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TRANSCRIPT
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Part I Defining Europe
Defining what Europe is, as we have seen, a task to vex even the most of
brilliant of historians. Politicians, on the other hand, generally have less
reticence: "Oui, c'est l'Europe, depuis l'Atlantique jusqu' l'Oural, c'est
l'Europe, c'est toute l'Europe, qui dcidera du destin du monde."3 De
Gaulle, that most capricious of Europeans, here has defined Europe as most
scholars and thinkers conceive of it, stretching from the shores of Portugal
up to the Urals, deep in Russia.
The lack of a natural frontier on the Eurasian continent, between the
majority of the landmass and its Western peninsula, is only the beginning of
the debate over where the geographical boundaries of Europe can be
drawn. Other descriptions are available to us. The division of Europe into
Western and Eastern halves is well documented, and almost natural in the
minds of politicians, scholars and map-makers alike. This was particularly
acute when Europe became the one of the frozen battlegrounds of the Cold
War between the USA and the USSR.
The division of Europe need not be strictly an East/West affair. Europe
can be seen in terms of a North/South divide. Most notably this has been
espoused by Fernand Braudel who was able to see the history of the
Mediterranean as being unique enough from the remaining Northern parts
of Europe for it to warrant its own monumental history. 4 Having suitably
established this, it then becomes logical that there should be competing
3 General Charles de Gaulle in a speech to the people of Strasbourg as reported in LeMonde, 24 November 1959, p 4.4 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II;Vol I (France: 2nd Ser, 1966; London: Fontana Press, 1990).
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histories of Northern Europe, North Western Europe, even Scandinavian
Europe.
Recent work by historians from Eastern Europe has also challenged
conventions of what is traditionally considered to be the boundaries of that
part of the continent. The Czech novelist Milan Kundera was one of the first
intellectuals to argue for a recognition of a 'Third Europe', Central Europe.
In an article The sequestrated West, or the tragedy of Central Europe in
1984, he argued that World War II had created a new Europe distinct from
both Western and Eastern Europe. Roughly comprising Poland, Hungary
and Czechoslovakia (as was) he argued that this Third Europe was a Europe
in miniature, "that part of Europe which is geographically in the centre,
culturally in the West and politically in the East."5
The big question mark over any geographical definition of Europe has
always been whether Russia is to be excluded or included. For every
argument that suggests in terms of cultural inclination she is a necessary
part of Europe, there are others which point to her isolationist, imperialist
posture and the lack of commonalty in religious traditions between her
Orthodox Christianity, and the Catholicism of her neighbours. Most
definitions of Europe, as hinted at by de Gaulle, want to have it both ways,
accepting Russia but only up to a point. This ambivalence has often also
been shared by Russian intellectuals. Fyodor Dostoyevsky despised
Western Civilization, believing that Orthodox Russian nationalism was
destined to triumph over the decadent Western World. Says Ivan
5 Quoted in Bronislaw Geremek, The Common Roots of Europe (Cambridge: Polity Press,1996), p 5.
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Karamazov, left unenlightened after all his attempts at improving himself
via Western education, "I want to take a trip to Europe, Alyosha I know
it's a cemetery I shall be going to, but it's the dearest, dearest of
cemeteries, that's all", neatly expressing Dostoyevsky's view of Europe.6
Defining the very idea of Europe, the essence of its civilization, is just
as important as setting out its geographical borders. Despite what those
who believe in a very definite Central or Eastern or indeed Western Europe
might argue, at these regions' foundations, as most scholars agree, they
share the same bedrock: the legacy of Christianity and Graeco-Roman
culture that constitute the cornerstones of Western Civilization. There
certainly are changes in inference over how important certain currents of
cultural transmission might have been to different areas at different points.
It certainly is the case that some regions see themselves as possessing
qualities that are the polar opposite of those that the notion of Western
Civilization implies. But those two intertwined legacies are the alpha of
European culture, societies, language, politics, art, education.
'Europe' as an idea emerged from these roots, most particular from
the one that represented the Christian/Graeco-Roman currents best;
'Christendom'. Denis Hay argues that not only was Christendom's virtual
identity with the area of Europe one of the most important factors in the
latter's development through the course of the Middle Ages, but that their
congruency fostered a sense of cultural unity which cemented the
emergence of 'Europe', and the acceptance of the European peoples as
6 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, (London: Penguin, 1993 edn [1st pub1880]), p 264.
