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Regional & Federal Studies

ISSN: 1359-7566 (Print) 1743-9434 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/frfs20

Federalization with a Constitutional Guaranteeto Secession: Controversies, Paradoxes andImponderables in Ethiopia

Tesfa Bihonegn

To cite this article: Tesfa Bihonegn (2015) Federalization with a Constitutional Guarantee

to Secession: Controversies, Paradoxes and Imponderables in Ethiopia, Regional & FederalStudies, 25:1, 45-70, DOI: 10.1080/13597566.2014.944863

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2014.944863

Published online: 14 Oct 2014.

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claims for autonomy and even independence have limited alternatives otherwise avail-able to them. Thus, as much as it is feared, federalism is also compelling under certaincircumstances. Perplexing then is how best to design the constitutional and insti-

tutional orders of particular federations in ways that could make them maximallyless prone to secessionism?If federations are likely to face secessionist mobilizations and pleas, a question

raised, is it not wise for federal states to prepare themselves for the ‘imminent’ andthe ‘inevitable’ in the rst place? In other words, why federations introduce an explicitright to secede in their constitutions to entertain secessionist demands according toestablished laws than the dangers of ‘unregulated political behaviour’? These are thearguments and advices of some writers who saw ‘counterintuitive strategic benets’(Roach, 2007 : 446) in an explicit constitutional right to secede. In particular, Daniel

Weinstock ( 2000 , 2001 ) and Wayne Norman ( 1998 , 1999 , 2006 ) argue that a consti-tutional guarantee to secession in multinational states would have in practice oppositeeffects than those destructive impacts for which they are usually attributed. Fears thatthe right could be used by constituent states as a ‘cheap bargain tool’ to secure unfairadvantages from the federal government by just threatening secession, both Normanand Weinstock claim, would be diminished by putting signicant procedural hurdlestowards its exercise as, for instance, a qualied two-thirds majority vote. Norman(2006 ), for instance, proposed that precedence must be given to keep groups togetherbut in case of failure in the within solutions, an explicit right to secede, or ‘Plan B’(Monahan and Bryant, 1996 ) is vital. Concurring with Weinstock ( 2000 , 2001 ), hewrote that such a right, in addition to avoiding the dangers of unregulated secessionistbehaviour, would actually reduce the likelihood of secessionism by raising high thestakes of secession.

There exist, however, varied and signicant obstacles against such propositions foran explicit right to secede in multinational federations. The rst is the morality andlegitimacy of a group or region sev ering from an existing sovereign state on whichpolemical literature exists elsewhere. 2 Second, a normative question peculiar to feder-alism is the ‘ federality ’ of an explicit constitutional guarantee to secession: is it‘federal’ for a federal state to provide for a legal right to secede to its memberstates? Paraphrasing the question, does the autonomy federal states render to memberstates extend to include a right of walking away from the federation to form theirown sovereign states? In this regard, Michael Burgess ( 2006 ), for instance, wrote, “aconventional wisdom has evolved in the mainstream literature which asserts that seces-sion on the part of the constituent units of a federation is candidly incompatible with thenotion of federation qua federation” (271). Some argue that the inclusion of an explicitright to secede in state constitutions makes the union a confederation than a federation(Duchacek, 1987 : 207; Filippov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004: 107). Third, more of utilitarian is the wisdom of incorporating an explicit right to secede in multinational

state constitutions. Detractors of a constitutionalized right to secede argue that such aright would incur signicant perils on democracy, constitutionalism and federal con-struction. They state that the right could be used perversely both by a national govern-ment and constituent regions, the rst to emasculate the powers of regions in fear of their eventual secession and the latter to secure unfair advantages from the federationby threatening divorce (Sunstein, 1991 , 2001 ; Baubock, 2000 ; Harbo, 2008 ). The arts

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of negotiation and deliberation inherent in democracy would also be endangered bysuch rights that could raise high the stakes of day-to-day politics (Sunstein, 1991 ,2001 ; Buchanan, 1998 , 2004 ; Harbo, 2008 ).

3For instance, Cass Sunstein ( 1991 )

wrote, “[t]echnocratic rationality does not characterize deliberations in which thespecter of secession is involved.” “The mere possibility of secession,” he added,“may prevent calm negotiation” (653). “It is always hard for antagonistic groups toaccommodate each other,” wrote another and “[a] right to secede will make itharder” (Horowitz, 2003 : 12). Others claim that the right is best explicitly disallowed(Filipov, Ordeshook and Shvetsova, 2004: 334). Lastly, objections against an explicitright to secede in multinational state constitutions come from those who strongly ques-tioned the utility of secession as a potential solution to the problems of multinationalstates and in enduring long-lasting peace. Supplemented by empirical evidences,

these individuals argue that the secession of a group or region from an existing multi-national state does not often provide a once-for-all remedy; it wou ld rather broughtanother chapter of conict between the seceded and the rump states. 4

My main interest in this article is not, however, to interrogate the legitimacy or‘ federality ’ of the explicit constitutional guarantee to secession in the federal consti-tution of Ethiopia ratied in December 1994. The right has been, in fact, a limelightfor various writers and commentators on the federal system of Ethiopia, both nationalsand foreigners. It is applauded by some but rebuked by others. For instance, it isextolled as “a novel state building strategy through peaceful means” (Kidane, 1997 :128). Given the eventual secession of Eritrea from Ethiopia in 1993, despite prolongedmilitary resistance and heavy military build-up, the right is acclaimed as an indicationto the nemesis of maintaining unity by force (Fasil, 1997 : 157). Others reiterate theassertion that the right is a conrmation to the vo luntary nature and basis of unionentered by the ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ 5 of the country in the federation(Andreas, 2003 ; Teshome, 2003 ). On the other hand, its detractors are many, includingPaul Brietzke ( 1995 ), Jon Abbink ( 1997 ), James Paul ( 2000 ), John Cohen ( 1995 ),Asnake Kefale ( 2003 ), Gebresillasie Alemante ( 2003 ) and Lovise Alaen ( 2002 ). Theright represents, of course, the “most common critique of the Ethiopian federalmodel” (Aalen, 2002 : 63). It is criticized as “a recipe for disaster” (Brietzke, 1995 :35), “an unprecedented constitutional solution to the problems spawned by ethnic het-erogeneity” (Alemante, 2003 : 55) and, as one put it, “a reward for subversion, thegravest threat to the survival of the Ethiopian state, and a far-fetched dogmaticgesture that scarcely any group had asked for” (Markakis, 2011 : 238).

In this article I try to show how the explicit constitutional right to secede in Ethio-pia came to be constitutionalized in a manner that gives precedence to disunion thanunion, and in contradiction with the potential use of federalism as a means of managingdiversity in those diversied states that had been unitary prior to this. Given the cen-trality the right acquires in the federal system, the confederal constitutional underpin-

ning from which the right is deduced, and the paradoxes with which it has beenproclaimed and defended; I argue that the right to secede in the federal constitutionof Ethiopia exhibit a perversion of federalism on one hand and a federal paradox onthe other. As I am going to expound soon, the Ethiopian federal system, by rushinginto the exit option without rst exhausting the most desired within solutions, isgermane to Donald Horowitz’s ( 1998 ) remark: “[i]t seems perverse to start at the

Federalization with a Right to Secession in Ethiopia 47

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rear end of the problem—with secession and the demand for recognition—rather thanto encourage domestic measures of interethnic accommodation” (205).

