Evaluation of Best Practices in Restitution and Victim Compensation

Orders and Payments

R. Barry Ruback

Alison C. Cares

Stacy N. Hoskins

April 2006

R. Barry Ruback

Crime, Law, & Justice Program

Department of Sociology

Penn State University

University Park, PA 16802

bruback@psu.edu

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Executive Summary

Over the past 25 years, the use of economic sanctions has increased because of pressures

to punish offenders, to reimburse victims, and to have offenders pay for the costs of prosecution,

incarceration, and supervision. In Pennsylvania there are at least 36 different county-level costs

and fees, as well as mandatory restitution, fines, and various state costs. This research project

was concerned with how these different economic sanctions are imposed and with whether they

are paid. In addition, the research examined whether state fees and restitution to the state were

imposed as mandated by law.

This research consisted of five parts. First, we coded data from approximately 2100

randomly selected adult criminal cases in six counties, in order to examine the imposition and

payment of different types of economic sanctions. Second, we examined data from

approximately 650 juvenile criminal cases in five counties in order to determine what factors

were related to the imposition and payment of economic sanctions. Third, we examined 228

DAVE (Dependable Access for Victimization Expenses) cases in four counties. These cases,

provided by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency (PCCD), were those in

which the state had paid money to the victims, and the state was interested in knowing whether

restitution to the state had been ordered for the compensation paid to the victims. Fourth, we

sent a mail survey to victims in two counties in order to determine victims‟ reactions to the

criminal justice system, particularly the restitution process. Finally, we sent a mail survey to

offenders in two counties in order to learn about their understanding and perceptions of

economic sanctions, as well as their ability to make the ordered payments.

Adult and Juvenile Data

To examine the imposition and collection of criminal economic sanctions in

Pennsylvania, we collected data from six counties1: Blair, Centre, Cumberland, Delaware,

Lancaster, and Westmoreland. We selected these counties because they varied along four

dimensions that we suspected would influence the use and effect of economic sanctions: (a)

county population size, (b) the number of criminal cases processed by the county, (c) the

methods each county uses to collect economic sanctions, and (d) geographic location. In terms

of population size, Blair, Centre, and Cumberland Counties have relatively small populations,

Delaware and Lancaster Counties have substantially larger populations, and Westmoreland

County has a population midway between the other counties. In terms of annual caseloads, the

number of criminal cases processed varied closely with the population of the county; Blair,

Centre, and Cumberland Counties handled fewer criminal cases than the three other counties. In

terms of the method of collecting economic sanctions, all of the counties except Centre and

Westmoreland Counties used specialized collections units to collect economic sanctions.

Finally, in terms of geographical diversity, Westmoreland County is located in the western part

of the state, Centre and Blair Counties are located in the middle of the state, and Cumberland,

Delaware, and Lancaster Counties are located in the southeastern part of the state.

We created computerized data coding forms for the adult and juvenile cases in each

county. We recorded the following types of information: offender characteristics (e.g., race,

gender, age, and prior record), case characteristics (e.g., charge and conviction offenses, type of

disposition, and sentence imposed), victim characteristics (e.g., race, gender, age, and type of

1 We also coded data in a seventh county, Luzerne. However, because of limitations in the data, especially missing

data, we were unable to perform analyses for Luzerne that are comparable to those we performed in the other six

counties. We do provide information about Luzerne County in Appendix I.

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injury), economic sanctions imposed and paid (e.g., fines, fees, costs, and restitution), and

recidivism. We also included several variables that record the different sources of information

used to collect data in each county.

In each county, we collected a random sample of approximately 500 adult cases and

approximately 200 juvenile cases from the year 2000. We chose to collect data from cases

docketed in the year 2000 in order to ensure that the case would have been resolved in terms of

guilt or innocence, that sentencing would have occurred, and that the offender would have had

some record of making or not making payments toward the amounts owed.

DAVE Cases

The Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) fund provides victims with compensation for

medical expenses, counseling, crime-scene cleanup, lost earnings, stolen benefits cash, funeral

expenses, and the like. When the CVC provides compensation to the victim, the judge is

mandated by law to order the offender to pay restitution to the CVC. To test whether judges are

ordering offenders to pay restitution to the CVC, we collected data from four counties: Centre,

Cumberland, Delaware, and Westmoreland.

The DAVE system, implemented on January 22, 2002, allows victim service providers to

file compensation claims electronically. Furthermore, the DAVE system helps victim advocates

determine the victim‟s eligibility and obtain the documentation necessary to process the victim‟s

claim. We obtained the list of DAVE cases from Ed Katz at PCCD. Because there were so few

DAVE cases per county per year, we recorded information about all of the DAVE cases in each

county that were on the PCCD list. We collected information about the DAVE cases using the

adult data coding forms created in the previous study.

Victim Survey

Victims are important to the criminal justice system because they can support efforts to

prosecute the crime they suffered and can report future crimes against them. To test whether

crime victims‟ satisfaction with the criminal justice system related to their perceptions of the

fairness of the process and their outcomes in their case, we surveyed 238 victims in two

Pennsylvania counties: Cumberland and Lancaster.

In both counties, we worked with county victim witness services personnel to obtain a list

of all victims who received orders of restitution in 2002 and 2003. After obtaining the two

samples, we mailed victims packets containing a cover letter from the victim witness services

office, two consent forms, a survey, and a one-dollar incentive. After we received the completed

survey and a signed consent form, we paid the victims an additional 10 dollars for their

participation.

The self-report survey was divided into four sections. The first section asked a series of

questions about the victimization: the type of crime of which they were a victim (e.g., burglary,

theft, robbery, assault, or other), when and where the victimization occurred, their relationship to

the offender(s), and the gender, race, and age of the offender(s). This section also included

questions about the case disposition and the victim‟s involvement in the criminal proceedings

(i.e., whether the victim testified at trial).

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The second section asked victims about their experiences with the restitution process:

how victims became aware they were eligible for restitution, whether they completed a form to

receive restitution, and who determined the amount of restitution owed to them. This section

also asked victims whether the judge imposed an order of restitution, the amount and distribution

of restitution imposed (i.e., the amount of restitution awarded for medical bills, lost wages, lost

or stolen property, repair to property, or other), and how much restitution they had received so

far. Furthermore, victims were asked to indicate whether they felt the amount of restitution

imposed was fair and how well they understood the restitution process.

The third section asked victims about their experiences with the criminal justice system,

including the amount and quality of their contact with the police, the prosecutor/district attorney,

the judge, the probation officer, and the victim-witness advocate. Also included in this section

were questions about how much input victims believed they had at various stages of the criminal

justice process. Respondents were also asked to rate their likelihood of reporting crimes in the

future. Additionally, there was a 22-item scale assessing victims‟ punishment goals (e.g., just

deserts, revenge, recognition of victim status, deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation, general

deterrence, positive general prevention, victim security, and societal security).

The fourth section asked about the victim‟s background. Included in this section were

questions about the victim‟s gender, race, age, marital status, education, and socioeconomic

status. In all, the survey included 49 questions. The survey was pretested on victims who, after

completing the survey, participated in structured cognitive interviews, in which they were asked

their thought process when they initially completed the items.

Offender Survey

Because there are increased pressures to collect more money from offenders in order to

punish them, to make them pay at least part of their costs to the criminal justice system, and to

restore victims to their precrime condition, we were interested in the extent to which offenders

were able to make the ordered payments.

We conducted a survey of offenders in Blair and Westmoreland Counties in order to

obtain basic descriptive information about the offenders‟ economic situation, including their total

debts and total payments due to the criminal justice system. In addition, this study explored four

possible reasons for the low rate of payment of these sanctions: (a) lack of understanding of the

sanctions, (b) disagreement with the rationale for the sanctions, (c) perception that the sanctions

are unfairly applied, and (d) lack of money to pay the sanctions.

In both counties, we worked with local probation personnel to obtain a list of all

offenders who were sentenced in 2003. After obtaining the two samples, we mailed offenders

packets containing a cover letter from the probation office, two consent forms, a survey, and a

one-dollar incentive. Participants were promised that their responses would remain completely

confidential and would not be shared with their probation officers or any other criminal justice

personnel. After we received the completed survey and a signed consent form, we paid the

offender an additional 10 dollars for their participation.

The self-report survey was divided into four sections. The first section asked a series of

questions about the offense and the punishment for the crime, in terms of incarceration and

probation. The second section asked offenders about the economic sanctions in their case,

including the amounts for costs, fees, fines, and restitution and the payments they had made.

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This section also asked offenders how well they understood how the various amounts of

economic sanctions were set. The third section asked offenders about their case, including their

perceived responsibility for the crime, the judgments about the amounts and procedures for

economic sanctions in their case. Additionally, there was a 22-item scale assessing offenders=

understanding of different punishment goals as they applied to their case (e.g., just deserts,

revenge, recognition of victim status, deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation, general

deterrence, positive general prevention, victim security, and societal security). The fourth

section asked for the offenders‟ opinions about economic sanctions in general, including their

perception of the burden that payment placed on them and other offenders. The final section

asked about the offender=s background. Included in this section were questions about the

offender=s gender, race, age, marital status, education, and socioeconomic status. In all, the

survey included 41 questions.

Summary of Findings Across Studies

This multimethod research program was designed to answer questions about the

imposition and payment of different types of economic sanctions in Pennsylvania. In prior

research we had focused on restitution. In this set of studies, in addition to restitution we

examined fees, fines and costs, and focused especially on two mandatory state costs, Crime

Commission Cost (CCC) and Crime Victim‟s Compensation Fund (CVC).

A. Variation in the Definition and Use of Economic Sanctions

Counties vary significantly in their use of economic sanctions. There were large

differences in what is termed a cost or fee and in terms of how restitution is used. We found

relatively high levels of variation among the counties in terms of the rates of imposition of all

types of economic sanctions.

Part of the reason for this difference among counties relates to differences in practice

(i.e., informal rules about the imposition of economic sanctions) rather than to differences in

explicit policy (i.e., formal guidelines about the imposition of economic sanctions). For

example, Cumberland County seldom imposed fines, fees, or costs for juvenile cases in the year

2000. In Delaware County, economic sanctions could be paid by the county, in which case the

juvenile usually completed community service in lieu of court costs, by the parents, or by the

juvenile.

There were also differences among counties in terms of the economic sanctions they

imposed. For example, Lancaster imposes a $10 per month administration fee for probation on

top of the $25 per month supervision fee. Other counties have only a flat supervision fee of $25.

Some counties charge fees for staying in jail (e.g., Centre County has a jail maintenance fee), and

counties package fees for DUI convictions differently.

B. Imposition of Economic Sanctions

1. Crime-Related Factors vs. Offender-Related Factors

In general, we found that the imposition of economic sanctions was dependent more on

crime-related factors, such as severity and type of crime, than on offender-related factors such as

age, race, or gender. As one would expect, higher levels of all economic sanctions varied

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directly with the severity of the conviction offense, such that higher levels of economic sanctions

were imposed for more severe crimes. In general, higher levels of fines and costs were imposed

for traffic and DUI than for other types of crimes. Overall, crime-related and offender-related

factors did not explain very well the total amount of economic sanctions ordered.

2. Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders

In general, we found that economic sanctions were more consistently imposed on adults

than on juveniles. This difference is not too surprising, since many mandated costs and fees do

not apply to juvenile cases. Moreover, this pattern is consistent with the fact that juvenile

offenders are less able than adults to pay (because of lack of income) and with the fact that

juvenile cases are more likely to be handled informally and with more individually tailored

sanctions.

3. Mandatory State Penalties

We investigated two mandatory state penalties, Crime Victim Compensation (CVC) and

Crime Commission Cost (CCC). Although CVC is mandatory for adults, we found rates of

imposition across six counties ranging from 86% to 97% (M = 91%).2 Across counties, CVC

was generally less likely to be imposed for summary offenses. We found rates of imposition of

CCC ranging from 84% to 97% (M = 90%). As with CVC, CCC was generally less likely to be

imposed for summary offenses.

As with the adult sample, we investigated the rates of imposition of Crime Victim

Compensation (CVC) and Crime Commission Cost (CCC) for juvenile cases. The imposition of

these costs for juveniles is mandatory only for consent decrees and adjudications of delinquency;

costs do not have to be ordered for informal adjustments or deferred hearings. For juveniles, we

found rates of imposition of CVC across four counties ranging from 19% to 82% (M = 55%).

Being adjudicated delinquent was positively related to imposition in two of the four counties.

We found rates of imposition of CCC ranging from 42% to 82% (M = 67%). In two of the three

counties in which we collected data, CCC was significantly more likely to be imposed when the

juvenile was adjudicated delinquent.

4. DAVE Cases

When the CVC provides compensation to the victim, the judge is supposed to order the

offender to pay restitution to the CVC. We examined four counties to determine whether in fact

restitution was ordered. At the low end, the percentage of cases in which judges acknowledged

CVC restitution was 3% in Delaware County. Next highest was Westmoreland County (19%).

At the high end were Centre County (50%) and Cumberland County (56%). The average

amount of CVC restitution ordered was lowest in Centre County ($741). Delaware County

($2,301), Westmoreland County ($3,196), and Cumberland County ($5,428) all imposed higher

amounts of CVC restitution.

2 The symbol M refers to the mean or average.

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C. Payment of Economic Sanctions

1. Crime-Related Factors vs. Offender-Related Factors

In general, we found that case-related factors were better predictors than offender-related

factors of payment. The percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for property

offenders than for offenders convicted of personal, drug, traffic or other offenses. Compared to

nonincarcerated offenders, incarcerated offenders paid a lower percentage of their economic

sanctions.

2. Adult vs. Juvenile Offenders

In terms of payment of economic sanctions overall, juveniles usually paid as high or a

higher percentage of the amount they owed than adults (perhaps reflecting that the economic

sanctions levels imposed on them are more reasonable to their situation than for adults). Also, in

three out of five counties, juveniles sentenced to a commitment rather than probation paid

significantly less of their economic sanctions, consistent with the finding that adults who went to

prison paid a significantly smaller percentage of their economic sanctions.

3. Mandatory State Penalties

The percent of adult cases in which CVC was paid in full ranged from 44% to 68% (M =

56%). Across counties, the percent of cases in which CVC was paid in full was significantly

higher for offenders convicted of drug or traffic offenses and significantly lower for offenders

incarcerated in jail. The percent of cases in which CCC was paid in full ranged from 44% to

68% (M = 55%). As with CVC, the percent of cases in which CCC was paid in full was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of traffic offenses and significantly lower for

offenders incarcerated in jail

.

We were also interested in the percent of cases in which CVC and CCC were paid in full

for juvenile cases. However, in most cases this information was unavailable.

D. Victims and Restitution

Victims are important to the criminal justice system because they can support efforts to

prosecute the crime they suffered and can report future crimes against them. We were

particularly interested in how victims judged the fairness of the outcomes they received (e.g.,

restitution, the offender‟s sentence) and the procedures by which those outcomes were reached

(e.g., how information was gathered, how much voice they had in the final decision). Research

suggests that individuals care about both the outcomes they receive and the process by which

those outcomes were reached.

To test whether crime victims‟ satisfaction with the criminal justice system was related to

their perceptions of the fairness of their outcomes and the procedures in their case, we surveyed

238 victims in two Pennsylvania counties. Results indicated that victims were more satisfied

with procedural than outcome fairness and that the more satisfied victims were with the

outcomes and procedures in their case, the more willing they said they would be to report crimes

in the future. Overall, women said they desired more input into criminal justice decisions, and

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this difference may explain the general finding that women are more likely than men to report

crimes to the police.

E. Offenders and Economic Sanctions

We explored four possible reasons for offenders‟ low rate of payment of economic

sanctions: (a) lack of understanding of the sanctions, (b) disagreement with the rationale for the

sanctions, (c) perception that the sanctions are unfairly applied, and (d) lack of money to pay the

sanctions. Although there was some support for the first three explanations, offenders‟ reported

lack of money was the best predictor of nonpayment.

We asked both victims and offenders to rate the importance of 22 reasons for punishing

offenders. Offenders and victims differed significantly on 20 of the 22 items; the only 2

nonsignificant items related to rehabilitation. Most of the differences between the two groups

were large. On four items in particular, the differences were very large: three of the items related

to victim or societal safety, and the fourth item concerned restitution to the victim. Victims were

much more likely than offenders to say that their safety and the safety of society is an important

reason for punishing offenders. Moreover, victims were much more likely than offenders to say

that restoring victims to their precrime condition is an important purpose for punishment.

Recommendations

We suggest that PCCD consider two recommendations regarding understanding and

consistency.

1) Understanding

Our survey of offenders indicated that they had little understanding (a) of how the

economic sanctions they were ordered to pay were set and (b) of where their payments were

directed. They also seemed to have little understanding of how much they owed in total.

Understanding could be increased if offenders were reminded of what they owe for each type of

economic sanction.

2) Consistency

Across counties, and even within counties, there is a high level of variation in how

economic sanctions are handled. In conversations with different staff members, we received

different information about procedures and policies. We think it would be helpful if each county

had a list explaining all of the possible economic sanctions that could be imposed, as well as a

clear description of the policies and procedures operating in the county.

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Acknowledgments

We received an extraordinary amount of help during the two years in which we collected data. First, we

would like to thank the staff at PCCD, particularly Doug Hoffman, Carol Lavery, and Ed Katz for their

help.

Second, we would like to thank the President Judges in the Counties for giving us approval to conduct the

research. We would also like to thank the Clerks of Court, Chief Probation Officers, Victim-Witness

Advocates, probation staffs, and clerk of courts staffs for helping us collect the data and answering our

questions. These individuals are listed below by county.

Blair County

Judge Thomas Peoples, Jr., President Judge

Carol Newman, Prothonotary & Clerk of Courts

Stan Sral, Chief Adult Probation Officer

Staff in Adult Probation – Catherine Wyland

Doug Weaver, Adult Probation

Doug Keating, Assistant DA

David Gorman, District Attorney

Sue Griep, Victim Witness Coordinator

Centre County

Judge Charles C. Brown, Jr., President Judge

Tom Young, Director of Probation & Parole

Debra Reed, Probation & Parole

Deborah Immel, Prothonotary & Clerk of Courts

Judge Charles Brown, President Judge

Pat Mitara, Probation & Parole

Cumberland County

Judge George E. Hoffer, President Judge

Sam Miller, Chief, Juvenile Probation

John Roller, Chief, Adult Probation

Chuck Bear, Adult Probation

Judge George Hoffer, President Judge

Donna Vandemortel, Executive Director, Victim Services Division, District Attorney's

Office

Karla Kocher, Victim Services Division, District Attorney's Office

Joe Osenkarski, Retired, Chief, Juvenile Probation

Tom Boyle, Juvenile Probation

Delaware County

Judge Kenneth A. Clouse, President Judge

Danielle Dimatteo, Juvenile Probation

Philip Damiani, Court Executive Director

Kenneth Clouse, President Judge

Nancy in Adult Probation

Lancaster County

Judge Michael A. Georgelis, President Judge

Chris Reed, Supervisor, Collections Enforcement Unit, Adult Probation & Parole

Pam Grosh, Victim-Witness Office

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David Mueller, Director, Juvenile Probation & Parole

Jeff Worley, Senior Probation Officer, Juvenile Probation & Parole

Dale Denlinger, Clerk of Courts

Staff in Clerk of Courts – Dee, Donna, Marie

Staff in Files Office – Carol, Lynn, Florence, Herb

Luzerne County

Judge Michael T. Conahan, President Judge

Karl Blight

Phyllis Mantione

Bob O'Reilly, Clerk of Courts

Pat in Clerk of Courts Office

Westmoreland County

Judge Daniel J. Ackerman, President Judge

John J. Driscoll, Juvenile Court Judge

Andrew Urban, Director of Adult Probation

Heather Stegman, Adult Probation

Paul S. Kuntz, Court Administrator

David L. Patterson, Clerk of Courts

Brenda Wright, Accounts Supervisor, Clerk of Courts Office

Addie Beighley, Director of Juvenile Probation

Third, we would like to thank the members of our Advisory Committee: Mary Achilles (Office of Victim

Advocate), Bret Bucklen (Department of Corrections), Chad Firestone (JNET), Tom Green (Juvenile

Court Judges Commission), Pamela Grosh (Lancaster County District Attorney‟s Victim Witness

Services), Deborah Buchanan Haar (Dauphin County Victim Witness), Doug Hoffman (PCCD),

Annmarie Kaiser (Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association), Ed Katz (PCCD), Carol Lavery (PCCD),

Warren Klunk (Department of Revenue), Ron Mull (Treasury), Lawrence Murray (County Chief Adult

Probation Officers Association), Brinda Penyak (County Commissioners Association), Bob Reiber

(Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole), Laurie Reiley (Victim/Witness Assistance Program),

Michael Schwoyer (Pennsylvania House of Representatives Judiciary Committee), Tom Shuster

(Pennsylvania Council of Chief Juvenile Probation Officers), Jennifer Storm (Victim/Witness Assistance

Program), and Donna VandeMortel (Cumberland County District Attorney‟s Victim Services Division).

Fourth, we would like to thank Mark Bergstrom, Cynthia Kempinen, Jodi Ripka, Phil Ponselle, and Cathy

Dittman at the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing for their help in conducting the research and

managing the grant.

Finally, we would like to thank Ben Feldmeyer, who helped develop the coding instruments and

supervised undergraduate students during the first year of the project. In addition, we would like to thank

the undergraduates who went to the counties to collect data from court records and probation files.

During 2003, the students were Adrienne Lonas, Jessica Ames, Patrick Smythe, Laura Detweiler, Stefanie

Hauck, and Tara Gardner. During 2004 and 2005, the students were Jennifer Krupa, Nora Flaherty,

Lauren Merian, Daniel Brian, Kevin Bilwin, and Mary Dzielski.

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………………… 1

Acknowledgments …………………………………..……………………………………. 9

Chapter 1 - Introduction, Literature Review, Overview of the Studies ………………….. 12

Chapter 2 - Adult Data – Calendar Year 2000

Blair, Centre, Cumberland, Delaware, Lancaster, & Westmoreland Counties …... 32

Chapter 3 - Juvenile Data – Calendar Year 2000

Blair, Centre, Delaware, Lancaster, & Westmoreland Counties………………….. 53

Chapter 4 - DAVE Cases

Centre, Cumberland, Delaware, & Westmoreland Counties ……………………… 65

Chapter 5 - Victim Survey ……………………………………………………………… 69

Chapter 6 - Offender Survey …………………………………………………………….. 90

Chapter 7 - Summary, Discussion, and Implications …………………………………….. 114

References ……………………………………………………………………………… 127

Appendix A Adult Master Data Collection Form …………………………………… 138

Appendix B Juvenile Master Data Collection Form ……………………………… …. 139

Appendix C Complete List of Variables …………………………………………….. 140

Appendix D Blair County …………………………………………………………… 150

Appendix E Centre County …………………………………………………………… 156

Appendix F Cumberland County…………………………………………………… 167

Appendix G Delaware County……………………………………………………… 177

Appendix H Lancaster County……………………………………………………….. 185

Appendix I Luzerne County………………………………………………………….. 198

Appendix J Westmoreland County…………………………………………………… 203

Appendix K Victim Survey Questionnaire and Descriptive Statistics……………….. 211

Appendix L Offender Survey Questionnaire and Descriptive Statistics ……………… 218

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Chapter 1: Introduction

Literature Review and Overview of the Studies

This project was funded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency

(PCCD) in order to determine how economic sanctions are imposed in Pennsylvania and whether

those sanctions are paid. In particular, PCCD was interested in whether two state fines, the CCC

and the CVC, were imposed for every offense as mandated by law and whether these costs were

paid. PCCD was also interested in whether judges imposed restitution on offenders to be paid to

the CVC Fund in cases in which PCCD had already paid compensation to the victim.

Literature Review3

Although economic sanctions have been criticized because they are perceived to be unfair

to poor defendants, to have no effect on wealthy defendants, and to be unenforceable because it

is unconstitutional to imprison offenders for nonpayment of debt, three pressures suggest that

they are likely to be used more frequently in the future. First, the costs of criminal justice

operations are becoming so prohibitively high that offenders are now expected to pay at least

part of those costs, even the costs of incarceration (Butterfield, 2004). Second, concern for

victims has increased, so that restitution is likely to be awarded more frequently (Office for

Victims of Crime, 1998). Third, although the number of prisoners has jumped from 218,205 at

year-end 1974 (Hindelang, Gottfredson, Dunn, & Parisi, 1977, p. 686) to 1,381,892 at year-end

2000 (Beck & Harrison, 2001), imprisonment is now less likely than it was 10 years ago (Levin,

Langan, & Brown, 2000). This trend means that there are increasing pressures for intermediate

sanctions, including economic sanctions, both because of the high cost of incarceration and

because of the beliefs that long periods of incarceration are unjustified on grounds of just deserts

and are ineffective in deterring future crime.

Although economic sanctions are typically discussed as if they were independent, it is

3 Most of this literature review comes from Ruback and Bergstrom (2006).

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important to note that in practice economic sanctions are generally additional penalties rather

than sole sanctions (Hillsman, 1990). Moreover, there are likely to be multiple economic

sanctions. For example, Meyer and Gray (1997) found that convicted DUI offenders in a county

in southern California had to pay about $1,200, including a fine of $390, $664 in statutorily

mandated penalty assessment fees, $50 for the Alcohol Abuse Prevention Fund, a $37 fee for

testing, a $25 citation fee, and a $25 payment to the state restitution fund.

The primary legal limitation on the use of economic sanctions is that under the U.S.

Constitution, individuals cannot be imprisoned for debt. Thus, if an indigent defendant cannot

pay fees or restitution, the state cannot revoke probation. In Bearden v. Georgia (1983), the

Supreme Court held that for offenses for which imprisonment is not an authorized penalty,

judges cannot impose incarceration as a penalty for default unless there is a hearing that

determines the defendant has the ability to pay but willfully does not. For indigent offenders,

judges must consider whether societal goals of punishment and deterrence can be accomplished

through a noncustodial sanction.

Economic sanctions have five advantages. First, compared with incarceration, they are

about as effective in deterring future crime (Gordon & Glaser, 1991) but are substantially

cheaper, because the state does not have to pay for housing (Morris & Tonry, 1990). Moreover,

economic sanctions can avoid the stigma and secondary effects of incarceration, such as loss of

employment and dependents who would otherwise have to rely on public assistance (Gordon &

Glaser, 1991). Second, economic sanctions can be delivered more consistently than other types

of sanctions, an important advantage because continuous punishment, in which punishment is

delivered after every response, deters behavior better than intermittent punishment, in which

punishment is delivered after some, but not every, response (Brennan & Mednick, 1994). In

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general, it is easier to impose financial penalties after every crime than to impose incarceration

after every crime. Third, compared with simple probation, economic sanctions are more

punitive. Fourth, economic sanctions are flexible, in that they can be adjusted to the facts of the

case and the changing circumstances of the offender. Moreover, they can be used alone, with

incarceration, with probation, or with both incarceration and probation. Fifth, evaluating the

basic fulfillment of economic sanctions is relatively easy and straightforward, and is usually

determined by an offender‟s level of payment.

Continuum of Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions rest on a continuum, ranging from sanctions that most directly

benefit the victim to those that most directly punish the offender. At the extremes of this

continuum, the purposes of economic sanctions are fairly clear: restitution focuses almost

exclusively on reparation to a specific victim (with little or no consideration of punishing the

offender), while fines focus almost exclusively on punishing the offender (with little or no

consideration of reparation to a victim). However, most economic sanctions are less pure in

purpose and occupy the „middle ground,‟ because they seek reparations for „society‟ as a victim

(and in particular the court system), and require offenders to pay substantial (and increasing)

amounts in an effort to hold them accountable for their actions. These „middle ground‟

economic sanctions include costs and fees.

Victim-Focused Economic Sanctions (Restitution)

Restitution, a payment by the offender to the victim for financial losses, embodies both

the just deserts notion of offense-based penalties and concern for the victim (Harland, 1981).

Until the late 1970s, state statutes broadly stated that restitution may be ordered, but did not

specify the conditions under which restitution would be appropriate (Harland, 1980, p. 3). By

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1990, all states had implemented statutes regarding restitution (Shapiro, 1990), consistent with

the recommendation of the President‟s Task Force on Victims of Crime (1982).

Contemporary use. In most states, restitution is a permissible condition of probation,

although some states have made restitution a mandatory condition in every case (Klein, 1997, p.

154). In some states, restitution is justified by its rehabilitative effects on offenders, whereas in

other states it is justified by its restorative effects on victims. Restitution is aimed at doing

justice by having the offender compensate a victim for damages caused by the crime.

Nationally, restitution is handled in one of four different ways (McGillis, 1986): (a) as a

component of Victim/Witness Assistance Programs, (b) through Victim-Offender Reconciliation

Programs (VORP), (c) in conjunction with probation or parole supervision, and (d) through

court-based employment programs. The first two methods, Victim/Witness Assistance Programs

and VORPs, are victim-focused agencies, whereas the last two methods, probation/parole

supervision and court-based employment programs, are offender-focused agencies.

Victim/Witness Assistance Programs usually focus on the economic aspects of restitution,

whereas VORPs typically focus on the psychological harm resulting from the victimization.

To be fair to victims, restitution programs must give them the opportunity to make a

claim for all relevant losses. In most states, victims are limited to economic losses that are

“easily ascertainable” (McGillis, 1986, p. 36). Some states use the general language of “losses

and damages,” whereas others list specific types of losses, such as medical expenses and stolen

property. Most states do not allow restitution for pain and suffering and other general damages,

because judges believe that these damages should be sought in civil suits. The other aspect of

fairness to victims is that they not be misled into believing that they will recover restitution in

full (McGillis, 1986, p. 36).

16

To be fair to offenders, McGillis (1986, pp. 35-40) argued that restitution programs

should meet four standards. First, they should use selection criteria that treat all victims equally.

Research suggests that poor offenders, including minority offenders, are less likely to be ordered

to pay restitution than are nonpoor offenders (Hudson & Chesney, 1977). Second, restitution

programs should use fair procedures to determine the amount of damages owed the victim.

When probation officers believe that an amount is distorted, they should investigate without

offending the victim and then rely on the sentencing hearing to bring out the truth of the claim.

Third, restitution programs should give offenders the opportunity to challenge restitution

recommendations. Many states provide that offenders have the opportunity to participate in a

restitution plan prior to the sentencing hearing, and some states allow offenders to a detailed

hearing in which the defendant can challenge the victim‟s claims of losses. Fourth, the judge‟s

restitution order must be precise about the amount of restitution owed and the schedule for

paying it. In states, where restitution can be ordered only as a condition of probation, the period

of probation must be long enough to allow offenders to reasonably meet their financial

obligations.

Nationally, restitution is imposed in 14% of all felony convictions: 13% for violent

offenses, 26% for property offenses, 6% for drug offenses, 6% for weapons offenses, and 10%

for other offenses (Durose & Langan, 2003). Restitution programs have generally been seen as

unsuccessful for three reasons (Office for Victims of Crime, 1998, p. 358): (a) judges are

reluctant to impose restitution on offenders who are assumed to be unable to pay it; (b) payment

on restitution orders typically follows other financial obligations (e.g., costs, fines); and (c) there

is often ambiguity about who is responsible for monitoring, collecting, disbursing, and enforcing

restitution payments. Moreover, there are differences among states in terms of whether indirect

17

victims (e.g., insurance companies) and local governments are entitled to restitution (Klein,

1997).

Research. Studies with adults suggest that judges are more likely to order restitution

when the offender is better educated and employed, characteristics that make it more likely that

the offender will pay the imposed restitution (Lurigio & Davis, 1990). In a Bureau of Justice

Statistics study of felony probation in 32 counties, the average restitution order imposed per

probationer was $3,368, of which on average only 54% was paid by the time probationers had

completed their sentences (Cohen, 1995). Research with adults suggests that the collection rates

of restitution are low, 45% in one national study (Smith, Davis, & Hillenbrand, 1989) and 34%

in Cook County (Chicago) (Lurigio, 1984). If offenders have no money, they are often unwilling

to make any efforts to pay the restitution (Galaway & Hudson, 1975). The likelihood of

payment is increased if offenders are (a) told about the importance of restitution, (b) given

employment opportunities, (c) closely supervised, and (d) allowed to pay in installments (Van

Voorhis, 1985). These factors have also been found in research on the payment of fines,

suggesting that payment increases with ability to pay and closer supervision (Hillsman,

Mahoney, Cole, & Auchter, 1987).

In their multivariate analyses of restitution decisions in Pennsylvania from 1990-1998,

Ruback, Ruth, and Shaffer (in press) found that restitution was ordered more for property

offenders, offenders with no prior record, white offenders, and younger offenders. A 1995

statutory change making restitution mandatory increased the proportion of restitution orders

statewide in 1996-1998, but the level of this change was not equal in all counties or for all types

of cases.

In an extension of this research, Ruback and Shaffer (2003) found that restitution was

18

significantly more likely to be imposed if the victim-witness assistance office was in the

courthouse building than elsewhere, probably because judges were more likely to be aware of

victims‟ losses if workers in the victim-witness office were physically closer to the district

attorney. Restitution was also more likely to be imposed in counties that did not have a separate

collections unit.

Outlaw and Ruback (1999) examined adult probation cases from Allegheny County

(Pittsburgh), Pennsylvania in which restitution was or could have been a condition of probation.

Results indicated that judges ordered restitution most often when damages were easy to quantify

and that offenders were most likely to pay the restitution when they were able to pay and when

the victim was a business. Restitution payment was negatively related to rearrest, and this effect

was especially strong among married persons, suggesting that restitution was particularly

effective for individuals who were better integrated into the community.

In one of the few experimental studies of economic sanctions, Lurigio and Davis (1990)

randomly assigned adult probationers who were delinquent in payment of restitution to (a) a

treatment group that received a letter notifying them of the amount of money they owed, telling

them how to make payment and threatening them with serious consequences if they did not or

(b) a control group that did not receive a letter. Results indicated that offenders who received a

notification letter were significantly more likely to pay restitution. Moreover, this effect was

particularly strong for probationers who had jobs and who had shorter criminal histories,

probably because these individuals had greater ability to make payment and because their greater

ties to the community mean that probation revocation would be a greater punishment for them.

19

Society-Focused Economic Sanctions (Costs, Fees)

Fees are used to reimburse the state for the administrative cost of operating the criminal

justice system. Current distinctions in the labeling of fees (e.g., court costs, supervision fees,

etc.) help to differentiate the purpose or use of the funding, but do not otherwise change the

nature of these society-focused sanctions.

In a recent survey of Pennsylvania counties, Bergstrom (2002) identified 36 different

county-based costs and fees imposed on offenders, which are in addition to state-mandated costs

and fees. As shown in Table 1-1, the number of counties (of 67) imposing each of these costs

and fees ranged from 1 to 64, and the range in the dollar amounts was sometimes substantial.

Overall, the label „cost‟ is used to describe a blanket charge for program admission/participation

and can include a number of specific (direct) charges and/or a general (indirect) charge based on

average processing expenses. As an example, ARD/Fast Track is a cost imposed in several

counties, ranging from $125 to $400, to cover all court processing expenses associated with a

diversion program. The label „fee‟ is much more common and is used to describe a specific,

individual charge for a service. As an example, it is common for counties to impose a $250 fee

for DNA Analysis.

Table 1-1. County Costs and Fees in Pennsylvania

Number of Counties (of 67)

Imposing the Cost/Fee Range

ARD Standard 15 $30 - $400

ARD/Fast Track 5 $125 - $400

ARD/DUI 16 $100 - $525

Non-DUI Court Costs 17 $52 - $300

DUI Court Costs 17 $24 - $310.56

Bench Warrant 13 $4 - $200

Court/Clerk Fee 20 $5 - $200

Fingerprint Card 4 $7.50 - $17.50

ARD Expungement Fee 1 $15

Case Management Fee 1 $10

Bail Administration Fee 15 $3 - $50

Automation Fee 36 $1.50 - $5

20

Law Enforcement Fee 2 $5 - $10

Live Scan Processing Fee 1 $150

DUI Fee 11 $50 - $525

Crime Lab Fee 34 $40 - $90

Blood Analysis Fee 12 $15 - $112.25

DNA Fee 26 $8 - $250

Drug Testing Fee 16 $5 - $90

D&A/TASC Evaluation Fee 9 $16 - $100

Psychological Evaluation Fee 2 $158 - $185

Psychological and D&A

Evaluation Fee 1 $220

Psychiatric/Medical Evaluation Fee 5 $45 - $266

Court Reporting Network Fee 24 $25 - $150

Administration Fee (Fines, Costs,

Restitution, ARD) 10 $2 - $400

Supervision Fee (monthly) 64 $25 - $60

Nominal Supervision Fee (monthly) 1 $25

Other Supervision Fee 5 $10 - $200

Supervision Transfer Fee 5 $25

Drug Supervision Fee 3 $5 - $100

Electronic Monitoring Fee (Daily) 22 $2 - $15

Electronic Monitoring Fee (Flat Fee) 11 $15 - $200

Community Service Fee (Insurance) 20 $5 - $100

Victim Impact Panel Fee 3 $25

Highway Safety Class Fee 25 $50 - $300

Other Program Fees 6 $125 - $650

Purposes. Many jurisdictions impose fees on offenders to offset under-funding, because

high probation caseloads often mean offenders are subject to no supervision (Petersilia, 1997).

Supervision fees are the most common type of special condition of probation (Bonczar, 1997).

In most jurisdictions, there is a monthly fee, which defrays the costs of preparing presentence

reports and engaging in regular supervision activities. Additional fees can be imposed for

specific services, such as electronic monitoring. In 1992, probation departments nationally

imposed fees ranging from $10 to $40 per month, although the fee was lowered if the offender

could not pay (Finn & Parent, 1992). The use of supervisory fees has been upheld by the courts.

For example, in Taylor v. Rhode Island (1996), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the

monthly fee the defendant paid was not a punishment. The Court noted that the fee was directly

related to the costs associated with supervising probationers and parolees and went into a

separate fund used only for defraying those costs; the amount was reasonable and rationally

21

related to those costs; and the fee did not serve, primarily, the sentencing goals of deterrence or

retribution.

Probation fees are aimed at having offenders partially pay for the costs of their

supervision (Olson & Ramker, 2001). There is a need for fees to cover the costs of

administering probation, because, even though two-thirds of convicted offenders are placed on

community supervision, only one-tenth of correctional budgets pay for supervision (Petersilia,

1997, p. 172). Not surprisingly, probation officers generally believe that collecting fees takes too

much time and infringes on their ability to do what they consider to be more important duties

(Morgan, 1995). Probation officers seem to have higher collection rates if they are evaluated in

part on their collection rates (Wheeler & Rudolph, 1990).