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politically one.7 Of course it must be recognised that the idea of Europe was
one that was developed and driven by Europe's elite, a political and cultural
concept invented and experienced by them, especially in times of crisis and
confrontation, they the Europeans against the barbarian invaders. 8
These various questions of how to define Europe meant that the
debate over whether Europe was an intelligible field to study was only
really settled by the end of the 1950s.9But with that question settled, the
proof that there is a demand for histories of Europe at the continental
rather than the regional level can be seen by the range of European
histories discussed below.
Part II Comparing Historians' Approaches To Europe & European
History
Comparison of the relative merits of certain historians' approaches will
reveal that not only is the very definition of Europe still constantly being
refined and tested, but that meaningful histories of the continent can
emerge. The range of definitions of Europe discussed indicates the variety
of European histories available; from those that tell the story of the entire
continent, to those that look at Europe from a regional and cultural
viewpoint.
"It is the view of one pair of eyes, filtered by one brain, and translated
by one pen."10 At least that statement cannot be called into question in
7 Denis Hay, Europe: The Emergence of an Idea, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,1957), p 120.8 Peter Rietbergen, Europe: A Cultural History, (London: Routledge, 1998), p xvii.9 Hay, op cit, p ix.10 Davies, op cit, p x.
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Norman Davies' impressive if controversial Europe: A History. He has set
out to turn some long-standing shibboleths of the writing of European
history on their head, the greatest of these being the idea that the history
of Europe can be written without far greater consideration of Eastern
Europe, the part of the continent that Davies feels has been unjustly
neglected for far too long.
The book is also novel in its presentation of the evidence that Davies
has gathered. In addition to the central narrative, which now gives equal if
not greater weighting to the events that occurred in the Eastern half of
Europe, he has assembled over 300 capsules of information on topics
ranging from democracy to the origin of 'Irish jokes', and littered them
throughout the text. This pointillist technique, as he describes it, is there to
illustrate some of the quirks, novelties and more humorous moments of
European history.
In his lucid introduction, Davies acknowledges that the geographical
parameters of the East of Europe have always been open to debate. He
also makes it clear that in the absence of any universal political institutions,
it is cultural criteria that has defined European civilization, and Christianity
is the most important strand of this. With this in mind, Davies then goes on
to attack many of the failings of the way that European history is
traditionally presented. His first target is that of 'Eurocentrism'. Historians
writing in this tradition he argues have been guilty of regarding their
civilization as superior, and only looking for their own beauty. This is then
combined with a more trenchant attack on 'Western Civilization', something
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that Davies feels has clearly been a distorting factor. His core complaint
with the concept appears to be that it has not been rigorously applied to
the whole continent, and that Eastern Europe's contribution to European
history has been downplayed and devalued. Viewing European history
through the distorting lens of 'Western Civilization' can hide the East's
contribution; when Davies' asks whether or not Poland contributed to the
Renaissance, you know that the answer is going to be in the positive. He
again emphasises the fact that the East/West division only has the
appearance of permanency because of the events of the Twentieth century,
and that Western supremacy has not been true all the time, drawing a
favourable parallel between the Byzantine empire at the expense of
Charlemagne's. "Eastern Europe is no less European for being poor,
undeveloped or ruled by tyrants," he writes.11 The greater weighting on the
events of the East within the narrative does lead to new perspectives. For
example, the barbarian invasions become the 'drive to the west' by the
tribes of the Steppes. Davies leaves himself open to charges of indecision.
Russia is mentioned despite his reservation, but what of Turkey? Is there
not a case to be made of its European status?
Davies succeeds in balancing out the history of Europe his work is
vital for redressing the gap in knowledge of Eastern Europe, and presenting
it in a different light from that of 'also ran' status. But to imply that
previous histories have not focused on the Eastern half of Europe because
of institutional scholarly prejudice alone is not enough. The fact that we do
not talk of an 'Eastern Civilization' is surely not just down to historians' bias.
11 Davies, op cit, p 28.
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Why didn't these Eastern countries go and get empires, and go on to rule
the world? Its a question worth asking, that Davies seems not to want to
answer.
