october 8, 2013 | nepool markets committee

OCTOBER 8, 2013 | NEPOOL MARKETS COMMITTEE

ISO NEW ENGLAND - MARKET DEVELOPMENT

Complete Summary of NCPC Redesign for Out-of-Merit Operation to Address Offer Flexibility – as of 10/08/2013

NCPC Payments

Preface

This document is a complete summary of the proposed NCPC credit design, as of October 8, 2013.

Changes to the design from what was presented at the July 10, 2013 meeting , and the date the change was presented, are indicated as:

•“New Slide”

•“Updated Slide”

Minor changes to text are shown in red.

Deleted text is shown in light orange with a wavy underline.

2

New Slide – mm/dd/yy

Updated – mm/dd/yy

NCPC DESIGN DETAILSDetailed overview of the proposed design for Offer Flexibility

NCPC Detailed Design presentation overview

• Common Concepts– Commitment Decisions– Dispatch Decisions– Effective Offers– Best Alternative Framework– NCPC Settlement Periods

• Day-Ahead NCPC Settlement (DA NCPC)

• Real-Time NCPC Settlement (RT NCPC)– Real-Time Commitment NCPC Credits– Real-Time Dispatch NCPC Credits

4

DAY-AHEAD AND REAL-TIME COMMON DESIGN DETAILSCommon design elements for both the Day-Ahead NCPC (DA NCPC) and Real-Time NCPC (RT NCPC) Credit Calculations

Commitment Decisions

• Occur when the ISO or a participant makes a decision to commit a resource to operate for some period of time

• Commitment Decisions have several properties that are considered in the NCPC evaluation– Who made the decision – ISO or participant (Commitment Driver)– Reason for the decision – links to cost allocation (Decision Reason)– Offer in place at the time of the decision (Effective Offer)– Time at which the decision occurred (Decision Time)– Duration of the commitment decision (Decision Interval)

6

Commitment Decision Occurrences

• Commitment Decisions occur throughout the resource scheduling processes. Examples of Commitment Decisions include:– Day-ahead schedule– Real-time schedule (additions to day-ahead)– Real-time fast-start dispatch– Real-time audit demonstration– Participant self-schedule request

• Day-Ahead schedules create real-time Commitment Decisions for all resources except for fast-start resources

• Commitment Decisions may continue into a subsequent day

7

New and Modified Commitment Decisions

• New Commitment Decisions that create additional schedules do not alter previous Commitment Decisions– For example a day-ahead schedule for HE8-HE10 is not changed by

the creation of an additional scheduled in real-time for HE11-HE14

• Commitment Decisions may be canceled prior to the start or terminated ahead of the scheduled end time

8

Dispatch Decisions

• Occur when ISO makes a decision to dispatch a resource above its EcoMin limit

• Dispatch Decisions have several properties that are considered in the NCPC evaluation– Dispatch decisions are made by the ISO (Dispatch Driver)– Reason for the decision – links to cost allocation (Decision Reason)– Offer in place at the time of the decision (Effective Offer)– Time at which the decision occurred (Decision Time)– Duration of the dispatch decision (Decision Interval)

9

Dispatch Decision Occurrences

• Dispatch Decisions occur in the day-ahead market (cleared energy schedules) and throughout real time. Examples of Dispatch Decisions include:– Day-ahead schedule above EcoMin limit– Real-time dispatch– Real-time audit request– Real-time manual dispatch (for reliability constraint)

• For the purposes of NCPC, Dispatch Decisions are considered to occur with an hourly duration (consistent with the minimum settlement granularity)

10

Effective Offers for Commitment Decisions

• When a Commitment Decision occurs, the Commitment Cost of the Supply Offer in place at the time is “locked in” for purposes of NCPC for the duration of the commitment– Commitment Costs include the Start-Up Fee, No Load Fee, Energy Cost

at the EcoMin limit• Start-Up Fee is from the offer for the commitment “release for

dispatch” start hour

• Commitment Cost are locked with each Commitment Decision– Resources with multiple Commitment Decisions through the day may

have different Effective Offer costs evaluated by NCPC

• Effective Offers for Commitment Decisions that span multiple days are used in settlement for subsequent days

11

Updated – 8/9/13

Effective Offers for Commitment Decisions including future Operating Days

12

New Slide – 10/08/13

• The Effective Offer for Resources completing Minimum Run Time in a subsequent day:

– For commitments in the DA market or RAA, the Supply Offer in place for HE24 of Day 1 (at time of commitment) establishes commitment costs for minimum run time hours in Day 2

– For commitments made during the operating day (Day 1), the Supply Offer in place for Day 2 (at time of commitment) establishes commitment costs for minimum run time hours in Day 2

• For Resources committed prior to the DA market, the Commitment Costs are established by the Supply Offer in place for the future day (at the time of the commitment)

Effective Offers for Dispatch Decisions

• When a Dispatch Decision occurs, the Dispatch Cost of the Supply Offer in place at the time is “locked in” for purposes of NCPC for the duration of the decision (for NCPC considered to occur hourly)– Dispatch Cost is the Energy Cost above the EcoMin limit

• The Dispatch Cost is the final offered value used for the day-ahead clearing or real-time dispatch

13

Effective Offers after a Reoffer or Mitigation

• Commitment Costs used in the NCPC settlements will be based upon the lesser of the original Effective Offer at the time of commitment or a participant’s final re-offer

• For resources that are mitigated, the Commitment and Dispatch Costs used in NCPC settlement will be based upon the mitigated Supply Offer

14

Updated – 8/9/13

Effective Offers and changes to EcoMin limit

• If the EcoMin limit is redeclared to a different level than was offered at the time of the Commitment Decision, the Commitment Cost is modified as follows:– an increase of EcoMin causes the Energy cost at the commitment

EcoMin limit to be applied as the cost of energy between commitment EcoMin and the higher redeclared EcoMin

– for reductions to the EcoMin the energy cost at the lower EcoMin level will be used to determine Commitment Cost

• During a Minimum Generation Emergency event, the EcoMin is set to the Emergency minimum limit and the Commitment Cost rule for a reduction of EcoMin limit is applied

