirownrecruitment).Yet,thehardworkisstilltobedone;tomeaningfullylearnfromtheseideas,andadapt,combineorcontrastthemtofindpracticalideasthatwouldbestassistinthespecificpolitical,financialandadministrativerealitiesfacedinbyKanoandKaduna.

Toassistinthiseffort,Chapter5concludeswithasimpleframeworktohelpmemberswiththeiranalysis.Instartswithanoverviewofthedifferenttypesofareastogetpolicyideasfrom,followedbyanassessmentframeworktoassesswhichoptionswouldbetechnicallyoptimal,whilealsopoliticallyandadministrativelyfeasible.Itendswithabriefnoteonapotentialreformprocess,followingincrementalexperimentationandadaptation.

Overall,itisfoundthatthereisnoonerightwaytoimproveteacherrecruitmentanddeployment;therearelikelymanypossibleways,andsuccessfulreformsoftenemergeasahybridofideas.Thekeyistostartexperimentingwithpromisingideas,learnandadapt.EDORENhopesthatthroughthisinteractiveresearchactivity,theparticipatingstatescomesonestepclosertofindingrecommendationstoreformingthesystemtobetterensureeffectiveteachersarerecruitedanddeployedtopriorityschools.

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1 Introduction

1.1 UseofThisPaper

ThisliteraturereviewispartofawiderpieceofThematicResearchconductedbyEDOREN(EducationData,ResearchandEvaluationinNigeriainitiative)on“Identifying,recruitinganddeployingeffectiveteachers”.InlinewithotherEDORENactivities,thisismainlyfocusedonprimaryteachersinNorth-WesternNigeria.Thestudywilladdresstwomajorquestions:

• Whattypesofteachersmakefor“moreeffective”teachers?• Howshouldthesystembereformedtobetterensureeffectiveteachersarerecruitedand

deployedtopriorityschools?

ThisstudyisconductedbyStateResearchTeams,consistingofstate-basededucationpolicymakers(MoE/SUBEB)andacademics.TheresearchistakingplaceinKanoandKadunastates,withateaminbothstatesthathaswonastudygranttoimplementtheresearch.EDOREN’sroleistoprovideadministrativeoversight,hands-ontechnicalsupportonresearchcapacity,andtoofferteamswithinnovativepolicyideasfromtheinternationalliterature,thatcanfeedintotheresearch.

ThisliteraturereviewprovidesanexampleofEDOREN’slatterrole,byprovidingtheStateResearchTeamswithanoverviewofinternational“policyoptions”toimprovingteacherrecruitmentanddeployment.Eacharediscussedbrieflyandtheireffectsareillustratedthroughcountryexamples.Yet,thispaperisnotaimedatprovidingdirectrecommendations.Indeed,EDORENisdeeplyawareoftheriskandunsuitabilityoftransplanting‘internationalbestpractice’intoacompletelydifferentcontextsthatbearshighlyspecificpolicyproblems(Pritchettetal,2012).Instead,itaimsonlytoprovidebroadideastostimulatediscussionanddebatewithinStateResearchTeamsinordertogetinspirationfromothercontexts.

ThehardworkislefttotheStateResearchTeams;tomeaningfullylearnfromtheseideas,andadapt,combineorcontrastthemtofindpracticalideasthatwouldbestassistinthespecificpolitical,financialandadministrativerealitiesfacedbyKanoandKadunaState.Todoso,eachsectionwillraiseanumberofparticularquestions,thataimtoguideresearchersandprovideimportantareasforfurtherinvestigation.

1.2 Methodology

Thispaperisbasedonabriefscopingandsynthesisoftwobodiesofliterature.ThefirstrelatestoresearchthatcapturesNigeria’scurrenteducationalinstitutions,organisationalarrangements,andprocesses.Thisisusedtoprovideabroadoverviewofthecurrentteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentprocessesandtheirrelatedchallenges.Thesecondbodyrelatestotheinternationalliteratureonteacherrecruitmentanddeployment.SelectionofpapersherewerefocusedonidentifyingandassessingarangeofpolicyoptionsthatcouldpossiblybeutilisedinaNigeriancontext.Assuch,prioritywasgiventopolicyexamplesfromsub-SaharanAfrica,thoughthispaperalsoincorporatesselectfindingsfromLatinAmericaandIndia.

1.3 Overview

Inchapter2,wewillprovideasummaryoftherecruitmentanddeploymentprocessinNorthernNigeria,andprovideabriefoverviewofthemainchallengesfaced.Chapter3thenprovidespolicyoptionsfromdifferentdevelopingcountriesaroundtheworldonhowtoimproverecruitmentanddeploymentprocesses.Chapter4proposesfourpotentialpolicyoptionsforNigeria.Chapter5thenchangestackslightlyandprovidesaframeworkforanalysisonhowbesttoadaptandtailorsuchpolicyoptionstothelocalcontextinKanoandKaduna,offermeaningfulandrealisticpolicyrecommendationsandstartthegradualprocesstoexperimentwithincrementalpolicyreform.

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2 RecruitmentandDeploymentProcessesinNorthernNigeria

2.1 Introduction

ThischapteristryingtosetoutthethecurrentrecruitmentanddeploymentprocessesinNorthernNigeria.Thiswillrelyonasynthesisoffindingsfromtheliteratureinfourstates:Kwara,Jigawa,KatsinaandKaduna.

ItisdifficulttodescribeNigeria’srecruitmentprocessesindetail,astheexactrolesandresponsibilitiesdiffersomewhatbetweenStates.Moreover,thereisastrongdifferencebetweentheformalproceduresstipulatedinlawsandregulations,andtheactualrecruitmentanddeploymentproceduresmostcommonlyobserved.Inpractice,therearethreemainwaysinwhichateachercanberecruited:

1. Formalteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentprocess(throughSUBEB);

2. Informalteacherreplacementprocess(throughlocalgovernment);

3. TemporaryteachersrecruitedthroughtheFederalTeachersScheme.

Eachwillnowbediscussedinturn.Here,wewilldescribeboththeoverallrecruitmentanddeploymentprocess,themainactorsresponsibleandthemainchallengesidentified.Thiswillsetthetoneforthenextchapterinidentifyingwhichpolicyoptionscanbestaddressthemajorchallengesfacedbythesystem.

2.2 Formalteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentprocess(throughSUBEB)

Formallyspeaking,therecruitmentofallprimaryteachersistheresponsibilityoftheStateUniversalBasicEducationBoard(SUBEB).1Inthepast,LocalGovernmentCouncils(LGCs)secretarieswerealsoallowedtoappointcertainlocal,unqualifiedteachers,butonlyinthelowestSalaryGrades(Grade2to6).However,itisnowaformalprerequisitethatanynewlyrecruitedteacherhasaminimumofanNCE(NationalCertificateofEducation)qualificaton.AsanyNCEteacherhastocomeinataminimumofSalaryGrade7,thisplacesSUBEBsquarelyinchargeofallrecruitment(ESSPIN,2009).

TheassessmentofteacherneedsisoftendonebySUBEBalone,andbasedonlyonthedatacollectedbytheLGEA.Thissometimesincludesspecificrequestsfromheadteachers,butmainlyrelatestofillingestablishmentsinofficialpolicyguidelines;primarilythepupil-to-qualifiedteacherratio(Thomas,2011).Assuch,thereisaclearlackofconsultationfromtheschools’headteachers.

SUBEBthenholdsanexaminationforallpotentialrecruits,includingteacherapplicantstobothPrimarySchoolsandJuniorSecondarySchools(JSS).Thiswouldnormallybedoneonceperyear,butvarieddependingonthenumberofvacanciesposted.2Theexaminationdatewouldbeadvertisedthroughprintmedia,radioandtelevision.Novacancydetailsareadvertised,butpotentialrecruitsareoftenrequiredtosubmitorbringanapplicationlettertotheexamination.Theexaminationitselftendstobeawrittenexamination,andforsuccessfulcandidates,aninterview.Inaddition,therecruitmentprocessalsoaimstochecktheauthenticityofanyNCEorotherdegreecertificates.Teacherscannotformallyindicatealocationpreferencefortheirschool’slocationorthegradesorsubjectstheywishtoteach(Thomas,2011).

TheformalteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentprocessesalsodifferedslightlybetweenStates:

(a) InKwara,theinitialselectionprocessfollowsthestepsdescribedabove.Afterwards,SUBEBissolelyresponsibleforpostingsuccessfullyrecruitedcandidatestoschools.Wherepossible,

1FollowingtheNationalPolicyonEducation(NPE)andtheStateUniversalBasicEducation(UBE)actsof1999.2Inmanystates,suchaformalassessmenthasnottakenplacesince2007(seebelow).

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teachersarepostedtotheirhomeLG,andmatchedtoaschool’squalificationandspecialismneeds.Inpractice,however,thereweremanycomplaintsthatpostedteachers’profiledidnotmatchschoolrequirements.ItwasalsonotedthatthehighestscoringteachersinSUBEB’sexaminationwerepostedtoJSS,irrespectiveofsuitabilityorpersonalpreference.(Thomas,2011).

(b) InJigawa,therecruitmentprocessfollowscloselytheprocessdescribedabove.However,afterSUBEBselectstoteachers,theyarethenpostedtoaspecificLG,wheredeploymenttotheschoolisledbytheLocalGovernmentEducationAuthority(LGEA).GiventhatLGEAsareresponsibleformonitoringandrecordingeachschools’teacherneeds,theycouldbewellplacedtomatchteachers’preferencesandspecialismtoindividualschools.(Thomas,2011).

(c) ForKatsina,nodirectSUBEBrecruitmentwasrecorded,andbothrecruitmentanddeploymentwastheresponsibilityoftheLGEA.TheformalrecruitmentsystemconsistedoftheLGEAadvertisingpositionsandinvitingapplicationsfromqualifiedcandidates.“Suitablecandidatesareshortlistedforinterviewsandifsuccessful,areissuedwithappointmentletters.However,interestedcandidatesmayalsosubmitprospectiveapplicationstotheLGA”.Noconsiderationwasgiventoindividualrequests(WattsandAllsop,2015).

(d) InKaduna,SUBEBalsoplayednodirectrole.Instead,teacherrecruitmentistheresponsibilityoftheLGEA,whichworkswitharecruitmentcommitteemadeupofrepresentativesofthevariousgovernmentstakeholders,teachersunions,communitiesandfaith-basedgroups”(WattsandAllsop,2015).Theofficialrecruitmentprocesshereinvolves“acallforapplications,shortlistingofqualifiedapplicants,oralandwritteninterviews,verificationofcandidates’credentials,andfinally,issuanceofemploymentletters.Protocolscoveringappointmentsareclearandwellunderstood”.Noconsiderationwasgiventoindividualrequests.(WattsandAllsop,2015).

DiscussionPoint:WhatistheFormalRecruitmentandDeploymentSystem?

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribetheformalrecruitmentanddeploymentsystem:

• Whichgovernmentdepartmentisofficiallyresponsibleforrecruitingprimaryteachers?Whichotheractorsarealsoformallypartoftheprocess?

• Whatdoestheofficialrecruitmentprocesslooklike?

• Whichgovernmentdepartmentisofficiallyresponsiblefordeployingprimaryteacherstoschools?Whichotheractorsarealsoformallypartoftheprocess?

• Whatdoestheofficialdeploymentprocesslooklike?

MajorChallenges

Themostimportantchallengetotheformalsystemdescribedabove,itisthatthisrecruitmentanddeploymentprocessisoftenoverlookedorunderutilisedinfavourofmoreinformal,localrecruitment(seebelow).However,therearealsoanumberofotherchallengesthatareworthnotinghere:

• Headteachershavenodirectinputintotheoverallselection,ordeploymentofteachers.Assuch,theycannotensureonlythemosteffectiveteachersareselectedorensurethattheteacherpostedtotheirschoolbestmatchestheschool’srequirements(Thomas,2011).

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• Thishascontributedtolimitedoversightfromschoolstopreventrecruitmentofineffectiveteachers,andalsoensuredteacherpostingsaresometimespoorlymatchedtotheschoolneeds.

• Candidatesalsohavenoformalinputintotheirposting.Teacherscannotformallyindicatealocationpreferencefortheirschool’slocationorthegradesorsubjectstheywishtoteach.Iftheydonotliketheirposting(e.g.avoidaruralposting),theycannotrelyonanyformalprocess,butinsteadhavetorelyontheirinformal(political)connections.Forthosewithoutsuchconnections,suchteachersaremoredisappointedandmorelikelytodropoutofteaching(ESSPIN,2009).

• Thislackofinputisalsoamissedopportunityforassessingteachers’willingnessintherecruitmentprocess,inordertoimprovedeploymenttopriorityschools(seesection4.3).

• Despiteconsiderablechallengestoattractteacherstospecificruralschools,therearenospecificincentiveschemesorscholarshipprogrammestoattractteacherstoruralareas.Assuch,thesystemisinsufficientlyaddressingdeploymentissues.

DiscussionPoint:Whatarethemajorchallenges?

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribethemajorchallengestotheformalrecruitmentanddeploymentsystem:

• Whatelementsoftheofficialrecruitmentsystemwork,andwhichonesdonotwork?

• Whathavebeenthemajorconsequencesoftheofficialrecruitmentsystem’sfailings?

