finaldraft moa ad comment intervention signing updated

7/29/2019 FinalDraft MOA AD Comment Intervention Signing Updated

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Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court

Manila

En BancTHE PROVINCE OF THE NORTH

COTABATOET AL.,

Petitioners,

-versus-

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL

DOMAINET AL.,

Respondents,

x-----------------------------------------x

CITY GOVERNMENT OFZAMBOANGA,ET AL.,

Petitioners,

-versus-

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL

DOMAIN (GRP) ET AL.,

Respondents,

x------------------------------------------x

MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE

FOUNDATION, INC. ,

Intervenor.

x------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 183591

GR No. 183752

COMMENT-IN-INTERVENTION

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(By MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC.)

Intervenor Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (hereinafter referred to

as Muslaf), by itself, unto this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:

Statement of the Case

On July 23, 2008, petitioners North Cotabato and Piol filed a petitiondocketed as GR No. 183591 seeking relief: (1) for the issuance of temporary

restraining order (TRO) and, in the alternative, writ of preliminary injunction

against public respondents to formally signing the MOA; (2) requiring the latter to

furnish petitioner the copy of the MOA inclusive of its annexes; and, (3)

prohibiting it to formally sign said MOA pending its disclosure to the public as

well as its public consultation and hearing. A day after, they filed an Urgent ex

parte Manifestation as well as Extremely Urgent Manifestation for the issuance of

Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO.

On July 30, 2008, a resolution was issued requiring the public respondents

statutory counsel, Solicitor General, to file its Comment.

In the meantime, another petition was filed by the City of Zamboanga et. al.

docketed as G.R. No. 183752 which contain substantially the same allegations and

causes of action in G.R. No. 183591.

On 04 August 2008, a resolution was promulgated consolidating the two

separate petitions, GR No. 183591 and 183752; issuing a temporary restraining

order (TRO) directing public respondents to cease and desist from signing the

MOA; requiring Solicitor General to file its Comment in GR No. 183752 and to

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furnish the Court and all the parties the copy of the MOA; noting the Comment of

public respondents in G.R. No. 183591; requiring petitioners in G.R. No. 183591

to file their Reply against public respondents Comment; and setting the case for

oral argument on August 15, 2008.

COUNTER STATEMENT OF HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

The Mindanao Conflict (the Conflict) predates the birth of the Philippine

Republic. It began with the entry into these islands of Spanish Conquistadores,

fresh from expelling the Moors in Spain, only to find vibrant sultanates and

kingdoms who vigorously opposed colonization. Of these sultanates, two were

described by Jesuit priest Fr. Horacio dela Costa as full-pledged sultanates with

a fiscal administration, courts of justice, and a bureaucracy.1 They were, in

other words, already political entities as nations-states and not just nations in its

sociological sense by the time the Spaniards set foot and definitely long before

the birth of the First Philippine Republic in 1898.

The Conflict calls into question basic assumptions about the Philippines as a

nation-state, about whether the Philippine Republic from inception is a mono-

nation state or a plural-nation state. It further calls into question the lastingviability of the Philippines as a unitary state capable of accommodating distinct

ethno-nationalist histories and state-building trajectories.

Since the late 1960s up until today, the modern day reincarnation of this

conflict has thus far cost 120,000 lives. In year 2000, an all-out military

offensive produced 1,000,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) and, in year

2003, another all-out military offensive produced 400,000 IDPs.2 After the

resolution of the conflict in Aceh, Indonesia, the Mindanao Conflict now has the

1 Ruurdje Laarhoven, Triumph of Moro Diplomacy, New Day Publishers, 1989 (p. xvi).2 Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project, Profile of Internal Displacement:Philippines (2005), pp. 18 and 19, available at www.idpproject.org.

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distinction of being the longest running conflict in Asia. Further, given the

gravity of its impact on the humanitarian and human rights situation, it threatens

to transform the conflict affected areas into the Darfur of Southeast Asia, if not

already.