• Dispatch Cost applies to the energy above EcoMin or the Emergency limit

15

Example of Commitment Cost with higher redeclared EcoMin limit

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Commitment Cost for energy at EcoMin limit is shaded area under the curve

Commitment Cost energy offer

EcoMin limit = 90 MW

Marginal cost at EcoMin limit = $14/MWh

Offer requested offer slope

EcoMin limit redeclared to 110 MW

Marginal cost at commitment EcoMin

limit ($14/MWh) extended up to higher

EcoMin limit

90 90 110

Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling – Day-Ahead

• For purposes of NCPC credit evaluation, a self-schedule request by a participant in DA is considered to be an offer of:– Start-Up Fee = $0/start– No Load Fee = $0/hour– Energy cost up to EcoMin @ floor price ($-150/MWh)– Energy cost above EcoMin @ prices in energy offer

17

Updated – 9/10/13

Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling – Real-Time• In RT, resources are only committed by the ISO for reliability,

not economics.– An offline resource that needs/wants to run in RT cannot get online by

simply lowering its offer price to its RT cost– A RT self-schedule is the only way to ensure commitment in RT– Valuing EcoMin energy at $-150 is a significant penalty in this situation

• For NCPC purposes, a RT self-schedule will be evaluated as follows:– Energy cost up to EcoMin @ $0/MWh– Revenues for energy up to EcoMin excluded from calculation of RT

Commitment NCPC credit

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Effective Offers and Self-Scheduling

• When a participant submits an intra-hour request to dispatch at a specific output level:– energy cost up to the requested level is an energy offer at the

floor price for the entire hour– Startup Cost = $0 (no impact unless this was a startup hour)– No Load Cost = $0

19

Updated – 9/10/13

Best Alternative determinations for NCPC

• DA NCPC:– For a resource cleared to deliver energy at a price below its

offered cost, the best alternative is to not participate in the day-ahead market

• RT NCPC:– For a resource committed to operate over a period, the best

alternative is to remain online for the hours when profit is maximized

– For a resource dispatched above EcoMin limit to a level where incremental energy cost is greater than the real-time LMP, the best alternative is to operate at a feasible economic level

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NCPC Credit Calculations are formulated based on actual revenues and Best Alternative

• NCPC credit determinations are formulated to identify the payment necessary to make a resource no worse off for following ISO instruction (therefore willing to follow)

• NCPC credit =

Max[0, (Best Alternative Cash Flow) - (ISO Instruction Cash Flow)]

where Cash Flow = revenue - cost

• Both the DA NCPC and RT NCPC Credit calculations apply this approach

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NCPC Settlement Periods• For DA NCPC and RT Commitment NCPC, each discrete period

of contiguous scheduled hours are evaluated separately (i.e., NCPC Settlement Period)– May include one or more Commitment Decisions

• For RT Dispatch NCPC, each hour is evaluated separately

• No transfer of profit/loss between NCPC Settlement Periods

• A Settlement Period ends at the earlier of a) the last hour of a commitment in which energy is produced/consumed (including shutdown ramp) or b) the end of the operating day

• NCPC Settlement Periods are truncated at operating day boundaries– Commitment Decisions may continue into next day– Separate NCPC Settlement Period begins with the start of next day

22

Updated – 8/9/13

NCPC Settlement Periods – Fast-Start Resources

• For Fast Start resources, the credits for DA NCPC, RT Commitment NCPC, and RT Dispatch NCPC are evaluated separately for each hour

• No transfer of profit/loss between hours

• Separate Settlement Periods are established if contiguous Commitment Decisions reflect a change in the resource’s designation to or from a Fast Start Generator

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Updated – 10/08/13

DAY-AHEAD NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCredit design for Generators scheduled out-of-merit in the day-ahead market

Eligible Resources for Day-Ahead NCPC

• All generators scheduled in the day-ahead market are eligible for DA NCPC credits

• Requires the resource to submit Supply Offers into the day-ahead market

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Effective Offers for Day-Ahead NCPC

• Energy costs at EcoMin limit are the Supply Offers submitted to the day-ahead market for Commitment Decisions that originate in day-ahead– For resources scheduled in the day-ahead market for the purpose of

completing a prior day’s commitment, the energy costs at EcoMin limit are determined using Supply Offers captured at the time of the Commitment Decision

• Dispatch Costs (i.e., energy costs above EcoMin limit) are the Supply Offers submitted into the day-ahead market

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NCPC Settlement Period for Day-Ahead NCPC

• Each contiguous period of committed hours (i.e., day-ahead cleared schedule) is evaluated separately for DA NCPC credit– May include one or more Commitment Decisions

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Self-Schedule Offers in Day-Ahead Must Respect Inter-temporal Offer Parameters• When a Day-Ahead Self Schedule is for less than the Min Run

Time, or violates the Min Down Time, the Day-Ahead Market will clear additional hours economically, as needed to create a feasible schedule.

• The NCPC Credit will evaluate the minimum required number of additional hours as self-scheduled, starting with contiguous hours prior to the self-schedule, and continuing with hours following the self-schedule, as needed.– All hours in between two self-schedule hours that violate the Min Down Time will be

evaluated as self-scheduled.

• If, as a result, the first hour of the DA schedule is now evaluated as self-scheduled, the resource will not be eligible for the Startup Fee.

• In the current rules, entire day is considered self-scheduled.

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Day-Ahead NCPC Credit Determination

• Eligible Quantity: total day-ahead scheduled output

• Hourly cost: the Eligible Quantity cost determined using Effective Offers for commitment and dispatch cost

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x DA LMP)

• Startup and No Load will be considered in DA Credit– Startup cost amortized over the commitment period

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, ∑(Hourly Cost) - ∑(Hourly Revenue)]– summation includes all hours in the Settlement Period

• Best alternative is to break-even ($0)

29

Updated – 9/10/13

REAL-TIME NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCredit design for Generators committed and/or dispatched out-of-merit in the real-time market

Eligible Resources for Real-Time NCPC

• All resources that are online and operating in response to ISO commitment or dispatch (up and down) instructions

• Requires the resource to have a Supply Offer in the real-time market and to be able to respond to ISO dispatch instructions

31

Updated – 9/10/13

Effective Offers for Real-Time NCPC

• Commitment Costs are based upon the offers in place at the time of the commitment (whether the commitment occurred in day-ahead or real-time)– Energy cost at EcoMin, Start-Up Fee, and No Load Fee are used for

determination of RT NCPC Credit

• Dispatch Costs are based upon the energy offers submitted to the real-time market and used to determine resource’s dispatch (DDP)

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Excluded offer costs for operation during audits

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• RT NCPC credits do not evaluate a resource’s Start-Up fees, No-Load fees, energy cost, or energy revenue during:– a Market Participant requested audit– an ISO-initiated audit when both the following are true:

• the Resource had a summer or winter Seasonal Claimed Capability equal to 0 MW at the beginning of the current Capability Demonstration Year, and

• the ISO Initiated Claimed Capability Audit is the first Claimed Capability Audit that the Resource performs during that Capability Demonstration Year.