• Whatelementsoftheofficialdeploymentsystemwork,andwhichonesdonotwork?

• Whathavebeenthemajorconsequencesoftheofficialdeploymentsystem’sfailings?

2.3 Informalteacherreplacementprocessthroughlocalgovernment

Inpractice,theformalrecruitmentprocessdescribedaboveisoftennotnotutilised.ThisisbecauseLGCsareoftenreluctanttogiveuptheirrecruitmentauthoritytothestate,andprefertoemploytheirown,unqualifiedlocals,toqualified“foreigners”.(ESSPIN,2009).Forthatreason,theyoftenblockSUBEBfrominitiatingnewrecruitmentrounds.3

Localgovernmentsthenhavetwomainwaystoconducttheirownrecruitment.ThefirstwayistorelyontheirabilitytorecruitSalaryGrade1-6teachers,byappointingunqualifiedteachers.4Thishasresultedinaverylargenumberofunqualifiedteachersbeingappointed,especiallyinNothernStates(ESSPIN,2009).

Thesecond,andmostcommonwaythatLGsconducttheirownrecruitmentisbyfocusingonteacher‘replacement’insteadofrecruitment.LGCsareallowedtotakeresponsibilityforreplacingstaffthathasretiredordied,andthisprocessisclassifieddifferentinthesystem,andthereforedoesnothavetofollowthesame,formalrecruitmentprocess(ESSPIN,2009).Usinginformalteacher‘replacement’mechanismshasbecomethemainmethodofteacherrecruitmentinallfourstatesanalysedhere.Forinstance,WattsandAllsop(2015)mentionthatnonew,formalrecruitmentroundshavetakenplaceinKatsinasince2007,

3SUBEBpaysprimaryteachers’salariesbydeductingfundsfromeachLocalGovernment’sallocations.Becauseit’stheLG’smoney,theycanpreventgivingtheSUBEBpermissiontopostanynewteacherestablishments(Thomas,2011).4WhilethisistechnicallynotpermittedundertheNEP,informallythisisseenasacceptableifnobettercandidatecanbefound.

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andinKadunasince2010.Afterthisperiod,bothrecruitmentanddeploymenthavehappenedonanadhocbasis,whichresultedindeterioratedteacherselectionandconsiderablevariationindeploymentoutcomes.

Thestatesanalysedalsoreporteddifferentinformalteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentprocesses:

a) InKwara,aninformal‘sharing’ofteacherrecruitmentbetweenSUBEBandLGwasused.AsexplainedbyoneLGEA“iftherewere,say,20vacancies,SUBEBwouldfill17vacanciesthroughtheirnormalprocedureandallowtheLGEAtorecommendcandidatesfortheremainingthreevacancies.Thisshouldbeconsideredasanunofficialpracticeandithasbeensuggestedsubsequentlythatsuchpracticesnolongertakeplace.”(Thomas,2011).

b) InKatsina,theprocesshasalsobeendescribedas‘mixed’.Attimes,vacanciesinprimaryschoolswerefilledfollowingtheformalprocess(writtenapplicationsplusinterviews),whileothertimesthiswasdominatedbyexternalinfluencingor‘godfathering’(involvingofficialsatvariouslevels).

c) InKaduna,therehasbeennosystematicrecruitmentofprimaryteacherssince2010,andtheprocessisadhoc,focusedonreplacementalone.Theinformalprocessthusdominatesentirely,resultinginmuchgreatersusceptibilitytopoliticalpressures(seebelow)(WattsandAllsop,2015).

DiscussionPoint:WhatistheInformalRecruitmentandDeploymentSystem?

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribetheinformalrecruitmentanddeploymentsystem:

• Whichgovernmentdepartmentisactuallyleadingtherecruitmentofprimaryteachers?Whichotheractorsarealsoinfluencingthisbehaviour?

• Whatdoestherealrecruitmentprocesslooklike?

• Whichgovernmentdepartmentisactuallyleadingthedeploymentofprimaryteacherstoschools?Whichotheractorsareinfluencingthisbehaviour?

• Whatdoestheofficialdeploymentprocesslooklike?

MajorChallenges

Astherecruitmentprocesshasbecomelessbasedonformalinterviews,ithasinsteadreliedmoreonpressuresfromelites,traditionalrulersandpoliticians.AccordingtooneSUBEBdirector,LGAchairmen‘handedoutteachingjobstotheirfriends’,mostofwhomunqualified(Bennelletal,2014).OneLGEAofficerreportedathreattohavetheirEducationSecretaryremovedfromofficeiftheydidnotcomplywithcertainpostingrequests.Thishasanumberofimplications:

• Teachersareappointedwithinappropriatequalifications,andmanydonotholdtherequiredNCEorhaveonlypassedtheSeniorSecondarySchoolExamination.(WattsandAllsop,2015).

• ‘Politicallyappointed’teachersareoftenlesseffectivethanothers,becausetheyarelessaccountabletotheschool’sheadteacherandthewidereducationsystem.Forexample,oneHeadTeacherfromKatsinamentioned:“Mostofthesepoliticians’candidatesarenoteveninterestedintheteachingjob.Theyjustwantthesalary,youwon’tevenseethemcomingtoschoolandyoucan’treportthem.Thosethatwanttodothejobandhavethequalificationarenotemployed”.(WattsandAllsop,2015).

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• Unqualifiedteacherswithpoliticalconnectionsoftenusefakecertificates,orimpersonateotherteacherstogetemployment.Thisfurtherunderminestrustinteachercertificatesandthewidersystemofteacherrecruitment(WattsandAllsop,2015).

DiscussionPoint:Whatarethemajorchallenges?

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribethemajorchallengestotheinformalrecruitmentanddeploymentsystem:

• Whatelementsoftherealrecruitmentsystemwork,andwhichonesdonotwork?

• Whathavebeenthemajorconsequencesoftherealrecruitmentsystem’sfailings?

• Whatelementsoftherealdeploymentsystemwork,andwhichonesdonotwork?

• Whathavebeenthemajorconsequencesoftherealdeploymentsystem’sfailings?

2.4 TemporaryTeachersRecruitedthroughtheFederalTeachersScheme.

Besidestherecruitmentprocessoccurringineachstate,thereisalsoaFederalinitiativefocusedonteacherrecruitment.This“FederalTeachers’Scheme”5waslaunchedin2006toincreasetheshareofNCE-trainedteachersrecruitedtopublicschools.Inthisprocess,theFederalMinistryofEducation(FME),theUniversalBasicEducationCommission(UBEC)andtheSUBEBscollaboratetoemployrecentNCEgraduatestoteachinprimaryandjuniorsecondaryschoolsfortwoyears(UBEC2014).IthelpstoalleviatethemajorfundingconstraintonrecruitingteachersattheStateandLGAlevelsbyofferingadditionalfederalfundingforteacherrecruitment,whilealsoprovidingrecently-qualifiedteacherswithtemporaryjobsandteachingexperience.

However,thisrecruitmentistemporaryandteachers’salarieswouldeventuallyneedtobetakenonbylocalgovernmentsfollowingtheprogramme’stwo-yearperiod.Forthisreason,manyFTSteachershavedifficultyinfindingsubsequentemploymentandstruggletobeabsorbedintothepermanentteachingworkforce(HumphreysandCrawford,2014).

Thomas(2011)reportsthatthissystemrecruitsabout1,000teacherseverytwoyears.TheFederalTeachersScheme(FTS)isrestrictedtoNCEholders.Thisisgenerallyenforced,thoughaftersomeconcernsaboutthestandardofcandidates,Kwarastateisnowinvolvedintheselectionprocesstoensurethisisstrictlyenforced.

TeachersrecruitedthroughtheFTSareoftenpaidatalowerratethanstate-recruitedteachers.6ThishasalsobeenareasonwhymanyFTSteachersdonotremainintheirpostforthefulltwoyears;whenSUBEBadvertisesitsownfundedposts,holdersofFTS-fundedappointmentstendtoapply.Yet,attimes,teachersre-applyforanFTSappointment,andarethusFTSteachersforlongerthan2years(Thomas,2011).

AnewfederalschemetorecruitteacherswasalsointroducedinDecember2015byPresidentMuhammaduBuhari.Whiletheexactdetailsarestillunclear,thissystemiscalled“N-PowerTeacherCorps”andaimstoengageandtrain500,000youngunemployedgraduates.Itisavolunteeringprogrammeofa2-yearduration,andthusverycomparabletotheFTS.Participantswillprovideteaching,instructional,andadvisorysolutionsin4keyareas.The4mainfocusareasareinprimaryandsecondaryeducation,

5ThisschemeisimplementedundertheMDGProjectandfinancedthroughtheDebtReliefGrants.6Thomas(2011)notesthatin2010,forJigawa,thiswasN10,000foranFTSteacher,versusN15,535forastate-basedteacher.

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agriculture,publichealthandcommunityeducation(civicandadulteducation).ItisunclearwhethertheconventionalFTSschemeissubsumedunderthisthewprogramme,orwhetherbothwillrunside-by-side.7

DiscussionPoint:WhataretheimplicationsoftheFederalTeachingSchemeforyourState?

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribewhattheimplicationsareofaFederalTeachingSchemeforyourState.

• HowdoestheFTS’recruitmentanddeploymentprocessdifferfromthatattheStatelevel?

• TowhatextentdofederalandStaterecruitmentcomplementeachother?Howdotheyconflict?

• Whatisthebestroleforafederalorganisation(likeFME/UBEC)tosupportprimaryteacherrecruitmentanddeploymentatthestate?

2.5 SummaryandImplications

AbriefdescriptionofthecurrentprocesstorecruitinganddeployingteachersinNorthernNigeriasuggeststhatthesystemisfacedwithconsiderablechallenges,thatarecontributingtotheperpetuationoflow-qualityteachinginNigeria’seducationsystem.

Thischaptershowsthatwhilerecruitmentisofficiallystructuredaroundastate-basedprocessofformalexaminationsandinterviews,inpracticeitisdominatedbylocalgovernmentsandheavilyinfluencedbypressuresfromlocalpoliticalelites.Unqualifiedteachersareemployedbasedontheirrecommendations,passingofffakecertificatesorimpersonatingotherteachers.Allthewhile,thereislittlespaceforotheractors,suchasheadteachers,toensureadequatequalitystandardsandensureappropriatematchingofcandidatestoeachschool’sneeds.Thissuggeststhatthesystemwouldbenefitfromreform,forinstancebymakingitmoreresponsivetoheadteachers’views,orbymovingrecruitmentawayfromlocalgovernmentdiscretionaryhiringandensuringitmovestowardsaformal,test-basedrecruitmentsystem.

Thischapteralsoshowstheimpactthatdifferentrecruitmentsystemshaveondeployment.Whenthestateisresponsibleforrecruitmentand‘blindly’poststeacherstoruralschools,thisoftenleadstolargelevelsof‘refusals’.Moreover,itunderminestheformalsystem,asteacherstendtousetheirinformalinfluencingchannelstogetmovedtoadifferentlocation.Whenlocalgovernmentsselecttheirowncandidates(ashashappenedde-facto,inmanystates),thisimprovestheiroverallamountofteachersemployed,thoughthisisoftenrealisedbyrecruitinglocalswhoareunqualifiedtobeteachers.8

Wewillreturntothisissueinthenextchapter,butnoteherethatthismeansthatdeploymentcannotbeconsideredasanafterthought.Inordertoassureteachersarealsodeployedtorural,hard-to-staffschools,weneedtomakesurethatthesystemeitherexplicitlyrecruitsteachersbasedonawillingnesstoteachinsuchschools,orotherwiseprovidessufficientincentivesorscholarshipstoenticeteacherstogothere.

7https://www.naij.com/853295-no-youwin-federal-government-launches-n-power.html8Thisisacommonfinding,thatisalsoreflectedinthecaseofLesotho(seenextchapter).

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3 PolicyOptionsonRecruitmentandDeploymentProcesses

Inthischapter,wewillprovideanoverviewofinternationalpolicyoptionsforimprovingrecruitmentanddeploymentprocesses.Wewillbeginwithrecruitment,anddescribeaconceptualframeworkwiththreepotential‘screeningpoints’ofeffectiveteachers,followedbypolicyoptionsoneachoneofthesescreeningpoints,Afterwards,weconsiderdeploymentprocesses,anddescribethethreemainteacherdeploymentsystemsaroundtheworld.Thissectionthenhighlightscommonpolicyoptionstoimprovedeploymenttopriorityschools:forcedtransfer,incentivesandtargetedrecruitment.

3.1 Recruitment

Toimproveteachereffectiveness,betterrecruitment–theselectionofthemostappropriatecandidateforthejob-iscrucial.Itcanbedifficulttospotwhichpersonprovidesthebestteaching,andteachercertificationaloneisofteninsufficient(SteenbergenandHill,2016).Forthatreason,offeringgreaterattentiontotheprocessbywhichteachersareselectedprovidesoneofthemostimportantrolestoraisingtheeffectivenessoftheteachingworkforce(Staiger,2010).

3.1.1 ConceptualFramework:ThreePointsofTeacherSelection

Figure3.1introducesabroadframeworkofthepossiblewaystoimproveteacherrecruitment,basedonBrunsetal(2015).Thishighlightthemostcommontrajectorytobecomingateacher,andalongthewayoffersthethreekeystagesatwhichthesystemcanassessandselectteacherswithspecificcharacteristics.

