f. steinhausler and a. sobel cbrn terrorism mitigation: new aspects

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F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

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Page 1: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

F. STEINHAUSLER AND

A. SOBEL

CBRN Terrorism Mitigation:

New Aspects

Page 2: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Topics

1. Terrorism Threat2. CBRN Mitigation

Page 3: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

1. Terrorism Threat

Page 4: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Threat Development

Suicide terrorismSequential truck bombsState sponsored terrorismSwarm attacksRemote-control of terrorist operationsDual-use-technology terrorism

Page 5: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Threat Outlook

Attacks on chemical facilities, other critical infrastructure

Decoding of individual genomes,metabolomesCommunicable diseasePhysical protection of nuclear weapons

Page 6: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Terrorist Profile & Society Response

MotivationPsychology of groups

and self-organizationRadicalizationSacred valuesMindset of terrorist

Bonding of victimsComplacency towards

security risksExtent of panicSelf-reliance of publicResilience of societyEducation of the next-

generation of scientists

Page 7: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

2. CBRN Mitigation

Page 8: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Mitigation and Threat

CBRN weapons are likely to be deployed against:

High concentration of civilians present at high value or symbolic targets

Critical infrastructure (e.g., petrochemical facilities, power plants, pipelines, nuclear sites)

Security forces Psychology and political will

Page 9: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Mitigation and Probability

CBRN deployment has widely differing probability:

High p: Low-cost Easy to make R-device

Easy to access and dual-use

Medium p: Low-cost Crude B-, C-device

Low p: Material acquisition complex Improvised N-device;

weaponize (HEU-based device only)

Page 10: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Examples in Countries with Large Populations: Russia and India

Russia: Critique on politicizing Nuclear Terrorism and overestimating risk

Need for increased realism in CBRN mitigation

India: Predominant weighing different

threats to society and ideologiesRanking of CBRN within the scope of

conventional terrorismLow key efforts to mitigate CBRN in

large populations

Page 11: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Information Needs

CBRN Mitigation requires information on:

1. Equipment/processes necessary for the evaluationevaluation of a CBRN incident

2. Minimum capability for a nation, local government or individual to adequately identifyidentify and mitigatemitigate the consequences

3. Adequacy of international, national, regional or local communicationcommunication systems and standards available

Page 12: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Innovative Emergency Response Management: Cellular Phone System

Information relayed to individuals in emergency zone

PLUS: Data/science-driven management of overall emergency response

OPEN ISSUE: Technical implementation

Page 13: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

CBRN Scenario Testing

Nuclear Attack:1.Large city under N-attack by boat 2. Important role of fallout mappingPLUS: Multidimensional information

infrastructure in placeOPEN ISSUE: Feasibility of scenario design

White Powder Attack: 1.Small city facing unknown threat2. Important role of decision forming process/immediate

stepsPLUS: Logical deduction by exclusion &

confirmation OPEN ISSUE: First Responder capability

Page 14: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Post-Attack 100 Days

1. Chemical: Thousand of victims Present emergency management feasible, if

adequate Public Health System in placeOPEN ISSUE: Questionable surge capacity and

sustainability

1. Biological: Tens of thousands of victims Adequacy of current emergency management

questionable in case of epidemic due to overburdening of Public Health System

OPEN ISSUE: Logistical problems with quarantine and baseline assessment of endemic disease

Page 15: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Post-Attack 100 Days (continued)

1. Radiological: Dozens of victims Current emergency management adequate Sound clean-up procedures and targeted communication-

strategy are keyOPEN ISSUE: Stigmatization of victims; property devaluation

1. Nuclear: Tens of thousands of victims, depending on yield,

population density, mode of deployment and metrological conditions

Successful emergency management dependent on timely arrival of adequate outside assistance

Long-term problems likelyOPEN ISSUE: Uncertain resilience of survivors until arrival of

external assistance; genetics and impact on health issues of future generations

Page 16: F. STEINHAUSLER AND A. SOBEL CBRN Terrorism Mitigation: New Aspects

Summary

A simplified one-science approach is recommended for CBRN operations

Many domains have yet to be explored to include the complex systems impacting CBRN operations

Psychological and political realms Adaptive and self-organizing networks Autonomous systems Understanding of human factors