• Exclusion of these costs is consistent with the redesign principles and the existing tariff provisions

Economic Dispatch Point for Real-Time NCPC

• NCPC credit determinations for commitment and dispatch best alternatives use a common concept for the loading level at which a resource would be “economically” dispatched

• The economic energy dispatch point (EDP) between the resource’s EcoMin limit and DDP based on the hour’s Dispatch Costs and the real-time LMP

• The economic dispatch point is set equal to the DDP for upward and downward ramp constrained resources– DDP reflects the feasible change to output in response to price for a

ramp-limited resource

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Example of the Economic Dispatch Point

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Unit is not ramp constrained

Dispatch Cost energy offer

0 --> 50 MW $10/MWh

51 --> 150 MW $20/MWh

Offer requested offer slope

EcoMin limit = 70 MW

DDP = 140 MWMarginal offer cost at DDP = $19/MWh

RT LMP = $16/MWh

Range of possible EDP values

Based on the energy offer for dispatch and the RT LMP, the resource would

be economically dispatched at 110 MW; therefore EDP = 110 MW

EDP = 110 MW

RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination

• RT Commitment NCPC credits are determined in two parts, calculated separately:– A credit for the Min Run Time (MRT) hours– A credit for the post-MRT hours

• The credit for the MRT hours ensures a resource is no worse off for starting at the ISO requested commitment start time versus a delayed start – A resource that is unprofitable in the early hours could otherwise

improve its financial position by delaying its start time

• The credit for the post-MRT hours ensures a resource is no worse off for continuing to operate until de-committed by the ISO.

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RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination During Min Run Time (“Claw-Forward” Credit)

• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue= MIN (revenue metering, economic dispatch point)

• Hourly cost: Energy Cost + Start-up fee + No Load fee– eligible quantity energy cost is determined using the Effective Offers

for Commitment and Dispatch Costs– portion of Start-Up fee from Effective Offer equal to one hour’s share

of the fee amortized over Commitment Decision duration– No-Load fee from the Effective Offer

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x RT LMP)

• Credit for the MRT hours: Max[ 0, (total hourly cost – total hourly revenue)for the MRT period ]

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Updated – 9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC Credit Determination Following Min Run Time• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue

= MIN (revenue metering, economic dispatch point)

• Hourly cost: Energy Cost + Start-up fee + No Load fee– eligible quantity energy cost is determined using the Effective Offers for Commitment

and Dispatch Costs– portion of Start-Up fee from Effective Offer equal to one hour’s share of the fee

amortized over Commitment Decision duration– No-Load fee from the Effective Offer

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Quantity x RT LMP)

• Best alternative is to break-even ($0) or shutdown at max cumulative profit (>$0)

• Hourly profit = Hourly Revenue – Hourly Cost

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, Maximum Profit] – Final Profit over the period after MRT– Maximum Profit = maximum total profit (sum of hourly profits for the post-MRT hours)

possible by choosing to shutdown at any hour after minimum run time has expired– Final Profit = sum of hourly profits over the post-MRT Period

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Updated – 9/10/13

Hours Evaluated for RT Commitment NCPC

• Cost and revenues are calculated for each hour of a commitment Decision Interval

• When the resource is ramping from an offline state to its EcoMin limit, energy cost is not calculated because these costs are included in the Start-Up fee; however, revenues are included to offset the costs included in the Start-Up fee– Hourly cost is not calculated explicitly– Hourly revenue = (revenue metering x RT LMP)

• Similarly, shutdown costs are permitted in the Startup Fee– Therefore, revenues after release for shutdown are included

• During periods after the resource is released for shutdown, neither hourly cost or revenue are included in the NCPC credit determination

39

Updated – 8/9/13

Application of Start-Up Fee for RT Commitment NCPC Credits• Late Start

– Start-Up fee is included in the costs if the resource releases for dispatch not more than 30 minutes earlier or later than the scheduled commitment start

• Early Start (similar to current treatment)– If accepted by the Control Room as “pool-scheduled”, the eligible amount is

100% of Min(Early Startup Fee, Original Commitment Startup Fee)– Otherwise, resource must self-schedule: Startup Fee is not eligible

• The appropriate Start-Up fee for cold/intermediate/hot status is included based on status at the time of the start

• Start-Up fee is apportioned over the number of hours in the Commitment Decision duration– the Start-Up fee is amortized through the end of the commitment in which

minimum run time expires– the amortization period is not extended if a new commitment is added after

the time when minimum run time expires– Start-Up fee may be applied across Settlement Periods in two operating days

40

Updated – 8/9/13

Application of the Start-Up Fee for Resources released for dispatch before or after start time

• When a resource is released for dispatch more than 30 minutes later than the scheduled commitment start, the Start-Up fee will be reduced in proportion to the number of minutes later than planned the actual release occurs (discounting 30 minute grace period)– Example: when 54 minutes late to release for a 2 hour commitment

the Start-up fee reduction equals (54-30)/120 = 0.2

• When a resource releases for dispatch more than 30 minutes earlier than requested by the ISO, the Start-Up fee will not be included in NCPC

41

Updated – 8/9/13

Application of the Start-Up Fee for Resources that shutdown ahead of the end time

• When the ISO requests or approves a participant request to shutdown ahead of the end of the Commitment Decision duration, the total Start-Up fee will be considered for NCPC

