46 ARMY � September 2010

General of the ArmyGeorge C. Marshall

From left: LTGWilliam H. Simp-son, commandinggeneral, Ninth U.S.Army; MG Troy H.Middleton, com-manding general,

VIII Corps; and MGDonald Stroh, com-manding general,

8th Division.

Then-MG Alexander M. Patch

Photographs: U.S. Army

By COL James Scott WheelerU.S. Army retired

OL Cole C. King-

seed’s article in the

December 2009

ARMY, “Marshall’s

Men,” provides an

excellent discussion

of GEN George C. Marshall’s

“uncanny ability to identify

and develop commanders

who displayed ‘aggressive

and determined leadership’ in

the conduct of their duties.”

Marshall identified, promoted

and nurtured an amazing

number of fine Army

leaders during his six

years as Chief of Staff

of the Army (1939–1945).

September 2010 � ARMY 47

Above, LTG Lesley J. McNair,commanding general of U.S.Army Ground Forces. Left,then-MG Courtney H. Hodges.

GEN JacobL. Devers

Most of these officers came to Mar-shall’s attention before he becameChief of Staff, and their names wereentered in a “black book” that he re-portedly kept in his desk drawer inthe War Department. As the Army ex-panded from 174,000 men in 1939 tomore than 8 million by 1943, Mar-shall’s most important task was to se-lect the general officers needed tocommand, sustain and lead this force in battle.The “Marshall men” mentioned in Kingseed’s article

were Dwight D. (Ike) Eisenhower, Joseph Stilwell, OmarN. Bradley, Mark W. Clark, George S. Patton, Terry de laMesa Allen, Matthew B. Ridgway, Maxwell D. Taylor, J.Lawton Collins and Walter Bedell Smith. Stilwell, Clarkand Patton commanded armies, and Bradley commandedthe 12th Army Group under Eisenhower, the Supreme Al-lied Commander. All of these leaders contributed im-mensely to the success of the Allies. A few of Marshall’spicks did not work out, as was the case with Lloyd Freden-dall and John Lucas. Nonetheless, Marshall usually foundthe right leaders and put them into the right assignments.This was one of his greatest contributions to Allied victory.Kingseed’s article, however, did not mention several of

the most important of Marshall’s picks for high command.William H. Simpson, Courtney H. Hodges and AlexanderM. Patch all commanded Americanarmies. Lesley J. McNair commandedthe Army Ground Forces, and Jacob L.Devers commanded the 6th ArmyGroup in France. These are “Mar-shall’s forgotten men.”It is useful to expand our under-

standing of how George Marshall identified promisingleaders. Most historians mention that Marshall metroughly 200 of the men he promoted to command divi-sions, corps and armies while he was the assistant com-mandant at the U.S. Army Infantry School. This list promi-nently includes Stilwell, Bradley, Hodges and Allen.Marshall’s Infantry School years, however, were in someways the culmination of a selection process that beganmuch earlier.Marshall came to know of many of his future picks

while he served in France with the American Expedi-tionary Forces (AEF) in 1917–19. As the operations officerof the 1st Infantry Division, Marshall worked with Patch,McNair, Clarence R. Huebner and Teddy Roosevelt Jr. Inthe stress of battle, Marshall assessed the qualities of thesecombat leaders. Later, as operations officer of First Army,Marshall learned of combat leaders such as Simpson, Pat-

ton, Clark, Allen and Hodges. Thesewere some of the original Marshallmen.Marshall also learned about the dif-

ficulty of winnowing out senior lead-ers who could not accomplish theirmissions. As he wrote in his bookMemoirs of My Services in the WorldWar, 1917-1918, “The development ofthe American Expeditionary Forceswas marked by a series of personaltragedies suffered by officers assignedimportant tasks and who … were un-able to produce the desired result. …But war is a ruthless taskmaster, de-manding success regardless of confu-sion, shortness of time and paucity oftools. … The hurly-burly of the con-flict does not permit commanders todraw fine distinctions; to succeed, theymust demand results … and drive

48 ARMY � September 2010

COL James Scott Wheeler, USA Ret.,served in the Army for 30 years. He haspublished four books including, most re-cently, The Big Red One: America’sLegendary 1st Infantry Divisionfrom World War I to Desert Storm.Currently, he is writing a biography ofGEN Jacob L. Devers. COL Wheeler’sArmy service included a combat tour inVietnam, command of a tank battalionin Germany, and 12 years on the per-manent history faculty of the U.S. Mili-tary Academy.

From left, LTG Hodges, commander of theFirst U.S. Army; then-LTG Omar N.

Bradley, commander of the 12th ArmyGroup; and then-LTG George S. Patton Jr.,

commander of the Third U.S. Army.