Some probation departments have become self-supporting through supervision fees,

whereas other departments are able to cover only a portion of their costs (Olson & Ramker,

2001). Texas is generally considered the most successful state in generating fees, with about

40% of the cost of basic probation covered by fees paid by offenders (Finn & Parent, 1992).

Research. Research suggests that probationers in rural counties are more likely than

probationers in urban counties to be ordered to pay probation fees (Ellsworth & Weisheit, 1997),

even when individual difference variables are controlled statistically (Olson & Ramker, 2001).

In their analysis of probation fees in Illinois, Olson and Ramker (2001) found that fees were

ordered in 55% of the cases and, on average, probationers paid 72% of the ordered amounts.

Multivariate analyses indicated that probation fees were significantly more likely to be imposed

in rural than urban jurisdictions, when treatment or fines were also imposed, and, in terms of

individual characteristics, for white offenders, offenders with higher incomes, offenders with

prior convictions, and offenders convicted of a misdemeanor rather than a felony. The total

22

amount of the probation fee ordered was greater in urban than rural jurisdictions and for

offenders who were given longer sentences. Probationers were likely to pay higher percentages

of their probation fees if they were white, had higher incomes, had lower amounts of fees

ordered, were sentenced to pay fines, were sentenced in a rural area, and did not have their

probations revoked.

Olson and Ramker suggested that the difference in imposition of fees is attributable to the

fact that rural judges are likely to be more responsive than urban judges to their communities and

more concerned with the imposition of justice in individual cases than with the processing of

large numbers of cases (see also Weisheit, Wells, & Falcone, 1995). It might also be the case

that rural areas have lower available tax bases to support government operations, and therefore

they have a greater need to rely on revenues from fees (Olson, Weisheit, & Ellsworth, 2001).

With regard to their finding that collection rates were higher in rural areas, Olson and

Ramker suggested that judges in rural areas were concerned that offenders pay something,

whereas judges in urban areas were concerned that fees should be imposed and enforced only if

they were set at a level high enough to justify the time and expense of collection.

Offender-Focused Economic Sanctions (Fines)

Fines are monetary penalties for crime. They have several inherent advantages over other

types of penalties (Campbell, 1991, pp. 1-9; Hillsman, 1990). They are obviously punitive and

can be tailored to the seriousness of the particular crime and to a specific individual‟s criminal

history and resources. They are also flexible in terms of serving as sole penalties or of being

combined with other sanctions, ranging from treatment to incarceration. They also have the

advantage of providing funds to support both the collections office and other related

expenditures, such as victim/witness assistance and victim compensation. For example, in the

23

federal system, fines are aimed primarily at benefiting victims, in that most fines are deposited in

the Crime Victims Fund, 90% of which goes to the states for victim compensation and assistance

(General Accounting Office, 1999).

Contemporary use. In the United States, in contrast, many judges are opposed to fines

because many believe that fines cannot be enforced against the poor and have little effect on the

wealthy, whom they perceive as buying their way out of punishment (Hillsman, 1990). Judges

generally believe that fines by themselves cannot serve as an alternative to either probation or

incarceration (Cole, Mahoney, Thornton, & Hanson, 1987). Moreover, most model penal codes

and sentencing standards are opposed to fines, which are assumed to have little correctional

value and to be biased against the poor (National Advisory Commission, 1973, pp. 162-164). In

addition, flat fines and fines with absolute maximums may become ineffective when legislatures

do not regularly update them to adjust for inflation (Gillespie, 1981). For some offenses, in

which the fine is statutorily determined, fines are regressive and fail to meet the goals of

individualized justice. As a result, fines are used primarily in courts of limited jurisdiction,

especially traffic courts (Hillsman, Sichel, & Mahoney, 1984).

For example, in lower courts, fines are used for minor offenses (e.g., shoplifting),

particularly for first-time offenders who have enough money to pay the fine (Hillsman et al.,

1987). In the municipal court in Columbus, Ohio fines were imposed on 87% of the convicted

offenders, and especially among those convicted of drunk driving (Ryan, 1980). Although the

day fine was initially tested in Staten Island, New York in 1988-89, and has been introduced in

several other U.S. jurisdictions, it has failed to gain widespread support.

Nationally, fines are imposed in 25% of all felony convictions: 20% of violent offenses,

24% of property offenses, 27% of drug offenses, 19% of weapons offenses, and 27% of other

24

offenses (Durose & Langan, 2003). Fines are often used in connection with probation to

increase the likelihood of payment and the level of punishment. When they impose fines, judges

in many state systems rarely have information about the offender‟s ability to pay. This lack of

information may result in fines that are too high, especially because legislatively imposed

sanctions are required and may themselves be beyond what some offenders can pay. But it is

also possible that fines might be set too low, which means that the sentence will fail to fulfill its

potential for retribution and deterrence (Cole, 1992). In the federal system, where judges might

have better information than in many state systems, fines are strongly and positively related to

ability to pay (Waldfogel, 1995).

According to Hillsman and Greene (1992), within a jurisdiction, judges usually apply the

“going rate” for fines, so that all violators of a particular offense are obligated to pay the same or

similar amounts. Because judges tend to use this going rate for fines, however, they neglect to

adjust the seriousness of the penalty to the particular defendant. And, because this going rate is

usually low (in order to accommodate the poorest offenders), fines have little penalty value for

affluent offenders. Rather than at initial sentencing, judges‟ adjustments to fines tend to be at the

back end, when they often excuse the remaining unpaid portion or simply let the probation

period expire without enforcing the fine. Research suggests that fines are more likely to be paid

if the amounts and payment schedules are reasonable and take into account an offender‟s ability

to pay, if the offender‟s payments are closely monitored, and if progressively more coercion is

used in response to nonpayment (Hillsman, 1990).

Morris and Tonry (1990) argued that the fines rather than incarceration in jail or prison

should be the primary type of punishment because fines can be as effective in punishing past

crime and in deterring future crime. In making decisions about the most reasonable level of

25

fines, the “light touch of the law” seems appropriate (i.e., a penalty sufficiently harsh to get the

offender‟s attention but not so harsh as to produce negative results, such as losing a job; McCord,

1985).

Imposition of Economic Sanctions

Few studies have examined how economic sanctions are imposed or how judges impose

multiple sanctions. In one of the only studies to investigate multiple sanctions, Gordon and

Glaser (1991) focused on the use and effects of monetary sanctions, jail, and probation in cases

sentenced to probation by the Los Angeles municipal courts between 1981 and 1984. Cases

were sampled from each of five offense groups (assaults, burglaries, drug crimes, DUI, and theft)

and stratified by type of sanction (fines, restitution, cost of probation supervision, and jail). Each

case was followed for a two-year period to track revocations, arrests, convictions, and

incarcerations. Gordon and Glaser found that type of offense significantly predicted sentences of

probation only, of jail and probation, and of jail, probation, and financial penalties. However,

individual attributes (race, ethnicity, drug problems, and prior convictions) failed to predict

sentences of probation and financial penalties. Gordon and Glaser also found that the amount of

financial penalties was affected by the type of crime and the offender‟s employment status.

Compared with drug offenders, offenders convicted of burglary, DUI, and theft received

significantly higher financial penalties, suggesting that judges believed financial penalties were

inappropriate for drug offenders. In addition, employed offenders were ordered to pay

significantly larger amounts than unemployed offenders.

In terms of postsentencing outcomes, Gordon and Glaser (1991) found that, among their

sample of offenders, those who received jail terms had significantly higher odds of subsequent

arrest, compared with offenders who received a sentence of probation with financial penalties,

26

even after controlling for individual attributes, offense, and previous convictions. Individuals

ordered to pay higher financial amounts were significantly more likely to have their probation

revoked, although the simple imposition of a financial penalty resulted in lower risk of probation

revocation (Gordon & Glaser, 1991). Not surprisingly, individuals who were ordered to pay

more financial penalties were less likely to pay the entire amount due (Gordon & Glaser, 1991).

In another examination of multiple economic sanctions in a big city, Ruback (2004)

examined the imposition and effect of restitution, fines, and costs in Philadelphia during the

seven-year period 1994-2000. Restitution was significantly more likely to be ordered and to be

ordered for higher amounts when the victim was the State rather than a private individual or

business. For both State-victim and private-victim cases, the imposition of fines and the

imposition of restitution were negatively related and generally were predicted by different

factors.

Discussion

The use of economic sanctions is likely to increase because of greater pressure on

offenders to pay for the costs of supervision and the harm done to crime victims. But perhaps

the most important reason for increases in the use of economic sanctions is that they appear to be

as effective as incarceration in reducing recidivism (Cherry, 2001; Gordon & Glaser, 1991;

Outlaw & Ruback, 1999). Of course, without experimental control, the results of studies could

be attributed to selection bias, with judges imposing economic sanctions only on the best risks

and impose incarceration on the rest.

Why should economic sanctions be as effective? Brennan and Mednick (1994) tested

and found support for five principles of behavior: (a) punishment following a crime produces a

lower rate of recidivism, (b) different types of punishing stimuli have similar effects in reducing

27

recidivism, (c) the more crimes that are punished, the greater the reduction in recidivism, (d)

crimes that are always punished are less likely to be repeated than are crimes that are only

intermittently punished, and (e) criminal behavior is likely to be repeated if punishment is

discontinued. Using data from a cohort of men born in Copenhagen during a three-year period in

the 1940s and followed for 26 years, Brennan and Mednick found that fines were as, if not more,

effective than incarceration, a finding that supports the notion that sanctions have similar effects

on recidivism regardless of their severity.

Overview of the Studies

Adult and Juvenile Data

To examine the imposition and collection of criminal economic sanctions in

Pennsylvania, we collected data from seven counties: Blair, Centre, Cumberland, Delaware,

Lancaster, Luzerne, and Westmoreland.4 We selected these counties because they varied along

four dimensions that we suspected would influence the use and effect of economic sanctions: (a)

county population size, (b) the number of criminal cases processed by the county, (c) the

methods each county uses to collect economic sanctions, and (d) geographic location.

First, as can be seen in Table 1-2, all seven counties in the study are mid-sized urban

counties.5 However, Blair, Centre, and Cumberland Counties have relatively small populations,

while Delaware and Lancaster Counties have substantially larger populations. The populations

of Luzerne and Westmoreland Counties are about midway between the other counties. Centre

County is less densely populated and has fewer young people than the other counties. Delaware

County is by far the most densely populated county. Second, the yearly criminal caseloads of the

4 The Advisory Committee originally chose Dauphin County for investigation. However, because the President

Judge of Dauphin County did not allow us to collect data from probation records, we replaced Dauphin County with

Cumberland County. 5 The Center for Rural Pennsylvania defines a county as urban if more than half of its population lives in an urban

area, as defined by the Census.

28

counties varied closely with their population sizes: Blair, Centre, and Cumberland Counties

handled fewer criminal cases than the four other counties.

Table 1-2. Information about Counties in the Study: Census, Cases Processed, Cases Sampled

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Luzerne Westmoreland

2000 Population 129,144 135,758 213,674 550,864 470,658 319,250 369,993

Population Density

Per Sq. Mile 246 123 388 2,990 496 368 361

% Population Under 18 23% 18% 22% 25% 27% 21% 22%

Total Adult Cases 1,931 1,942 2,759 6,257 5,513 4,101 4,922

Adult Cases Sampled 483 503 503 284 530 581 533

Total Juvenile Cases * 221 656 1,899 1,474 1,284 606

Juvenile Cases Sampled * 159 228 209 212 322 176

Third, the counties varied in their methods of collecting economic sanctions. Except for

Centre and Westmoreland Counties, all of the counties used specialized collections units to

collect economic sanctions. However, the specialized collections units operated differently in

each county.

Fourth, we selected counties based on their geographical diversity. Centre and Blair

Counties, adjacent counties in the middle of the state, allowed us to compare two counties that

are similar on several dimensions (e.g., population and yearly criminal caseload). Moreover,

because of their proximity to The Pennsylvania State University, they were ideal locations for

training staff and developing the data collection tools for the project. Cumberland, Delaware,

and Lancaster Counties, located in the southeastern part of the state, allowed us to make

comparisons among three larger counties. Their proximity also permitted communication and

coordination among project staff while collecting data in these counties. Luzerne County,

located in the northeastern part of the state, and Westmoreland County, located in the western

part of the state, allowed us to compare larger counties in different parts of the state.

29

The information about adult and juvenile cases is presented in two ways. In the main

text, one chapter is devoted to adult cases and one chapter is devoted to juvenile cases. In the

appendices, adult and juvenile cases are discussed separately for each county.

DAVE Cases

The Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) Fund provides victims with compensation for

medical expenses, counseling, crime-scene cleanup, lost earnings, stolen benefits cash, funeral

expenses, and the like. When the CVC provides compensation to the victim, the judge is

mandated by law to order the offender to pay restitution to the CVC. To test whether judges are

ordering offenders to pay restitution to the CVC, we collected data from four counties: Centre,

Cumberland, Delaware, and Westmoreland.6

The DAVE (Dependable Access for Victimization Expenses) system, implemented on

January 22, 2002, allows victim service providers to file compensation claims electronically.

Furthermore, the DAVE system helps victim advocates determine the victim‟s eligibility and

obtain the documentation necessary to process the victim‟s claim. We obtained the list of DAVE

cases from Ed Katz at the PCCD. Because there were so few cases per county per year, we

recorded information about all of the DAVE cases in each county that were on the PCCD list.7

Victim Survey

Victims are important to the criminal justice system because they can support efforts to

prosecute the crime they suffered and can report future crimes against them. To test whether

crime victims‟ satisfaction with the criminal justice system related to their perceptions of the

6 We started collecting DAVE cases during the second year of our research project. We did not collect DAVE cases

in Lancaster and Luzerne Counties because we had already completed our data collection in those counties. We did

not collect DAVE cases in Blair County because we did not have a staff member to send to the county. 7 In Centre County, we collected information about cases from 2002-2003. In Cumberland County, we collected

information about cases from 2000-2004. In Delaware County, we collected information about cases from 2001-

2004. In Westmoreland County, we collected information about cases from 2000-2004.

30

fairness of the process and their outcomes in their case, we surveyed 238 victims in two

Pennsylvania counties: Cumberland and Lancaster.

Results indicated that victims were more satisfied with procedural than outcome fairness

and that the more satisfied victims were with the outcomes and procedures in their case, the more

willing they said they would be to report crimes in the future. Overall, women said they desired

more input into criminal justice decisions, and this difference may explain the general finding

that women are more likely than men to report crimes to the police.

Offender Survey

In recent years the number of economic sanctions imposed on offenders has increased

because of increased pressures to punish offenders, have offenders pay for at least part of their

treatment and correctional supervision, and make offenders restore victims as much as possible

to the condition they were in before the crime occurred. With these increased pressures to

collect more money for more different purposes, we were interested in the extent to which

offenders were able to make the ordered payments.

We conducted a survey of offenders in Blair and Westmoreland Counties to obtain basic

descriptive information about the offenders‟ economic situation, including their total debts and

total payments due to the criminal justice system. In addition, we explored four possible reasons

for offenders‟ low rate of payment of economic sanctions: (a) lack of understanding of the

sanctions, (b) disagreement with the rationale for the sanctions, (c) perception that the sanctions

are unfairly applied, and (d) lack of money to pay the sanctions. Although there was some

support for the first three explanations, offenders‟ reported lack of money was the best predictor

of nonpayment.

31

We asked both victims and offenders to rate the importance of 22 reasons for punishing

offenders. Offenders and victims differed significantly on 20 of the 22 items; the only 2

nonsignificant items related to rehabilitation. Most of the differences between the two groups

were large. On four items in particular, the differences were very large: three of the items related

to victim or societal safety, and the fourth item concerned restitution to the victim. Victims were

much more likely than offenders to say that their safety and the safety of society is an important

reason for punishing offenders. Moreover, victims were much more likely than offenders to say

that restoring victims to their precrime condition is an important purpose for punishment.

32

Chapter 2: Adult Data

Method

We chose to collect data from adult cases docketed in the year 2000 in order to ensure

that the case would have been resolved in terms of guilt or innocence, that sentencing would

have occurred, and that the offender would have had some record of making or not making

payments toward the amounts owed.

Sampling

In each county, we selected a random sample of approximately 500 adult cases.8 In order

to draw the sample, we first identified the total number of adult cases docketed in the year 2000.

We then selected random samples of one hundred cases and counted the number of cases that

were missing in each sample. This procedure allowed us to estimate the total number of missing

cases in the year 2000 (i.e., the number of cases for which no information was available). We

determined the sampling frame we needed to select in order to produce a sample of 500 adult

cases by dividing the total number of cases docketed during the year by 500. We then sampled

every “nth

” docket number. For example, in Centre County, which had 1942 cases in calendar

year 2000 and 16% missing cases, we collected data from every 3rd case to obtain a sample of at

least 500 adult cases.9

Data Collection

In each county, project staff used laptops and computerized coding forms to record

information. Although we developed the coding form for data collection in Centre County, we

modified the form to reflect variations across counties (see Appendix A for the adult data

8 In Delaware County, because of constraints on time and manpower, we selected a random sample of only 250

cases. 9 In Blair County, we used a slightly different sampling procedure because the probation office organized its files by

defendant name, rather than by docket number. However, we do not believe this difference in sampling affects the

analyses or findings.

33

collection forms). The computerized coding form was useful because it allowed us to transfer

the data directly into SPSS, a program used for statistical analysis of data.

We collected information from various sources, including Clerk of Courts files, probation

files, and Victim/Witness Services files. In several counties, these sources provided both

computer and paper files. Because they often contained different information, we reviewed both

computer and paper files when available. We collected information from Clerk of Courts paper

files in all but Cumberland, Delaware, and Westmoreland Counties. We also had access to Clerk

of Courts computer files in all but Centre County. We reviewed probation computer files in all

but Westmoreland County and we had access to probation paper files in Blair, Cumberland,

Delaware, and Westmoreland Counties.

Although the probation computer files provided most of the desired information, the

probation paper files usually contained detailed information about the offender‟s background.

As a result, we were unable to collect data for several variables when the probation paper files

were unavailable. The reason we could not access probation paper files varied by county (see

Appendices D-J for a more detailed discussion of the problems encountered in each county).

In Blair and Cumberland Counties, we collected additional data from the Victim/Witness

Office.10

We used these records to obtain basic demographic information about the victim(s),

victim estimates of loss, and the use of victim impact statements. However, because not all

victims receive services from the Victim/Witness Office, our data does not include information

about all victims.

10

The Luzerne County Victim/Witness Office no longer had information on individual cases from the year 2000 and

we were denied access in Centre, Delaware, and Westmoreland Counties. In Lancaster County, the District

Attorney‟s Office, which was responsible for victims in the year 2000, was not interested in working with our

project.

34

Variables

For each adult case, we recorded the following types of information: offender

characteristics (e.g., race, gender, age, and prior record), case characteristics (e.g., charge and

conviction offenses, type of disposition, and sentence imposed), victim characteristics (e.g., race,

gender, age, and type of injury), economic sanctions imposed and paid (e.g., fines, fees, costs,

and restitution), and recidivism. We also included several variables that record the different

sources of information used to collect data in each county. In order to link offender information

across the different types of criminal records, we had to collect several pieces of identifying

information (e.g., social security number and state identification number). Once our data

collection was complete, however, we removed all unique identifiers from the data in order to

maintain the confidentiality of the information.

Although the amount of information available varied slightly by county, we were able to

obtain most of the desired information from all seven counties. The following discussion

describes the variables and data collection techniques used across counties. We discuss

variations on these techniques and variables in more detail in Appendices D-J.

We used several variables to record offender characteristics, which includes both

demographic information and information about the offender‟s criminal record (see Appendix C

for a complete list of variables). Demographic information was available for almost all cases

examined during our data collection. When probation paper files were missing or unavailable,

we were able to collect only limited information. As a result, offender characteristics collected

in Centre, Lancaster, and Luzerne Counties may be incomplete.

In terms of the offender‟s criminal record, we were interested in the number of prior

convictions for misdemeanors and felonies and in whether the offender had an official history of

35

violence. To collect this information, we relied primarily on the Pennsylvania Commission on

Sentencing (PCS) sentencing guideline form, which is typically located in Clerk of Courts paper

files. From these forms we were able to determine the offender‟s number of prior convictions

and whether the offender had been convicted of a violent crime. However, there was ambiguity

in several offense categories (e.g., felony 3), and it was often difficult to determine whether a

prior conviction had been for a violent crime. Additionally, in Blair and Luzerne Counties, the

Clerk of Courts paper files rarely contained PCS sentencing guideline forms. As a result, we had

to rely on Clerk of Courts computer files to collect prior record information.

We also collected information about a variety of case characteristics, including the charge

and conviction offenses, type of disposition, and type and severity of the sentence imposed (see

Appendix C for a complete list of variables). We typically recorded the information that

corresponded to the offender‟s most serious conviction offense for a particular case. If not

convicted of a crime, we recorded information corresponding to the offender‟s most serious

charge offense. In Luzerne County, we could not identify which case characteristics applied to

charge offenses and which applied to conviction offenses. Because we could not record

information corresponding to the most serious conviction offense, the data we collected

corresponded to both charge and conviction offenses.

Information about the Offense Gravity Score (OGS) and about whether the case was

plea-bargained was available only on the PCS sentencing guideline form.11

Given that most

sentencing guideline forms were missing in Blair and Luzerne Counties, data for these variables

may be incomplete. We also collected detailed information about both the sentence imposed and

11

In Cumberland County, plea bargaining was not tracked on the PCS sentencing guideline form and therefore is

missing.

36

the sentence actually served by offenders. However, the information we recorded corresponded

to all conviction offenses, rather than to the most serious conviction offense.

Although we tried to collect detailed information about victims, it was largely

unavailable. However, we were able to obtain victim information in cases where the offender

was ordered to pay restitution to a victim (see Appendix C for a complete list of variables).

Where available, we collected information about victim demographics, the type of injury

sustained (e.g., personal, psychological, or property), and the victim‟s estimate of loss.

We also collected detailed information about the economic sanctions imposed and

collected in each case. Although some economic sanctions were common across counties, there

was considerable variation in the types of economic sanctions imposed (see Appendix C for a

complete list of variables). We recorded information about the total amount of economic

sanctions ordered in each case, as well as the amounts ordered for restitution, costs, fees, fines,

Crime Commision Cost (CCC), and the Crime Victim‟s Compensation (CVC) Fund. In several

counties, these categories were broken down into subcategories (e.g., county fines and state

fines). However, it was not possible to create such subcategories in all of the counties.

Regarding the collection of economic sanctions, we recorded such information as the

total amount of money paid and the total number of payments made. For example, we recorded

the amount of money paid to date for restitution, CCC, and CVC. In several counties, we were

able to collect information about money still owed and money being paid for previous

convictions. When available, we also collected detailed information about restitution orders. In

general, however, detailed restitution information was rarely available across counties. We

recorded information on economic sanctions that corresponded to each case as a whole, rather

than to the most serious conviction offense.

37

Lastly, we recorded information about recidivism (see Appendix C for a complete list of

variables). The collection of this information was uniform across counties. When an offender

had multiple violations of supervision orders, multiple re-arrests, or multiple revocations, for

each of these variables, we recorded only the first incident or outcome that followed sentencing.

Results

The results of this study are presented in three parts. First, we provide descriptive

information about the counties. Second, we describe how case and offender characteristics affect

the imposition and payment of economic sanctions. In this section, we estimate regression

models predicting the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent of economic

sanctions paid across counties. Third, we present results describing the imposition and payment

of specific economic sanctions across counties.

Descriptive Analyses Adult Data

Table 2-1 provides a description of the adult sample in each county. There were a

number of similarities across counties, especially in terms of gender, age, and education. The

results show that most offenders were male and white. The average age at sentencing ranged

from 30.4 in Centre County to 33.4 in Westmoreland County. The average amount of education

offenders received ranged from 11.5-12.3 years. Most offenders were convicted of misdemeanor

offenses, followed by felony offenses and summary offenses. In Centre, Cumberland, Delaware,

and Westmoreland Counties, most convictions were for traffic offenses. In Blair and Lancaster

Counties, most convictions were for property offenses.

Table 2-1. Description of the Sample

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

% n % n % n % n % n % n

Gender

Male 77.7 321 81.5 343 81.4 355 81.4 193 82.0 402 79.6 336

Female 22.3 92 18.5 78 18.6 81 18.6 44 18.0 88 20.4 86

Total 413 421 436 237 490 422

Missing 0 3 8 2 3 0

38

Race

White 89.6 370 92.9 382 81.4 320 56.3 129 77.5 307 87.8 330

Nonwhite 9.8 40 7.1 29 18.6 73 43.7 100 22.5 89 12.2 46

Total 410 411 393 229 396 376

Missing 3 13 51 10 97 46

Education M = 11.7 M = 12.3 M = 11.7 M = 12.1 M = 11.5 M = 12.1

Total 352 204 134 138 19 345

Missing 61 220 310 101 474 77

Offense

Grading

Summary 7.2 29 14.8 62 17.1 76 1.3 3 2.0 10 11.8 50

Misdemeanor 74.9 301 73.1 307 59.9 266 81.0 187 74.1 364 70.1 296

Felony 17.9 72 12.1 51 23.0 102 17.7 41 23.8 117 18.0 76

Total 402 420 444 231 491 422

Missing 11 4 0 8 2 0

Type of

Offense

Property 27.4 113 23.8 101 26.4 117 18.4 44 29.0 143 21.1 89

Personal 16.9 70 15.8 67 14.2 63 15.1 36 14.0 69 17.5 74

Drug 15.5 64 10.4 44 13.3 59 22.6 54 18.9 93 12.6 53

Traffic 24.2 100 37.0 157 29.6 131 35.6 85 27.2 134 40.3 170

Other 16.0 66 13.0 55 16.5 73 8.4 20 11.0 54 8.5 36

Total 413 424 443 239 493 422

Missing 0 0 1 0 0 0

Age at

sentencing

M = 31.5 M = 30.4 M = 31.4 M = 32 M = 30.9 M = 33.4

Total 422 434 226 469 385

Missing 2 10 13 24 37

Multivariate Analyses

The following discussion describes how case and offender characteristics affect the

imposition and payment of economic sanctions, both overall and separately for specific

economic sanctions.12

Total amount of economic sanctions ordered. Table 2-2 describes the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered across counties. The results show that the type (i.e., property,

personal, drug, traffic, or other) and severity (i.e., summary, misdemeanor, or felony) of the

12

We excluded Luzerne County from our analyses because sentencing information and data on economic sanctions

were combined across multiple cases. As a result, we were unable to collect complete information about a particular

case.

39

offense significantly predicted the total amount of economic sanctions ordered. In Centre

County, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a traffic offense. In Cumberland and Delaware Counties, the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered was significantly lower for offenders convicted of a drug crime.

The total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted

of a felony. The type of sentence imposed also affected the total amount of economic sanctions

ordered. In Blair and Lancaster Counties, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was

significantly higher for offenders incarcerated in prison.13

Apart from case characteristics, in some counties offender characteristics also affected

the total amount of economic sanctions ordered. In Blair and Delaware Counties, the total

amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for non-white than white

offenders. Furthermore, in Cumberland County the total amount of economic sanctions ordered

increased with age. The average amount of economic sanctions ordered ranged from $1305 in

Blair County to $1864 in Lancaster County.

The results presented in Table 2-2 also show low R2 values across all six counties. R

2 is

a measure of how well the predictor variables explain the dependent variable. The higher the R2

(i.e., the closer it is to 1.00), the better the predictor variables explain the dependent variable. In

these models, the low R2 values indicate that the predictor variables included in these models

explain little or no variation in the total amount of economic sanctions ordered. In the tables

below, the total dollar amounts ordered are being predicted by the variables in the first column.

Table 2-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 1304.93 1360.03 1861.26 1427.46 1864.41 1470.8

Mean n 405 416 443 222 475 394

13

In Blair County, prison estimates may be unstable because there were very few prison sentences.

40

Summary -325.54 -533.97 -832.69 -956.13 -374.22

Felony 419.65 1455.38*** 3325.99*** 1193.99** -306.03 3012.84***

Personal -335.43 286.44 -652.48 -724.99a -1021.39 -882.59

Drug -296.45 -434.52 -2265.58** -1061.69** -802.83 -1397.95

Traffic 266.48 837.28** -65.16 -171.56 -535.06 -186.66

Other Offense -89.66 -14.60 -1070.76 -427.48 -1135.06 240.06

Prison 2589.97* -615.08 1882.91 -1220.60a 5292.24*** 352.22

Jail -38.37 386.98a -807.98 -206.96 -611.93 876.92

RIP -59.83 680.58 865.95 222.49 -612.05 476.76

No Sentence -459.95 -710.24 482.93 -1493.64 -1294.40 -304.91

Non-White 1171.72* -18.45 -938.42 580.67* -87.26 -1019.70

Age 3.82 8.15 69.90** 16.78a 11.93 46.67

a

Male 43.69 -219.01 413.96 -15.64 662.14 -959.70

Constant 1073.46 870.06* -411.65 1014.23* 1617.00 371.15

R2 0.06 0.15 0.12 0.14 0.06 0.08

n 372 401 387 211 373 350

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Percent of economic sanctions paid. Table 2-3 describes the percent of economic

sanctions paid across counties. The results show that case characteristics were stronger

predictors than offender characteristics of the percent of economic sanctions paid. The percent

of economic sanctions paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal, drug,

traffic, or other offenses than for property offenses. Furthermore, the percent of economic

sanctions paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders, particularly those incarcerated

in prison. The only offender characteristic that affected the percent of economic sanctions paid

was the offender‟s race. In Cumberland, Delaware, and Lancaster Counties, the percent of

economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for non-white than white offenders.

The R2 values are higher for these models than for the previous ones, a finding that

suggests we can better predict the percent of economic sanctions paid than the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered.

Table 2-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Economic Sanctions Paid Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 56.59 76.9 65.06 45.79 42.81 64.63

Mean n 405 412 443 221 475 236

41

Summary 3.84 12.95 -9.76 -12.57 -74.63

Felony -4.54 -7.28 -10.79a 6.08 -1.84 -17.43

Personal 18.55** 10.92a 15.50* 10.26 19.20* 20.72

Drug 15.54* 16.16* 18.89** 5.00 6.01 8.35

Traffic 46.08*** 21.88*** 24.17** 36.63*** 41.55*** 34.88

Other Offense 23.58** 8.55 17.43* 22.24a 14.55 -4.98

Prison -33.36** -44.86*** -49.27*** -26.93a -28.19*

Jail -27.71*** -20.98*** -16.27* -32.54*** -25.35*** -33.86

RIP -9.08 -24.68* -3.38 -14.10 -15.33 39.07

No Sentence -3.22 -6.89 6.62 11.13 21.44a 57.09

Non-White -8.27 -12.94a -12.13* -19.36** -13.58* -12.83

Age 0.21 0.21 0.34a 0.02 0.28 -0.51

Male 6.34a 8.47

a -0.35 -1.76 -1.41 26.39

Constant 34.28*** 59.18*** 57.31*** 53.36*** 32.29** 46.45

R2 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.35 0.21 0.05

n 371 397 387 207 363 224

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Fines. The results presented in Table 2-4 describe the total amount of fines ordered

across counties. The total amount of fines ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of drug or traffic offenses and for offenders incarcerated in prison. No offender

characteristics significantly predicted the total amount of fines ordered.

Table 2-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 402.22 330.25 444.31 314.34 506.59 557.13

Mean n 371 273 237 56 355 89

Summary -34.93 24.50 239.11 105.99 387.49

Felony -212.37 144.64* 74.87 5.33 70.21 -3.09

Personal -185.85 128.53a 59.72 17.52 -104.27 -108.61

Drug 517.49 269.06*** 722.97*** 30.46 728.28** 106.77

Traffic 214.49 278.43*** 410.78* 168.98*** 349.02 150.19

Other Offense 144.51 143.42a 145.08 23.91 198.68 17.48

Prison 3561.17*** 267.59* 717.81* 94.13a 3119.19*** 3631.33***

Jail 62.49 70.25 -3.42 111.48*** 125.19 110.08

RIP -125.07 409.35*** -105.98 120.69** 215.62 83.04

No Sentence -42.64 -135.36 -365.33 -45.58 -296.85 -156.19

Non-White 711.35 -29.55 75.05 -18.60 322.20 111.44

Age 2.59 2.15 1.22 1.35a -5.70 0.89

Male 152.01 60.12 -94.66 22.76 50.79 9.35

Constant -112.01 -113.76 11.07 -108.04** 22.45 -73.02

R2 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.44 0.21 0.24

n 374 401 387 211 372 290

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

42

The results presented in Table 2-5 describe the percent of fines paid across counties.

Case characteristics significantly predicted the percent of fines paid only in Blair and Centre

Counties. In Blair County, the percent of fines paid was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of personal, traffic, or other offenses. The percent of fines paid was significantly

lower for offenders incarcerated in jail. In Centre County, the percent of fines paid was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a summary offense, for offenders convicted of

drug or traffic offenses, and for offenders incarcerated in prison. Furthermore, the percent of

fines paid was significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in jail and for offenders sentenced to

RIP. No offender characteristics significantly predicted the percent of fines paid.

Table 2-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Fines Paid Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

Mean 56.03 81.1 60.83 45.32 58.06

Mean n 368 269 237 56 31

Summary -22.21 58.44*** -12.76 -19.99

Felony 2.20 8.66 18.94 20.34 11.69

Personal 31.16** 12.28 -13.59 -55.83

Drug 23.55a 11.37* -15.79 -13.51 81.88

Traffic 52.52*** 18.06** -14.34 50.83

Other Offense 48.28*** 25.34 -13.16 69.18 48.50

Prison -41.54a 14.28*** -97.35 -64.80

Jail -28.90** -63.51*** -35.76 -43.27 -19.34

RIP -7.20 -26.77** -1.36 -25.94 8.36

No Sentence 19.39a -30.97 10.13 44.37

Non-White -13.65 -10.28 -23.46 -25.07 28.58

Age 0.41 -15.17 0.18 -0.38 0.63

Male 13.16 0.14a 2.46 42.78

a 22.25

Constant 11.86 11.99*** 91.98*** 65.27 -40.57

R2 0.12 0.19 0.32 0.24 0.32

n 336 260 199 55 28

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Costs and fees. Table 2-6 describes the total amount of costs and fees ordered across

counties. The results show that the type and severity of the offense significantly predicted the

total amount of costs and fees ordered. The total amount of costs and fees ordered was

43

significantly lower for offenders convicted of a summary offense and significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a traffic offense.

Table 2-6. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Costs and Fees Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 438.14 735.91 566.19 792.98 413.25 342.28

Mean n 404 403 443 223 466 354

Summary -19.19 -316.96 -452.94*** -225.65* -300.52**

Felony -351.95* 171.07 -16.58 -135.15 102.28** 155.53**

Personal 158.74 295.10* 129.41** 73.41 20.75 60.33

Drug -94.19 41.31 22.11 -252.13a -10.68 -1.84

Traffic 80.61 831.44*** 454.32*** 40.78 527.23*** 147.37**

Other Offense -177.79 146.77 81.13* -161.59 61.63 17.67

Prison 411.06 -205.09 290.42*** -174.02 5.66 -334.73**

Jail 372.07** 502.35*** 27.97 -165.98a -136.15*** 16.33

RIP 493.60* 339.57 8.66 -144.83 -173.89* 283.62***

No Sentence -209.64 -358.33 -6.82 -617.75 -186.57*** 23.51

Non-White 489.59** 164.57 -11.47 53.61 -20.08 1.27

Age -2.20 2.15 0.86 -1.55 0.36 0.30

Male -33.76 35.31 -0.93 173.27 17.78 24.60

Constant 465.60* 145.99 444.47*** 821.90*** 274.21*** 159.84*

R2 0.12 0.28 0.55 0.07 0.52 0.24

n 376 400 387 214 373 342

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 2-7 describes the total amount of state costs and fees ordered across counties. The

results show that the total amount of state costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a felony, for offenders convicted of personal or traffic offenses, and for

offenders sentenced to Restricted Intermediate Punishments (RIP). The total amount of state

costs and fees ordered was significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in jail or prison.

Table 2-7. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of State Costs and Fees Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 189.29 226.98 173.3 240.67 233.81 204.23

Mean n 400 395 433 221 474 353

Summary -56.96 -95.84** -120.50*** -145.97* -152.02*

Felony 43.33 62.11** 61.73** 115.47** 34.14 65.48*

Personal 0.72 45.27* 15.12 19.33 88.63** 91.29**

Drug 1.87 36.80a 17.02 -15.59 7.23 34.54

Traffic 281.19*** 191.62*** 202.12*** 47.67 194.67*** 134.87***

Other Offense 35.85 62.75** 11.58 -10.01 45.21 67.08a

44

Prison -38.79 -80.41* 18.61 -164.43** -103.22* -172.97*

Jail 101.58 -34.20* 1.09 93.95*** -38.35a 6.85

RIP 33.40 86.55* 32.76 135.42** -103.84a 77.35**

No Sentence -56.56 -140.11*** 1.20 -110.96 -73.33* -82.12

Non-White -40.27 5.20 -25.73 -27.60 -44.20* 0.29

Age 0.73 -0.25 1.16a 1.38 -0.04 1.54

a

Male 27.17 -1.01 9.42 11.43 -16.14 11.29

Constant 62.35 163.01*** 70.34* 113.44* 195.36*** 42.36

R2 0.12 0.44 0.37 0.25 0.25 0.2

n 373 399 387 212 373 342

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table 2-8 describe the total amount of county costs and fees paid

across counties. The total amount of county costs and fees paid was significantly lower for

offenders convicted of a summary offense and significantly higher for offenders convicted of

traffic offenses. The average amount of county costs and fees paid ranged from $309 in

Westmoreland County to $828 in Delaware County.

Table 2-8. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of County Costs and Fees Paid Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 366.85 706.31 493.35 827.92 469.7 309.13

Mean n 405 388 443 223 477 353

Summary -18.94 -361.58a -428.77*** -388.99** -252.94*

Felony -264.54a 163.66 29.25 -13.27 114.61* 183.47***

Personal 151.02 229.80a 86.84* 61.39 77.97 123.39*

Drug -124.85 -53.04 -69.64a -258.64

a -49.26 -16.94

Traffic 0.45 740.93*** 298.98*** -81.73 576.89*** 70.50

Other Offense -180.25 158.16 14.42 -178.42 90.59 30.63

Prison 242.52 -348.08a 133.91

a -362.35 -136.75 -430.27**

Jail 241.10a 384.88*** 4.41 -113.39 -208.59*** -64.22

RIP 331.95a 331.23 20.26 -72.14 -367.66** 262.95***

No Sentence -251.06a -356.48 1.24 -643.45 -261.74*** -66.59

Non-White 536.35** 200.04 -13.55 27.69 -83.32a 3.02

Age -2.10 1.85 1.28 -1.31 -0.22 1.20

Male -13.85 10.72 14.33 187.95 -12.42 -3.25

Constant 438.54* 218.85 414.62*** 857.97*** 414.05*** 168.13*

R2 0.09 0.27 0.41 0.06 0.42 0.21

n 373 400 387 212 373 342

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

45

Restitution. The results presented in Table 2-9 describe the total amount of restitution

ordered across counties. The type and severity of the offense significantly predicted the total

amount of restitution ordered. The total amount of restitution ordered was significantly higher

for offenders convicted of a felony and significantly lower for offenders convicted of drug

offenses. The average amount of restitution ordered was lowest in Blair County ($848) and

highest in Cumberland County ($3112).