• Resources that trip (or are otherwise forced to shutdown due to operational problems) will be considered for only the portion of the Start-Up fee apportioned to the hours when the resource was online

• A trip caused by a network equipment failure unrelated to plant operation will not disqualify consideration of the full Startup Fee in the credit determination (current treatment)

• If the ISO requests that a resource restart following a trip, the additional Start-Up fee will be apportioned to the hours of the Commitment Decision

42

Updated – 8/9/13

Settlement Period for RT Commitment NCPC

• Each contiguous block of committed hours (i.e., real-time online operation between times of startup and shutdown) is evaluated separately for RT Commitment NCPC credit– May include one or more commitment decisions

• Hourly profit = Hourly Revenue – Hourly Cost

• NCPC credit = MAX [0, Maximum Profit] – Final Profit ]– Maximum Profit = maximum total profit (sum of hourly profits)

possible by choosing to shutdown at any hour after minimum run time has expired

– Final Profit = sum of hourly profits over the Settlement Period

43

Updated – 9/10/13

The above text was relocated to the earlier slide describing Post-MRT RT Commitment NCPC Credit

RT Dispatch NCPC Credit Determination

• Eligible quantity: hourly energy amount for cost and revenue when DDP > economic dispatch point (EDP)– Eligible Cost Quantity = MIN (revenue metering, DDP) - EDP– Eligible Revenue Quantity = revenue metering – EDP

• Hourly cost: cost of Eligible Cost Quantity determined with Effective Offers for Commitment and Dispatch Cost

• Hourly revenue: (Eligible Revenue Quantity x RT LMP)– Revenue earned by operating above the DDP will offset cost

• Resource’s best alternative is to operate at economic dispatch point (revenue >= cost)

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Settlement Period for RT Dispatch NCPC Credits

• Each hour is evaluated separately for RT Dispatch NCPC Credit

• NCPC Dispatch Credit =

MAX (0, Hourly Cost – Hourly Revenue)

• When the dispatch Hourly Revenue exceeds Hourly Cost, the additional profit that the resource earned by exceeding the DDP will be used to increase revenue reduce cost in the RT Commitment NCPC determination

45

Updated – 8/9/13

Regulation Opportunity Cost in RT NCPC

• Regulation resources will already have been compensated for out-of-merit operation while regulating

• The hourly regulation out-of-merit cost compensation is included in revenues for the RT Dispatch NCPC credit determination to avoid double-compensation

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HOURLY NCPC CREDIT DESIGNCalculation of hourly DA NCPC Credits and RT NCPC Credits for the purpose of cost allocation

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DA NCPC and RT NCPC Hourly Credit

• Credits are apportioned to hours in the NCPC Settlement Period:– to those hours where Hourly Cost > Hourly Revenue (negative profit)– in proportion to each hour’s negative profit divided by the sum of the

negative profits for all hours in the Settlement Period

• NCPC Settlement Period duration:– one or more hours for DA NCPC and RT Commitment NCPC– one hour for RT Dispatch NCPC

• The Commitment Reason or Dispatch Reason corresponding to each hour will determine NCPC cost allocation type– The credit will be apportioned evenly in hours with multiple reasons

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OTHER NCPC CREDITSComplete summary of NCPC Redesign for Offer Flexibility conforming changes to other NCPC credit types.

ISO proposes to modify some other types of NCPC Credit for Offer Flexibility

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Credit Type Proposal

Day-Ahead External Node NCPC (III.F.2.3/III.F.2.4) No change

Synchronous Condenser NCPC (III.F.2.2) No change

Real-Time External Transactions (III.F.2.3/III.F.2.4) Conforming change

Postured DARD Pump (III.F.2.4) Conforming change

Cancelled Pool-Scheduled Resource (III.F.2.5) Conforming change

Postured Generation (III.F.2.6) Conforming change

Hourly Shortfall (III.F.2.1.17) Conforming change

Minimum Generation Emergency (III.F.2.1.18) Included in RT Dispatch NCPC

Day-Ahead External Node NCPC is not being modified

• No proposed changes to this NCPC compensation

• External Transactions, Decrement Bids and Increment Offers that are cleared out of rate in the day-ahead market at external nodes are eligible for NCPC for the difference between the LMP and the transaction price each hour

• Coordinated External Transactions are not eligible

51

Updated – 10/08/13

Synchronous Condenser NCPC is not being modified

• No proposed changes to this NCPC compensation

• Resources committed to operate as a synchronous condenser receive NCPC credit for the hourly price to condense each hour and the condensing start-up fee (if applicable) submitted with their Supply Offer

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Minor changes are proposed to the Real-Time External Transactions NCPC

• Hourly evaluation rather than over transaction duration

• Priced transactions with an associated day-ahead cleared schedule will be:– Evaluated based on the real-time scheduled quantity exceeding the

day-ahead scheduled quantity– Evaluated based on the total real-time scheduled quantity for

transactions re-cleared in real-time using a revised offer price

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Real-Time External Transaction NCPC credit

• Priced external transactions that are cleared out of rate in the real-time market are eligible for NCPC for the difference between the LMP and the offer price each hour

• Coordinated External Transactions are not eligible

• Priced import transaction hourly credit:

Scheduled Quantity x (Transaction Price – Real-Time LMP)

• Priced export transactions hourly credit:

Scheduled Quantity x (Real-Time LMP – Transaction Price)

54

Updated – 10/08/13

Minor changes are proposed to the Real-Time DARD Pump NCPC

• Hourly evaluation rather than over entire day

• DARD Pump with day-ahead cleared demand will be evaluated based on total real-time consumption rather than deviations exceeding the day-ahead demand

• Consumption in excess of ISO dispatch instruction will not be considered

• Bid cost determined with greater of demand bid at time of ISO posture order or submitted each hour

55

Updated9/10/13

Real-Time DARD Pump NCPC credit

• DARD Pumps are eligible only when an ISO posturing order causes the resource to consume out of rate

• The greater of hourly demand bids at the time of the posturing order or submitted for each hour determines the bid price for NCPC compensation

• DARD Pump hourly credit:

MIN (DDP, Metered Output Consumption) x (Real-Time LMP – Bid Price)

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Updated9/10/13

Cancelled Start NCPC compensation is unchanged, but proposal modifies eligibility requirements

