geuss--liberalism and its discontents

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Liberalism and Its DiscontentsAuthor(s): Raymond GeussSource: Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), pp. 320-338Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072588

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LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

RAYMONDGEUSSUniversityof Cambridge

Agentsin contemporaryWestern ocieties find themselvesin an odd situ-ation. On theonehand,we seem tohavenorealisticalternativeo liberalism;that s, we knowof no otherapproacho humansocietyandpoliticsthat s atthesametime as theoreticallyrich andcomprehensiveas liberalismandalsoeven remotelyas morallyacceptableto wide sections of the population nWestern ocieties,astheyarenowinfact constituted.'Liberal deaspermeateour social worldandoureverydayexpectationsabouthowpeopleand nstitu-tionswill andoughtto act;theyconstitute he finalframeworkwithin whichourpoliticalthinkingmoves. Prima acie nonliberal orms of habitualbelief,such as those associatedwith certainreligions,formsof nationalism, esidualclass enmities,and so on, still, of course, exist, buttheyseem to be, atbest,isolated andlocalised foreignbodies in a universe,the overall structureofwhich is essentiallyliberal; n societies thatareor areaspiring o be 'West-ern',even these nonliberaldeologicalfragments ometimesadoptprotectivecolouration n the form of the best veneer of compatibilitywith liberalismtheycan muster.

Onthe otherhand,therearesigns of a significant heoretical,moral,andpoliticaldisaffection with some aspectsof liberalism.Liberalismhas for alongtimeseemed to lack much nspirational otential;t is goodatdissolvingAUTHORSNOTE:This ext s a revisedversionofan articleI wrote n Germanandpublished nDecember2001 in theDeutscheZeitschrift ir Philosophieunderthe title 'Das UnbehagenamLiberalismus'.Theoriginal Germanarticle in turnwas the contentof a series of three talksIgave at the Universityof Saarbriicken n December 2000. My thanksto Professor WilfriedHinschof Saarbriickenfor hekind nvitation ospeakthere,and also to thecolleagues in Cam-bridgewithwhomI have discussed this topicmost requently,JohnDunn,ZeevEmmerich, ndQuentinSkinnerI also owea greatdebtofgratitude oHilaryGaskinand to thetwoanonymousreaders or this ournal whohelpedme to correctseveral mistakesandsignificantly mprove heoriginal Germanversionof the essav.POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 30 No. 3, June2002 320-338? 2002 Sage Publications320


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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 321

traditionalmodesof life andtheirassociatedvalues,but less obviously goodatreplacingthemwithanythingparticularlydistinctiveor admirable.2 t fitsall too comfortablywith some of the more ignoble aspectsof commercialsociety. What contributioncould liberalismconceivablymake to thinkingabout the general degradationof the planetaryenvironment?Liberal dealslike individualism, oleration,orlimitationof statepower,seemeithershort-sightedlyconfused or mere covers for hegemonic designs. As the Harvardpoliticalscientist SamuelHuntingdonnotoriouslywrote,'What s universal-ism tothe West s imperialism o therest' 3Oldercriticismsof liberalismhavealso lost none of theirpowerandplausibility: hat t hasno clearremedyforpoverty, orreprehensibleormsof inequalityof power,of conditionsof life,and so on. To the extent to which liberalism s committed o theprinciplesofindividual nitiativeandthe defence of privateproperty,t is hard o avoid thesuspicionthat t is ratherpartof theproblem hanpartof the solution. Politi-cal theories, however, which, like liberalism,are deeply anchored in thesocial institutions,the mentality,and the form of life of largeandwealthypopulationscannoteasily be shifted by even the most vigorous forms ofintentionalhumanaction.Thisinertiaeven in the face of massive andtellingcriticism s notmerelythedisreputable esult of the brutepowerof thepast;rather, n an uncertain,dangerous,andunpredictableworld there aregoodgeneralreasons not to embarkon radicalchangesin one's social formationunless one is forced to it by demonstrableoverwhelmingnecessity.The title of this essay is modelledon that of a late essay by Freud.4ForFreudwe modems are condemned to suffer fromcultural mperativesandregulations hatdo not allow us to lead a biologically fulfillinglife, butthatwe arealso not able simplyto throw off. 'Discontent'withcivilisationis anunavoidableate,giventheincompatibilitybetween ourbiology andthe nec-essarydemandsof anyform of specificallyhumansociety,andFreud hinksthat t is strictly mpossibletodoawaywith italtogether;he bestwe can do istryto mitigatesomeof its worst effects.Incontrast o this,thediscontentwefeel with liberalism s of a different ype, if only becausewe canbe sure thatchangesin the world aroundus, in ourpolitics,our social arrangements, ureconomic circumstances,or perhapssimplyan improvementn ourpowersof theoreticalmagination,will sooneror laterdissolve liberalismandrenderit as irrelevanto us as feudalismortheoriesof moralitybased on honour. nthe meantime,though,we are stuck with a politicaland social regimeand aset of associated doctrineswhose deficiencies arepalpable.Historically,iberalism s an inventionof the nineteenth entury.5Liberal'wasoriginallya wordused todesignateapoliticalparty;t seems tohave beenused for the first time in about 1810-11 to referto a groupin Spainwhosemembersadvocateda limitationof theprivilegesof thekingand heintroduc-


