final resolution booklet

RESOLUTION BOOKLET

ACADEMIC POWER SHIFTS FORUM LYON

26.10-02.11.2015

October - November 2015, Lyon - France

Procedure for the General Assembly General rules The wish to speak is indicated by raising the committee placard. The authority of the board is absolute.

I. Procedure and time settings

II. Presentation of the motion for the resolution

III. Topic video IV. Reading of the operative clauses

V. 3 minutes to defend the motion for the resolution

VI. 2x 1,5 minutes to attack the motion for the resolution

VII. 1 minute for the proposing committee to answer to the attack speech VIII. General debate

IX. 3 minutes to sum up the debate

X. Voting procedure Defence Speech One member of the proposing committee delivers the Defence Speech from the podium. It is used to explain the rationale of the overall lines of the motion for the resolution and to convince the plenary that it is worthy of being adopted. This speech can last a maximum of three minutes. Attack Speeches An individual delegate, who is not a member of the proposing committee, delivers an Attack Speech from the podium. It reflects an individual opinion and is used to point out the flaws of the approach taken by the proposing committee and should suggest alternative solutions. Often, an Attack Speech is concluded with an appeal to the plenary not to adopt the resolution in its present form. Response to the Attack Speech The proposing committee responds to the points raised by the Attack Speech. The response does not take place from the podium. The Response to the Attack Speech may last for one minute. Points of Personal Privilege These are requests for a delegate to repeat a point that was inaudible. Failure to understand the language being spoken does not constitute a Point of Personal Privilege. Direct Responses Twice per debate, each committee may use the ‘Direct Response’ sign. Should a committee member raise the Committee Placard and the ‘Direct Response’ sign during the Open Debate, he/she will immediately be recognised by the board and given the floor as soon as the point being made is concluded. A Direct Response can only be used to refer to and


discuss the point made directly beforehand. If two or more Direct Responses are requested at once, the board will decide which committee to recognise. In this case, the second Direct Response shall only be held if it can be referred to the first Direct Response, so on and so forth. Points of Order These can be raised by the Chairperson if a delegate feels the board has not properly followed Parliamentary procedure. Ultimately, the authority of the board is absolute. Summation Speech One or two members of the proposing committee deliver the Summation Speech from the podium; the microphone can only be passed once. It is used to summarise the debate, respond to the main points, selected criticisms and to once more explain why the chosen approach is the most sensible. It typically concludes with an appeal to vote in favour of the resolution. This speech can last a maximum of three minutes.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ON ENVIRONMENT, PUBLIC

HEALTH AND FOOD SAFETY

How green is renewable energy? The use of renewable and green energy sources has increased immensely in the past years in Europe

paving the way for a carbon-free future. However, not all of these energy sources are clean energy systems that do not contribute to greenhouse

gas emissions and climate change within their phases of production, preparation and usage. What steps can the EU take to ensure a

comprehensive green energy policy with a renewable energy mix that is realistic for Europe's future?

Submitted by: Adèle Baudat (FR), Viktoriia Bybel (UA), Evangelos Iatrou (GR), Anthea Oseku (CH), Noah Schöppl (DE), Nare Shahnazaryan (AM), Martha Stolze (DE), Mari Vetti Frostad (Chairperson, NO)

The European Youth Parliament,

A. Emphasising that a comprehensive European Energy Policy has to balance both a reliable energy supply and ecological sustainability,

B. Acknowledging the existing targets set in Europe 2020, the 2030 Energy Strategy, and the Energy Roadmap 2050 as first steps towards a realistic increase in the use of Renewable Energy Sources (RES),

C. Deeply concerned that RES might have a negative environmental impact due to the use of non-RES in the course of their generation,

D. Emphasising that RES are available in an abundant amount, yet they could only replace conventional energy sources when yielding methods are optimised,

E. Keeping in mind that the annual RES growth would need to almost double to cover 20% of the EU’s energy supply as stated in the 2020 targets,

F. Taking into account that nuclear energy is energy-intensive, carbon-low and almost infinite available, however, also potentially hazardous for human life and the environment,

G. Realising that further investments in research and development of RES are vital for them to increase their competitiveness and exploit their full potential,

H. Noting with regret that current investments in RES mainly focus on low-risk yet low outcome technologies, whilst investments in the development of unconventional, higher risk options could result in a more sufficient energy supply,

I. Notes the differences between Member States in terms of the structure of the energy industry and supply, the geographic and climate circumstances, and the efficiency of RES support systems;


1. Calls upon the European Commission to propose a directive, which requests all Member

States to cover at least 80% of their own energy supply with RES by 2050, decrease their share of fossil fuels in the energy mix to below 20%, phase out the use of coal and oil and phase out nuclear energy;