Firstly,aftersecondaryschool,individualsapplytogettheirteachingcertificationfromateachertraininginstitute.Thisoffersthefirstscreeningopportunity:allowingonlythosetoenterteachertrainingwhoaremeetprioritycriteria(e.g.beingacademicallygiften,mostmotivated,orwillingtoteachinruralareas).

Secondly,becauseallprimaryteachersareformallyobligatedtohaveateachingdegree,anotherpointofscreeningisfromteachereducationandintotheinitialyearsofteaching,oftenonaprobationaryperiod.Thechallengehereishowtoselectthebestteacherfromallthosewhohaveateachingcertification.Thisincludesthewiderprocess(e.g.throughaformalexaminationandinterview)toassessifteachersmeetcertainformalteachercapacitystandards,andhowbesttoprioritiseamongstdifferentteachers.

Thethirdprocesstoteacherselectionislesscommon.Thisrelatestotheperiodbetweenteachingonprobation,andjoiningtheteachingprofession.Thisoffersanothermeanstoimprovingselection,byallowingtheconductofteachercompetencyassessmentsafterapersonhasbeenteachingforawhile.

Figure3.1ThreePointsofSelectionforTeacherRecruitment

Source:adaptedfromBrunsetal(2015)

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DiscussionPoint:DifferentPointsofSelectionforTeacherRecruitment

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna)todescribethedifferentselectionpointsforteacherrecruitment.

• Whichofthesethreeentrypointsismostimportantinyourstate?

• Arethereanyotherentrypointsthroughwhichindiviualscanentertheteachingprofession?

Inthefollowingsections,wewillgothrougheachofthesethree‘screeningpoints’,andprovideexamplesofpolicyoptionsfromtheinternationalliterature,whattheireffectwasonimprovingrecruitment.Mostofthesearetakenfromtheseminal2015reports:“GreatTeachers-HowtoraisestudentlearninginLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean”,byBarbaraBrunsandothers.

3.1.2 RaisingSelectivityofTeacherEducation

Thedecisionofwhotoacceptintoteachertraininginstituteshasastrongbearingofwhotheteachersofthefuturewillbe.Ifthequalityofthosewhoapplytoteachertrainingcollegesislow,thatalsomeansthatitmaybemoredifficultforaCollegeofEducation(CoE)totransfervitalteachingskills.(Brunsetal,2015).

InNorthernNigeria,thequalityofapplicantstoteachertraininginstitutesisoftenlow.Themainreasonforthisisthattheprofessionisdeemedunattractive,becausethepayisregardedastoolow(WattsandAllsop,2015).StudentsoftenonlyenrolfortheNCEbecausetheyfailedtobeadmittedforothercourses(AllsopandHoward2009),andfewhavethe“genuinedesiretobecometeachers”(Akinbote2007).

ThisdoesnotmeanthatCollegesofEducation(CoE)haveanytroubleinfillingtheircourses.Indeed,manyareheavilyoversubscribed.9Insomecases,NCEapplicantsdonotevencomplywithselectioncriteria,andareonlyallowedentrybypresentingfakequalifications(Dunneetal,2014).InNiger,thisledtoexcessivelylargeclassrooms;lecturehallsdesignedfor400–600studentswerefoundtohostclassestwiceorthreetimesthissize.Suchovercrowdingalsostronglyunderminesteachingquality(Dunneetal,2014).

Manypeopleoftenpointtothelargeneedforteacherstojustifyover-enrolmentinCoEs.However,trainingmoreteachersdoesnotleadtoincreasedrecruitment.Thestatecanonlyaffordtorecruitacertainamountofteachers.Moststatesthusenduptrainingmoreteachersthantheycanrecruit.Forexample,inKatsina,between2008and2013,anannualaverageof2,000NCEteachersgraduated,butonly900teacherswererecruited–soonly45%ofteacherswereabsorbedintothesystem(Benneletal,2014).

Insum,greaterteachereducationselectivity(e.g.ensuringonlythemostqualifiedormotivatedapplicantsareallowedtoentertheCoE)canleadtobetterteachertrainingbyreducingovercrowding,whilealsoraisingtheshareofteacherstrainedthatenduprecruited(Benneletal,2014;SteenbergenandHill,2016).

Wewillusepolicyexamplesofthreemainstrategiesusedtoraisingtheselectivityofteachereducation:

• RaisingstudententrystandardsintoCollegesofEducation;

• RaisingthestandardsofCollegesofEducationthroughaccreditation;

• Creatingspecialfinancialincentivestoattracttopstudents,oraspecifictypeofstudents.

9ThisisbecauseCoEsareheavilyreliantonstudenttuitionfeesforrevenueandsohaveanincentivetoincreasestudentintakebeyondtheircapacity(Bennelletal,2014;SteenbergenandHill,2016).

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1. RaisingstudententrystandardsintoCollegesofEducation

Peru.Inthe1990s,Perusawalargeexpansionofgovernment-fundednon-universityteachertraininginstitutes,calledInstitutosSuperioresPedagógicos(ISPs).EnrolmentinISPswasinitiallymarginal.Yet,withinonedecade,235ISPswereestablished,andISPsrepresentedover75%ofallteachereducationenrolment(Piscoya,2004).Yet,therealsowereseriousconcernsraisedaboutboththequalityofteacherscomingoutoftheseISPs,andthelargenumberofgraduatestheISPsproduced,whichcouldnotbeabsorbedbythesystem.TheMinistryofEducationfoundthatonly22%ofinstitutesexhibited“optimum”levelsofquality(Sánchez,2006).Similarly,onestudyfoundthat“everyyearabout30,000teachersgraduatefrompre-servicetraininginstitutions,whereasonlyabout3,100areneededperyeartoservenewenrollmentsand3,700tocoverforthosewhoretire”(Peru,ConsejoNacionaldeEducación2006).Torespondtothesechallenges,in2007theMinistryofEducationestablishedaunifiednationalstandardforadmissionintoISPs.Thisadmissionhadtwostages.Firstly,therewasanationalstage,implementedbytheNationalMinistryofEducation.Here,allapplicantsweregivenamultiplechoicetesttoassessgeneralknowledge,logicalthinking,mathsandcommunicationskills.Secondly,therewasaregionalstage,overseenbytheprovincialeducationauthorities.Forthis,candidates’vocation,personalityandspecialisedknowledgewasevaluatedthroughawrittentestandaninterview.Tobeadmittedintoateachertraininginstitute,applicantsneededtoobtainaminimumscoreof70%forbothstages(Brunsetal,2015).Establishingnationalintakestandardshadaverystrong,immediateeffectonteachertrainingenrolments,reducingenrolmentinteachereducationprogramsfrom38,000in2006toabout12,000in2008(muchclosertoPeru’sactualrecruitmentneeds).Italsostronglyeffectedtheoverallqualityofteachinggraduatesintheyearsfollowing,whichscoredconsiderablyhigherintermsofsubjectknowledge(Brunsetal,2015).Whileeffective,thisadmissionprocessfacedconsiderable(political)opposition.ManyruralISPswerefacedwithclosure,astheystruggledtofilltheirprogrammeswithqualifiedcandidates.ThereformwasalsochallengedbyPeru’sindigenouscommunities,whichheldthattheteachingforcewouldbelessculturallydiverseasaresultofthehigherentrystandards.TheMinistryofEducationthushadtoreversecertainelementsofthereform,resultinginahybridsystemwheretheNationalGovernmentsetsthenationaladmissionsguidelines,whileinstitutionsareresponsibeforcarryingouttheintakeprocesses.By2012,allinstitutionswereagaingivenresponsibilityoverentrythroughtheirownentryexaminations.However,thisteststillhadtocoverallthesameelementsasinthetwo-stagedassessment.Topreventteacheroversupply,theMinistryofEducationgavealltraininginstitutesanannualenrolmentcap,basedontheprojectednumberofteachersneededandaffordabletoberecruited.Asaresult,whileISPteacherqualityintakewaslesscloselymonitored,itwasstillmuchbetterthanbeforethereform.Moreover,totalenrolmentwasconsiderablyreduced,andnowcloselyinlinewiththeteacherneeds(Brunsetal,2015).Thissuggestsraisingstudententryisapowerfultoolthatcanimproveteacherquality,andalignteachersupplyandteacherdemand.However,itcanalsobecontroversialandpoliticallychallengingtoadopt.

2. RaisingthestandardsofCollegesofEducationthroughaccreditation

TheprevioussectionnotedhowthelastdecadessawarapidgrowthofCoEs.Thisisoftentoduetoacombinedpoliticalappealof‘tacklingeducationneeds’and‘generatingjobs’inaspecificlocality(Grindle,2004).ManyCoEsproducealargenumberofunder-preparedteachersthatcannotbeabsorbedintothesystemduetofinancialconstraints.Yet,duetotheirpoliticalimportance,theyalsocannotbecloseddown.Inthiscase,theexampleofChileshowshowagovernmentcanstillimproveteachereducationthroughanationalteachereducationqualityassurancesystem,designedtocertify,monitor,andimproveCoEs.

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Chile.In2006,Chileintroducedamandatoryaccreditationsystemforteachingprogrammes.However,giventhepoliticaldifficultytoenforcesuchasystemandshutdownlow-performingteachinginstitutes,theyimposedthissystemthroughstudentfinancing.Fromthatpointonwards,studentswereallowedonlytoobtainagovernmentloanorscholarshipforteachereducationfromanaccreditedteachingprogramme.Ittooksometimeforthisnationalaccreditationsystemtoshowresults.However,especiallyinitslateryears,thetotalshareofnonaccreditedteachereducationprogrammesreducedconsiderably,from30%in2011,toonly5%in2013(Chile,ConsejoNacionaldeEducación2011).Mostimportantly,accreditationstandardshadaverysignificantresultonstudentenrolmentdecisions.Onlythreeyearsafterthesystemwasintroducedin2006,enrolmentshiftedfrom77%innonaccreditedprogrammes(23%inaccreditedprogrammes),toonly34%innonaccreditedprogrammes(66%inaccreditedprogrammes).ThecaseofChilethusshowstheimportanceofcombiningsupply-sidereforms(collegeaccreditation)withdemand-sidereforms(providingstudentfinanceonlyforaccreditedinstitutions).

3. Creatingspecialfinancialincentivestoattracttopstudents,oraspecifictypeofstudents.

Afinalmethodtoimprovestudententryisbytargetingaspecificgroupofstudents.InColumbia,thiswasusedtoattracttopstudents.Asimilarprocesscanalsobeusedtofurtherdeployment,byattractingthosewillingtoteachinruralareas.Section3.2.4providesanexamplefromNigeriaofthiskind.Columbia.InColumbia,itiscommontoconductanoveralluniversityadmissiontest.Fromthis,applicantswiththetop10%highestscoreswereofferedaspecialscholarshiptostudyteachereducation.Thisprogrammeincludedaloantocovertuitionfeesforthetotaldurationofthedegree,whichwouldbeforgiveninitsentirelyoncestudentscompletetheirdegree.In2012,thegovernmentallocatedoverUS$70milliontocoverover6,000studentsintheprogramme.Whileexpensive,thisprogrammehasresultedinalargeincreaseinthewillingnesstoteach.Moreover,byhavinganumberofcohortsthatareacademicallymuchstronger,ithasalsoprovidedanimportantsignaltootherstudents.Becausepupilsnowhavetocompetewithotherbetter-qualifiedcandidatestoapply,ithasevenattractedmoreacademicallygiftedcandidatesforthenon-scholarshippositions.Theprogrammethushadastrongeffectonthequalityofallapplicants(Brunsetal,2015).Whileprovidingfinancialincentivestoattracttopstudentsmaybeexpensive,theydoattractbetterstudents.Theycanevenraisethestandardofotherapplicants,bysignallingahigherquality-standardexpectedofallapplicants.Thisraisesoverallintakequalityforthewholeteachertraininginstitute.

DiscussionPoint:RaisingSelectivityofTeacherTraining

Consideryourstate(KanoorKaduna).

• Whatarethemajorreasonsthatweakorpoorlymotivatedstudent-teachersareallowedentry?

• Whichoftheseexampleswouldbesthelpaddressthisissueinyourstate?

• Whywouldsomeoftheseexamplesnotworkinyourstate?

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3.1.3 RaisingStandardsofHiringTeachers

Thesecondpointofscreeningisfromteachereducationintotheinitialyearsofteaching.Thechallengehereishowtoselectthebestteacherfromallthosewhohaveateachingcertification.Thisrequiresaclearstandardonwhatcapabilitiesareformallyexpectedofteachers,andatransparentprocesstoassessingifanyteachermeetssuchstandards(e.g.throughaformalexaminationandinterview).

ThisareaiscrucialforNorthernNigeriatoconsider,giventhemanyindiciationsthatalargeshareofNCEgraduatesareinsufficientlypreparedtoteachandlackvitalsubjectknowledgeandteachingskills(Cameron,2014;Dunneetal,2014andBennelletal,2014,Deetal,2016;).Forinstance,onerespondentfromKatsinamentionedthat“therearesometeachersthatcannotreadouttheirnameseventhoughtheyhaveanNCE”(Deetal,2016).Assuch,theNCEprovidesinsufficientbasisforselection.Moreover,showninthepreviouschapter,thecurrentrecruitmentprocessisoftendeeplyflawed.Itfailstoselectthemostappropriatecandidatesduetoitsinformalprocessthatisheavilyinfluencedbyexternalpoliticalpressures.