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322 POLITICALTHEORY June2002

tion of a constitutionalmonarchyonthe Britishmodel.Expost,alegitimisingprehistory of liberalism is constructed in which Spinoza, Locke,Montesquieu,Adam Smith,and others are made to featureprominentlyastheoreticalprecursors. ince at the latestthe middleof the nineteenth entury,then, 'liberalism'refers both to a relativelyabstract heoreticalstructure-acollection of characteristicarguments, deals, values, concepts-and to asocialreality,apoliticalmovement hat s at leastpartiallynstitutionalisednorganisedparties.Janus-facedhistoricalphenomenaof thiskind thatencom-passbothconceptualor theoreticalelements and real social forcespose spe-cial difficulties for traditional orms ofphilosophy.Since its beginning,phi-losophy has oriented itself primarilyon the analysis and evaluation ofrelativelywell-definedarguments,butthestrugglebetweencompetingpolit-icalgroups s nota seminardiscussion.Questionsof definitionandof purelytheoretical onsistencyareoften not the most relevantonestoaskinpolitics.6

IIClassicalliberalism s best understoodas a negativephenomenon,a reac-tionagainstcertainevents,theories,and social andpoliticaltendencies nthelateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies hatearlyliberals dentifiedas

especiallydangerous.7naddition, his was a twofoldreaction,a kind of waron two fronts. In one direction,as it were, vis-a-vis the past, liberalismopposes absolutismandalso the cameralist dea that the state had thedutyandtheright o carefor thepositivewell-beingof its members n an extensivesense. In the otherdirection,facing the future,classical liberalismstronglyrejectstheexaggeratedmoralisationof politicsthat t sees as propagatedbythe FrenchRevolutionaries.The ideological precursorsof liberalism n theeighteenthcenturywere staunchopponentsof thesubordinationf politicstotheology,andto the extent to which an absolutistethicssimply stepsinto theplacethatnow discredited heologyonce occupiedin thepoliticalandsocialspherewithoutchangingtheexistingstructures,t too becomesanappropri-ate object of liberal criticism. Rousseau's theory of the republic as theembodimentof aunitarygeneralwill opensupahighlyinsalubrious, pecifi-cally modernpossibility,thatof clothing politicaldecisionswith the mantleof anunlimited,secularmoralauthority.Kant'sattempt o groundpoliticsona nonnaturalistategoricalethics is understoodby liberalsas a parallelphe-nomenon and correspondinglycondemned. Thus, for the early liberalBenjamin Constant, Robespierre's 'republique de la vertu et de la terreur' isa natural utcomeof takingRousseau'scentralconceptionsat facevalue,and


