end of life, year after year after year · my experience with als. in: black holes and baby...

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Salon CMAJ All editorial matter in CMAJ represents the opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the Canadian Medical Association. CMAJ NOVEMBER 24, 2009 • 181(11) © 2009 Canadian Medical Association or its licensors 868 End of life, year after year after year A fter Fred (as we’ll call him) was diagnosed with an inop- erable tumour the doctors told him he had perhaps six months to live. A merchant seaman, Fred decided to spend his savings enjoying himself while waiting for the end. More than eight months later, Fred showed up at a hospice still dying, but now broke, having spent his savings on what physicians had assured him would be the last months of his life. He stayed at the hospice well past the three-month time limit normally allot- ted residents — he had no place else to be — but was eventually moved to an apartment with the help of social ser- vices. Fred eventually returned, dying almost three years after his six-month, end-of-life diagnosis. The end-of-life determination sets the agenda for ethicists and physicians who counsel patients as they make decisions based on a presumably fore- shortened longevity. 1 Many hospices share the same assumptions as the physicians making terminal diagnoses, limiting client stays to a set number of weeks. However, the predictions made by clinicians are at best estimates, the validity of which is daily called into question by the Freds who live on past all expectation. There are many: Famously, for example, cosmologist Steven Hawking was given no more than a few years to live when, in his third year at Oxford University, he was diagnosed with amotrophic lateral scle- rosis. He lived until 2009, more than 35 years after his initial, rapidly terminal diagnosis. 2 The assumption that the date a life will end can accurately be predicted has spawned a robust industry of health economists, medical ethicists, physi- cians and sociologists who set policy guidelines for the last days and weeks of a person’s life. 3 What will dying cost (the patient and the health care system); where should the death occur (at home, at a hospice, in hospi- tal); and what pallia- tive treatment is appropriate for the dying person, are all explored in countless books, journal articles and policy guidelines. The general rule, informal, but in many instances inviolate, is to keep the person as comfortable as possi- ble and abjure any life-prolonging treatment. In this way an end of life determination becomes the handmaiden and overture for another category of medical decision- making with real legal currency these days, those based on “futility.” 4 Futil- ity may be a self-fulfilling promise, however, when aggressive medical attention is ignored on the assumption that the end of life is both assured and imminent, or that a patient’s condition is without hope of improvement. As a gerontologist one sees this fre- quently when a senior with chronic conditions is assumed to be at the end and any nonpalliative treatment will only prolong the dying. Seniors, how- ever, have a habit of confounding physician predictions and living on. 5 Letting “nature take its course” becomes in such cases an unnatural judgment ending the patient’s chances of future life. Simply stated, the best clinical expectation is often a very bad predic- tor. Medical decisions based on these expectations may be bad medicine. That patients live longer than expected, sometimes much longer, should be good news. It becomes problematic, however, when assump- tions of early death in “end-of-life decision-making,” and “futility” of continued treatment are accepted as determinations that define patient treatment. When that happens, the diagnosis may become the cause of death and not a predictor of it. Tom Koch PhD Bioethicist Vancouver, BC REFERENCES 1. Blank RH, Merrick JC. End-of-life decision mak- ing. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press; 2005. 2. Hawking S. My experience with ALS. In: Black holes and baby universes and other essays. New York (NY): Bantam Books; 1993. p. 21-7. 3. Field MJ, Cassel CK, editors. Approaching death: improving care at the end-of-life. Washington (DC): National Academy Press; 1997. 4. Wiener RL, Eton D, Gibbons VP, et al. A prelimi- nary analysis of medical futility decisionmaking: law and professional attitudes. Behav Sci Law 1998;16:497-508. 5. Koch T. Mirrored lives: aging children, aging par- ents. Westport (CT): Praeger Books; 1990. DOI:10.1503/cmaj.091402 Have you got an opinion about this arti- cle? Post your views at www.cmaj.ca. Potential Salon contributors are welcome to send a query to [email protected]. Fred Sebastian Previously published at www.cmaj.ca

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Page 1: End of life, year after year after year · My experience with ALS. In: Black holes and baby universes and other essays. New York (NY): Bantam Books; 1993. p. 21-7. 3. Field MJ, Cassel

Salon CMAJ

All editorial matter in CMAJ represents the opinions of the authors and not necessarily those of the Can adian Medical Association.