Theliteraturepointstotwomainideastoraisingthestandardstohiringteachers:

• Introduceatargetedrecruitmentcampaigntoattractspecificteachingcandidates

• Adoptingaformal,centralisedandtest-basedrecruitmentsystem.

1. Introduceatargetedrecruitmentcampaigntoattractspecificteachingcandidates

Toselecttherightcandidates,suitablecandidateshavetoapplyforateachingposition.Itisimportanttoprovidetheappropriateconditionstoenticehigh-qualitycandidatestoapplytoateachingposition.Themostobviouswaytodosoisbyraisingtheposition’ssalary.Forinstance,DalBoetal(2013)findthatwhenconsideringacivilservantjobinMexico,higherwagesattractmorequalifiedapplicants.However,thisisoftennotpossible,andwillunlikelybefeasibleforNigeriagivenitscurrentfiscalchallengesrelatedtoloweroilprices.10Yet,therearealsonon-financialwaystoattractspecificteachingcandidatesbydesigningatargetedrecruitmentcampaigntoattractspecificcandidates.ThecaseofZambiaofferssuchanexample.

Zambia.In2010,theGovernmentofZambialaunchedanewprogrammetocreateanewcivilservicepositioncalledtheCommunityHealthAssistant(CHA)toaddressstaffshortagesinruralareas.Whilelowlypaid,thispositionoffersagentsanentrypointintothecivilservice.Moreover,byprovidingaccesstoextensivein-servicetraining,italsoallowedmemberstoadvancemorerapidlytohigher-rankedpositionswithintheMinistryofHealth(Ashrafetal,2015).

Toassessthebestwaytoattractappropriatecandidates,anexperimentwasconductedwithtwodifferentrecruitmentcampaigns.Inhalfofparticipatinglocalgovernments,recruitmentposterswerefocusedoncareerincentives.Thislistedtheopportunitytomoveupthecivil-servicecareerladder,andillustratedanumberofpotentialnextpositions(e.g.nurse,clinicalofficerordoctor).Thiscampaignpostersummarisedthiswiththeslogan:“Becomeacommunityhealthworkertogainskillsandboostyourcareer!”.Intheotherhalfoflocalgovernments,recruitmentposterswerefocusedonsocialduties.Thiswaspresentedasanopportunitytocontributetoone’scommunityand“gaintheskillsyouneedtopreventillnessandpromotehealthforyourfamilyandneighbours”.Thesummarysloganherewas“Wanttoserveyourcommunity?Becomeacommunityhealthworker!”.

Thestudyfoundthatdifferentcampaignshadasignificanteffectonthetypeofindividualswhoapplied.Whentestedbeforeselection,membersofthefirstgroup(careerambitions)scoredconsiderablybetterin

10NigeriaToday,“Buhari’sbudgetnotimplementable–Senators”,January212016

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anentryexamination.Evenwhileconductingtheirwork,theyperformedmuchbetterintheirpositionasCHAthandidthesecondgroup(socialduties).Crucially,theperformancegapbetweenthetwogroupswasonlyexplanainableupto40%byobservablecharacteristics(suchaslevelofeducationandtestscores).Theremaining60%differenceinperformancewasduetounobservabletraits.Hence,thefirstgroupwassimplymoremotivatedandcareer-focused,whichisoftendifficulttopickupinanyexamination(nextsection),butcanbereachedthroughanappropriatecampaign.

Recruitmentcampaigndesignofferanotherimportantmechanismtoimproverecruitment.Bytailoringamessagetoattractaspecificgroupofapplicants,itoffersanon-financialmechanismtoattractdifferentindividualswhomayhavecertaindesirable,butun-observeablecharacteristics(suchasacareerfocus).

2. Adoptingaformal,centralisedandtest-basedrecruitmentsystem.

Attheheartofanyappropriateteacherrecruitmentsystemisaprocessofmeritocraticselectionbasedonteachers’skillsandcompetencies.Thequestioniswhatthissystemshouldlooklike,andatwhatlevelthisselectionismostappropriate.Chapter2findsthatexcessivelocaldiscretionisoftenlinkedtopoliticalinterference.Thissuggestsignificantlymoreeffectiveteacherswouldberecruitedbymovingawayfromlocalgovernmentdiscretionaryhiringandtowardsaformal,test-basedrecruitmentsystem.ThecaseofMexicoprovidesanimportantexampleoftheimportanceofshiftingrecruitmentsystems.

Mexico.In2008,theMexicangovernmentrequiredallnewcivilserviceteacherstobehiredbystatesonthebasisoftheirperformanceonanationaltest.Thisexaminationcoversbothsubjectknowledgeandpedagogicalskillsrelatedtotheteacher’seducationlevelanddisciplinetheywillteach.Thisofferedabigdifferencefromtheprevioussystemofteacherhiringthroughnon-transparentprocessescontrolledbystate-levelcommitteesdominatedbytheteachers’union.

Asstatesgraduallyrolledoutthissystem,Estrada(2013)wasabletoassesstheimpactofthereformbycomparingschoolsthatreceivedatest-hiredteacherversusthosereceivingatraditionallyhiredteacher.Evenwithinarelativelyshort(one-year)period,heshowedthatintroducingatest-basedteacherintoaschoolcanhaveaverylargeeffectsonstudentlearning.Theseteacherwereassociatedwithastudent’sincreaseof.78SDinSpanishanda.66standarddeviation(SD)inmathsscores,whichareverylargeeffects.

Estradefurthernotesthatthedifferenceinperformancecannotbeexplainedonlyintermsoftheteacher’stestscores.Eventhosetest-basedteacherswithsimilarscorestotraditionallyhiredteachersoutperformtheminschools.Thisemphasisestheimportanceofteacheraccountability.Ifateacherknowstheyarepoliticallyappointed(aswasoftenthecaseinMexico’straditionalrecruitmentsystem),theyarelessaccountabilitytotheheadteacher,andmaythushavelowerattendanceandlessmotivationtoperform.

ThecaseofMexicoemphasizesthebroaderimportanceofenforcingarecruitmentsystembasedonaformalandtransparentprocess(suchasanationalexamination).Suchteachersaremuchmoreeffective,bothduetotheircompetencyandbecausetheyaremoreaccountabletotheoveralleducationsystem.

DiscussionPoint:RaisingStandardsofHiringTeachers


• Whatarethemajorreasonsthatweakorpoorlymotivatedteachersareallowedentry?

• Howcouldarecruitmentcampaignbestbeusedtoattracteffectiveteachers?

• Wouldaformalisedtest-basedrecruitmentsystemhelpaddressthisissueinyourstate?Whatwoulditlooklike?

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3.1.4 RaisingRequirementstoPassingTeacherProbation

Thefinalprocesstoteacherselectionistoimproveselectionafterteachersstartteachingonprobation,butbeforetheyjointheteachingprofession.InNigeria,primaryteachersareinitiallyappointedonatwo-yearprobationaryperiod,butthisismainlyaformality.Exceptforseriousmisconduct,allteachersprogresswithoutdifficultybeyondthisperiod(ESSPIN,2009).However,aprobationaryperiodcouldofferanotherimportantmethodtoimprovingteachingselection,asshownbyaninterestingnewproposalfromIndia.

India.AsmallcampaignisunderwaytoformaliseaninterestingnewrecruitmentsysteminIndia(Muralidharan,2015).Thisisbasedonthreefindingsinrecentyearsregardingteacherrecruitment:

Firstly,teachersaremoreaccuratelyevaluatedoncetheytheyareteaching.Classroomobservation,studentsurveysandprincipals’perceptionsallperformmuchbetterinpredictingateacher’scapacitytoimprovestudentlearningthantraditionalmeasuressuchasgraduatedegreesorteachingcertificates(Grossmanetal,2013;Kane&Staiger,2011;Jacob&Lefgren,2008).Thisalsobetterallowstheassessmentofnon-observeableteachercharacteristicssuchascareerfocus,(asdescribedintheZambiacaseabove)butalsoleadership,perseveranceandcriticalthinking(Muralidharan,2015).

Secondly,recruitingtemporary“contractteachers”cansignificantlyimprovelearningoutcomesinprimaryschools.Onestudyfoundsuchteacherswereatleastaseffectiveasregularteacherswithmoreformaltrainingcredentials.Becausetheseteachersaremoreaccountabletotheschool,theyarealsomuchlesslikelytobeabsent(18%forcontractteachersversus27%fortraditionalteachers).Hence,“contractteacherswereabletomorethanmakeupfortheirlowerlevelseducation,training,andexperiencewithhigherlevelsofeffort”.(MuralidharanandSundararaman,2013)

Thirdly,centralisedrecruitmenttogetherwithmostteachers’preferencetobedeployedtourbanareashasresultedinlargeteacherdisparitiesthroughoutthecountry.Toimprovethissituationforhard-to-staffschools,thereisastrongcasetomakeforlocalhiringofstaff.

Puttingthesethreeitemstogether,Muralidharan(2015)advocatesforasystemwhereeachteacherisdirectlyemployedbytheschoolonacontract-basisforuptothreeyears,givingprioritytolocalcandidates.Thelocalgovernmentwillthenconductannualin-schoolassessmentsoftheirteachingskills,andverifytheteacher’seffectivenessthroughclassroomobservationsandprincipalsurveys.Onceayear,teacherscangetpromotedtotheregularteacherserviceiftheyarefoundtomeettheminimumteachingrequirements.If,afterthreeyearstheystilldonotmeettheminimumteachingrequirements,theteacherisletgo,andareplacementcontractteacherisrecruitedinstead.

Whilethissystemisnotyetimplemented,itisincreasinglyconsideredasaseriousoptioninIndiabecauseitstrikesacrucialbalancebetweenrecruitmentanddeployment.Localrecruitmentcanprovideanimportantmechanismtoensureequitabledeployment,whileregionalpost-hocassessmentsoffersastrongselectionmechanismtorecruitingthemosteffectiveteachers.

DiscussionPoint:RaisingRequirementstoPassingTeacherProbation


• Whatisthecurrentprobationsystemlike?

• Whatwouldasuccessfulprobationarysystemlooklike?

• Whatchanceisthereforusingaprobationsystemtoimproverecruitmentofeffectiveteachers?

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3.2 Deployment

Itisnotsufficienttofocusonrecruitmentalone.AlmostallcountriesinSub-SaharanAfricafinditdifficulttoachieveanequitabledeploymentofteachers,withthepoorestandleastdevelopedareasexperiencingthegreatestdifficultyinteachersupply(UIS2006).Asteachershaveapreferencetoteachinurbanareas,themostcapableandqualifiedteachersoftenendupthere.Asaresult,ruralschoolsendupwithfewer,andlessqualifiedteachersthanurbanschools(SteenbergenandHill,2016).Forthatreason,MinistriesofEducationneedstotakeaproactivestandandtakedeploymentconcernsseriously.Thissectionprovidesexamplesofsuchpolicyoptionsfordeployment,usingcasestudiesfromsub-SaharanAfrica.

3.2.1 ConceptualFramework:ThreeTeacherDeploymentSystems

Intheirinfluentialreport,"TeachersforRuralSchools",MulkeenandChen(2008)describethreebroadapproachestoteacherdeployment,illustratedbelowinfigure3.2.Thefirstiscentralisedplanning,wheretheMinistryofEducationdirectlyassignsteacherstoschoolsonthebasisofschoolneeds.Thesecondsysteminvolvesadecentralisedmodality,wherelocalgovernmentaretaskedwithdeployingteacherstospecificschools(afterrecruitmenthasbeencompletedatcentrallevel),orresponsibleforbothrecruitmentanddeployment.Thethirdsysteminvolvesschool-basedrecruitment.Here,teachersdirectlyapplyforajobinaspecificlocation,thusavoidingtheneedforanyteacherdistributionsystem.

Figure3.2ThreeTeacherDeploymentSystems

CentrallyPlannedSystem.Mostcountriesinsub-SaharanAfricainitiallyreliedonacentralisedteacherdistributionsystem.Thishastheadvantageofappearingstraightforward,bybasingitonaneutralpolicytargetsuchasa‘Pupil-TeacherRatio’.Forinstance,ifthisis40:1,theoverallteacherneediscalculatedbasedoneachschool’sprojectednumberofpupils,dividedby40.Thenumberofnewteacherstobedeployedtoaschoolisthensimplycalculatedbytakingtheoverallneededteachersminusthecurrentstock.Bypostingallteachers‘blindly’(i.e.withoutsubjectivematchingonteacherpreferences),thissystemisalsoseentobemoretransparentandlesssubjecttopoliticalinterferenceorotherlocalpressures.