2. Further calls upon the European Commission to discourage Member States from building new nuclear power plants;

3. Urges the European Council to shift the focus concerning research and development from conventional to alternative energy sources;

4. Encourages Member States to surpass the 2030 target demanding a RES share in the EU energy mix of 27% by 3%;

5. Further encourages Member States to engage in an exchange about technological expertise in cooperation with the European Environment Agency;

6. Invites the European Investment Bank to take into account Member States’ Gross Domestic Product when distributing the available means for the installation of RES technology within the European Structural and Investment Fund;

7. Requests the European Commission in consultation with the Innovations & Networks Executive Agency to adopt a directive applying the Cradle to Cradle principle in all RES systems by 2030;

8. Emphasises the need for Member States to set up programs offering insurance policies for unconventional, high-risk RES investments.


Notes:


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY

AFFAIRS I

The finances behind a “power shift”: Modernising energy systems and developing technical solutions bear high costs and financial risks for

public and private investors as well as consumers. Should the costs for projects and reforms be shared among public and private stakeholders

and if so, how? What steps should the EU take in order to ensure that all goals set up in the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework are adhered to

by both public and private investors?

Submitted by: Beatriz Constantino (PT), Lidia Dutkiewicz (PL), Lukas Hagen (DE), Siarhei Karpau (BY), Camilla Mawdesley-Thomas (GB), Anton De Meester (BE), Hoang Nguyen (CZ), Hannah Rehwinkel (DE), Vanessa Thiele (DE), Mighel Molenkamp (Chairperson, NL)


A. Noting with deep concern that current energy investments are five times lower than needed to reach the 2030 decarbonisation targets,

B. Fully aware investments in research and innovation in the fields of renewable energies and energy efficiency are essential for the “power shift” to a low-carbon economy,

C. Recognising that reshaping the energy system could save the EU up to EUR 81 billion1 in

an expenditure per year,

D. Having examined that costs for the transition to a low-carbon economy are similar to replacing old energy systems,

E. Bearing in mind the renewable energies market is considered as risky and fragmented by investors due to:

i) high initial costs for entering the market,

ii) inadequate financial and technical performance data track records,

iii) differing access to energy infrastructure throughout the EU,

F. Aware that project promoters and technology developers have insufficient access to affordable project financing tools due to extensive bureaucratic procedures,

G. Observing that project promoters and technology developers generally lack the skills and knowledge necessary for the development of large-scale, bundled, or pooled energy efficiency investments,

1 Forging a joint commitment to sustainable and cost-efficient energy transition in Europe, EURELECTRIC, June

2014

https://www.accenture.com/t20150523T023638__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-%20%20Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_11/Accenture-Forging-Joint-Commitment-%20%20Sustainable-Cost-Efficient-Energy-Transition.pdf

https://www.accenture.com/t20150523T023638__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-%20%20Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_11/Accenture-Forging-Joint-Commitment-%20%20Sustainable-Cost-Efficient-Energy-Transition.pdf


H. Alarmed by the lack of awareness amongst consumers and decision makers regarding the full benefits of energy efficiency investments,

I. Noting with regret that there is only insufficient cooperation between the private and public sector in efforts of transitioning to a renewable and efficient energy supply,

J. Deeply concerned with the inequality among Member States regarding standards and norms for the use of renewable energies and ensuring energy efficiency,

K. Aware of corporations’ tendency to strive for maximum profits, leading to environmental issues being side-lined,

L. Expecting the “power shift” to cause a loss of jobs in the current energy market;

1. Has resolved to set the share of costs of the projects and reforms among public and

private stakeholders with an initial share of the private sector at a 49% maximum;

2. Further resolves that Member States implement gradually decreasing public investments with a share complementing the private sector;

3. Further invites Member States to gradually shift subsidies already in place from the conventional sector to the renewable energies sector;

4. Calls upon Member States to allocate funds through the European Investment Bank towards:

a) energy transport and transport infrastructure in the private sector,

b) research of the financial and technical performance of the renewable energies market,

c) companies participating in the renewable energies market;

5. Encourages the European Commission to allocate funds through culture, education and youth grants towards:

a) the training and requalification of citizens subject to unemployment resulting from the “power shift”,

b) the promotion of educational programmes and projects concerning renewable energies and energy efficiency;

6. Expresses its hope that Member States’ energy market conditions are further harmonised;

7. Requests the diversification of Member States' third country energy suppliers;

8. Emphasises the EU’s objective to gradually become energy-self-sufficient;

9. Urges the European Commission to set up regular summits with investment groups, project promoters, Member States’ representatives, and stakeholders such as the International Energy Agency and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development;

10. Endorses the continued use of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, gradually increasing its coverage of greenhouse gas emissions from 45% to 100%;


11. Calls for the introduction of an EU-wide standardised label by the European Commission certifying companies which include renewable energies in their respective value creation chain.