Nexus Between Ancestral Domain and the GRP-MILF Peace Process

A. Ancestral Domain

1. Land Colonization Program

At the turn of the 20 th century when the Americans took over after the

Treaty of Paris, Moros comprised about 76% of the entire population of

Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan.3 But by the turn of the next century, Moros

comprise only 19% of the population while that of settlers, their descendants, and

subsequent migrants now comprising the.4

The reason for this dramatic reversal is the numerous land colonization

policies mandated by the Philippine legislature and implemented by the executive

branch that encouraged settlers from Luzon and Visayas to colonize agricultural

lands in Mindanao5 even as lands owned byMoros by virtue of grants from Sultans

3 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Philippine Human Development Report(Human Development Network, Manila, 2005), p. 29; The World Bank, Social Assessment ofConflict Affected Areas in Mindanao (Environment and Social Development Unit, 2003), p. 8.4 Supra, 2005 Philippine Human Development Report, at p. 25.5 Act No. 2254 (1913), Agricultural Colonies Act creating agric colonies in Cotabato Valley;Act No. 2280 (1914) creating agricultural colony in Momungan (Balo-i), Lanao; Act No. 2206(1919) authorizing provincial boards to manage colonies (Zamboanga opened Lamitan, Suluopened Tawi-Tawi, Bukidnon opened Marilog, Cotabato opened Salunayan & Maganoy);Resettlement done by Interisland Migration Division (1919-1930) of the Bureau of Labor(opened Kapalong, Guiangga, Tagum, Lupon and Baganga in Davao, Labangan in

Zamboanga; Lamitan in Basilan; Cabadbaran in Butuan; Buenavista in Agusan; Momunganand Kapatagan valley in Lanao; brought in more settlers to Pikit and Pagalungan); Act No.4197 Quirino-Recto Colonization Act / Organic Charter of Organized Land Settlement (1935);Act No. 441 Creating National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA) (opened KoronadalValley and Ala Valley in Cotabato, and Mallig plains in Isabela); Rice and Corn ProductionAdministration (RCPA) created in 1949 to promote rice and corn production (opened Buluanin Cotabato and Maramag-Wao in Bukidnon-Lanao border); 1951, Land SettlementDevelopment Corporation (LASEDECO) (opened Tacurong, Isulan, Bagumbayan, Part ofBuluan, Sultan sa Barongis, Ampatuan); 1951, Economic Development Corps (EDCOR) for

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and Datuswere invalidated and declared null and void.6

Inevitably, the programs generated not only resentment by Moros against

the government but also communal tensions such that by the late 1960s, militiasbegan to be formed and by the early 1970s, communal fighting between Christian

and Muslims villages broke out.7

2. Three (3) Injustices

The resentment and tensions caused by the land colonization program

during the American, Commonwealth, and post-WWII periods was compounded

by what Archbishop Orlando Quevedo sums up as three (3) injustices: injustice

to Moro sovereignty, injustice to Moro identity, and injustice to Moro integral

development.8

During the Malolos Convention which drafted the Constitution of the First

Philippine Republic, not a single one of the delegates was any of the Moro

sultanates. An invitation sent to the Sultan of Sulu by the Katipuneros was

ignored.

During the Commonwealth period, when the land colonization policy was

already underway, Moro leaders issued the so-called Zamboanga Declaration.9

This was followed by the Dansalan Declaration issued on the eve of the 1935

captured and surrendered Huks (opened Arevalo in Sapad, Lanao del Norte; Genio inAlamada, Gallego and Barira in Buldon, all in Cotabato, and two others in Isabela andQuezon); RA 1160 (1954) created National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration(NARRA); 1963, Land Authority inaugurated land reform, also managed resettlement; RA6389 (1971) created Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), did resettlement thru theBureau of Resettlement. Note: Culled from Powerpoint Presentation of Professor RodolfoRodil, Vice-Chairperson, GRP Peace Negotiating Panel, presented at the University of the

Philippines, College of Law, August 8, 2008.6 Philippine Bill of 1902, Sec. 84.7 Thomas M. McKenna, Muslim Rulers and Rebels (Anvil Publishing, Manila, 1998), at p. 149.8 See Cotabato Archbishop Orlando Quevedo, Injustice: The Root of the Conflict inMindanao (Paper delivered by Cotabato at the 27th General Assembly of the Bishops'Businessmen's Conference in Taguig, Metro Manila, on July 8, 2004), available athttp://www.bangsamoro.info/modules/wfsection/article.php?articleid=46.9 Peter Gordon Gowing, Mandate in Moroland (New Day Publishers, Quezon City, 1983), at p.311.