Adisadvantageofacentralisedsystemisthatitdependsheavilyonthequalityofinformationtheyreceivefromschools.Ifthisisincorrect(asisoftenthecase),sowilltheprojections.Italsoleadstolargedelaysinrecruitment;itoftentakesoverayearfortheeducationstatisticstobeupdated,andthenanotheryeartocompletetherecruitmentdriveanddeploymenttoschools.Assuch,ifateacherdropsoutofaschool,itoftentakesatleasttwoyearstoreplacesuchindividualsunderthissystem(MulkeenandChen,2008).Themajorweakness,however,isthatitisoftenpracticallyimpossibletoimplementthedeploymentplan.Becauseteachersprefertoliveinurbanareas,theyoftencircumventtheMinistryofEducation’spostingby“claimingfictitioushealthproblems,exploitingpoorrecordkeeping,orjustfailingtotaketheirassignedposting”(Hedges2000).Assuch,thissystemoftenendsupleadingtoalargedifferencebetweenformalpostingsandtherealpositionstakenupbyteachers,andperpetuatesregionaldisparities(Mulkeen,2009).

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DecentralisedSystems.Tobemoreresponsivetotheneedsofschoolsandteachers,manycountriesinsub-SaharanAfricahave(partly)decentralisedtheirrecruitmentanddeploymenttolocalgovernment.Thisiseitherdoneinatwo-stagesystem,wherecentralauthoritiesdeployteacherstoadistrict,andthedistrictauthoritiesdeployedteacherstospecificschools.Alternatively,localgovernmentismadefullyresponsibleforallhiring,distributionandtransferofteachers.Themorelocal,themoreflexibleandresponsiveittendstobetoschools’needs.LocalGovernmentsareoftenmuchbetterawareofthespecificneedsandrequirementsfacedbyheadteachers,andcanthusassurebettermatching(Mulkeen,2009).

However,decentralisedsystemsarealsomorevulnerabletoexternalpressuresandpoliticalinterference,especiallyfordistrictswithweakadministrativecapacity.Thishasimplicationsforrecruitment,aslocaltiesmakeiteasiertofavourspecificcandidates(thosewithpoliticalconnections,friendsorrelatives)overmorequalifiedcandidates.Italsohasdeploymentimplications.Closerproximityofteacherstoadministratorsmeansteachersarebetterabletoputpressureonthesystemtobetransferredtoapreferred(i.e.urban)location,leadingtocontinuedteacherdisparitieswithinadistrict(MulkeenandChen,2008).

School-BasedRecruitment.Whenschoolsareallowedtorecruittheirownteachers,thereisnoneedforateacherdeploymentsystem.Instead,teachersdirectlyapplyforaspecificschool,andschoolswillonlyselectteacherswhowillaccepttheposition.Italsogiveseachschool’sheadteacherthebestabilitytoselectthosecandidatesthatmatchtheschool’sbroaderteachingrequirements.AsshowninLesotho(see3.2.4below),thissystemoftenensuresthatmostschoolscanfilltheirteachingposts,thusbeingthemostsuccessfulinimprovingequitableteacherdeploymentacrossthecountry.However,thissystemalsoleadstothebestqualifiedteacherstogetthemostdesirable(i.e.urban)jobs.Moreruralschoolshavetorelyonlocalteachers,whooftenhavelowerornoqualifications.

DiscussionPoint:ThreeTeacherDeploymentSystems


• Whichofthesesystemsbestdescribesyourstate’sdeploymentprocess?

• Areyouexperiencingthesameorotherbenefitsandchallengesinyourdeploymentprocess?

Basedonthisconceptualframeworkandtheinternationalliterature,therearethreemainmethodsusedtoimprovedeploymenttopriorityschools:forcedtransfer,incentivesandtargetedrecruitment.WewillnowuseexamplesfromdifferentAfricancountriestoillustratetheeffectofeachoftheseoptions.

3.2.2 ForcedTransferforTeacherstoRemoteAreas

SouthAfrica.Inanefforttoequaliseteacherdeployment,SouthAfricaissuedalargecampaigninthelate1990storelocatemoreteacherstoruralareas(Göttelmann-DuretandHogan,1998).Whilethisappearedtobealow-costmethodtoimproveeducationoutcomes,itfailedtonotablyreduceteacherdisparities,whileseverlydamagingteachermoraleandleadingtohighstaffturnover.Mostteacherswerenotwillingtomove,andalargenumberofkey(scienceandmaths)teachersdecidedtoleaveteachinginstead(Garson,1998).Moreover,thenumberofgraduateschoosingtoapplytoteachingalsoreducedheavilybecauseitwasconsideredalessappealingprofession“whereoneislikelytoberedeployedormoved”(Samuel2002).Becauseonsuchfailings,SouthAfricamostlyendeditsredeploymentcampaign.

ThecaseofSouthAfricahighlightsthemajorlimitationofusingforcedtransfersasapolicy,andreflectsthepotentialdangerofanysystemthatinsufficientlytakesintoconsiderationitsteacher’spreferences.

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Eritrea.ThecountryofEritreaisoneofthefewwhereasystemofforcedteachertransferiseffective.Itusesatwo-stagedeploymentsystem,whereteachersareassignedtooneofsixregions,whichthenallocateteacherstoaschool.Noteacherisgivenachoiceoflocation,anddeploymentisstrictlyenforced.Eritreahasaveryeventeacherdeploymentasaresult.TherearetwomainreasonswhyEritrea’sforceddeploymentismoreeffectivethaninmostothercountries.Firstly,ithasaveryrigidandrule-boundregime,sothatthereislittleopportunityforinformalinfluencingofpostings.Secondly,newlyrecruitedteachersareawarethathavingapre-designatedposting(possiblyinaruralarea)isarequirementtogainentryintothenationalcivilservice(MulkeenandChen,2008).

Eritreashowsthatonlysomestatesarelikelyabletoimplementforcedtransfers.Moreover,teachersaremorelikelytoacceptaruralpostiftheyseeitasatemporarysteponapathtoamoredesirablejob.

DiscussionPoint:ForcedTransfersforTeacherstoRemoteAreas


• Whathavebeenyourchallengeswithforcedtransfer?

• Cananyoftheexamplesusedherebemadetoworkinthestate?Whyorwhynot?

3.2.3 ProvidingIncentivesforTeachersinRemoteAreas

ThereisastrongacknowledgementinmostMinistriesofEducationthatforcedtransferalonewillnotaddressdeploymentissues.Forthatreason,manycountrieshaveattemptedtomakeworkinginruralareasmoreattractivebyofferingdesignatedincentives(Mulkeen2009).Twoincentivesarecommonlyprovided.Thefirstrelatestofinancialincentives,oftenintheshapeofadesignated‘ruralhardshipallowance’.Thesecondconstitutesofin-kindincentives,suchashousing.Examplesofbotharegivenbelow.

1. RuralTeachingAllowances

Financialincentivesarewidelyusedtoattractandretainteachersinruralschools,butinmostcaseshavelimitedimpact.Forinstance,Zambiaprovidesa20%bonus,andUgandahasa30%bonusforprimaryteachersinhardtoreachareas.Yet,bothtimesthesewereunsuccessfultoattractmanyteachersintoruralareas,astheamountofferedwasgenerallyconsideredtobeloolow(MulkeenandChen,2008).ThecaseofTheGambiaoffersapowerfulexampletoshowthattherightfinancialincentivescanprovidechange.

TheGambia.Toattractqualifiedteacherstohardshipposts,TheGambiaintroducedaspecialallowancein2006foranyoneteachinginaschoolthatismorethan3kmfromthemainroad.Thishardshipallowanceequatedtoanadditional30%ofateacher’salary,butwentupto35%and40%astheschoolswerefurtherremovedfromthemainroad.Asaresult,by2007,24%ofqualifiedteachershadrequestedtobetransferredtothemostremotelocationstoreceiveanincreaseintheirsalary.Moreover,65%ofstudentteacherswerereportedtonowtakeupthepostifselectedtoahardshipschool.However,suchasystemwasalsoveryexpensive,andthusreducedtheoverallamountofteachersTheGambiacouldrecruit.

TheGambia’scasehighlightstwogenerallessonsabouttheuseofincentives.Firstly,incentivesneedtobesubstantialinsizetooutweighthesocialandeconomiccostoflivinginanisolatedarea.Secondly,thereneedstobeafairsystemofclassifyingschools,ideallyonethatdistinguishesbetweendifferentdegreesofremoteness.Moregeneralclassificationsoftenfailbecausetheyprovidebonusestoteachersworkinginsmalltowns,whileprovidingrelativelylittleextratoteachersinthemostisolatedschools(Mulkeen,2009).

Thissuggeststhatfinancialincentivescanattractteacherstoruralareas.However,italsoimpliesthattheassociatedcostofsuchapolicywillbesolargethatmanycountrieswillnotbeabletoaffordit.

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2. TeacherHousing

Malawi.Theothermajorstrategytoimprovingdeploymentrelatestotheprovisionofteacherhousing.InMalawi,thiswasoftenconsideredtobeanabsoluteprerequisiteforateachertoacceptthepost.Thisisbecausemanyruralareasarelargelydependentonsubsistencefarming,andthuslackanyprivatemarketforhousing.Teacherswouldhavetobuildahousethemselves,oracceptthebasicfacilitiesavailableinruralareas,whichmanyqualifiedteachersreportedtobeunwillingtodo.Forthatreason,onedistrictofficerreportedthat“ifyousendonewherethereisnohouse,theycomebackandyouareforcedtoputthemsomewhereelse”(Mulkeen,2009).Absenceofhousingwasparticularlyimportanttofemaleteachers,whowereworriedaboutsafetyconcernswithoutadequateresidence.Forthatreason,Malawi’seducationdatashowastrongcorrelationbetweentheavailabilityofhousinginanareaandthepresenceoffemaleteachersintheschool.

Publicprovisionofhousingisthusanimportantmechanismtoattractteacherstoruralareas.However,itisalsoveryexpensive,bothininitialbuildingandinmaintenancecost.Forthatreason,veryfewcountriesareabletoprovidehousingforallteachers.InMalawi,teachinghousingwasprovidedforlessthan25%ofteachers.Someofsuchhousingwaseventemporary,andinpoorcondition(Mulkeen,2009).Malawishowsthatpublichousingisnotjustanincentive,itisoftenconsideredtobeanabsoluteminimumrequirementforanyteachertoacceptapost.However,itisalsoveryexpensivetoensure.DiscussionPoint:ProvidingIncentivesforTeachersinRemoteAreas


• Whatincentivesareprovidedinyourstatetoteachersdeployedtotheremotestareas?

• Howdifficultisittofindhousingintheremostareas?Isthisamajorpolicyproblem?

• Whatwouldbeneededtoattractindividualstorequestbeingtransferredtoaremotelocation?

3.2.4 TargetedRecruitmentofTeachersforRemoteAreas

Athirdstrategyaimstoimprovedeploymentbytargetingrecruitmentofstudentteacherswithintheirownregion.Thisassumesthattheirdirectlinkstothecommunitywillmakeateachermorewillingtoremaininsuchruralsettings,andsonoadditionalfinancialincentivesneedtobeprovided.Moreover,becausetheyalreadyliveinthesecommunities,publichousingisalsonotrequired(Craig,Kraft,andduPlessis1998).Threecasessuchtargetedrecruitmentareprovidedhere:Lesotho,throughschool-basedrecruitment,andZambia,througharecruitmentsystemthattakesteachers’preferencesseriously,andNigeria,throughafemaleteachertrainingscholarshipprogramme.

Lesotho.ThecountryofLesothohasaverydistinctrecruitmentanddeploymentprocess.Here,theMinistryofEducation“grants”teacherestablishmentstoschoolsinresponsetotheirpupilenrolmentandavailablefunding.Onceanpostiscreated,theschoolmanagementcommitteecanselecttheteachertofilltheposition.TheofficialpapersforthisteacherarethensenttotheTeacherServiceCommissionforratification,afterwhichthecentralgovernmentwillstartpaymentoftheteacher’ssalary.

Asaresultofthisschool-basedrecruitmentsystem,thereisnolongeraproblemwithteachersrefusingtheirpostings,asindividualsunwillingtoworkinruralareasdonotapplyforpostsinthoseareas.Forthatreason,Lesothohasoneofthemostequitableteacherdistributionsinsub-SaharanAfrica(MulkeenandChen,2009).Inaddition,thissystemhasencouragedvolunteerteacherstoapplytoteachinruralschools,

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inthehopethatwhenapositionarises,theyareemployed.Suchfreelabourhasprovidedimportantschoolsupport,butcanoccassionalyendintensionwhenajobisawardedtoanotherperson(Mulkeen,2009).

Thislocalsystemalsohasanumberofchallenges.Itismoreopentolocalinfluencethanacentraldeploymentsystem.Whilepostsareadvertised,schoolsoftenalreadyhaveapersoninmindwhentheybegintheselectonprocess.Thereisalsoastrongpreferenceforlocalcandidates,sothatexternal,qualifiedteachershavebeenrejectedincommunitiesinplaceforalocal,unqualifiedteacher.Becauseitishardertofindqualifiedlocalteachers,thissystemexacerbatesqualitydifferencesbetweenurbanandruralschools.Forinstance,theschoolcensusdatarevealsonly24%ofteachersinurban(lowland)areasareunqualified,comparedwith51%inrural(mountain)areas.AfinaldifficultyofthissystemisthatitbecomeschallengingfortheMinistryofEducationtotransferteachersfromschoolswhereenrolmentisindecline,tootherneedyschools.Schoolauthoritiesoftenpreventanyteachersfrombeingtransferredout(Mulkeen,2009).