Notes:


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL LIBERTIES, JUSTICE AND

HOME AFFAIRS

“Not In My Back Yard”? With developing new energy sources and the ever-growing need to invest in new energy infrastructure, Member

States are increasingly faced with residents' involvement during the processes that affect not only their living environment, but also general policy discussions. What role can and should citizens play in the future

of the EUʼs energy infrastructure?

Submitted by: Bruno Gonçalves (PT), Shabana Haydar (DK), Mariam Hayrapetyan (AM), Dejana Kallogjerovic (AL), Eike Plhak (DE), Leonard Rosen (DE), Marta Subatait (LT), Romane Valignat (FR), Nina-Maria Thomic (Chairperson, AT)


A. Noting that the 2030 Energy Strategy calls for the establishment of more modern, high performance energy and storage systems,

B. Keeping in mind that the European Commission estimated a budget of EUR 200 billion to upgrade the EU's infrastructure to the standards of the 2030 Energy Strategy,

C. Realising that residents’ acceptance towards the construction of nearby energy infrastructure usually increases with the ownership and profit for the local population,

D. Emphasising that new power grids have to meet the security and sustainability standards as outlined in the European Energy Security Strategy,

E. Taking into account the current collision of different stakeholders’ interests, such as national and local governments, residents, Transmission-System-Operators (TSOs), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media,

F. Expressing its concern about the current inefficient moderation capabilities of both the Directorate-General on Communications and the Grid Infrastructure Communications Toolkit,

G. Deeply concerned about the low level of citizens’ participation in policy discussions in local communities due to a lack of information, transparency and awareness,

H. Fully supporting independent associations like the Renewable Grid Initiative in simplifying the flow of information between TSOs and other stakeholders,

I. Bearing in mind that the production of renewable energy is amongst others dependent on the geographically varying possibility to connect with the European power grid as well as weather conditions,

J. Highly appreciating the decentralisation of energy infrastructure to shift the production and storage of power to individual households as well as local communities,


K. Further noting that subsurface transmission lines built by TSOs are more expensive, less durable, more difficult to build and take longer to be repaired than overhead transmission lines;

1. Requests the European Commission and the Committee of the Regions to take into

account residents’ needs in the implementation of the 2030 Energy Strategy;

2. Expresses its appreciation for the European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) which, on behalf of the affected residents, demands for a secure energy infrastructure;

3. Recommends the TSOs to consult residents concerning the aesthetic aspects of local energy infrastructure before any construction is conducted;

4. Further expresses its satisfaction for the Trans-European Networks as a tool for diversifying the energy supply and guaranteeing reliability through the creation of an internal energy market;

5. Encourages Member States to promote private households producing their own energy supply;

6. Strongly urges the European Commission to further subsidise local communities or private households planning to build renewable energy supplies or storage systems;

7. Further requests the European Commission to continue the research on energy storage systems;

8. Urges the European Commission to actively promote the use of the Grid Communications Toolkit as a means of moderation between residents and other stakeholders;

9. Congratulates independent associations and NGOs, such as the Renewables Grid Initiative and INFORSE, on making a valuable contribution to the moderation between the different stakeholders.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON INDUSTRY, RESEARCH AND

ENERGY II

Energy independence at the expense of the environment? Which approach should the EU take regarding the development of hydraulic

fracturing in light of the method’s possible negative environmental impact in accordance with its current strategy for the European energy

mix?

Submitted by: Muriel Althaus (CH), Tiago Louro Alves (PT), Ruth Kinvuidi (FR), Asma Lghazaoui (CH), Laura Libera (DE), Rafiz Novruzov (AZ), Lydia Purschke (DE), Klara Andersson (Chairperson, SE)


A. Deeply conscious that in 2013 the EU imported 53 % of its gross energy consumption and 66 % of its natural gas consumption, 39 % of which was provided by Russia

1,

B. Affirming that shale gas could account for 3-10 % of the total EU gas consumption in 2035

2 and thus could offer a limited contribution to energy self-sufficiency,

C. Noting with deep concern that binding EU legislation on hydraulic fracturing is currently difficult to implement due to opposition from several Member States,

D. Bearing in mind that there is a lack of research and available data on the size, location and profitability of European shale gas reserves,

E. Realising that in the short term, the development of hydraulic fracturing in the EU is likely to be less costly than transitioning to renewable energy sources (RES),

F. Alarmed by the environmental impacts caused by hydraulic fracturing, such as air and water pollution, noise disturbance, landscape disfigurement, and water waste,

G. Noting with regret that residents of hydraulic fracturing areas may relocate due to the aforementioned environmental impacts,

H. Keeping in mind that companies are not obliged to disclose which chemicals they are using during the hydraulic fracturing process,