In comparison, JM Roberts' The Penguin History of Europe is a model
of scholarly restraint, covering the same extended time span as Davies
does, but in roughly half the number of pages. His approach is markedly
different from Davies' in its conventionality, reflected in the absence of
such tools as 'pointillist' capsules. He is perhaps less guilty of the charges
that Davies may wish to lay at the door of other historians working
obviously in the 'Western Civilization' tradition; he does counsel caution
about the meaning of Europe, arguing that Europeans have shared
different things at different times. And even his geographical definition of
Europe is broadly similar: up to the mountains of the Caucasus.
There are of course similarities in both of the books. By definition,
both are discussing the same events; it is their interpretations that differ.
Both open with a geographical discussion of Europe, looking at the features
and the resources that helped to shape the continent. Both show the
importance of Ancient Greece as the cradle of European Civilization
(although Roberts might go further and argue that it ergo was the cradle of
World Civilization.) Davies writes that, "enough has survived for that one
small East European country to be regularly acclaimed as 'the Mother of
Europe', 'the Source of the West', a vital ingredient if not the sole fountain-
head of Europe." while Roberts describes, "the onset of an era which we
can now recognise to have been of cardinal and enduring importance in
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shaping Europe and its future."12Both suffer from what could be described
as a telescoping effect' in their narratives. As they both race towards the
present day, and recounting near-contemporaneous events, an uneven
pace prevails.
But what of the differences between them? Tim Blanning, in a review
of both books highlighted what he felt to be Davies' weakest suit, his near
neglect of economics and the importance and effects upon Europe of the
Industrial Revolution. Roberts in contrast was praised for his chapter on
'The World's New Rich.'13 The balance given in both to the relative weighting
(and therefore implicit importance) of events in Eastern Europe is another
crucial difference. Both books' final sections deal with Europe in the age of
the Cold War, Roberts prefers to deliver the narrative from a mostly
Western view, the events in Eastern Europe being dealt with in a sub-
chapter. Davies, in contrast, is scrupulous in the equal space given to the
events in both West and East. Davies scores in his (slightly superficial)
record of some of the cultural changes of the last fifty years. Roberts makes
up for this shortcoming with a more nuanced discussion of both the causes
and roots of de-colonization, and the effect that that particular process had
on areas around the world such as the Middle East.
Most of all, Roberts is willing to defend himself against charges of
'Eurocentrism'. He does acknowledge some of the criticisms that Davies et
al have made. He recognises that Europeans have denigrated other
12 Davies, op cit, p 139; JM Roberts, The Penguin History of Europe (London: Penguin,1996), p 23.13 Tim Blanning, 'Gibbon goes East', The Times Literary Supplement, 20 December 1996, p3.
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civilizations and been prepared to make ill-considered judgements, such as
that of the Victorians about the Chinese. He agrees with the view that
Europeans did believe that they were 'better' than those that they
subjugated however badly behaved they were as oppressors. But
'Eurocentrism' can be defended on the grounds that Europe's impact on the
history of the world, was for a period, greater than that of Asia, Africa and
the Americas. It was Europeans that took up the study of other cultures.
However, "It is a simple fact that the practices of some other societies
encountered by Europeans were often just as cruel, barbaric and beastly as
those of the conquering European;"14 a view which is either deliberately
ignoring its inherent cultural relativism, or is some form of ironic apologia.
There are other histories, while not necessarily sharing this continent
wide focus, give equally important insights into the history of Europe.
Braudel's The Mediterranean, as mentioned earlier, is one such way that
Europe can looked at regionally. Here it is less the continent of Europe that
is the shared characteristic but rather that of the sea it shared a common
destiny, the Turkish Mediterranean sharing the same rhythms as that of the
Christian one. It is perhaps the defining example of theAnnales tradition,
the most complete flowering of the historiography offered by the radical
French historians of the 1920s, who first achieved notice in the eponymous
magazine.