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Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITSDISCONTENTS 323

absolutistethics of the Kantian ypeisjustanother, lightlyetiolatedversionof the same basicposition.8Thereare four chief componentsof the classical liberalismof Constant,Mill, andde Tocqueville.First, iberalsassignahigh positivevalue to tolera-tion, as the cardinalvirtue of humansocieties. This is the oldest layerin theliberalsynthesis.Second,liberalsattributepecialnormativemportanceo aparticular ind of humanfreedom.Society should consist as much aspossi-ble of voluntary elationsbetweenpeople,and nparticular,he free assentofthe members s theonly sourceof political authority.Third, iberalsare com-mitted o individualism: societyis good onlyto theextentto which theindi-vidualsin it are well off. Fourth, iberalism s characterisedby a particularkind of anxiety, hefear of unlimited,concentrated, rarbitraryower.Limi-tation of suchpoweris thusalwaysa goal of liberalpolitics.These four ele-ments constitute the political substanceof the traditional iberalism of thenineteenthcentury.Sincemy intention s to start romliberalismas a historicalphenomenon,it is importanto tryas far as possibleto avoidanachronism,hatis, to avoidnarratinghehistoryof liberalism romanend-point n thepresent hat spos-itivelyvalued andassumed eleologicallyas the naturalgoal of thehistoricalprocess. Precisely this kind of anachronisticview seems to me to havebecome increasinglycommon in late twentieth-centuryiberalism, espe-ciallyunder heimpactof the workof JohnRawls.Startingn the later1950s,Rawls'sworkgave impetusto a revival of politicalphilosophy,a disciplinethathadbeenpronouncedmoribundby someof its mostdistinguishedpracti-tionersa few years before, and his early achievement,especially as docu-mentedby TheoryofJustice9 ed to acorresponding ttempt oreinterprethehistoryof liberalismretrospectivelynthelightof hisposition.This had somepeculiarresults,given thatTheoryof Justice(andthe associatedearlywrit-ings)represented significantdepartureromwhat had been the main lineofliberalthinking n a numberof important espects.Firstof all,as thetitle of Rawls'smajorearlywork ndicates,heplacedtheconceptofjusticeat the centreof attention.Since 'justice'for him is thechiefvirtue of a humansociety,it is understandablehat he organiseshis politicalphilosophyarounda 'theoryof justice'. This,however, s arather urprisingdevelopment.To be sure,justice was of great importance o a number ofpaganthinkers n the ancient world-the qualification pagan' s importantherebecause the Paulinestrandof primitiveChristianity nceagaindemotedjustice(andthe 'law')in favourof 'grace' 0-but I think t is fairtosaythatnoparticularaliencyhad been attributedo 'justice' n thepoliticalphilosophyof the modem period.The two originatorsof modem politicalphilosophy,


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324 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002

Machiavelli and Hobbes, set the tone. For Hobbes, security and self-preservationarethebasic politicalvirtuesandthehighestgoals of politics.'Justice' s a mereword,the contentof which is given by the law laiddownbythesovereign; t is thus ahighlyderivativeandnotvery significantphenome-non. Machiavellirecognisesthe varietyof disparategoals thathumanspur-sue and a correspondingvarietyof differentconceptionsof thegood andofthe good life-there is the life of piety,of wealthaccumulation,of politics.Even withinthe realmof politics,apoliticalcommunity s theobjectof praiseon accountof its 'greatness',not itsjustice (in theDiscorsi), and an individ-ual is 'virtuoso'by virtueof beingable to attain ame,honour,glory,praise,and so forth,rather han orbeing 'just' n mattersof the distribution f goodsor the administration f given laws. The theoreticalupshotof the work ofthese two theorists s that ustice is a minorpropertyof subordinate dminis-trativesystemsrather han the chief virtue of a society as a whole, and that'beingjust' is the appropriate efiningcharacter raitof the administrator,functionary, rbureaucratather hanof thepoliticianor citizen.To umpfor-ward by several centuries from Hobbes, Marx, too, treatsjustice as anepiphenomenon.Each socioeconomic formationgenerates heconceptionofjusticeit 'needs'to allowproduction oproceedas smoothlyaspossible,andthisconceptionremainsdependenton and has no standingoutsidethe modeof productionnquestion.This relative heoretical nsoucianceabout hecon-ceptofjusticeis notmerelya general eatureof much of themostinterestingmodempolitical philosophy,but it seems especiallycharacteristic f classi-cal liberalism.Afterall, for Humboldt,Constant,Mill, and de Tocqueville,toleration, freedom,and individualism were focal issues, butjustice waseithercompletely invisible (Constant),or at best a minor side-issue (J. S.Mill), or finallyan objectof some suspicionbecause it could be thoughttopresupposea unitary, entralisingview of society that was a dangerto indi-vidualism Humboldt).Prima acie, it seemshighlyunlikelythat heanalysisof a conceptlike 'justice',which is so highlydependenton shiftingformsofeconomic activityandon historicallyextremelyvariableconceptionsof thegood life, could give one anyrealgraspon thecentralphenomenonof poli-tics. If this is correct, he Rawlsianprojectwasheaded nthewrongdirectionfrom the start,but even if Rawls's reorientationof political philosophyaround heconceptofjusticewas on its ownterms aphilosophically ruitfulmove, it representsa singularlyunfortunateposition from which to try torewritethe historyof liberalism,a movementwhose membersoverwhelm-ingly hadverydifferentconcerns.The second main element in Rawls's early programmewas a remoral-isation of political philosophy. For him, in contrast to most nineteenth-century iberals,politicalphilosophywas 'appliedethics', andthe 'ethics'in