Also addressed by the article are the practical impacts of the explicit constitutional

guarantee to secession on realizing the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’, apolity envisaged by article 2 of the same constitution. Corollary to this are the empiri-cal corroborations the explicit right to secede in Ethiopia would offer to the widerdebate on the merits and aws of such a right in multinational states and federal con-struction. The importance of such enquiry lies in the fact that Ethiopia is now the onlystate that incorporates an explicit general right to secede in its constitution. Thoughsuch a right does exist in the 1983 St Kitts and Nevis constitution, the right appliesonly to Nevis and not to those within Kitts (also known as Christopher). 6 The exitlaw in the European Union needs not to be matched here for the EU, being an associ-

ation of sovereigns, is more confederal than federal. While few constitutions allowed aright to secede in the past (for instance, the 1977 Soviet constitution), the contemporarytrend in most constitutions ranges from prohibition of secession by afrming the indi-visibility of the state to silence on the matter. In Canada, though the constitution con-tains no explicit right to secede, the Supreme Court Reference on Qu ébec Secession in1998 established a kind of quasi-constitutional right of secession. 7 In fact, there isrecently a growing acceptance on the legitimacy of secessionist mob ilization in theWest albeit without explicit constitutional regulations on the matter. 8 What makesthe Ethiopian case different is the explicit provision of the right in the constitution,or as Will Kymlica ( 2006 ) observed, “the way the very idea is explicitly deducedfrom rst principles [constitutional order], rather than implicitly evolving out of piece-meal democratic negotiations” (55). Thus, looking for the possible impacts of thisunusual constitutional arrangement in Ethiopia on its endeavours to multinationalstate building and federal construction is worthy.

As much as the importance of the respective enquiry, however, there exist signi-cant constraints that obscure attempts to unravel fully the impacts of the right in thecountry’s federal construction for the last two decades. A major obstacle is that Ethio-pia is not yet a federation in the substantial sense of the term and its de jure federalismsuffers from severe deciencies of operational federalism. Here it will be sufcient toconsider the freedom of secessionists in western federations that have no such explicitright but the criminalization and silencing of them in Ethiopia, the very country thatdeclared a right to secede a basic group constitutional right. Though Ethiopia excep-tionally introduced a right to secede, it maintained the rule of game with secessionistsby African regimes—brute force. Thus, the imponderables are signicant. In spite of this, as I am going to explain and argue, the impact of the right that can possibly bedeciphered so far is the political dynamite the right has continued creating in thecountry ever since its constitutionalization—a signicant problem which I refer toas ‘federal nuisance’ in the endeavours of the country for federal construction. In

fact, the hefty controversy the right created in the country echoes one of Sunstein’sarguments against a constitutionalized right to secede—the necessity of takingcertain issues off the political agenda using constitutionalism to reduce “the powerof highly controversial questions to create factionalism, instability, impulsiveness,chaos, stalemate, collective action problems, myopia, strategic behavior, or hostilities”(1991 : 642, 2001 : 101).

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The presentation of the article is as follows: in the rst section, a brief overview of the federal conguration and the federal system of Ethiopia is given. Then is the focusof the article, the right to secede, in the second section. In this section, I explain the

right, its constitutionalization, and its constitutional and ideological underpinnings.In the third section, I present my arguments on how the explicit constitutional guaran-tee to secession in Ethiopia is a perversion of federalism on one hand and a federalparadox on the other. In the last section, I present what I called a ‘federal nuisance’with regard to the practical impacts of the explicit right to secede in the federal con-stitution on the country’s endeavours for federal construction in the last two decades.

The Federal System of Ethiopia: A Brief Overview

Ethiopia is a post-war ‘federation’. It undertook federal conguration following pro-tracted ethno-national conicts that culminated in toppling a national government.In other words, the federal system of Ethiopia did not come from the appreciationand recognition of the country’s ethnic diversity by a national government, nor as acompromise to placate ethno-national insurgencies struggling for different forms of autonomy, including a separate statehood. Failing to do so and impeccably insistingon ‘national indivisibility’, the national government, the Marxist regime of ColonelMengistu, was obliterated from the political scene altogether when it lost the battleagainst centrifugal forces, particularly the EPLF (Eritrean People’s Liberation Front,hereafter EPLF) and the TPLF (Tigray Peoples Liberation Front, hereafter TPLF) in1991. The TPLF had been ghting for the self-determination of the Tigray peoplewith its political agenda prevaricating from different forms of autonomy and some-times to secession. Later, it joined with other forces and together formed the existingruling party, EPRDF (Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front, hereafterEPRDF) , the party that played the dominant role in the federal decomposition of thecountry. 9 EPLF’s agenda had been clear from the beginning. It considered Ethiopiaas a ‘colonizer’ and Eritrea’s question as one of decolonization that must be settlednothing short of full independence, which it eventually did so. Eritrea’s hard-won inde-pendence in the battle in 1991 was formalized in a referendum held in 1993, sealing thebirth of a new African state—Eritrea.

Thus, the federalization of the country and the constitutional and institutionaldesigns of the federal system were dominantly the makings of ethno-national organiz-ations in the absence of a national/central government. Following the war, a general‘peace and democracy conference’ was convened by EPRDF in which differentethno-national orga nizations that claimed to represent the diverse groups of thecountry participated. 10 The conference was agreed to serve as an interim governmentpending the writing of a new constitution and the holding of general elections to form apopular government. Hence, it adopted a transitional charter in July 1991 as a guiding

rule for the transitional period, and formed a transitional executive that representeddifferent ethno-national organizations. The charter granted a right to self-determination and independence (this is how the right to secede was propounded inthe transitional charter) to all nationality groups in the country. In January 1992, adecree was made for the establishment of 14 regional states, but the number waslater reduced to the existing nine member states of the federation. 11 Following the


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writing of the federal constitution, a Constituent Assembly dominated by EPRDFratied it on 8 December 1994. After a general parliamentarian election held in May1995, the ‘Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’ was inaugurated on 21 August,

culminating the transitional period and government.The fact that the federation is the making of ethno-national organizations, domi-nantly the ruling coalition, EPRDF, and the federal constitution is eventually endorsedby member states, already in place, as independent entities rather than a mere bunch of citizens has led some writers to emphasize in the origin of federalism in Ethiopia whatAlfred Stepan ( 1999 ) referred to as ‘coming-together’ federalism. This is also used bysome, as I am going to consider in the coming section, to deduce some kind of logic forthe explicit right to secede in the federal constitution in that member states, since they joined in the federation as independent units and on their will, they can also sever from

it whenever they wish to.The federal constitution, at any rate, granted a right to self-determination indiscri-minately to all groups in the country who are designated as ‘nations, nationalities andpeoples’. A literal application of this right by the constitution would have resulted inthe formation of about 80 kilils (the Ethiopian equivalent for US states and Swisscantons) to commensurate with the country’s diverse groups. However, the consti-tution established only nine kilils (Addis Ababa, the capital and Dire Dawa in theeast were made city administrations) as constituent members of the federation.Though they have symmetric powers (Article 47(4)), the kilils (regional states) doexhibit signicant disparities in population, territory, composition and socio-economicdevelopment. For instance, the two most populous states, Oromia and Amhara, withpopulations of more than 27 and 17 million, respectively, are in stark contrast withHarari which is only populated by less than 200,000 heads, or even those better popu-lated states of Benishangul-Gumuz and Gambella, each with far less than a millionpopulation. 12 A special importance is the fact that only ve of the kilils —Tigray,Afar, Amhara, Oromia and Somali—are “core nationality regions” (Asnake, 2003 :265; Merera, 2003 : 138; Assefa, 2007 : 244) in a sense that they are dominated over-whelmingly by a single group on whose names the states are designated and run bytheir languages. 13 The rest four—Harari, Benishagul-Gumuz, SNNPRs (SouthernNations, Nationalities and People’s Regional State), and Gambella are heterogeneousand are constituted by different groups with none of them making a majority. The mostdiversied of all is the SNNPRs which, given its hosting to more than 56 groups, isaptly described as ‘a federation within a federation’ (Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003 : 84).