• Starts scheduled in the day-ahead market are eligible– Day-ahead schedule compensation for Start-Up fees will not ensure

willingness to incur cost RT are no longer compensated through DA NCPC so their eligibility is now necessary

• Resources that are cancelled more than two hours after the scheduled synchronization time are not eligible

• Resources that self-schedule a start within lesser of (i) their Minimum Down Time or (ii) 10 hours after being cancelled are not eligible– Applies when self-schedule is requested after the cancellation order

• Requirement that resources have a Notification Time not longer than 24 hours remains (no change)

57

Updated9/10/13

Cancelled Start NCPC credit

• Each cancelled pool-scheduled commitment is compensated when the ISO cancels a start after Notification Time begins– If cancelled ahead of the Notification Time there is no credit

• Start-Up fee and Notification Time are based upon the offer information used by ISO to make the commitment decision

• Cancelled Start credit:

Start-Up fee x

percentage of Notification Time completed

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Cancelled Start NCPC examples

Cancelled Start credit = $4,000 (= $6k * 1/1.5)

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Commitment OfferStart-Up fee $6,000 Notification Time 1.5 hoursMin Down Time 3 hours

Cancelled Start credit = $0 (cancelled prior to Notification Time)

Cancelled Start NCPC examples (continued)

Cancelled Start credit = $6,000 (if cancelled after 2 hour limit no credit)

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Commitment OfferStart-Up fee $6,000 Notification Time 1.5 hoursMin Down Time 3 hours

Cancelled Start credit = $0 (self-scheduled start within lesser of Min Down time and 10 hrs)

Updated9/10/13

What is Posturing?

• “an action of the ISO to deviate from the jointly optimized security constrained economic dispatch for Energy and Operating Reserves solution for a Resource … for the purpose of maintaining sufficient Operating Reserve (both online and off-line) or for the provision of voltage or VAR

• When the ISO postures a resource, the resource incurs an opportunity cost– The posture order prevents the resource from operating at times and

at output levels that would have been profitable– The Posturing Credit is intended to make the postured resource

financially no worse off for having followed the ISO’s posturing instructions.

61


Posturing for Limited Energy Resources

• A Limited Energy Resource is postured to preserve some amount of the available energy for future hours to provide operating reserves, VAR or voltage support in a future hour.– A manual decision is required because the cooptimized energy

dispatch only incorporates a 15 minute lookahead.

• To meet the “no worse off” NCPC design principle, the posturing credit must compare the resource’s actual revenues to the “best alternative” revenues had the resource not been postured.– The Best Alternative results from using the postured energy in the

highest priced hours, subject to the unit’s real-time EcoMax, EcoMin, hourly LEG

62


Posturing for Limited Energy Resources

• Since the same “fuel” is used in the actual dispatch and the best alternative proxy dispatch, the cost is the same for both, except…

• A postured resource may have energy left unused at the end of the day– The cost of replacing the unused energy the next day is avoided– The Posturing Credit values the energy remaining in storage at the

end of the day at the estimated avoided cost to replace the energy the next day: • For Pump Storage Resources, replacement cost = DALMP for HE3-5• For other LEG Resources (storage hydro, gas units with LEG), value of

unused energy = 0

63

Updated – 10/08/13

Posturing for Limited Energy Resources• Posture Credit for a Limited Energy Resource: = Max[0, Best Alternative Margin – Actual Margin]

= Max[0, (Energy RevenueBA + Remaining Energy MWh ValueBA) – (Energy RevenueACTUAL + Remaining Energy MWh ValueACTUAL)]

• Energy RevenueBA = Best Alternative Energyh x RTLMPh

– Best Alternative Energyh represents the hourly use of available energy that maximizes potential Real-Time revenue

• Energy RevenueACTUAL = Actual Energyh x RTLMPh

• Evaluated from start of posturing through the end of the Operating Day• Available energy for shared fuel resources divided equally amongst units

based on unit’s Max Daily Energy (as redeclared by the Lead Participant) and actual generation and pumping prior to posture order.

• For non-Fast Start resources, available energy is dispatched in contiguous hours (no shutdown & restart)

64

Updated – 10/08/13

Posturing – Available Energy

• For units sharing a common fuel supply, when:

Actual Generation - Actual Pumping > Est. Available Energy

this implies the available energy was reallocated between units during the remainder of the day

• The ISO will adjust the original estimates as necessary to create feasible operating outcomes for the resources sharing the fuel source.

65


Posturing – Pumping after Posture Order• Pumping after being postured will impact the additional

energy in storage at end-of-day– This “extra pumping energy” will be valued at replacement cost

• Economic (or self-scheduled) pumping should not make the participant financially worse off by lessening the posture credit

• To achieve this outcome, any “extra pumping energy” is included in the “best alternative” end-of-day storage– It is not included in the “best alternative” energy dispatch

• Including the “extra pumping energy” in both the actual and best alternative sides of the credit calculation allows it to cancel out without impacting the posture credit.

66


Generator with Limited Energy (Fast Start) postured through end of operating day (pumped storage)

67

Updated – 10/08/13

Fast Start GeneratorEcoMax Limit 100 MW

Available Energy 200 MWhReplacement cost $40 /MWh = average(next day DA LMP HE3-5)

Posturing starts

Hour 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24RT LMP $60 $70 $80 $100 $70 $60 $30 $40

Actual GEN MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 RemainingActual PUMP MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Energy

Actual Avail. MWh 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200Remaining

Best Alt. GEN MWh 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 EnergyBest Alt. Avail. MWh 200 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 0

(a) Best Alt. Revenue $18,000 (c) Actual Revenue $0(b) Best Alt. Avoided Replacement Cost $0 (d) Act. Avoided Replacement Cost $8,000

Posturing NCPC creditDAY = $10,000 = MAX [0, (a + b) - (c + d)]

Posturing ends

Generator with Limited Energy (Fast Start) postured temporarily and later dispatched (pumped storage)

68

Updated – 10/08/13



Posturing starts

Hour 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24RT LMP $60 $70 $80 $100 $70 $60 $30 $40

Actual GEN MWh 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 RemainingActual PUMP MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Energy