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question s acomplexandoriginalconstruction.Rawls is not in anyinterest-ing sense a Kantianbecause he has no room in his theoryfor such centralKantiandoctrinesasthatof the 'apriori',buthe is alsoatpainstoemphasiseacertaincontinuitybetween his position and Kantianethics, particularlyontwo issues: the centralityof individual 'autonomy'and the priorityof therightto thegood." The characteristic arlier iberalview,however,was oneof great suspiciontoward he intrusionof specificallymoralcategoriesintopolitics, and in particularof principled rejection of the Kantianethics.Rawls's work hadthe curious effect of advancingKant to the positionof akind of patronsaint of liberalism.This is mildlyparadoxical,because Kanthad been seen for most of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesby themain philosophic proponentsof liberalism(Constant,J. S. Mill, I. Berlin;also BenthamandDewey) as an archanti-liberal.Pre-Rawlsian iberals had two mainobjectionsto Kant.Firstof all, theconcept of the a priori,which is structurallyndispensable or all formsofKantianism,s not acceptable o liberals. Kant's abstract onceptionof rea-son(whichcan insomesensebe seen asthe sourceof hisdoctrineof the apri-ori)constitutesanattempt oabsolutiseaccidental ormsof thinking hathap-pento be sociallyimportant tsomeparticularime,andthustofreezehumandevelopmentat some givenlevel. Becausepeopleat a certain imeandplaceallthink hatmurderers houldbeexecuted, hatall formsof tellinganuntruthareintolerable,orthattherightsof propertyareincompatiblewithtaxation,and cannotperhapseven coherently magine any alternatives, hese beliefswill be stylisedas universalprinciplesand circumflexedwiththehyperbolicradianceof the apriori.An aprioriphilosophy s for liberalsa fetteronhumanprogress.A Kantianethics of unvaryinga prioriprinciples s incompatiblewith theopenness, flexibility,andwillingnesstorevise one's view andadapttotherealitiesof thesituationdemandedof liberalpolitics.Second,althoughboth Kant andclassical liberalismare committedto the value of freedom,theirrespectiveconceptionsof freedomareradicallydifferent.Most liberalsare highly suspicious of Kantianfreedom-based-on-reason nd, in fact,stronglysuspectthat his 'positive'conceptionof freedomcan beused tojus-tify forms of totalitarianism.12To avoidanypossible misunderstandingn thispoint,I amcertainlynotclaimingthata Kantian tylephilosophy s absolutely ncompatiblewithanyform of liberalism.Tomake anassertion ikethatwould be to makepreciselyone of themistakesI amsuggesting hat(some)moder liberalsmake,that s,to assumethat here s anessence of liberalismand anessence of Kantianismandthat he two canbecompatibleorincompatible. f 'liberalism'and 'Kant-ianism' are open concepts, it is not excludedthataftera sufficientlylongperiodof time, it mightbe possible thatthe two could be made to converge.