Borrowing from geography amongst other academic disciplines, the
Annales school believed that the historian had to look at the landscape
14 Roberts, op cit, p 666.
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itself to uncover the personal forces which were the ones that shaped
man's destiny and future. This also meant a focus upon the slower rhythms
of social trends and cycles. The Mediterranean exemplifies this, featuring
an extended discussion of the climate, other ecology, boundaries of the sea
and the region before looking at the social and economic trends that these
conditions helped to facilitate. Stuart Clark, in his article on theAnnales
historians, identifies these divisions clearly, and the structure is one that is
strictly followed by Braudel. The opening section is the historie de la longue
dure, this environmental vision where the perspective of centuries is
required. Secondly, the broader movements of societies, economies and
political institutions (which could be in cycles of anything from five to fifty
years) are denoted conjunctures. And the short-term political history, the
'froth of history' involving individual actors is what sits atop this structure. 15
Braudel put it more elegantly: "[The] actions of a few princes and rich men,
the trivia of the past, bear[ing] little relation to the slow and powerful
march of history which is our subject."16
Due to the startling nature of his work, Braudel has often been
criticised, not least for what could be described as a lack of interest in
humans, as opposed to hisAnnales colleagues Lucien Lefebvre and Mark
Bloch. The lack of linkage between the tripartite structure does question
whether Braudel was ever actually that interested in presenting a rounded
picture of human affairs. But The Mediterranean remains a bold attempt to
focus attention on one part of Europe, and show (in part) how the seas
destiny affected the continents.
15 Stuart Clark, 'TheAnnales Historians', in The Return of Grand Theory in The HumanSciences, ed Quentin Skinner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p 177-199.16 Braudel, op cit, p 18.
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A differing account of Europe's creation can be found from another
continental historian, this one Spanish. Josep Fontana's The Distorted Past:
A Reinterpretation of Europe highlights what could be called that of the
'barbarian' element in European history, the role played by that of the
outsider to challenge and indirectly, sometimes inadvertently to shape
Europe's past and future. What he describes as the "fabrication" of an
external enemy conceals the fact that the interests of Europe and her
migrs are the same, preventing a consciousness of solidarity. Fontana
then goes on to argue for a dismantling of the linear view of history, which
he feels interprets all change as progress, and its replacement with a
"Multidimensional history [which] will be able to aspire to being legitimately
universal and will also restore to us the diversity of our own European
culture."17
Fontana's history here is of slightly less value, as it arguably
downplays other vital elements of European history in order to give the
idea of the struggle against 'invaders' of any sort priority. One might
suggest that the multidimensionality he aspires to remains precisely that
for him, an aspiration.
But Europe is nothing if not a cultural creation; a cultural history will
be of as much value as works that focus upon politics and the environment.
Peter Rietbergen's Europe: A Cultural Historyis precisely such a volume.
The cultural roots of the European elites' conception of Europe are
explored. He questions the age of the 'European concept': "the Europe that
now projects itself with such a pretence of historical inevitability is, indeed,
17 Josep Fontana, The Distorted Past: A Reinterpretation of Europe, (Oxford: Blackwell,1995), p
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only a recent creation; some would even say that this Europe is really a
creation of the late nineteenth century."18
More importantly, he identifies that 'Europe' is made up of a number
of traditions which do constitute a coherent culture. These include the
nascent democracy of ancient Greece; the legal structures of classical
Rome; the moral value of Christianity; the tolerance that developed
through interregional/interconfessional contacts within the narrow confines
of Europe; the emergence of printing and hence the spread of cultural
diversity; and the emergence of industrial society where, in theory, 'chance'
was open to everyone.19 His approach leads to some insights less easily
gained from other histories, most notably that 'European' can be used as
an adjective it implies a criterion for quality. 20 While sometimes his
discussions of certain cultural topics border on the esoteric, others such as
those of the effect of travel and migration on European history are
genuinely revelatory.
Two earlier histories of Europe are worthy of attention for an attempt
to provide a coherent history of Europe. These histories are by DH
Lawrence, and some of the European history contained in the lectures
given by Franois Guizot at the Sorbonne in 1828. Lawrence was
commissioned by OUP to write a textbook aimed at adolescents. It may now
seem like 'bad history', its traditional framework avoiding any new
synthesis. But at the same time, it offers vivid portraits of historical
18. Rietbergen, op cit, p xxi.19 Rietbergen, ibid, p xxiii.20 Rietbergen, ibid, p 459.
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personages from Europes past. While the epilogue of 1925 is a bleak affair,
ruminating on the aftermath of the Great War, what has gone previously is
uplifting in tone. Lawrence's history was, "an attempt to give some
impression of the great surging movements which rose in the hearts of men
in Europe, sweeping human beings together into one great concerted
action, or sweeping them apart forever on the tides of opposition." 21
Guizot, returning to the Sorbonne in 1828, recognised diversity as
crucial to a concept of European history. In his first lecture on 'The History
of Civilization in Europe', he stated baldly that, "Modern Europe presents us
with examples of all systems, of all experiments of social organisation not
withstanding their diversity, they all have a certain resemblance which it
is impossible to mistake."22 He also saw within Europe's diversity her
superiority progress according to the intentions of God. As with diversity,
Guizot was also one of the first to proclaim Eurocentrism.