I. Deeply disturbed that EU decision makers have met ten times more often with fracking lobbyists than with NGOs that represent citizens’ interests,

J. Further noting that the lack of transparency in the decision making process within the EU concerning hydraulic fracturing leads to the impression that citizens’ interests are not being taken into account;

1 Shale gas and EU Energy Security, European Parliament, December 2014.

2 Unconventional wisdom: an economic analysis of US shale gas and implications for the EU, IDDRI Science Po,

February 2014.

http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2014/542167/EPRS_BRI(2014)542167_REV1_EN.pdf

http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/Study0214_TS%20et%20al._shale%20gas.pdf

http://www.iddri.org/Publications/Collections/Analyses/Study0214_TS%20et%20al._shale%20gas.pdf


1. Invites Member States to increase taxes on hydraulic fracturing activities for companies to

further subsidise the development of renewable energies;

2. Recommends that Member States consider organising referenda on whether hydraulic fracturing should be allowed;

3. Calls upon the European Commission to provide funding for research into the life span, location and profitability of shale gas reserves in Europe;

4. Urges the European Commission to initiate a directive on a minimum distance between hydraulic fracturing operations and residential and water protection areas;

5. Requests that the European Commission ensures the protection of ecosystems, flora and fauna near hydraulic fracturing operations;

6. Calls for stricter environmental legislation on waste water and air pollution to be initiated by the European Commission;

7. Further requests that Member States oblige companies to disclose the chemicals used during the hydraulic fracturing process;

8. Expresses its hope that hydraulic fracturing companies use the least hazardous chemicals available;

9. Further invites Member States to impose fines for hydraulic fracturing companies that violate the regulations specified in clauses 4-6 that grow exponentially when violations are repeated;

10. Endorses the creation of a platform that makes citizens aware of the legal compensation mechanisms in existence that provide for the victim of any hydraulic fracturing related incidents;

11. Supports the organisation of meetings between regional and local politicians and residents in areas with shale gas reserves;

12. Further resolves to extend the current obligation to disclose meetings with lobbyists and NGOs by EU decision makers to include decision makers at all levels.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC AND MONETARY

AFFAIRS II

With the 2030 Energy and Climate Framework Member States are committed to a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of 40%, a 27% increase of renewable energy sources in the EU’s energy mix and an

increase of energy efficiency by 27-30% by 2030. Yet this energy transition is only binding on an EU level and Member States' willingness to translate these targets in national strategies differs widely. In light of the recent proposal for an "Energy Union", how can the EU promote a

homogeneous energy transition which is compatible with Member States’ needs for economic growth and fulfilling all targets set until 2030

and beyond?

Submitted by: Roman Hausmann (DE), Julien Jarillot (FR), Luka Kodikaitė (LT), Anna Melkina (RU), Chloe Muddiman (GB), Cécile Regradj (FR), Nina Schmid (DE), Gevorg Vardanyan (AM), Lewin Schmitt (Chairperson, DE)


A. Having examined the European Commission’s proposal for an Energy Union as a comprehensive framework to tackle energy issues on a European level,

B. Noting with deep concern that not all Member States are on track for meeting the 2030 goals as they are not binding on a national level,

C. Deeply concerned about the current price for certificates in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) being too low to promote its objective of further reducing greenhouse gas emissions,

D. Believing that a low-carbon economy ensures sustainable growth whilst allowing the EU to remain economically competitive in the long-run,

E. Alarmed by the EU’s considerable energy import dependency on external suppliers,

F. Taking into account that a homogenous energy transition with the expected convergence of energy prices throughout the EU may not be beneficial for Member States with currently low energy prices,

G. Noting with regret that the energy transition towards renewable energy sources (RES) implies the necessity to cut down on fossil fuel energy industries, which inevitably leads to the loss of jobs in this economic sector,

H. Realising that certain Member States question the long term benefits of a low-carbon economy in fear of hampering economic growth,


I. Emphasising the possibilities for economic growth and employment resulting from the energy transition and the development of a European energy network,

J. Affirming that the extension of cross-border energy infrastructure is necessary for achieving an integrated energy market,

K. Having considered that Member States may face financial difficulties when implementing the infrastructure required for an energy transition;

1. Urges Member States to take into account the need for improving the proposal of the

Energy Union when considering its benefits;

2. Suggests that the EU encourages self-sufficiency in energy supply by setting maximum shares of energy imports from non-EU partners with a tariff being put on imports exceeding the limit;

3. Calls for a comprehensive binding agreement on how to translate the 2030 targets on a national level by:

a) extending the model of the Effort Sharing Decision to include EU ETS sectors,

b) respecting the Member States’ relative economic capacities,

c) including fines for Member States not meeting their goals,

d) using the funds collected through 2 and 3c) to finance projects related to the energy transition;

