february 11-12, 2014 | markets committee

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FEBRUARY 11-12, 2014 | MARKETS COMMITTEE Catherine McDonough [email protected] | 413-535-4027 Strengthen Incentive for Load to participate in the Day-Ahead Energy Market(‘DAEM’) NCPC Cost Allocation: Phase 1

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February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee. Catherine McDonough. [email protected] | 413-535-4027. Strengthen Incentive for Load to participate in the Day-Ahead Energy Market(‘DAEM’). NCPC Cost Allocation: Phase 1. Overview of Presentation. Highlights Problem/Concern Background Data - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

FEBRUARY 11-12, 2014 | MARKETS COMMITTEE

Catherine McDonough [email protected] | 413-535-4027

Strengthen Incentive for Load to participate in the Day-Ahead Energy Market(‘DAEM’)

NCPC Cost Allocation: Phase 1

Page 2: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Overview of Presentation

• Highlights

• Problem/Concern– Background Data

• Proposed Solution– Current Approach/Example – Proposed Approach /Example

• Market Analysis – Summary of Impacts– RT 1st Contingency NCPC charge rates – Historical information

• Next Steps

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Page 3: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Highlights: What does the Phase 1 Proposal change?

• No change in the way Generators, Imports, Increments and Negative NCPC load deviations are charged for NCPC

• Reallocates ~20% of RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges to RTLO instead of positive NCPC load deviations (DA>RT)

• NCPC charges will be lower for participants whose pro-rata share of positive NCPC load deviations is greater than their share of RTLO

• NCPC charges will be higher for participants whose pro-rata share of positive NCPCP load deviations is less than their share of RTLO

• NCPC charges for Decrements (‘DECs’) will be zero

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Page 4: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

PROBLEM/CONCERN

Page 5: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Problem/Concern

• 91% of peak-hour load generally clears in the DAEM; – Participants err on the side of under-clearing load in the DAEM

• About 70% of DA/RT load deviations are negative (RT>DA)– Virtual transactions—especially Decrements – are down markedly

since 2010/2011

• ISO frequently needs to commit more units in Reserve Adequacy Analysis (‘RAA’) or in Real-Time– Reduces efficiency of the unit commitment and dispatch process– Later notice can make it more challenging for generators to procure

fuel--especially during winter months

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Page 6: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Participants tend to under-clear load in DAEM

Historical Daily Averages (2012-2013)

Percent of RTLO (peak-hour) Cleared Day Ahead* 91%*Includes Load Bids + DECs -INCs

NCPC load deviations (MW) 40,732

Positive NCPC load deviations (DA>RT) (MW) 12,586 Positive NCPC load deviations /NCPC load deviations 31%

Negative NCPC load deviations (RT>DA) MW 28,146 Negative NCPC load deviations / NCPC load deviations 69%

RTLO (MW) 367,856

Negative NCPC load deviations/RTLO 8%Positive NCPC load deviations /RTLO 3%NCPC load deviations/RTLO 11%

Page 7: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Peak-Hour RTLO under-clears in the DAEM

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70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

105%

110%

115%

1-Jan-10 1-May-10 1-Sep-10 1-Jan-11 1-May-11 1-Sep-11 1-Jan-12 1-May-12 1-Sep-12 1-Jan-13 1-May-13 1-Sep-13

Percent of RTLO (peak hour) cleared in DAEM*

60 day Moving Average

* Includes Cleared DA Load Bids (Fixed and Price Sensitive) + DECs - INCs

Page 8: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

PROPOSED SOLUTION

Page 9: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Proposed Solution: Modify NCPC Cost Allocation Phase 1

• Allocate RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges associated with positive real-time load deviations to participants based on their real-time load obligation (‘RTLO’)* – No change in how we allocate RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges to negative

load deviations or other NCPC deviations – No change in how we calculate NCPC deviations– RTLO excludes DARD pumping load & load from non-pumping DARDs that

follow dispatch

• Expected Benefits – Stronger incentive for load (exports, load, decrements) to participate in DAEM

– Addresses concerns regarding the reduction in virtual transactions – Complements other changes the ISO has proposed– Can be in place for Winter (2014/15)

• Comprehensive review of the current method used to allocate NCPC costs may result in broader set of changes in Phase 2 (discussions to begin in 2015)

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Page 10: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

RT 1st Contingency NCPC Cost Allocation Current Method

1. NCPC deviation charge rate (daily) = RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges (daily) / Total NCPC deviations (daily)

2. RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges (participant, daily) = NCPC deviation charge rate (daily) x NCPC deviations (participant, daily)

Note: All NCPC deviations are charged the same ($/MW) rate

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Page 11: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Example : Current MethodBase Case *

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*Base Case assumes that all Load Participants have the same load deviations and RTLO MWs. We relax these assumptions in the examples shown in the Appendix A.