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Constitutional Convention. The tenor of both was Moros were afraid of how they

will be treated if Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan, were made part of the Philippines.

At the very least, these historical antecedents call into question basic

premises of the Philippines as a nation-state: whether the incorporation of the

Bangsamoro in the Philippine Republic was with their, or their leaders, consent;

whether the Philippines is a mono-nation or plural-nation state, and; assuming

the Philippines is a plural-nation state, whether the Unitary state structure of the

Philippines is capable of accommodating distinct historical and political

trajectories of the plurality of nations in its jurisdiction.

Indeed, as one legal expert on the peace process observes, the Mindanao

Conflict is a clash between two imagined nations or nationalism.10

B. The GRP-MILF Peace Process

The GRP-MILF Peace Process is only the latest attempt to resolve the

Conflict. This process started with then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres

exploratory and preparatory meetings with the MILF in August of 1996.11

Given the magnitude of the Conflict and the fundamental issues which

strike at the core assumptions of the Philippines as a nation-state, it has takenboth Peace Panels of the GRP and the MILF twelve (12) years to agree upon a

Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) which, it should

be hastily added, is not even the Comprehensive Peace Compact that the panels

deem as the culmination of their negotiations.12 But the ceremonial/formal

signing of the initialled Memorandum of Agreement was aborted after the

issuance by this Honorable Court of the Temporary Restraining Order.

10 Soliman Santos, Evolution of the Armed Conflict on the Moro Front, condensed in 2005UNDP Philippine Human Development Report(Human Development Network, 2005), at p.65, downloadable at www.hdn.org.ph.11 Soliman Santos, Dynamics and Directions of the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations (AlternateForum for Research in Mindanao, Inc., 1st ed., Davao, 2005), at p. 5.12 Par. 7, Governance, GRP-MILF Memorandum of Agreement Ancestral Domain.

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The GRP-MILF Peace Process is not the first attempt to resolve the conflict

and address long-held Bangsamoro grievances by way of negotiations.

Unfortunately, all past attempts have failed. The 1976 Tripoli Agreement was at

best abandoned by both signatory parties or at worst, unilaterally implemented by

the government. On the other hand, the implementation of the 1996 Final Peace

Agreement was marked by a resumption of hostilities in 2001 and in the

incarceration of Prof. Nur Misuari, the signatory to the pact.

The GRP-MILF Peace Process has already taken twelve years. This was

marked by two all out military offensives in years 2000 and 2003, and countless

major outbreaks of fighting which produced almost One Million (1,000,000) and

Four Hundred Thousand (430,000) refugees, respectively, and thousands of homes

ruined. Human casualties, combatants and non-combatants, are indeterminate.

Meanwhile, the social costs of the continuing conflict is reflected in an opinion

poll commissioned by the United Nations Development Project showing half of

Filipinos would outright prefer a Christian over a Muslim job-applicant and that

about the same percentage see Muslims as terrorists.13

Yet, notwithstanding all these obstacles14 and the immensity of task

assumed by the GRP and MILF Peace Panels to resolve the Conflict, they

prodded on and eventually succeeded in crafting the MOA-AD which would have

paved the way to the formal negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace Compact.

However, rather than welcome the MOA-AD as another attempt to resolve

the Conflict peacefully and succeed where past attempts have failed, the instant

petition was filed. Soon afterwards, the TRO was issued and the scheduledAugust 5 signing of the MOA-AD was cancelled. Thereafter, hostilities resumed

13 See supra, 2005 UNDP Philippine Human Development Report, Appendix 1.1, Measuringthe Bias Against Muslims, pp. 53-58.14 See also Paul Oquist, Mindanao and Beyond: Competing Policies, Protracted Conflict andHuman Security(United Nations Development Program, Manila, 2002).