4. Endorses the reform of the EU ETS by reducing the supply of certificates and integrating new sectors;

5. Expresses its hope for accelerating the transition towards a low-carbon economy via the development of a pan-European energy infrastructure by:

a) increasing common technological standards for electricity grids,

b) suggesting state-ownership of energy infrastructure whilst outsourcing operations to private contractors in form of requests for tenders;

6. Requests the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF) finance education programmes for workers from the fossil energy sector during the transition stages to facilitate employment;

7. Further requests the CEF allocate more funds towards energy infrastructure as a project of common interest in its upcoming budget;

8. Calls upon the European Commission to significantly increase financial support provided by Horizon 2020 for research on and development of sustainable energy production measures;

9. Encourages the Cohesion Fund and the Europe 2020 Public Bond Initiative to redistribute investment resources towards projects that advance the infrastructure for an integrated European energy grid.



ENERGY I

Energy independence at the expense of the environment? Providing over 11% of the world’s electricity and about 30% in the EU, nuclear

energy is still prominent in our current energy mix as it increases the nation’s energy independence and serves as a carbon-neutral energy

production tool in a time of climate change. On the other hand, it poses the danger of immediate safety risks and long-term environmental

impacts in case of accidents. What way should the EU choose in using nuclear energy for the European energy mix? Do alternatives, such as

Thorium or fusion power plants, pave a way forward?

Submitted by: Emilia Konczewska (PL), Victoria Lehnart (DE), Oleksandr Lymar (UA), Valentin Perrin (FR), Heidi Renault (FR), Yannik Sauerwein (DE), Laura Sommer (DE), Tim Weber (SI), Ana Pereira (Chairperson, PT)


A. Regrets that the EU imports over half of its energy1 at an annual cost of around EUR 400

billion2,

B. Fully alarmed by the EU’s limited financial support for large nuclear energy infrastructures due to a lack of a common EU position on nuclear energy,

C. Bearing in mind that the decision to operate a nuclear power plant by Member States may have an international impact as seen in the Chernobyl disaster

3,

D. Concerned by the risk of nuclear accidents, terrorist attacks and natural disasters associated with nuclear power plants,

E. Deeply conscious that the long term storage of nuclear waste represents a risk for the environment, public health and a country’s economy,

F. Fully aware of the already existing technologies to reuse nuclear waste,

G. Deeply concerned that uranium supplies are limited and will be exhausted within 90 years

4,

H. Expecting new technologies such as thorium-based nuclear power and nuclear fusion to contribute to meeting the ever increasing energy demand world wide,

I. Noting with deep concern the limited amount of EU funding allocated to research on remediation,

1 Imports and secure supplies, European Commission, 2015

2 Energy Union Package, European Commission, 25 February 2015

3 Maps of radionuclide deposition, UNSCEAR, 16 December 2008

4 Supply of Uranium, World Nuclear Association, September 2015

https://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies

http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/docs/energyunion_en.pdf

http://www.unscear.org/unscear/en/chernobylmaps.html

http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Nuclear-Fuel-Cycle/Uranium-Resources/Supply-of-Uranium/


J. Convinced that sharing nuclear technology could lead to nuclear proliferation despite that it is meant to promote low priced and available energy,

K. Realising that the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) does not yet allow low carbon energy producers to get free allowances;

1. Invites the creation of a programme to shift uranium power plants to thorium followed by

fusion as baseload and other renewables as a flexible part along with the need for diversifying research and investing in non-weather dependent technology;

2. Recommends that the European Investment Bank (EIB) establishes a fund for promoting energy transition;

3. Supports the introduction of an agreement between Member States regarding a common handling and cost bearing position in the unlikely event of a fallout;

4. Requests that Member States allocate a specific percentage of their respective Gross Domestic Product (GDP) national budget to promote research on nuclear safety and prevent the cost of nuclear disaster damages;

5. Further invites cooperation between private companies and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) over thorium technology risks;

6. Calls upon the European Commission to establish a tariff for companies who import energy, allocating the generated income to subsidise European carbon-neutral energy producers;

7. Urges Member States to implement progressive taxes on overconsumption of electricity, allocating the revenue into renewable energy research;

8. Further recommends the European Council allocate subsidies for the construction of nuclear power plants powered by repossessed radioactive waste;

9. Encourages the European Commission to discuss nuclear energy as part of their 5 year strategy;

10. Calls for the EU ETS to devote 20% of its allowances to carbon-neutral energy producers as a further incentive to promote a clean Europe.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

Fundamental rights in a globalised economy: With multinational energy projects funded by European public and private funds the EU is

increasingly held liable for fundamental rights violations and corruption occurring outside of its territory. How should the EU balance an

affordable energy supply for consumers across the Member States whilst safeguarding its trading partners’ compliance with fundamental

rights?