With regard to the division of power, member states have their own legislative,executive and judiciary powers enumerated by article 52 of the federal constitution.Like its US counterpart, the federal constitution of Ethiopia left residual powers tomember states. Kilil governments, like the federal government, are parliamentarian.Kilil (state) Councils, the highest legislative bodies of member states, which are

elected for ve years’ term in ofce on the same date for federal g eneral parliamentar-ian elections, choose the executive body amongst their members. 14 In fact, both min-orities residing in majority regional states and those groups in diversied regions areguaranteed by article 47(2) of the federal constitution a right of forming their own sep-arate kilils (states). In other words, those groups who do not own a state individuallyhave a right to secede from existing member states and form separate states of their

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own within the federation. Thus, the Ethiopian constitution established for both rightsof secession and separation, the rst involving a right of walking away from thefederation to form an independent state and the latter a right of severing from

member states in the federation to form a separate autonomous state.The federal system, ever since its emergence, has been heavily dominated by theruling coalition and its allies, which have continued to run governments both atfederal and regional state levels. At present the party staggeringly make up 98% of the seats available in the lower house of the federal parliament—House of People’sRepresentatives. For the ruling party, EPDRF, which dominated the transition of thecountry to a federal state and the writing of the federal constitution, the federalizationwas necessary to address the problem of national inequalities in the past; to securepeace and democracy in the country; and to maintain the territorial integrity of the

state endangered by secessionist movements. Constitutionally entrenched autonomyto the diverse groups of the country seems to have fallen short of adequacy for theruling party to achieve these objectives. Thus, pushing the centrifugal forces in thecountry exceptionally further and slackening the stringent pulls inherent in state-nationalism elsewhere, it has masterminded the constitutionalization of an explicitright to secede in the federation.

Three-pronged attacks have continued to be directed against the ruling party in thisregard. The rst is from nationalist organizations and parties that reprimanded theruling party’s emphasis on ethnic divisions in the state, which, they believed, putthe survival of the state apprehensively in danger. On the other hand, ethno-nationalorganizations outside the ruling coalition, though they are more or less consonantwith the federal design, are opposed to the dominance of the ruling and its constrictionson the formal constitutional provisions. Third are secessionist movements, which hadrst co-operated with the ruling but later, following disputes with the ruling party,withdrew from the transitional government and returned to the armed struggle.These are dominantly the OLF (Oromo Liberation Front) and the ONLF (OgadenNational Liberation Front). The OLF claimed it is ghting for the ‘independence’ of the Oromos while the ONLF claimed it is struggling for the ‘liberation’ of Somalis(Ethiopian Somalis) in the country. Like the Eritrean secessionists before them, theyconsidered the questions of the groups they claimed to represent as one of decoloniza-tion to be settled in outright independence.

The Right to Secede: Ethiopia’s Federal Anomaly

First, some words on the political expediency views on the constitutionalization of theright to secede in Ethiopia seem important. In fact, as mentioned above, such a rightwas rst propounded in the transitional charter adopted in July 1991 by the ‘peaceand democracy conference’. Afrming the rights of nations and nationalities of

the country to self-determination, the transitional charter granted a “right to self-determination of independence when the concerned nation/nationality and people isconvinced that the above rights [internal self-determination rights] are denied,abridged, or abrogated”. The adoption of the transitional charter had demonstratedthe participation of other groups than the federal constitution that felt exclusively inthe hands of the ruling party and its allies after the withdrawal of major contenders


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that had played roles in the making of the transitional charter. Nevertheless, it is this‘right to self-determination of independence’ in article 2 of the transitional charterthat came to be incorporated as ‘right to self-determination, including the right to

secession’ in article 39 of the federal constitution adopted in December 1994 and inau-gurated in August 1995. The ‘continuity’ between the transitional cha rter, co-authoredby others, particularly the OLF associated with a secessionist agenda,

15and the federal

constitution, dominantly authored by the ruling coalition, in guaranteeing a secessionright need not misinform our understanding on the actual champions of the right, or theappropriate explanation for its constitutionalization.

One such assumption is attributing the constitutionalization of the right to thestate’s acquiescence to Eritrea’s de facto independence won in 1991 and formalizedin a referendum endorsed by the ‘peace and democracy conference’ in 1993. Given

the endorsement seconded to the Eritrean cause, preventing a similar entitlement togroups in the rump state, it is arg ued, was logically ‘a blatant deployment of doublestandards’ (Andreas, 2003 : 158). 16 Accordingly, depriving a constitutional right tosecede in the rump state after blessing the secession of Eritrea was considered as a con-tradiction. Another is attributing the constitutionalization of the right to the secessio-nist movements, particularly the OLF, which had allegedly requested the inclusion of the right as a prerequisite to their participation in the transitional process. Accordingly,the right had come to be included in the transitional charter as a ‘psychological sop’(Vaughan and Tronvoll, 2003 : 86) to ingratiate secessionists (Alemu, 2005 : 326 and327; Assefa, 2007 : 235). The ruling party’s argument on the needs for the inclusionof the right in both the transitional charter and the federal constitution concurs withsuch views. Guaranteeing a right to secession, EPRDF claimed, had been unavoidablein light of the secessionist agenda many armed ethno-regional groups had been promot-ing. Accommodating these groups in a federal structure, the ruling party argued, hadbeen impossible without a constitutional guarantee to secession that would allowthese groups purse their interests peacefully. Denying so, accordingly, would haverather led to the continuation of the war these groups had been waging against thecentre. 17

With no need for delving into other issues, a simple comparison between the ‘rightto independence’ in the transitional charter, which could be better associated with suchclaims, and the ‘right to secession’ in the federal constitution reveals how such politicalexpediency views on the constitutionalization of the right are at best imsy. In otherwords, the manner in which the federal constitution asserted the ‘right to secession’does not give credence to such assumptions. The right, not relegated rather revitalizedin the federal constitution, does not seem something one made as a placatory provision.While the ‘right to independence’ in the transitional charter had a substantive require-ment or conditionality attached to it, the ‘right to secession’ in the federal constitutionis reinvigorated and become unconditional. Unlike the transitional charter that pro-

vided a right to independence with a ‘sufx’ reading, “when the concerned nation/ nationality and people is convinced that the above rights [internal self-determinationrights] are denied, abridged, or abrogated”, the right to secede in the federal consti-tution is without a shred of conditionality attached to it. The Amharic (Amharic isthe working language of the federal government and a considerable number of member states) version of the article which has, of course, a ‘nal legal authority’

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(Article 107), sounds stronger than the En glish version in avowing the non-condition-ality in the exercise of the right to secede. 18 Also subsumed with the article grantinginternal self-determination rights,

19the soul of the federal system, the right to

secede has become the most cherished provision in the federal constitution. It is a pro-vision that is non-derogative even during state of emergency (Article 93(4)), and non-amendable if not supported by a qualied two-third majority vote by both chambers of the federal parliament plus a majority vote by all state legislatures (Article 105 (1)). 20

It is fair, therefore, to afrm that it is the mere ideological predilection of the rulingparty, not political expediency, which was actually behind the constitutionalization of the right to secede in the federal system of Ethiopia. Ideologically the inclusion of theright resulted from EPRDF verbatim of Lenin’s conception of the right to self-determination for the so-called ‘oppressed nationalities’. According to this Leninist

pronouncement, ‘a free union is a false phrase without the right to secede’ (Lenin,1977 : 84), and ‘full democracy’ cannot be satisfactorily assured only by declaringthe equality of groups and unless these groups are entitled with “the right to free pol-itical separation” (87). 21 Thus, if there was another force that must share credit orblame with the ruling party for the constitutionalization of the right to secede, it wasthe Ethiopian Student Movement during which this ‘nationalities right to self-determi-nation up to and including secession’ had been rs t propounded in the late 1960s as arecipe to the ‘nationalities question’ in the country. 22 The principle had been ‘a gospel’(Bahru, 2008 : 333) worthy of dying for the different leftist and ethno-national organ-izations that came to forge their ideological pedigree to the student movement, includ-ing the ruling coalition. The continuity between the Ethiopian Student Movementduring which the so-called ‘nationalities right to self-determination up to and includingsecession’ had been introduced into Ethiopia’s political vocabulary and the rulingcoalition that eventually constitutionalized the ‘right to self-determination, includingsecession’ is hardly polemical.