Actual Avail. MWh 200 200 200 200 100 100 100 100 100Remaining

Best Alt. GEN MWh 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 EnergyBest Alt. Avail. MWh 200 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 0

(a) Best Alt. Revenue $18,000 (c) Actual Revenue $7,000(b) Best Alt. Avoided Replacement Cost $0 (d) Act. Avoided Replacement Cost $4,000


Posturing ends

Postured Limited Energy Generatorwith Pumping after Being Postured

69




Posturing starts

Hour 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

RT LMP $60 $70 $80 $100 $90 $60 $30 $40Actual GEN MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Remaining

Actual PUMP MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 (200) 0 EnergyActual Avail. MWh 200 200 200 200 200 200 400 400 400

Extra RemainingBest Alt. GEN MWh 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 Pumping Energy

Best Alt. Avail. MWh 200 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 (200) 200

(a) Best Alt. Revenue $18,000 (c) Actual Revenue $0(b) Best Alt. Avoided Replacement Cost $8,000 (d) Act. Avoided Replacement Cost $16,000


Posturing ends

Postured Limited Energy Generatorwith Pumping & Generation after Being Postured

70




Posturing starts

Hour 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

RT LMP $60 $70 $80 $100 $70 $60 $30 $40Actual GEN MWh 0 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 Remaining

Actual PUMP MWh 0 0 0 0 0 0 (200) 0 EnergyActual Avail. MWh 200 200 200 200 100 100 300 300 300

Extra RemainingBest Alt. GEN MWh 0 0 100 100 0 0 0 0 Pumping Energy

Best Alt. Avail. MWh 200 200 100 0 0 0 0 0 (200) 200

(a) Best Alt. Revenue $18,000 (c) Actual Revenue $7,000(b) Best Alt. Avoided Replacement Cost $8,000 (d) Act. Avoided Replacement Cost $12,000


Posturing ends

Summary of Limited Energy ResourcePosturing Examples

• Generation after posturing reduces credit, but does not alter final value

• Pumping after posturing does not affect credit, but increases final value

71


Actual Revenue

Posture Credit

Actual Avoided Replacement Cost (Actual)

Value of Actual Revenue,

Remaining Energy & Posture Credit

No Pump or Gen After Postured $0 $10,000 $8,000 $18,000

Generation After Postured $7,000 $7,000 $4,000 $18,000

Pump After Postured $0 $10,000 $16,000 $26,000

Pump and Gen After Postured $7,000 $7,000 $12,000 $26,000

Posturing for non-Limited Energy Resources

• A resource that is not energy-limited is only postured to meet a reliability need that is not fully reflected in the energy & reserve dispatch.– Once again, a manual decision is required

• No need to estimate the value of postured energy shifted to future hours, since there is no limit on available energy– Credit is determined separately for each postured hour– A Best Alternative Output (BAO) level is determined for each hour,

based on the resource’s energy offer curve, and subject to EcoMin, EcoMax, RTHOL and hourly LEG

– If BAO <= Actual energy, then credit = 0

72


Posturing for non-Limited Energy Resources

• Hourly Posture Credit for non-Limited Energy Resources:= Max[0, Best Alternative Margin – Actual Margin]= MAX[0, (RTLMP * BAO – Energy Cost at BAO)

– (RT LMP * RQM – Energy Cost at RQM)]

• Energy cost includes No-Load and Startup Fees– For fast starts postured offline, total Start-Up fee is included each

hour– For non-fast starts postured offline, remaining Start-Up fee from the

RT Commitment NCPC credit is included in each hour – For resources postured online, SU & NL for BA is same as Actual and

can be ignored

73


Fast-Start generator postured offline (without energy restriction)

74


Generator postured to reduce energy output (without energy restriction)

75


Allocation of Posturing Credits

• Total daily posturing credit for a LEG resource is allocated to the “reason” for the posture instruction identified at the time of the posture decision– For example, 1st Contingency, VAR, etc.)

• The hourly posturing credit for non-LEG resources is allocated in accordance with the hourly reason for the posture decision, if so identified.

76


What is Hourly Shortfall NCPC and what has changed in the ISO proposal?

• Hourly Shortfall compensates a generator with a DA energy obligation which is not dispatched in RT by the ISO– A resource may be financially worse off for following ISO dispatch if

the RT cost to replace its DA energy sale exceeds the DA payment

• The ISO previously proposed a RT opportunity cost model to evaluate the amount by which a generator is worse off– Based upon participant feedback and further analysis, the ISO

proposes to retain the current design (i.e., energy replacement cost compensation), but conformed for offer flexibility

– The replacement cost model aligns the eligibility conditions with the financial value of the best alternative considered

77

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC credit: eligibility

• Eligible resources are: pool-scheduled in the day-ahead market, offline and available, not postured, but decommitted or not dispatched by the ISO in real-time– Includes Fast Start generator with denied RT self-schedule

• Intermittent Power Resources remain ineligible

• Resources are evaluated during hours of a DA commitment– Fast Start generators evaluated by individual hour– Non-Fast Start generator evaluated over contiguous hours at EcoMin

and for energy above EcoMin by individual hour

• Only hours when the RT offer is less than or equal to the DA offer are evaluated (detailed on next two slides)

78

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC credit: consideration of RT Supply Offer

Fast Start generator:

• Each hour, RT offer (Start-up, No-Load, energy offer at DA Cleared MW) must be less than or equal to the DA offer– DA pool commitment of a Fast Start does not become a RT

commitment– Evaluation of RT offer relative to DA offer prevents compensating

resources that are offline due to higher RT offer

• Energy quantity considered is limited to the offered RT high capacity limit; i.e., MIN(EcoMax, Limited Energy limit)

79

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC credit: consideration of RT Supply Offer (continued)

Non-Fast Start generator:

• DA EcoMin quantity is evaluated for the contiguous hours of DA commitment regardless of RT energy offer– DA pool commitment of a non-Fast Start becomes a RT commitment and

resource would be producing at least EcoMin if not for ISO dispatch offline

• Each hour, RT energy offer for energy quantity between DA EcoMin and DA Cleared MW must less than or equal to the DA offer to be evaluated for this quantity– Evaluation of RT energy offer relative to DA offer prevents compensating

resources that would not be dispatched at DA level due to higher RT offer

• Energy quantity considered is limited to the offered RT high capacity limit; i.e., MIN(EcoMax, Limited Energy limit)