Table 2-9. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Restitution Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 847.5 964.76 3111.9 1309.77 2523.91 1940.88

Mean n 195 107 136 43 114 148

Summary -244.87 -78.54 -490.36 -562.97 -92.31

Felony 810.53* 1113.22*** 3168.54*** 835.54** -467.96 2716.44**

Personal -304.50 -232.39 -802.71 -702.58* -915.05 -1098.46

Drug -666.92* -738.68** -2944.04*** -812.14** -1571.74a -1536.19

Traffic -195.14 -434.12* -990.46 -438.54 -1607.41* -595.83

Other Offense -24.75 -403.33 -1256.12 -621.13 -1421.57 139.30

Prison -835.68 -404.94 1028.17 -801.55a 2108.87 -1393.50

Jail -458.97a -157.77 -815.16 -349.84

a -519.63 810.64

RIP -407.54 -58.46 903.71 -327.58 -442.56 -25.21

No Sentence -163.56 -71.55 804.48 -655.67 -421.80 38.79

Non-White 31.59 -110.58 -977.57 437.28* -344.89 -1248.59

Age 4.46 4.76 66.28** 8.18 19.78 50.17a

Male -116.75 -313.95a 489.66 -211.82 589.83 -941.21

Constant 629.32a 638.02* 909.84 533.97 784.02 -57.01

R2 0.04 0.1 0.13 0.15 0.03 0.08

n 376 399 386 211 373 324

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 2-10 describes the percent of restitution paid across counties. The results show that

the percent of restitution paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders. The average

percent of restitution paid was lowest in Lancaster County (34%) and highest in Centre County

(74%).

46

Table 2-10. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Restitution Paid Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 59.65 73.9 59.87 53.76 33.64 58.44

Mean n 191 106 136 43 114 79

Summary 16.99 9.11 -20.71 52.52

Felony 1.17 -6.80 -26.59** 21.67 -14.61 -15.04

Personal 25.67* 19.23a 17.02 -14.88 11.98 37.05

a

Drug 10.39 34.54 39.34** 28.32 27.89 19.10

Traffic 45.64*** 24.72 -17.72 42.99a -5.05 19.09

Other Offense 19.30 17.26 12.89 -4.42 1.15 -3.39

Prison -29.22a -31.60* -18.72 -23.84 -43.50*

Jail -23.34* -17.68 1.70 -3.99 -22.60a -27.81

a

RIP -7.22 -81.44** -1.28 -68.52 -28.279*

No Sentence -13.54 -15.00 29.00 -56.86

Non-White -12.63 3.50 -3.21 -28.90a 6.95 0.63

Age 0.26 0.22 1.13* 0.22 0.54 1.21*

Male 9.77 5.60 -1.59 -17.59 -2.45 14.70

Constant 35.83** 65.54*** 35.34* 61.49* 35.05a 6.89

R2 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.45 0.23 0.36

n 185 104 127 40 92 75

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Supervision fees. Table 2-11 describes the total amount of supervision fees ordered

across counties. The results show that the total amount of supervision fees ordered was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony and for offenders convicted of traffic

offenses. Furthermore, the total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly lower for

offenders convicted of a summary offense and for offenders incarcerated in prison.

Table 2-11. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees Ordered Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 237.02 308.66 261.95 554.78 657.72 392.43

Mean n 214 279 169 116 217 165

Summary -46.03 -138.28* -109.01** -310.16* -188.71

Felony 136.74a 102.42** 112.53*** 252.39*** 47.05 104.01*

Personal -9.00 59.42a -31.32 10.14 148.06* 209.25***

Drug -7.42 -32.61 -84.00* -46.78 -32.59 19.56

Traffic 198.06** 140.02*** 48.02 -47.30 244.42*** 114.29*

Other Offense 39.84 83.08* -45.78 -33.36 74.03 102.02

Prison -206.46 -253.39*** -138.88* -388.46** -239.14* -349.79*

Jail -0.60 -87.60** -22.51 161.78*** -110.06* -48.02

RIP -88.36 48.07 58.00 201.07* -297.58* 86.69*

No Sentence -105.65 -162.97** 23.28 -160.78 -148.35a -123.83

47

Non-White -1.65 7.77 -27.98 -57.55 -106.63* 55.65

Age 0.55 -0.36 1.31 1.65 -0.64 2.56a

Male 24.42 -6.77 26.00 27.82 -46.00 -8.99

Constant 56.64 209.03*** 47.88 150.04a 335.67*** 42.99

R2 0.06 0.24 0.12 0.22 0.15 0.14

n 373 399 387 211 372 274

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table 2-12 describe the percent of supervision fees paid across

counties. The percent of supervision fees paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted

of personal, drug, traffic, or other offenses. Furthermore, the percent of supervision fees paid

was significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in jail.

Table 2-12. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Supervision Fees Paid Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 30.6 74.25 30.47 57.46 47.51

Mean n 279 169 116 217 157

Summary 2.67 21.09

Felony 0.95 -3.09 -1.33 3.98 -14.65

Personal 1.32 0.93 7.78 24.59* 44.57**

Drug 12.94* 24.72* 9.95 0.53 33.28**

Traffic 17.42*** 43.00*** 40.92** 31.74*** 31.88*

Other Offense 15.19* 21.73a 33.82** 2.71 7.01

Prison -20.97 -100.14** 17.13

Jail -7.65* -11.96 -8.93 -22.47** -29.07**

RIP -14.22a -46.29*** 17.16 15.29 8.90

No Sentence -39.42* 1.98 47.71 -14.10

Non-White -5.99 -0.40 3.25 -4.16 3.97

Age -0.05 0.29 0.44 0.25 -0.08

Male -2.03 6.46 -7.62 5.11 8.12

Constant 25.89*** 43.82** 3.30 38.35** 21.84

R2 0.13 0.44 0.2 0.19 0.21

n 271 159 108 168 151

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Crime Victims Compensation (CVC). Table 2-13 describes the imposition of CVC

across counties. The results show that CVC was less likely to be imposed for offenders

convicted of a summary offense. The percent of cases in which CVC was imposed was lowest in

Westmoreland County (86%) and highest in Delaware County (97%).

48

Table 2-13. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition of Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 93% 89% 90.30% 97.30% 91% 86.30%

Mean n 407 416 444 226 493 372

Summary 0.28 -3.02** -4.16*** -0.67 -2.28*

Felony -0.36 8.91 -2.90 11.66 1.98* 0.61

Personal -0.15 11.88 -8.27 10.76 1.42 -0.19

Drug -1.04 0.67 0.41 -0.95 -1.25* 0.66

Traffic -2.65** 1.90** -12.94 39.36 0.27 -0.14

Other Offense -0.46 2.45** -9.79 12.58 -0.15 1.00

Prison 0.41 5.27 -0.43 10.72 -0.74 -2.50*

Jail 2.30* -2.26** 3.60** -2.82 0.06 0.10

RIP 7.69 6.51 2.06 0.03 6.06 -0.58

No Sentence -1.23 -3.28** 2.67* -40.65 0.22 -0.86

Non-White -1.61* 0.40 0.05 0.01 -0.02 0.12

Age 0.02 -0.04a -0.06 0.56 -0.03 0.03

Male -1.45 0.25 -8.63 -11.90 -0.15 0.13

Constant 5.22** 3.92*** 23.66 3.48 3.17*** 1.16

R2

n 372 399 387 212 493 340

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table 2-14 describe the percent of cases in which CVC was paid

in full. The percent of cases in which CVC was paid in full was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of drug or traffic offenses and significantly lower for offenders incarcerated

in jail.

Table 2-14. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) Paid in Full Across

Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

Mean 51% 56% 68% 43.60% 60%

Mean n 378 366 401 220 180

Summary 0.23 0.60 0.37

Felony -0.68 -0.24 -0.47 0.75 -0.13

Personal 1.03** 0.01 0.71a -0.03 1.01

a

Drug 1.12* 1.03* 0.95* -0.09 0.75

Traffic 2.69*** 1.26*** 1.81*** 1.85** 1.10*

Other Offense 1.44*** 0.59 0.73a 0.80 0.44

Prison -6.85 -0.63 -1.54* -1.16

Jail -1.64*** -0.66* -1.14** -2.00*** -0.88*

RIP -0.66 -1.24* -0.65 -1.24a -0.38

No Sentence -0.22 -1.17 -0.53 3.35 4.27

Non-White -0.55 -0.26 -0.39 -0.53 -0.52

Age 0.01 -0.01 0.03a -0.01 0.01

49

Male 0.31 0.21 0.09 -0.13 1.35**

Constant -0.97* -0.01 0.13 0.47 -1.38a

R2

n 357 355 372 208 171

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Crime Commission Cost (CCC). Table 2-15 describes the imposition of CCC across

counties. The results show that CCC was significantly less likely to be imposed on offenders

convicted of a summary offense. The percent of cases in which CCC was imposed was lowest in

Westmoreland County (84%) and highest in Delaware County (97%).

Table 2-15. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition of Crime Commission Cost (CCC) Across Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 91% 88% 90.30% 97.30% 91% 84.40%

Mean n 406 415 444 226 493 372

Summary -0.22 -3.36** -4.16*** -0.81 -2.26*

Felony 0.62 9.07 -2.90 11.66 1.70a 0.31

Personal -0.31 12.27 -8.27 10.76 1.06 -0.27

Drug -1.30 0.69 0.41 -0.95 -1.55** 0.26

Traffic -1.97* 2.21** -12.94 39.36 -0.09 -0.25

Other Offense -0.29 3.24** -9.79 12.58 -0.53 0.99

Prison -0.52 4.84 -0.43 10.72 -0.51 -1.93a

Jail 2.37* -2.76*** 3.60** -2.82 0.34 0.10

RIP 6.94 5.86 2.06 0.03 6.04 -0.46

No Sentence -0.77 -3.68** 2.67a -40.65 0.23 -0.68

Non-White -1.31a 0.41 0.05 0.01 -0.19 0.07

Age 5.36 -0.03 -0.06 0.56 -0.03 0.03

Male 0.03 0.42 -8.63 -11.90 0.03 0.23

Constant -1.06** 3.71*** 23.66 3.48 3.35*** 0.99

R2 3.66

n 355 399 387 212 493 340

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 2-16 describes the percent of cases in which CCC was paid in full. The results

show that the percent of cases in which CCC was paid in full was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of traffic offenses and significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in jail.

50

Table 2-16. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Crime Commission Cost (CCC) Paid in Full Across

Counties

Blair Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

Mean 49% 54% 68% 43.60% 60.10%

Mean n 369 367 401 220 173

Summary -0.27 0.62 0.37

Felony -0.64 -0.28 -0.47 0.53 0.05

Personal 1.02** 0.03 0.71a -0.05 1.09

a

Drug 0.80a 0.96* 0.95* -0.24 0.68

Traffic 2.63*** 1.20*** 1.81*** 1.81** 1.04*

Other Offense 1.36** 0.54 0.73a 1.20 0.61

Prison -6.84 -0.85 -1.54* -0.97

Jail -1.71*** -0.56* -1.14** -2.10*** -0.90*

RIP -0.74 -1.11a -0.65 -1.70* -0.45

No Sentence -0.09 -1.11 -0.53 3.20 4.42

Non-White -0.45 -0.21 -0.39 -0.67a -0.65

Age 0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.01

Male 0.40 0.21 0.09 -0.08 1.15*

Constant -0.94* 0.05 0.13 0.60 -1.40a

R2

n 349 356 372 208 165

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Total amount of economic sanctions ordered across all cases. In addition to collecting

information about cases from the year 2000, we were also interested in how offenders‟ financial

obligations affected the imposition and payment of economic sanctions. When available, then,

we recorded the total amount of economic sanctions offenders owed across all of their cases.

The results presented in Table 2-17 describe the total amount of economic sanctions ordered

across all cases. Economic sanctions were significantly less likely to be ordered for drug or

traffic offenses and significantly more likely to be ordered for incarcerated offenders.

Table 2-17. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered Across All Cases

Blair Cumberland Delaware Lancaster

Mean 4470.11 4043.15 3307.38 5783.52

Mean n 409 441 225 483

Summary -10.96 -1020.33 -150.25

Felony 850.67 6167.28*** 1377.75* 1273.56

Personal -2861.21** -2295.26a -389.95 -5567.84**

Drug -2981.17** -5670.64*** -593.46 -4329.15*

Traffic -4840.44*** -3439.48** -1566.28* -6305.13***

51

Other Offense -2467.60* -3863.35** -1211.00 -3554.49

Prison 7435.85*** 1322.18 -649.36 10653.29**

Jail 2990.82** 610.21 1608.86** 554.53

RIP 3089.76* 1281.64 1167.39 485.09

No Sentence -497.36 2885.90a 225.31 -2774.98

Non-White -286.60 -1877.63* -237.61 -1562.32

Age -45.1252 56.68 18.33 40.68

Male 494.4561 2255.35* 500.84 2079.17

Constant 6876.5*** 1482.11 2307.67* 5967.61*

R2 0.16 0.21 0.14 0.11

n 374 387 211 373

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Percent of economic sanctions paid across all cases. Table 2-18 describes the percent

of economic sanctions paid across all cases. The results show that the percent of economic

sanctions paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal, traffic, or other

offenses. Furthermore, the percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for

offenders incarcerated in jail or prison.

Table 2-18. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Economic Sanctions Paid Across All Cases

Blair Cumberland Delaware Lancaster

Mean 57.43 55.11 63.37 46.45

Mean n 409 441 130 483

Summary 6.50 -2.36 -8.00

Felony -2.20 -10.18 8.49 -10.22a

Personal 21.12** 24.02** 14.79 20.17**

Drug 16.47* 26.59** 2.90 1.56

Traffic 45.78*** 35.23*** 38.76*** 27.50***

Other Offense 22.08** 27.08** 17.37 9.65

Prison -37.10** -51.71*** -43.96* -22.99*

Jail -27.65*** -15.36* -33.44*** -15.63***

RIP -9.61 -1.62 -27.50* -0.39

No Sentence -4.32 -13.41 -2.77 11.78

Non-White -5.56 -6.12 -18.63* -14.33**

Age 0.28 0.49* -0.17 0.55**

Male 5.04 -4.52 7.92 4.21

Constant 33.39*** 36.54** 62.00*** 27.03***

R2 0.24 0.17 0.39 0.28

n 374 387 121 367

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

52

Discussion

Overall, case characteristics were stronger predictors than offender characteristics of the

amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent of economic sanctions paid across

counties. More specifically, the amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher

for offenders convicted of a felony. Furthermore, the percent of economic sanctions paid was

significantly lower for incarcerated offenders. The total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a traffic offense.

This finding probably reflects the fact that most traffic offenses were for DUI, as the amount of

economic sanctions imposed in these cases is generally high.

53

Chapter 3: Juvenile Data

In addition to examining the imposition and payment of economic sanctions for adult

offenders, we also examined these same issues for juvenile offenders.

Method

Sampling

We collected data from juvenile cases docketed in the year 2000. In each county, we

selected a random sample of approximately 200 juvenile cases.14

In order to draw the sample,

we first identified the total number of juvenile cases in the year 2000. We then selected random

samples of one hundred cases and counted the number of cases that were missing in each sample.

This procedure allowed us to estimate the total number of missing cases in the year 2000 (i.e.,

the number of cases for which no information was available). Accounting for this number, we

determined how many docket numbers we needed to select in order to produce a sample of 200

juvenile cases. We then sampled every “nth

” docket number.

It was often difficult to draw the juvenile samples because counties do not always assign

docket numbers or similar tracking numbers to juvenile records. Furthermore, each county

organized its juvenile files and records differently and there were few similarities across

counties. Because many juvenile cases were informally processed, several counties did not have

a readily available list of all juvenile cases handled in the year 2000. As a result, we had to

develop a unique sampling procedure for each county. Because Centre County processed only a

small number of juvenile cases, we coded all juvenile cases from the year 2000.

Data Collection

To collect data on juvenile cases, we first modified the adult data collection form to

accommodate juvenile cases. For example, we added several juvenile-specific variables (e.g.,

14

We were unable to collect juvenile data in Blair County because the president judge denied us access to the files.

54

case processing variables and additional programs) to the adult data collection form. We then

customized the data collection form for each county (see Appendix B for the juvenile data

collection forms).

In all but Westmoreland County, we collected juvenile data primarily from the juvenile

probation department.15

We examined both computer and paper files when available. We had

access to probation paper files in Cumberland, Delaware, Lancaster, and Luzerne Counties. In

the remaining counties, we relied on the limited amount of information provided by probation

computer records, Clerk of Courts paper and computer records, and Victim/Witness Services

paper records.

Although probation paper files were a rich source of information, we found that even

when we could access probation paper files, many of those from the year 2000 were missing. In

most cases, files were missing because probation departments frequently removed juvenile

records from their files when offenders reached a certain age (i.e., 18 to 21) and were discharged

from probation.

We used the same basic data collection procedures in all six counties, but there were

several differences across counties in the way information was collected and what was available

to us (see Appendices D-J for information about data collection procedures specific to each

county).

Variables

For each juvenile case, we recorded the following types of information: offender

characteristics (e.g., race, gender, age, and adults in the home), case characteristics (e.g., charge

and conviction offenses and type of disposition), victim characteristics (e.g., gender, and type of

15

Due to time constraints in Westmoreland County, we were able to collect information from only Clerk of Courts

paper files.

55

injury), economic sanctions imposed and paid (e.g., fines, fees, costs, and restitution), and

recidivism. Because juvenile files often combined information across cases, we were not always

able to collect information about specific cases.

Juvenile cases differed from adult cases in several ways. Juvenile probation files usually

contained detailed information about offenders‟ backgrounds and living conditions. In contrast

to adult probation files, however, juvenile probation files also included mental health

assessments and results of regular drug tests. Juvenile probation files also contained detailed

victim information, including demographic information (e.g., gender) and participation in the

criminal justice process (e.g., whether the victim submitted a victim impact statement). Because

juvenile probation files were a rich source of data, we were able to collect most of the desired

background information when we had access to these files. Unfortunately, we had access to

probation paper files only in Cumberland, Delaware, Lancaster, and Luzerne Counties.

Juvenile cases provided only limited information about the imposition and collection of

economic sanctions, perhaps because economic sanctions were assessed less frequently for

juveniles, especially for informally handled cases. When information on economic sanctions

was available, however, the different types of economic sanctions were usually combined. As a

result, we were often unable to collect detailed economic sanctions information for juvenile

cases.

Results

Descriptive Analyses Juvenile Data

Table 3-1 describes the juvenile sample in each county. The results show that most

offenders were male and white. The only exception to this finding was in Delaware County,

where most offenders were nonwhite (56.8%). The average age at sentencing ranged from 15.6-

56

16.2 years. The average amount of education offenders received ranged from 8.6-10 years.

Most offenders were convicted of misdemeanor offenses, followed by felony offenses and

summary offenses. Most offenders were convicted of property offenses. In Westmoreland

County, however, most offenders were convicted of personal offenses.

Table 3-1. Description of the Sample

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

% n % n % n % n % n

Gender

Male 77.8 123 85.8 157 77.0 151 81.1 146 79.6 113

Female 22.2 35 14.2 26 23.0 45 18.9 34 20.4 29

Total 158 183 196 180 142

Missing 0 1 0 6 1

Race

White 93.6 147 76.5 140 43.2 79 89.1 57 89.4 127

Nonwhite 6.4 10 23.5 43 56.8 104 10.9 7 10.6 15

Total 157 183 183 64 142

Missing 1 1 13 122 1

Education M = 8.6 M = 10 M = 9.5 M = 10

Total 177 153 55 95

Missing 158 7 43 131 48

Offense Grading

Summary 4.4 7 3.3 6 6.7 12 6.6 12 1.4 2

Misdemeanor 64.6 102 65.2 120 73.7 132 66.9 121 78.9 112

Felony 31.0 49 31.5 58 19.6 35 26.5 48 19.7 28

Total 158 184 179 181 142

Missing 0 0 17 5 1

Type of Offense

Property 43.7 69 38.8 71 34.2 67 32.1 59 32.2 46

Personal 21.5 34 30.1 55 30.1 59 25.5 47 33.6 48

Drug 13.9 22 15.8 29 19.9 39 27.2 50 21.0 30

Traffic 5.7 9 3.8 7 2.0 4 2.2 4 4.9 7

Other 15.2 24 11.5 21 13.8 27 24 8.4 12

Total 158 183 196 184 143

Missing 0 0 2 0

Age at sentencing M = 16.2 M = 15.6 M = 16 M = 16.2 M = 16

Total 131 183 173 181 132

Missing 27 1 23 5 11

Multivariate Analyses

The following discussion describes how case and offender characteristics affect the

imposition and payment of economic sanctions. We begin by estimating regression models

57

predicting the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent of economic sanctions

paid across counties. Next, we present results describing the imposition and payment of specific

economic sanctions across counties.

Total amount of economic sanctions ordered. Table 3-2 describes the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered across counties. In Westmoreland County, the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony. In

Cumberland and Delaware Counties, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was

significantly lower for offenders convicted of personal offenses. The total amount of economic

sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders adjudicated delinquent in Centre

County, but significantly lower for offenders adjudicated delinquent in Lancaster County. The

average amount of economic sanctions ordered ranged from $294 in Delaware County to $898 in

Centre County.

Table 3-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 898.25 506.13 294.14 868.23 314.16

Mean n 105 76 162 139 127

Summary -224.69 -222.91 -34.92 -1033.68

Felony 491.73 151.15a -28.56 -276.87 471.86*

Personal -832.25 -229.05** -171.56** -1383.60 -9.74

Drug -470.67 -201.02a -150.22** -1549.59 -349.88

a

Traffic -364.17 78.43 -104.62 -1809.06 -331.50

Other Offense -237.63 1.84 -155.41* -361.95 -96.12

Commitment 399.61 -62.17 12.08 -204.81 -393.72

Adjudicated Delinquent 817.63* 114.26 -26.36 -5269.46** 119.45

Age 77.40 0.97 -15.55 401.47 121.93**

Male 375.75 97.60 42.43 1457.20 -97.29

Constant -1195.72 104.94 639.54** -1130.84 -1544.64*

R2 0.17 0.153 0.13 0.092 0.196

Adjusted R2 0.08 0.099 0.06 0.011 0.119

n 105 169 144 123 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

58

Percent of economic sanctions paid. Table 3-3 describes the percent of economic

sanctions paid across counties. In Delaware County, the percent of economic sanctions paid was

significantly lower for offenders convicted of a summary offense and significantly higher for

older offenders. In Lancaster County, the percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly

higher for offenders convicted of personal or drug offenses and significantly lower for

committed offenders. In Westmoreland County, the percent of economic sanctions paid was

significantly lower for committed offenders and significantly higher for older offenders and for

offenders who were adjudicated delinquent.

Table 3-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Economic Sanctions Paid Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 87.24 82.21 48.03 55.23 93.01

Mean n 105 71 150 132 45

Summary -17.37 -60.96** -9.89

Felony 0.05 -9.79 -2.26 -10.12 -15.86

Personal -5.76 -10.02 -3.94 38.07** -1.92

Drug 0.94 -1.34 -16.16 23.71* 18.18

Traffic 12.41 -11.98 28.63 33.99 2.76

Other Offense -8.36 11.74 16.02 19.81 6.40

Commitment -2.93 6.04 -19.08a -21.87* -31.07*

Adjudicated Delinquent 0.85 -2.78 2.79 -5.28 21.57*

Age -1.13 3.71 5.88* 4.68a 4.96*

Male 6.11 -9.88 9.79 14.48 -8.97

Constant 104.56* 41.80 -44.46 -38.63 15.16

R2 0.05 0.105 0.143 0.2 0.334

Adjusted R2 -0.08 -0.032 0.071 0.121 0.141

n 84 69 130 112 41

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Costs and fees. The results presented in Table 3-4 describe the total amount of costs and

fees ordered across counties. In Cumberland and Westmoreland Counties, the total amount of

costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a traffic offense. The

total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for adjudicated offenders in

59

Centre County and for committed offenders in Westmoreland County. The average amount of

costs and fees ordered ranged from $85 in Westmoreland County to $431 in Centre County.

Table 3-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Costs and Fees Ordered Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 430.65 92.28 139.8 117.67 84.85

Mean n 85 36 133 137 125

Summary -133.38 -16.71 -69.99 65.46a

Felony -136.02 12.51 -5.04 -6.08 5.82

Personal -333.30a 1.06 20.16 35.18* 10.20

Drug -24.00 9.37 13.23 8.77 -7.63

Traffic 40.21 328.54*** 100.49 41.79 76.49**

Other Offense -178.38 8.85 6.12 12.50 -2.62

Commitment 172.18 8.48 -5.34 19.48 56.23**

Adjudicated Delinquent 268.25* 6.75 -30.54 19.89 6.39

Age -9.86 1.04 0.29 0.38 -0.28

Male 59.07 -0.91 4.05 9.41 0.06

Constant 350.62 -15.32 118.38 68.12 78.41

R2 0.11 0.678 0.037 0.127 0.205

Adjusted R2 0.02 0.655 -0.03 0.043 0.125

n 105 152 156 115 99

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 3-5 describes the total amount of state costs and fees ordered across counties. The

results show that the total amount of state costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a traffic offense. In Delaware County, the total amount of state costs and

fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony and significantly lower

for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent.

Table 3-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of State Costs and Fees Ordered Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 56.41 39.93 2.7 39.29 47.65

Mean n 71 29 106 126 103

Summary -13.13 -10.10 -1.82 0.66

Felony 13.45 4.36 1.70* 0.42 3.75

Personal -0.01 -1.20 -0.74 -2.20 -3.18

Drug 5.84 -0.77 -0.54 -4.97 -1.31

Traffic 1.28 66.20*** -1.26 31.96*** 18.37***

Other Offense 32.88 4.10 0.48 0.71 -1.43

Commitment -9.18 -0.58 0.70 -1.08 3.97

Adjudicated Delinquent 33.54* 5.00 -7.06** 0.48 -0.92

60

Age 0.74 0.00 0.18 0.89 0.93a

Male -4.54 -0.82 1.04 -0.26 -0.55

Constant -1.34 5.02 5.56 26.09* 32.05**

R2 0.09 0.175 0.172 0.263 0.292

Adjusted R2 0.00 0.115 0.079 0.19 0.21

n 105 148 100 112 88

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 3-6 describes the total amount of county costs and fees ordered across counties. In

Centre County, the total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

who were adjudicated delinquent. Apart from this finding, however, no other factors

significantly predicted the total amount of costs and fees ordered across counties.

Table 3-6. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of County Costs and Fees Ordered Across Counties

Centre Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 123.24 221.38 65.19 31.99

Mean n 63 81 136 121

Summary -55.79 -80.55 26.59

Felony 69.12a -16.69 2.27 -7.25

a

Personal 18.48 13.65 8.93 -0.32

Drug 23.60 12.14 6.10 -1.56

Traffic 19.99 98.47 19.95 -5.71

Other Offense 73.01 0.15 -1.15 9.35

Commitment -56.94 -2.83 14.55a 5.92

Adjudicated Delinquent 73.15* -31.44 3.90 3.65

Age 3.94 0.33 -1.40 1.08

Male 5.64 0.50 -4.32 1.07

Constant -73.93 122.85 78.35* 10.97

R2 0.11 0.046 0.09 0.122

Adjusted R2 0.01 -0.02 0 0.029

n 105 156 114 95

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Restitution. Table 3-7 describes the total amount of restitution ordered across counties.

The results show that the total amount of restitution ordered was significantly lower for offenders

convicted of a personal offense. In Delaware County, the total amount of restitution ordered was

also significantly lower for offenders convicted of a drug offense and for older offenders. In

Lancaster County, the total amount of restitution ordered was significantly lower for offenders

61

who were adjudicated delinquent. In Westmoreland County, the total amount of restitution

ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony.

Table 3-7. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Restitution Ordered Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 1261.58 580.95 470.97 3035.11 703.72

Mean n 43 58 24 32 41

Summary -45.52 -215.24 10.77 -1182.64

Felony 617.03 124.50 -42.22 -440.47 920.29*

Personal -496.05 -213.23** -240.93*** -1647.05 664.05

Drug -453.15 -190.02a -185.45** -1389.16 -723.85

Traffic -449.44 -221.74 -157.45 -2049.45

Other Offense -172.79 11.07 -154.65a -336.67 730.47

Commitment 257.66 -53.25 4.08 -289.45 -834.32

Adjudicated Delinquent 527.67 104.58 20.37 -5784.68** 92.67

Age 80.40 1.41 -40.65** 465.86 190.23a

Male 295.73 85.58 27.29 1629.85 -83.85

Constant -1417.35 94.86 833.00** -1929.26 -2768.41

R2 0.15 0.136 0.222 0.103 0.283

Adjusted R2 0.055 0.08 0.149 0.013 0.109

n 105 165 118 111 42

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table 3-8 describe the percent of restitution paid across counties.

We obtained information about the percent of restitution paid in Centre and Cumberland

Counties. However, no case or offender characteristics significantly predicted the percent of

restitution paid.

Table 3-8. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Restitution Paid Across Counties

Centre Cumberland

Mean 85.52 83.73

Mean n 43 55

Summary

Felony 7.19 -8.01

Personal -40.03a 17.62

Drug -13.70

Traffic 10.62 0.05

Other Offense -13.80 14.51

Commitment -36.11 -8.23

Adjudicated Delinquent -1.28 -3.01

Age -1.49 4.16

Male 0.31 17.22

62

Constant 114.20a 9.53

R2 0.20 0.166

Adjusted R2 -0.031 -0.009

n 37 53

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Crime Victims Compensation (CVC). Table 3-9 describes the imposition of Crime

Victims Compensation (CVC) across counties. The percent of cases in which CVC was imposed

was lowest in Cumberland County (19%) and highest in Lancaster County (82%).

Table 3-9. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition of Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 43% 18.70% 82% 76.50%

Mean n 158 150 147 132

Summary -0.43 -19.21 2.30

Felony 0.12 1.14* 0.65 0.18

Personal -0.41 -0.42 -0.32 0.04

Drug 0.14 -0.36 18.81 1.65

Traffic -20.99 -19.73 18.48 18.89

Other Offense -1.18 0.56 -3.30* 1.18

Commitment 0.19 -19.52 -2.92* -3.12***

Adjudicated Delinquent 1.36** -0.48 4.22*** -0.60

Age -0.08 0.04 0.02 0.08

Male 0.08 -0.65 0.46 0.62

Constant 0.46 -1.60 -0.76 0.39

R2

Adjusted R2

n 130 147 125 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Crime Commission Cost (CCC). Table 3-10 describes the imposition of Crime

Commission Cost (CCC) across counties. The percent of cases in which CCC was imposed was

lowest in Centre County (42%) and highest in Lancaster County (82%).

Table 3-10. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition of Crime Commission Cost (CCC) Across Counties

Centre Lancaster Westmoreland

Mean 41.90% 82% 75.80%

Mean n 129 147 132

Summary 0.79 2.06

Felony 0.54 1.76 0.11

Personal 0.30 0.76 -0.26

Drug 0.58 0.82 1.61

63

Traffic -20.31 18.63 19.07

Other Offense -0.53 -2.70* 1.08

Commitment 0.33 -1.57 -3.04**

Adjudicated Delinquent 3.20*** 3.80*** -0.27

Age -0.12 -0.11 0.05

Male -1.53* 0.74 0.40

Constant 0.75 0.56 0.86

R2

Adjusted R2

n 105 125 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Total amount of economic sanctions ordered across all cases. The results presented in

Table 3-11 describe the total amount of economic sanctions ordered across all cases. In

Cumberland County, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a traffic offense and for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent. In

Delaware County, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for

male offenders. In Lancaster County, the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was

significantly lower for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent.

Table 3-11. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered Across All Cases

Cumberland Delaware Lancaster

Mean 619.49 1303.49 1749.16

Mean n 107 177 133

Summary -463.27 508.38 -2833.07

Felony -11.30 -110.18 520.75

Personal -238.77a -330.13 -1409.21

Drug -221.08 59.98 187.98

Traffic 777.42* -342.02 -2502.89

Other Offense 6.48 -100.04 1730.96

Commitment -193.88 180.11 -183.64

Adjudicated Delinquent 350.99* 523.94 -11436.45***

Age -13.62 -82.56 719.43a

Male 271.20a 889.05** 1683.94

Constant 351.08 1505.72 -28.26

R2 0.129 0.105 0.138

Adjusted R2 0.073 0.041 0.054

n 166 152 113

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

64

Percent of economic sanctions paid across all cases. Table 3-12 describes the percent

of economic sanctions paid across all cases. In Cumberland County, the percent of economic

sanctions paid was significantly higher for older offenders. Apart from this finding, however, no

other factors significantly predicted the percent of economic sanctions paid across all cases.

Table 3-12. Regression Analyses Predicting the Percent of Economic Sanctions Paid Across All Cases

Cumberland Delaware Lancaster

Mean 85.43 50.32 54.32

Mean n 107 83 133

Summary 3.03 -40.39 -6.78

Felony -0.21 0.81 -10.17

Personal -0.08 -5.68 29.98

Drug 4.05 7.87 10.90

Traffic -10.71 38.07 50.95

Other Offense 12.58 14.19 8.88

Commitment 3.62 -0.23 -12.94

Adjudicated Delinquent -1.23 -1.13 -0.51

Age 4.90** 5.58a 3.14

Male -2.66 -11.67 5.56

Constant 11.26 -26.70 -8.12

R2 0.123 0.177 0.135

Adjusted R2 0.028 0.04 0.049

n 104 71 112

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Discussion

Consistent with the results for the adult data, case characteristics were stronger predictors

than offender characteristics of the amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent of

economic sanctions paid across counties. Furthermore, the total amount of costs and fees

ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of traffic offenses.

65

Chapter 4: DAVE Cases

PCCD was particularly interested in whether judges were ordering restitution to PCCD in

cases in which the victim had received compensation from the state. To answer this question, we

obtained a list of DAVE cases for four of the counties in which we coded data.

DAVE Cases

Table 4-1 describes the sample of DAVE cases in each county. The results show that

most offenders were male and white. The average age at sentencing ranged from 25.3 years in

Centre County to 29.8 years in Delaware County. The average amount of education offenders

received ranged from 11.9-13.3 years. Most offenders were convicted of misdemeanor offenses,

followed by felony offenses and summary offenses. In Centre, Cumberland, and Delaware

Counties, most offenders were convicted of personal offenses. In Westmoreland County, almost

equal percentages of offenders were convicted of property (43.5%) and personal (42.4%)

offenses.

Table 4-1. Description of the Sample

Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

% n % n % n % n

Gender

Male 100 8 92.2 59 88.4 107 75.3 64

Female 0 0 7.8 5 11.6 14 24.7 21

Total 8 64 121 85

Missing 0 0 1 0

Race

White 87.5 7 0 0 55.3 63 85.5 71

Nonwhite 12.5 1 0 0 44.7 51 14.5 12

Total 8 0 114 83

Missing 0 0 8 2

Education M = 13.3 M = 11.9 M = 11.9

Total 6 0 54 51

Missing 2 0 68 34

Offense Grading

Summary 12.5 1 12.7 8 0.9 1 3.6 3

Misdemeanor 37.5 3 49.2 31 47.2 51 60.7 51

Felony 50 4 38.1 24 51.9 56 35.7 30

Total 8 63 108 84

66

Missing 0 1 14 1

Type of Offense

Property 0 0 12.5 8 19.0 23 43.5 37

Personal 87.5 7 75.0 48 58.7 71 42.4 36

Drug 0 0 6.3 4 5.0 6 0 0

Traffic 0 0 3.1 2 14.0 17 14.1 12

Other 12.5 1 3.1 2 3.3 4 0 0

Total 8 64 121 85

Missing 0 0 1 0

Age at sentencing M = 25.3 M = 29.6 M = 29.8

Total 8 62 117

Missing 0 2 5

Results

The results presented in Table 4-2 describe the average amount of economic sanctions

ordered and the percent paid across counties.16

The average amount of fines imposed ranged

from $187 in Cumberland County to $495 in Westmoreland County. The average amount of

restitution imposed was lowest in Delaware County ($3,538) and highest in Cumberland County

($18,073). The percent of restitution paid was generally low, ranging from 8% in Westmoreland

County to 14% in Delaware County. The average amount of supervision fees imposed ranged

from $295 in Centre County to $746 in Westmoreland County. The average amount of costs and

fees ordered was substantially lower in Westmoreland County ($568) than in Centre ($2,064),

Cumberland ($1,253), and Delaware ($3,575) Counties.

Table 4-2. Average Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

Amount

Ordered

%

Paid

Amount

Ordered

%

Paid

Amount

Ordered

%

Paid

Amount

Ordered

%

Paid

Total Current

Case

Mean 6617.03 15.15 14745.62 25.14 3258.12 47.46 5228.13 16.34

Mean n 7 7 64 64 116 25 65 40

Fines Mean 233.33 0 186.86 22.22 273.75 75 495 33.33

Mean n 3 3 9 9 10 2 3 3

Restitution Mean 5968.16 12.28 18072.85 3537.5 14.12 5649.03 7.68

Mean n 5 5 53 70 47 53 28

16

Because there were so few DAVE cases, we conducted only simple descriptive analyses of the data. Multivariate

analyses are not appropriate for such small samples.

67

Supervision

Fees

Mean 295 8.33 512.94 43.91 598.28 75 746.43 10.36

Mean n 5 5 17 17 58 8 21 18

Total Costs

and Fees

Mean 2063.74 1253.39 3574.56 567.56

Mean n 7 63 117 41

State Costs

and Fees

Mean 285.76 301.05 261.51 350.91

Mean n 7 63 113 40

County Costs

and Fees

Mean 1639.45 859.01 3585.07 457.57

Mean n 7 63 117 41

Total Across

All Cases

Mean 16258.94 26.69 6234.1 50.5

Mean n 63 63 118 10

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 4-3 describes the imposition and payment of CVC and CCC across counties. In

Centre County, CVC and CCC were ordered in all cases. In Cumberland County, CVC (98%)

was ordered more often than CCC (67%). In Delaware County, CVC and CCC were ordered in

virtually all cases (97% for both). Similarly, in Westmoreland County, both CVC and CCC were

ordered in almost all cases (98% and 97%, respectively).