The right to secede, according to EPRDF, is none other than a testimony to the newbasis and motives of ‘unity’ in Ethiopia by its diverse communities. In fact, as it isclearly stipulated in the preamble of the federal constitution, the ‘free will andconsent’ of nations and nationalities is the new basis of ‘unity’ in the federation, repla-cing the one historically amassed through ‘forceful incorporation and subjugation’. Onthe other hand, the ruling party seems convinced that secessionist desires will witheraway if groups do obtain cultural and political autonomies. As far as group claimsfor equality and autonom y are realized, accordingly, secessionism will be weakenedand gradually disappear. 23 Stating this optimism of the ruling coalition, ChristopherClapham ( 2009 ) wrote, “the removal of the basis of discrimination by one groupagainst others would in turn remove any valid source of separatism and make possiblethe maintenance of a single Ethiopian state” (182).

Constitutionally, the inclusion of the right to secede is the extreme end of the con-

federal temptation lucidly inherent in the federal constitution of Ethiopia. In the rstplace, as the preamble of the constitution, which commences with the words “[w]e,the Nations, Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia” stipulates, the federal constitutionalludes to the formation of a single polity. Then article 8 of the constitution declaredthat “[a]ll sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples of Ethio-pia”. The task of interpreting the constitution itself is entrusted to the ‘second chamber’


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of the federal parliament, House of Federation, which is constituted by the representa-tives of these ‘Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ of the country. Such confederalinclinations of the federal constitution are asserted by different writers with strong

words. Cohen ( 1995 ), for instance, wrote that even if the federal constitution “labelsthe new country as a federal state, it is in fact based on a constitutional system moreakin to ‘confederation,’ an innovative form that looks like federalism but appearscloser to an international treaty among ethnic groups having the power to secede”(157 and 158). In a similar fashion, Britezeke ( 1995 ) argues that the formal provisionsin the constitution seem “an international treaty such as the Treaty of Rome” (33).Vaughan and Tronvoll ( 2003 ), on the other hand, depict the constitutional pronounce-ments as providing for “a radically devolved confederation” (84).

The explicit right to secede guaranteed in the federal constitution can be construed

as an afrmation that nations and nationalities of the country have come together as‘sovereigns’ and their togetherness in the federation is constitutionally with their‘sovereignty’ unscathed and remaining exclusively at their disposal. Thus, nationsand nationalities can invoke their ‘sovereignty’ and walk away from the federationwhenever they wish to. Startling as it is, the federal constitution ended disproportio-nately in making a collection of sovereigns, as confederations do elsewhere, in itsvery rst attempt at federalizing a historic state that had been troubled by a series of ethno-national insurgencies vying for different forms of autonomy. A state whichhad been unitary with profuse centralization of power and resource in prior, Ethiopia,has become an exception that blessed, in the words of Edward Freeman (quoted inBurgess, 2006 : 271), “a provision for its own dissolution” in its rst federal undertak-ing to manage its diversity.

With regard to the modalities of the right, despite the right is explicitly provided inthe federal constitution, there exist a signicant ambiguity regarding the actual bearersthat are entitled to secede. This is because the right to secede in the constitution isgranted expressly not to member states of the federation but indiscriminately to indi-vidual ‘nations, nationalities and peoples’ of the country. Remember that not all of these groups have a state of their own and only ve of them have states designatedin their names and which they overwhelmingly populated. Others do not have states,which they individually own, or states conferred upon them and bearing theirnames. They are either minorities in majority states or ‘equals’ in the states they jointly own and govern. The ambiguity here is that whether all nations, nationalitiesand peoples of the country, or only those who have states designated on their namesindividually, are actually entitled to the right to secede? This ambiguity in the consti-tutional statement has led one to state that the “problem of dening the entities that areentitled to exercise the right to secede makes the constitutional procedures of secessionvague” (Asnake, 2003 : 265). Given the right to separation ‘nations, nationalities andpeoples’ in majority regions or those in heterogeneous states are granted in the consti-

tution, which entitled them with a right to form their own states, the assertion that ‘nopeople can initiate the process for secession without rst becoming a state’ (Fasil,1997 : 159) seems cogent. What is more, secession as the ultimate quest is to beespoused and entertained normatively after the highest prize the constitution conferredupon the diverse groups of the country, autonomous state in case of Ethiopia, is rstsecured. Thus, it seems convincing that nations and nationalities are expected to

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secure their own mother states prior to evoking independent statehood through theexplicit right to secede in the federal constitution.

At any rate, neither the federal government nor members of the federation, other

than the claimant state, have votes in determining moves towards possible truncationof the federation they jointly formed. The question of secession by a regional state is tobe initiated in its legislature, kilil (state) council, and becomes eligible for a decisivereferendum if it is approved by a qualied two-thirds majority vote (Article39(4(a))). Securing a majority vote in a popular referendum that needs to be organizedby the federal government after a three-year waiting period is enough for a regionalstate to secure secession (Article 39, sub-article 4(b and c)). A proclamation issuedby the f ederal government in 2001 added some details on the constitutional pro-vision. 24 Accordingly, the House of Federation, the ‘second chamber’ of the federal

parliament, to which the question for secession is submitted in writing by the claimantstate council, is entrusted to the task of conrming the fullment of the required two-thirds majority vote by the respective state council and, in doing so, organizes a refer-endum within three years. The division of assets between the federal government andthe seceding state following a positive referendum in favour of secession is going to beeffected by this same House of Federation. In fact, during the three years waitingperiod between a regional state’s decision to secede and the organization of popularreferendum in the claimant state, the federal government has a chance to negotiatewith the seceding region to reconsider its decision. If the respective region stickswith its decision, however, the federal government is obliged by the constitution tohold the decisive referendum unless it resorts to force by ignoring the constitutionalprovision.

Ethiopia’s Perversion of Federalism and Federal Paradoxes

The fact that ‘nations and nationalities’ did ratify the constitution as distinct groups thana bunch of citizens, and member states, formed shortly before the federal constitution, joined in the federation as ‘independent’ entities leads some to mistakenly argue onthe legitimacy of the explicit constitutional right to secede in the federal system of Ethio-pia. According to these views, since member states formed the federation at will and asindependent units, they are also entitled to revise the consents they made while enteringin the federation. Thus, one claimed, not only the formation of the federation was madeby the free will and consent of the member states but the survival of the federation itself also hinges on the continued blessings of the constituent units (Andreas, 2003 ).

Such assessments, however, conate mere political contingency, brought about bythe demise of the national government in the making of the federation, with crude his-torical reality. The national government under Colonel Mengistu had opted to go onwith its ghting against the ethno-national liberation movements until it nally lost

the battle. Unlike contemporaneous Marxist regimes in Africa that had been similarlyentangled by armed groups, as Angola’s MPLA and Mozambique’s FRELIMO, it didfail eventually to secure peace deals with the rebels. The national government, oblit-erated from the political scene altogether after its capitulation to these armed groupsghting for different forms of autonomy, the subsequent federal decomposition of Ethiopia felt under the discretionary makings of ethno-national groups that claimed


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to represent the needs of particular groups in the country. 25 Thus, the federalization of the country that followed the year 1991 comes to take the facade of ‘coming-together’federalism in which (prior) independent states were coming together to form a new

state. This was, however, circumstantial brought by the demise of the national govern-ment with which ethno-national organizations would have to bargain. Practically,however, the federal constitution is an attempt to federalize a historic s tate that hademerged in all its present territorial possessions at least a century ago. 26 Though itwas undertaken exclusively by those ethno-national organizations that had ratherbeen struggling against it, together a national government absent in the ‘negotiation’leading to the ‘federation’, the federalization of the country was a reconguration of an existing state into autonomous states that were non-existent in prior, not prior inde-pendent states joining together to form a new state.