In view of the obvious effects that Europe has had upon the rest of
the world, it perhaps becomes apposite to see what non-European views of
Europe say, and whether they concur with much of this 'Europe first'
attitude. Japanese intellectuals of the Meiji Restoration looked to Europe for
templates of how they could strengthen their own civilization in the face of
the nineteenth century challenge from the West. Fukuzawa Yukichi, in his
An Outline of a Theory of Civilization, showcased both the positive and
negative effects that a European-derived Western Culture would have on
21 DH Lawrence, Movements in European History, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1921[1981 edn]), p xxvi.22 Franois Guizot, Historical Essays and Lectures; Edited and With an introduction byStanley Mellon, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1972), p 163.
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Japan. There is a trenchant critique of the havoc that the West is causing in
Japan. But he also argues that, despite the problems that he sees in
Europe, "Western Civilization is an incomparable means for both
strengthening our national polity and increasing the prestige of our imperial
line."23 Fukuzawa was here arguing for an adoption of the spiritof Western
Civilization rather than a wholesale absorption of its outer trappings, but for
our purposes shows a conception of a progressive conception of Europe
which agrees with certain European's claims of being the engine of
civilization.
Considering the importance of diversity in Europe, it is appropriate
that there are so many different approaches to its history. This diversity is
reflected in her peoples as well but in amongst their differing identities,
can a 'European' identity be seen to exist?
Part III Is There Such a Thing as 'European peoples'?
Such has been the pervasiveness of nationalism in the last 200 years that
very few people would consider their primary identification would be with
their continent rather than their nation. That testifies to its success one of
"the most persuasive political forces ever", as it was recently described.24
Taking Benedict Anderson's definition of a nation, that of the imagined
political community as inherently limited and sovereign, then it can
immediately be seen why there are problems in trying to apply such a
doctrine to something as broad as membership of a continental
23 Fukuzawa Yukichi,An Outline of A Theory of Civilization, tr D Dilworth and GC Hurst,(Tokyo: Sophia University, 1973 [1st pub 1875]), p 28.24 Professor RJ Evans, in his inaugural lecture as Oxford University's Regius Professor ofModern History, Trinity Term 1998.
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community.25 And the "deep horizontal comradeship" that he describes as
being necessary for a nation to exist, must be hard to foster between
former enemy states. It is only now with the development of (democratic)
supra-national governmental institutions and bureaucracy that a European
identity may be possible. Economic integration, as Hobsbawm suggests,
means that supranational identities may be becoming logical choices.26
There are certain similarities between the various European
nationalities which mean that the emergence of 'European peoples' is not
an impossibility. These include genetic and ethnic similarities between
Europeans, but there are also congruences in terms of language most
European dialects are from the same Indo-European family of languages,
while the Latin influence on modern European languages is clear.
Europeans have always defined themselves against those who have
been different from them, in terms of ethnicity, race, and also religion. Yet
a European history which, for example, does not feature an Islamic threat
to Christendom, a Europe whose economy was unaided by the money lent
by Jewish financiers, does not exist. Europe was created in opposition to
what she did not recognise in herself; but she also relied upon these hostile
sources. For example it was only in the academic and religious institutions
of the Near East that the study of those Greek texts fundamental to
European identity prevented them from being lost forever.
25 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, (London: Verso, 1991 [2nd edn]), p 6.26 EJ Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth and Reality,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p 182.
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Even those defined as outsiders can still claim European identity. As
Elizabeth Tonkin et al point out, groups and individuals don't have one
identity, but potentially a wide variety of possible identities and affinities,
which only incompletely or partially overlap in space and/or time.27 Under
this conception therefore, one could happily be European, as well as being
a Londoner, Asian, English and British.
One final example should perhaps be remembered. There has been a
successful development of a continental identity, shared by peoples of
differing nationalities with European roots. That the United States of
America managed to create such a persuasive form of national identity
suggests that the creation of a European identity is also distinctly possible.