Table 4-3. Imposition and Payment of CVC and CCC Across Counties

Centre Cumberland Delaware Westmoreland

If

Ordered

Paid in

Full

If

Ordered

Paid in

Full

If

Ordered

Paid in

Full

If

Ordered

Paid in

Full

CVC Mean 100% 0% 98% 76% 97% 89% 98% 59%

Mean n 7 7 64 63 117 18 40 34

CCC Mean 100% 0% 67% 79% 97% 82% 97% 55%

Mean n 7 7 64 43 117 17 39 33

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table 4-4 describes the imposition of CVC restitution across counties. When the CVC

provides compensation to the victim, the judge is supposed to order the offender to pay

restitution to the CVC. We examined four counties to determine whether in fact restitution was

ordered. At the low end, the percentage of cases in which judges acknowledged CVC restitution

was 3% in Delaware County. Next highest was Westmoreland County (19%). At the high end

were Centre County (50%) and Cumberland County (56%). The average amount of CVC

68

restitution ordered was lowest in Centre County ($741). Delaware County ($2,301),

Westmoreland County ($3,196), and Cumberland County ($5,428) all imposed higher amounts

of CVC restitution.

Table 4-4. Imposition and Payment of CVC Restitution Across Counties

Acknowledged Ordered Paid

Centre Mean 50% 740.67 0.00

Mean n 8 4 2

Cumberland Mean 56% 5427.72 203.31

Mean n 64 37 37

Delaware Mean 3% 2300.94 0.00

Mean n 122 3 2

Westmoreland Mean 19% 3195.63 20.67

Mean n 85 16 16

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Discussion

Our examination of DAVE cases suggests that some counties are more effective than

others in ordering restitution to CVC. One possible explanation for the relatively low rates of

imposing this restitution is that, on average, the offenders involved owe high amounts of costs

and fees, as well as restitution (see Table 4-2). However, because our analysis of DAVE cases

involved only four counties, caution must be exercised in making any generalizations.

69

Chapter 5: Victim Survey

Victims are typically the initiators of the criminal justice process, in that most police

investigations begin with victims‟ reports. However, victims are often left out of subsequent

decision making, in major part because, under the law, crimes are committed against the state,

not individual victims. Victims‟ omission from the process also reflects the criminal justice

system‟s concern with protecting the constitutional rights of the accused. Moreover, the efficient

operation of the criminal justice system relies on the interplay of a community of professional

actors, and the victim is merely a temporary and tangential player in this ongoing enterprise.

Reforms in the past 30 years have been aimed at recognizing victims‟ rights and

increasing their role in the system. In addition, there is a practical concern, in that victims‟

cooperation is often needed to prosecute an offender. And future victims, who are

disproportionately past victims (Outlaw, Ruback, & Britt, 2002), must report their victimizations

if the criminal justice system is to be successful in identifying, prosecuting, and monitoring

offenders. Despite these reforms, many victims still feel left out of the criminal justice process.

Victims‟ reactions to their experience with the criminal justice system probably relates to

what they should expect about their interactions with the criminal justice system regarding

process and outcome. With regard to process, they might expect to learn information about their

case, such as whether the offender was arrested, when the trial and sentencing are to occur, and

whether they are entitled to compensation or restitution. They might also expect to be treated

with respect and to have some input into decisions about the case, such as plea bargaining,

sentencing, and parole. With regard to outcome, they might expect the offender to be punished

and some sort of monetary compensation for their losses. This study examined victims‟

perceptions of the criminal justice system, focusing particularly on issues of process and

70

outcome, and tested whether these perceptions are related to victims‟ willingness to report future

victimizations.

Outcomes and Process

Another possible explanation for the consistent gender difference in reporting concerns

differences in the perception of justice. Scholars have differentiated two types of justice,

distributive justice and procedural justice. Distributive justice refers to the perceived fairness of

outcomes. As might be expected, individuals are upset when their outcomes are not fair, and

they are particularly upset when their outcomes (e.g., wages) are too low rather than too high.

Procedural justice refers to the perceived fairness of the process by which decisions are made.

Procedural justice includes how information is gathered, how the decision process is structured,

and how a decision can be appealed (Leventhal, 1980). Research suggests that individuals are

concerned with both distributive and procedural justice. That is, they care about both the

outcomes they receive and the process by which those outcomes were reached.

In the context of victims‟ interactions with the criminal justice system, we expected that

both distributive justice and procedural justice factors would affect victims‟ judgments, as, for

example, research indicates that victims are more satisfied when police responded quicker

(Percy, 1980; Poister & McDavid, 1978), and, consistent with the notion of procedural justice,

victims seem to be more satisfied when they feel that police officers have listened to them

(Shapland, 1983). First, we expected that victims would care about two specific outcomes: the

defendant‟s sentence (e.g., incarceration, fines) and whether or not the defendant was ordered to

pay restitution.

Second, we expected that victims would be concerned about procedures used to

determine the outcomes in their case. Consistent with what is known as fairness heuristic theory

71

(van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997), procedures should be especially important for

victims, for three reasons. First, according to this theory, procedures can reveal more than

outcomes about what an authority thinks about an individual, because they touch on fundamental

questions of trust, respect, and inclusion. Second, process typically comes before outcomes and

therefore is more likely to influence judgments about overall fairness. Third, procedural fairness

may be easier than distributive fairness to judge. For example, in many situations outcomes are

difficult to interpret because the outcomes of others are not known, and procedural information

thus becomes the standard by which overall fairness is determined. Crime victims‟ outcomes are

generally poor; that is, offenders are often not caught, or, if prosecuted, their charges are plea

bargained and sentences are less severe than what they would have been for the most serious

crimes. If victims do not know other victims‟ outcomes, they are likely to rely on their

judgments about procedural fairness (e.g., how they were treated) to affect their judgments about

outcome fairness. The most important way that individuals judge procedural fairness is whether

or not they have a voice about the outcome they would receive (Tyler, 1988; van den Bos, Wilke,

Lind, & Vermunt, 1998). Procedural fairness is important because it indicates to victims that

their complaint is being taken seriously, that they matter as individuals, and that they have

standing in the community (Lind & Tyler, 1988).

Third, based on research from organizations (Sweeney & McFarlin, 1997), we expected

women to be more concerned than men with procedural justice. This greater concern with

process has three bases: (a) because women are socialized to be concerned with and derive

satisfaction from relationships, (b) because women lack access to informal mechanisms (e.g.,

social networks) to resolve unfairness, and (c) because of past discrimination and sex-role

stereotyping women have to rely on more formal procedures to obtain fair outcomes. This

72

greater concern with procedural justice is coupled with research indicating that, compared to

men, women expect lower outcomes, such as lower wages (Major, 1994). In the context of the

criminal justice system, the hypothesis would be that female victims report more, not because

they expect to have better outcomes, but because they are more concerned with procedural

justice.

Purposes of Punishment

In addition to assessing victims‟ satisfaction with the outcomes of their case and with the

way they were treated, we were also concerned with how victims viewed the purposes of

punishment. The most complete investigation of victims‟ view of punishment was conducted

using 174 victims of violent crime (84 victims of rape, 90 victims of nonsexual assault; 84%

female) who had received financial support from a German victim assistance association within

the prior five years (Orth, 2003). Participants rated the importance of each of 18 statements

about punishment goals, two for each of nine a priori categories. A factor analysis of the 18

items revealed five factors: retaliation, recognition of victim status, confirmation of societal

values, concern with victim security, and concern with societal security. Orth suggested that the

first three are moral goals, in that they relate to sensitivity to befallen injustice, whereas the last

two are instrumental goals predicting increased punishment severity.

The same basic pattern was true for both rape victims and nonsexual assault victims.

Orth found that gender and crime type were generally unrelated to the punishment goals. The

primary strength of this study is that victims, as opposed to third parties, were asked to rate

different punishment goals in terms of a real criminal case versus a hypothetical scenario.

However, the study has two limitations: only victims of severe violent crime were included and

73

most of the victims (84%) were female. In addition, the fact that Orth‟s sample was German

raises questions about the generalizability of his results to the United States.

For two reasons, in this study we investigated how victims view the purposes of

punishment. First, we wanted to test whether Orth‟s findings would be replicated in the United

States. Second, we were interested in discovering how the purposes of punishment related to

measures of process and outcome fairness. We expected that victims who endorsed a goal of

punishment, regardless of what the particular goal was, would be more likely to say they wanted

a voice in the criminal justice process and that they would report future victimizations to the

police.

Method

We surveyed victims in two Pennsylvania counties in order to determine their

understanding of the sentencing process, their desire for having input to the criminal justice

process, and their satisfaction with outcomes and the Pennsylvania system for providing

restitution to crime victims.

Description of the Survey

The self-report survey, which is included in Appendix K, was divided into four sections.

The first section asked a series of questions about the victimization: the type of crime of which

they were a victim (e.g., burglary, theft, robbery, assault, or other), when and where the

victimization occurred, their relationship to the offender(s), and the gender, race, and age of the

offender(s). This section also included questions about the case disposition and the victim‟s

involvement in the criminal proceedings (i.e., whether the victim testified at trial).

The second section asked victims about their experiences with the restitution process:

how victims became aware they were eligible for restitution, whether they completed a form to

74

receive restitution, and who determined the amount of restitution owed to them. This section

also asked victims whether the judge imposed an order of restitution, the amount and distribution

of restitution imposed (i.e., the amount of restitution awarded for medical bills, lost wages, lost

or stolen property, repair to property, or other), and how much restitution they had received so

far. Furthermore, victims were asked to indicate on a four-point scale (“Very unfair,”

“Somewhat unfair,” “Somewhat fair,” “Very fair”) whether they felt the amount of restitution

imposed was fair and how well they understood the restitution process (on a seven-point scale

ranging from 1, “Not well at all” to 7 “Very well”).

The third section asked victims about their experiences with the criminal justice system,

including the amount and quality of their contact with the police, the prosecutor/district attorney,

the judge, the probation officer, and the victim-witness advocate. Also included in this section

were questions about how much input victims believed they had at various stages of the criminal

justice process. All of these items were rated on four-point scales (“Strongly disagree” to

“Strongly agree,” “Not important” to “Very important,” and “Very dissatisfied” to “Very

satisfied,” the specific response options depending on the particular question asked).

Respondents were also asked to rate on a seven-point scale their likelihood of reporting crimes in

the future. Additionally, there was a 22-item scale assessing victims‟ punishment goals (e.g.,

just deserts, revenge, recognition of victim status, deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation,

general deterrence, positive general prevention, victim security, and societal security). Victims

were asked to read a series of statements beginning, “It was important to me that the offender

should be punished…” and to indicate the importance of each statement for why the offender in

their case should be punished. Statements included such items as “to even out the wrong the

offender had done,” “to bring satisfaction to me, the victim,” “to stop the offender from further

75

offenses,” and “to show that crime does not pay.” Responses were coded “Very important,”

“Somewhat important,” “Not very important,” or “Not important.” Of the 22 items on the scale,

18 came from the study by Orth (2003). We added four more items in order to increase the

number of goals assessed: one asking specifically about moral outrage, two relating to

rehabilitation (treatment, education), and one concerning restitution to the victim. The items are

listed in Table 5-1.

Table 5-1. Means and Items of A Priori Categories of Punishment Goals and Assignment to Underlying Factor

A priori category M Factor

It was important to me that the offender should be punished …

Just deserts 3.41 To even out the wrong that the offender had done 1

3.29 To make amends for the offender‟s guilt 1

Revenge 3.09 To bring satisfaction to me, the victim 1

2.53 To make the offender suffer, as I suffered by his/her action 1

Recognition of victim status 2.80 To make it clear that society is on my side 1

2.66 To make it clear publicly that the offender did wrong to me 1

3.41 To reimburse me for the losses I suffered* 1

Deterrence of offender 3.90 To stop the offender from further offenses 5

3.87 So that the offender knows that crime does not go unpunished 5

Rehabilitation 3.24 To allow rehabilitation of the offender 3

3.00 To allow the offender to be understand our legal system 3

3.06 To treat the offender‟s drug, alcohol, or mental health problems* 3

2.73 To provide the offender with education or work skills* 3

General deterrence 3.60 To show that crime does not pay 4

3.53 To stop others from committing similar offenses 2

Positive general prevention 3.55 To uphold the important values in society 4

3.17 So that people are not frustrated with the legal system 4

Victim security 3.56 So that I can live in safety 2

2.95 So that I do not have to be afraid of the offender for now 2

Societal security 3.52 So that the offender is not a danger to others 2

3.32 So that society does not have to fear the offender for now 2

Moral outrage 3.70 To make it clear that the offender‟s act was wrong* 4

Note. Items are on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (Not Important) to 4 (Very Important). Factor 1 = Retaliation;

Factor 2 = Security; Factor 3 = Rehabilitation; Factor 4 = Moral Outrage; Factor 5 = Individual Deterrence.

*item added in this study.

76

The fourth section asked about the victim‟s background. Included in this section were

questions about the victim‟s gender, race, age, marital status, education, and socioeconomic

status. In all, the survey included 49 questions. The survey was pretested on victims who, after

completing the survey, participated in structured cognitive interviews, in which they were asked

their thought process when they initially completed the items.

Sampling

We sampled victims from Cumberland and Lancaster Counties, which were chosen

because they had relatively complete data on adult cases and because they were willing to

participate and were very cooperative in the research we had worked with them on a previous

study examining the imposition and payment of economic sanctions in Pennsylvania. In both

counties, we worked with county victim witness services personnel to obtain a list of all victims

who received orders of restitution in 2002 and 2003. In Cumberland County, we excluded large

companies (e.g., Wal-Mart), victims who requested but did not receive an order of restitution,

and victims never recorded in the victim witness services agency files (i.e., victims who were not

listed in either the criminal complaint or the district attorney‟s files). This procedure yielded a

sample of 514 victims.17

In Lancaster County, we excluded duplicate victims, banks, insurance

companies, institutional victims, police, and out-of-state businesses. This procedure yielded a

sample of 523 victims.

After obtaining the two samples, we mailed victims packets containing a cover letter

from the victim witness services office, two consent forms, a survey, and a one-dollar incentive.

After we received the completed survey and a signed consent form, we paid the victims an

additional 10 dollars for their participation.

17

The victim-witness advocates in Cumberland County did not record which cases were from 2002 and which cases

were from 2003. As a result, we could not separate the 514 victims by year. However, there were 863 victims in

2002 and 806 victims in 2003.

77

Results

Participants

We received 143 completed surveys from Cumberland County and 95 completed surveys

from Lancaster County, for a final sample of 238 victims. After eliminating those surveys that

were returned as undeliverable, the response rates for Cumberland and Lancaster Counties were

31% and 20%, respectively. One factor that might explain the dramatic difference in response

rates between the two counties is that in Cumberland County letters to victims were individually

addressed and signed, whereas in Lancaster County the letter was not addressed to the individual

victim and the signature was photocopied. Overall, 1,037 surveys were sent out, of which 124

were returned as undeliverable. The response rates were 23% of those sent out (238/1037) and

26% of those actually delivered (238/913). Although low, these response rates are consistent

with other studies of victims (e.g., Orth, 2003) and with studies using a single contact, as we did

here, because we wanted to minimize the intrusiveness to victims. In addition, Pennsylvania

(and the Northeast in general) tends to have a lower response rate to surveys than the rest of the

country (Groves, Fowler, Couper, Lepkowski, Singer, & Tourangeau, 2004). Of 70 comparisons

between counties, only 2 were significant, a number below what would be expected by chance.

Thus, in subsequent analyses, we pooled responses across counties.

The sample was primarily white (94%), male (59%), married (67%), and fairly well

educated (91% high school graduates, 35% with at least a college degree). Of the 238

respondents, 24% were victims of burglary, 42% were victims of theft, 4% were victims of

robbery, 12% were victims of assault, and 30% were victims of other crimes, most of which

were vandalism (19%) or automobile accidents (7%). Most of the crimes (54%) occurred at the

respondent‟s home. An additional 16% occurred at work, and 8% occurred in the respondent‟s

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neighborhood. Summary information about the sample is presented in Table 5-2. In the table, M

stands for the mean or average and “Mdn” stands for median, which is the number separating the

top half from the bottom half.

Table 5-2. Description of the Sample

Overall Cumberland County Lancaster County

(n = 238) (n = 143) (n = 95)

Gender (% male) 59% 62% 55%

Race (% white) 94% 93% 95%

Age 17-97 17-97 18-91

M = 47.6; Mdn = 47.0 M = 47.4; Mdn = 47.0 M = 47.4; Mdn = 47.0

Marital Status (% married) 67% 63% 73%

Education

High School graduate 24% 31% 15%

Some post-secondary 32% 30% 35%

At least a B.A. 35% 34% 36%

Current Work Situation 65% full-time 67% full-time 64% full-time

14% retired 15% retired 14% retired

Household Income

Less than $20,000 16% 17% 14%

$20,001 - $40,000 24% 27% 18%

$40,001 - $60,000 17% 20% 13%

$60,001 - $80,000 15% 14% 17%

More than $80,000 28% 21% 38%

Time in Current Home 1 month - 47.7 yrs 2 months - 46.0 yrs 1 month - 47.7 yrs.

M = 12.8; Mdn = 10.0 M = 12.5; Mdn = 7.8 M = 13.3; Mdn = 11.1

Living With

Spouse only 37% 37% 38%

Spouse & children 33% 28% 39%

Restitution Ordered (%)

Yes 62% 64% 59%

Don‟t Know 28% 27% 30%

Received CVC funds (%) 6% 6% 5%

Slightly more than half of the crimes involved one offender (54%). Twenty-three percent

involved two offenders, 14% involved three offenders, and about 4% involved four or more

offenders (the remainder were missing this information). The offender was known to the victim

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in 37% of the cases. Almost all of the offenders (88%) were male, with an estimated median age

of 22 (M = 27.2). Most of the cases (69%) were resolved by guilty plea, although 25% went to

trial. About 60% of the samples in the two counties said the offender in their case was ordered to

pay restitution, although more than a quarter said they did not know whether restitution had been

ordered.

Variables Relevant to the Victim-Witness Assistance Program

In terms of notification about the trial, 43% were notified by the District Attorney‟s

Office and 17% were notified by the Victim-Witness Services Office. About 3% said they called

to find out, and 13% said they were not notified. Of the sample, 16% said they testified at trial.

The defendant was convicted in 84% of the cases, not convicted in 2% of the cases, and the

respondent did not know the outcome in 11% of the cases (3% missing). Property was taken in

63% of the cases (n = 149), was fully returned in 5% of the cases (8% of those in which property

was taken; n = 12), and was partially returned or returned damaged in 16% of the cases (26% of

those in which property was taken; n = 38).

In terms of notification, respondents said they learned they were eligible for restitution

primarily from the victim-witness advocate (45%) and the police (23%). Of the respondents,

70% (n = 167) said they were asked to fill out a form in order to request restitution, and 59% of

the entire group (84% of whose who had been asked; n = 141) said they did complete it. Of the

respondents, 46% (n = 109) said no one helped them complete the form.

In general, these percentages suggest that victims received only some support from

officials in the criminal justice system. However, we need to be a little skeptical of such self-

reports. For example, Erez and Tontodonato (1990) found that 20% of victims who reported that

they had not completed a victim impact statement had actually done so, as evidenced by the

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statement in prosecutors‟ files. Davis and Smith (1994) found that only about half of individuals

who had been interviewed about how the crime had affected them remembered being

interviewed when asked after their case had been disposed of.

Restitution was ordered in 61% of the cases (n = 144), most for stolen property (n = 65)

or for repair to property (n = 53). Restitution ranged from $0 to $61,800 (M = $7342; Mdn =

$500). Restitution was paid completely in 53 cases (22%), partly in 62 cases (26%), and not at

all in 106 cases (45%) (7% missing).

Purposes of Punishment

A factor analysis, using a Varimax rotation, of the 22 items regarding punishment goals

resulted in five factors, all of which had eigenvalues greater than one. The rotated factors

accounted for 63% of the variance. We assigned each of the 22 items to the factor on which it

loaded highest and then averaged the scores across the items for each of the five scales. Factor 1,

Retaliation, consisted of 7 items ( = .85). Factor 2, Security, consisted of 5 items ( = .84).

Factor 3, Rehabilitation, consisted of 4 items ( = .83). Factor 4, Moral Outrage, consisted of 4

items ( = .73). Factor 5, Individual Deterrence, consisted of 2 items ( = .62). Item means

and assignment to the factors are presented in Table 1.

A 2 Between (Gender) x 5 Within (Punishment Goals) repeated measures analysis of

variance revealed significant effects for gender, F(1, 223) = 4.03, p < .05, and punishment goals,

F(4, 892) = 91.04, p < .001. Overall, males endorsed the five goals (M = 3.43) significantly

more than did females (M = 3.30). In terms of differences among the goals, Moral Outrage (M =

3.87) was endorsed significantly more than Individual Deterrence (M = 3.51), and Individual

Deterrence was endorsed significantly more than Security (M = 3.38), according to a post-hoc

Newman-Keuls test (p < .05). All three of those goals were endorsed significantly more than

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Rehabilitation (M = 3.05) and Retaliation (M = 3.01), which were not significantly different

from each other.

There was also a significant Gender x Punishment Goals interaction, F(4, 892) = 3.09, p

< .05. Males and females did not differ in their endorsement of Retaliation or Moral Outrage,

but males were significantly more likely to endorse Security, Rehabilitation, and Deterrence,

according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test (p < .05).

To test the generalizability of the factor analyses, we conducted two separate factor

analyses, one for the subsample of victims of property crime (n = 188) and one for the subsample

of victims of violent crimes (n = 49). The loading pattern for the subsample of victims of

property crime was virtually identical with the overall factor analysis, in that there were five

factors extracted although there were minor differences on two items in the loading level. With

regard to the subsample of violent crime victims, six factors were extracted. The additional

factor was due to a single item relating to individual deterrence. Three other items that loaded

differently than with the overall sample related to general deterrence.

We also conducted a factor analysis of only the 18 items used in Orth‟s original research.

The resulting factor structure was virtually identical to that using 22 items, except that four

factors were extracted instead of five. The primary difference was that individual and general

deterrence were combined into a single factor. Our findings probably differ from Orth‟s because

he deleted items from the original scale.

Victims who rated Retaliation higher were less likely to think the amount of restitution

was fair, r(189) = -.15, p < .05, less likely to believe the victim-witness advocate had listened to

them, r(109) = -.26, p < .01, less satisfied with their treatment by the victim-witness advocate,

r(132) = -.17, p < .05, less likely to believe the procedures used to determine the amount of

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restitution were fair, r(207) = -.17, p < .01, and less likely to believe the sentence imposed on the

offender was fair, r(203) = -.21, p < .001. Victims who rated Security higher were more likely to

believe the police had listened to them, r(174) = .16, p < .05. Victims who rated Rehabilitation

higher were more likely to be satisfied with their treatment by the Crime Victims Compensation

Board, r(25) = .45, p < .001, more likely to be satisfied with their treatment by the police, r(217)

= .16, p < .05, and more likely to believe the sentence imposed on the offender was fair, r(202) =

.17, p < .05. Victims who rated Moral Outrage higher were less likely to believe the sentence

imposed on the offender was fair, r(205) = -.19, p < .01. Victims‟ ratings of Deterrence were

unrelated to any of the measures or distributive and procedural justice. No other correlations

were significant.

Individuals with lower household incomes were significantly more likely to say they

favored punishment for purposes of Retaliation, r(214) = - .19, p < .01, Security, r(217) = -.16, p

< .05, and Rehabilitation, r(213) = -.21, p < .01. Individuals with more education were

significantly less likely to say they favored punishment for purposes of Retaliation, r(219) = -

.21, p < .01, Security, r(220) = -.19, p < .01, and Deterrence, r(220) = -.17, p < .05. Age was

related only to Rehabilitation, r(215) = .16, p < .05, such that older individuals were more likely

to favor punishment for purposes of rehabilitation.

The 189 property crime victims were significantly more likely to endorse Deterrence as a

punishment goal (M = 3.55) than were the 49 personal crime victims (M = 3.35), t(229) = 2.14, p

< .05. Type of crime did not affect the other four goals of punishment.

Process and Outcome

To compare process and outcome, we conducted paired t-tests of satisfaction with

treatment and satisfaction with outcome for police, the victim-witness advocate, the prosecutor,

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the judge, and the probation officer.

Across all stages of the criminal justice system, victims were more satisfied with process

than with outcomes: (a) police: M‟s = 3.47 vs. 3.37, t(217) = 2.94, p < .01; (b) prosecutor: M‟s =

3.22 vs. 3.05, t(147) = 4.23, p < .001; (c) judge: M‟s = 3.19 vs. 2.97, t(78) = 3.66, p < .001; (d)

probation officer: M‟s = 2.61 vs. 2.31, t(46) = 2.66, p < .05; (e) victim-witness advocate: M‟s =

3.12 vs. 3.05, t(133) = 1.78, p < .08. Similarly, victims were somewhat more satisfied with the

procedure for restitution (M = 3.03) than with the amount of restitution the offender was ordered

to pay (M = 2.94, t(187) = 1.72, p < .09). Although process and outcome were generally rated

significantly different for these six pairs of variables, the two were highly correlated, r‟s ranging

from .78 to .91, all p‟s < .001.

Process. In general, individuals reported contacting the victim-witness advocate

significantly more often (M = 1.60) about restitution payments than they were contacted by the

victim-witness advocate (M = 1.32), t(139) = 3.26, p < .001. Similarly, individuals reported that

they were more likely to have to contact the court themselves about the status of the restitution

order (M = 3.18) than they were to be contacted by the court (M = 1.59), t(136) = 10.14, p <

.001. Contacting the court and being contacted by the court were negatively related, r(136) = -

.66, p < .001, suggesting that if victims were contacted by the court, victims would not contact

the court. However, contacting the victim-witness advocate and being contacted by the victim-

witness advocate were unrelated, r(139) = -.04, n.s., suggesting that victims‟ actions regarding

the victim-witness advocate‟s office were unrelated to what the victim-witness advocate did.

Age was positively related to judgments about the fairness of restitution procedures,

r(211) = .18, p < .01, judgments that the police listened to the victim, r(175) = .23, p < .01,

satisfaction with treatment by the police, r(221) = .14, p < .05, satisfaction with the outcome of

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the interaction with the police, r(216) = .13, p < .05, and judgments that the prosecutor listened

to the victim, r(49) = .35, p < .05. Household income was negatively related to the number of

times the victim contacted the victim-witness office, r(140) = -.18, p < .05.

Because most respondents had had only limited or no contact with most criminal justice

officials, we could not use satisfaction with actual contact as a measure of procedural fairness.

Instead, we used a composite scale consisting of the average of five items assessing victims‟

desired input with the police, prosecutor, judge, probation office, and victim-witness services

advocate. These five items were averaged to form a composite scale ( = .78). Females (M =

3.71) wanted significantly more input into the criminal justice system than did males (M = 3.48),

t(227) = 3.33, p < .001. Desired input into the criminal justice system was positively related to

all five punishment goals: Retaliation, r(225) = .20, p < .01; Security, r(226) = .25, p < .001;

Rehabilitation, r(226) = .21, p < .001; Deterrence, r(227) = .26, p < .001; and Moral Outrage,

r(227) = .13, p < .05. That is, the more victims endorsed the goal, the more they wanted to have

input with agents of the criminal justice system.

A multiple regression analysis indicated that desired input into the criminal justice system

was significantly predicted only by gender (female), F(8, 206) = 3.61, p < .001 (Adjusted R2 =

.089). Household income, age, education, whether the offense was a property crime, and the five

goals of punishment were all nonsignificant predictors.

Outcome. Retaliation was negatively related to judgments about whether the amount of

restitution was fair, r(189) = -.15, p < .05, about the fairness of the procedures used to determine

restitution, r(207) = -.17, p < .05, about satisfaction with treatment by the victim-witness

advocate, r(132) = -.17, p < .05, about satisfaction with the outcome of interaction with the

victim-witness advocate, r(137) = -.19, p < .05, and about the fairness of the sentence imposed,

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r(203) = -.21, p < .01. Security was positively related to judgments about the extent to which the

police listened to the victim, r(174) = .16, p < .05. Rehabilitation was positively related to

judgments about the extent to which the police listened to the victim, r(172) = .20, p < .01,

judgments about the extent to which the prosecutor listened to the victim, r(48) = .31, p < .05,

satisfaction with treatment by the police, r(217) = .16, p < .05, and satisfaction with the outcome

of the interaction with the police, r(212) = .21, p < .01.

A multiple regression analysis indicated that perceived fairness of the sentence imposed

on the defendant was significantly predicted by whether the offense was a property crime, if the

victim endorsed Retaliation, Security, and Moral Outrage less as punishment goals, and if the

victim endorsed Rehabilitation more as a punishment goal, F(8, 185) = 4.91, p < .001 (Adjusted

R2 = .140). Gender, household income, age, education, and Security as a goal of punishment

were all nonsignificant predictors.

Willingness to Report Crimes in the Future

One of the important dependent variables was whether respondents would be willing to

report crimes in the future. This item was positively related to the degree to which respondents

said they understood the restitution process ( r(227) = .25, p < .01), to how satisfied they were

with the amount of contact they had had with the victim-witness advocate ( r(134) = .33, p <

.001), and to how fair they perceived the procedures used to determine the amount of restitution

in their case ( r(208) = .18, p < .01). The more input victims said they desired, the less likely

they were to say they would report crimes in the future, ( r(225) = .25, p < .001).

Willingness to report crimes in the future was positively related to four of the five

punishment goals: Retaliation, r(228) = .15, p < .05; Security, r(229) = .13, p < .06;

Rehabilitation, r(228) = .18, p < .01; and Deterrence, r(229) = .21. The more victims endorsed

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the goal, the more they said they were willing to report crimes in the future. Endorsement of

Moral Outrage was unrelated to willingness to report crimes in the future. Individuals with

higher household incomes were somewhat more likely to say they would report crimes in the

future, r(226) = .14, p < .05. Age and education were unrelated to stated willingness to report

crimes in the future.

To determine whether satisfaction with outcome and process affect victims‟ willingness

to report future victimizations, we conducted a series of regression analyses. We began with

gender, income, and type of crime, as males reported having significantly higher incomes (M =

3.47) than did females (M = 2.68), t(227) = 4.17, p < .001. A chi-square analysis revealed that

males were more likely than females to be property crime victims (85% vs. 70%, X2 (1, 232) =

6.56, p < .01 (Yates‟ correction).

As shown in Table 5-3, females and individuals with higher incomes were more likely to

say that they would be willing to report crimes in the future. The type of crime did not affect this

judgment. The only punishment factor that was significantly related to willingness to report after

controlling for gender, income, and type of crime was Retaliation. Victims who endorsed

Retaliation as a goal of punishment were more likely to say they would report future

victimizations. In the second model, a measure of outcome fairness, the perceived fairness of the

defendant‟s sentence, was added to the equation and was a significant predictor. In the third

model, when the composite measure of procedural fairness (Desired Input) was added to the

equation, gender was no longer significant, suggesting that the effect of gender was mediated by

procedural fairness.

Table 5-3. Regression Analysis of Willingness to Report Crimes in the Future

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Gender (1 = female) .144* .142* .094

Income .152* .218** .191*

Type of crime (1 = property) .019 -.021 -.019

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Retaliation .232** .271*** .225**

Fairness of Sentence Imposed on Offender ---- .180* .188**

Desired victim input ---- ---- .182*

Model F 4.22** 4.70*** 5.07***

R2 .082 .111 .140

Adjusted R2 .062 .087 .112

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001

Discussion

Women are more likely than men to report violent victimizations to the police, a result

that prior research suggests is the result of sex role socialization regarding help seeking and

differences in the perception of crime seriousness depending on whether the victim is female or

male. In this study we replicated the general finding that men are less likely than women to say

that they would report crimes. In addition, we tested two possible explanations for this effect,

sex differences in the perceived purposes of punishment and sex differences in desire for

procedural justice. Our study suggests that desire for procedural justice partially mediates sex

differences in reporting.

Purposes of Punishment

Although sex differences in the purposes of punishment did not explain sex differences in

planned reporting, our analysis of punishment goals represents a cross-cultural test of Orth‟s

(2003) study of victims in Germany. Our study only partially replicated Orth‟s findings

regarding punishment goals. Like Orth, we found that retaliation was the most important goal,

although in our study, unlike Orth‟s, this factor included items relating to recognition of victim

status. We also found that security mattered, although in our study, unlike in Orth‟s, victim

security and societal security loaded on one factor. Also like Orth, we found a factor relating to

upholding societal values (what we called moral outrage). Unlike Orth, we found a factor

relating to deterrence of the individual offender and a factor for rehabilitation, although, based on

a planned contrast, this factor was endorsed significantly less than the other four goals, F(1, 223)

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= 52.21, p < .001.

There are four possible reasons for the differences between our findings and those of

Orth. First, our sample included both property and violent crime, whereas Orth‟s sample

included only assaults, primarily rape. Second, our sample included both men and women,

whereas Orth‟s sample was almost all female. Third, Orth deleted some items from his final

analysis, whereas we included a few additional items (although additional analyses eliminating

the added items did not substantively change the results). Finally, there may be cultural

differences between Germany and the United States that account for the different patterns.

Procedural Justice

Consistent with work from organizational psychology, we found that procedural justice is

important and that women are more desirous of it. This difference in desire for procedural

justice is consistent with the more general literature on coping, which indicates that there is a

small, but significant effect that women are more likely than men to seek instrumental social

support, such as concrete help from friends and family (Tamres, Janicki, & Helgeson, 2002). In

the context of criminal justice, unless they become vigilantes, victims can achieve instrumental

goals only by working with officials in the criminal justice system. Thus, given the general

findings, we would expect women to want to have more input into criminal justice decision

making.

This conclusion does not completely answer the question, however, as multiple studies

indicate that for some stressors women are more likely than men to appraise the stressor as more

severe and it is this appraisal that drives sex differences rather than differences in coping style

(Tamres et al., 2002). As there is evidence that crimes against women are perceived as more

severe than the same crimes against men (Ruback et al., 1999), the differences in coping style

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may be due in part to differences in appraisal. Moreover, it may be that rather than seeking

instrumental goals, women seek to talk with criminal justice officials for emotional social

support, a consistent finding in the literature (Tamres et al., 2002).

Policy Implications

Men and women did not differ in how important they believed Retaliation and Moral

Outrage were as goals of punishment, but men were significantly more likely to favor

punishment for Security, Rehabilitation, and Deterrence. Women were significantly more likely

than men to want to give input to decision makers and to say they would report crimes in the

future. This pattern suggests, as Sweeney and McFarlin, (1997) found with federal employees,

that men are more concerned with outcome justice whereas women are more concerned with

procedural justice. Although it would be important to replicate these findings, the pattern does

suggest that officials in the criminal justice system should be attentive to gender as a possible

explanation for any differences they observe regarding participation in the criminal justice

system (e.g., giving a victim impact statement at sentencing).

More generally, our findings here that victims perceive process and outcome differently

is consistent with a large literature indicating that both distributive and procedural justice are

important. Because victims‟ objective outcomes are likely to be low (e.g., offenders are often

not caught), the reforms enacted over recent decades are important if, as implemented, they

convince victims that the criminal justice system cares about procedural fairness.

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Chapter 6: Offender Survey

Economic sanctions – fines, fees, costs, and restitution – have been criticized because

they are perceived to be unfair to poor defendants, to have no effect on wealthy defendants, and

to be unenforceable because offenders cannot be imprisoned for nonpayment of debt (Ruback &

Bergstrom, 2006). Nevertheless, for three reasons they are likely to be used more frequently in

the future. First, because the costs of criminal justice operations are so high, offenders are now

expected to pay at least part of those costs. Second, concern for victims has increased, so that

restitution is likely to be awarded more frequently (Office for Victims of Crime, 1998). Third,

although the number of prisoners has increased six-fold in the past 25 years, imprisonment is

now less likely than it was 10 years ago (Levin, Langan, & Brown, 2000). As a result, there are

increasing pressures for intermediate sanctions, both because of the high cost of incarceration

and because of questions regarding whether incarceration is effective in deterring future crime.

Despite these three pressures for increasing the number and amount of economic

sanctions imposed on offenders, the reality is that large proportions of these sanctions are not

paid. Collection rates for restitution are around 50% (Cohen, 1995). At the federal level, there is

more than $35 billion in unpaid fines (Mendoza & Sullivan, 2006). The usual assumption is that

nonpayment is the result of not having sufficient income or assets to pay the sanctions. Aside

from inability to pay, however, there are three alternative explanations relating to a lack of

motivation to pay: lack of understanding of the sanctions, disagreement with the rationale for the

sanctions, and belief that the sanctions are unfairly applied. To explore these four rationales, we

surveyed sentenced offenders in Blair and Westmoreland Counties.

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The Use of Economic Sanctions

Nationally, fines are imposed in 25% of all felony convictions: 20% of all violent offense

convictions, 24% of all property offense convictions, and 27% of all drug offense convictions

(Durose & Langan, 2003). Restitution is imposed in 14% of all felony convictions: 13% of all

violent offense convictions, 26% of all property offense convictions, and 6% of all drug offense

convictions.

Offenders generally perceive economic sanctions to be severe, even if they think they can

pay them. McClelland and Alpert (1985) and Apospori and Alpert (1993) found that recent

arrestees believed that a $5,000 fine was about as severe as spending a year in jail, a $1,000 fine

was about half as severe, and a $500 fine was about one-quarter as severe. Similarly, Spelman

(1995) found that 128 offenders in Texas believed a $1,000 fine was about as severe as one year

of regular probation, and a $5,000 fine was about as severe as two years of regular probation.

Almost half (46%) of the sample believed a $5,000 fine was more severe than three months in

county jail, primarily because they had few legitimate sources of income. Spelman also found

that the perceived difficulty of paying economic sanctions depended on the type of offender and

the amount of the sanction, such that property offenders viewed large fines as very severe,

whereas drug and violent offenders did not.

Despite believing that economic sanctions are severe, offenders seem to believe that they

can pay the ordered amounts. Petersilia and Deschenes (1994) found that their sample of

Minnesota inmates believed that the chance of paying a $100 fine would be close to 80%, and

the chance of paying victim restitution or paying a $500 fine would be close to 70%.