ThecaseofLesothosuggeststhatschool-basedrecruitmentoffersalow-costmodeltoensuresufficientteachersaredeployedtoruralareas.However,thisstrategyoftencomesattheexpenseofteacherquality,andresultsinmorelocalinterferenceandmoreunqualifiedteachersemployedinruralareas.

Zambia.TherecruitmentanddeploymentsystemofZambiaincorporatessomeelementsofcentralisedplanning,andsomeelementsofindividualchoice.Everyyear,allpostsarenationallyadvertisedinnewspapers,radioandtelevision,togetherwiththeoverallnumberofpostsavailableineachdistrict.Candidatesareaskedtoapplydistricttothedistrictinwhichtheywishtowork,whileencouragingapplicationstoruraldistricts,ascandidateswillhaveahigherprobabilityofbeingemployedhere.

AcentralmeetingisthenorganisedbythenationalMinistryofEducation,bringingtogetheralldistrictofficerstodeterminewhichcandidatesareselectedanddeployed.Thiscantakeuptotwoweeks.ThemeetingisfurthermonitoredbyobserversfromtheteacherunionamdZambia’spresident’soffice.Afteragreeingontheoverallselection,eachdistrictdrawsfromtheoverallpoolofteacherswhoappliedtotheirowndistrict.Then,someapplicantswhowerenotselectedfortheirchosendistrictarethenofferedplacesfordistrinctsthathaveinsufficientapplicants.

Thissystemwasabletopartlyimprovedeploymenttohardshipdistricts.Thisisbecauseteachersaremorelikelytoacceptapostinarurallocationiftheyhaveexplicitlychosentoapplythere.Asaresult,in2006,forinstance,outof1,116teachersrecruitedinthefirstround(manyofwhichtohardshipdistricts),only83failedtoreporttoschool(7%).

ThecaseofZambiasuggeststhataskingteacherstodirectlyapplytohardshiplocationsworksbetterthanblindposting.Moreover,enticingteacherstoapplytohardshippostsbystressingthehigherprobabilityofemploymentcan(partly)improvedeploymentproblems.

Nigeria(Bauchi,Katsina,NigerandSokoto).Afinalexample,closertohome,aimstoimprovedeploymentbysponsoringindividualsforteachertrainingbasedontheirwillingnesstoteachinruralareas.The‘FemaleTeacherTraineeScholarshipScheme’(FTTSS)offersscholarshipstowomeninruralareastotrainfortheNCEatastateCoE,onconditionthattheyteachinaruralschoolfortwoyearsaftercompletingtheirtraining.Statespledgetoadoptadditionalstudentteachers,employallnewgraduatesandtodeployallgraduatestotheirhomevillages.TheschemehasoperatedinBauchi,Katsina,NigerandSokotosince2008andexpandedtoZamfarain2012.TheimpactoftheFTTSSonimprovingdeploymenthasbeenmixed.Over7,800womenwereawardedsuchscholarshipsacrossthefivestates,and84%ofsuchtraineesexpressedtheintentiontoteachinaruralschoolfor2yearsaftergraduation.MostFTTSSgraduateswererecruited,mostlytorurallocalities,thoughinsomecasesinNigerstate,graduateswerealsopostedtonon-ruralschools.(Dunneetal,2014).

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Yet,asampleoftrackedFTTSSstudentssuggestthatveryfewteachersgraduatewithinfouryears(45%ofFTTSSstudentsinBauchi,17%inNiger).Lowpassrateswerepartlyduetoacademicability(studentteachersthoughtcoursesweretoodifficult,lackedstudyskillsandEnglishproficiency),andpartlyreflectedpoorselection(somestudentteachersdidnothavetheminimumqualificationstomeetselectioncriteria).PersonalandpoliticalinterestswerealsocitedasfactorsinfluencingFTTSScandidateselection.TheFTTSSprogrammethusraisesquestionswhetherteachertrainingisthebestplacetostartinordertoimprovedeployment.Indeed,manynon-FTTSSteachergraduateswerealsofromruralareas,yetwereoftennotselectedtoteach(duetoteacheroversupply)(Bennelletal,2014).Itmaythusbeeasiertosponsorthosegraduates,thantrainunqualifiedindividuals.Assuch,theproject’sevaluationconcludedthatinsteadoftraining“theprocessesfromgraduationtodeploymentneedspecificattention”(Dunneetal,2014).TheFTTSSshowsthatatargetedrecruitmentschemeforruralapplicantscanimproveteachers’willingnesstoteachinhardshiplocations.However,thisisoftenbestrealisedbybetterselectionofteachergraduates,ratherthansponsoringnew,unqualifiedindividualstotrainasteachers.DiscussionPoint:ProvidingIncentivesforTeachersinRemoteAreas


• Howcouldthesystembetterrecruitthosewhowanttoworkinthemostremoteareas?

• Whatwouldbethebenefitsandchallengestorecruitinglocallyonly?


Thischapterhasprovidedanoverviewofdifferentpolicyoptionstoimprovingrecruitmentanddeployment.Notably,verydifferentrecommendationscameoutofeachsection.

Thefirstsectionshowedthattoensurerecruitmentofthebestteachers,itoftenmakessensetocentralisethesystemandadoptastructured,formalrecruitmentprocessbasedontransparentprinciples.Suchanapplicationofanentryexam,aninterviewwithscoringsheets,oramarkedteacherclassroomobservationcouldbedoneatanyofthethreeselectionstages:atentryofateachertrainingcollege,whenapplyingforateachingposition,orduringone’sprobationinordertoentertheteachingprofession.Thekeyistoofferclearandtransparentminimumteachercompetencies,avoidaninformalsystemtodominate,andensurethesystemisrobustenoughagainstexternalinfluences(suchaspoliticalinterference),whichundermineboththequalityofselection,andlowerteachereffectivenessbyreducingtheiraccountabilitytoschools.

However,thedeploymentcasesuggestthatthemorecentralisedthesystemis,themorepronouncedthedisparitieswillbebetweenurbanandruralschools.Forcedtransfersrarelywork,andcanbedamagingtoteachermorale.Localisingthesystemoftenleadstothemostequitabledeploymentsystem,howeveritcomesatthepriceofteachereffectiveness.Morequalifiedteacherswillapplyforpositionsinurbanareas,whileruralschoolswilloftenendupwithunqualifiedindividuals.Alternativestothissystemcanwork,butrequiresignificantfinancialinvestmentsonthesideoftheMinistryofEducation.Thisoftenincludesbotharuralhardshipschemeandtheprovisionofteacherhousinginlocalitiesthatotherwiselacksuchamenities.

Assuch,thereisoftenatrade-offbetweenpoliciesfocusedonrecruitingeffectiveteachers,andensuringmoreequitabledeployment.Findingabalancebetweenthetwoisthuscrucial.Thenextchapterwilltrytodoso,bybuildingonthesefindingsandcombiningthemwiththefindingsfromchapter2toprovidefourbroad,potentialpolicyoptionstoimprovebothrecruitmentanddeployment.

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4 PuttingItAllTogether:FourPolicyOptions

4.1 Introduction

Inthischapter,wewillputtogetherthefindingsfromNigeria’scurrentrecruitmentanddeploymentprocessesdescribedinchapter2withthevariouspolicyoptionsdescribedinchapter3.Wewillinitiallyofferfourbroadpolicyideas.Thistriestofindawaytobestbalancethetrade-offbetweensystemsfocusedonimprovingrecruitment(selectingeffectiveteachers)anddeployment(equitabledivisionofteachers).

4.2 FourPolicyOptions

Whenconsideringoptionsforpolicyreform,itisbotheasytobetoocautiousandonlyproposereformsthatarefeasible,butdonotfundamentallyimproveanyoutcome,ortobetooradicalandendupwithcompletelyunrealisticsuggestions.Forthatreason,wewillpresentfourdifferentoptionshere,rangingfromleasttomostreformist.Notehowever,thattheseareofferedonlyassuggestionstostimulatediscussion,andshouldnotbeseenasdirectrecommendations.Itisvitalthateachoftheseoptionsareanalysedinmoredetail(seebelow).ThemostappropriatereforminKanoandKadunamaybesomehybridofthesesuggestions,ormayevenendsupbeingafifthpolicyoptionthatfocusesonanotherreformarea.

• Option1:Formalisethelocalrecruitmentsystemandadoptaruralteachingallowance.11

Themoststraightforwardpolicyoptiontoimprovingthecurrentsystemisto‘workwiththegrain’(Levy,2014)andtrytorationalisetheinformal,localrecruitmentsystemthatiscurrentlydominatingrecruitment.Underthisreform,allprimaryteacherrecruitmentbecomesformalresponsibilityoftheLocalGovernment.

Toimprovetherecruitmentstandard,theprocesshastofollowcertainminimumrequirementssetoutbythestate.Toenforcethissystem,andimproveitstransparency,LocalGovernmentCouncils(LGCs)arerequiredtohaveadesignated‘event’wheretheyconducttheteacherselection,organisedbytheLocalGovernmentEducationAdviser(LGEA).Astate-SUBEBrepresentativehastoattendtoensureallprocessesarerespected.Allheadteachersfromschoolswithproposedpostingsarealsoinvitedtotakepartintheteacherselectionprocess.Othermembers,suchastheTeacherUnionandGovernor’srepresentativescouldalsobeinvitedas‘observers’toensurethatthesystemisimplementedfairly.

Selectionatlocalgovernmentlevelislikelytoprivilegelocalcandidates,thusbenefittingdeployment.However,byhavingasystemthatenforcesminimumstandards,theremaystillbefewerqualifiedcandidatesinparticularhardshiplocations.Forthatreason,aruralteachingallowanceshouldalsobeintroducedthatisbasedonatransparentrule(e.g.distancefromthepavedroad).Thisamountshouldbesignificant(aminimumof+30%extrasalary)andincreaseformoreruralpostings(+40%to50%extraasapostingismorerural).Aclear‘zoning’mapshouldbedevelopedtoclearlyexplaintheserulestoteachers.Thisruleshouldbeuniformacrossthestateandfinancedatthestatelevel(toavoidpenalisingruralareas).

Thissystemwilllikelybemostpoliticallytenable,andwillimproveteacherselection.However,bydrawingfromalocalpool,themosteffectiveteacherswillstilllikelygotourbanareas.Theruralteachingallowance,whilepopularwithallstakeholders,maybefinanciallyunaffordableforstatestocover.

11ThispolicytakeselementsofPeru’shybridselectionprocess(section3.1.2),Zambia’srecruitment“workshops”thatensuretransparencythroughexternalobservers(secton3.2.4),andfindingsfromTheGambiaaboutincentives(section3.2.3).

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• Option2:CentralisetherecruitmentsystemtoSUBEB;applicantsindicateanLGApreference.12

Theoptionthatislikelytoallowselectionofthebestteacherswouldrequirecentralisingtherecruitmentprocess(orenforcingthecurrentformalprocess)andmakingitthefullresponsibilityoftheSUBEB.

Toenticeapplicantstoruralareas,anannualstate-basedrecruitmentcampaignwillclearlypostthetotalnumberofpositionsthatareavailableineachLGA.ThiswillalsostressthatpreferenceisgiventothoseapplicantswhoapplytothemostruralLGAsareas.Applicantsthenhavetoapplytothestateindicatingafirst,andsecondpreferenceforLGA.

Allapplicantsarethenrequiredtoconductastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andpossiblyalsoasmall,graded,teachingdemonstration,basedonasetofpre-specifiedcriteriaofeffectiveteaching.Anoverallgradeisthengiventoeachteacher.Tofurtherbenefitthosewillingtoteachinruralareas,pointsareaddedtoapplicants’scoresiftheychoosetoteachinaruralLGA(andmorepointsifitisaveryruralLGA),whilepointsaresubtractedforapplicantspreferringtoteachinanurbanarea(andmorepointsaresubtractedifit’saveryurbanLGA,suchasthecapital).

Afterthisadjustment,allteachersarerankedfromhighesttolowestscoring.ThestateallocatesindividualstoLGAsbasedontheirindicatedpreference,startingwiththehighestscoringteacherandmovingdownthelinetocovereveryone’sfirstchoice.Remainingapplicantswhowerelower-downandnotselectedfortheirfirstchosenLGA,arethenofferedplacesfortheirsecondchoiceLGA(ifstillavailable)orotherwise,anotherLGAwithinsufficientapplicants.Suchoffersarereportedbacktoteachers,togetherwiththeirrankintheoverallstatetest.Theteachercanchoosetoeitheracceptorrejecttheoffer.Ifrejected,nootherofferisprovided,butamemberlowerdownonthelistisofferedtheposition.ThelistofrecruitedteachersisthenprovidedtotheLGEA,whichwillworktogetherwithallheadteachersfromschoolswithproposedpostings,tojointlydecideonthefinalschooldeployment.

Thissystemplacesthemostemphasisonteachercompetency,andwillthuslikelyimproveselection.Italsooffersavery‘fair’andtransparentrecruitmentanddeploymentsystem,thatdoesnotrequirelargefinancialcontributions.However,itseverelyreducesthe(informal)powersoflocalgovernment,andpreventsthemfrominfluencingtheselectionorchoosing‘locals’only(asdeploymentisdrivenbyteachers’applicationsentirely).Itmayalsobecumbersometoimplementatstatelevel,anditisuncertainifthissystemcanfillhardshiplocationswithoutadditionalincentives.