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and in just one week, published number of refugees already number One Hundred

Sixty Thousand (160,000) persons.15

Issues in Intervention

I. WHETHER RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO TEMPORARY

RESTRAINING COMMANDING PUBLIC RESPONDENTS TO

CEASE AND DESIST FROM FORMALLY SIGNING THE MOA-

AD.

II.WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN THEIR ALLEGED DENIAL TO

FURNISH THE COPY OF THE MEMORANDUM OF

AGREEMENT ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (MOA-AD)

BETWEEN PUBLIC RESPONDENTS AND MORO ISLAMIC

LIBERATION FRONT (MILF).

III. WHETHER PUBLIC RESPONDENTS ACTED WITH GRAVE

ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN

EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN PUBLIC RESPONDENTS

ALLEGEDLY FAILED TO CONDUCT PUBLIC

CONSULTATION AND HEARINGS PRIOR TO THE SIGNING

OF THE MOA BETWEEN THE RESPONDENTS AND THE

MILF.

Arguments and Discussion

I. Whether respondent is entitled to a

temporary restraining order

commanding public respondents to

cease and desist from formally

signing the MOA-AD.

15 See Inquirer Online, Humanitarian Crisis Looms in North Cotabato, athttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fighting.

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http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fighting


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Intervenors replead, reproduce and incorporate by reference all the foregoing

allegations.

A. The Signing of the MOA-AD will not result in irreparable injury to the

petitioners warranting the issuance of temporary restraining order (TRO).

The rule on the issuance of a TRO requires that there must be great or

irreparable injury that would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard

on notice.16 In the case of the applicants in this consolidated case, there is no

irreparable injury that will be caused by the formal signing of the MOA-AD. This

document is not self-executory. In fact, it will not even constitute the culmination

of the negotiations between the GRP and MILF. Rather, it is the signing of the

Comprehensive Compact which will signal the end of the negotiations. In fact, the

signing of the MOA-AD will merely put into motion the start of the formal

negotiations on the Comprehensive Peace Pact. On this point, the MOA-AD

clearly states:

TERRITORY

2. x x x

d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior

agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using

all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the

signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as

enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached

herein (the Annex). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this

16Sec. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. No preliminary injuction shall be granted without hearing and priornotice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appearfrom facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that greator irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the mattercan be heard on notice, the court to which the application forpreliminary injunction was made,xxx

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framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to

complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the

Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing

of the MOA-AD.

GOVERNANCE

7. The parties agree that that mechanisms and modalities for the

actual implementation of this MOA shall be spelt out in the

Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to

occur effectively.

Any provision of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the

existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a

Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to

the legal framework with due regard to nonderogation of prior

agreement and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the

Comprehensive Compact.

8. The parties agree that the BJE shall be empowered to build,

develop and maintain its own institutions, inclusive of, civil service,

electoral, financial and banking, education, legislation, legal,

economic, and police and internal security force, judicial system and

correctional institutions, necessary for developing a progressive

Bangsamoro society, the details of which shall be discussed in the

negotiation of the Comprehensive Compact.

10. Matters concerning the details of the agreed consensus

points on Governance not covered under this Agreement shall be

deferred to, and discussed during, the negotiations of the

Comprehenssive Compact.

In fact, their act of applying for the TRO has caused the people of Mindanao

irreparable injury as hostilities or the state of un-peace has resumed. The 160,000

refugees that have had to flee their homes after the resumption of hostilities that

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followed the cancellation of the signing of the MOA-AD 17 will bear this out. It

shows the both panels the futility of negotiating for twelve years because in the

end, all their efforts at confronting the difficult issues facing them will be put to

naught and their agreements can be readily set aside by a baseless allegation of

irreparable injury by petitioners.

B. In any case, the availability of the MOA-AD from various sources

renders the prayer for TRO moot and academic.