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Similarly,nothingpreventsus fromusingourpresentconceptsanachronisti-callyif we wishtodothat,especiallyif we cangive someplausiblereason orwanting odoit. WhatIdowish toassert, hough, s thatasamatterof factthemajorityof liberal heoreticiansn thenineteenth entury,and a notinsignifi-cantnumber n theearlytwentiethcentury, aw Kantas anopponentof theirbasic projectand that this is a fact that liberals who wish to be Kantiansshouldrecogniseand take some kindof positionon rather hanignoring.Ifthey were wrong,why exactly wereConstant,J. S. Mill, Dewey, and IsaiahBerlinwrongaboutthe compatibilityof Kantianismand liberalism?What-ever the best way forward or liberals in the twenty-firstcentury mightbe,neitherKantnorRawlsprovidesanilluminatingmode of cognitiveaccess tothe historicalphenomenonof liberalism.

IIITopassnow from thehistoryof liberalism o itspresentstate andpossiblefuture,one sometimeshears he claim that iberalismdiffersfromotherpolit-

ical philosophiesthrough ts recognitionof thepluralityof potentiallyvalu-ablemodesof life. This is a highly misleadingassertion.Firstof all, liberal-ism has no monopolyon the praiseof pluralism.Afterall, Marx, too, wasconvincedthat the capitalisteconomic formationmade it possible for indi-viduals to developandparticipaten a wide varietyof diverseforms of life.Second, the multipleforms of life which liberalismrecognises are alwaysassumed to be embedded n anoverridingconsensus thathas a latent moralsignificance.What s distinctiveabout iberalism sn't, therefore, o much tsopennesstopluralismas its view thatall societies should be seen as capableof attaining onsensus,despitea lack of homogeneity nthemanners,beliefs,and habitsof theirmembers.Canone give anyreasonsforadopting his atti-tude towardconsensus?It is not completelyclear what 'consensus'means.The term vacillates betweendescriptiveand normativeuses in a way thatisconfusing.One candistinguish ourkinds of case.Thefirst s thecase of sim-ple empiricalagreement.We are bothstanding n therain,andundernormalcircumstances will assume thatyou too knowit is raining.The second kindof case is that of adaptivebehaviour,conformism,acquiescence,or modusvivendi.Peopledoasothersdo in someparticular reaof life withoutgivingitmuchthought,orbecausetheythinktheymust bow toforce majeure.Thus,certain Islamic groupsin the United Kingdomno longer circumcise theiryoungwomen becausetheydon'twantproblemswiththeBritishpolice andcourts,despitethe factthatthey by no meansagreethattheyshouldgive upthis practicethatthey take,to use the now fashionable argon,to be partly


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Geuss/ LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 327

constitutiveof their 'identity'. They just thinktheyhaveno choice. A thirdgroupof cases concernsformalagreements,as in the paradigmatic ase ofcontracting. n acontractallpartiesexplicitlyaffirm hat heywill behave n acertainway,usuallyby transferring ertainresourcesor performingcertainservices.However,all partiesto a contractneed not haveequally good rea-sons to enter ntoit, andthey certainlyneednothave the same reasons. Twopeople can agreeon state-enforcedvegetarianism,he one for religious,theotherformedical or sociopoliticalreasons.Thefourthpossiblecase of con-sensusis one in which theparticipants ave the same reasonsforagreement.Evenif theagentshave the same reasons oragreeing, t does not follow fromthat actalone that heagreementhasany particular ormative alueor stand-ing.Twothieves canhavethe samereasonsforwanting ocooperate n abur-glary.If one agreesthatincreasing he numberof personsinvolveddoes notchangethestandingof any agreement, t isn't clear thateven the existence ofuniversalconsensus need be anythingmore than one fact amongothers.One standardiberal ine of argumentends to runthe notions of 'consen-sus' that areprominent n these differentcases together.Effective coordina-tion of action s highlydesirable f humansaretosurviveand ive a life anyofthem will find worthliving, but coordinationof actionrequiresthat somekindof at leastminimalandtacitagreementn values and normative oncep-tions exist between thecooperatingparties. f thepartiesdid not sharea largenumber of such values, cooperationwould break down. Therefore,it isclaimed,there exists in everysociety a basic consensusthatcan serveas thebasis on whichfurtheragreements ouldbereached, herebyexpandingevenfurther he human ocialsphere n which freedomandnormativity eacefullyintertwine.From histhe further onclusion s drawn hat t is alwayspossibleandrational or humansto tryreach consensuswith theirfellows, or at anyrate with those withwhomtheymustregularlydeal.13To be moreprecise,there arethree variantsof the liberal thesis. Firstanempiricalversion:in fact, in everyfunctioningsociety thereis, one way oranother,a basic consensus.Second,thepoliticalthesis that t is always possi-ble 'inprinciple' o elaborate he basicconsensuson whichsocial life restssothatpeacefulresolutionof conflictsis possible.The thirdmoralisingvarianthas a strongerand a weakerversion.