• Option3:RecruitmentbecomesthejointresponsibilityofSUBEBandCoEs;loan-scholarshipsareprovidedtothosewillingtotemporarilyteachinthemostruralcommunities.13

Thispolicyoptionfocusesontheentryintoteachertrainingasthemainselectionmethodtoimprovingteacherrecruitmentanddeployment.

Underthissystem,theSUBEBsetsoutthelikelynumberofcandidatesitiswillingtorecruitintwoyearstime.Allstate-levelteachertraininginstitutes(TTIs),includingtheCollegeofEducation,andanypotentialFederalTeachingCollegeorUniversity,areprovidedwithacap14ontheirNCEentrythatisdirectlylinkedtotothisrecruitmenttargeted(e.g.possiblyanextra15-20%highertoaccountforteacherdropout).Theywillonlyreceivestatefundingforthisselectnumberofcandidates.15Todisincentiviseextraenrolment,theseschoolswillalsofacea(financial)penaltyiftheyexceedtheirenrolmentcap.

12ThispolicyislargelybasedonMexico’stest-basedsystem(section3.1.3)andZambia’steacherdeploymentsystem(secton3.2.4).13ThispolicyislargelybasedonthecaseofPeru(seesection3.1.2),togetherwithColumbia'sloan-scholarshipscheme(see3.1.2)andthetargetedrecruitmentoftheFemaleTeacherTrainingScholarshipScheme(see3.1.4).14Incaseofmultipleteacherteachercolleges,aninternalallocationformulaofentrantshastobeoverseenbySUBEBorMoE.15Thoughbymaintainingtheoverallallocation,andreducingenrolment,per-studentfundingwillincreasesignificantly.

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TheSUBEBandMoEwillalsoplaceadditionalrequirementsonteachertraininginstitutestoimproveandenforcetheirselectioncriteria.Allapplicantsarerequiredtoconductastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andpossiblyalsoasmall,graded,teachingdemonstration,basedonasetofpre-specifiedcriteriaofeffectiveteaching.Allcandidatesarerankedfrombesttoworst,andstartingfromthehighest-rankingcandidates,alldesignatedpositionsarefilleduntiltheenrolmentcapismet.

Toimprovedeploymenttoruralareas,applicantswhoarewillingtoteachinarurallocationfortwoyearsareprovidedwithaloan-scholarshipthatcoversalltheirtuitionfeesandlivingexpenses.Thisisturnedintoagrantwhentheygraduateandhavecompletedtwoyearsofteachinginarurallocation.Afterthesetwoyears,theseteachersarefurtherallowedtohaveafirst-choiceinselectingwhichofLGAswithoutstandingteacherneedstheywishtobetransferredto.

Attheendofthetwoyear-cohort,theSUBEBandMoEwillagaintestallapplicantsonthesestandardisedrequirements.TheythenprovidealargebonustothecollegeforeveryteachercomingoutoftheNCEprogrammethatmeetsminimumteachingstandards.Thiswillfurthermakesurethecollegesareseriousaboutselectingonlythemostcapablecandidatesandlikelyincentivisesremedialeducationtotakeplace.Thistestalsodoublesastheformalprocesstorecruitingteachers(thoughexternalcandidatesarealsoabletoapplyduringthistime).TeachersaredeployedtotheLGEAonthebasisoftheirstatedpreferenceandopenvacancies.TheLGEAwillthenworktogetherwithallheadteachersfromschoolswithproposedpostings,tojointlydecideonthefinalschooldeployment.

Thissystemprovidesanappealingsolutionbycloselyaligningthedemandandsupplyofteachergraduates,whilesimultaneouslystimulatingimprovedteachertrainingthroughimprovedselection,monitoringandassessment.Italsoreducestheinformalpowersoflocalgovernment(andmaythusbepoliticallytricky),butmaybepopularforstudentteachersbyraisingtheirlikelihoodofemployment.Theloan-scholarshipisacost-effectivewaytostimulatedeploymenttoruralareas,andfacesrelativelylittleriskasitturnsintoagrantonlywhenstudentshavecompletedtheirinitialtwoyearsofteaching.

• Option4:Schoolscanrecruitteachersonprobation.Theseteachershavetopassaminimumteacherstandardstestwithinthreeyears,whichisadministeredannuallybytheState.16

Themostradicalsuggestionistofullydevolverecruitmentanddeploymentprocessestotheschool.

Underthissystem,theSUBEBmakesanassessmentoftheschoolswhichmosturgentlyneedteachers,andthetotalnumberofrecruitsthatarefinanciallyaffordable.Itthen‘grants’suchanewpositiondirectlytotheschool,whichcanstartitsownselectionprocess.Byrecruitinglocalcandidates,itwilllikelyquicklyfilltheposition,thusaddressingoverallteacherdeploymentdisparities.However,italsoraisestheriskofrecruitingalargenumberofunqualifiedcandidates.

Tocounterthis,apost-hocstateassessmentprocessisproposed.Thisrequiresthatanynewteachingrecruithastomeetcertainminimumteacherstandardswithinthreeyearsoftakingtheir‘probationary’post.Thisassessmentisconductedannuallybythestate,whichincludesastandardisedexamination,amarkedinterview,andpossiblyalsoasmall,graded,teachingdemonstration,basedonasetofpre-specifiedcriteriaofeffectiveteaching.Anoverallgradeisthengiventoeachteacher.Thosewithanoverall‘pass’markarethenpromotedtotheregularteachingservice.If,afterthreeyearstheteacherhasstillnotpassed,theyareletgo,andtheschoolhastostartrecruitmentofareplacementcandidate.

Thissystemthusplacestheburdenofupgradingateacher’sskillsontheteacherandtheschool’sheadteacher.Thiswillmakethemtakeotherexercises(e.g.in-serviceteachertraining,andclassroomsupport)

16ThispolicyisbasedonLesotho'srecruitment(section3.2.4),togetherwithanassessmentproposalfromIndia(section3.1.4)

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moreseriously.Itisalsopossiblywell-combinedwithrevisionstotheLGEAinspectorate,sothatitisusedasagradually‘supportsystem’topreparingthesenewteacherstomeettheminimumteacherstandards.

School-basedrecruitmentoffersaverycost-effectivemannertoimprovedeployment.Moreover,thefocusonin-schoolteacherassessmentsfollowslatestfindingsonhowbesttoidentifyeffectiveteachers.Yet,thissystemalsolargelyoverhaulstheconventionalrecruitmentandplacessignificantextraburdensontheheadteacher.Assuch,thisisoftenconsideredtobetooradicalofareforminmanycountries.

DiscussionPoint:FourPolicyOptions


• Gothrougheachoftheexamples,andhighlighttheelementsthatmightworkinyourstate.Whymightthesebeeffective,andhowwouldtheybemadetowork?

• Gothrougheachoftheexamples,andhighlighttheelementsthatwilllikelynotworkinyourstate.Whyisthatso?Whatdoesthatteachusaboutwhatpolicyelementshavetobeavoided?

• Whatwouldbeafifthoption,thatprovidesameaningfulsolutiontotacklerecruitmentanddeployment?Whatarethebenefitsandchallengestothisapproach?


Thischapterhasproposedfourdifferentpolicyoptions,focusingondifferentpointsofentryandwithdifferentemphasesonrecruitmentordeployment.Theyalsorangefromminortweakstothecurrentsystem(e.g.formalisinglocalrecruitmentbychangingthecompositionandselectionprocessoftheteacherrecruitmentcommittee)tolargeoverhauls(e.g.makingschoolsresponsiblefortheirownrecruitment).

Ingeneral,alloptionsincludesomemechanismofstandardisedexaminationprocess,thoughthiscanoccuratdifferentstagesoftheselectionprocess.Allfouroptionsalsoofferawaytoattractteacherstohardshiplocations,eitherthroughruralteachingincentives,stressingthehigherlikelihoodofemploymentintheseareas,orthroughtargetedrecruitment.Allcouldwork,thoughindifferentdegrees,andsomearemuchmoreexpensivethanothers.Lastly,allsystemsalsorequireastrongerSUBEBtodeterminewhichLGAsandwhichschoolsneednewteachers,andhowmanynewpositionsarefiscallyfeasibletocreate.Thisstressestheneedforgreaterclarityandopennessinhowsuchallocationsaremade.Moreover,italsomeansthatthedataonwhichsuchprojectionsarebased(bothintermsofschoolneeds,andintermsofrecruitmentaffordable)isvital,andshouldreceiveextraattention.

Asmentionedintheintroduction,thesearejustpolicyideas,takenfromtheinternationalliterature.Itisdifficulttotellhowfeasibletheseare.Forthatreason,thenextsectionoffersasimplemodelthattakesthisassessmentforwardandguidestheparticipanttohowbesttoanalysewhichpolicyoptionismostfeasible,andhowbesttoproceed.

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5 HowBesttoUtilisePolicyOptions

TheanalysisinthechapterspreceedingareallconsideredtobevitalinputsintotheresearchsetouttodobytheStateResearchTeamsinKanoandKaduna.Basedonthis,theirfindingsinthefirstphaseoftheresearch,andtheirbroaderunderstandingofthesystem,suchpolicyideascannowmeaningfullybeanalysed,adapted,combinedorcontrastedtofindpracticalideasthatwouldbestassistinthespecificpolitical,financialandadministrativerealitiesfacedbyKanoandKadunaState.

Thissectionprovidesasimpleframeworktohelpmemberswiththeiranalysis.Instartswithanoverviewofthedifferenttypesofareastogetpolicyideasfrom,followedbyanassessmentframeworktoassesswhichoptionswouldbetechnicallyoptimal,whilealsopoliticallyandadministrativelyfeasible.Weendwithabriefnoteonapotentialreformprocess,followingincrementalexperimentationandadaptation.

5.1 WheretoGetPolicyIdeasFrom

Afteridentifyingapolicychallenge(say,theineffectiverecruitmentanddeploymentofteachers),itisimportanttofindnewandinnovativeideasthatprovidethebasisforrecommendationstogovernment.However,itisalsoimportanttoconsiderwhatsourcesareusedforpolicyideas.InFigure5.1,wepresentastylisedmodelfromAndrewsetal(2016)thatplotsdifferentsourcesofinformationontwodimensions:vertically,itreflectswhethertheidea‘works’andisthustechnicallyfeasibletoreachitsaimedobjectives(e.g.willitimproverecruitmentanddeployment?).Horizontally,thisreflectstheextenttowhichanideaisadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasibleinagivencontext(e.g.wouldtheSUBEBbeabletoimplementthisproposal,andwouldtheCommissionerforEducationapprove?).Figure5.1reflectsthedifferentpositionsacrossfoursuchsourcesofinformation:existingpractice,latentpractice,positivedevianceandexternalbestpractice.Wewillnowbrieflydiscusseachoftheseinturn.

Figure5.1.TheDesignSpace:WhereDoWeGetIdeasFrom?

Source:Andrewsetal,2016

Thefirstsourceofinformationrelatesto‘existingpractice’.Asitiscurrentlybeingused,thisisclearlyadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasible,thoughitwilllikelyhavecertainkeychallengesthatpreventitfrombeingtechnicallyfeasible(andarethereasontheassessmentisoftenconductedinthefirstplace).

Simplybyconsideringthecurrentpractices,likelyideaswillstartappearingonhowpossiblytoaddressthechallengesfacedintheprocess,knownas‘latentpractice’.Forinstance,inchapter2,wesawthattherewereanumberofsmallchangesthatcanbemaderelativelyeasily(e.g.involvetheheadteachersmoreintheselectionanddeploymentprocess).Byworkingcloselywithinthesystem,suchareformisstillhighlyadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasible.Itwillalsomoveusslightlyclosertoatechnicallydesiredoption,thoughcertaindeeperinstitutionalconstraintswillnotbeaddressed.

Thethirdcategoryof‘positvedeviance’relatestoideasthatarealreadybeingacteduponinthelocalcontext(andarethusoftenadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasible),whilealsoyieldingthesamepositive

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results(addressingthepolicyissue).However,theseideasareonlyexhibitedinasmallpartofthesystemandthus‘deviatiefromthenorm’(Marshetal.2004).OneexamplecouldbeoneofalocalgovernmentwhichhasdevelopedasystemtoattractandrecruitbetterteachersthanitsneighbouringLGAs.Thiscouldthenofferaveryimportantsourceofinspirationforthewidereducationsystem,asitisbotheffectiveandfunctionalwithinthelocalcontext.

Thefourth,andmostcommonoption,isbasedaround‘externalbasedpractice’;findanexamplefromanothercountrythathas‘solved’thisproblemandrecommenditasasolution.Indeed,chapter3and4provideakeyexampleinthis.Thisissocommon,thatcountriesoftenhavemanystrategicplansthatcloselyresembleglobal“bestpractice”(Andrew,PritchettandWoolcock,2012).However,thisdoesnotmeanthatbyadoptingsuchpolicyambitionsthatoutcomeswillimprove(seeBox1forthecaseofprocurementinUganda).Thisisoftenbecausethese‘bestpractice’policiesareseentobetoocomplicatedtoimplement,ordonothavethewiderbackingfromotherstakeholdersingovernment.Assuch,asshowinFigure5.1,theyareoftennotadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasibleinthegivencontext.Thisreflectsthedangerofinternationalbestpractice.Itistemptingtotakeasolutionfromsomewhereandtransplantitintoadifferentcontext.However,thisoftendoesnotwork.Instead,suchpolicyonlyendsup‘masking’agovernment’spoorperformancetotheoutsideworld.Thisprovidesacasewherepushingforthebest,evidence-based,technicalsolutionmaynotleadtothemosteffectivepolicygeneration,but“facilitatestheperpetuationofdisfuction”(Andrews,PritchettandWoolcock,2012).