In such states, as Ethiopia, the essence of federalism is managing ethno-regionalcleavages threatening a unitary state and its very survival as an integrated entity. Fed-eralism in this regard is an option, as one aptly stated, for the ‘bedroom separation’approach as a bargained resort to prevent ‘outright divorce’ (Ryan, 1995 : 395). It isessentially an undertaking to preserve the territorial integrity of unitary states thatcame to be crippled by the forces of sub-state nationalism by granting constitutionallyentrenched autonomy to constituent groups. Political and cultural autonomy the statesrender through some form of federal design is essentially a trade-off between marriageand divorce by the states with their diverse groups. Thus, autonomy seconded by thestates need to provide ‘moral reasons’ for the diverse groups to uphold the territorialintegrity of the states, as Rainer Baubock ( 2000 : 379) rightly argued, and for thestates a moral ground to sanctify their territorial integrity. In other words, federalismin such states needs to provide for a win-win solution in which groups secure auton-omous units while states maintain their existence as integrated entities. The incorpor-ation of an explicit right to secede in these federations makes the federalism a win-losesolution in which groups achieve both but the states secure none. Hence, constitutio-nalizing an explicit right to secede in these federations is a function creep againstone of the very purposes federalism is supposed to accomplish—preservation of terri-torial integrity from degenerating into smaller entities by subsuming them, throughconstitutionally entrenched autonomy, within and under one bigger entity. It is incon-sistent for such states that came to adopt some kind of federal design (Ethiopia, of course, for the very rst time) to prevent dismemberment, however, to contain a con-stitutional provision allowing so. Doing so in such states, as Ethiopia did, is none otherthan a perversion of federalism.

What is more perverse for Ethiopia is the sheer weight and centrality the right tosecede acquires in the federal constitution. In fact, as described in the previoussection, this cardinal character of the right in the federal constitution disputes withthe political expediency views on the constitutionalization of the right. The clear con-

federal contemplations inherent in the preamble of the constitution from which theright is deduced, the declaration that ‘nations, nationalities, and peoples’ are ‘sover-eign’ (article 8), the inclusion of the right in chapter three of the constitution whichprovides for ‘fundamental rights and freedoms’, the simple majority vote referendumthe right required from secessionist groups (article 39(4)) than a qualied two-thirds asin the case of St Kitts and Nevis, the fact that the right is not even subject to suspension

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or limitation during states of emergency (article 93(4)); all show how the right tosecede is the most cherished provision in the federal constitution. It is unusual for afederal state to contain an explicit right to secede it its constitution; constitutionalizing

the right with such heft is abnormal.In addition, given the fact that the constitutional autonomy of member states dohave signicant limitations in other important areas, the provision of the right tosecede in the federal system of Ethiopia is confounding. In other words, the federalconstitution allowed the secession of constituent states before exhausting thoserights they would exercise within the federation and while denying them some vitalrights that are common in federations. In fact, the constitution extolled the ‘nations,nationalities, and peoples’ of the country in many ways. It acclaimed them as ‘sover-eigns’ who can review the consents they had made while entering into the federation.

Unity for the sake of unity itself was not what motivated their togetherness in the fed-eration. As the preamble of the constitution lucidly describes, they (re)joined to formthe federation since they saw the advantages of their togetherness to pursue better theirindividual and common interests. The constitution is not merely the new basis of relation they established with the state. Though the state maintained its older name,the pronouncements of the federal constitution stipulate the formation of a newfoundstate with a new basis of unity. As authors of the constitution and owners of the fed-eration it formed, they are empowered to interpret the constitution and arbitrate con-stitutional disputes. Member states, on the other hand, have legislative, executiveand judiciary powers in their own jurisdictions enlisted by article 52 of the federal con-stitution. The constitution only established Amharic as the working language of thefederal government and member states are left to determine theirs. 27 They are alsoentitled to adopt their own state constitutions and ags. Unlike other African states,which either ban or discourage the formation of ‘ethnic’ parties, Ethiopia’s electorallaw allows such parti es and most of the parties in the country, including the rulingcoalition, are ‘ethnic’. 28

In spite of such rights and privileges, two signicant constrictions in particular putthe powers and privileges given to constituent units and groups in paradox. The rst isthe meagre scal powers member states have in the federation. The second is theunusual powers given to the ‘second chamber’ of the federal parliament other thansafeguarding the needs and interests of member states in the decisions of the federalgovernment. Though the concentration of scal power at the centre may be justied,arguably, in terms of the needs for addressing regional inequalities and the quest forrapid development, the fact that members of the federation have no legislativepowers they share with the centre is as bizarre as their right to secede. 29 This, asone captures well, is a “signicant betrayal of the federal idea” (Assefa, 2007 : 442) .Federations commonly have ‘second chambers’ that are entitled to different degreesof legislative powers which they share with the centre so that they could have a say

in issues affecting them and the federation as a whole. The federal constitution of Ethiopia, though established parliamentarian bicameralism as federations do else-where, the ‘second chamber’, House of Fe deration is non-legislative, making thefederal parliament operationally unicameral. 30 In other words, the federal system of Ethiopia upholds only the ‘self-rule’ aspect of federalism without substantiating theequally important ‘shared-rule’ component of federalism.


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This is where the paradoxical nature of the explicit right to secede in the federalconstitution appears. A constitution, which entitled members of the federation an expli-cit right to walk away from the federation unconditionally, fails to ensure them from

sharing power at the centre and have stakes in the decisions of the federal governmentaffecting their interests and the federation they jointly formed. In other words, the con-stitution moved exceptionally further and allowed an explicit right to secede tomember states but it also retreated from a core principle of federalism, which federa-tions commonly and necessarily employ, and left member states almost powerless atthe centre by establishing for a non-legislative ‘second chamber’. Depriving themfrom exercising such a day-to-day right, which is benign and axiomatic, but promisinga right that they would exercise only in exceptional circumstances, which is threateningand contentious, is not only a federal paradox; it is also a mockery to the forces whose

names and interests have been passionately invoked in defence of the constitutionalright to secede.Apart from such paradoxes that exist in the principles of the federal constitution, de

jure federalism, practical realities in Ethiopia’s de facto federalism reveal that the right tosecede is the unfaithful promise the ruling coalition made to the diverse groups of thecountry. Though the ruling party is a champion of the right to secede, it is against itsexercise or operational observance. Its commitment to the realization of Eritrean inde-pendence was, however, evident and the alliance it had with the EPLF during the waragainst Colonel Mengistu’s regime was not a simple strategic co-operation madeagainst a common enemy. The TPLF had long recognized Eritrea, similar to the creedof the EPLF, as a ‘colony’ under Ethiopia that did deserve unconditional right to inde-pendence. It was this recognition by the TPLF that had in fact served as strong glue forthe alliance between the TPLF and the EPLF during the war against the Marxist regimeof Colonel Mengistu (Young, 1996 : 53; Andreas, 2003 : 158). Apart from Eritrea,however, the ruling is against secessionist demands from other groups. With no interestfor its operationalization, the ruling seems to have been overtaken by the symbolic sig-nicances of the right. Thus, while it damns nationalist parties which are opposed to theexplicit constitutional guarantee to secession as ‘chauvinists’, it also incriminates move-ments that assert it as ‘narrow nationalists’. What is more, though the right to secede inthe federal constitution was presumably to deal with secessionist movements peacefullyand to avoid in the country similar horrors as the one occurred during the protractedarmed struggle for Eritrean independence, the country maintained the military traditionof its predecessor, the Marxist regime of Mengistu, in its response to secessionist move-ments. Though the explicit right to secede that would allow secessionists to pursue theirobjectives peacefully exists in the federal constitution, secessionists in Ethiopia are inexile and in the jungles, not at home and in the parliament. For a state as Ethiopia inwhich constitutionalism (not constitutions), rule of law (not rule by law) and doing inthe interests of the people (not speaking in their names) hardly exist, this, though

painful, is a common political reality.