Interestingly, for all three of these conditions correctional staff said the chances of completing

the condition was significantly lower (less than 50% for the last two conditions). For the

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condition of paying a $20/week supervision fee, both inmates and correctional staff rated the

chances of completing this condition as being around 50%.

Nonpayment of Economic Sanctions

Even though many offenders believe they can pay their ordered economic sanctions, in

fact, only about half of economic sanctions are paid. Lack of resources is probably the most

important reason. For example, a survey of federal probationers found that about a third reported

that the sanction resulted in a significant hardship, and slightly more than a tenth said the

sanction resulted in a severe deprivation, although slightly more than half said that the economic

sanction did not present any specific hardship (Allen & Treger, 1994).

Aside from inability to pay, there are three possible explanations relating to a lack of

motivation to pay. That is, offenders may not want to pay the ordered amounts because they do

not understand the purpose of the sanctions, they disagree with the reasons given for paying the

sanctions, they believe the amounts ordered and the procedures used to determine those amounts

are unfair, or they do not believe there is any punishment for failing to pay the sanctions.

Lack of understanding. Supreme Court decisions since Miranda have indicated that

before offenders can be convicted of a crime, they must understand the nature of the proceedings

against them so that they can contribute to their defense. After being convicted, however,

offenders have fewer rights and understanding is less important. The notion is that offenders

will pay only if they understand what they are paying for. Moreover, understanding that their

payments go to victims has implications for rehabilitation, in that restitution is likely to be

effective only if offenders understand that they are taking responsibility and making reparations

for their wrongdoing (Outlaw & Ruback, 1999).

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Disagreement with the purpose of the sanctions. A second possible rationale for

nonpayment is that offenders disagree with the purposes of the sanctions and therefore choose

not to pay. Allen and Treger (1994) interviewed 82 probationers in the Northern District of

Illinois about fines and restitution. Probationers believed fines and restitution primarily served

the goal of punishment, followed by the goal of justice. They did not believe these sanctions

served the goal of either deterrence or rehabilitation. Despite this pattern, however, perceptions

of the purpose were not related to payment.

Orth (2003) investigated how victims of violent crime in Germany perceived the

purposes of punishment. His sample of predominantly female victims of rape or nonsexual

assault revealed five factors: retaliation, recognition of victim status, confirmation of societal

values, concern with victim security, and concern with societal security. Ruback, Cares, and

Hoskins (2006) replicated this study in Pennsylvania with a sample of victims (see the previous

chapter of the victim survey results). Their study also revealed five factors: retaliation, security,

rehabilitation, moral outrage, and individual deterrence. Victims endorsed moral outrage the

most, individual deterrence the next most, and security the third most. The least endorsed were

rehabilitation and retaliation.

In this study, we used the same 22 items as Ruback et al. (2006) in order to determine

whether offenders conceptualize punishment in the same way that victims do. In addition, we

wanted to test whether offenders‟ ratings of the 22 items differed significantly from those of

victims.

Perception that the sanctions are unfair. Research suggests that individuals care about

both the outcomes they receive (distributive fairness) and the process by which those outcomes

were reached (procedural fairness). Thus, a third possible rationale for nonpayment is that

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offenders believe that economic sanctions are unfair because the amounts are too high or the

procedures used to determine the amounts are unfair. There is some research to support this

notion. For example, probation officers typically have some flexibility in terms of payment

schedules for fines and restitution, and thus offenders may be treated inequitably (Alexander,

Montgomery, Hamilton, Dutton, Griswold, Russell, Salo, & Muse, 1998).

Our survey of victims in Pennsylvania indicated that victims were generally more

satisfied with procedural than outcome fairness in terms of their treatment by agents in the

criminal justice system, particularly with regard to restitution (Ruback et al., 2006). Results

indicated that victims‟ perceptions of both procedural and outcome fairness affected their

willingness to report crimes in the future. As with victims, we expected offenders‟ perceptions

of both distributive and procedural fairness to be related to their behavior, specifically their

payments toward their economic sanctions.

Individual Differences in Nonpayment

Individuals who have greater ties to the community (e.g., a job, a marriage) are more

likely to complete probation successfully (Landis, Merger, & Wolff, 1969; Petersilia, 1985; Sims

& Jones, 1997). Consistent with this general finding about probation success, there is research

suggesting that ties to the community also increase payment of economic sanctions. Outlaw and

Ruback (1999) found that offenders with greater ties to the community who paid their ordered

restitution were less likely to recidivate. Lurigio and Davis (1990) found that individuals who

were employed were likely to pay more of their ordered restitution in response to a letter

notifying them of their delinquency in payment. Rather than interpret this finding in terms of

attachment and commitment (Hirschi, 1969), Lurigio and Davis believed the finding indicated

that notification is effective for those who can pay because they have a job.

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Aside from ties to the community, two demographic factors are related to the successful

completion of parole. Specifically, older and female probationers are more likely to succeed on

probation than are younger and male probationers (Morgan, 1994; Sims & Jones, 1997). We

were interested in testing whether these differences would appear in our sample of offenders.

Hypotheses

Based on prior research, we expected most offenders in our survey to express difficulty in

paying the economic sanctions they owe. We also expected nonpayment to be related to an

inability to make the payments (i.e., low income), as well as to four factors that would reduce

offenders‟ motivation to pay the sanctions: lack of understanding, disagreement with the

rationale for the sanctions, perception that the sanctions are unfairly applied, and belief that there

is no punishment for failing to pay the sanctions.

Method

We surveyed offenders in Blair and Westmoreland Counties in order to discover the

economic sanctions they were ordered to pay, their understanding and perceptions of the

sentencing process, especially with regard to economic sanctions, and their judgments about the

fairness and impact of economic sanctions.

Description of the Survey

The self-report survey was divided into four sections (see Appendix L). The first section

asked a series of questions about the offense and the punishment for the crime, in terms of

incarceration and probation. The second section asked offenders about the economic sanctions

in their case, including the amounts for costs, fees, fines, and restitution and the payments they

had made. This section also asked offenders how well they understood how the various

amounts of economic sanctions were set. The third section asked offenders about their case,

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including their perceived responsibility for the crime, the judgments about the amounts and

procedures for economic sanctions in their case. Additionally, there was a 22-item scale

assessing offenders= understanding of different punishment goals as they applied to their case

(e.g., just deserts, revenge, recognition of victim status, deterrence of the offender, rehabilitation,

general deterrence, positive general prevention, victim security, and societal security). Offenders

were asked to read a series of statements beginning, AIt was important that I should be

punishedY@ and to indicate the importance of each statement for why they should be punished.

Statements included such items as Ato even out the wrong that I had done,@ Ato bring

satisfaction to the victim,@ Ato stop me from further offenses,@ and Ato show that crime does not

pay.@ Responses were coded Avery important,@ Asomewhat important,@ Anot very important,@

or Anot important.@ Of the 22 items on the scale, 18 came from the study by Orth (2003). We

added 4 more items in order to increase the number of goals assessed (moral outrage, treatment,

education, restitution to the victim). The fourth section asked for the offenders‟ opinions about

economic sanctions in general, including their perception of the burden that payment placed on

them and other offenders. The final section asked about the offender=s background. Included in

this section were questions about the offender=s gender, race, age, marital status, education, and

socioeconomic status. In all, the survey included 41 questions.

After designing the survey instrument, we obtained from the probation office in Centre

County the names of two offenders willing to participate in cognitive interviews. The cognitive

interviews proceeded in two stages. First, the offenders completed the self-report survey.

Second, we discussed each of the survey questions with the offenders. The purpose of the

cognitive interviews was to help us identify questions that were difficult to understand or that did

not accurately reflect what we intended. We then modified the survey to reflect any changes

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suggested by the offenders. The offenders were paid $25 for their participation in the cognitive

interviews.

Sampling

We sampled offenders from two Pennsylvania counties (Blair and Westmoreland), which

were chosen because we had collected data there on the imposition and payment of economic

sanctions and because they agreed to cooperate with the research. Our sample of 405 adult

offenders sentenced in 2000 in Blair County was 78% male, 90% white, with an average age of

31.5 (Mdn = 29.1), and with 11.7 years of education (Mdn = 12.0). The offenses they were

convicted of were as follows: 27% property, 17% personal, 16% drugs, 24% traffic/DUI, and

16% other. In terms of sentence received, 4% were incarcerated in state prison, 21% were

incarcerated in county jail, and 51% received probation. Our sample of 394 adult offenders

sentenced in 2000 in Westmoreland County was 80% male, 88% white, with an average age of

33.2 (Mdn = 31.5), and with 12.0 years of education (Mdn = 12.0). The offenses they were

convicted of were as follows: 21% property, 17% personal, 15% drug, 39% traffic/DUI, and 8%

other. In terms of sentence received, 3% were incarcerated in state prison, 28% were

incarcerated in county prison, and 51% received probation.

In both counties, we worked with local probation personnel to obtain a list of all

offenders who were sentenced in 2003. We selected offenders convicted in calendar year 2003

because we wanted to ensure that they had had the opportunity to pay their economic sanctions

for at least a year. However, we also wanted to minimize the time in which they could have

moved or otherwise be hard to track down by mail and we wanted to choose a time period that

was not so long, so that the offenders could remember the details of the case we were asking

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about. We conducted the survey in the summer of 2005, and calendar year 2003 met all of these

requirements.

After obtaining the two samples, we mailed offenders packets containing a cover letter

from the probation office, two consent forms, a survey, and a one-dollar incentive. Participants

were promised that their responses would remain completely confidential and would not be

shared with their probation officers or any other criminal justice personnel. After we received

the completed survey and a signed consent form, we paid the offender an additional 10 dollars

for his or her participation.

Results

Participants

We received 78 completed surveys from Blair County and 44 completed surveys from

Westmoreland County, for a final sample of 122 offenders. We mailed 508 surveys to offenders

in Westmoreland County. Of these, 110 were returned as undeliverable. Thus, the response rate

for Westmoreland County was 11% (44/398). We mailed 501 surveys to offenders in Blair

County. Of these, 64 were returned as undeliverable and we received letters from family

members that 2 additional offenders had died. Thus, the response rate for Blair County was

78/435 = 18%. After eliminating those surveys that were undeliverable, the overall response rate

was 15% (122/833). Two surveys were returned because the inmates were in prison and prison

rules prohibited them from completing the survey. The number of completed surveys in our

survey is low primarily because offenders, unless imprisoned, generally do not complete surveys.

Further, compared to the rest of the country, the response rate is lower in the northeast,

especially Pennsylvania (Groves, et al., 2004).

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The sample consisted of 75 males and 47 females, who ranged in age from 20 to 67 (M =

34.1; Mdn = 33). Of the sample, 93% were white, 4% were black, and the remainder described

themselves as belonging to other racial groups. In terms of marital status, 39% had never been

married, 41% were married or living with someone, and 20% were divorced. In terms of

education, 25% had not completed high school, 28% had graduated from high school, and 38%

had at least some college or advanced technical training, 5% had a college degree, and 4% had

some graduate training. In terms of work, 30% were employed full time, 13% were employed

part time, 20% were unemployed, 21% were disabled, and the remainder included students,

retirees, homemakers, and occasional workers. In terms of income, 49% reported annual

incomes less than $10,000, 31% reported incomes between $10,000 and $20,000, 13% reported

incomes between $20,000 and $30,000, and the remaining 7% reported incomes greater than

$30,000.

The 122 respondents had been convicted of burglary (9), theft (25), robbery (2), assault

(10), drug possession (24), drug selling (15), DUI (44), traffic offenses (12), and other (26), most

of which were property (10) or drug offenses (5). The numbers total more than 122 because

individuals could be convicted of more than one offense (range = 1-4; M = 1.4; Mdn = 1, Mode =

1). We recoded the crimes respondents said they were convicted of into five categories: (a)

property (n = 29), (b) personal (n = 11), (c) drugs (n = 29), (d) DUI/traffic (n = 47), and (e) other

(which consisted of firearms violations, gambling, fleeing from police, and false ID; n =4). Two

individuals did not complete this item about their conviction offense. When a respondent listed

more than one conviction offense, we coded the most serious crime (e.g., personal more serious

than property). In subsequent analyses, we excluded other crimes, because there were so few

cases and because they did not form a cohesive category.

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In terms of punishment, 6 had been sentenced to state prison, 46 had been sentenced to

county prison, and 87 had been sentenced to probation (multiple sentences were possible). The

most common of the 25 other sentences listed were house arrest (6), parole (7), and loss of

license (3).

Economic Sanctions Imposed

In terms of economic sanctions, 28 had been ordered to pay jail fees, 72 had been ordered

to pay court costs, 58 had been ordered to pay supervision fees, 34 had been ordered to pay other

costs and fees, 72 had been ordered to pay fines, and 29 had been ordered to pay restitution.

Overall, 79 respondents said they had been ordered to pay some type of economic sanction, with

the total amounts ranging from $101 to $25,000 (M = $2,848; Mdn = $1,400). An additional 42

respondents said they did not know the total amount they owed. A total of 87 respondents said

they were ordered to make monthly payments that ranged from $1 to $2,000 (M = $104; Mdn =

$68). An additional 27 respondents said they did not know what their ordered monthly payments

were.

Of the respondents, 88 said they had been shown a sheet that indicated the total costs and

fees they owed, and 61 said they had been given a sheet to keep that indicated the specific costs

and fees they owed. Of these individuals, most rated on a 7-point scale that having been given a

sheet was very important (M = 5.70; Mdn = 7). An additional 48 individuals who had not been

given a sheet indicated on a 7-point scale that they would have liked to have been given a sheet

listing the specific amounts they owed (M = 5.90; Mdn =7).

Understanding of Economic Sanctions

Respondents were asked to indicate on a 7-point scale how well they understood how the

amounts of five economic sanctions (court costs, supervision fees, other costs and fees, fines, and

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restitution) were determined. In general, respondents indicated that they did not understand how

the amounts were determined, in that the means for all five items were below 4, the midpoint of

the scale.

These responses were analyzed using a 4 Between (Type of Crime) x 5 Within (Type of

Economic Sanction) repeated measures analysis of variance. This analysis revealed a significant

effect for type of economic sanction, F(4, 416) = 15.34, p < .001. A post-hoc Newman-Keuls

test of the means (p < .05) indicated that restitution (M = 4.03) was understood better than all of

the other economic sanctions, which did not differ significantly from each other (court costs: M =

2.83; supervision fees: M = 2.81; other costs and fees: M = 2.80; fines: M = 3.01). There was

also a significant Type of Crime x Type of Economic Sanction interaction, F(12, 416) = 2.19, p

< .05. A post-hoc test indicated that property offenders understood the determination of

restitution significantly more than the four other types of economic sanctions. Personal, drug,

and DUI/traffic offenders indicated that they understood the determination of all five economic

sanctions at a fairly low level.

The relatively low numbers for the understanding of the five specific sanctions can be

better understood in light of two other questions pertaining to the understanding of sentencing.

In response to a question asking how well they understood how criminal sentences are set in

Pennsylvania, offenders‟ responses were fairly uniform across the scale, and the average was at

the midpoint (M = 4.04; Mdn = 4). There were no differences in terms of crime committed (F <

1). Similarly, respondents were asked how well they understood where the money they pay

goes. The average response was well below the midpoint (M = 2.97; Mdn = 2), and there was no

significant difference as a function of crime committed (F < 1). Overall, then, offenders

indicated they somewhat understood sentencing in general and the setting of restitution amounts,

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but they did not understand how other economic sanctions were determined or where their

payments went.

We tested whether offenders who had more meetings with their probation officer

understood the sanctions better. Most (78%) had no additional contact from their probation

officer and most (81%) said they did not contact their probation officer, although those who were

contacted by the probation officer also tended to be the same individuals who said they contacted

their probation officer, r(114) = .46, p < .001. However, additional contact was not related to

better understanding.

Purposes of Punishment

A factor analysis, using a Varimax rotation, of the 22 items regarding punishment goals

resulted in four factors, all of which had eigenvalues greater than one. The rotated factors

accounted for 69% of the variance. We assigned each of the 22 items to the factor on which it

loaded highest and then averaged the scores across the items for each of the five scales. Factor 1,

Justice, consisted of 8 items ( = .90). Factor 2, Deterrence, consisted of 6 items ( = .90).

Factor 3, Concern for Victims, consisted of 5 items ( = .85). Factor 4, Rehabilitation, consisted

of 3 items ( = .74). This information is presented in Table 6-1.

Table 6-1. Means and Items of A Priori Categories of Punishment Goals and Assignment to Underlying Factor

A priori category M Factor

It was important that I should be punished …

Just deserts 2.96 To even out the wrong that I had done 1

2.97 To make amends for my guilt 1

Revenge 2.50 To bring satisfaction to the victim 3

2.12 To make me suffer, as the victim suffered by my action 3

Recognition of victim status 2.52 To make it clear that society is on the victim‟s side 3

2.38 To make it clear publicly that I did wrong to the victim 3

2.60 To reimburse the victim for the losses he or she suffered 3

Deterrence of offender 3.33 To stop me from further offenses 4

3.18 So that I know that crime does not go unpunished 1

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Rehabilitation 3.03 To allow for my rehabilitation 4

2.55 To help me understand our legal system 1

2.94 To treat my drug, alcohol, or mental health problems 4

2.58 To provide me with education or work skills 2

General deterrence 3.01 To show that crime does not pay 1

2.99 To stop others from committing similar offenses 1

Positive general prevention 3.08 To uphold the important values in society 1

3.64 So that people are not frustrated with the legal system 2

Victim security 2.59 So that the victim can live in safety 2

2.40 So that the victim does not have to fear me for now 2

Societal security 2.65 So that I am not a danger to others 2

2.48 So that society does not have to fear me for now 2

Moral outrage 3.17 To make it clear that my act was wrong 1

Note. Items are on a 4-point scale, ranging from 1 (Not Important) to 4 (Very Important). Factor 1 = Justice; Factor

2 = Deterrence; Factor 3 = Concern for Victims; Factor 4 = Rehabilitation.

Comparisons by gender indicated that females (M = 3.20) rated Justice significantly more

important than did males (M = 2.87), t(120) = 2.11, p < .05. Females (M = 2.67) also had

significantly more Concern for Victims than did males (M = 2.29), t(104) = 2.00, p < .05. All

four sentencing goals were significantly related to the perceived fairness of the amounts of and

procedures for the economic sanctions. The goals were unrelated to total economic sanctions

owed, total monthly payments, and household income.

A 4 Between (Type of Crime) x 4 Within (Punishment Goals) repeated measures analysis

of variance revealed a significant effect for punishment goals, F(3,288) = 26.30, p < .001.

Rehabilitation (M = 3.14) was endorsed more than Justice (M = 3.02), and Justice was endorsed

more than Deterrence (M = 2.55), according to a post-hoc Newman-Keuls test (p < .05). All

three of those goals were endorsed significantly more than Concern for Victims (M = 2.48).

There was also a significant Type of Crime x Punishment Goals interaction, F(9, 288) =

2.68, p < .01. Property and personal offenders were most concerned with Justice and least

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concerned with Deterrence. In contrast, drug offenders and DUI/traffic offenders were most

concerned with Rehabilitation and showed the least Concern for Victims.

Comparison to victims. These same 22 items had been used in a study of victims by

Ruback et al. (2006). Table 6-2 presents a comparison of offenders‟ and victims‟ responses to

the 22 items. As can be seen in the table, there were significant differences on 20 of the 22

items; the only 2 nonsignificant items related to rehabilitation. Most of the differences were

between .40 and .70, which are quite large given that the scale was only four points. However,

there were four items on which the difference between offenders‟ and victims‟ responses were

greater than .80. Three of the items related to victim or societal safety, and the fourth item

concerned restitution to the victim.

Table 6-2. Comparison of Means of 22 Punishment Items for Offender (n = 122) and Victim (n = 238) Samples

Offender

Mean

Victim

Mean

Mean

Difference t

It was important to me that the offender should be punished …

To even out the wrong that the offender had done 2.95 3.41 .46 4.28***

To make amends for the offender‟s guilt 2.96 3.29 .33 2.93**

To bring satisfaction to me, the victim 2.49 3.10 .61 4.64***

To make the offender suffer, as I suffered by his/her action 2.11 2.52 .41 3.01**

To make it clear that society is on my side 2.52 2.82 .30 2.29*

To make it clear publicly that the offender did wrong to me 2.39 2.66 .27 2.01*

To reimburse me for the losses I suffered 2.62 3.41 .79 6.69***

To stop the offender from further offenses 3.33 3.90 .57 7.82***

So that the offender knows that crime does not go unpunished 3.17 3.86 .69 9.07***

To allow rehabilitation of the offender 3.02 3.25 .23 2.10*

To allow the offender to be understand our legal system 2.58 3.01 .43 3.55***

To treat the offender‟s drug, alcohol, or mental health problems 2.95 3.06 .11 .85

To provide the offender with education or work skills 2.59 2.73 .14 1.01

To show that crime does not pay 3.02 3.60 .58 5.83***

To stop others from committing similar offenses 3.01 3.53 .52 5.10***

To uphold the important values in society 3.10 3.55 .45 4.73***

So that people are not frustrated with the legal system 2.66 3.17 .51 4.27***

So that I can live in safety 2.60 3.56 .96 8.55***

So that I do not have to be afraid of the offender for now 2.42 2.92 .50 3.59***

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So that the offender is not a danger to others 2.68 3.51 .83 7.53***

So that society does not have to fear the offender for now 2.50 3.32 .82 6.65***

To make it clear that the offender‟s act was wrong 3.17 3.71 .54 5.81***

Note. Wording for the questions is in terms of the survey that was given to victims. For offenders, the introductory

wording was “It was important that I should be punished … .” Items were answered on a 4-point scale, ranging

from 1 (Not Important) to 4 (Very Important).

We analyzed the continuous measures using a 2 x 3 (Gender x Type of Crime) analysis of

variance. On none of the variables was gender a significant predictor. There were significant

type of crime effects on the percentage of economic sanctions that were paid, F(1, 56) = 5.57, p

< .01, and perceived fairness of the amounts they had to pay for costs, fees, fines, and restitution,

F(3, 106) = 2.97.

Procedural and Outcome Fairness

Respondents rated the fairness of the amounts that they had to pay for each of the five

types of economic sanctions. They also rated the fairness of the procedures used to determine

each of the five types. These 10 ratings were analyzed using a 2 x 2 Between (Gender x

Incarceration) x 5 x 2 Within (Type of Economic Sanction x Type of Fairness) doubly repeated

measures analysis of variance. This analysis revealed one significant between-subjects effect,

the interaction between incarceration status and gender, F(1, 109) = 6.29, p < .05. Female

respondents believed the economic sanctions were significantly fairer if they had not been

incarcerated (M = 3.00) than if they had been incarcerated (M = 2.18), whereas male respondents

were somewhat more likely to believe the sanctions were fairer if they had been incarcerated (M

= 2.71) than if they had not (M = 2.46).

There was a significant effect in terms of overall fairness for the type of sanction, F(4,

436) = 4.30, p < .01. Restitution (M = 2.77) was judged to be the most fair economic sanction,

court costs were judged the next most fair sanction (M = 2.61), supervision fees (M = 2.59) and

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fines (M = 2.57) were judged next most fair, and other costs and fees (M = 2.39) were judged to

be the least fair.

There were also three marginally significant within subject effects. Respondents

believed procedures were somewhat more fair than the amount of economic sanctions set, F(1,

436) = 3.19, p < .10. There was also a marginally significant interaction between type of

economic sanction and type of fairness, F(4, 436) = 2.33, p = .055. For court costs, supervision

fees, other costs and fees, and fines, respondents rated procedural fairness higher than outcome

fairness, but for restitution respondents showed no difference in how they rated procedural and

outcome fairness. Finally, there was a marginally significant interaction between type of

fairness, gender, and incarceration status, F(1, 436) = 3.31, p = .06. For respondents who had

been incarcerated, both males and females rated procedural fairness higher than outcome

fairness. For respondents who had not been incarcerated, males rated procedural fairness higher

than outcome fairness, whereas females rated outcome fairness higher than procedural fairness.

Economic Hardship

We used four measures of the extent to which the economic sanctions posed a hardship to

respondents: (a) their reported difficulty in making their monthly payments, (b) their responses to

two questions about whether paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders being able to

complete probation or parole successfully and to provide for their families, (c) their expectations

about paying off their ordered economic sanctions, and (d) two behavioral indicators of hardship,

whether they had missed any payments and whether they had had their monthly payments

reduced.

We asked respondents to indicate on a 7-point scale how difficult it is for them to make

their monthly payments. Most respondents indicated that it was difficult, with 66% of the

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sample answering above the midpoint of 4 (M = 5.14; Mdn = 6.0). As would be expected,

difficulty in making payments was negatively related to income, r(117) = -.28, p < .01, and

positively related to the total amount owed for economic sanctions (for this crime and prior

crimes), r(105) = .18, p < .07. However, difficulty in making payments was not related to

monthly payments for other expenses, r(118) = -.06, n.s., or to the number of dependents, r(112)

= .05, n.s.

Difficulty in making monthly payments for economic sanctions was also related to

reactions to the system. Respondents who said it was difficult to make their monthly payments

said they understood sentencing less, r(118) = -.19, p < .05, believed the amounts of economic

sanctions were less fair, r(117) = -.29, p < .001, and believed the procedures for setting the

economic sanctions were less fair, r(115) = -.27, p < .01.

As would be expected, difficulty in making monthly payments was positively related to

respondents‟ beliefs that paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders successfully

completing probation or parole, r(113) = .26, p < .01, and that paying economic sanctions

interferes with offenders being able to provide for their families, r(115) = .16, p < .10. That is,

offenders who had more difficulty in making monthly payments were also more likely to say that

making the payments interferes with successfully completing probation or parole and with being

able to provide for their families. A list of the monthly obligations offenders reported, together

with the mean amount owed, is presented in Table 6-3.

Table 6-3. Other Monthly Payments Due

Mean Monthly

Type of Payment % Who Pay Payment

Child support 11% $ 33.42

Rent/mortgage 47% $228.29

Food 45% $172.31

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Car payments 16% $ 51.00

Insurance 31% $112.48

Utilities 43% $113.06

Credit card bills 17% $200.20

Health care 12% $ 10.20

Other 17% $ 28.24

In terms of objective measures of difficulty in making payments, we found that 53

offenders said they had missed making any type of payment at least once, 13 offenders had had

their monthly payments reduced, and 2 offenders had been allowed by the court to stop

payments. However, consistent with Petersilia and Deschenes (1994), who found that about 70%

of their sample of offenders said that they would pay all of the restitution they owed, we found

that 103 of our respondents (80%) said they expected to pay all of the money they owed.

To determine how important the three explanations relating to motivation to pay

(understanding, agreement with the rationales, fairness) and the one explanation relating to

ability to pay are in actually making payments, we conducted logistic regressions in which we

tested various explanations. For example, in one model we used composite scores for the

understanding of economic sanctions, the perceived fairness of the amounts of economic

sanctions, the perceived fairness of the procedure used to determine economic sanctions, the

composite score for Justice as a goal for sentencing, and the offender‟s income to predict

whether or not the offender had ever missed a payment. The only significant predictor of

missing a payment was household income.

Individual Differences and Economic Sanctions

One of the things we were interested in is related to the fact that older offenders and

women are more likely than younger offenders and men to successfully complete probation.

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Women (M = 3.20) were significantly more likely than men (M = 2.87) to rate Justice higher,

t(120) = 2.11, p < .05. Similarly, women (M = 2.67) were significantly more likely than men (M

= 2.29) to be more concerned about the victim, t(104) = 2.00, p < .05. Women (M = 3.09) were

slightly more likely than men (M = 2.64) to believe it is fair for offenders to pay supervision fees,

t(119) = 1.75, p < .09. Women were not more likely than men to be incarcerated, to owe more

money, or to have higher monthly payments.

We conducted a median split to determine whether there were age differences in

perceptions of economic sanctions. Offenders 33 and older (M = 2.80) were significantly more

likely to believe in deterrence (M = 2.37), t (114) = 2.27, p < .05. Similarly, offenders 33 and

older (M = 2.63) had significantly more concern for victims than did offenders under 33 (M =

2.25), t(102) = 2.07, p < .05.

Married individuals are more likely to succeed on probation, including paying their

economic sanctions, than are single individuals. This could be because they have more money or

because they care more about succeeding because they have more to lose if their probation is

revoked. A third possibility is that they care more about victims. Married and cohabiting

individuals (M = 2.67) had significantly more concern for victims than did unmarried individuals

(M = 2.28), t(104) = 2.08, p < .05. Similarly, married and cohabiting individuals (M = 3.32)

were significantly more concerned about their own rehabilitation than were single individuals (M

= 2.95), t(120) = 2.17, p < .05. However, married and cohabiting individuals (M = 2.33) were

significantly less likely than single individuals (M = 2.89) to believe it is fair to require offenders

to pay other costs and fees, t(119) = 2.34, p < .05. In the sample, there was no significant

difference in the proportion of men and women who were married.

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Effect of Incarceration

People whose sentence included incarceration in state prison (n = 6) or county prison (n =

46) owed significantly more money (M = $4,114) than did respondents who had not been

incarcerated (M = $2,227), t(77) = 2.05, p < .05. They also owed more for other crimes (M’s =

$3,915 vs. $1,376), t(91) = 2.43, p < .05. They were less likely to say they understood court

costs (M’s = 2.32 vs. 3.18 for incarcerated and nonincarcerated samples, respectively). They

also differed in how they viewed the fairness of sentences imposed on most offenders, t(118) =

2.64, p < .01.

Discussion

We had hypothesized that offenders do not pay a higher percentage of their ordered

economic sanctions both because they are not motivated to do so and because they are unable to

do so. This survey of offenders found some support for all four reasons that we investigated,

both the three reasons pertaining to motivation to pay, and the one reason relating to ability to

pay.

Motivation to Pay

We hypothesized that offenders might not be motivated to pay their economic sanctions

because they do not understand them, they do not agree with them, and they do not believe the

sanctions were fairly applied. We found some support for all three rationales.

First, there was strong evidence that offenders did not understand how fines, fees, and

costs were imposed. Although offenders, and particularly property offenders, said they

understood how restitution decisions were imposed, the absolute number (a mean of 4 on a 7-

point scale) was in fact not very high.

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Second, there was evidence that offenders did not agree with the rationale for economic

sanctions. Our results indicated that the offenders did not rate any of the goals of punishment

very highly. And, as compared to victims, they rated all of the goals as less important, especially

those related to concern for victims (including making restitution to them).

Third, there was evidence that offenders did not perceive the amounts of the economic

sanctions or the procedures used to determine them to be very fair. In general, there were no

significant differences between outcome and procedural fairness.

Inability to Pay

Although there was support for all three reasons pertaining to motivation to pay, the

strongest explanation related to inability to pay. Our multivariate analyses of an objective

indicator of nonpayment (having to miss payments) indicated that our indicators of motivation to

pay were not significantly related to missing a payment, whereas indicators of ability to pay

(e.g., total economic sanctions owed, total monthly payments) were significant indicators.

Alternative Explanation for Nonpayment

A rationale for nonpayment that we did not investigate is that there are no perceived

penalties for nonpayment. Many probationers do not comply with their court-ordered conditions,

and there are often no sanctions for failing to comply (Langan, 1994). For economic sanctions

in particular, research suggests that often no punishments are imposed for non-payment of court-

ordered fines and restitution (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). Offenders learn that threats (e.g.,

meetings, letters of reprimand, warnings) often have no repercussions, and probation revocation

for failure to pay is unlikely (Wheeler et al., 1990). Nonpayment of restitution is rarely the basis

for revocation of probation (Lurigio & Davis, 1990).

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A study of probationers in Illinois illustrates these points (Allen & Treger, 1994). The

survey suggested that offenders start out believing that payment is required, but that they learned

this was not true. About half of the offenders believed their probation officer would report

nonpayment to the court but would not recommend incarceration. About a quarter believed their

probation officer expected them only to make a good faith effort at making full payment, and

more than a tenth believed their probation officer did not expect them to make full payment.

In our study, we did not find any support for this idea. In fact, open-ended responses to a

question about whether paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders being able to

complete probation or parole successfully indicated evidence that our respondents did fear

nonpayment. Open-ended responses to this question were coded (83% agreement; kappa = .78).

The most common response of the individuals who answered the question (14/52 = 27%) were

that failure to make the payments meant that they could not complete probation/parole. An

additional 6 individuals (12%) said that failure to pay resulted in going to jail.

A possible reason why we found that offenders feared the repercussions of nonpayment is

that our respondents were a self-selected sample of individuals who could be reached by mail,

who were not in prison, and who were probably more conscientious than those who did not

respond. The high rate of non-delivered questionnaires two years after conviction (17%)

suggests that our initial pool of individuals was highly transient. Those individuals who

responded not only were probably less transient (and therefore probably had more ties to the

community) but also were more concerned about earning money.

Implications

One of our key findings was that, with the possible exception of restitution, most

offenders did not understand how the amounts they owed were determined. Nor did they

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understand where the money they paid went. Correctional scholars believe that by making

payments on a regular basis offenders can learn to take responsibility for their crimes. However,

particularly with regard to restitution, this belief is premised on the assumption that offenders

know where their payments go. Thus, future research might investigate how best to convey this

information to offenders and whether this information gives offenders a better understanding of

the penalties, makes them feel more responsible for their crimes, and reduces their likelihood of

committing a new offense.

It might also be that offenders not only do not understand how amounts were determined,

but also do not understand such logistical issues as where they are supposed to make their

payments. In some counties, different types of economic sanctions have to be paid in different

places. It might be that in those counties, probation is better at monitoring the economic

sanctions collected by them, versus the ones paid to the Clerk of Courts or to someone else. If

so, it may be that this would partially explain some of the findings in this research project about

differences in payment by type of economic sanction, as well as some of our prior research that

found payment rates were higher when probation officers were in charge of collection (Ruback,

Shaffer, & Logue, 2004).

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Chapter 7

Summary, Discussion, and Implications

Summary of the Research Findings

Adult and juvenile cases. Our analysis of the adult and juvenile cases revealed that

counties vary significantly in their use of economic sanctions, especially in juvenile cases. The

variation in juvenile cases can be somewhat explained by the fact that juvenile courts are more

focused on rehabilitation than on punishment, and, compared to adult courts, there is more

emphasis on customizing treatment to the individual.

Aside from the variation between counties, we also found that case characteristics (e.g.,

the type and severity of the offense) are better predictors than offender characteristics (e.g., age,

race, or gender) of both the imposition and payment of economic sanctions. In adult cases, for

example, higher levels of economic sanctions were imposed for more severe crimes.

Furthermore, the total amount of fines and costs ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of traffic offenses. This finding probably reflects the fact that most traffic offenses

were for DUI, and, because of mandated fines and costs, the amount of economic sanctions

imposed in these cases is generally high. There also appears to be less variation in the type of

sentence, length of sentence, and economic sanctions imposed in DUI cases than in other types

of cases. For example, in some counties, groups of DUI cases are processed at the same time

(especially those eligible for ARD) and all receive 12 or 24 months of probation and the same

package of services and economic sanctions (which, in one county, totals $525 when fines, the

ARD supervising fee, and the cost of a traffic safety course are included).

In terms of the payment of economic sanctions, we found that the percent of economic

sanctions paid was significantly lower for property offenders than for offenders convicted of

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personal, drug, traffic, or other offenses, possibly because property offenders have fewer assets

than do other types of offenders. Furthermore, the percentage of economic sanctions paid was,

not surprisingly, significantly lower for incarcerated offenders (or, in juvenile cases, offenders

sentenced to a commitment). Even if offenders pay while they are incarcerated (which most do

not), the amount of payments most can make would be very minimal.18

In general, however,

case and offender characteristics explained little or no variation in the amount of economic

sanctions ordered or the percent of economic sanctions paid across counties.

The results showed that counties not only impose different costs and fees, but also that

they use restitution, a mandatory sanction, in different ways. For example, judges in one county

sometimes order restitution for police or other state agencies, which appears to be in conflict

with the restitution statute. Counties also varied in their imposition and payment of two other

mandatory state penalties: Crime Victim Compensation (CVC) and Crime Commission Cost

(CCC). In adult cases, the imposition of CVC and CCC was generally high (M = 91% and M =

90%, respectively). Across counties, CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed for summary

offenses.

In juvenile cases, the imposition of these costs is mandatory only for consent decrees and

adjudications of delinquency. Largely because of that, across counties there is greater variation

in the imposition of CVC (M = 55%) and CCC (M = 67%) in juvenile cases than in adult cases.

The percentage of adult cases in which CVC and CCC were paid in full was modest (M =

56% and M = 55%, respectively). The percentage of cases in which CVC and CCC were paid in

full was significantly higher for offenders convicted of traffic offenses and significantly lower

18

During the period of our data collection, counties were awaiting a court decision regarding whether or not the

wages earned in prison could be garnished and put towards restitution/other economic sanctions. Some

counties/institutions were not withholding, and others were withholding, but not paying out the monies pending the

court‟s decision.

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for offenders incarcerated in jail, paralleling the findings for economic sanctions overall. We

were also interested in the percentage of cases in which CVC and CCC were paid in full in

juvenile cases, but this information was generally unavailable.

DAVE cases. We examined DAVE cases in four counties to determine whether

restitution was being ordered to the state Crime Victims Compensation (CVC) Fund in those

cases where the CVC provided compensation to the victim. Consistent with our results from the

adult and juvenile cases, our examination of the DAVE cases revealed that some counties are

more effective than others at ordering restitution to the CVC. The percentage of cases in which

judges acknowledged CVC restitution was lowest in Delaware County (3%) and highest in

Cumberland County (56%). The average amount of CVC restitution ordered ranged from $741

in Centre County to $5,428 in Cumberland County.

Victim survey. We surveyed victims in two counties to test whether victims‟ satisfaction

with the criminal justice system was related to their perceptions of the fairness of their outcomes

and the procedures by which those outcomes were reached. The results show that victims are

generally more satisfied with procedural than outcome fairness. More specifically, victims were

somewhat more satisfied with the procedure for restitution than with the amount of restitution the

offender was ordered to pay. Furthermore, victims‟ satisfaction with the outcomes and

procedures in their cases increases their willingness to report crimes in the future. The results

also show that women want more input into criminal justice decisions.

Offender survey. In order to explain offenders‟ low rate of payment of economic

sanctions, we surveyed offenders in two counties. We also found that offenders generally do not

understand how the amounts of different economic sanctions (court costs, supervision fees, other

costs and fees, fines, and restitution) are determined. Restitution was understood better than all

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of the other economic sanctions, but that understanding was still far from universal (M = 4.03 on

a scale of 1 to 7). Although most offenders indicated that they had been shown a sheet that

indicated the total costs and fees they owed, 39% of the offenders in this study did not remember

being given a sheet. These individuals indicated that they would have liked to have been given a

sheet with a breakdown of specific amounts they owed. In sum, then, we found that offenders

somewhat understood sentencing in general and the setting of restitution amounts, but they did

not understand how other economic sanctions were determined, where their payments went, or

exactly how much money the owed.