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)

(1) RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges for Dec 31st 154$ Participant

A B C D Total Load Load Load Other

(2) NCPC deviations 14 14 14 20 62 (3) = (1a)/(2e) NCPC deviation charge rate 2.48$

(4)=(2)x(3e) RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges (CURRENT METHOD) 35$ 35$ 35$ 50$ 154$

Page 12: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

RT 1st Contingency NCPC Cost Allocation Proposed Method (Phase 1)

1. RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges (participant, daily) = NCPC deviation charge rate (daily) x NCPC deviations (participant, daily)

except positive NCPC load deviations (DA>RT)

2. Total RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges for RTLO =NCPC deviation charge rate (daily) x positive NCPC load deviations (daily)

3. NCPC load charge rate (daily) =Total RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges for RTLO/ Total RTLO

4. RT 1st Contingency NCPC load charge (participant, daily) = NCPC load charge rate (daily) x RTLO (participant, daily)

*Parts of the allocation method that change with the Phase 1 proposal shown in blue

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Page 13: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

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Example: Proposed Method (Phase 1)Base Case

NCPC deviation charge rate is the same as w/ current method: See Slide 8

(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (1) RT 1st Contingency NCPC Credits for Dec 31st 154$

Participant A B C D Total

Load Load Load Other (5) Negative NCPC load deviations (MWs) 6 13 10 NA (6) NCPC Non-load deviations (MWs) 20

(7)=(5)+(6) NCPC deviations (MWs) 6 13 10 20 49(3) RT 1st Contingency NCPC charge rate 2.48$

(8)=(6)*(3e) RT 1st Contingency NCPC deviation charges 15$ 32$ 25$ 50$ 122$

(9) Positive NCPC load deviations (MWs) 8 1 4 NA 13(10)= (9)*(3e) Total RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges for RTLO 32$

(11) RTLO (MWs) 130 130 130 NA 390(12)=(10e)/(11e) NCPC load charge rate 0.08$ (13)=(11)*(12e) RT 1st Contingency Load Charges* 11$ 11$ 11$ -$ 32$

(14)=(8)+(13) Total RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges (PROPOSED METHOD) 26$ 43$ 36$ 50$ 154$ *Total displayed is off by 1 due to rounding

Page 14: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Example: Proposed vs. Current Method

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Participants whose pro-rata share of positive load deviations > pro-rata share of RTLO allocated less RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges Participants whose pro-rata share of

positive load deviations < pro-rata share of RTLO allocated more RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges Impact of Phase 1 change is smaller when

the difference between pro-rata shares of (+) load deviations and RTLO is smaller

Base Case Participant A B C D Total Proposed*- Current Method (9)$ 8$ 1$ -$ -$

% Change PROPOSED vs. CURRENT -26% 24% 2% 0% 0%*Assumes no change in behavior

NCPC load deviations/NCPC deviations 23% 23% 23% 32% 100%Impact Driver (+) load devs. (participant)/ (+) load devs. (all participants) 62% 8% 31% 100%

RTLO (participant) / RTLO (all participants) 33% 33% 33% 100%

Control (+) load devs. (participant)/load devs (participant) 57% 7% 29%

Page 15: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

MARKET ANALYSIS

Page 16: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Summary of Impacts

• No change in RT 1st Contingency NCPC deviation charge rate; generators, Imports, Increments and negative NCPC load deviations will be charged the same as today

• Phase 1 reallocates ~20% of RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges to RTLO instead of to positive load deviations; If positive load deviations rise over time, the share of RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges allocated to RTLO will also rise

• RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges will be lower for participants whose pro-rata share of positive load deviations is greater than their pro-rata share of RTLO