Thestrongerasserts hatwe are all in some sense obligedto reachconsen-sus or that t is alwaysrational or us totrytoreachconsensus; he weaker hatit is alwaysa good idea to tryto reachconsensus.Againstthese liberalpositions,MarxistsandNietzscheanscan makecom-mon cause. Nietzsche sees humansociety as a field of potentialand actualconflict,although he 'conflict' nquestionmaynotalwaysbe amatterof fist-icuffs butmayinvolveonly theexchangeof arguments nd witticisms.Inthe


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realworld,Nietzscheargues,anyexisting 'consensus'can be no more thanamomentaryruceentered nto forpragmatic easonsandwith no moral mpli-cations,and to expect anythingmoreis a utopianhope.Marxists n anycase have alwaysbeen of theopinionthat irreconcilableconflict,continuingdisagreement, ndsocial division arethe normal tatesofall formsof societythathave existedupto now.Apparentpublicconsensus smerelythe false (andthin)ideologicalcover that hides a chasmof divisionthat s asdeepandunbridgeable sanythingn the humanworldcanbe. In itsclassic form,Marxism eaches thateveryclass society is divided ntogroupsthat not only have no common good but have diametricallyopposedbasicinterests.What is good for thecapitalists s bad for theproletariat, nd viceversa.Onlya classless societycould lacksociallyentrenchednsolublecon-flicts of interest. ncapitalistsocieties,politics-as-usuals apointlessactivityformembersof theproletariat, ndtheonlysensiblewayto act in thelongrunis activeengagement n the class struggle.Fora varietyof reasons,the aboveanalysisnowadaysseems out of date.The thesis thattheeconomicallyandpoliticallyrelevantstructure f a mod-em societycan be exhaustivelydescribedby the contrastbetweencapitalistsandproletariats no longer plausible.This shouldnot, however,be takentoimplythat iberalconceptionsof socialharmonyand the unlimitedpossibil-ity of peaceful consensus have become any more convincing,because themainproblemof the Marxistanalysisis that it oversimplifies he sources ofconflict anddivisionin the modem world. Insteadof one main contradictionbetween workersandcapitalists,there is an almostunsurveyablevarietyofgroups hatarepotentiallyoractually nconflict with eachother,groups hatin some cases havevery sharplydefined,completely incompatible nterestsand control over considerablepowersand resources.In a given case, it may sometimesbe possible to attainagreementaboutsomepointsof dispute n real orhypotheticaldiscussion. Sometimesthere sneutralgroundora groundconstitutedby sharedbeliefs on to which one canwithdrawto find compromises-sometimes, not always. In every societytherearebothareasof consensus and areasof conflict. Both shouldbeunder-stood naturalistically, nd individuals,social groups,and institutionsmustlearnto deal with both.Naturallywe often-but notalways-have perfectlygoodreasonsfortakingpart n discussion,especiallywhenthealternativesphysicalviolence withopponentswho arestronger hanwe are,but whetherthe reasonswe do (ordo not)havein aparticularase aregood, less good, orridiculouslybadis anempiricalmatter.'4Noneof the three iberal hesesaboutconsensus seems tome atallplausi-ble.Firstof all, it seemsobvious thatmanysocietiesareperfectlywell abletomaintain hemselvesalthough heirmembersdo not takepart n a consensus