The Petitioners prayer for the issuance of the TRO is premised on the

alleged failure of the Respondents to furnish them copies of the MOA-AD.

However, assuming it were true that they have yet to obtain copies even before the

filing of their Petition, inasmuch as the Honorable Court had already ordered the

counsel for Respondents, the Office of the Solicitor General, to furnish thePetitioners copies of the MOA-AD, it is respectfully submitted that the TRO is

rendered moot and academic.

In any case, copies of the MOA-AD is already available in the public

domain such as numerous online news websites even before the issuance of the

TRO.18

Thus, it is with due respect that herein intervenors pray that the said TRO be

lifted immediately, as the purpose for which it was requested by the herein

petitioners, is already non-existent. The MOA-AD has already been released to the

17 See, for example, the fighting in North Cotabato that already produce 160,000 refugees.Inquirer Online, Humanitarian Crisis Looms in North Cotabato , athttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fighting18 http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/newspics/downloads/MOA%20On%20Ancestral%20Domain.pdf;http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homeland;

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http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/newspics/downloads/MOA%20On%20Ancestral%20Domain.pdfhttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/newspics/downloads/MOA%20On%20Ancestral%20Domain.pdfhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homelandhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homelandhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homelandhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/newspics/downloads/MOA%20On%20Ancestral%20Domain.pdfhttp://www.abs-cbnnews.com/images/news/newspics/downloads/MOA%20On%20Ancestral%20Domain.pdfhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homelandhttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20080804-152469/GRP-MILF-draft-pact-on-Bangsamoro-homeland


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public. As such, the petitioners have already been informed of its contents. The

TRO is no longer needed.

II. Whether public respondents acted with grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of

jurisdiction in their alleged denial to furnish the

copy of the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

between public respondents and Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF), thus, warranting the

issuance of a preliminary injunction .

Both petitions failed to show that they were denied by public respondents of

their right to information.

In G.R. No. 183591, there was no official record refusing the request for the

copy of the MOA. With respect to GR No. 183952, there was no request made torespondents to access the subject MOA.Indubitably, the petitions failed to present

before this High Court any breach of a right which is legally demandable and

enforceable.

In GR No. 183591, petitioners had requested (Annex C, Petition) a copy

of the MOA only July 21, 2008. Without waiting for the request, they filed two

days thereafter or on July 23 this petition without waiting for a reasonable time for

public respondents to act on the request. The filing, therefore, is premature. In the

first place, there is no official act to be complained of since there was no refusal of

the request by public respondents.

In G.R. No. 183752, the petitioner has not presented any document or letter

requesting from the public respondents a copy of the MOA. Thus, there was no

administrative denial and no evidence attached to the petition showing that their

right to information was denied.

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Simply, except for the letter in attached as Annex C in the Petition G.R.

No. 183591, nothing in the petitions states that the petitioners formally requested

for a copy of the MOA-AD nor attempted to access the information at the office

of the OPAPP or their official representative in Zamboanga City and North

Cotabato. In fact, when Rep. Climaco of Zamboanga requested for a copy, she

was shown a draft copy of MOA-AD at Congress which was admitted in their

Petition at par 20 under Brief Statement of Facts page 10. At that moment she

could have made copies for which she could have shown to the governor, mayor

and her constituents at Zamboanga. Unfortunately, she failed to do so and is now

putting the blame on the Peace Panel. For easy reference allegation of the

petitioner in GR 183591 are reproduced below:

18. Also, on July 25, 2008, Petitioner Rep. Climaco wrote Sec.

Hermogenes C. Esperon, Jr., the current Presidential Adviser

on Peace Process, requesting for a copy of the Memorandum of

Agreement on Ancestral Domain. The request fell on deaf ears.

xxx xxx xxx

20. Prompted by the said news, the resident of Zamboanga

started clamoring for copies of the purported MOA-AD. Their

apprehension were confirmed when petitioner Climaco was

shown a draft copy of the same in Congress;

Petitioners would like this Court to believe that Rep. Climaco was never

provided a copy of the MOA-AD but upon his own admission he state that he was

shown a draft copy of the same in Congress. Thus their claim of not being

furnished a copy is a blind allegation on their part.