Submitted by: Alexandra Blin (FR), Deborah Bortoletto (CH), Carlotta Marie Keil (DE), Nadine Mair (DE), Roman Mazur (UA), Carl Schneegaß (DE), Sofia Serrano (DE), Maria Köpping (Chairperson, AT)


A. Emphasising that Article 21.I of the Treaty on European Union obliges the EU to act according to the values of democracy, rule of law and universality of human rights on the international scene,

B. Fully alarmed by the political instabilities, human rights violations and corruption practices on the territory of EU energy trading partners such as Russia and several countries from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region,

C. Noting that the EU does not command the necessary reserves of natural energy resources such as gas and oil to be energy-self-sufficient,

D. Aware of the fact that the EU imports 53% of its consumed energy1 and therefore is highly

dependent on constant and reliable energy supply from third countries,

E. Realising that Member States concluded different bilateral trade agreements and also vary largely in their dependence on energy imports,

F. Deeply regretting that previous diplomatic approaches of the EU intended to improve the human rights situation in third countries have not proven effective enough,

G. Noting with regret the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of unanimous decisions taken in the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) when imposing sanctions on third countries,

H. Convinced that non-governmental organisations (NGOs) play a key role in raising awareness and collecting data on human rights issues outside of the EU,

I. Noting with deep concern that the lack of transparency and involvement of citizens in policy-making leads to corruption in some of the EU’s energy trading partners,

1 Imports and Secure Supplies - Diverse, affordable, and reliable energy from abroad, European Commission, 2015

http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/imports-and-secure-supplies


J. Aware of allegations of human rights violations and corruption committed outside the EU territory by EU companies, which are financed by European public and private funds;

1. Expresses its appreciation for the new EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-2019;

2. Recommends Member States to strengthen their trade partnerships with countries that commit to complying with human rights;

3. Expresses its hope for the European Commission to increase the EU’s energy independency by promoting further research in different fields such as renewable energy and shale gas;

4. Encourages Member States to invest in infrastructure for alternative energy transportation methods such as Liquefied Natural Gas and Compressed Natural Gas shipping;

5. Calls for a Treaty change introducing a qualified majority voting procedure2 within the

CFSP when making decisions on imposing sanctions;

6. Urges the Council of the EU to increase the use and scope of sanctions against energy trading partners that severely violate human rights;

7. Further requests the Council of the EU to encourage third countries to improve their human rights situation by offering them economic incentives such as access to the EU energy trading market;

8. Emphasises that Member States should cooperate more closely amongst each other and with third countries when imposing sanctions against countries that violate human rights;

9. Calls for the European Commission to closely monitor the use of development aid provided to third countries by sending experts and only provide funding to entities that use these means appropriately;

10. Further recommends the European Commission to offer countries that face corruption expertise and assistance in reforming their bureaucratic systems;

11. Further requests that the European Development Fund3 provides financial support to

existing local organisations in third countries that aim to enhance political participation;

12. Further invites national and European decision-makers to take into consideration the expertise, collected data and recommendations offered by NGOs;

13. Calls for the establishment of an investigation committee under the mandate of the EU Special Representative on Human Rights

4;

14. Calls upon the European Commission to impose fines on companies based in the EU and financed by European public and private funds where cases of human rights violations or corruption are detected.

2 In the Council of the EU, a qualified majority requires votes that represent 55% of the Member States and 65% of

the EU population. 3 The European Development Fund (EDF) financially supports cooperation activities in the fields of economic

development, social and human development as well as regional cooperation and integration. 4 The position of the EU Special Representative on Human Rights was created with the adoption of the EU’s

Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy. His role is to enhance the effectiveness and visibility of EU human rights policy. This EU Special Representative works closely with the European External Action Service and has a broad, flexible mandate.


Notes:



ENERGY III

Smart cities and smart regions: Climate change puts different challenges on urban and rural areas not only regarding the provision of public services and a fair access to energy but also guaranteeing safety

of its inhabitants. What role in the energy mix of the future should decentralised energy production play to achieve sustainability, reliability

and affordability?

Submitted by: Rafailia Ampla (GR), Jan Eustachi (DE), Jonay Franke (DE), Ella Glenz (DE), Yevgenya Karapetyan (AM), Lo-Paul Lambert-Emery (FR), Mariarosaria Rita Rizzo (IT), Jakub Rolewski (PL), Miguel Cruz Teixeira (PT), Can Elvanlıoğlu (Chairperson, TR)


A. Fully alarmed that due to technological challenges the currently available renewable energy cannot guarantee a reliable energy supply in Member States' rural and urban areas,

B. Aware that Member States are highly dependent on the imports of conventional energy sources from third countries,

C. Bearing in mind the Members States’ sovereignty inhibited cross-border cooperation in the EU energy sector up to the present,