80

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC credit: formulas

Fast Start Generator:

= MAX[0, (RT LMPh – DA LMPh) *

MIN(DA Cleared MWh, RT High Limith)]

Non-Fast Start Generator:

For EcoMin energy quantity = MAX[0, ∑{ (RT LMPh – DA LMPh)* DA EcoMin MWh }]

For energy quantity above EcoMin = MAX[0, (RT LMPh – DA LMPh) * {MIN(DA Cleared MWh, RT High Limith)- DA EcoMin MWh }]

where:• Non-Fast Start summation is for contiguous hours of DA commitment• RT High Limit is the maximum capability; i.e., MIN(EcoMax, LEG)

81

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC example for Fast Start generator

• Hourly credit evaluated for total DA Cleared MW– For hours where RT offer (Start-up + No-Load + energy) ≤ DA offer

82

New Slide10/08/13

Hourly Shortfall NCPC example for non-Fast Start generator

83

New Slide10/08/13

• Net credit across DA commitment evaluated for DA EcoMin quantity

• Hourly credit evaluated for DA Cleared MW > DA EcoMin MW– For hours where RT energy offer ≤ DA energy offer

Minimum Generation Emergency credit is replaced by RT Dispatch NCPC

• RT Dispatch NCPC credit replaces need for a special credit during Minimum Generation Emergency– Compensates out of rate energy dispatch during normal system

operation and Min Gen

• Hourly No Load fee compensated by RT Commitment NCPC

• During Min Gen the RT Dispatch NCPC cost will be allocated to Real-Time Generation Obligation (III.F.3.1)

84

Cost allocation for these NCPC credit types

85

Credit Type Cost Allocation

Day-Ahead External Node NCPC (a) Purchase & Increment offers: DA load obligations at the node [III.F.3.2.4]

(b) Sales & Decrement bids: DA generation obligations at the node [III.F.3.2.4]

Synchronous Condenser NCPC RT deviations (same as 1st Contingency) [III.F.3.1]

Real-Time External Transactions RT deviations (same as 1st Contingency) [III.F.3.1]

Postured DARD Pump RT load obligations (Network Load if for VAR) [III.F.3.1]

Cancelled Pool-Scheduled Resource RT allocator for commitment reason [III.F.2.5, III.F.3.2]

Postured Generation RT load obligations (Network Load if for VAR) [III.F.3.1]

Hourly Shortfall RT allocator for commitment reason [III.F.2.1,17, III.F.3.2]

Minimum Generation Emergency RT generation obligations [III.F.3.1]

New Slide9/10/13

EXHIBITS AND EXAMPLESMaterials prepared to explain NCPC redesign concepts and examples of detail design components

NCPC CREDIT DESIGN COMPARISONSide-by-side existing NCPC credit design and proposed redesign for the Energy Market Offer Flexibility changes

Out-of-Merit NCPC Credits overview:existing and proposed designs

88

Design Element Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Day-Ahead NCPC Total as-bid cost (energy, startup, no load) for resources scheduled in the day-ahead market is compensated through NCPC when DA revenue is not sufficient

Same As-bid cost of energy for resources scheduled in the day-ahead market is compensated through NCPC when DA Revenue is not sufficient

Real-Time NCPC As-bid cost for additional energy, startup, or no load during RT operation is compensated through NCPC when incremental RT revenue is not sufficient (additions to DA)

Total as-bid cost (energy, startup, no load) for resources operating during real-time is compensated through NCPC when the RT revenue is not sufficient (independent of DA)

Accounting Period Full operating day evaluated as a single period to compare resource cost and revenue

Periods within the operating day are evaluated separately to compare cost and revenue

Updated9/10/13

Out-of-Merit NCPC Credits overview (continued)

89

Design Element Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Cost Occurrence Assume fixed costs paid DA will be incurred to operate in RT

Costs considered when incurred to follow ISO instructions

Offers Used to Calculate Cost

DA offer applied in DA NCPC and RT offer applied for RT NCPC

Offers in effect at the time that Commitment and Dispatch decisions are instructed

Credit Formulation Additional payment required for resource to break-even for following ISO instruction

Additional payment required for resource to be no worse off for following ISO instruction (relative to best alternative)

Hourly NCPC Credit Single, daily NCPC credit apportioned to hours of operation using ratio of hourly Load Obligation to total Load Obligation

Multi-hour period NCPC credit (sub-daily) apportioned to hours within the period using ratio of each hour’s losses to total losses

SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF “PENALTIES”Actions that reduce the Offer cost considered for NCPC under existing and Offer Flexibility designs

Actions that reduce Offer cost for NCPC

91

Action Existing Design Offer Flexibility Design

Infeasible Self-Schedule

Ineligible for NCPC for entire day if self-schedule request is infeasible given resource minimum run or down time

Additional hours required to honor minimum run and down time considered self-scheduled

Not Following DDP Excursion outside +/- 10% tolerance in any 5-minute interval makes unit ineligible for total hourly cost Cost up to DDP Revenue at RQM

No +/-10% tolerance or change to hourly cost eligibility

Cost is same Revenue is same

Actions that reduce Offer cost (continued)


Early Start Unacceptable then Start-Up, No Load, and Energy excluded

Acceptable then Start-Up, No Load, and Energy included

Unacceptable then same (considered self-scheduled)

Acceptable then same (costs limited to commitment offer)

Late Start No discount of Start-Up Start-Up cost discounted by number of minutes later than 30 minute grace period (comparable to early shutdown due to trip)

Actions that reduce Offer cost (continued)

Observations:

• Adjustments are largely the same or eliminate “step-change” in compensation to align severity of adjustment with system impact

• Late Start is the only new adjustment– Generators most often achieve ordered time within 30 minute window– Adjustment is gradual and preserves incentive to continue startup– Comparable to existing adjustment for Early Shutdown

93


Early Shutdown Trip then Start-Up cost discounted unless transmission-related Approved then no discount of Start-Up

Trip then same

Approved then same

EXAMPLES OF NCPC CALCULATION STEPSDemonstration of how certain (previously described) elements of the calculations are performed