A Federal Nuisance—Dynamite over the Right to Secede in Ethiopia

Almost two decades have elapsed since the adoption of the federal constitution inEthiopia. Do the federal experiences of Ethiopia with a constitutional guarantee to

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secession offer us insights or empirical evidences on the practical impacts of the rightin the country and to the wider debate on the wisdoms or perils of an explicit right tosecede in multinational states? A simple answer to this question would be not so much.

The fact that the formal provisions in the constitution have not yet become fully oper-ational and remain concealed under the hegemony of the ruling party leaves us with anumber of imponderables to unravel the practical impacts of the right and draw appro-priate substantive lessons. This is while, in addition to the constitutional guarantee tosecession, Ethiopia’s federal design have in principle most of the features whichwriters identied are ‘secession-inducing’. These include ethnic/regional parties gov-erning member states (Brancati, 2006 , 2009 ); formation of constituent units alongidentity/ethnic lines (Roeder, 1991 , 2009 ); member states dominated by a singlegroup (Hale, 2004 ); and signicant disparities among states of the federation (Horo-

witz, 1985 , 2008 ; Watts, 1996 ). In spite of this, since both the federal governmentand constituent states have been ruled by members of the ruling coalition, EPRDF,and its allies plus the fact that most politically sensible issues are dealt at partylevels, the full forces of the constitutional principles, including the right to secede,have been so far unveiled. Though the ruling party is a coalition of four ethnic/regionalparties, it is its organization under the principles of democratic centralism, ‘centrist andby denition anti-federal’ (Ibrahim, 2003 : 121), which militates against the realizationof the formal provisions in the constitution.

The right to secede has never been also put to test so far. Whether this is owing tothe dominance of the ruling party, which is operationally opposed to the right or thesatisfaction from cultural and political autonomies groups might enjoy in the federationis something to be proved in the future. In this regard, drawing a parallel with thedefunct Soviet Union, it is claimed that the forces of the constitutional emphases onethnicity in general and the right to secede in particular in the country would befully felt when the central government declines or the ruling EPRDF eventually relin-quish its grip on power. One dominant writer on Ethiopia, undermining a similar scen-ario in the country, made, however, the following caveat quoted at length:

[i]t has been said of Stalin’s nationality policy in the Soviet Union, from whichthe Ethiopian model derived, that it had life only after death: so long as themonolithic Soviet state remained in being controlled by the Communist Partyof the Soviet Union, the rights of national self-determination formally guaran-teed under the constitution were meaningless; as soon as CPSU collapsed,however, the division of the Soviet Union into fteen ‘union republics’ onethnic or national lines led to the splitting of the entire country into fteen sover-eign states.

The central question confronting the EPRDF government’s approach to thechallenge of diversity is whether, by building ethnicity explicitly into the struc-

ture of political life, it has sent in train centrifugal forces which, when it even-tually loses power, will lead to a similar dismemberment of Ethiopia.(Clapham, 2004 : 55)

The dismemberment of the Sovi et Union was not, in fact, primarily because of theright to secede in its constitution. 31 Nor the actual seceding of the republics was


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effected through the constitutional channel. Though the Soviet constitution granted asecession right, it had no procedures for its exercise (Sunstein, 1991 : 645; Buchanan,1991 : 127; Cassese, 1995 : 264). Such a provision was adopted in 1990 when things

came to surface. The law set ‘cumbersome and complicated’ procedures and require-ments to be followed by a seceding republic. The law required securing a two-thirdsmajority vote in a popular referendum to be held “no sooner than six months and nolater than nine months” after a plea for secession. The seceding of the state, after a posi-tive vote in a referendum, would be materialized not only after a ve-year transitionperiod but also following a conrmation vote to be carried out after the end of the tran-sition period and which needs to be conrmed by a two-thirds majority vote in favourof secession (Cassese, 1995 : 265). However, the law was not applied and the dissol-ution of the federation was superseded by the speed of events at the centre.

As it is well established, the collapse of the Soviet federation, though constitutionaland institutional designs might have played roles, was primarily political: lack of con-stitutionalism or operational unitarism under principal federalism. Ethiopia’s federa-tion, it can be argued, would not be revitalized because of a right to secede, as theruling ponticates; it would not be dismembered simply because it allowed a rightto do so, as the opposition threatens. The fears against an explicit right to secede inmultinational state constitutions are not simply for it will encourage secessionism.Secessionism is not merely a matter of constitutional regulation. It is a complexissue with different socio-cultural, historical and political factors together with exogen-ous forces facilitating for or militating against it. 32 Ethiopia, with a history of long sta-tehood and enormous cultural interaction and integration among its diverse groups, isnot such a strongly divided state to be disintegrated at ease.

A conspicuous impact of the right to secede in the constitution on federal construc-tion in the country for the last two decades is, however, the dynamite it has continuedcreating along Ethiopia’s political spectrum, a signicant trouble I prefer to refer as‘federal nuisance’. No constitutional provision has been a colossal debate in Ethiopiancontemporary political life than the explicit right to secede. The right had been conten-tious when it was rst contemplated during the Ethiopian Student Movement in the1960s and, after the downfall of the Marxist regime of Colonel Mengistu, legally guar-anteed rst in the transitional charter in July 1991 and then in the federal constitution.As dynamite as ever, the right remains the most embattled constitutional guarantee inEthiopian politics after it has become a constitutional order, impeccably debatedamong politicians with considerable passion and vigour. The ruling coalition,EPRDF, defends the right as an example of unrestricted federal democracy vital toforge real unity in the country out of the free will of constituents, replacing the‘fake’ unity the state had historically amassed through at and force. On the otherhand, nationalist parties rebuked the right as an act of blessing disintegration,making the ‘sacred’ unity of Africa’s oldest independent state apprehensively

negotiable.For the heft of the political sensibility it raises, the dynamite the explicit right to

secede has created in the country might not be so surprising. There are, however,additional factors that compounded the political controversies over the right tosecede in Ethiopia. One is the country’s acquiescence to Eritrean independence. Ethio-pia has become, indeed, the rst and, until the recent formation of sovereign South

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Sudan in July 2011, the only African state that had witnessed the success of a seces-sionist movement. It entered into a federal arrangement following the separation of Eritrea that not only truncated the country but also landlocked it. The provision of a

right to secede for groups still home has created apprehension and anxiety amongmany over the fate of the rump state. The nature and history of the ruling party thatchampioned the right and oversaw the country’s federalization is another. As acoalition of ethnic parties, the ruling party raised doubts over its commitment to thecauses of unity. Particularly perturbing and often exploited by the opposition to under-mine the ruling’s appeal for unity is the one-time secessionist agenda the TPLF (thecore of the ruling party at least until recently) had proclaimed for its constituencyduring the armed struggle against the central government. Called ‘manifesto 68’,this TPLF’s programme declared the establishment of the ‘Republic of Tigray’ as

the goal of TPLF’s war against Mengistu’s regime. The idea of a sovereign state of Tigray, though immediately dropped because of opposition from the ranks and lesof the Front itself, was not totally erased until the TPLF, after capturing Tigray,decided to form a coalition with other ethnic-based organizations and marchedtowards holding state power. 33 Coupling its championship for the right to secede inthe constitution, this one-time agenda of the TPLF has added some kind of impetusto the controversies over the right and its opponents exploited it hyperbolically topresent the TPLF as anti-unity.

Above all, the controversy over the explicit right to secede in the federal consti-tution is aggravated by the presence of secessionists, which have given meaning andattention to the constitutional right to secede and passion and vigour to the debateover it. Active secessionist movements currently implicated the regional states of Oromia and Somali. Particular apprehensive in this regard is the case for the secessionof the Oromia regional state. This is because the Oromos, constituting more than 34%of the total population, are the largest group in the country, and the regional state of Oromia, stretching over 360,000 square kilometres in the country’s hinterland, is thebiggest of all. The secession of this region will not only cost the country people andterritory but it would also lead to its fragmentation. For instance, in party debatesfor the May 2010 general parliamentarian election aired on national TV, LidetuAyalew, then secretary of Ethiopian Democratic Party (EDP), one of the multi-ethnic opposition parties, displayed a terrible hand-sketched map of Ethiopia thatdeliberately omitted the regional state of Oromia to show not only his criticism of the constitutional guarantee to secession but also the imminence of the state’s fragmen-tation if Oromia does actually secede.