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that s inany waynormativelybinding;manypeopleinmanysocietiessimplyputupwithexistingarrangementshat heymustendureasbesttheycan. Sec-ond, the claim thatit is 'in principle'alwayspossible to attainconsensusiscompletelyuninformative ntil oneknows,in more detail thanhas ever beenprovidedby liberals,whatexactly 'inprinciple'means.Furthermore,ven ifthe claimweretrue,why shoulda statementaboutaconsensusthat 'couldbeattained'under some fictive or hypotheticalcircumstanceshave any directrelevance o agivenrealpoliticalsituation?Finally, t is alwaysanopen ques-tionwhetherornot it is agoodidea to enter nto discussionorattempt o reachconsensus.If I am dealingwith a smallgroupof armedfanatics,it is by nomeans clearthatIoughtto arguewith them rather han mmediatelyanduni-laterallydisarming hem. Tobe sure,I will probablyhavevariousreasonsfortryingtodo thiswith as littleuse of forcemyself aspossible,buteven if I useminimalforce I won't be discussing anythingwiththem,anda prioriI can'tknow thatanyparticularevel of applicationof force will be sufficient.

IVWhichparts, hen,of classical liberalismdeserveto be furtherdevelopedand cultivated?In the firstplace the criticismof theocraticconceptionsof

society or, what is another form of the same thing, of absolutist(that is,explicitlyorimplicitlytheocentric) orms of ethics. The Kantianphilosophyis no morethanat best a half-secularisedversionof such a theocraticethics,with 'Reason' n theplaceof God. This doesnot amount o muchmorethanachangeof names.15The purenormative tandpointhat Kant'sethics tries tooccupy,a standpointn which we consideronlythenormatively elevant ea-turesof a possible world, abstractingstrictlyfrom the real world and theempiricalaccidents of concretesituations, s an expressionof whatDeweycalled 'thequestforcertainty'.16nan insecureworld,weak humansstruggleconvulsivelytoreachsomekind of stability; he apriori s anovercompensa-tionin thought orexperiencedhumanweakness.17 his is one of theoriginsof Kant'snotoriousrigidity,his authoritarianevotionto 'principles',andhistendencyto promote ocal habitsof thoughtto constituentsof the absoluteframeworkwithin which alone (purportedly), nycoherentexperiencewaspossible; thus, Euclidean geometry is declared the a priori condition ofhumanexperience,andsadisticremnantsof puritanismbecomedemandsofpurepractical eason.18 lassical iberalismrejectedKant'spracticalphiloso-phy,butperhaps his is not enough. Perhapsone should also rejectthe veryidea of a purenormative tandpoint.


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This mightbe thoughtto be a ratherextremesuggestion.Kantianshavesome human ailingslike everyoneelse; these neednot be thought o reflectnegativelyon thepurenormative tandpoint. s thereanyreasonto thinkthattheveryidea of apurenormative tandpoint mpliestheattempt o absolutiseaccidentalexistinghabits of thought?Rather hantryingto give a directanswerto thisquestion,I would like toapproach t by discussingtwo examples.Both are drawnfrom the work ofJohn Rawls. As I said,Rawls was nevera strictKantian,andas his thoughtdeveloped,he moved furtherandfurtherawayfromcommitment oanyformof purenormativity.This is a further eason ousehimas anexample: f someof the deficiencies inherent n adoptingapurenormative tandpointare visi-ble even in a philosopherwho has moved as farbeyondKant as Rawlshas,this seems to me to give furtherweight to suspicionsabout the normativestandpointas a whole.To startwith the firstexample,in Theoryof Justice,Rawls claims to bedescribing he 'reflectiveequilibrium'hatwouldbe attainedby certain ullyrationalagentswhoengaged ndiscussionundercertain dealisedconditions.This state of reflectiveequilibriums best understoodas a kindof successorto thepurenormativeperspective.Afterall, thepointof one of the main con-structions-the introductionof the 'veil of ignorance'- is precisely toexclude from considerationempirical nformation hatmight prejudice heoverridingnormative orceof theoutcome.Itis, then,extremelystriking,notto sayastounding, o thelay reader hatthecomplextheoreticalapparatus fTheoryof Justice,operating hroughover500 pagesof densely argued ext,eventuates n a constitutionalstructure hatis a virtualreplica(with someextremelyminordeviations)of the arrangementshat exist in the UnitedStates.19 t strainscredulityto the breakingpoint to believe that 'free andrationalagents'(withno furtherqualifications), venif theywerediscussingbehindanartificialveil of ignorance,andassuming hat heyweretoagreeonanythingat all under those circumstances,would light on precisely thesearrangements. omecriticsmightfastenon this as an indicationof the essen-tiallyconservativebias of Rawls's discussion:the theoretical magination semployed not to thinkaboutalternativesto the statusquo, but in order toreproduce t schematically n thought,presenting t as the outcomeof full,free,rationaldiscussion.20 hismightseemgrosslyunfair,givenRawls'sevi-dent intention to produce a work that would have some powerfulredistributivemplications.If, however,one thinks it at all reasonable tojudgewhat is afterall presentedas a political philosophyby its actualpoliti-cal effects, it is hard to see how Rawls's perfectly genuine redistributivehopes could have any chance of being realised-and not merely becauseRawlshas no theoryof politicalaction oragency, although hatis also true.