Understanding the Actual Workings in the Counties

Over the course of this project, our interactions with staff members revealed detailed

information about the actual workings in the counties. The following discussion describes for

the counties we studied the organization of collections and supervision, the order of payment,

and the procedures used in the event of nonpayment. Although all counties emphasized that

collections enforcement was a priority, no two counties handled the imposition and collection of

economic sanctions in exactly the same way.

Organization of collections and supervision. All of the counties took considerable

action to try to enforce payment. Typically, payment plans were established so that if offenders

stayed on schedule with their payments, they could complete them by the time their probation

was due to expire. Many counties require offenders to pay a minimum monthly payment (e.g.,

$60 in Cumberland County). Although offenders cannot be discharged from probation until their

economic sanctions are paid in full, they can go on inactive supervision or unsupervised

probation. In practice, however, offenders are sometimes discharged without completing

payment.

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With the exception of Centre and Westmoreland Counties, all of the counties used

specialized collections units to monitor and/or collect economic sanctions. In some counties,

such as Cumberland and Lancaster, these units are part of the adult probation department, staffed

at least in part by probation officers. These specialized probation units are responsible for

monitoring and enforcing payments, but they do not collect the payments directly. In Lancaster

County, payments are made to the Treasurer and in Cumberland County, they are made to the

Clerk of Courts. In other counties, such as Blair and Delaware, the collections unit is separate

from the probation department. For example, Delaware County has a separate Court Financial

Services (CFS) office that is responsible for the collection of all economic sanctions. However,

CFS staff work closely with other departments, including probation. The collection of economic

sanctions is sometimes split between two offices. For example, in the year 2000 in Luzerne

County, the probation office collected restitution and supervision fees, while the Clerk of Courts

collected costs and fines. Additionally, offenders often have to pay for treatment that is required

as a condition of their probation. Some of the programs are paid for through the payments

calculated as a part of sentencing or intake to probation, but others are paid directly to the

treatment provider, which is typically a private organization.19

There are also differences across counties in how offenders make payments. For

example, a staff member in Centre County informed us that each time an offender comes to the

probation office to make a payment, he or she is asked about which case the money should be

applied to. Although offenders have payment contracts that require them to pay a specific

amount of money each month, they can pay whatever amount they choose when they come into

19

It is important to note that what we measured in our analyses of economic sanctions may not have been the total

amount an offender owed. In many cases, if an offender is required to get counseling, participate in a safe driver

program, etc., he or she must pay for that service directly to the service provider.

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the probation office. In Luzerne County, restitution and supervision fees are handled by the

same office, but offenders have to make two separate payments (i.e., one payment for restitution

and one payment for supervision fees). Thus, if an offender is paying by check or money order,

he or she would have to have two checks or two money orders each time.

In the year 2000, some counties did not impose particular types of economic sanctions on

juvenile offenders, which may have affected the results in this study. For example, Cumberland

County seldom imposed fines, fees, or costs in juvenile cases. Furthermore, in Luzerne County

juveniles were not ordered to pay court costs. In contrast to the other counties, Luzerne County

required juveniles to attend school/job training or to find employment as a condition of their

probation, and if they were employed, to pay 75% of their wages toward restitution and fines.

The most common type of economic sanction imposed on juveniles was restitution. The

collection and distribution of restitution varied by county. In some counties, payments were

made to the probation officer during regular appointments. In other counties, restitution was

handled by the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP).

Order of payment. The counties were most similar in terms of the prioritized order in

which payments were applied. The law requires that each time an offender makes a payment,

50% goes toward restitution (until restitution is paid in full) and 50% goes toward the payment of

other fines, fees, and costs. However, there are exceptions to this general rule. In Centre

County, for example, offenders must pay 100% of restitution before paying any other economic

sanction. If the offender is in jail or on work release, however, 15% of each payment goes

toward jail/institutional maintenance fees and the remainder goes to restitution. In Lancaster

County, offenders first pay a $10 per month probation administration fee, followed by 100% of

restitution, costs and fees, and probation supervision fees. In Westmoreland County, each time a

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juvenile offender makes a payment, the first $50 is paid to the Crime Victim Compensation

(CVC) fund, followed by restitution and state and county costs. Although restitution on older

cases is generally paid before restitution on recent cases, there are no formal guidelines about

how multiple cases with restitution should be handled. For example, a staff member in Blair

County informed us that judges sometimes issue court orders mandating that a particular victim

receive payment first. In other words, the victim who complains the most could be given priority

in payment. In other counties, we heard of other alternatives, including dividing the payments

proportionally across victims.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. The counties in this study employ a

range of strategies in dealing with the nonpayment of economic sanctions. One strategy that

many counties shared was a multi-step process characterized by a gradual increase in threatened

sanctions. In general, offenders who stop making their payments receive one or more warning

letters asking for payment. If the offender still fails to make payments or to respond to contact

by the probation department, he or she is charged with contempt of court, and a judge issues a

decision on the matter. While nonpayment of economic sanctions can be a violation of probation

or parole, judges also have the option of setting a new payment plan, reducing the amount owed,

extending probation, and/or substituting community service for costs and fees. For instance, in

Centre County, judges often reduce the total amount of economic sanctions the offender owes.

These reductions are often substantial because judges base their decision on the offender‟s ability

to pay. In another example, in Delaware County, defendants who do not have the ability to pay

(i.e., because of incarceration, unemployment, or disability) may perform community service in

return for a reduction in the amount of money they owe. Some counties, such as Delaware,

Lancaster, Luzerne, and Westmoreland Counties, occasionally use private collections agencies to

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collect money owed on old cases. Because economic sanctions cannot be forgiven without a

judicial order, in order for government agencies to be able to recover all of the money owed, they

typically impose an additional fee to cover the cost of private collection. For example, in one

county the overall amount owed by the offender was increased by 25% if the case was sent to a

private collections agency.

The type of action taken also depends on the offender‟s supervision status. For example,

if an offender fails to make payments while on probation, his/her probation may be revoked or

extended. If an offender is no longer on probation but still owes money, he or she may be held in

contempt of court for nonpayment. A staff member in Cumberland County informed us that all

collections cases are sent through one judge. If offenders are not making payments, the judge

prefers that they appear in court before their probation expires so that he can extend their

probation. The judge only occasionally sends someone to prison for nonpayment, mainly to send

a message that it can happen. In Lancaster County, the number of cases going to court for

contempt for nonpayment was drastically reduced after the introduction of the Collections

Enforcement Unit (CEU).

Across counties, we found even greater variation in the types of action taken in juvenile

cases. In Cumberland County, for example, probation staff may revoke probation or have the

juvenile earn money through a community service program. At age 21, contempt of court

proceedings may begin and judgments may be filed against the individual. In Luzerne County,

juveniles who fail to pay their fines on time or who fail to make payments according to their

payment plan are sent to detention until someone pays their fines. Because most juvenile cases

are for nonpayment of fines, this outcome seems fairly common. However, it is at the judge‟s

discretion which juveniles are sent to detention for nonpayment of fines. In Delaware County,

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the case can be sent to court, community service can be ordered to cover costs not mandated by

the state, or the individual can be referred to an outside collections agency. In most counties,

parents or guardians are allowed to pay on a juvenile case.

Implications for Future Research on Economic Sanctions20

Despite the pressure toward the increased use of economic sanctions and the evidence of

their effectiveness, the criminal justice system faces three problems: (a) setting the amounts of

the sanctions, (b) receiving payments from offenders who may not be able to pay, (c) setting

priorities among the different economic sanctions.

Problem of setting the amount of sanctions. Judges‟ single biggest complaint with

regard to setting economic sanctions is that at sentencing they lack complete information about

offenders‟ economic circumstances, including employment income (net of taxes), other sources

of income (e.g., welfare, unemployment), residence expenses, and number of dependents

(Hillsman & Greene, 1992). Judges lacked this information at sentencing (Olson & Ramker,

2001).

Judges do seem to consider whether offenders should pay multiple economic sanctions.

Thus, consistent with the idea that judges believe there is a total amount of economic sanctions

that is fair, an increase in one type of economic sanction seems to lower the amounts of other

types of economic sanctions. Recent studies in Pennsylvania, using both state-level data

(Ruback, et al., 2005) and county-level data (Ruback, 2004; Ruback, Shaffer, & Logue, 2004)

suggest that the imposition of restitution is negatively related to the imposition of fines.

Problem of payment. Staggering amounts of economic sanctions are unpaid. Because

most offenders have little money, they have difficulty paying these sanctions, especially if

multiple sanctions are imposed (Wheeler, Hissong, Slusher, & Macan, 1990). Economic

20

Some of this discussion comes from Ruback and Bergstrom (2006).

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sanctions put additional burdens on offenders that make it even more difficult for them to try to

lead crime-free lives. Furthermore, their inability to pay these sanctions has implications for the

funding of government services dependent on offender-paid fees and costs and, in the case of

restitution, for the economic and psychological welfare of victims. Moreover, noncompliance

with orders to pay economic sanctions undermines the credibility of the criminal justice system

with both offenders and the public (Lurigio & Davis, 1990). Consistent with that notion, in the

counties we studied probation officers, prosecutors, and victim witness service providers told us

that ordering restitution can sometimes set up false hope for victims. And, these individuals said

that they must often help victims see the restitution order as a symbolic victory, because the

victim‟s chances of seeing any money are low.

Although large amounts of economic sanctions are imposed, payment levels are fairly

low. What is needed is a cost-benefit analysis, to determine whether the costs of encouraging

and tracking payments justify the amount of money that is brought in. Several counties that we

studied send out letters to stimulate payment. These letters serve not only to educate offenders

(see below) but also seem to encourage payment (Lurigio & Davis, 1990) and are much cheaper

than more active supervision.

Problem of priorities. The use of multiple monetary sanctions has implications in terms

of priority of payment (Olson & Ramker, 2001), both across types of economic sanctions and

within any one type of sanction. With multiple types of monetary sanctions, it is unclear how

monthly payments should be split among fines, fees, and restitution. The problem is

compounded when offenders have these multiple monetary obligations for multiple crimes.

Thus, for example, how should restitution payments for victims of three different crimes be

prioritized? Possible options include (1) payment in terms of chronological order (i.e., the

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oldest first), (2) payment in reverse chronological order (i.e., the newest first, in the assumption

that earlier victims have already coped with the loss), (3) the largest restitution amount first, (4)

the most severely injured victim first (which will probably overlap with #3), (5) the most

proactive victim first, and (6) the victim who needs it the most first.

Implications for Practice

Our multimethod research program has two implications for practice: understanding and

consistency.

Understanding

One rationale behind some economic sanctions is that offenders understand that the

money they are paying is going for a specific purpose. In the case of restitution, the economic

sanction for which understanding is assumed to be most important, offenders learn that they have

caused specific harm to a specific victim and that their monthly payments are directed at

restoring the victim to his or her precrime state. Economic sanctions whose purpose is

punishment (e.g., fines) also assume that offenders understand the underlying purpose. Despite

the implicit assumption that offenders understand the economic sanctions, our survey of

offenders indicated that they had little understanding (a) of how the economic sanctions they

were ordered to pay were set and (b) of where their payments were directed. They also seemed

to have little understanding of how much they owed in total.

Best practice. Understanding could be increased if offenders were reminded of what

they owe for each type of economic sanction. In fact, what most of the units do is to go back

through old cases and try to keep up with current cases – simply seeing whether offenders are

paying and, if not, sending a reminder and a new payment plan. A lot of the work is done by the

computer system, which can be set to monitor payments and let the relevant person know when

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action has to be taken in terms of sending out a letter (or a letter can even be generated

automatically). Cumberland County automatically sends an invoice every month to each

offender, which seems to be effective. Even if an offender loses the original sheet with the

breakdown of economic sanctions, in 30 days or less, he or she will know what is still owed and

where to send it.

Consistency

Across counties, and even within counties, there is a high level of variation in how

economic sanctions are handled. In conversations with different staff members, we received

different information about procedures and policies. As evident from our analyses in Chapters 2

and 3, there are clear differences among counties in terms of how economic sanctions are paid

and tracked.

Suggestion. Part of the reason offenders do not understand the economic sanctions they

are expected to pay is that in the counties there are few individuals who know everything that

needs to be known about economic sanctions. In our conversations with staff, we received

multiple answers regarding what a certain economic sanction was (especially for many of the

ones that were acronyms), and whether it was paid to the state, county, municipality, or private

agency. The incomplete and conflicting information we received suggests that offenders who

wanted to know what a payment was for would not be able to receive a correct answer. We think

it would be helpful if each county had a list explaining all of the possible economic sanctions

that could be imposed, as well as a clear description of the policies and procedures operating in

the county.

Future Analyses

In the next several months we plan to continue analyzing the adult and juvenile data we

126

collected from court records and probation files. In particular, we will be conducting additional

multivariate analyses, testing factors such as exposure time and specific county-level practices.

127

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APPENDIX A

Adult Data Collection Forms

139

APPENDIX B

Juvenile Data Collection Forms

140

APPENDIX C

Complete List of Variables

141

Offender Gender

Offender Race

Offender Hispanic

Marital Status

Years of Education

Adult or Juvenile Offender

Number of Dependents

Current Employment

Monthly Income

Substance Use (ever)

Date of First Conviction

Number of Prior Convictions

History of Violence

Arrest Date

Trial/Plea Date

Sentencing Date

Initial Bail

Bail Amount

Severity of Crime

Type of crime (this offense)

Violent Crime

Plea Bargain

Case Disposition

Trial

Trial Type

Case ID Number

County

Concurrent or Consecutive

Restitution

Offense Gravity Score

Prior Record Score

Charge Offenses

Conviction Offenses

Victim 1 Testify

Victim 1 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Victim 1 Estimate of Damage

Discharged from Probation

Date of Birth

Physical Disability

Developmental Disability

No Disability Known

Total Number of Charges Filed

Total Number of Conviction Offenses

Prison Start Date

Prison End Date

Parole Start Date

Parole End Date

142

Probation Start Date

Probation End Date

SID #

SSN

Victim 1 Gender

Victim 1 Adult Status

Physical Injury Victim 1

Psychological Injury Victim 1

Property Injury Victim 1

Victim 2 Gender

Victim 2 Status

Victim 2 Testify

Victim 2 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 2

Psychological Injury Victim 2

Property Injury Victim 2

Victim 2 Estimate of Damage

Victim 3 Gender

Victim 3 Status

Victim 3 Testify

Victim 3 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 3

Psychological Injury Victim 3

Property Injury Victim 3

Victim 3 Estimate of Damage

Original Total Amount Ordered

Total Paid to Date

No. of Payments Made

Amount of Restitution Ordered

Amount of Restitution Paid

Number of Prior Victims Being Paid Restitution

Amount of County Fines Ordered

Amount of County Fines Paid

Date of 1st Warning Letter

Number of Warning Letters

Date Supervision Violated

Rearrest Date

Revocation Date

Rearrest

Revoked

Adult Probation File

Alcohol

Cocaine

Crack

Heroin

Marijuana

Meth

Other Drug

143

RIP Start Date

RIP End Date

Day Reporting w/Probation

Inpatient Drug/Alcohol Treatment

Electronic Monitoring/House Arrest

Intensive Supervision

Halfway/Rehab Center

Work Release

Other RIP Program

Community Service

Individualized Services/Counseling

Drug Testing

Outpatient Drug/Alcohol Treatment

Fines

Religion

Child Support

Monthly Amount of Child Suport

Additional Restitution Ordered?

Amount of additional restitution

Case Data Entry Complete

Offense Date

Payment Complete

Summary Appeal

Original Amount Reduced

Amount of Reduction One

Type of Reduction One

Amount of Reduction Two

Amount of Reduction Three

Type of Reduction Two

Type of Reduction Three

Number of Reductions

Summary Appeal Denied

Number of Kids

Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition

Alcohol Safe Driv. Course/Act 122

Probation Extended

Sent to Prison/Jail

Imprisoned on Other Offense

Contempt for Nonpayment

Contempt Date

Years of State Minimum Sentence

Months of State Minimum Sentence

Days of State Minimum Sentence

Years of State Maximum Sentence

Months of State Maximum Sentence

Days of State Maximum Sentence

Years of County Minimum Sentence

Months of County Minimum Sentence

Days of County Minimum Sentence

Years of County Maximum Sentence

144

Months of County Maximum Sentence

Days of County Maximum Sentence

Years of RIP

Months of RIP

Days of RIP

Years of Probation

Months of Probation

Days of Probation

Years Probation Extended

Months Probation Extended

Days Probation Extended

Years of Credit Time

Months of Credit Time

Days of Credit Time

Computer

Amount of County Supervision Ordered

Amount of County Supervision Paid

Total Number of Victims (across cases to date)

Total Amount Ordered

Total Amount Paid Overall

Total Number of Cases being Paid

Docket File

Mental Health

Impaired Driver Program (IDP)

Hours of Community Service

Judicial Computer Program

CAT (Catastrophic Loss) Fund

EMS

Crime Comm. Cost (CCC)/VWS

Domes Violence Comp Act 44

Act 167 State Costs

Crime Lab User Fee

Firearm Education Cost FET (Act 158)

Witness Fee

Prior Law - State Cost (A)

Subpeona

Insurance Fee

Electronic Monitoring

Central Processing (CP) Cost

Amount of Court Costs Ordered

District Attorney (DA)

Sheriff (SH)

Amount of Other Fee 1

Amount of Other Fee 2

Amount of Other Fee 3

Batterers Intervention Prog

Total Number of Cases Ever Paid

Victim Witness File

Probation Case Number

Automation Fee

145

DA Administration Fee

Amount of State Supervision Ordered

Amount of State Supervision Paid

Impaired Driver/DUI School

Plea

DUI Prison Management

DUI Drug/Alcohol

State DUI

DUI Booking Fee

Prison Fee

Amount of State Fines Ordered

Amount of State Fines Paid

Annual Income

Total Amount Due

Weekly Income

Amount of Other Fee 4

Offender's age at time of sentencing

Percent of Case Paid to Date

Percent of Restitution Paid to Date

Restitution Payment Complete

Violated Probation or Parole

CVC Paid Restitution?

Total Amount of CVC Restitution Ordered

Total Amount of CVC Restitution Paid

Amount of Victim Compensation Ordered

Amount of Victim Compensation Paid to Date

CCC/VWS Amount Paid

Date Completed

Amount of Restitution Paid

Victim Req Notification

Victim Req Notification

Victim Req Notification

Bail Reduced

Type of Victim 1

Type of Victim 2

Type of Victim 3

Total Due to Date (this case)

Reduced To

Reduced To

Reduced To

Total Amount Reduced By

Total Amount Reduced To

Amount of Restitution Due

Total Amount of CVC Restitution Due

Amount of County Fines Due

Amount of State Fines Due

Amount of Fines Ordered

Amount of Fines Paid

Amount of Fines Due

Amount of County Supervision Fees Due

146

Amount of State Supervision FeesDue

Amount of CVC Due

Amount of vws Due

Amount of Supervision Fees Ordered

Amount of Supervision Fees Paid

Amount of Supervision Fees Due

Hourly Wage

Sentence Dates Adjusted Due to Outside Factors

Amount of Restitution Ordered for Victim 1

Part of Claim of Other Victim

Local Fines Amount Ordered

Local Fines Amount Paid

Local Fines Amount Due

Victim 1 Request Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count (Victim 1)

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 1

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 1

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 1

Other Also Paid for Victim 1

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 1

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 1

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 1

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 1

Victim 2 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 2

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 2

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 2

Other Also Paid for Victim 2

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 2

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 2

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 2

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 2

Victim 3 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 3

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 3

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 3

Other Also Paid for Victim 3

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 3

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 3

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 3

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 3

Victim 4 Gender

Victim 4 Status

Victim 4 Testify

Victim 4 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 4

Psychological Injury Victim 4

147

Property Injury Victim 4

Victim 4 Estimate of Damage

Victim Req Notification

Type of Victim 4

Victim 4 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 4

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 4

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 4

Other Also Paid for Victim 4

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 4

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 4

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 4

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 4

Victim 5 Gender

Victim 5 Status

Victim 5 Testify

Victim 5 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 5

Psychological Injury Victim 5

Property Injury Victim 5

Victim 5 Estimate of Damage

Victim 5 Req Notification

Type of Victim 5

Victim 5 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 5

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 5

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 5

Other Also Paid for Victim 5

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 5

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 5

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 5

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 5

Victim 6 Gender

Victim 6 Status

Victim 6 Testify

Victim 6 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 6

Psychological Injury Victim 6

Property Injury Victim 6

Victim 6 Estimate of Damage

Victim 6 Req Notification

Type of Victim 6

Victim 6 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 6

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 6

148

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 6

Other Also Paid for Victim 6

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 6

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 6

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 6

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 6

Victim 7 Gender

Victim 7 Status

Victim 7 Testify

Victim 7 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 7

Psychological Injury Victim 7

Property Injury Victim 7

Victim 7 Estimate of Damage

Victim 7 Req Notification

Type of Victim 7

Victim 7 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 7

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 7

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 7

Other Also Paid for Victim 7

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 7

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 7

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 7

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 7

Victim 8 Gender

Victim 8 Status

Victim 8 Testify

Victim 8 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 8

Psychological Injury Victim 8

Property Injury Victim 8

Victim 8 Estimate of Damage

Victim 8 Req Notification

Type of Victim 8

Victim 8 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 8

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 8

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 8

Other Also Paid for Victim 8

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 8

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 8

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 8

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 8

Victim 9 Gender

Victim 9 Status

149

Victim 9 Testify

Victim 9 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 9

Psychological Injury Victim 9

Property Injury Victim 9

Victim 9 Estimate of Damage

Victim 9 Req Notification

Type of Victim 9

Victim 9 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 9

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 9

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 9

Other Also Paid for Victim 9

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 9

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 9

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 9

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 9

Victim 10 Gender

Victim 10 Status

Victim 10 Testify

Victim 10 Impact Statement

DA Request Restitution

Physical Injury Victim 10

Psychological Injury Victim 10

Property Injury Victim 10

Victim 10 Estimate of Damage

Victim 10 Req Notification

Type of Victim 10

Victim 10 Req Restitution

Offender Convicted on Relevant Count

Insurance Company Also Paid for Victim 10

Financial Services Comp Also Paid for Victim 10

Medical Provider Also Paid for Victim 10

Other Also Paid for Victim 10

Other Restitution Order Amt 1 for Victim 10

Other Restitution Order Amt 2 for Victim 10

Other Restitution Order Amt 3 for Victim 10

Other Restitution Order Amt 4 for Victim 10

# of Victims Being Paid Restitution on Current Case

150

APPENDIX D

Blair County

151

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Blair County has a separate Fines and

Costs Office that is responsible for the collection of all economic sanctions. After the Clerk of

Courts/Prothonotary‟s Office determines the amount of money defendants owe, the Fines and

Costs Office disburses the money. Although the Clerk of Courts receives bail payments, the

Fines and Costs Office collects all other payments directly. We did not collect information from

their files, but the Fines and Costs Office has records (organized by offender) dating back to

1968.

Validity of the data. The Clerk of Courts/Prothonotary‟s Office began keeping

computer records in January of 1989, but converted to a new computer system in 1997. In some

cases, fines and costs information did not transfer over to the new system. As a result, the

economic sanctions information we recorded is actually an underestimate. Information about

economic sanctions also may have been inaccurate because staff members entered payments into

the computer in groups, rather than as they were received. The Clerk of Courts/Prothonotary‟s

Office was very behind in terms of inputting data into the computer. For cases from the past 2-3

years (at the time of our data collection), information may be missing because it had not been

entered into the computer.

For all cases prior to 1997, only the economic sanctions information (e.g., fines, fees,

costs, and restitution) was correct. Thus, we could not accurately assess the offender‟s prior

convictions in these cases. Instead, we calculated the offender‟s prior convictions based on the

offender‟s convictions after 1997. In some cases, however, we were able to obtain complete

conviction information from the District Attorney‟s files.

152

Order of payment. Each time a defendant makes a payment, 50% goes toward

restitution and 50% goes toward the payment of other fines, fees, and costs. According to the

Fines and Costs Office, older cases are paid before recent ones and individual victims are paid

before businesses. However, staff members informed us that judges sometimes issued court

orders mandating that a particular victim receive payment first.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. In Blair County, the adult probation

office may discharge from active supervision offenders who still owe money to the Fines and

Costs Office. However, offenders who fail to complete their payments upon release are sent to

contempt court, where a judge then issues a decision on the matter. Private collections agencies

are never used in Blair County.

Method

Sampling. We began our data collection in the adult probation office in Blair County.

Probation files were organized by the offender‟s name, rather than by docket number or year, as

in the other counties. Because we could not check for missing cases without first knowing which

docket numbers would be included in our sample, we had to draw the sample first. Once we

knew which docket numbers would be included in our sample, we searched the Clerk of

Courts/Prothonotary‟s computer records to find the names of the offenders that corresponded to

those docket numbers. After completing this process, we could then check for missing cases.

Given the amount of time this procedure took, we did not check for missing cases. However,

once data collection began we found that there were rarely any missing cases.

Data collection. Data collection began in early September of 2003 and continued

through April of 2004. We collected data from paper and computer files in both the Adult

Probation Office and the Clerk of Courts/Prothonotary‟s Office.

153

Probation paper and computer files and Clerk of Courts/Prothonotary paper and computer

files provided only limited information about victims. As a result, we contacted the

Victim/Witness Office to obtain information about victims. However, the Victim/Witness Office

in Blair County did not exist until the year 2000. Because the office did not start keeping track

of restitution until after the year 2000, we collected data about victims from the District

Attorney‟s files. We recorded information about only those victims ordered restitution. When

available, we also recorded the total number of victims not ordered restitution (i.e., the number

of victims who were given the opportunity to request restitution but chose not to do so). The

District Attorney informed us that judges in Blair County typically do not order restitution to

insurance companies.

Results

Adult Data

Table D-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid

for both the current case and across all cases. Across both models, the total amount of economic

sanctions imposed was significantly higher for offenders incarcerated in prison. Furthermore,

the percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of

personal, drug, or traffic offenses and for non-incarcerated offenders.

Table D-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Blair County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1304.93 56.59 4470.11 57.43

Mean n 405 405 409 409

Summary -325.54 3.84 -10.96 6.50

Felony 419.65 -4.54 850.67 -2.20

Personal -335.43 18.55** -2861.21** 21.12**

Drug -296.45 15.54* -2981.17** 16.47*

Traffic 266.48 46.08*** -4840.44*** 45.78***

Other Offense -89.66 23.58** -2467.60* 22.08**

154

Prison 2589.97* -33.36** 7435.85*** -37.10**

Jail -38.37 -27.71*** 2990.82** -27.65***

RIP -59.83 -9.08 3089.76* -9.61

No Sentence -459.95 -3.22 -497.36 -4.32

Non-White 1171.72* -8.27 -286.60 -5.56

Age 3.82 0.21 -45.1252 0.28

Male 43.69 6.34a 494.4561 5.04

Constant 1073.46 34.28*** 6876.5*** 33.39***

R2 0.06 0.22 0.16 0.24

n 372 371 374 374

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table D-2 describes the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and restitution ordered. The

results show that the total amount of fines ordered was significantly higher for offenders

incarcerated in prison. The total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a misdemeanor, for offenders incarcerated in jail or sentenced to RIP, and

for non-white offenders. The total amount of restitution ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a felony and significantly lower for offenders convicted of a drug offense.

Table D-2 also describes the percent of fines and restitution paid. The results show that the

percent of fines and restitution paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal

or traffic offenses and significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in jail.

Table D-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Blair County

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 402.22 56.03 438.14 189.29 366.85 847.5 59.65

Mean n 371 368 404 400 405 195 191

Summary -34.93 -22.21 -19.19 -56.96 -18.94 -244.87 16.99

Felony -212.37 2.20 -351.95* 43.33 -264.54a 810.53* 1.17

Personal -185.85 31.16** 158.74 0.72 151.02 -304.50 25.67*

Drug 517.49 23.55a -94.19 1.87 -124.85 -666.92* 10.39

Traffic 214.49 52.52*** 80.61 281.19*** 0.45 -195.14 45.64***

Other Offense 144.51 48.28*** -177.79 35.85 -180.25 -24.75 19.30

Prison 3561.17*** -41.54a 411.06 -38.79 242.52 -835.68 -29.22

a

Jail 62.49 -28.90** 372.07** 101.58 241.10a -458.97

a -23.34*

RIP -125.07 -7.20 493.60* 33.40 331.95a -407.54 -7.22

No Sentence -42.64 19.39a -209.64 -56.56 -251.06

a -163.56 -13.54

155

Non-White 711.35 -13.65 489.59** -40.27 536.35** 31.59 -12.63

Age 2.59 0.41 -2.20 0.73 -2.10 4.46 0.26

Male 152.01 13.16 -33.76 27.17 -13.85 -116.75 9.77

Constant -112.01 11.86 465.60* 62.35 438.54* 629.32a 35.83**

R2 0.09 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.09 0.04 0.27

n 374 336 376 373 373 376 185

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table D-3 describes the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and CCC. The results

show that the total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a traffic offense. CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed when the offender

was convicted of a traffic offense and were more likely to be imposed when the offender was

incarcerated in jail. The results also show that although CVC and CCC were ordered in more

than 90% of all cases, offenders paid these economic sanctions only about half the time.

Table D-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Blair County

Supervision Fees

Ordered

CVC CCC

If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 237.02 93% 51% 91% 49%

Mean n 214 407 378 406 369

Summary -46.03 0.28 0.23 -0.22 -0.27

Felony 136.74a -0.36 -0.68 0.62 -0.64

Personal -9.00 -0.15 1.03** -0.31 1.02**

Drug -7.42 -1.04 1.12* -1.30 0.80a

Traffic 198.06** -2.65** 2.69*** -1.97* 2.63***

Other Offense 39.84 -0.46 1.44*** -0.29 1.36**

Prison -206.46 0.41 -6.85 -0.52 -6.84

Jail -0.60 2.30* -1.64*** 2.37* -1.71***

RIP -88.36 7.69 -0.66 6.94 -0.74

No Sentence -105.65 -1.23 -0.22 -0.77 -0.09

Non-White -1.65 -1.61* -0.55 -1.31a -0.45

Age 0.55 0.02 0.01 5.36 0.01

Male 24.42 -1.45 0.31 0.03 0.40

Constant 56.64 5.22** -0.97* -1.06** -0.94*

R2 0.06 3.66

n 373 372 357 355 349

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

156

APPENDIX E

Centre County

157

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult and Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Centre County has a combined adult and

juvenile probation and parole department. The county does not have a specialized collections

unit and does not use specialized probation officers to collect economic sanctions. However,

they do have one full-time staff member in the probation department dedicated to the tracking of

economic sanctions. Probation staff members are very proud of their collections record and they

believe they take it more seriously than do most other counties. In 2002, they collected $2.3

million, $524,000 of which was restitution to victims.

Because we were also interested in the efficiency of the payment process, we observed

the amount of time it took to process a payment. According to one staff member, the time it

takes to process a payment depends on the offender (i.e., on where the offender wants the money

to go). Although offenders may make payments in person or through the mail, we were able to

observe only payments made in person. Each time an offender came to the probation office to

make a payment, a staff member asked him/her about which case to apply the money. A staff

member informed us that although offenders have payment contracts that require them to pay a

specific amount of money each month, they can pay whatever amount they choose when they

come into the probation office. Only three offenders came into the probation office on the day

we observed, but the amount of time it took to process a payment ranged from 40 seconds to

three minutes and six seconds. In the latter case, however, a staff member was filling in for

someone who was out to lunch.

Validity of the data. The adult probation computer files go back as far as 1985.

Although all cases after November of 2000 are in the computer system, cases prior to November

158

of 2000 are only in the computer if their balances were not paid in full. As a result, convictions

from cases that were paid in full and were prior to November of 2000 are not included in the

prior convictions variable. Regarding juvenile offenders, Centre County has very few informal

adjustments because the District Attorney‟s Office does not like to use that option.

Order of payment. Before paying any other economic sanctions, offenders must pay

100% of restitution. If an offender is in jail or on work release, however, 15% of each payment

goes toward jail/institutional maintenance fees and the remainder goes to restitution. The

probation staff also told us that individual and business victims are paid restitution before

insurance companies. We were able to record information about only those victims ordered

restitution. Beyond jail/institutional maintenance fees and restitution, the payment order is quite

complex. In general, it appears that economic sanctions paid to the county are made before those

owed to the state.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. When offenders fail to make payments,

Centre County uses a four-stage process to collect the money they owe. First, the probation

office sends a reminder letter asking for payment. Second, the office sends a more severe letter

asking for payment. Third, the office sends a letter informing the offender that he/she has to

meet with the Director of Probation. Fourth, the probation department files contempt of court

charges. In contempt cases, judges often reduce the amount owed. These reductions are often

substantial because judges base their decision on the offender‟s ability to pay.

Additionally, Centre County does not use private collection agencies to collect money

owed on old cases. Instead, in the fall of 2002, the probation department went back through their

records and sent new letters to those who had not paid to put them back under scrutiny.

159

Method

Data collection. The researchers collected data in Centre County from June to

September of 2003. We collected information on adult cases from the Clerk of Courts paper

files and the county computer system, which was used by both the probation and Clerk of Courts

offices. These sources provided detailed information about charge and conviction offenses, the

sentence imposed, and the economic sanctions ordered and collected for each case. However,

we were not able to access the adult probation case files because many had been removed from

the probation office. Retrieving information from these files would have required large

quantities of time and resources. As a result, we were not able to collect detailed information

about offenders‟ backgrounds. To overcome this limitation, we used Clerk of Courts paper files

to find limited offender demographics, such as race and gender.

We collected all juvenile data from the juvenile probation computer system because the

Clerk of Courts paper files were sealed and most of the juvenile probation paper files were in

storage and unavailable. As a result, we were unable to obtain detailed background information

on juvenile offenders. However, most of the information we were searching for was stored in the

juvenile computer system. Additionally, the probation computer system contained information

for juvenile cases that were handled formally and informally.

Results

Adult Data

Table E-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid.

The results show that the total amount of economic sanctions imposed was significantly higher

for offenders convicted of a felony and for offenders convicted of a traffic offense. The percent

160

of economic sanctions paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a drug or traffic

offense and for non-incarcerated offenders.

Table E-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Centre County 21

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1360.03 76.9

Mean n 416 412

Summary -533.97 12.95

Felony 1455.38*** -7.28

Personal 286.44 10.92a

Drug -434.52 16.16*

Traffic 837.28** 21.88***

Other Offense -14.60 8.55

Prison -615.08 -44.86***

Jail 386.98a -20.98***

RIP 680.58 -24.68*

No Sentence -710.24 -6.89

Non-White -18.45 -12.94a

Age 8.15 0.21

Male -219.01 8.47a

Constant 870.06* 59.18***

R2 0.15 0.21

n 401 397

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table E-2 describes the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and restitution ordered and

the percent paid. The results show that the amount of fines ordered was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of a felony, for offenders convicted of drug or traffic offenses, and for

offenders incarcerated in prison or sentenced to RIP.22

The percent of fines paid was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a summary offense, for offenders convicted of

drug or traffic offenses, and for offenders incarcerated in prison. The total amount of costs and

fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal or traffic offenses and

for offenders incarcerated in jail. The total amount of restitution ordered was significantly

21

Columns were intentionally left blank when the information was unavailable. 22

In Centre County, RIP estimates may be unstable because there were very few RIP sentences.

161

higher for offenders convicted of a felony. No offender characteristics significantly predicted the

total amount of fines, costs and fees, or restitution ordered or the percent paid.

Table E-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Centre County

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 330.25 81.1 735.91 226.98 706.31 964.76 73.9

Mean n 273 269 403 395 388 107 106

Summary 24.50 58.44*** -316.96 -95.84** -361.58a -78.54 9.11

Felony 144.64* 8.66 171.07 62.11** 163.66 1113.22*** -6.80

Personal 128.53a 12.28 295.10* 45.27* 229.80

a -232.39 19.23

a

Drug 269.06*** 11.37* 41.31 36.80a -53.04 -738.68** 34.54

Traffic 278.43*** 18.06** 831.44*** 191.62*** 740.93*** -434.12* 24.72

Other Offense 143.42a 25.34 146.77 62.75** 158.16 -403.33 17.26

Prison 267.59* 14.28*** -205.09 -80.41* -348.08a -404.94 -31.60*

Jail 70.25 -63.51*** 502.35*** -34.20* 384.88*** -157.77 -17.68

RIP 409.35*** -26.77** 339.57 86.55* 331.23 -58.46 -81.44**

No Sentence -135.36 -30.97 -358.33 -140.11*** -356.48 -71.55 -15.00

Non-White -29.55 -10.28 164.57 5.20 200.04 -110.58 3.50

Age 2.15 -15.17 2.15 -0.25 1.85 4.76 0.22

Male 60.12 0.14a 35.31 -1.01 10.72 -313.95

a 5.60

Constant -113.76 11.99*** 145.99 163.01*** 218.85 638.02* 65.54***

R2 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.44 0.27 0.1 0.21

n 401 260 400 399 400 399 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table E-3 describes the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and CCC. The results

show that the total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a felony, for offenders convicted of traffic or other offenses, and for non-

incarcerated offenders. The percent of supervision fees paid was significantly higher for

offenders convicted of drug, traffic, or other offenses. CVC and CCC were less likely to be

imposed when the offender was convicted of a summary offense and when the offender was

incarcerated in jail.

162

Table E-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Centre County

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 308.66 30.6 89% 56% 88% 54%

Mean n 279 279 416 366 415 367

Summary -138.28* 2.67 -3.02** 0.60 -3.36** 0.62

Felony 102.42** 0.95 8.91 -0.24 9.07 -0.28

Personal 59.42a 1.32 11.88 0.01 12.27 0.03

Drug -32.61 12.94* 0.67 1.03* 0.69 0.96*

Traffic 140.02*** 17.42*** 1.90** 1.26*** 2.21** 1.20***

Other Offense 83.08* 15.19* 2.45** 0.59 3.24** 0.54

Prison -253.39*** -20.97 5.27 -0.63 4.84 -0.85

Jail -87.60** -7.65* -2.26** -0.66* -2.76*** -0.56*

RIP 48.07 -14.22a 6.51 -1.24* 5.86 -1.11

a

No Sentence -162.97** -39.42* -3.28** -1.17 -3.68** -1.11

Non-White 7.77 -5.99 0.40 -0.26 0.41 -0.21

Age -0.36 -0.05 -0.04a -0.01 -0.03 -0.01

Male -6.77 -2.03 0.25 0.21 0.42 0.21

Constant 209.03*** 25.89*** 3.92*** -0.01 3.71*** 0.05

R2 0.24 0.13

n 399 271 399 355 399 356

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Pooled Analyses

In Centre County, we sampled cases from the year 2000 and from the end of 2002

through the beginning of 2003. As a result, we estimated a second set of regression models after

pooling the 2000 and 2002-2003 samples. Table E-4 describes the total amount of economic

sanctions ordered and the percent paid. The results from the pooled analyses are essentially the

same as the results from the 2000 sample. However, the percent of economic sanctions paid was

significantly lower in 2002-2003 than in 2000.