LTG William H. Simpson

September 2010 � ARMY 49

subordinates beyond what would ordinarily be consideredthe limit of human capacity. Wars are won by the side thataccomplishes the impossible.”Marshall’s appreciation for the kind of combat leaders

needed by a modern army to win wars came from his per-sonal experiences and observations of war. The men whosenames he entered into his black book from the AEF hadhelped accomplish the seemingly impossible task of turn-ing raw conscripts into capable soldiers in 1917–18. Mar-shall never forgot them.During the interwar years, Marshall served as GEN John

J. Pershing’s aide while he was Army Chief of Staff(1921–24). This brought Marshall into contact with men likeEisenhower, who worked on the American Battle Monu-ments Commission. Marshall also had close relationshipswith the two Chiefs of Staff succeeding Pershing: John L.Hines (1924–26) and Charles P. Summerall (1926–30). Evenwhile he was commanding the 15th Infantry Regiment inTientsin, China, in the 1920s, Marshall stayed in touch withPershing, Hines and Summerall, and certainly heard aboutthe best and brightest officers they knew. His five years asassistant commandant of the Infantry School brought himinto contact with many more promising officers. By then,Marshall knew many of the men who would hold seniorcommands in the Army in World War II. During the twoyears before the United States entered the war, Marshalladded others to his list of men whom he believed could getthings done regardless of confusion, shortness of time andpaucity of tools.

A look at two of the most important of Marshall’s forgot-ten men, McNair and Devers, rounds out the picture ofhow Marshall selected and nurtured senior leaders. Thesemen contributed immensely to American success and wereamong the most important of his senior leaders. Unfortu-nately, their service, and that of the other forgotten Mar-shall men, is unknown to most Americans.Lesley McNair was an artilleryman who served in the

Mexican expedition in 1916 and in the 1st Infantry Divi-sion with Marshall in World War I. McNair was theyoungest brigadier general in the war, and Marshall knewthat he got results. During the interwar period, McNairhelped to transform and modernize American artillerydoctrine and practice while serving as the assistant com-mandant at the Army Field Artillery School (1929–1933). In1939, Marshall turned to McNair to direct the Commandand General Staff College and modernize its instruction.When mobilization began in 1940, Marshall entrusted

McNair with the daunting task of organizing a generalheadquarters and then, in 1942, with transforming that or-ganization into the Army Ground Forces, whose mission itwas to organize, equip and train the rapidly expandingArmy. McNair shouldered some of the greatest responsi-bilities of Marshall’s men. The results were impressive, asthe ground forces grew to 90 divisions and more than 4million men. McNair had Marshall’s full confidence andrelieved the Chief of Staff of incredible burdens. Unfortu-nately, McNair did not live to see the final results; he waskilled in combat in July 1944.

Then-LTG Devers(right), DeputySupreme AlliedCommander, re-ceives the KnightCommander of theOrder of the Bathfrom King GeorgeVI of England dur-ing his visit to theMediterraneanTheater in 1944.Vice Admiral H.Kent Hewitt, U.S.Navy, center, alsoreceived an award.

McNair brought Jacob Devers toMarshall’s attention in 1939. Deversgraduated from the U.S. MilitaryAcademy at West Point in 1909 andjoined McNair’s battery in the 4thField Artillery in Wyoming. The twoofficers worked together for threeyears, forming a close bond. Deversthen served in one of the Army’s firstmotorized artillery units in Hawaiibefore joining, in 1917, the faculty ofwhat later became the Field ArtillerySchool. Like Eisenhower and Bradley,Devers did not serve overseas duringWorld War I. Instead, he trained ar-tillery units for service in France. During the interwaryears, Devers served at the Military Academy and the Ar-tillery School, where he demonstrated that he knew how tocut through red tape and get things done. In 1939, Deverswas assigned as Chief of Staff of the Panama Canal Depart-ment. Marshall observed his work firsthand during inspec-tion tours. In mid-1940, Marshall promoted Devers tobrigadier general—the youngest at the time—and assignedhim to command the Provisional Brigade in the District ofColumbia. Devers quickly became one of Marshall’s “firebrigade” troubleshooters, working on special assignmentsfor the Chief. Marshall was very impressed with Devers’work. In October 1940, when Marshall needed a majorgeneral to train the 9th Infantry Division and to build FortBragg, N.C., he selected Devers. As Marshall noted in a let-ter to MG Daniel Van Voorhis, “Devers … is now a Divi-sion Commander, and making a fine job of it. We want tofind more men of the same type, and I am willing to godown the list quite a way to get them.” Jacob Devers dis-played the energy, initiative, organizational ability andruthlessness that Marshall knew were essential for success-ful senior leaders.Marshall continued to recognize Devers’ potential for

higher command and, in 1942, promoted him to lieutenantgeneral and entrusted him with command of the ArmoredForce at Fort Knox, Ky. Devers was instrumental in thefielding of the Sherman tank, the creation of 13 new ar-mored divisions and the development of the amphibioustruck known as the Duck (DUKW). Devers and McNairworked closely and successfully on doctrinal and organi-zational issues concerning the creation of a balanced fieldforce. As Marshall told Devers, “I congratulate you onyour ability to get things done, and I send my personalthanks for your highly efficient manner of doing them.Only the vast importance of the Armored Force program

has barred you, for the present, from employment in activeoperations.”In May 1943, Marshall selected Devers to take over