• RT 1st Contingency charges for Decrements (‘DECs’) will be zero because DECs create only positive load deviations and have no associated RTLO

• Participants may be able to reduce RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges by bidding their expected load in the DAEM; i.e. increase the share of positive load deviations

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Page 17: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

RT 1st Contingency NCPC charge rates

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RT 1st Contingency NCPC deviation charge rate ($/MW of NCPC deviation)

Year Average Minimum Median Maximum St.Dev. 2010 2.06 0.00125 0.62 17.94 3.202011 1.64 0.00032 0.45 22.78 3.182012 1.75 0.00033 0.58 18.84 2.872013 2.47 0.00074 0.41 44.33 5.54

2010-2013 1.98 0.00032 0.49 44.33 3.86

Proposed* RT 1st Contingency NCPC load charge rate ($/MW RTLO)

Year Average Minimum Median Maximum St.Dev. 2010 0.12 0.00014 0.04 1.34 0.202011 0.08 0.00002 0.02 3.08 0.242012 0.07 0.00001 0.02 1.88 0.152013 0.06 0.00004 0.01 2.06 0.15

2010-2013 0.08 0.00001 0.02 3.08 0.19

* Based on the historical level of positive NCPC load deviations and RTLO

Page 18: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Historical Daily Averages 2012-2013

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RT 1st Contingency Charges 154,675$

NCPC deviations (MW) 61,887 NCPC load deviations (MW) 40,732 NCPC load deviations (MW)/ NCPC deviations (MW) 66%

Positive NCPC load deviations (DA>RT) (MW) 12586Positive/NCPC load deviations 31%Positive NCPC load deviations /NCPC Deviations 20%

Negative NCPC load deviations (RT>DA) MW 49,301 Negative NCPC load deviations / NCPC load deviations 69%

RTLO (MW) 367,856

Negative NCPC load deviations/RTLO 8%

Positive NCPC load deviations /RTLO 3%

NCPC load deviations/RTLO 11%

Page 19: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

NEXT STEPS

Page 20: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Proposal Summary and Next Steps

• Exclude positive load deviations from NCPC charges to strengthen the incentive for load to participate in the day-ahead energy market

• Proposed changes targeted for implementation with Offer Flexibility Changes in Q4 2014

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Date Committee Action

December 2013 Markets Committee Introduce Proposal

February 2014 Markets Committee Discuss Proposal

March 2014 Markets Committee Discuss Proposal

April 2014 Markets Committee Discuss Proposal

May 2014 Markets Committee Vote Proposal

Page 21: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

APPENDIX A Scenario Analysis

Page 22: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Case 1*: Neutral impact on Participants whose pro-rata share of (+) load deviations = pro-rata share of RTLO

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*Assumptions: Same as Base Case except Participant 3 has lower RTLO (115 vs. 130 MW )

Implication: Pro-rata share of positive load deviations = pro-rata share of RTLO for participant C; Phase 1 has no impact on RT 1st Contingency Charges for Participant C

Case 1 Participant A B C D Total Proposed*- Current Method (9)$ 9$ (0)$ -$ -$

% Change PROPOSED vs. CURRENT -25% 25% 0% 0% 0%*Assumes no change in behavior

NCPC load deviations/NCPC deviations 23% 23% 23% 32% 100%Impact Driver (+) load devs. (participant)/ (+) load devs. (all participants) 62% 8% 31% 100%

RTLO (participant) / RTLO (all participants) 35% 35% 31% 100%

Control (+) load devs. (participant)/load devs (participant) 57% 7% 29%

Page 23: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

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Case 2*: Decrements will have zero NCPC charges

*Assumptions: Same as Base Case except Participant 3 is a cleared virtual demand bid (DEC) for 1 MW; positive load deviation = 1 MW and RTLO = 0

Implication: Participant 3 has no RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges

Case 2 Participant A B C D Total Proposed*- Current Method (9)$ 13$ (3)$ -$ -$

% Change PROPOSED vs. CURRENT -21% 29% -100% 0% 0%*Assumes no change in behavior

NCPC load deviations/NCPC deviations 29% 29% 2% 41% 100%Impact Driver (+) load devs. (participant)/ (+) load devs. (all participants) 80% 10% 10% 100%