We respectfully invite this Honorable Court to note that

on all the letters sent and attached as annexes by the petitioners

none requested that they be provided with a copy of the

Memorandum of Agreement. As to their position to be heard,

they have already aired their position to the Peace Panel. This is

evident in their own allegations in par 15 to 17 complaint in GR

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183591.

Their sentiment did not fall on deaf ears as the MOA-AD has a provision

that requires a plebiscite. Those affected will have their opportunity to be heard. If

there is anyone remiss in their duty to inform their constituents it is the

representatives of Zamboanga who early on were shown draft copies. They could

have easily made efforts to reproduce copies thereof and inform their people.

Even assuming arguendo that petitioners rights to information was violated,

this issue has become moot and academic when public respondents statutory

counsel, Solicitor General, complied with the resolution of this Honorable Court by

furnishing the latter and the parties with copies of the MOA.

III. Whether public respondents acted with grave

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess

of jurisdiction when public respondents allegedlyfailed to conduct public consultation and hearings

prior to the signing of the MOA-AD between the

respondents and the MILF.

This issue must be resolved in the negative.

A. The MOA-AD, as the product of the GRP-MILF Peace Process that

seeks to resolve a centuries-old conflict contain provisions for the ultimate type of

public consultation, i.e., plebiscite.

The MOA-AD clearly provides that:

TERRITORY

2. x x x

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d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior

agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using

all possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the

signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as

enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached

herein (the Annex). The Annex constitutes an integral part of this

framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to

complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding issues on the

Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing

of the MOA-AD.

Based on the above provisions, it is clear that the people themselves, in their

sovereign capacity, will be asked to decide on the MOA-AD. It must be added that

the issue on the acceptability of the MOA-AD to the people is an inherently

political question.

Further, the MOA-AD likewise does not expressly seek to contravene any

existing law. Where its provisions do not appear to be consistent with existing

law, then the MOA-AD will not take effect unless and until the appropriate

changes to the legal framework is accomplished. This changes, considering that it

will have to be undertaken either through legislation or constitutional amendments,

are likewise political questions and constitute the ultimate form of consultation.

Thus, the MOA-AD states:

GOVERNANCE

7. The parties agree that that mechanisms and modalities for the

actual implementation of this MOA shall be spelt out in the

Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to

occur effectively.

Any provision of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the

existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a

Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to

the legal framework with due regard to nonderogation of prior

agreement and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the

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Comprehensive Compact.

B. On the contrary, it is the Petitioners who would deprived the

people of the opportunity to participate in the consultations which they accuse the

Respondents of denying.

Had it been signed, the MOA-AD would have set off a series of events

including the holding of a plebiscite in the affected areas. By seeking to prevent

the signing of the MOA-AD, the Petitioners in effect are seeking to prevent the

holding of a plebiscite which would have been the ultimate opportunity for the

people to be consulted and decide upon the MOA-AD. In other words, by seeking

an injunction on the signing, the Petitioners now arrogate upon themselves the

power to decide on behalf of the sovereign people.

Closing Statement

The Conflict has been going on for the past five centuries. For the past four

decades, it has produced more than one hundred thousand deaths and millions of

refugees. The total tangible and intangible costs the Philippines has had to bear

because of this Conflict is immeasurable.

This is the Conflict which the valiant men and women of the GRP and MILF

Peace Panels are trying to resolve. Although they have not been lacking in

obstacles and the peace process has not had a dearth of critics, yet they prodded.

Finally, after twelve years of continuously working for a peaceful negotiated

resolution of the conflict, they arrived at the MOA-AD which they hope addressesthe roots causes of the conflict.

Thus, rather than throw another obstacle to this tremendous task of

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transcendental importance which they have imposed upon themselves, the Peace

Panels deserve commendation.