Box1:TheCaseofUganda’sProcurementRegulationbasedon“InternationalBestPractice”

Inthelate1990s,Ugandawasfacedwithaseriousprocurementproblem.Afteranumberofhigh-levelscandals,itaskedagroupofconsultantstorecommendthemostappropriatesystemtofollow.Thiswasconducted,andeventuallyahighlyambitiousbillwaspassed,followingthehighestinternationalstandardsofprocurementlaw.Indeed,GlobalIntegritygaveUganda98/100pointsforthequalityofitslegalframework;higherthananyothercountryintheworld.However,inpractice,thegovernmentdidnotactuallyimproveitsprocurement-performanceverymuch.Thesameinformalpracticescontinuedandservice-deliverydidnotmarkedlyimproveoverthenextdecade.Hence,problemspersisteddespitethe‘solutions’thatweremeanttoaddressthem(AndrewsandBategeka,2013).

Insum,itisimportanttobeawareofthebenefitsandlimitationsofdifferenttypesofpolicyideas.Ideally,wewouldtrytolookwithinthelocalcontextforcasesof‘positivedeviance’thatoffersolutionsthatareknowntobeadministrativelyandpoliticallyfeasible.However,suchideasarenotalwayswidelyavailable.Thisleavestheoptionoflookingambitiouslyatlocalpractices,andthinkingcreativelyhowtomakethesemoreeffective(latentpractice),orlookingatinternationalevidence(externalbestpractice),andtryingtofindawaytotailorthistothespecificadministrativeandpoliticallocalconditions.Inmanycases,thebestsolutionsprovideamixtureofalloffourelements.Thekeythen,istotrytofindthe‘hybrid’optionthatistechnicallymostpromising,whilealsobeingadministrativelyandpoliticallyfitting.Whilechapter4offerssome‘technical’ideas,thesenowhavetobetailoredtolocalcontext.Thenextsectionprovidesamethodtoassesssuchpolicyoptionstodoso.

5.2 AFrameworkforAssessment–TheThreeA’s

Therearemanydifferentframeworksandmethodologiestoassesspolicyoptions.Hereweproposeasimplifiedmodelbasedonthreekeyfactors:Authority,AbilityandAcceptance(Andrewsetal,2015).

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1. Authority(PoliticalFeasibility)

Authorityreferstothepoliticalsupportneededtoinitatethereform.Differentpoliticalactorswillpreferdifferentreforms,andsomereformsaremorecontentiousthanothers.Forthatreason,itisimportanttoidentifywhoarethemainsourcesofformalauthorityandinfluence(e.g.Governor,Commissioner,orSUBEBchairman).Theremayalsobeinformalsourcesofauthority(e.g.theinfluencingroleoflocalpoliticalsandtraditionalleaderscurrentlyinfluencingrecruitmentprocesses).

Onewaytoconductsuchanexerciseistodoa‘stakeholderanalysis’throughaseriesofinterviewswithallrelevantindividuals.Inthisprocess,thefirstaimistoidentifyhowinterestedeachinstitutionalstakeholderisinaparticularreform;whichdotheybelieveitismostfeasible,whicharetheymostinsupportof?Ahypotheticalcaseisgivenintable5.1,showingsomeinfavourofaparticularreform(asindicatedwithplussigns),someareopposed(minussigns)andothersareneutral.Wewillthuslikelyfindthatdifferentactorshaveverydifferentpreferencesonhowtoimproverecruitmentanddeployment.Itmayalsoimmediatelyreflectwhichoptionsarenotpoliticalyfeasible(e.g.inthishypotheticalcase,noactorsbesidesheadteachersaresupportiveofmovingtowardsschool-basedrecruitment).

Table5.1.ExampleofaStakeholderAnalysisacrosstheFourPolicyOptions

Scenario

Currentsystem(informalrecruitment,drivenbyLGAs).

Option1:Formaliselocalrecruitmentsystem,ruralteacherallowance.

Option2:CentraliserecruitmenttoSUBEB;applicantsindicateLGApreference.

Option3:Recruitmentdrivenbyteachertrainingentry;scholarshipsforthosewillingtoteachinruralareas.

Option4:Schoolsrecruitteachersonprobation,have3yearstopassminimumstandardstest.

ResultsbyStakeholderGovernor Nochange (+) (++) (+) (--)Commissioner/MinistryofFinance Nochange (---) (+) (-) (--)

Commissioner/MinistryofEducation Nochange (++) (++) (+) (-)

SUBEB Nochange (-) (+++) (+) (-)LocalGovernment Nochange (+++) (--) (---) (-)CollegesofEducation Nochange Nochange Nochange (+++) NochangeHeadTeachers Nochange (-) (+) (+) (+++)QualifiedTeachers Nochange (+) (+++) (++) (-)

Asecondaimofastakeholderanalysisistoassesshowinfluentialeachofthevariousstakeholdersareininitiatinganyproposedreform.Forinstance,localGovernmentshaveinfluence,butcouldpossiblybeoverruledonrecruitmentreformbySUBEBandtheEducationCommissioner,iftheychoosetodoso.

Puttingthesetwotogether,thetwoareas(influenceandinterest)canforma‘stakeholderanalysismatrix’.Figure5.2providesthehypotheticalcase,basedonpolicyoption1.Thisshowsthatthemainplayers(theupperquadrants)aredividedontheproposal,withsomeinfavour;someopposed.Thissuggeststhatinhypotheticalcase,thisoptionisrecommended,itwillhavetorelyonthetop-rightactorsas‘advocates’.Top-leftactorsstillrequireconvincing,orrequireanadapationtothepolicyinordertoappeasethem.Thebottompartreflectspotentialsupportandresistanceforimplementation(see‘acceptance’below).

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Figure5.2.AHypotheticalStakeholderAnalysisMatrix,basedonOption1

2. ‘Ability’(FinancialandAdministrativeFeasibility)

Abilityrelatestothepracticalsideofpolicyreform.Thisismadeupoffinancialcosts(affordability),andbroaderadministrativesupportneededforimplementation.

Firstly,areallofthepolicyoptionsfinanciallyfeasible,oraretherecertainoptions(e.g.introducingaruralteachingallowance)whichwouldbeprohibitelyexpensive?Whilesuchoptionscouldbecostedout,thiscanalsobeinitiallyassessedthroughinterviewswithkeyfinancialactors.Forinstance,whataretheviewsoftheMinistryofFinance,theMinistryofEconomicPlanningandBudget,andthebudgetunitoftherespectiveimplementationagencies(e.g.SUBEB)regardingtheaffordabilityofvariousproposals?Anotherpossiblewayistofocusonapilotofaspecificpolicyoption,andseewhataretheresourcerequirementshere,whichagencyisexpectedtofinancethis,andwouldtheybeabletoaffordsuchanexercise?

Secondly,anyreformwouldalsorequiretheadministrativetime,effortandskillsneededtostartsuchanintervention.Again,hereitishelpfultothinkaboutitintermsofapilot.Whichkeyagentsneedto‘work’onanyopeningengagement?Whichinstitutionsdotheyneedtocomefrom?Areanyspecificpolicyoptionsmoreadministrativelydifficulttoimplementthanothers?

Bothelementsthusallowustoassessdifferentkeycomponentsthatneedtobeinplaceinordertoinitiateanyreform.Ifanyparticularinterventionisfarmoredifficulttoimplement,itismuchlesslikelytobeasuccessfulmodelforreform(Andrewsetal,2015).

3. Acceptance(WillingnesstoImplement)

Acceptancereflectsthelikelysupportoroppositionfromwhoareaffectedbythereform(e.g.LGEAs,headteachers,teachers).Sometypesofreformaremorecontroversialforfront-officepersonelthanothers.Forinstance,aforcedtransfertoaruralschoolisdifficulttoimplement,whileteachersarelikelytosupportreceivingadditionalfundsthrougharuralteachingallowance.Withoutsufficientacceptance,thepolicywilllikelyfailtobeimplemented;itwillbeunderminedfromwithin(e.g.forceddeploymenttoruralschools).

Partoftheanalysisof‘acceptance’canthusbedonethroughastakeholderanalysis(seethebottomquadrantsinfigure5.2).However,notallheadteachersorteacherssharethesameview.Forthatreason,itmayalsobeimportanttothinkwhichpolicyismoststraightforward,andeasiesttocommunicatetofront-officepersonel.Incaseofloweracceptance,whatwouldbeneededtobestconvincesuchactorsoftheimportanceofthisparticularpolicyreform?

OverallReformSpace

Puttingallthreeelementstogether,andsummarisingeachwithpotentialof‘high’,‘medium’or‘low’reformspaceprovidesuswithahelpfultooltoquicklyseewhichreformismostplausible.Ahypothetical

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casesummarisingthefourpolicyoptionsisofferedinTable5.2.Here,basedonthestakeholderanalysis(seetable5.1)cleardifferencesappearintermsof‘authority’.Basedonfinancialcostandadministrativecomplexityoftheoptionsdescribed,asimilarpatternemergesfor‘ability’.Yet,slightlydifferentoptionsturnouttobemostacceptableofthefour.Thissuggeststhatinitscurrentform,oneoptionhaslowoverallchanceforreform,twohaveamedium-chance,andoneismostpromising.Basedonthis(hypothetical!)example,thissuggeststheResearchTeamshouldrecommendpolicyoption2tothegovernment,andfurtherdevelopthisideaforward(e.g.bydesigningaspecificpilotonhowthiscanbedone).

Table5.2.ExampleofAssessmentforOverallReformSpaceacrosstheFourPolicyOptions

Scenario

Currentsystem(informalrecruitment,drivenbyLGAs).

Option1:Formaliselocalrecruitmentsystem,ruralteacherallowance.

Option2:CentraliserecruitmenttoSUBEB;applicantsindicateLGApreference.

Option3:Recruitmentdrivenbyteachertrainingentry;scholarshipsforthosewillingtoteachinruralareas.

Option4:Schoolsrecruitteachersonprobation,have3yearstopassminimumstandardstest.

ReformSpace(High,Medium,Low)Authority Nochange Medium High Medium LowAbility Nochange Low High Medium LowAcceptance Nochange Medium Medium High HighChanceforReform? Nochange Medium High Medium Low

5.3 TakingYourFirstStep:TryingitoutandLearning

Aswasmentionedintheintroductionofthispaper,itisrelativelystraightforwardtoidentifypolicyideastoaddressaparticularproblem(asthispapershows).Itismuchhardertomeaningfullylearnfromtheseideas,andadapt,combineorcontrastthemtofindpracticialsolutionsthatwouldbestassistwiththechallengesfacedbythelocalpolitical,financialandadministrativerealities.ThisisthemajorchallengeupaheadfortheStateResearchTeamsinKanoandKaduna.

Thispaperprovidedanumberofpolicyideas,andamethodologytohelpassessthefeasibilityofsuchideas.However,nosuchanalysiscanprovidetheperfectrecommendation.Indeed,theinternationalpolicyresearchliteraturesuggeststhatitisvitalnottotrytodesigntheperfectsysteminonego.Thisisbecausethereareoftentoomanyuncertaintiestotakeintoconsideration,andimplementationofsuchasystemwouldbetoodifficult(Andrewsetal;2012).

Instead,itismuchbettertoidentifyasuitableentrypoint(basedontheconductedpolicyassessment),andstartsmall.Trytotestthissystemoutintherealworld,quicklyevaluate,revisethepilot,andtestagaintobettermeetitsobjectives.(Andrewsetal,2016).Suchaniterativeandexperimentalprocesswilllikelyofferthebestwaytofitanewproposalintothemuch-neededcontext-specificreform.Asshowninsection5.1,justbecauseaproposal‘works’inonecountry,doesnotmeanitwillworkinthenext.Moreover,startingsmalloftenoffersthemostfeasiblewaytogeneratereformspace.Takingthemodelfromsection5.2,authorityforreformwillalwaysberestrictedatfirst(whenpoliticiansmaystillbescepticalofanewidea),butthisgrowsastheideahasprovenitself(allowingforfurtherreform).Similarly,abilityandacceptanceforacivilservicetoimplementareformalsooftenemergeson-the-job,astheimplementingagencygraduallylearnshowbesttoimprovethesystem,andstartstoappreciatethebenefitsthataccruefromit.

Insum,thereisnoonerightwaytodoso,andsuccessfulreformsoftenemergeasahybridofideas.Thekeyistostartexperimentingwithpromisingideas,learnandadapt.EDORENhopesthatthroughthisinteractiveresearchactivity,theparticipatingstatescomesonestepclosertofindingrecommendationstoreformingthesystemtobetterensureeffectiveteachersarerecruitedanddeployedtopriorityschools.

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