RTLO (participant) / RTLO (all participants) 50% 50% 0% 100%

Control (+) load devs. (participant)/load devs (participant) 57% 7% 100%

Page 24: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

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Case 3*: Share of NCPC charges allocated to RTLO rises w/share of positive load deviations

•Assumptions: Same as Base Case except Participant C has lower RTLO (115 vs. 130 MW ) and NCPC load deviations for all participants are positive

•Implication: RT 1st Contingency NCPC Charges allocated based entirely on RTLO; Participants A and B pay more and Participant C pays less

Case 3 Participant A B C D Total Proposed*- Current Method 1$ 1$ (3)$ -$ -$

% Change PROPOSED vs. CURRENT 4% 4% -8% 0% 0%*Assumes no change in behavior

NCPC load deviations/NCPC deviations 23% 23% 23% 32% 100%Impact Driver (+) load devs. (participant)/ (+) load devs. (all participants) 33% 33% 33% 100%

RTLO (participant) / RTLO (all participants) 35% 35% 31% 100%

Control (+) load devs. (participant)/load devs (participant) 100% 100% 100%

Page 25: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

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Case 4*: Reducing negative load deviations alone may not reduce RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges

•Assumptions: Same as Base Case except Participant C has no negative load deviations ; Participant C’s load deviations = 4 instead of 14.

•Implication: RT 1st Contingency NCPC charges to Participant C are higher because the pro-rata share of positive load deviations is less than their pro-rata share of RTLO .

Case 3 Participant A B C D Total Proposed*- Current Method (11)$ 10$ 1$ -$ -$

% Change PROPOSED vs. CURRENT -26% 24% 8% 0% 0%*Assumes no change in behavior

NCPC load deviations/NCPC deviations 27% 27% 8% 38% 100%Impact Driver (+) load devs. (participant)/ (+) load devs. (all participants) 62% 8% 31% 100%

RTLO (participant) / RTLO (all participants) 33% 33% 33% 100%

Control (+) load devs. (participant)/load devs (participant) 57% 7% 100%

Page 26: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

APPENDIX B Additional material previously presented

Page 27: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Current Allocation Approach for RT NCPC Costs

Reason NCPC Credits Paid Allocation Metric Allocation Interval

1st Contingency System-wide RT NCPC Deviations Daily

Local Second Contingency Protection Resource (‘LSCPR’)

Locational Real Time Load (‘RTLO’) Daily

Voltage, Ampere, Reactive (‘VAR’) System-wide Network Load* Monthly

Special Constraint Resources (‘SCR’) Transmission Owner Daily

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* For more detailed description of how these costs are allocated reference Schedule 2 of the OATT

NCPC credits are paid when real time energy market revenue is not sufficient to recover the cost associated with an accepted supply offer

Page 28: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Historical Allocation of Real-Time NCPC Costs

Reason NCPC Credits Paid 2010 2011 2012 2013* Total

1st Contingency $73.4 $50.3 $48.5 $55.4 $227.7 LSCPR $3.8 $5.7 $8.2 $30.4 $48.1 VAR $3.6 $0.9 $2.7 $1.4 $8.6 SCR $1.6 $3.4 $3.7 $5.2 $13.9 Totals $82.5 $60.3 $63.1 $92.5 $298.3

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* Includes data from January through October 2013

All values in Millions $

Page 29: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Real-time NCPC Deviations Used to Allocate real-time 1st Contingency NCPC Costs

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Page 30: February 11-12, 2014 | Markets Committee

Historical Allocation of real-time 1st Contingency NCPC costs

RT NCPC Deviations 2010 2011 2012 2013* Total ($) Total (%)

Positive Load (RT<DA) $18.8

$11.5 $9.2 $7.4 $46.9 21%

Negative Load (RT>DA) $33.9 $ 20.8 $23.2 $ 27.0 $ 104.9 46%

Generation $6.5 $6.3 $6.3 $9.8 $28.9 13%

Import $6.1 $5.2 $5.7 $7.5 $24.5 11%

Increment $8.1 $6.5 $4.1 $3.8 $22.5 10%

Totals $73.4 $50.3 $48.5 $55.4 $227.7 100%

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All values in Millions $

* Includes data from January through October 2013