Contemporarily active secessionist movements in the country are the OLF (OromoLiberation Front) and the ONLF (Ogaden National Liberation Front), the rst claimingto ght for the independence of the Oromos and the latter for that of the Somalis. TheOLF was formed early in the 1970s. Its 1976 political programme stated the ‘decolo-

nization’ of Oromo lands from Ethiopia and the establishment of the ‘people’s demo-cratic republic of Oromia’ as its goal. It had been a major contender of the ruling partyduring the transitional period. Following disputes with the ruling coalition, however, itwithdrew from the transitional government few days before the June 1992 district andregional elections. Returned back to the armed struggle and its leadership in exile, theOLF has long been outlawed and is recently labelled as a ‘terrorist’ organization,


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allegedly for pursuing violence. Though the OLF has a considerable support amongeducated members of the Oromo, its secessionist agenda represented only the interestsof a section of the Oromo elites. Oromo parties in conventional politics, including the

OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organization), a member of the ruling coalitiongoverning the Oromia region, and those in the opposition are not consonant with thesecessionist agenda of the OLF. Many have increasingly criticized the wisdom of secession for a larger group together with the practical difculties of divorce for a hin-terland. (For such critics, see, for instance, Merera, 2003 : 100–105.) Even within theOLF, disputes over its traditional secessionist agenda have been increasingly intensi-ed and the actual division of the Front into two groups is now reportedly crystallizing,one insisting on a sovereign state and the other for a democratic accommodation wherethe Oromos cou ld have a ‘proper place’ that would commensurate to their demo-

graphic strength.

34

As far as the Somalis in Ethiopia are concerned, historical appeals for joining co-nationals in a ‘Greater Somalia’ that had been sponsored by the government in Moga-dishu shortly after the decolonization of Somalia in 1960 and propounded by suchorganizations as the Western Somalia Liberation Front (WSLF), seems now increas-ingly unattractive. The ONLF’s agenda for a sovereign state of Ogaden, the Somaliregional state, contemporarily represented this shift from sheer irredentism to conven-tional secessionism. Established in 1986, the ONLF pursue the establishment of asovereign state of ‘Ogadenia’ as its political agenda. In the 21 June 1992 districtand regional elections, it won and controlled the government of Region 5, presentlythe Somali kilil . It came to fall apart with the ruling party when in June 1993 itvoted for independence in the regional council it dominated. The ruling partyresponded swiftly by imprisoning leaders of the ONLF and by helping the formationof a rival party, the ESDL (Ethiopian Somali Democratic League), the party thatwon the 1995 regional election. In June 1998, the ESDL merged with a section of the ONLF to form a new party—Somali People’s Democratic Party (SPDP), theparty that has been administering the region since the 2000 regional election. Asection of the ONLF, however, withdrew and returned to armed struggle. Outlawedsince then , it, like the OLF, has recently been labelled by the federal government as‘terrorist’. 35

At any rate, the dynamite in Ethiopia’s contemporary politics created by the con-stitutionalization of the right to secede has been enormous. Forces in this dynamitealong the country’s political spectrum can be seen in three groups: anti-constitutionalguarantee to secession groups (opponents of the constitutionalization of the right), pro-constitutional guarantee to secession groups and pro-operational right to secessiongroups. The rst are those that reprimand the right to secede explicitly granted inthe federal constitution and urge for its rescission. They include not only nationalist(multi-e thnic) parties but also the different ethno-regional organizations in the

country.36

In fact, all opposition parties currently active in conventional politics,despite the different views they hold regarding the federal system, are critics of theright (Aalen, 2002 : 45). The second are those that argue on the need for the consti-tutional right to secede as a testimony to the ‘free union’ nations and nationalities of the country have entered in the federation. Under present circumstances, only theruling party belongs to this group. The third are those that demand the

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operationalization of the right to secede in the constitution for the people they claim torepresent, or are allegedly ghting for it. They include the OLF and the ONLF, or asection of them. While EPRDF needs the right for its symbolic decoration in the

federal constitution, these groups seem seriously enticed by it.The nuisance that resulted from the dynamite over the constitutionalization of theright to secede in Ethiopia is hefty and pervasive. It is a hot issue impeccably debatedbetween the ruling and the opposition, election after election. Given its continuouspublicity by elites, the constitutional clause of the right to secede, article 39, hasbecome the most popular constitutional provision among the mass, hardly absentfrom the minds and lips of many. In fact, it is for the ruling party, the author of con-stitution, the constitutionalization of the right has brought its burden. Of all the changesit brought to the country after its military triumph over the Marxist regime, it is this

right to secede in the federal constitution that entangled it most with elites both inthe academic and political circles. It is this right, which it must defend against wide-spread critics from the opposition. In addition, it is this right it found hard to instilto a section of its own members and supporters who too qu estioned the uprightnessof the right for the declared goal of securing unity in diversity. 37 In spite of widespreadand continuous critics coming from different corners, the ruling coalition remainsadamant on its championship of the right with the intransigence characteristic to it.

In addition to the unabated controversies created over the explicit right to secede inthe federal constitution, a federal nuisance, the right has also contributed to the resur-gence of ‘centrist’ nationalism orchestrated by nationalist opposition parties. This wasparticularly demonstrated during the May 2005 disputed general parliamentarian elec-tion in which a coalition of nationalist parties came close to unseat the ruling party.Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the major contender of the ruling coalitionin the election, secured a large support and vote from the electorate mainly for its ‘non-ethnic appeals’ than its organizational strength (Aalen and Tronvoll, 2009 : 196) orviable policy alternatives. The resurgence of such ‘centrist’ nationalism amongmany during the election as part of support for the opposition’s bid for power was,in particular, due to CUD’s hefty criticism of the constitutional guarantee to secession.The sentiments clearly demonstrated during the electi on need not be simply construedas outright opposition by many to ‘ethnic federalism’. 38 It is an indication to the spoilsthe explicit right to secede have created against a possible general public appeal to thefederal arrangement in the country. A good inference is that accommodating distinctgroups through federalism could hardly domesticate nationalist forces and envisioncommon appeals for a federal society when the federal design makes states’ territorialintegrity, nationalists’ article of faith, explicitly disintegrable at will by constituentunits.

Conclusion

Almost two decades have elapsed since Ethiopia, under EPRDF, has formally joinedthe les of world federal states. The adoption of federalism by EPRDF was indeednovel given Ethiopia is multi-ethnic in composition, larger in territory and had longbeen bedevilled by conicts between centrifugal and centripetal forces. In fact,some form of federal arrangement had been imminent following the downfall of


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Colonel Mengistu’s totalitarian regime and the resurgence of different ethno-nationalorganizations vying for different forms of autonomy. The only viable instrument thestate had left, after the national government was obliterated, was a federal arrange-

ment. Going back to a unitary state is now exactly an anachronism.Nonetheless, Ethiopia remains a feeble federation. It is federal largely for its rel-evant constitutional and institutional designs; operationally it is heavily burdened byunitary rhythms and signicant democratic deciencies. What is more, as a less bar-gained ‘federation’, the country is replete with elite controversies and divergencesover possible appropriate constitutional and institutional designs. The explicit rightto secede in the federal constitution stands top and remains as dynamite as ever.Though the right represents an unfaithful promise by the ruling coalition, it has beenimpeccably debated between the ruling and the opposition with considerable vehe-

mence. For a state as Ethiopia where the gap between what is constitutionalized andwhat is really consumed is often astonishingly wide, constitutional and institutionaldesigns per se should have been anodyne, not dynamite. However, when a constitutionattempts to regulate a highly sensible and fundamental issue as state territorial integ-rity, even a nominal provision, as the right to secede in the federal constitution of Ethiopia, could become a signicant nuisance.