As in the American case, if stress was laid upon the shared experiences of
the various peoples of the continent, then this could lead to a new supra-
national identity.
Part IV The Influence of Postmodernism on History
According to the dictionary, something that is 'meaningful' conveys
information, and is purposeful, significant and expressive. In
historiographical terms, there is an implicit value judgement within the
word. It suggests that the qualities of purpose, significance and expression
can only be achieved within a certain type of history. For our purposes let
us call it a 'narrative' history, wherein a series of events are recounted in a
chronologically continuous order, and then analysed for their causation and
their consequences.28
27 Elizabeth Tonkin et al, (eds), History and Ethnicity, (London: Routledge, 1989), p 17.28 Lawrence Stone, 'The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History', Past &Present58, 1979, defines narrative as the organisation of material in a chronological
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This has been the way in which traditional history, that of kings,
politicians, wars and diplomats has been presented. But the increasing
academic influence of the social sciences in the last 35 years, and that of
currents of postmodernist thinking over the last 15, have profoundly
affected this conception of history. For one, subjects that can be considered
as history have broadened immeasurably. While studying social and
economic history are hardly revolutionary concepts, they have become
more influential; as we slide towards an autonomous, anonymous mass
culture, understanding the 'pressures from below' has taken on a new
relevance. Moreover, we hardly bat at an eyelid at our ability to study
cultural history, the history of gender, Afro-Caribbean history and so on. But
at the same time, the increasing specialisation of historians has meant a
concomitant decline in the integration of their findings into traditional
narratives. Greater understanding is being reached; it is being achieved at
the cost of greater specialisation. Continuous narratives are being replaced
by discrete histories, limited by their often recherch subjects and lack of
linkages to the other discrete histories around them.
But postmodernism has posed a fundamental challenge to history
itself, in suggesting that it is not possible to do history at all, that history is
just one of many possible discourses, whose language does not relate to
anything but itself. Moreover, the work of textural deconstructionists such
as Barthes and Derrida have challenged the very idea of Rankean history
based on analysis of text based sources. Arguing that language changes its
sequential order, where the content is focused in a single coherent story with subplots,where description rather than analysis is present, p 3.
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meaning every time it is read, and that everything is a text, this therefore
poses insurmountable problems for the historian. There can be nothing
outside of the text, and fact and fiction become indistinguishable. Hence,
history loses its validity as the search for the truth and merely becomes
another outpost of creative writing.
It is these two influences, those of the increase of discrete histories
and the attack on narrative and therefore history itself which can lead to
the question being posed as to whether European peoples experiences
are too diverse to lead to a history that is meaningful. For history is nothing
if it cannot reflect diversity, and the problem lies less in diversity
preventing the emergence of meaning, but in a failure to integrate diversity
into overarching frameworks, to show links and commonalties, and to tell a
good story of causes and consequences.
Fortunately help is at hand to plot a new way for history in the light of
these particular intellectual currents. Richard J Evans' In Defence of History
is an elegant yet trenchant attack on those postmodern critics of history,
which while recognising that postmodernist as well as other academic
concerns can have a valuable influence on history, argues that the lengths
gone to by postmodernists are problematic.
Defending his craft in the face of the postmodernist hordes, Evans
writes:
"The language of historical documents is never transparent, andhistorians have long been aware that they cannot simply gazethrough it to the historical reality behind. Historians know, historians
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21have always known that we can only see the past 'through a glass,darkly'. It did not take the advent of postmodernism to point this out.What postmodernism has done is to push such familiar argumentsabout the transparency or opacity of historical texts and sources outto a set of binary opposites and polarized extremes."29
He argues that, although historians cannot impose a single meaning
on a text, this does not mean that any meaning is possible. "We are limited
by the words it contains, words which are not, contrary to what the
postmodernists suggest, capable of an infinity of meaning."30 Historical
language has always detailed varying levels of certainty, while historical
sources are not necessarily the same as literary texts. Hence some
postmodern critiques tumble the tools of literary analysis are not useful
when dealing with a set of statistics for example. The postmodern attack on
sequential time (implied in a continuous narrative) as a construct
"Historical time is a recent and highly artificial invention of Western
Civilization." he quotes Frank Ankersmit as saying is dealt with by pointing
out that the very existence ofpostmodern concepts is contrary to the
notion that there are no time periods.31 Once postmodernism's principles
are applied to itself, he implies, many of its arguments collapse under the
weight of their own contradictions.