Eisenhower’s position as commanding general, EuropeanTheater of Operations. Over the next seven months, Dev-ers supervised the buildup of American forces in theUnited Kingdom and played an active role in the strength-ening of the Eighth Air Force. Marshall appreciated hisdrive and energy, and his efforts to keep the preparationsfor Operation Overlord—the D-Day assault—on track. De-vers hoped to play a role in Overlord but was disap-pointed when Roosevelt selected Eisenhower to commandthe operation. Eisenhower, in turn, turned down Mar-shall’s offer of Devers as an Army or Army group com-mander, instead opting for Bradley and Hodges, whomEisenhower knew from the Mediterranean, where he hadbeen commander.In December 1943, Marshall put Devers in Eisenhower’s

old job as commanding general of the North African The-ater and as the deputy Allied commander in the Mediter-ranean. In a January 1944 diary entry, Devers recognizedthe enormous challenges facing him.

We seem from preliminary survey to be extravagant in per-sonnel in certain spots and very short in others. From theFifth Army front, there seem to be too many cases of exhaus-tion, running into something like 75,000, with a very slowturnover and return to duty. … In addition, there is TroyMiddleton, an excellent officer, sitting around doing nothing;Patton, relieved of his command, with no instructions; Clarkassigned two jobs. This should be straightened out in thenext 48 hours.

Devers worked closely with the War Department to im-prove the replacement situation in the Mediterranean and

50 ARMY � September 2010

Then-MG Bradley describes a maneuver of the Third Army in

Louisiana to LTG McNair in 1942.

to get Mark Clark’s Fifth Army divi-sions back up to authorized strength.Marshall also depended on Devers torein in British ambitions to expand thescope of operations in the Mediter-ranean, which Marshall feared wouldweaken or delay Overlord. By mid-1944, Devers had earned the dislike ofWinston Churchill as he preparedSeventh Army for Operation Anvil,the invasion of southern France, bymoving American service troops fromItaly to the new operation. He alsorecommended Alexander Patch tocommand Seventh Army and ensuredthat Lucian Truscott remained in thetheater when Eisenhower attemptedto raid the Mediterranean for more combat-proven gener-als. In this last endeavor, he did not endear himself to Ike.When Marshall created a new Army group to command

the Seventh U.S. and First French Armies in France in July1944, Devers asked for assignment as commanding gen-eral. Marshall, after clearing it with Ike, assigned the SixthArmy Group to Devers. The forces of the Sixth ArmyGroup pulled off a nearly flawless invasion of southernFrance in August and, by November 1944, were the firstAllied armies to reach the Rhine River. When Devers sawan opportunity to cross the Rhine, Eisenhower halted theeffort, further souring relations between the SupremeCommander and his senior American subordinate. In earlyJanuary 1945, the two generals again clashed over how torespond to the German Nordwind offensive. Devers re-sisted abandoning more than 500,000 French civilians inand around Strasbourg to reoccupation by the Germans.Eisenhower relented only after the French government re-fused to abandon Alsace without a fight.Devers also shouldered the difficult task of commanding

a French Army in his Army group. He dealt diplomatically,yet firmly, with Gen. Charles de Gaulle and Gen. Jean deLattre de Tassigny, two of the most brilliant and difficult ofthe French leaders. Devers spared Eisenhower from havingto work directly with the French, something at which Ikedid not particularly excel.In January 1945, Marshall asked Eisenhower for his rec-

ommendations for the commanders who should be se-lected for four-star rank. Eisenhower ranked Bradley and

Carl A. Spaatz well ahead of Devers. Marshall saw thingsdifferently and selected Devers ahead of Bradley, Spaatz,and Patton for promotion to full general. In the summer of1945, Devers was selected to command the Army GroundForces for the last four years of his service.Jacob Devers was outside of Marshall’s AEF and In-

fantry School acquaintances. As an artilleryman, he owedhis opportunity for promotion in 1939 to McNair. Hequickly proved that he was exactly the kind of seniorleader the Chief of Staff needed. His elevation shows thatMarshall was comfortable reaching beyond his immediatepool of potential senior leaders. Marshall also understoodthe need to protect generals such as Devers—who wereoutside of Eisenhower’s clique—from Ike’s weakness ofworking comfortably only with his own men. Devers wasa very successful Army group commander and loyallyserved under Eisenhower, even though Ike never warmedto him. After the war, Devers chose not to write a memoir,which has accounted in part for his current obscurity. Hecertainly was a preeminent Marshall man.When we study World War II, we need to pay a lot more

attention to men like Devers, McNair and Patch. They il-lustrate the depth of Marshall’s brilliance at selecting se-nior leaders who resolutely dealt with the daunting tasksthe Army faced. Devers’ service as an Army group com-mander provides particularly valuable lessons for ourArmy today, since he alone worked closely and success-fully with allies who spoke a different language and camefrom a different culture. �

52 ARMY � September 2010

On May 5, 1945, LTG Patch, command-ing general, Seventh U.S. Army, meets

Gen. Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt,former commander of the German army,

who was captured by the U.S. 36th Infantry Division on May 1.