CMAJ • NOVEMBER 24, 2009 • 181(11)© 2009 Canadian Medical Association or its licensors

868

End of life, year after year after year

After Fred (as we’ll call him)was diagnosed with an inop-erable tumour the doctors told

him he had perhaps six months to live.A merchant seaman, Fred decided tospend his savings enjoying himselfwhile waiting for the end.

More than eight months later, Fredshowed up at a hospice still dying, butnow broke, having spent his savings onwhat physicians had assured himwould be the last months of his life. Hestayed at the hospice well past thethree-month time limit normally allot-ted residents — he had no place else tobe — but was eventually moved to anapartment with the help of social ser-vices. Fred eventually returned, dyingalmost three years after his six-month,end-of-life diagnosis.

The end-of-life determination setsthe agenda for ethicists and physicianswho counsel patients as they makedecisions based on a presumably fore-shortened longevity.1 Many hospicesshare the same assumptions as thephysicians making terminal diagnoses,limiting client stays to a set number ofweeks.

However, the predictions made byclinicians are at best estimates, thevalidity of which is daily called intoquestion by the Freds who live on pastall expectation. There are many:Famously, for example, cosmologistSteven Hawking was given no morethan a few years to live when, in histhird year at Oxford University, he wasdiagnosed with amotrophic lateral scle-rosis. He lived until 2009, more than 35years after his initial, rapidly terminaldiagnosis.2

The assumption that the date a lifewill end can accurately be predicted hasspawned a robust industry of healtheconomists, medical ethicists, physi-cians and sociologists who set policyguidelines for the last days and weeksof a person’s life.3 What will dying cost

(the patient and thehealth care system);where should thedeath occur (at home,at a hospice, in hospi-tal); and what pallia-tive treatment isappropriate for thedying person, are allexplored in countlessbooks, journal articlesand policy guidelines.

The general rule,informal, but in manyinstances inviolate, isto keep the person ascomfortable as possi-ble and abjure anylife-prolonging treatment. In this wayan end of life determination becomesthe handmaiden and overture foranother category of medical decision-making with real legal currency thesedays, those based on “futility.”4 Futil-ity may be a self-fulfilling promise,however, when aggressive medicalattention is ignored on the assumptionthat the end of life is both assured andimminent, or that a patient’s conditionis without hope of improvement.

As a gerontologist one sees this fre-quently when a senior with chronicconditions is assumed to be at the endand any nonpalliative treatment willonly prolong the dying. Seniors, how-ever, have a habit of confoundingphysician predictions and living on.5

Letting “nature take its course”becomes in such cases an unnaturaljudgment ending the patient’s chancesof future life.

Simply stated, the best clinicalexpectation is often a very bad predic-tor. Medical decisions based on theseexpectations may be bad medicine.That patients live longer thanexpected, sometimes much longer,should be good news. It becomesproblematic, however, when assump-

tions of early death in “end-of-lifedecision-making,” and “futility” ofcontinued treatment are accepted asdeterminations that define patienttreatment. When that happens, thediagnosis may become the cause ofdeath and not a predictor of it.

Tom Koch PhDBioethicistVancouver, BC

REFERENCES1. Blank RH, Merrick JC. End-of-life decision mak-

ing. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press; 2005.2. Hawking S. My experience with ALS. In: Black

holes and baby universes and other essays. NewYork (NY): Bantam Books; 1993. p. 21-7.

3. Field MJ, Cassel CK, editors. Approaching death:improving care at the end-of-life. Washington(DC): National Academy Press; 1997.

4. Wiener RL, Eton D, Gibbons VP, et al. A prelimi-nary analysis of medical futility decisionmaking: lawand professional attitudes. Behav Sci Law1998;16:497-508.

5. Koch T. Mirrored lives: aging children, aging par-ents. Westport (CT): Praeger Books; 1990.

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Have you got an opinion about this arti-cle? Post your views at www.cmaj.ca.Potential Salon contributors are welcometo send a query to [email protected].

Fred

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Previously published at www.cmaj.ca