Table E-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Centre County, Pooled Sample

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1352.49 74.9

Mean n 586 511

Summary -421.33 9.14

Felony 1178.58*** -9.22

163

Personal 152.98 10.74a

Drug -163.99 18.74**

Traffic 757.23*** 23.24***

Other Offense -46.97 9.10

Prison 324.19 -46.67***

Jail 377.27* -22.19***

RIP 542.42 -23.49*

No Sentence -643.98 -5.51

Non-White -191.02 -11.14a

Age 7.26 0.16

Male -108.38 5.71

Year -26.73 -7.60***

Constant 853.45* 70.65***

R2 0.13 0.23

n 553 486

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table E-5 describe the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

restitution ordered and the percent paid. The findings regarding fines and restitution are

essentially the same as the results from the 2000 sample. However, the total amount of costs and

fees ordered was significantly lower in 2002-2003 than in 2000.

Table E-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Centre County, Pooled Sample

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 362.73 73.63 704.97 241.96 646.14 906.09 67.34

Mean n 385 339 556 472 464 146 126

Summary 78.17 3.17 -287.62 -74.84* -309.47a -36.24 8.053

Felony 177.34 7.14 87.78 49.95* 105.90 861.02*** -10.326

Personal 137.54 9.07 233.30* 58.62** 186.31a -330.95

a 19.503

a

Drug 456.03*** 19.27* 70.06 49.32* -63.43 -715.26*** 32.999

Traffic 248.04 21.94** 729.17*** 165.16*** 530.62*** -453.78** 20.231

Other Offense 116.83 11.98 138.50 64.57** 105.30 -426.54* 19.037

Prison 931.10*** -60.03*** -59.00 -21.42 -272.50a -216.85 -28.279

a

Jail 146.79a -24.77*** 427.69*** -30.54

a 316.47*** -138.81 -9.055

RIP 410.02* -22.15a 396.88* 102.89** 356.40* -132.86 -57.455*

No Sentence -109.37 -2.52 -282.31 -123.97** -262.93 -69.98 -18.462

Non-White -133.24 -13.60 128.27 -8.39 131.46 -168.99 4.537

Age 1.36 0.06 1.88 0.06 3.04 5.08 0.047

Male 101.14 5.57 27.81 1.98 26.71 -200.27 1.084

Year 66.24a -20.16 -78.19* -41.76*** -255.93*** -53.95 -18.654

Constant -248.97a 87.54*** 295.81* 193.51*** 527.34*** 633.07* 91.020***

164

R2 0.11 0.24 0.26 0.3 0.27 0.09 0.29

n 549 322 552 533 536 538 123

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table E-6 describe the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and

CCC. Although the total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly lower during

2002-2003, the percent of supervision fees paid was significantly higher during 2002-2003.

CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed in 2002-2003 than in 2000.

Table E-6. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Centre County, Pooled Sample

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 311.72 36.25 78% 56% 78% 54%

Mean n 331 330 564 175 563 439

Summary -116.16* 4.47 -1.38a 0.43 -1.46* 0.45

Felony 82.88** -1.70 0.59 -0.26 0.59 -0.30

Personal 72.00* 4.21 1.94*** 0.00 1.97*** 0.02

Drug -29.49 18.16** 0.63 1.08** 0.63 1.03**

Traffic 109.70*** 20.97*** 0.66a 1.18*** 0.68

a 1.14***

Other Offense 80.21* 17.84** 1.48** 0.64 1.73** 0.59

Prison -231.47*** -18.62 7.51 -1.00a 7.49 -1.20*

Jail -86.46*** -8.25* -0.56 -0.72 -0.62a -0.64*

RIP 36.75 -11.55 7.26 -0.81 7.24 -0.70

No Sentence -154.12** -40.09* -2.05** -0.81 -2.13** -0.76

Non-White 0.81 -5.06 0.06 -0.16 0.06 -0.11

Age -0.09 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02

Male 8.26 -5.08 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 0.08

Year -61.40*** 16.76*** -1.46*** -0.10 -1.49*** -0.06

Constant 257.81*** 10.20 4.16*** 0.35 4.12*** 0.36

R2 0.22 0.28

n 532 320 533 419 533 420

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Juvenile Data

The results presented in Table E-7 describe the total amount of economic sanctions

ordered and the percent paid in Centre County. The total amount of economic sanctions ordered

was significantly higher for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent. No other case or

165

offender characteristics significantly predicted the total amount of economic sanctions ordered or

the percent paid.

Table E-7. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Centre County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 898.25 87.24

Mean n 105 105

Summary -224.69 -17.37

Felony 491.73 0.05

Personal -832.25 -5.76

Drug -470.67 0.94

Traffic -364.17 12.41

Other Offense -237.63 -8.36

Commitment 399.61 -2.93

Adjudicated Delinquent 817.63* 0.85

Age 77.40 -1.13

Male 375.75 6.11

Constant -1195.72 104.56*

R2 0.17 0.05

Adjusted R2 0.08 -0.08

n 105 84

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table E-8 describes the imposition and payment of costs and fees, restitution, CVC, and

CCC. The amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders who were

adjudicated delinquent. Furthermore, both CVC and CCC were more likely to be ordered when

the offender was adjudicated delinquent.

Table E-8. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition and Payment of Costs and Fees, Restitution, CVC, and

CCC in Centre County

Costs and Fees Restitution CVC CCC

Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered Ordered

%

Paid If Ordered If Ordered

Mean 430.65 56.41 123.24 1261.58 85.52 43% 41.90%

Mean n 85 71 63 43 43 158 129

Summary -133.38 -13.13 -55.79 -45.52 -0.43 0.79

Felony -136.02 13.45 69.12a 617.03 7.19 0.12 0.54

Personal -333.30a -0.01 18.48 -496.05 -40.03

a -0.41 0.30

Drug -24.00 5.84 23.60 -453.15 0.14 0.58

Traffic 40.21 1.28 19.99 -449.44 10.62 -20.99 -20.31

166

Other Offense -178.38 32.88 73.01 -172.79 -13.80 -1.18 -0.53

Commitment 172.18 -9.18 -56.94 257.66 -36.11 0.19 0.33

Adjudicated Delinquent 268.25* 33.54* 73.15* 527.67 -1.28 1.36** 3.20***

Age -9.86 0.74 3.94 80.40 -1.49 -0.08 -0.12

Male 59.07 -4.54 5.64 295.73 0.31 0.08 -1.53*

Constant 350.62 -1.34 -73.93 -1417.35 114.20a 0.46 0.75

R2 0.11 0.09 0.11 0.15 0.20

Adjusted R2 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.055 -0.031

n 105 105 105 105 37 130 105

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

167

APPENDIX F

Cumberland County

168

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Cumberland County has a specialized

collections unit within the adult probation department that is responsible for enforcing

collections of economic sanctions ordered on adult criminal cases. The collections unit has one

supervisor and three staff members who are responsible for monitoring payments, sending out

dunning letters, and scheduling court appearances for revocations. Probation also sets and

adjusts offenders‟ payment plans. The minimum payment is $60 a month. Beyond that,

however, probation officers set up a payment plan so that offenders will finish paying by the

time their probation expires. The only exception to this rule is if the offender owes more than

could reasonably be paid off during his/her probation period.

Validity of the data. In November of 2003, during the course of our data collection,

Cumberland County switched over from the AS400 computer system to the new statewide

AOPC computer system. Although the AS400 system was still accessible, it was no longer

being updated. Because of glitches in the new system, payments and other information were not

being entered by the time we finished our data collection and therefore we used only the AS400

system. As a result, our data regarding amounts paid are actually underestimates. Problems with

the AOPC system also made it difficult for the probation office to track payments and produce

proper documentation and therefore they were unable to send bills and payment letters to

offenders. As a result, collections likely dropped.

Order of payment. In Cumberland County, by order of the court, payments made by

offenders are applied in the following: (1) payment of course instructors‟ fees in DUI cases (i.e.,

DUI School), (2) payment of county and state probation supervision fees, (3) payment of

169

restitution, (4) payment to Cumberland County prison for incarcerated defendants, (5) payment

of costs, fines, and ARD fees owed to Cumberland County, (6) payment of fines owed to

municipalities, (7) payment of fines owed to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, (8) payment of

sheriff‟s costs, (9) payment of witness fees, (10) payment of costs owed to the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania, and (11) payment of costs owed to the booking center. This order was later

amended so that restitution would be paid first.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. When offenders fail to make payments,

the type of action taken depends on their supervision status. If the offender is on unsupervised or

active probation, his/her probation can be revoked. If on inactive probation, the offender has to

go through the contempt process. Although there are five judges in Cumberland County, all

collections cases are sent through one judge. If offenders are not making payments, the judge

prefers that they appear in court before their probation expires so that he can extend their

probation. The judge only occasionally sends someone to prison for nonpayment, mainly to send

a message that it can happen. Private collections agencies are not used.

Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Juvenile probation tracks all economic

sanctions that are court ordered and collected. Juvenile probation also attempts to collect beyond

age 18 by sending cases to the collections unit in adult probation, even after offenders are

discharged from juvenile supervision. In Cumberland County, juvenile offenders make

payments to their probation officer. Probation staff estimated that 25-30% of juveniles are

ordered to pay restitution. However, Cumberland County seldom imposed fines, fees, or costs

for juvenile cases in the year 2000 and therefore few cases have any economic sanctions

information.

170

Validity of the data. Compared to the other counties, Cumberland County has slightly

different juvenile dispositions. Deferred Adjudication and Disposition is similar to an in-court

consent decree. In other words, at a later date there is a follow-up petition dismissing the

charges. Deferred Hearings are similar to out-of-court consent decrees. Cumberland County

uses few actual consent decrees. If a juvenile sentenced to a consent decree does not pay after 12

months, he/she can be adjudicated delinquent. Predelinquent is similar to an informal

adjustment. A low proportion of their cases are adjudicated delinquent. For the most part, only

the President Judge handles juvenile cases.

Order of payment. For adjudicated cases, how a payment is applied depends on the

priority assigned in the computer. In general, 50% of all payments are applied to restitution until

the restitution is paid in full. Restitution on older cases is supposed to be paid before restitution

on newer cases and individual and business victims are supposed to be paid before insurance

companies. After restitution, the order of payment should be CVC, DUI, fines, and DNA fees.

Juveniles make payments by mailing them to the Clerk of Courts, by making payments to the

Clerk of Courts in person, or by making payments to the probation officer who then takes the

payment to the Clerk of Court‟s Office. Juveniles who were not petitioned to court (i.e., were

handled out of court) make payments directly to their probation officer and the money is handled

in house. Restitution is paid first, but the juvenile may also have to pay fines or other fees for

service, but not things like CVC.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. In Cumberland County, the type of

action taken in the event of nonpayment is decided on a case-by-case basis. The probation staff

may revoke probation or have the juvenile earn money through a Community Service Program.

171

At age 21, contempt of court proceedings may begin and judgments may be filed against the

individual.

Method

Data collection. Data collection was undertaken from late September to mid November

of 2003, and again from early February through late April of 2004. Although we did not have

access to Clerk of Courts paper files for logistical reasons, we obtained detailed information

from probation paper files, from the computer system, and from Victim/Witness Services files.

The probation files were a particularly rich source of data for two reasons. First, one-half of

each file in adult and juvenile probation duplicated the information in the Clerk of Courts paper

file. Second, probation files were historic, meaning offenders had only one file starting from

their first adult offense (or juvenile offense, in the case of juveniles), no matter how many

subsequent offenses they had.

For adults, the county computer records included sentencing orders, prior offenses,

sentence start and end dates, and economic sanctions information. Detailed economic sanctions

information was available for each case. For juveniles, there was far less data in the computer.

Only formally handled cases (i.e., petitions to court that resulted in adjudications of delinquency)

were entered into the computer and only if there were economic sanctions ordered for that case.

The only information entered was the name and address of the defendant and economic sanctions

details.

Victim/Witness Services files were examined in Cumberland County for both adults and

juveniles. Not all cases with a victim were included, because not all victims chose to receive

services through the Victim/Witness Services office. For adult cases, Victim/Witness files

provided data on victims not otherwise known, in that victims not receiving restitution orders

172

could also be included in Victim/Witness files. For juvenile cases, however, not as many

additional victims were uncovered because victims were often included in juvenile probation

files whether they received orders of restitution or not. In general, the files provided information

about the type of victim (individual, business, insurance company, state agency), the gender of

the victim (when applicable), the status of the victim (adult or child), whether the victim

submitted a victim impact statement, the type of injury (physical, property, psychological), the

victim‟s estimate of loss, and whether the victim enrolled in the state‟s victim notification

program.

Results

Adult Data

Table F-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid

for both the current case and across all cases. Across both models, the total amount of economic

sanctions imposed was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony and significantly

lower for offenders convicted of a drug offense. Furthermore, the percent of economic sanctions

paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a personal, drug, traffic, or other offense.

The percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders,

especially those incarcerated in prison.

Table F-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Cumberland County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1861.26 65.06 4043.15 55.11

Mean n 443 443 441 441

Summary -832.69 -9.76 -1020.33 -2.36

Felony 3325.99*** -10.79a 6167.28*** -10.18

Personal -652.48 15.50* -2295.26a 24.02**

Drug -2265.58** 18.89** -5670.64*** 26.59**

Traffic -65.16 24.17** -3439.48** 35.23***

Other Offense -1070.76 17.43* -3863.35** 27.08**

173

Prison 1882.91 -49.27*** 1322.18 -51.71***

Jail -807.98 -16.27* 610.21 -15.36*

RIP 865.95 -3.38 1281.64 -1.62

No Sentence 482.93 6.62 2885.90a -13.41

Non-White -938.42 -12.13* -1877.63* -6.12

Age 69.90** 0.34a 56.68 0.49*

Male 413.96 -0.35 2255.35* -4.52

Constant -411.65 57.31*** 1482.11 36.54**

R2 0.12 0.19 0.21 0.17

n 387 387 387 387

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table F-2 describes the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and restitution ordered and

the percent paid. The total amount of fines ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of drug or traffic offenses and for offenders incarcerated in prison. None of the

variables significantly predicted the percent of fines paid. The total amount of costs and fees

ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal, traffic, or other offenses

and for offenders incarcerated in prison. The total amount of restitution ordered was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony. Furthermore, the total amount of

restitution ordered and the percent paid was significantly higher for older offenders.

Table F-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Cumberland County

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 444.31 60.83 566.19 173.3 493.35 3111.9 59.87

Mean n 237 237 443 433 443 136 136

Summary 239.11 -12.76 -452.94*** -120.50*** -428.77*** -490.36 -20.71

Felony 74.87 18.94 -16.58 61.73** 29.25 3168.54*** -26.59**

Personal 59.72 -13.59 129.41** 15.12 86.84* -802.71 17.02

Drug 722.97*** -15.79 22.11 17.02 -69.64a -2944.04*** 39.34**

Traffic 410.78* -14.34 454.32*** 202.12*** 298.98*** -990.46 -17.72

Other Offense 145.08 -13.16 81.13* 11.58 14.42 -1256.12 12.89

Prison 717.81* -97.35 290.42*** 18.61 133.91a 1028.17 -18.72

Jail -3.42 -35.76 27.97 1.09 4.41 -815.16 1.70

RIP -105.98 -1.36 8.66 32.76 20.26 903.71 -1.28

No Sentence -365.33 10.13 -6.82 1.20 1.24 804.48 29.00

Non-White 75.05 -23.46 -11.47 -25.73 -13.55 -977.57 -3.21

Age 1.22 0.18 0.86 1.16a 1.28 66.28** 1.13*

174

Male -94.66 2.46 -0.93 9.42 14.33 489.66 -1.59

Constant 11.07 91.98*** 444.47*** 70.34* 414.62*** 909.84 35.34*

R2 0.09 0.32 0.55 0.37 0.41 0.13 0.21

n 387 199 387 387 387 386 127

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table F-3 describes the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and CCC. The total

amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly lower for offenders convicted of a

summary offense, for offenders convicted of a drug offense, and for offenders incarcerated in

prison. The percent of supervision fees paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of

drug or traffic offenses and was significantly lower for offenders incarcerated in prison or

sentenced to RIP. CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed on offenders convicted of a

summary offense and were significantly more likely to be imposed on offenders incarcerated in

jail.

Table F-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Cumberland County

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 261.95 74.25 90.30% 68% 90.30% 68%

Mean n 169 169 444 401 444 401

Summary -109.01** -4.16*** 0.37 -4.16*** 0.37

Felony 112.53*** -3.09 -2.90 -0.47 -2.90 -0.47

Personal -31.32 0.93 -8.27 0.71a -8.27 0.71

a

Drug -84.00* 24.72* 0.41 0.95* 0.41 0.95*

Traffic 48.02 43.00*** -12.94 1.81*** -12.94 1.81***

Other Offense -45.78 21.73a -9.79 0.73

a -9.79 0.73

a

Prison -138.88* -100.14** -0.43 -1.54* -0.43 -1.54*

Jail -22.51 -11.96 3.60** -1.14** 3.60** -1.14**

RIP 58.00 -46.29*** 2.06 -0.65 2.06 -0.65

No Sentence 23.28 1.98 2.67* -0.53 2.67a -0.53

Non-White -27.98 -0.40 0.05 -0.39 0.05 -0.39

Age 1.31 0.29 -0.06 0.03a -0.06 0.03

Male 26.00 6.46 -8.63 0.09 -8.63 0.09

Constant 47.88 43.82** 23.66 0.13 23.66 0.13

R2 0.12 0.44

n 387 159 387 372 387 372

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

175

Juvenile Data

Table F-4 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid

in Cumberland County. The results show that the total amount of economic sanctions ordered

was significantly lower for offenders convicted of a personal offense. However, the total amount

of economic sanctions ordered across all cases was significantly higher for offenders convicted

of a traffic offense and for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent.

Table F-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Cumberland County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 506.13 82.21 619.49 85.43

Mean n 76 71 107 107

Summary -222.91 -463.27 3.03

Felony 151.15a -9.79 -11.30 -0.21

Personal -229.05** -10.02 -238.77a -0.08

Drug -201.02a -1.34 -221.08 4.05

Traffic 78.43 -11.98 777.42* -10.71

Other Offense 1.84 11.74 6.48 12.58

Commitment -62.17 6.04 -193.88 3.62

Adjudicated Delinquent 114.26 -2.78 350.99* -1.23

Age 0.97 3.71 -13.62 4.90**

Male 97.60 -9.88 271.20a -2.66

Constant 104.94 41.80 351.08 11.26

R2 0.153 0.105 0.129 0.123

Adjusted R2 0.099 -0.032 0.073 0.028

n 169 69 166 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table F-5 describes the imposition of costs and fees, restitution, CVC, and CCC. The

results show that the total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a traffic offense. The total amount of restitution ordered was significantly lower for

offenders convicted of a personal offense. Furthermore, CVC was more likely to be imposed

when the offender was convicted of a felony.

176

Table F-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition and Payment of Costs and Fees, Restitution, CVC, and

CCC in Cumberland County23

Costs and Fees Restitution CVC CCC

Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered Ordered

%

Paid If Ordered If Ordered

Mean 92.28 39.93 580.95 83.73 18.70%

Mean n 36 29 58 55 150

Summary -16.71 -10.10 -215.24 -19.21

Felony 12.51 4.36 124.50 -8.01 1.14*

Personal 1.06 -1.20 -213.23** 17.62 -0.42

Drug 9.37 -0.77 -190.02a -13.70 -0.36

Traffic 328.54*** 66.20*** -221.74 0.05 -19.73

Other Offense 8.85 4.10 11.07 14.51 0.56

Commitment 8.48 -0.58 -53.25 -8.23 -19.52

Adjudicated Delinquent 6.75 5.00 104.58 -3.01 -0.48

Age 1.04 0.00 1.41 4.16 0.04

Male -0.91 -0.82 85.58 17.22 -0.65

Constant -15.32 5.02 94.86 9.53 -1.60

R2 0.678 0.175 0.136 0.166

Adjusted R2 0.655 0.115 0.08 -0.009

n 152 148 165 53 147

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

23

Columns were intentionally left blank when the information was unavailable.

177

APPENDIX G

Delaware County

178

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Delaware County has a separate Court

Financial Services (CFS) office that is responsible for the collection of all economic sanctions

ordered by the Court of Common Pleas. CFS staff work closely with other court and county

departments (e.g., Adult Probation and Parole, Diagnostic Services, Children and Youth

Services, Juvenile Court, Community Services, Domestic Relations, and the prison) to collect all

fines, fees, costs, and restitution. To maximize collections, the staff specializes in specific job

functions. For example, one person coordinates efforts with the District Attorney‟s Office and

Adult Probation and Parole, another person sends restitution checks to victims, and yet another

person handles cases with large arrearages.

A case cannot close if an offender still owes restitution. However, a case can close if an

offender owes only court costs, unless it is an ARD case. Judges in Delaware County never

order restitution for insurance companies. However, judges sometimes order restitution for the

police or other state agencies.

Validity of the data. We encountered two problems in Delaware County. First, the

probation department began using a new computer system at the end of 1978 and the beginning

of 1979. As a result, any information we collected about offenders‟ prior convictions goes back

only as far as 1978-1979.

Second, restitution was often described as being “joint and several,” which means that the

amount of restitution owed was split between/among co-defendants. For example, if a judge

ordered two offenders to pay a total of $3,000 in restitution, each offender owed $1,500 in

restitution. Although each offender is required to pay his/her portion of the restitution, it rarely

179

happens. Instead, one offender usually pays more than the other(s) because he/she wants to be

released from probation.

Order of payment. In Delaware County, each time an offender makes a payment 50%

goes toward restitution and 50% goes toward supervision fees, costs, etc. Occasionally,

however, probation officers will request a court order from the sentencing judge ordering that

restitution be paid first.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. If an offender fails to make payments,

the court begins by extending probation and then files a civil judgment against the offender.

Cases dating back to February of 1991 have judgments filed against them that will remain on the

defendant‟s record until satisfied. Defendants who do not have the ability to pay (i.e., because of

incarceration, lack of employment, or disability), however, may perform community service in

return for a reduction in the amount of money they owe.

Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Delaware County handles all juvenile

cases in the same way. There are no informally handled cases. The District Attorney reviews all

cases and those that are accepted are sent to court, where the juvenile either makes an admission

or not and is then either adjudicated delinquent or not. The juvenile probation office has no

record of those cases that are rejected (only the offender‟s name and the date the case was

rejected). Economic sanctions may be assessed to the juvenile, to the parents, or to the county.

Validity of the data. Economic sanctions can be assessed to the juvenile, to the parents,

or to the county. We collected information about the amount of economic sanctions assessed to

the county from the computer files. If economic sanctions information was included in the

probation paper file, we could record the total amount of economic sanctions ordered. However,

180

Juvenile Court implemented a new computer system prior to the year 2000, and anything paid

prior to the conversion did not convert to the new system. As a result, if no economic sanctions

information was available in the probation paper file, the amount we recorded from the computer

file was actually an underestimate.

Order of payment. In Delaware County, payments are applied per court order. In

general, restitution is paid first. Regarding other fines, fees, and costs, older cases are paid

before more recent ones.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. If the offender fails to make payments,

several options are available: the case can be sent to court, community service can be ordered to

cover costs not mandated by the state, or the individual can be referred to an outside collections

agency.

Method

Data collection. We collected data from July to August of 2004. Data for adult cases

was collected from adult probation paper and computer files, as well as Clerk of Courts computer

files. Although we did not have access to Clerk of Courts paper files, these sources provided

detailed information about offenders, charge and conviction offenses, sentences imposed, and

economic sanctions ordered in each case. Data for juvenile cases was collected from juvenile

probation paper and computer files. Because the juvenile probation office tracks juveniles from

the time they enter the criminal justice system until the age of 21, these sources provided detailed

information about juvenile cases.

181

Results

Adult Data

Table G-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid

for both the current case and across all cases. Across both models, the total amount of economic

sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony. Furthermore, the

percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders and for

non-white offenders.

Table G-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Delaware County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1427.46 45.79 3307.38 63.37

Mean n 222 221 225 130

Summary

Felony 1193.99** 6.08 1377.75* 8.49

Personal -724.99a 10.26 -389.95 14.79

Drug -1061.69** 5.00 -593.46 2.90

Traffic -171.56 36.63*** -1566.28* 38.76***

Other Offense -427.48 22.24a -1211.00 17.37

Prison -1220.60a -26.93

a -649.36 -43.96*

Jail -206.96 -32.54*** 1608.86** -33.44***

RIP 222.49 -14.10 1167.39 -27.50*

No Sentence -1493.64 11.13 225.31 -2.77

Non-White 580.67* -19.36** -237.61 -18.63*

Age 16.78a 0.02 18.33 -0.17

Male -15.64 -1.76 500.84 7.92

Constant 1014.23* 53.36*** 2307.67* 62.00***

R2 0.14 0.35 0.14 0.39

n 211 207 211 121

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table G-2 describe the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

restitution ordered and the percent paid. The total amount of fines and state costs and fees

ordered was significantly higher for offenders incarcerated in jail or sentenced to RIP. The total

182

amount of restitution ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony and for

non-white offenders. No factors significantly predicted the percent of fines or restitution paid.

Table G-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Delaware County

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 314.34 45.32 792.98 240.67 827.92 1309.77 53.76

Mean n 56 56 223 221 223 43 43

Summary

Felony 5.33 20.34 -135.15 115.47** -13.27 835.54** 21.67

Personal 17.52 -55.83 73.41 19.33 61.39 -702.58* -14.88

Drug 30.46 -13.51 -252.13a -15.59 -258.64a -812.14** 28.32

Traffic 168.98*** 40.78 47.67 -81.73 -438.54 42.99a

Other Offense 23.91 69.18 -161.59 -10.01 -178.42 -621.13 -4.42

Prison 94.13a -64.80 -174.02 -164.43** -362.35 -801.55

a -23.84

Jail 111.48*** -43.27 -165.98a 93.95*** -113.39 -349.84

a -3.99

RIP 120.69** -25.94 -144.83 135.42** -72.14 -327.58 -68.52

No Sentence -45.58 -617.75 -110.96 -643.45 -655.67

Non-White -18.60 -25.07 53.61 -27.60 27.69 437.28* -28.90a

Age 1.35a -0.38 -1.55 1.38 -1.31 8.18 0.22

Male 22.76 42.78a 173.27 11.43 187.95 -211.82 -17.59

Constant -108.04** 65.27 821.90*** 113.44* 857.97*** 533.97 61.49*

R2 0.44 0.24 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.15 0.45

n 211 55 214 212 212 211 40

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table G-3 describe the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and

CCC. The total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a felony and for offenders incarcerated in jail or sentenced to RIP. No factors

significantly predicted the imposition of CVC and CCC.

183

Table G-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Delaware County

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 554.78 30.47 97.30% 43.60% 97.30% 43.60%

Mean n 116 116 226 220 226 220

Summary

Felony 252.39*** -1.33 11.66 0.75 11.66 0.53

Personal 10.14 7.78 10.76 -0.03 10.76 -0.05

Drug -46.78 9.95 -0.95 -0.09 -0.95 -0.24

Traffic -47.30 40.92** 39.36 1.85** 39.36 1.81**

Other Offense -33.36 33.82** 12.58 0.80 12.58 1.20

Prison -388.46** 10.72 -1.16 10.72 -0.97

Jail 161.78*** -8.93 -2.82 -2.00*** -2.82 -2.10***

RIP 201.07* 17.16 0.03 -1.24a 0.03 -1.70*

No Sentence -160.78 47.71 -40.65 3.35 -40.65 3.20

Non-White -57.55 3.25 0.01 -0.53 0.01 -0.67a

Age 1.65 0.44 0.56 -0.01 0.56 -0.01

Male 27.82 -7.62 -11.90 -0.13 -11.90 -0.08

Constant 150.04a 3.30 3.48 0.47 3.48 0.60

R2 0.22 0.2

n 211 108 212 208 212 208

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Juvenile Data

The results presented in Table G-4 describe the total amount of economic sanctions

ordered and the percent paid in Delaware County. For the current case, the total amount of

economic sanctions ordered was significantly lower for offenders convicted of a personal, drug,

or other offense. The percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly lower for offenders

convicted of a summary offense and significantly higher for older offenders.

Table G-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Delaware County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 294.14 48.03 1303.49 50.32

Mean n 162 150 177 83

Summary -34.92 -60.96** 508.38 -40.39

Felony -28.56 -2.26 -110.18 0.81

Personal -171.56** -3.94 -330.13 -5.68

Drug -150.22** -16.16 59.98 7.87

184

Traffic -104.62 28.63 -342.02 38.07

Other Offense -155.41* 16.02 -100.04 14.19

Commitment 12.08 -19.08a 180.11 -0.23

Adjudicated Delinquent -26.36 2.79 523.94 -1.13

Age -15.55 5.88* -82.56 5.58a

Male 42.43 9.79 889.05** -11.67

Constant 639.54** -44.46 1505.72 -26.70

R2 0.13 0.143 0.105 0.177

Adjusted R2 0.06 0.071 0.041 0.04

n 144 130 152 71

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table G-5 describes the imposition of costs and fees, restitution, CVC, and CCC. The

results show that the total amount of restitution ordered was significantly lower for offenders

convicted of a personal or drug offense and for older offenders.

Table G-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition and Payment of Costs and Fees, Restitution, CVC, and

CCC in Delaware County24

Costs and Fees Restitution CVC CCC

Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered Ordered

%

Paid If Ordered If Ordered

Mean 139.8 2.7 221.38 470.97

Mean n 133 106 81 24

Summary -69.99 -1.82 -80.55 10.77

Felony -5.04 1.70* -16.69 -42.22

Personal 20.16 -0.74 13.65 -240.93***

Drug 13.23 -0.54 12.14 -185.45**

Traffic 100.49 -1.26 98.47 -157.45

Other Offense 6.12 0.48 0.15 -154.65a

Commitment -5.34 0.70 -2.83 4.08

Adjudicated Delinquent -30.54 -7.06** -31.44 20.37

Age 0.29 0.18 0.33 -40.65**

Male 4.05 1.04 0.50 27.29

Constant 118.38 5.56 122.85 833.00**

R2 0.037 0.172 0.046 0.222

Adjusted R2 -0.03 0.079 -0.02 0.149

n 156 100 156 118

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

24

Columns were intentionally left blank when the information was unavailable.

185

APPENDIX H

Lancaster County

186

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Lancaster County launched the

Collections Enforcement Unit (CEU) in January of 2001, following the recommendations of a

task force created when the President Judge took office in 1999. The task force felt it was

important for collections enforcement to have the power of probation officers (i.e., to modify

payment plans and enforcement). The CEU, which is part of the adult probation department, is

currently working on collections enforcement of cases on active probation. If an adult offender

still owes money on a juvenile case, the unit will attempt to collect what remains on the juvenile

case. It is the responsibility of probation officers to decide probationers‟ payment plans, but

probationers make payments to the treasurer‟s office. Each of the four probation officers who

work in the CEU have a caseload of about 2500 probationers, while supervisors have caseloads

of about 700 probationers.

On July 1, 2001, Victim Witness started handling restitution orders for victims. Prior to

that, restitution orders were handled by adult probation after the hearing.

Validity of the data. In January of 2001, the courts converted to a new computer system

and all existing computerized data on economic sanctions was assigned to one of the following

categories: state costs and fines, county costs and fines, local costs and fines, supervision fees,

and restitution. This was the case for most docket year 2000 cases. We recorded information

about specific economic sanctions from the costs and fines accounting sheets in the Clerk of

Courts paper files. Because these forms were completed at sentencing, supervision fees

estimates were usually low. Data on supervision fees was taken from computer records. Any

post-conviction economic sanctions (e.g., charged incurred for probation or parole violations)

187

assessed were recorded separately in the computer and Clerk of Courts paper files. These

economic sanctions were included in the total amount ordered on a case. Some cases, if the

offender paid in full at the time of sentencing, did not have their economic sanctions information

entered into the computer system and therefore all information was gathered from the costs and

fines accounting sheets.

Date of first conviction was relatively unreliable. Although we could usually see what

year a conviction occurred, we rarely found a specific date of conviction. Also, we could only

find in the computer convictions starting in 1980. As a result, our data regarding date of first

conviction may be underestimates. Number of prior convictions was recorded from the PCS

sentencing guideline forms, but was amended if the number of prior convictions in the computer

was higher.

Order of payment. By order of the President Judge, offenders first pay a $10/month

probation administration fee, followed by 100% of restitution, costs and fees, and probation

supervision fees. Lancaster County started collecting administrative fees in January of 2001 to

help fund the CEU. Regarding restitution, individual victims are paid first, followed by

businesses, government agencies, and insurance companies. Within each victim category,

payments of restitution are split evenly across victims. Regarding court costs, payments are

applied evenly across costs, once probation administration fees and restitution are paid in full.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. If probationers fail to make payments,

the CEU has a four-stage process to collect the money they owe. First, the probationer receives a

past due notice. If there is no response to the past due notice and the probationer is on active

probation, a CEU staff member will “drop in” on the next regularly scheduled probation meeting,

but only for probationers supervised in the city of Lancaster. Offenders supervised in satellite

188

offices have to come in to meet with CEU officers. Third, CEU sends a delinquency letter, at

which point probationers have to meet with a CEU probation officer. The fourth step depends on

whether the case is active or inactive. If the case is inactive, CEU files contempt charges. If the

case is active, CEU schedules a violation hearing. In the past, there were over 100 violation

hearings a month. However, cases rarely reach this stage now (i.e., only about 12 cases a

month).

CEU computer records date back to 1980. All cases from the 1980s with money owed,

which amounts to approximately $2.4 million, have been turned over to a private collections

agency. If the collections agency is unsuccessful, however, Lancaster County will not pursue

these cases further. On September 22, 2003, the CEU turned over an additional 6,000 cases from

1990-2001 to a private collections agency. These cases were chosen because they were not

actively supervised, no payment had been made for 90 days, and/or they had no payment plan in

place. Some of the cases sent to a private collections agency were for incarcerated offenders.

Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Lancaster County has about 1,500

juvenile cases per year, 600 of which are handled informally. In informally handled cases,

juveniles receive six months of informal probation, but may also be sentenced to community

service, counseling, or restitution, which is usually handled through the Victim-Offender

Reconciliation Program (VORP) office. Informally handled cases are not included in court

docket files. A case is moved to non-supervised probation if all terms of the sentence are

fulfilled except payment of economic sanctions. Technically, all juveniles who complete their

supervision are on non-supervised probation until the age of 21.

189

Most other cases are petitioned to court. If the juvenile commits a serious offense, the

probation officer conducts a background investigation and then goes to court with a

recommendation. In most cases, the offender is adjudicated delinquent and, at minimum,

receives a sentence of probation. Offenders may also be adjudicated dependent instead of or in

addition to being adjudicated delinquent. Lancaster County does not use consent decrees. As a

last resort, a juvenile may be certified to adult court. In these cases, juvenile probation goes to

the judge and asks that a case be moved to the adult system. If a case is decertified from adult

court, juvenile probation does not become involved until the case is decertified, which is

typically seven to nine months after the offense.

In informally handled cases, no economic sanctions are ordered except for restitution (if

applicable). Juveniles pay economic sanctions per petition number, not per conviction offense.

According to juvenile probation, juveniles are sentenced to approximately $130 per petition

number. Although the Clerk of Courts office compiles the bill for court costs, payments are

made to the treasurer. Juveniles are not fined at the Court of Common Pleas level, but fines can

be assessed at the District Justice level.

Validity of the data. The juvenile data gathered depended on whether the case was

handled informally or was petitioned to the court. For informally handled cases, all data was

collected from the juvenile probation files. For cases petitioned to the court, data was gathered

from the Clerk of Courts paper files and computer records, although the information available in

the computer was very limited.

Order of payment. Although the economic sanctions are handled through different

systems, juveniles are supposed to pay 100% of restitution before paying any other economic

sanction. Restitution orders and payments for juveniles are not in the computer system.

190

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. Lancaster County does not pursue

payment from the parents if the juvenile does not pay. For both informal adjustments and

adjudications of delinquency, juvenile probation takes over payment of restitution if the VORP

process is not successful at resolving restitution issues. Juvenile probation contacts victims to

determine the amount of restitution owed and then collects it from the juvenile. Although

parents are not responsible for paying a juvenile‟s restitution, they can pay it if they want.

Method

Sampling. In addition to the 530 adult cases from calendar year 2000, we also collected

an additional sample of 2001 adult criminal cases in Lancaster County. We collected data on

cases from the second half of 2001 in order to evaluate the effectiveness of the Collections

Enforcement Unit that was created within probation and started enforcing collections in January

of 2001. Sampling followed the same procedures used for year 2000 cases. The six-month

sample from year 2001 has 170 cases.

Data collection. Data collection was undertaken from July to September of 2003. Data

for adult cases was gathered from Clerk of Courts paper files and from the county computer

system. Unfortunately, a new computer system was implemented in January of 2001, and in the

conversion from the old system, existing economic sanctions were combined. What remained

were five general categories: state fees/costs/fines, county fees/costs/fines, local fees/costs/fines,

supervision fees, and restitution. We recorded information about specific economic sanctions

from the costs and fines accounting forms in the Clerk of Courts paper files.

Data collection for juvenile cases depended on how the case was handled. For formally

handled cases, data was available in Clerk of Court paper files and in the county computer

system. For informally handled cases, data was available only in juvenile probation records.

191

Results

Adult Data

Table H-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid

for both the current case and across all cases. The total amount of economic sanctions ordered

was significantly higher for offenders incarcerated in prison. The percent of economic sanctions

paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders.