Lastly, intervenors wonder where is the logic in the argument that a peace

agreement is bad for peace when it should be the opposite. Clearly, an aborted

peace agreement and peace process will further set us back in our journey to peace.

As can be seen in the events that followed the cancellation of the MOA-AD

signing,19 the lack of logic in the consolidated petitions is clear. If at all, it is the

Filipino people and the peace process, nay peace itself, itself that has suffered from

the TRO. Intervenors hope that the damage is still repairable.

Prayer

WHEREFORE, premises considered, intervenor most respectfully pray for

the Honorable Court to:

1. Immediately lift the temporary restraining order issued by the Supreme

Court on 04 August 2008 for lack of legal and factual basis, and being moot

and academic;

2. Deny the petitioners prayer for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus, forlack of statutory and factual basis;

3. Deny the petitioners prayer for the issuance of Writ of Prohibition, for their

failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and for lack of statutory and

factual basis;

Other relief and remedies just and equitable under the circumstances are

19 See, for example, the fighting in North Cotabato that already produce 160,000 refugees.Inquirer Online, Humanitarian Crisis Looms in North Cotabato , athttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fighting.

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http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fightinghttp://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view/20080812-154136/Humanitarian-crisis-looms-in-N-Cotabato-over-fighting


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likewise most respectfully prayed for.

Respectfully filed. San Juan City for Manila, 12 August 2008.

MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC.

Suite 703, Jafer Placce Building, No. 19 Eisenhower St.

Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila

By:

ATTY. MUSA I. MALAYANG

Intervenor

IBP#694198, 5-21-2007

CALMANA CHAPTER

PTR #9303761, 7-18-2007

Roll No. 30632

ATTY. CARIM L. PANUMPANG

Intervenor

IBP# 03104, Lifetime

MANILA III CHAPTER

Roll No.29501

ATTY. RASOL Y. MITMUG, JR.

IntervenorIBP#06790, Lifetime

COTABATO CHAPTER

PTR#9976993, 1-20-2008

Roll No.54196

VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION

I, MUSA I. MALAYANG, under oath, respectfully states:

That I am the Secretary General of the Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation,

Inc.

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And upon deliberation of the subject petitions, we agreed to join as

intervenor, and accordingly cause the preparation of the foregoing Comment-in-

Intervention;

That we have read all the allegations of the said Comment-in-Intervention

which are true and correct of our personal knowledge.

Further, we hereby certify that we have not filed any similar action before

the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or any division thereof, or before any

tribunal or agency involving the same cause of action; that in case we discover

later on of a similar case filed before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals orany division thereof, or before any tribunal or agency, we undertake to inform the

Honorable Court of such action within five (5) days from gaining knowledge

thereof.

MUSA I. MALAYANG

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me a notary public, for and in

Quezon City, this _____ day of August , 2008, affiant exhibited to me his

Community Tax Certificate No.01363710 issued on April 23, 2008 at Manila.

Notary Public

Doc. No. _____Page No. _____

Book No. _____

Series of 2008.

NOTIFICATION

The Clerk of Court

Supreme Court

G R E E T I N G S:

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Please submit the foregoing Comment-in-Intervention upon receipt thereof

to the Honorable Court or its kind consideration and approval, without further

argument.

MUSA I. MALAYANG

Copy furnished:

Atty. ISRAELITO P. TARREON Registry Receipt No. _________

Counsel for Petitioners in GR No. 183591 Date : ___________

Torreon De Vera-Torreon Law Firm

2nd Floor, Torreon Building

1011 Washington St., Davao City

Atty. NORBERTO PATRIARCA Registry Receipt No. _______

Office of the City Legal Officer Date : ____________

City Government of ZamboangaCounsel for Petitioners in GR No 183752

2nd Floor City Hall NS Valderos St

7000 Zamboanga City

Office of the Solicitor General Registry Receipt No. _______

134 Amorsolo St Date : _____________

Legazpi Village

1229 Makati City

Explanation

The copies of the Comment-in-Intervention were furnished to the above-

parties by registered mail since personal service is not practical due to distance

and lack of messengerial service to effect personal service.

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