Evans then goes on to enunciate what he believes historical narrative
should be about. He argues that it seldom consists of a single, linear strand.
It should consist of a mass of subjective, local narratives (or indeed
'discrete' or 'diverse' narratives.) This does not necessarily mean that these
local narratives are claiming universal validity, but neither do master-29 Richard J Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta, 1997), p 104.30 Evans, ibid, p 106.31 Evans, ibid, p 141. Frank Ankersmit, History and Tropology: The Rise and Fall ofMetaphor, (Berkley, 1994), p 33-4.
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narratives have to be oppressive in their scope. "History has always been
seen by historians as a destroyer of myths more than a creator of them." 32
Narratives can also reflect the uneven nature of historical time; Evans takes
Braudel as an example of this. But ultimately Evans is pessimistic about
how successful this process of binding local narratives into a larger
framework might be. Citing the example of the 60 volume Fischer
Europische Geschichte, which presents comparative studies of broad
aspects of 'European history' rather than any 'history of Europe', Evans'
writes, "There can be no definitive history any more." Any synthesis of
historical knowledge becomes avowedly personal, as in Davies' Europe,
whose argument intends to provoke as much as inform.33
Is this last judgement fair? To an extent, but to judge from earlier
criteria, an avowedly personal narrative can still be meaningful if it is
expressive, conveys information and is significant; on these terms Davies
succeeds. And if diverse and differing personal narratives are being
created, then our picture of what constitutes the past can only become
more detailed and vivid, as long as it is recognised that discrete histories
are the start, not the end of any historical process. Far better for attempts
at this sort of multidisclipinary many narratives history, which can
incorporate a wide range of experiences, rather than a writing framework
for doing history. A Marxist framework for history, for example, merely sees
diverse experiences as having the same root causes somewhere within the
resolution of productive relations.
32 Evans, op cit, p 151.33 Evans, ibid, p 175-6.
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When dealing with obviously diverse histories such as those found in
Europe, it is apposite to remember that histories will not just 'emerge' from
the intellectual morass. Historians will create European history from any
process of 'emergence'. But in short the quasi-postmodern notion that
diverse experiences do not allow for the emergence of meaningful histories
is wrong. It is diversity and the various accounts of those diversities that
allow for a better, deeper and more complete understanding of what the
past is.
Part V Experiences Which Are Common to All Peoples of Europe
The celebration of diversity in experiences of the peoples of Europe should
not blind us to the idea that there are certain experiences that all peoples,
nationalities in Europe have been through. This does not mean that all
European peoples lived through these 'experiences' historical events,
social, political, economic and cultural trends in the same way, at the
same time, that they were caused by the same factors and that they had
similar consequences for everyone. It is merely recognising the fact that
they can be said to have an existence which transcends national
boundaries.
At one level some experiences will be shared by most European
peoples. Those experiences which constitute human relations familial life,
friendships, marriage, the idea of romantic love, sex, violence and so on
while hard to validate historically, can be safely assumed to be fairly
common to the mass of European peoples. Naturally there will be
differences in the way that these variety of human relations are
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experienced. One could possibly argue that familial life in the
Mediterranean has a different tenor to that of Northern Europe for a
number of reasons, but the fundamental experience remains the same.
Experiences which could be said to be equally pervasive are those
that can be defined as a trend of some form or other. One could argue that
most European peoples have been touched at one point by the effects of
the demographic fact of population increases, and the presence of
invaders, barbarians or their modern equivalents. The experience of
literacy has provided the means of accessing a shared culture. Most
Europeans live in a world which is a product of the spread and influence of
religion of whatever denomination; thus they can be said to have shared
some religious experience, even if it is merely participating in a culture
which at some point has been shaped by religion.
The example of religion also indicates some of the limits of these
cultural trends. For example, the growth of secular thought in the last 200
years, the disestablishment of the church from the state in certain
countries, and the way in which more and more people view themselves as
atheist rather than religious, all show that the twentieth century in
particular has meant that what was once assumed to be an experience for
all is not necessarily so. Take invasion as an example of an experience that
one might assume all European peoples had been subjected to at some
point, especially in this century. Britain however, withstood the threat of
invasion and extended occupation.