Table H-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Lancaster County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1864.41 42.81 5783.52 46.45

Mean n 475 475 483 483

Summary -956.13 -12.57 -150.25 -8.00

Felony -306.03 -1.84 1273.56 -10.22a

Personal -1021.39 19.20* -5567.84** 20.17**

Drug -802.83 6.01 -4329.15* 1.56

Traffic -535.06 41.55*** -6305.13*** 27.50***

Other Offense -1135.06 14.55 -3554.49 9.65

Prison 5292.24*** -28.19* 10653.29** -22.99*

Jail -611.93 -25.35*** 554.53 -15.63***

RIP -612.05 -15.33 485.09 -0.39

No Sentence -1294.40 21.44a -2774.98 11.78

Non-White -87.26 -13.58* -1562.32 -14.33**

Age 11.93 0.28 40.68 0.55**

Male 662.14 -1.41 2079.17 4.21

Constant 1617.00 32.29** 5967.61* 27.03***

R2 0.06 0.21 0.11 0.28

n 373 363 373 367

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table H-2 describe the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

restitution ordered and the percent paid. The total amount of fines ordered was significantly

higher for offenders convicted of a drug offense and for offenders incarcerated in prison.

Overall, the total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

192

convicted of a felony and for offenders convicted of a traffic offense. The percent of costs and

fees and restitution paid was significantly lower for incarcerated offenders.

Table H-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Lancaster County25

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 506.59 413.25 233.81 469.7 2523.91 33.64

Mean n 355 466 474 477 114 114

Summary 105.99 -225.65* -145.97* -388.99** -562.97 52.52

Felony 70.21 102.28** 34.14 114.61* -467.96 -14.61

Personal -104.27 20.75 88.63** 77.97 -915.05 11.98

Drug 728.28** -10.68 7.23 -49.26 -1571.74a 27.89

Traffic 349.02 527.23*** 194.67*** 576.89*** -1607.41* -5.05

Other Offense 198.68 61.63 45.21 90.59 -1421.57 1.15

Prison 3119.19*** 5.66 -103.22* -136.75 2108.87 -43.50*

Jail 125.19 -136.15*** -38.35a -208.59*** -519.63 -22.60

a

RIP 215.62 -173.89* -103.84a -367.66** -442.56

No Sentence -296.85 -186.57*** -73.33* -261.74*** -421.80 -56.86

Non-White 322.20 -20.08 -44.20* -83.32a -344.89 6.95

Age -5.70 0.36 -0.04 -0.22 19.78 0.54

Male 50.79 17.78 -16.14 -12.42 589.83 -2.45

Constant 22.45 274.21*** 195.36*** 414.05*** 784.02 35.05a

R2 0.21 0.52 0.25 0.42 0.03 0.23

n 372 373 373 373 373 92

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table H-3 describe the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and

CCC. The total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of personal or traffic offenses, for non-incarcerated offenders, and for white offenders.

The percent of supervision fees paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of personal

or traffic offenses. CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed when the offender was

convicted of a drug offense.

25

Columns were intentionally left blank when the information was unavailable.

193

Table H-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Lancaster County

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 657.72 57.46 91% 91%

Mean n 217 217 493 493

Summary -310.16* 21.09 -0.67 -0.81

Felony 47.05 3.98 1.98* 1.70a

Personal 148.06* 24.59* 1.42 1.06

Drug -32.59 0.53 -1.25* -1.55**

Traffic 244.42*** 31.74*** 0.27 -0.09

Other Offense 74.03 2.71 -0.15 -0.53

Prison -239.14* 17.13 -0.74 -0.51

Jail -110.06* -22.47** 0.06 0.34

RIP -297.58* 15.29 6.06 6.04

No Sentence -148.35a -14.10 0.22 0.23

Non-White -106.63* -4.16 -0.02 -0.19

Age -0.64 0.25 -0.03 -0.03

Male -46.00 5.11 -0.15 0.03

Constant 335.67*** 38.35** 3.17*** 3.35***

R2 0.15 0.19

n 372 168 493 493

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Pooled Analyses

In Lancaster County, we collected a second sample of cases from the year 2001. The

following discussion describes the results of the pooled analyses. Table H-4 describes the total

amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid for both the current case and across

all cases. The results of the pooled analyses are essentially the same as the results from the 2000

sample. The total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher for offenders

incarcerated in prison. Furthermore, the percent paid was significantly lower for incarcerated

offenders and for non-white offenders.

194

Table H-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Lancaster County, Pooled Analyses

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1900.84 43.27 5296.23 46.26

Mean n 623 622 633 632

Summary -861.99 -8.08 -427.65 -4.38

Felony 668.57 0.23 2147.09 -5.67

Personal -1613.78 18.77* -5511.56** 19.30***

Drug -1515.44 11.57 -4294.26* 8.52

Traffic -633.81 45.69*** -5450.69*** 29.59***

Other Offense -1636.09 13.64a -3747.54* 6.52

Prison 3579.69* -29.84* 7800.60** -27.27**

Jail -186.28 -27.10*** 1113.66 -16.38***

RIP -213.57 -14.07 1559.64 2.95

No Sentence -946.25 11.57 -1720.11 8.24

Non-White 927.64 -17.35* -182.09 -16.68***

Age -2.43 0.30 21.90 0.53***

Male 898.28 0.32 2012.04 2.81

Year 402.86 -3.11 -1409.56 -5.74

Constant 1601.20 29.83** 5691.56** 27.75***

R2 0.04 0.23 0.1 0.28

n 505 491 505 495

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table H-5 describe the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

restitution ordered and the percent paid.26

The total amount of fines ordered was significantly

higher for offenders convicted of drug offenses and for offenders incarcerated in prison. The

total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a

felony and for offenders convicted of traffic offenses. Furthermore, the total amount of costs and

fees ordered was significantly higher in 2001 than in 2000. The total amount of restitution

ordered was significantly lower for offenders convicted of drug offenses. The percent of

restitution paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of drug offenses and for non-

incarcerated offenders.

26

In Lancaster County, the costs and fees categories are underestimates compared to the other counties.

195

Table H-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Lancaster County, Pooled Sample

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 457.34 433.82 242.32 493.74 2731.88 31.46

Mean n 458 613 619 624 153 150

Summary 108.53 -167.66* -126.65* -306.27** -626.27 68.23

Felony 37.82 120.07*** 33.77 137.89** 530.82 -3.50

Personal -164.30 5.40 66.29* 52.54 -1370.29 19.52

Drug 635.62** -13.25 16.45 -40.47 -2121.49* 41.01*

Traffic 286.48 566.06*** 185.57*** 618.40*** -1627.21a -2.88

Other Offense 172.73 40.27 45.22 61.10 -1806.33a -7.88

Prison 2855.15*** 19.45 -112.35** -161.28a 814.05 -47.59**

Jail 148.78 -162.26*** -45.77* -237.73*** -67.92 -25.83**

RIP 288.64 -187.63** -45.18 -295.99*** -209.27

No Sentence -293.02 -182.47*** -99.19** -262.51*** -92.30 -55.18

Non-White 276.02a -28.50 -53.89** -88.52* 753.19 -1.71

Age -6.79 -0.19 -0.38 -0.83 7.47 0.48

Male 60.59 23.49 -15.66 2.76 819.13 6.58

Year 0.00 66.37** 36.45* 75.22* 478.82 -5.70

Constant 111.25 284.60*** 215.73*** 417.42*** 586.41 26.89

R2 0.19 0.57 0.26 0.48 0.03 0.18

n 459 500 500 501 499 122

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table H-6 describe the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and

CCC. The total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a personal or traffic offense, for non-incarcerated offenders, and for white

offenders. Furthermore, the total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher in

2001 than in 2000.27

Table H-6. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Lancaster County, Pooled Sample

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 620.35 62.11 93% 93%

Mean n 311 257 632 607

Summary -302.78* 22.05 -0.67 -0.81

Felony 59.31 1.26 1.98* 1.70a

27

The amount of supervision fees ordered is significantly higher in 2001 than in 2000 because, starting in January of

2001, the President Judge added a $10 a month administration fee.

196

Personal 136.82* 21.60* 1.42 1.06

Drug -15.80 0.77 -1.25* -1.55**

Traffic 231.27*** 28.12*** 0.27 -0.09

Other Offense 65.63 -1.88 -0.15 -0.53

Prison -240.77* 20.60 -0.74 -0.51

Jail -89.00* -21.05** 0.06 0.34

RIP -205.37* -0.26 7.11 7.08

No Sentence -146.06* -8.67 0.22 0.23

Non-White -128.85** -9.03 -0.02 -0.19

Age -1.11 0.14 -0.03 -0.03

Male -40.45 5.78 -0.15 0.03

Year 179.42*** 23.03** 7.75 7.51

Constant 342.83*** 44.29*** 3.17*** 3.35***

R2 0.19 0.24

n 462 205 496 476

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Juvenile Data

The results presented in Table H-7 describe the total amount of economic sanctions

ordered and the percent paid in Lancaster County. The total amount of economic sanctions

ordered was significantly higher for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent. For the current

case, the percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly higher for offenders convicted of

personal or drug offenses and significantly lower for committed offenders.

Table H-7. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Lancaster County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 868.23 55.23 1749.16 54.32

Mean n 139 132 133 133

Summary -1033.68 -9.89 -2833.07 -6.78

Felony -276.87 -10.12 520.75 -10.17

Personal -1383.60 38.07** -1409.21 29.98

Drug -1549.59 23.71* 187.98 10.90

Traffic -1809.06 33.99 -2502.89 50.95

Other Offense -361.95 19.81 1730.96 8.88

Commitment -204.81 -21.87* -183.64 -12.94

Adjudicated Delinquent -5269.46** -5.28 -11436.45*** -0.51

Age 401.47 4.68a 719.43

a 3.14

Male 1457.20 14.48 1683.94 5.56

Constant -1130.84 -38.63 -28.26 -8.12

R2 0.092 0.2 0.138 0.135

197

Adjusted R2 0.011 0.121 0.054 0.049

n 123 112 113 112

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table H-8 describes the imposition and payment of costs and fees, restitution, CVC, and

CCC. The results show that the total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher

for offenders convicted of a personal offense. The total amount of state costs and fees ordered,

however, was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a traffic offense. The total amount

of restitution ordered was significantly lower for offenders who were adjudicated delinquent.

Table H-8. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition and Payment of Costs and Fees, Restitution, CVC, and

CCC in Lancaster County

Costs and Fees Restitution CVC CCC

Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered Ordered

%

Paid If Ordered If Ordered

Mean 117.67 39.29 65.19 3035.11 82% 82%

Mean n 137 126 136 32 147 147

Summary 65.46a 0.66 26.59 -1182.64 2.30 2.06

Felony -6.08 0.42 2.27 -440.47 0.65 1.76

Personal 35.18* -2.20 8.93 -1647.05 -0.32 0.76

Drug 8.77 -4.97 6.10 -1389.16 18.81 0.82

Traffic 41.79 31.96*** 19.95 -2049.45 18.48 18.63

Other Offense 12.50 0.71 -1.15 -336.67 -3.30* -2.70*

Commitment 19.48 -1.08 14.55a -289.45 -2.92* -1.57

Adjudicated Delinquent 19.89 0.48 3.90 -5784.68** 4.22*** 3.80***

Age 0.38 0.89 -1.40 465.86 0.02 -0.11

Male 9.41 -0.26 -4.32 1629.85 0.46 0.74

Constant 68.12 26.09* 78.35* -1929.26 -0.76 0.56

R2 0.127 0.263 0.09 0.103

Adjusted R2 0.043 0.19 0 0.013

n 115 112 114 111 125 125

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

198

APPENDIX I

Luzerne County

199

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult and Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. Luzerne County has a special restitution

enforcement office that collects restitution and supervision fees for both adults and juveniles.

However, costs and fines are handled elsewhere. Although this specialized unit operates

independently, it usually works closely with the adult probation department to improve the

collection of economic sanctions. After sentencing, offenders go to the probation office and

meet with a probation officer and a restitution officer. During this meeting, the officers establish

a payment plan based on the offender‟s financial situation. Although restitution and supervision

fees are handled by the same office, adult offenders have to make two separate payments (i.e.,

one payment for restitution and one payment for supervision fees). In contrast, juvenile

offenders make only one payment, which is then dispersed to the appropriate places. A staff

member informed us that restitution receives priority when dispersing these payments.

In the year 2000, Luzerne County did not order juveniles to pay court costs. However,

most juveniles were ordered to pay fines, which were to be paid immediately (or at least within

two months). When only fines were imposed, most juveniles did not receive a monthly payment

plan. If a juvenile was on probation, however, he/she was required to have a payment plan for

fines, fees, and restitution. As a condition of probation, all juveniles must either attend

school/job training or find employment. If a juvenile is employed, 75% of his/her wages goes

toward restitution and fines. Furthermore, any money earned while in a placement facility (e.g.,

boot camp) goes toward what the juvenile owes. Juveniles are responsible for paying restitution,

fines, costs, and supervision fees, while parents are responsible for placement costs, detention,

electronic monitoring, and psychological evaluations.

200

Validity of the data. For both adults and juveniles, cases were often combined. As a

result, sentencing information and economic sanctions information were combined across cases.

Offense dates, arrest dates, and incarceration dates were also combined across cases. By

comparing information across different databases, we were usually able to separate out the

sentencing information for each case. However, information about supervision fees, restitution

amounts, and some dates may be inaccurate.

Order of payment. In the year 2000, the collection of economic sanctions was split

between the Clerk of Courts Office and the Probation Office. The Probation Office collected

supervision fees and restitution and the Clerk of Courts Office collected costs and fines. Each

time an offender made a payment to the Probation Office, 50% of the payment was applied to

restitution and 50% of the payment was applied to supervision fees.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. The Clerk of Courts sends each offender

a bill for all court costs and fines. If the offender is unable to pay, he/she must contact the Clerk

of Courts to negotiate a payment plan. If offenders miss payments while on probation, they may

have their probation or parole revoked. If the offender is no longer on probation but still owes

money, he/she may be held in contempt of court for nonpayment. A staff member informed us

that the restitution office has an 86% collection rate for fees and restitution. They also informed

us that they occasionally use outside collection agencies for people who are no longer on

probation but still owe money for fees and restitution.

A staff member informed us that juveniles who failed to pay their fines on time or who

failed to make payments according to their payment plan were sent to detention until someone

paid their fines. Because most juvenile cases were for nonpayment of fines, this outcome seems

201

fairly common. However, it is at the judge‟s discretion which juveniles are sent to detention for

nonpayment of fines.

Method

Data collection. We collected data in Luzerne County from July to September of 2003.

For adult cases, we collected data from Clerk of Courts paper and computer files, probation

computer files, and the restitution collection unit‟s computer files. These sources allowed us to

collect detailed information about offenders, charge and conviction offenses, sentences, and

economic sanctions for each adult case. However, three problems limited data collection for

adults. First, Victim/Witness Services did not have any case-specific information from the year

2000. As a result, we were unable to collect detailed victim information. Second, adult cases

were frequently combined in the Clerk of Courts and adult probation computer systems, meaning

that sentencing information and data on economic sanctions were combined from multiple cases.

In these cases, we were unable to collect complete information about a particular case. Third,

PCS sentencing guideline forms were rarely available in Clerk of Courts paper files. As a result,

we were unable to collect several types of information, including the Prior Record Score (PRS)

and the Offense Gravity Score (OGS). To compensate for this limitation, we recorded the

number of prior convictions listed in the Clerk of Courts computer system. However, these

records likely underestimate the true number of prior convictions for each offender.

In general, we were able to collect only limited amounts of juvenile data in Luzerne

County. The juvenile probation computer system and the juvenile probation paper files offered

detailed information about the offenders‟ backgrounds, charges, and sentences. However,

juvenile probation files were missing for 100 (40%) of the cases.

202

Two other data sources in Luzerne County had important information about juvenile

cases. The juvenile book records contain complete information on the charges, convictions,

disposition, and sentence given for each juvenile case. Additionally, the Restitution Collection

Unit‟s computer system contains almost all of the information on economic sanctions imposed

and collected for juvenile cases because outstanding juvenile balances are frequently turned over

to this unit. However, we were unable to collect information from these data sources due to time

and resource constraints. As a result, we collected only limited information on economic

sanctions imposed and collected for juvenile cases. Additionally, our sentencing data may be

incomplete for some juvenile cases.

203

APPENDIX J

Westmoreland County

204

Collection of Economic Sanctions

Adult Data

Organization of collections and supervision. In Westmoreland County, the Clerk of

Courts Office is responsible for the collection of all court-ordered economic sanctions.

However, the Adult Probation Office is responsible for enforcing the collection of all court-

ordered economic sanctions. Offenders are ordered to pay restitution, fines, fees, and costs as

part of their sentencing order. After offenders are processed through intake in the Adult

Probation Office, a payment plan is established. Offenders are required, as a condition of their

probation, to pay off all economic sanctions owed.

Validity of the data. Data for adult cases was collected from probation paper files and

Clerk of Courts computer files. We did not collect data from probation computer files because

they provided less information than probation paper files and were therefore unnecessary. We

did not have access to Clerk of Courts paper files.

Order of payment. In Westmoreland County, payments made by offenders are applied

in the following order: (a) restitution, (b) electronic monitoring fees, then (c) supervision fees,

fines, costs.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. When offenders fail to make payments,

Westmoreland County uses a four-stage process to collect the money they owe. First, the

offender receives a warning letter asking for payment. Second, the offender has a technical

violation hearing before a hearing officer in Adult Probation. Third, the offender has a

revocation hearing before a judge. Fourth, the offender is turned over to a private collections

agency.

205

Juvenile Data

Organization of collections and supervision. In Westmoreland County, the Clerk of

Courts Office is responsible for the collection of restitution, fines and costs. After the juvenile

has completed his/her court hearing and restitution, fines, and costs have been ordered, the Clerk

of Courts Office sends an invoice to the juvenile. The Juvenile Probation Office is responsible

for charging supervision fees for all juveniles on electronic monitoring.

Validity of the data. In Westmoreland County, the Juvenile Probation Office was

located in a separate building across town, rather than in the courthouse. Because of time

constraints, we collected information about juvenile cases from only Clerk of Courts paper files.

The Clerk of Courts Office assigns each juvenile one file number for his/her entire juvenile

history. Within each file, however, different cases have different referral numbers.

Juvenile docket files in the Clerk of Courts Office go back as far as 1999. Because Clerk

of Courts paper files were organized by time (i.e., by when the juvenile entered the system), we

could not obtain a list of all cases for the year 2000. Instead, we sampled every other case.

Then, for each juvenile, we selected his/her first case from the year 2000. Although Clerk of

Courts paper files included information about both delinquent and dependent children, we

excluded dependency cases from our sample.

Order of payment. Each time an offender makes a payment, the first $50 is paid to the

Crime Victim Compensation fund. Restitution is paid next, followed by state and county costs.

Procedures used in the event of nonpayment. If an offender fails to complete his/her

payments, the type of action taken depends on the case (i.e., on whether the juvenile has the

means to pay, is old enough to work, etc.). The Juvenile Probation Office either violates the

206

juvenile and brings him/her back to court or issues a judgment against the juvenile. In

Westmoreland County, they never close a case with outstanding restitution and costs.

Method

Data collection. We collected data from June to October of 2004. Data for adult cases

was collected from probation paper files and Clerk of Courts computer files. We did not collect

data from probation computer files because they provided less information than probation paper

files and were therefore unnecessary. We did not have access to Clerk of Courts paper files.

Due to time constraints and a lack of resources, data for juvenile cases was collected from

only Clerk of Courts paper files. As a result, we obtained only limited information about

juvenile cases in Westmoreland County. One of the problems we encountered working in the

Clerk of Courts office was that we could not obtain a list of all cases (i.e., formally and

informally handled cases) in the year 2000. Furthermore, the files contained in the Clerk of

Courts office included both delinquent and dependent cases. For the purpose of this study, we

excluded all dependency cases.

Results

Adult Data

Table J-1 describes the total amount of economic sanctions ordered and the percent paid.

The results show that the total amount of economic sanctions ordered was significantly higher

for offenders convicted of a felony.

Table J-1. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Westmoreland County28

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 1470.8 64.63

Mean n 394 236

28

Columns were intentionally left blank when the information was unavailable.

207

Summary -374.22 -74.63

Felony 3012.84*** -17.43

Personal -882.59 20.72

Drug -1397.95 8.35

Traffic -186.66 34.88

Other Offense 240.06 -4.98

Prison 352.22

Jail 876.92 -33.86

RIP 476.76 39.07

No Sentence -304.91 57.09

Non-White -1019.70 -12.83

Age 46.67a -0.51

Male -959.70 26.39

Constant 371.15 46.45

R2 0.08 0.05

n 350 224

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table J-2 describe the total amount of fines, costs and fees, and

restitution ordered and the percent paid. The total amount of fines ordered was significantly

higher for offenders incarcerated in prison. The total amount of costs and fees ordered was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony, for offenders convicted of a traffic

offense, and for offenders sentenced to RIP. The total amount of restitution ordered was

significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony.

Table J-2. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Fines, Costs and Fees, and Restitution Ordered and

the Percent Paid in Westmoreland County

Fines Costs and Fees Restitution

Ordered % Paid Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered

Ordered % Paid

Mean 557.13 58.06 342.28 204.23 309.13 1940.88 58.44

Mean n 89 31 354 353 353 148 79

Summary 387.49 -19.99 -300.52** -152.02* -252.94* -92.31

Felony -3.09 11.69 155.53** 65.48* 183.47*** 2716.44** -15.04

Personal -108.61 60.33 91.29** 123.39* -1098.46 37.05a

Drug 106.77 81.88 -1.84 34.54 -16.94 -1536.19 19.10

Traffic 150.19 50.83 147.37** 134.87*** 70.50 -595.83 19.09

Other Offense 17.48 48.50 17.67 67.08a 30.63 139.30 -3.39

Prison 3631.33*** -334.73** -172.97* -430.27** -1393.50

Jail 110.08 -19.34 16.33 6.85 -64.22 810.64 -27.81a

RIP 83.04 8.36 283.62*** 77.35** 262.95*** -25.21 -28.279*

No Sentence -156.19 44.37 23.51 -82.12 -66.59 38.79

208

Non-White 111.44 28.58 1.27 0.29 3.02 -1248.59 0.63

Age 0.89 0.63 0.30 1.54a 1.20 50.17

a 1.21*

Male 9.35 22.25 24.60 11.29 -3.25 -941.21 14.70

Constant -73.02 -40.57 159.84* 42.36 168.13* -57.01 6.89

R2 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.2 0.21 0.08 0.36

n 290 28 342 342 342 324 75

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

The results presented in Table J-3 describe the imposition of supervision fees, CVC, and

CCC. The total amount of supervision fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a felony, for offenders convicted of a personal or traffic offense, and for offenders

sentenced to RIP. CVC and CCC were less likely to be imposed when the offender was

convicted of a summary offense and when the offender was incarcerated in prison.

Table J-3. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Supervision Fees, CVC, and CCC Ordered and the

Percent Paid in Westmoreland County

Supervision Fees CVC CCC

Ordered % Paid If Ordered Paid in Full If Ordered Paid in Full

Mean 392.43 47.51 86.30% 60% 84.40% 60.10%

Mean n 165 157 372 180 372 173

Summary -188.71 -2.28* -2.26*

Felony 104.01* -14.65 0.61 -0.13 0.31 0.05

Personal 209.25*** 44.57** -0.19 1.01a -0.27 1.09

a

Drug 19.56 33.28** 0.66 0.75 0.26 0.68

Traffic 114.29* 31.88* -0.14 1.10* -0.25 1.04*

Other Offense 102.02 7.01 1.00 0.44 0.99 0.61

Prison -349.79* -2.50* -1.93a

Jail -48.02 -29.07** 0.10 -0.88* 0.10 -0.90*

RIP 86.69* 8.90 -0.58 -0.38 -0.46 -0.45

No Sentence -123.83 -0.86 4.27 -0.68 4.42

Non-White 55.65 3.97 0.12 -0.52 0.07 -0.65

Age 2.56a -0.08 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01

Male -8.99 8.12 0.13 1.35** 0.23 1.15*

Constant 42.99 21.84 1.16 -1.38a 0.99 -1.40

a

R2 0.14 0.21

n 274 151 340 171 340 165

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

209

Juvenile Data

The results presented in Table J-4 describe the total amount of economic sanctions

ordered and the percent paid in Westmoreland County. The total amount of economic sanctions

ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony and for older offenders. The

percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly higher for older offenders and for offenders

who were adjudicated delinquent. The percent of economic sanctions paid was significantly

lower for committed offenders.

Table J-4. Regression Analyses Predicting the Total Amount of Economic Sanctions Ordered and the Percent Paid

in Westmoreland County

Total Current Case Total All Cases

Ordered % Paid Ordered % Paid

Mean 314.16 93.01

Mean n 127 45

Summary

Felony 471.86* -15.86

Personal -9.74 -1.92

Drug -349.88a 18.18

Traffic -331.50 2.76

Other Offense -96.12 6.40

Commitment -393.72 -31.07*

Adjudicated Delinquent 119.45 21.57*

Age 121.93** 4.96*

Male -97.29 -8.97

Constant -1544.64* 15.16

R2 0.196 0.334

Adjusted R2 0.119 0.141

n 104 41

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

Table J-5 describes the imposition of costs and fees, restitution, CVC, and CCC. The

results show that the total amount of costs and fees ordered was significantly higher for offenders

convicted of a traffic offense and for committed offenders. The total amount of restitution

ordered was significantly higher for offenders convicted of a felony. The results also show that

CVC and CCC were imposed in three-quarters of all cases.

210

Table J-5. Regression Analyses Predicting the Imposition and Payment of Costs and Fees, Restitution, CVC, and

CCC in Westmoreland County

Costs and Fees Restitution CVC CCC

Total

Ordered

State

Ordered

County

Ordered Ordered

%

Paid If Ordered If Ordered

Mean 84.85 47.65 31.99 703.72 76.50% 75.80%

Mean n 125 103 121 41 132 132

Summary

Felony 5.82 3.75 -7.25a 920.29* 0.18 0.11

Personal 10.20 -3.18 -0.32 664.05 0.04 -0.26

Drug -7.63 -1.31 -1.56 -723.85 1.65 1.61

Traffic 76.49** 18.37*** -5.71 18.89 19.07

Other Offense -2.62 -1.43 9.35 730.47 1.18 1.08

Commitment 56.23** 3.97 5.92 -834.32 -3.12*** -3.04**

Adjudicated Delinquent 6.39 -0.92 3.65 92.67 -0.60 -0.27

Age -0.28 0.93a 1.08 190.23

a 0.08 0.05

Male 0.06 -0.55 1.07 -83.85 0.62 0.40

Constant 78.41 32.05** 10.97 -2768.41 0.39 0.86

R2 0.205 0.292 0.122 0.283

Adjusted R2 0.125 0.21 0.029 0.109

n 99 88 95 42 104 104

*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 ap<.10

211

Appendix K

Victim Survey Questionnaire

Table K-1. Frequencies for Criminal Justice System Variables

212

Table K-1. Frequencies for Criminal Justice System Variables

24b. Treatment by the Crime Victim Compensation Board

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 4 16%

Somewhat dissatisfied 4 16

Somewhat satisfied 8 32

Very satisfied 9 36

28. Amount of contact by the victim/witness advocate

Number Percentage

Never 100 71%

1-4 times 37 26%

5-10 times 2 1%

More than 10 times 1 1%

29. Times the victims contacted the victim/witness advocate

Number Percentage

Never 82 58%

1-4 times 43 30%

5-10 times 9 6%

More than 10 times 8 6%

30. Satisfaction with the amount of contact by the victim/witness advocate

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 25 18%

Somewhat dissatisfied 28 20%

Somewhat satisfied 45 33%

Very satisfied 40 29%

31a. The police listened to my ideas and opinions about the case.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 18 10%

Disagree 14 8%

Agree 84 48%

Strongly agree 61 35%

31b. The prosecutor listened to my ideas and opinions about the case.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 24 49%

Disagree 10 20%

Agree 10 20%

Strongly agree 5 10%

213

31c. The judge listened to my ideas and opinions about the case.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 22 26%

Disagree 17 20%

Agree 27 32%

Strongly agree 18 21%

31d. The victim-witness advocate listened to my ideas and opinions about the case.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 13 12%

Disagree 19 17%

Agree 55 49%

Strongly agree 25 22%

31e. The probation officer listened to my ideas and opinions about the case.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 5 2%

Disagree 10 4%

Agree 10 4%

Strongly agree 24 10%

31f. The court took my estimation of losses I suffered into account when determining the amount

of restitution.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 47 20%

Disagree 66 28%

Agree 17 7%

Strongly agree 25 11%

32a. In general, how important do you think it is for victims to have input with the police?

Number Percentage

Very important 192 81%

Somewhat important 33 14%

Not very important 5 2%

Not important 3 1%

32b. In general, how important do you think it is for victims to have input with the

prosecutor/district attorney?

Number Percentage

Very important 173 73%

Somewhat important 49 21%

Not very important 4 2%

Not important 2 1%

214

32c. In general, how important do you think it is for victims to have input with the judge?

Number Percentage

Very important 146 61%

Somewhat important 55 23%

Not very important 18 8%

Not important 8 3%

32d. In general, how important do you think it is for victims to have input with the probation

officer?

Number Percentage

Very important 131 55%

Somewhat important 46 19%

Not very important 34 14%

Not important 14 6%

32e. In general, how important do you think it is for victims to have input with the victim-

witness advocate?

Number Percentage

Very important 158 66%

Somewhat important 51 21%

Not very important 10 4%

Not important 7 3%

33a. Overall, how satisfied were you about the OUTCOME of your contact with the police?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 15 7%

Somewhat dissatisfied 18 8%

Somewhat satisfied 55 25%

Very satisfied 130 60%

33b. Overall, how satisfied were you about the OUTCOME of your contact with the

prosecutor/district attorney?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 26 16%

Somewhat dissatisfied 16 10%

Somewhat satisfied 57 35%

Very satisfied 63 39%

33c. Overall, how satisfied were you about the OUTCOME of your contact with the judge?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 19 20%

Somewhat dissatisfied 11 12%

Somewhat satisfied 23 25%

Very satisfied 40 43%

215

33d. Overall, how satisfied were you about the OUTCOME of your contact with the probation

officer?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 21 38%

Somewhat dissatisfied 7 13%

Somewhat satisfied 10 18%

Very satisfied 18 32%

33e. Overall, how satisfied were you about the OUTCOME of your contact with the victim-

witness advocate?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 22 16%

Somewhat dissatisfied 14 10%

Somewhat satisfied 46 33%

Very satisfied 58 41%

34a. Overall, how satisfied were you about the WAY YOU WERE TREATED of your contact

with the police?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 14 6%

Somewhat dissatisfied 12 5%

Somewhat satisfied 57 26%

Very satisfied 140 63%

34b. Overall, how satisfied were you about the WAY YOU WERE TREATED of your contact

with the prosecutor/district attorney?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 18 12%

Somewhat dissatisfied 14 9%

Somewhat satisfied 43 29%

Very satisfied 76 50%

34c. Overall, how satisfied were you about the WAY YOU WERE TREATED of your contact

with the judge?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 13 16%

Somewhat dissatisfied 7 9%

Somewhat satisfied 17 21%

Very satisfied 45 55%

216

34d. Overall, how satisfied were you about the WAY YOU WERE TREATED of your contact

with the probation officer?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 15 31%

Somewhat dissatisfied 9 18%

Somewhat satisfied 4 8%

Very satisfied 21 43%

34e. Overall, how satisfied were you about the WAY YOU WERE TREATED of your contact

with the victim-witness advocate?

Number Percentage

Very dissatisfied 13 10%

Somewhat dissatisfied 19 14%

Somewhat satisfied 42 31%

Very satisfied 62 46%

35a. The court or probation officer keeps me up-to-date on the status of the restitution owed to

me.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 117 64%

Disagree 27 15%

Agree 27 15%

Strongly agree 13 7%

35b. To keep up-to-date on the status of the restitution order, I have to contact the court myself.

Number Percentage

Strongly disagree 19 13%

Disagree 16 11%

Agree 34 23%

Strongly agree 77 53%

36. In your opinion, how fair were the PROCEDURES used to determine the amount of

restitution in your case?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 26 12%

Somewhat unfair 35 16%

Somewhat fair 62 29%

Very fair 90 42%

217

37. In your opinion, how fair was the SENTENCE IMPOSED used to determine the amount of

restitution in your case?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 48 23%

Somewhat unfair 36 17%

Somewhat fair 61 29%

Very fair 63 30%

218

Appendix L

Offender Survey Questionnaire

Table L-1. Frequencies for Criminal Justice System Variables

219

Table L-1. Frequencies for Criminal Justice System Variables

17a. How well do you understand how criminal sentences are set in Pennsylvania?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 23 19%

2 10 8%

3 18 15%

4 18 15%

5 17 14%

6 10 8%

Very well 7 25 21%

17b. How well do you understand how the amount of court costs you owe was determined?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 51 42%

2 17 14%

3 16 13%

4 13 11%

5 5 4%

6 3 3%

Very well 7 16 13%

17c. How well do you understand how the amount of supervision fees you owe was determined?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 52 43%

2 16 13%

3 11 9%

4 13 11%

5 7 6%

6 5 4%

Very well 7 16 13%

17d. How well do you understand how the amount of other costs and fees you owe was

determined?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 56 46%

2 10 8%

3 16 13%

4 14 12%

5 9 7%

6 3 3%

Very well 7 13 11%

220

17e. How well do you understand how the amount of fines you owe was determined?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 48 39%

2 12 10%

3 16 13%

4 18 15%

5 5 4%

6 5 4%

Very well 7 15 12%

17f. How well do you understand how the amount of restitution you owe was determined?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 36 30%

2 7 6%

3 13 11%

4 14 12%

5 6 5%

6 8 7%

Very well 7 32 26%

17g. How well do you understand where the money you pay goes?

Number Percentage

Not at all 1 57 47%

2 9 7%

3 8 7%

4 13 11%

5 11 9%

6 4 3%

Very well 7 18 15%

18. In light of the other expenses you have, how difficult is it financially for you to make your

monthly payments?

Number Percentage

Not at all difficult 1 15 12%

2 8 7%

3 6 5%

4 7 6%

5 17 14%

6 14 12%

Very difficult 7 53 43%

221

19. How responsible do you feel for causing the victim harm?

Number Percentage

Not at all responsible 1 42 34%

2 5 4%

3 4 3%

4 10 8%

5 8 7%

6 14 12%

Very responsible 7 24 20%

20. How responsible do you feel for restoring the victim to where he or she was before the

crime?

Number Percentage

Not at all responsible 1 43 35%

2 1 1%

3 7 6%

4 11 9%

5 6 5%

6 13 11%

Very responsible 7 22 18%

21a. In this case, how fair do you think the amounts were that you had to pay for court costs?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 29 24%

Somewhat unfair 2 27 22%

Neutral 3 39 32%

Somewhat fair 4 15 12%

Very fair 5 12 10%

21b. In this case, how fair do you think the amounts were that you had to pay for supervision

fees?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 36 30%

Somewhat unfair 2 21 17%

Neutral 3 45 37%

Somewhat fair 4 7 6%

Very fair 5 12 10%

21c. In this case, how fair do you think the amounts were that you had to pay for other costs and

fees?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 35 29%

Somewhat unfair 2 30 25%

Neutral 3 40 33%

Somewhat fair 4 8 7%

Very fair 5 7 6%

222

21d. In this case, how fair do you think the amounts were that you had to pay for fines?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 32 26%

Somewhat unfair 2 25 21%

Neutral 3 38 31%

Somewhat fair 4 14 12%

Very fair 5 13 11%

21e. In this case, how fair do you think the amounts were that you had to pay for restitution?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 30 25%

Somewhat unfair 2 17 14%

Neutral 3 33 27%

Somewhat fair 4 10 8%

Very fair 5 26 21%

22a. In this case, how fair do you think the procedures for the court costs you were ordered to

pay?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 24 20%

Somewhat unfair 2 25 21%

Neutral 3 44 36%

Somewhat fair 4 16 13%

Very fair 5 11 9%

22b. In this case, how fair do you think the procedures for the supervision fees you were ordered

to pay?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 25 21%

Somewhat unfair 2 22 18%

Neutral 3 52 44%

Somewhat fair 4 9 8%

Very fair 5 11 9%

22c. In this case, how fair do you think the procedures for the other costs and fees you were

ordered to pay?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 28 23%

Somewhat unfair 2 27 22%

Neutral 3 45 37%

Somewhat fair 4 10 8%

Very fair 5 8 7%

223

22d. In this case, how fair do you think the procedures for the fines you were ordered to pay?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 25 21%

Somewhat unfair 2 24 20%

Neutral 3 48 39%

Somewhat fair 4 12 10%

Very fair 5 11 9%

22e. In this case, how fair do you think the procedures for the restitution you were ordered to

pay?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 24 20%

Somewhat unfair 2 18 15%

Neutral 3 44 36%

Somewhat fair 4 8 7%

Very fair 5 20 16%

24a. How fair are the sentences that are imposed on most offenders?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 20 16%

Somewhat unfair 2 28 23%

Neutral 3 34 28%

Somewhat fair 4 30 25%

Very fair 5 10 8%

24b. Overall, how fair do you think it is that offenders are required to pay court costs?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 20 16%

Somewhat unfair 2 27 22%

Neutral 3 22 18%

Somewhat fair 4 33 27%

Very fair 5 20 16%

24c. Overall, how fair do you think it is that offenders are required to pay supervision fees?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 28 23%

Somewhat unfair 2 26 21%

Neutral 3 28 23%

Somewhat fair 4 19 16%

Very fair 5 20 16%

224

24d. Overall, how fair do you think it is that offenders are required to pay other costs and fees?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 27 22%

Somewhat unfair 2 34 28%

Neutral 3 26 21%

Somewhat fair 4 20 16%

Very fair 5 14 12%

24e. Overall, how fair do you think it is that offenders are required to pay fines?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 11 9%

Somewhat unfair 2 21 17%

Neutral 3 29 24%

Somewhat fair 4 29 24%

Very fair 5 32 26%

24f. Overall, how fair do you think it is that offenders are required to pay restitution?

Number Percentage

Very unfair 1 13 11%

Somewhat unfair 2 8 7%

Neutral 3 24 20%

Somewhat fair 4 24 20%

Very fair 5 53 43%

25. How much do you think paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders successfully

completing probation or parole?

Number Percentage

Definitely do not interfere 1 16 13%

Probably do not interfere 2 11 9%

Neutral 3 43 35%

Probably interfere 4 16 13%

Definitely interfere 5 29 24%

26. How much do you think paying economic sanctions interferes with offenders being able to

provide for their families?

Number Percentage

Definitely do not interfere 1 9 7%

Probably do not interfere 2 6 5%

Neutral 3 41 34%

Probably interfere 4 19 16%

Definitely interfere 5 42 34%