D. Noting with regret that citizens and local communities lack awareness and technological knowledge concerning the possible benefits of decentralised energy production and consumption,

E. Deeply conscious that a gradual transition towards energy production generated from renewable energy sources (RES) requires high investment capital for:

i) infrastructure adjustments,

ii) research and development,

iii) technological innovation,

F. Noting with concern the lack of mandatory targets concerning a fixed share of RES in the EU’s energy mix slows down further development and the implementation of a distributed generation,

G. Deeply concerned that a dependency on centralised energy generation is caused by the total EU's energy and electricity demand being satisfied only through base load providers,


H. Noting with regret that the cost of sustainable construction and restoration of buildings hampers public and private investors to fully implement energy efficient measures;

1. Expresses its hope that Member States increase urban energy distribution;

2. Recommends Member States promote the shift towards decentralised energy production by:

a) expanding the installation, development and usage of smart grids as well as smart metering systems,

b) urging grid operators to offer financial incentives to consumers that do not use energy during peak consumption hours,

c) proposing citizens invest in energy efficient households;

3. Supports the establishment of a common system for the decentralised energy production generated from RES according to Member States’ respective resources;

4. Further recommends the European Commission continue to invest in research and development through the European Investment Bank and Horizon 2020 Programme for:

a) reliable and efficient RES technologies,

b) energy storage technologies on a local basis;

5. Encourages the European Commission to create financial incentives for private investors and citizens to invest in distributed generation by:

a) guaranteeing priority selling of electricity when overproduction in citizens’ energy plant occur,

b) ensuring that it is a priority of the Cohesion Fund and the Connecting Europe Facility,

c) suggesting Member States set up special funds that offer grant opportunities for small scale energy producers for distributed generation projects especially in rural regions;

6. Further invites Member States to establish and develop:

a) transmission networks including the exchange of surplus energy within the EU,

b) distributed generation infrastructures prioritising rural areas;

7. Calls upon the Directorate-General for Energy to establish an information campaign demonstrating how citizens can be empowered in distributed energy generation and consumption.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the light of ongoing tensions with Russia due to the current conflict in Ukraine, how can the EU balance its role as an advocate of peace and stability whilst ensuring the safety of its energy supply from Russia?

Submitted by: Meri Asatryan (AM), Amélie Leclere (FR), Rokas Navickas (LT), Niels Oldemeier (DE), Marion Salomon (FR), Enes Shehu (AL), Viktroriia Vlasenko (UA), Francesco Zollo (IT), Michael Rozhkov Shekhtman (Chairperson, UA/IL)


A. Deeply concerned by the reports of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe which outlined multiple human rights violations and violations of general principals of the international law concerning national sovereignty in the Russia-Ukraine conflict,

B. Aware of the lack of communication between the EU and its neighbouring countries despite the European Neighbourhood Policy and Eastern Partnership Agreement which promote cooperation and communication,

C. Noting with deep concern that tensions in Ukraine are still in place despite the significant influence of economic and diplomatic sanctions on both the economic development and international political power of Russia,

D. Deeply regretting the lack of political independence of the EU and its Member States1 due

to long-term contractual commitments with Gazprom,

E. Taking into consideration that Gazprom remains the main energy supplier for Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, FYR Macedonia, Moldova and Serbia,

F. Deeply disturbed by the absence of common stance of the EU regarding its external energy policy due to varying national interests among Member States as well as the dependency on Russian energy supply,

G. Convinced of the importance of the common European Energy Union project and the implementation of the Energy Security Strategy which serve as first steps in a long-term process towards European energy self-sufficiency,

H. Realising that the sanctions imposed on Russia caused significant difficulties for Member States that are dependent on Russian energy supply,

I. Fully alarmed by the lack of diversification of energy suppliers and trade partners amongst Member States;

1 The EU imports 39% of gas and 33% of oil from Russia.


1. Expresses its hope for the increase in the number of meetings of the Council of the European Union in its Transport, Telecommunications and Energy (TTE) configuration;

2. Encourages Member States to prioritise the contractual commitments with Gazprom that do not pass through Ukraine while looking for alternative energy suppliers;

3. Supports the development of energy supply infrastructure between the largest energy producers in Europe such as France, the United Kingdom, Germany, Norway and Member States that almost solely depend on Russian energy supply;

4. Urges Member States to join the Southern Gas Corridor, Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline project and further develop cooperation with African countries such as Algeria;

5. Calls upon international organisations, non-governmental organisations and Member States as well as the private sector to contribute to the process of improving and expanding the liquefied natural gas infrastructure and ensure the subsidising of bio-gas and oil-shale enterprises in Eastern Europe;

6. Recommends the European Commission to gradually implement the Energy security agenda as outlined by the North-Atlantic Treaty Organisation which seeks for diversification of energy supply, energy efficiency and energy awareness;

7. Further recommends the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) to invest in projects related to shale and bio gas, alternative gas pipelines and alternative sources of energy within in the EU;

8. Calls upon the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED) to further improve on and invest in common European infrastructure and energy market;

9. Recommends Member States to allocate funds to the research on particularly efficient energy sources in each Member State according to their respective natural resources and geographic conditions.


MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION BY THE COMMITTEE ON CLIMATE CHANGE

A new Kyoto Protocol? With recent changes in energy policy changes in France including a new Energy Transition for Green Growth bill and the

Clean Power Plan in the United States, the upcoming 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris could mark a decisive stage in the negotiations of a post-2020 international agreement on

climate change. What position should the EU set for its negotiations of a binding and universal climate agreement?

Submitted by: Maria Cossi (IT), Matthias Hodler (CH), Jurga Kvekšaitė (LT), Fiona Lee (GB), Timotheus Riedel (DE), Julie Rojas (FR), Michal Sklenár (CZ), David Zaroian (AM), David Plahl (Chairperson, DE)


A. Guided by the sovereignty principle of international law which prohibits the interference in the affairs of any country in the world,

B. Alarmed that the Kyoto Protocol has not been effective enough given that the annual global CO2 emissions continued rising from 31,6 GT to 34,5 GT during its first commitment period between 2008 and 2012,

C. Conscious that China with 10 GT/year, the United States with 5 GT/year and the EU, India and Russia each with approximately 2,5 GT/year account for more than the half of the 38,2 GT/year of global greenhouse gas emissions,

D. Realising that in order to prevent the most dangerous consequences of global warming it is necessary to limit the rise in temperature to 2°C and reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 90% until 2050 in comparison to 2005,

E. Welcoming the content of the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC) as a promising first step towards a new international climate change agreement,

F. Noting with regret that the Kyoto Protocol does currently not include any enforcement mechanisms to bind countries to meet their respective targets,

G. Emphasising that there is no clear obligation for countries to agree on any further agreements once the Paris agreement expires, potentially causing a policy vacuum in case no new agreement is reached,

H. Fully aware that not all countries in the world are on the same financial and technological level and differ in their economic systems,

I. Considering that many countries are hesitant to adopt new climate change policies due to the potential clash between environmental protection and economic growth,


J. Viewing with appreciation how the continuous drop of renewable energy prices, caused by technological advancements, makes renewable energy an increasingly viable option within the EU,

K. Keeping in mind that countries who are predominately dependent on the agricultural and industrial sector face more difficulties in reducing greenhouse gas emissions than economies dominated by the service sector,

L. Fully aware that the international competitiveness of companies can be affected by regional or national emission trading schemes or taxes on greenhouse gas emissions,

M. Expressing its satisfaction towards recent national legislation in some countries, which is in line with the international fight against climate change;

1. Reaffirms the importance of including individual greenhouse gas emission reduction

targets for every participating country in a new international climate change agreement;

2. Emphasises that the inclusion of as many countries as possible, especially the largest emitters of greenhouse gases, ensures maximum effectiveness of a new agreement;

3. Further emphasises that negotiations on a new agreement should be built on the ideas proposed in the INDCs;

4. Calls for the establishment of a framework for an enforcement mechanism that encourages compliance with the targets set by the new agreement discussed during the negotiations leading up to the climate change conference in Paris (COP21);

5. Recommends the COP21 to agree that the specific emission reduction rates set in the Paris agreement remain in place until a new agreement is reached;

6. Encourages developed countries to raise their contributions to the Green Climate Fund;

7. Supports the cooperation between developed and developing countries in achieving their goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by further sharing their knowledge in the fields of green technologies, Disaster Risk Reduction and the education of workers;

8. Calls upon the European Commission to mainstream ecological standards across its development aid programmes and to encourage other aid donors to follow this example;

9. Further recommends participating countries to support an intensified research and development of renewable energy sources, energy efficiency and potential reductions in energy and resources consumption;

10. Urges the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development to develop ideas to ease the worldwide trade of green technologies using the experience of well developed countries;

11. Further urges countries to raise their contributions to the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction;

12. Further encourages regional organisations, such as the ASEAN, the AU, the GCC, the PIF or the USAN, and larger countries, such as the United States, China or India, to further develop and implement Emissions Trading Schemes, modelled after the EU Emissions Trading Scheme;


13. Further calls upon the European Commission to instruct the delegations of the EU to collect information and promote the EU’s position as outlined in this resolution until the COP21 has reached an agreement.

Christopher Nölte Delegates’ Support of the SessionMobil: +49 (0) 152 5611 9498 E-Mail: [email protected]

The Schwarzkopf Foundation is the international umbrella organisation of the European Youth Parliament (EYP). EYP France is a National Committee in the EYP network.

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