Apart from the lingering controversy the right has continued creating in thecountry, the practical impacts of the right have been so far largely unveiled. Givensecessionist groups are in exile and out of the federal process at home, we are notable to observe how the constitutional right to secede would have fared in theirhands. What is more, the fact that governments both at federal and state levels are con-trolled by the ruling party and its allies seems to have concealed the impacts of the rightthat would have been otherwise revealed. A reasonable inference is that the outcomesof the right on federal construction in the country are yet to come particularly followingincreased democratization and substantial federalization in the state. It is then we willbe in a position to put the impacts of right appropriately in its own terms and draw rel-evant empirical lessons on the wisdom or aw of an explicit constitutional guarantee tosecession in multinational states.

In spite of these, there is a point worthy of making from what has been unfolded.This is on the dynamite the right to secede has continued to create along the country’spolitical spectrum ever since its emergence. A constitution, which is supposed to createa common vision towards the polity it envisages, needs not to be itself the source of trouble as it has come to be exactly the case in Ethiopia. The fact that the federaldesign followed largely the convictions and prescriptions of the ruling coalition iswhat makes the constitution a source of acrimony than harmony. Here it needs to beacknowledged that federations do not always emerge out of painstaking ‘federalbargain’. Federations forged otherwise are not also necessarily destined to fall. Anexhaustively bargained federation may end up in debilitating troubles if it overlooks

later the need for renewal or reform to address constantly changing societal realitiesor newly emerging problems. On the other hand, those least bargained and improvisedfederations as Ethiopia can be revitalized and transformed into vibrant federations withwider and common appeals if they manage to ‘negotiate’ on what had been initiallyimposed, unseen or overlooked. In this regard, Ethiopia may not need a new federalbargain as some suggested so but consensus making on existing controversial

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constitutional and institutional orders. Given the heft and sensibility of the issue itaddresses, the dynamite it has created, and the nuisance it has brought to many; theexplicit guarantee to secession in the federal constitution is an agenda for serious

reconsideration. Hence, the ruling party needs to be heedful to the fact that successfulfederal construction requires general convention, not particular conviction, and con-sensus making, not creed maintaining. The wisdom in the popular adage, ‘successhas a thousand fathers, but failure is an orphan’ is signicantly relevant for endeavoursin federal construction and reconstruction.

Acknowledgements

I am thankful to my colleagues at Dilla University (Dr. Temesgen Nigus, Dr. Asrat

Seme (now in Hawassa University), Anteneh Melu, Tasew Tadesse, TewodroseBogale, Dr. Badege Fekadu, and Dr. Abdu Mohammed) for reading the rst draftof the article and providing valuable suggestions. My thanks are also to the twoanonymous reviewers of the journal.

Notes1 There are various materials on the relationship between federalism and secession. See, among others,Kymlicka ( 1998 , 2005 ) and Erk and Anderson ( 2010 ).

2 There are multiple resources on the theories of secession and debates over it. See, for instance, Moore(1998 ), Lehning ( 1998 ), Macedo and Buchanan ( 2003 ), Dahlitz ( 2003 ), Buchanan ( 2004 ) and Kohen(2006 ).

3 Though Buchanan is a champion of a remedial only rights theory in international law, he is less opti-mistic to the incorporation of an explicit right to secede in state constitutions.

4 See, for instance, Ryan ( 1995 ) and Horowitz ( 1998 , 2003 ).5 This is how the federal constitution designated the diverse groups of the country. Article 39(5) denedthem indiscriminately as “a group of people who have or share a large measure of common culture orsimilar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or related identities, a commonpsychological make-up, and who inhabit an identiable, predominantly a contiguous territory”.

6 Article 113 of the constitution provided: “The Nevis Island Legislature may provide that the island of

Nevis shall cease to be federated with the island of Saint Christopher.” The secession of Nevis wouldbe effected if it is rst supported by two-third majority vote by its Assembly and then by a similar two-third majority vote in a popular referendum.

7 On such issues, see Monahan and Bryant ( 1996 ), Kreptul ( 2003 ), Norman ( 2006 ) and Aronovitch(2006 ).

8 In such federations, parties with secessionist agenda are free to compete in elections and propagatetheir claims. Though they do not include an explicit right to secede in their constitutions, federationsin the West are increasing accepting the legitimacy of secessionist referenda. See Kymlicka ( 2004 :144–175, 2005 : 107–126).

9 The party is a coalition of four ethnic/regional parties: TPLF (Tigray People’s Liberation Front),ANDM (Amhara National Democratic Movement), OPDO (Oromo People’s Democratic Organiz-

ation) and SEPDM (Southern Ethiopia People’s Democratic Movement). It has been in power formallysince 21 August 1995.

10 More than 20 ethno-regional organizations had participated in the conference to oversee the country’stransition to democracy and federalism. However, the number of participants increasingly sagged astime went on, since many, including the OLF, withdrew from the transitional government establishedby the conference following disputes with the ruling coalition. For the conference and the transitionalprocess, see Vaughan ( 1994 ), Lyons ( 1996 ) and Vestal ( 1996 ).


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11 This is because ve of these regional states merged to form one Southern Nations, Nationalities, andPeoples Regional State (SNNPRs), the most diversied of all the member states in the federation.

12 All numbers are according to the 2007 population and housing census of Ethiopia. Accordingly, thepopulation size of the nine kilils is as follows: Tigray (4,314,456), Afra (1,411,092), Amhara

(17,214,056), Oromia (27,158,471), Somali (4,439,147), SNNP (15,042,531), Benishangul-Gumuz(670,847), Gambella (306,916) and Harari (183,344).

13 The dominance of one group in these ‘core regions’ is as follows: Tigray (96.55% are Tigray), Amhara(91.48% are Amharas), Afar (90.03% are Afars), Oromia (87.80% are Oromos) and Somali (97.20%are Somalis).

14 For member state constitutions and their governments, see Tsegaye ( 2009 ).15 Next to the ruling coalition, the OLF was the major player in the making of the transitional charter. For

the roles the OLF had played during the transitional period, see Leenco ( 1998 , 1999 ) and Vaughan(1994 , 2003 ).

16 In a similar fashion, Brietzke ( 1995 : 27) claimed that the right was constitutionalized only to add “jus-tication for the independence of Eritrea [without the intent of applying it equally to other parts of the

country]’.17 See Ethiopian Ministry of Information ( 2002 : 26– 41).18 The Amharic version reads, “be manchewem huneta and yalemnem gedeb [in all circumstances and

without any restriction]”.19 Article 39, sub-articles 1 and 2 of the federal constitution described it as encompassing a right to “a full

measure of self-government” by the diverse groups of the country in their territories; the right to speak,write and develop their languages; the right to express, develop and promote their culture; and the rightto preserve their histories.

20 All provisions under chapter three of the constitution, “fundamental rights and freedoms”, will beamended under such stringent procedures. Other provisions will be amended if they are supportedby two-thirds majority vote in a joint session of the federal parliament, House of Peoples Representa-

tives and House of Federation, plus a majority vote approval by at least two-thirds of the member statecouncils (Article 105(2)).

21 For such conceptions of the right to self-determination in Marxist-Leninist thought and the gapsbetween principle and practice, see Connor ( 1984 ).

22 The Ethiopian Student Movement had played the leading role in the instigation of the 1974 revolutionthat ousted Emperor Hailesillasie from power. For a general history of the movement, see a seminalbook by Balsvick ( 2005 ). For the ideological importance and inuence of the movement on Ethiopiancontemporary politics, see Vaughan ( 2003 ).

23 See, Ethiopian Ministry of Information ( 2002 : 26–41).24 This is Proclamation No.251/2001 issued on 6 July as “Consolidation of the House of Federation and

the Denition of its Powers and Responsibilities”.25

After the war, the Workers Party of Ethiopia (WPE), the ruling party of Colonel Mengistu, was bannedand most of its leaders w

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