Example of multi-hour NCPC credit division among individual hours in the period

• Total losses of ($160) occurred over two hours• Hourly NCPC credit is apportioned based on each hour’s

contribution to total losses• NCPC costs are allocated in accordance with the reason for out-of-

merit operation95

Reduction of Start-Up fee when release occurs later than planned time (after 30 minute grace)

Start-Up is not reduced because actual release occurs within 30 minutes after planned time

96

Commitment OfferStart-Up fee $6,000

2 hour commitment“planned” and “actual” are release for dispatch time

Start-Up is reduced by 20% = (54 – 30) / 120

NCPC considers Start-up of $4,800 = (1 - .20) * $6000

ramp

ramp

Calculation of Energy offer cost for RT Commitment and RT Dispatch NCPC eligible quantity amounts

• RT Commitment NCPC eligible quantity = EDP (= 90 MW)– Energy offer cost = $1,110 ( = $720 + $390 )

• RT Dispatch NCPC eligible quantity = DDP – EDP (= 110 – 90 MW)– Energy offer cost = $450

97

Commitment Cost energy offer*0 --> 50 MW $10/MWh51 --> 150 MW $20/MWh

Dispatch Cost energy offer*0 --> 50 MW $15/MWh51 --> 150 MW $30/MWh

*Offer requested offer slopeUnit is not ramp constrained

EcoMin Limit = 70 MW

EDP = 90 MWMarginal energy offerat EDP = $21/MWh

DDP = 110 MWMarginal energy offerat DDP = $24/MWh

RT LMP = $21/MWhCost to EcoMin at Commitment offer Cost above EcoMin

at Dispatch offer

RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch

Resource’s total NCPC credits = $408 = ( $400 + $8 )

98

Commitment/Dispatch OfferEnergy $50 /MWh

Start-Up $350 /start

EcoMin 10 MWEcoMax 30 MW

Min Run Time 7 HrRamp Rate 6 MW/Hour

Hour 2: Resource is ramp-constrained up which is reflected in the DDP value; DDP is upper-limit for EDP

Example slide 1 of 3

RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch (continued)


99

Hour 4: Resource is not ramp-constrained but dispatched to operate above the EDP RT Dispatch NCPC credit






RT eligible quantity treatment during ramp-constrained resource dispatch (continued)


100

Hour 6:Resource is ramp-constrained down EDP set equal to DDP (feasible dispatch) and cost included in RT Commit NCPC






DA NCPC CREDITSExamples of: including Start-Up and No-Load fees; credit calculations for Fast Start and non-Fast Start generator; and DA market self-schedule commitment hours

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up andNo-Load offer (non-Fast Start generator)

• Hourly cost includes total offer cost for Energy, Start-Up and No-Load– Start-Up fee is apportioned over commitments containing min run time

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue is for all contiguous cleared hours

102

New Slide9/10/13

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up andNo-Load offer (Fast Start generator)

103

• Hourly cost includes total offer cost for Energy, Start-Up and No-Load– Start-Up fee is apportioned over commitments containing min run time

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Cost – Revenue] each hour– Fast Start credit is determined for each cleared hour

New Slide9/10/13

DA NCPC Credit including Start-Up and No-Load offer and self-schedule (non-Fast Start generator)

• DA self-schedule is offer of Start-Up = $0, No-Load = $0, Energy@EcoMin = floor price, and Energy above EcoMin at prices in Supply Offer

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue is for all contiguous cleared hours

104

New Slide9/10/13

RT COMMITMENT NCPC CREDITSExamples of: Fast Start generator RT Commitment NCPC credit; RT market self-schedule commitment hours; and RT Commitment NCPC credits within Minimum Run Time and after Minimum Run Time

RT Commitment NCPC Credit (for Fast Start generator)

106

• ISO RT commitment of Fast Start initiates with dispatch order to start for min run time and each subsequent hour dispatched is a new commitment– Start-Up fee is apportioned over hours of initial min run time commitment

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Cost – Revenue] each hour– Fast Start credit is determined for each hour dispatched

New Slide9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC hourly cost andrevenue for self-schedule commitment• RT self-schedule is offer of Start-Up = $0, No-Load = $0, Energy@EcoMin =

$0/MWh, and Energy above EcoMin at prices in Supply Offer

• For RT self-schedule hour, NCPC calculation of hourly revenue excludes energy payments for output up to EcoMin

107

Note: the NCPC credit calculations are shown in next examples

New Slide9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC Credit in Min RunTime (for non-Fast Start generator)• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]

– Summation of cost and revenue for min run time hours in each commitment– Revenue during startup is apportioned to hours of min run time (not shown)

• This credit improves incentive to start when ordered: an unprofitable commitment is not subsidized by later profitable commitments

108


New Slide9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC Credit after Min Run Time (for non-Fast Start generator)• NCPC credit is: MAX[0,Maximum Profit_POST-MRT] – Final Profit_POST-MRT

– Maximum Profit = maximum cumulative profit after minimum run time expires– Final Profit = cumulative profit for all hours after minimum run time

• This credit improves incentive to continue following dispatch after resource would choose to shutdown: maximum operating profit is preserved

109


New Slide9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC Credit in Min Run Time with multiple commitments (for non-Fast Start generator)

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0, Sum(Cost) – Sum(Revenue)]– Summation of cost and revenue for min run time hours in each commitment– Revenue during startup is apportioned to hours of min run time (not shown)

• This credit improves incentive to start when ordered: an unprofitable commitment is not subsidized by later profitable commitments

110


New Slide9/10/13

RT Commitment NCPC Credit after Min Run Time(for non-Fast Start generator)

111


New Slide9/10/13

• NCPC credit is: MAX[0,Maximum Profit_POST-MRT] – Final Profit_POST-MRT– Maximum Profit = maximum cumulative profit after minimum run time expires– Final Profit = cumulative profit for all hours after minimum run time

• This credit improves incentive to continue following dispatch after resource would choose to shutdown: maximum operating profit is preserved

october 8, 2013 | nepool markets committee

Documents

decision iso

decision links

decision timeduration

dayahead ncpc da ncpc

realtime commitment

decision effective offertime

examples of dispatch

time fast