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Before the advent of the twentieth century, it can be said that all
European peoples at some point experienced the rise and emergence of
capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein has argued that 'Europe' is a convenient
shorthand for the what is the central zone of the world economy, which has
developed from what he terms the 'long sixteenth century'. It is his
contention that modern European history is the story of the genesis and
functioning of a particular historical system which originated in Europe and
now covers the world.34
But it is perhaps the experiences of the twentieth century which are
most clearly common to all European peoples. The obvious one is that of
war. The calamitous effects of the two world wars that had Europe as their
cockpit were clear enough. Even those that stayed out of the fighting were
affected, as the recent controversies over the extent of Switzerland's
neutrality during World War II have shown. Civil war is another facet of the
murderous experience that all European countries have had the horror of
seeing this century. The means of war changed, with opposing
governments viewing rapid destruction of enemy populations as the
quickest way to ensure success. The populations of other countries were
viewed as totally expendable, a gruesome irony considering that the actual
business of war became reserved for those members of a technologically
advanced military elite.
In particular it is possible to see World War II as the bloody resolution
of the three ideologies that were competing for global dominance at the
34 Wallerstein in Taylor et al, op cit, p 146.
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time. The idea of this conflict as a struggle to the bitter end between
Fascism, Communism and Liberal Democracy is one that has been
advanced by Michael Howard and, more recently, Mark Mazower.35
After 1945, one could forgive most Europeans for asking where the
peace dividend was. Their continent yet again became divided, this time
between the competing spheres of two superpowers. But Europeans have
benefited from the other side of war; the evolution of modernity. For
example, most Europeans drive on roads which were built by machines
which have the same caterpillar tracks as the tanks which once ranged
across the same land.
The role and presence of Americans on European soil during World
War II and since, helped the process of cultural transference that most
Europeans have wittingly or unwittingly experienced in the later part of the
twentieth century, that of the Americanization of Europe. The Americans
played a major role in the political and economic reconstruction and the
securing of Europe, most overtly through the tools of the European
Recovery Programme (Marshall Plan) and later the creation of NATO. The
scope and scale of cultural transmission which also took place across the
Atlantic was staggering. Food, TV, movies, music and fashion were all
exported to Europe as the brand new thing.
One other experience could be described as being common to all
European peoples. If, as suggested earlier, there has been no creation of a
35 Michael Howard, War in European History(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p119; Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, (London: Allen Lane,1998), p x-xii.
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European identity, then this suggests that every European has experienced
the process being defined under a particular nationality. (Which in turn
leads to the idea that the only meaningful history of Europe would be a
history of the emergence of European nationalisms.) But for such diverse
peoples, it is those global experiences and cultural processes which seem
to provide seemingly the greatest unity for 'European peoples'.
Part VI Concluding Remarks
Has the haze lifted? Would AJP Taylor be any happier in looking at European
history now? One would suspect so, if he bore in mind that diversity is the
key to understanding Europe and European history. It is in the diversity of
experiences, as well as those that are common, that the history of the
peoples of Europe lies. Diversity does not prevent the emergence of any
meaningful history of Europe, for diversity is meaningful, and has to be an
essential part of any European history.
But it is a diversity built upon shared foundations, and whatever
interpretation is made, whatever route is taken through nearly five
millennia of history, those shared foundations will need to be stressed.
Europe may stretch from the Atlantic to the Urals, from the Arctic Circle to
the Sahara, may be responsible for all of the world's glories and all of her
ills, but its civilization came from the a single cradle.
Diversity is everywhere in Europe. Diverse are the definitions that she
can apply to herself and the challenges that they pose in recognising her
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borders. Diverse are the historians and their approaches to the task of
writing European history. So diverse are the European peoples that a single
European identity may never be created. And diverse are the reactions to
even common shared experiences.
At times this diversity can be problematic: "This panoply of national
cultures, histories and values does make it hard for Europeans to act
cohesively and subjectively in moments of crisis," writes Mazower.36 But it is
not problematic enough to prevent the emergence of a meaningful history
of Europe. Postmodernist currents in history should not be allowed to turn
diverse experiences into discrete ones, and then proclaim that there is no
need for them to be integrated into a narrative. There is, and there will
always be a demand for histories that tell the story of Europe, even if it is in
the guise of the "story of 'Europes'".