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The actualeffect of Rawls'stheoryis to undercut heoreticallyanystraight-forwardappeal oegalitarianism.Egalitarianism astheadvantagehatgrossfailureto comply with its basic principles s not difficultto monitor.Thereare, to be sure, well-known and unsettled issues about comparabilityofresourcesand aboutwhetherresourcesarereallytheproperobjectsforegali-tarians o be concernedwith,but therecan be little doubt hat f personA in afully monetarised ociety has ten thousand imes themonetaryresourcesofpersonB, then undernormalcircumstances he two arenot for mostpoliti-cally relevantpurposes 'equal'.Rawls'stheoryeffectivelyshifts discussionawayfrom the utilitariandis-cussion of the consequencesof a certaindistributionof resources,and alsoaway from an evaluationof distributions rom the point of view of strictequality; nstead,hefocuses attentionon acomplexcounterfactualudgment.The questionis not, 'Does A have grossly more thanB?'-a judgmenttowhich within limits it might not be impossible to get a straightforwardanswer-but ratherhevirtuallyunanswerable: WouldB have even less if Ahad less?' One cannot even begin to think aboutassessing any such claimwithoutmakinganenormousnumberof assumptionsaboutscarcityof vari-ous resources,the formthe particular conomy in questionhad,the prefer-ences, and in particularhe incentivestructure, f thepeoplewho lived in it,andunless one had a rather obustanddetailedeconomictheoryof a kind thatfew peoplewill believeanyeconomisttodayhas. In a situationof uncertaintylike this, the actualpoliticalonusprobandiin fact tacitlyshiftsto the have-nots;21he 'haves' ack an obvioussystematicmotivation oargue or redistri-butionof theexcess wealththeyown,orindeedto findargumentso thatcon-clusionplausible.Theydon'tinthe samewayneedtoproveanything; hey,exhypothesi,'have' the resources n question:'Beatipossedentes'.How, however, are the have-nots-or intellectuals speaking in theirname-supposed to makeanargumenthatdependsbothonconvincingoth-ers of the generalplausibilityof Rawls's approachand in additionon whatcannot be more than a highly speculative evaluation of a complexcounterfactual claim? That Rawls's early views have had no realredistributive ffect is not merely a result of the usualdifficultyof imple-mentingpoliticaltheories n the real world.The secondexamplecomes fromRawls's late work On the Lawof Peoples. In this work in which Rawls dis-cusses certainaspectsof internationalelations,he introduces hecategoryofan 'outlawstate',a 'regimethatrefuses tocomplywith areasonableLaw ofPeoples' (p. 90), and writes that 'France,Spain, the Hapsburgs-or, morerecently Germany'were instances of 'outlaw states' (pp. 105f.). 'Outlawstate' is a slightlymore refined variantof the term'roguestate',which hascome tofashionableuse inthe contextof theattemptby the Bush administra-


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tion to justify its missile defence programme,22nd Rawls's claims about'outlaw states'arethephilosophicalpendentof formerU.S. PresidentRea-gan's characterisation f the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire'.At this latepointin his career,Rawls has movedveryfarindeedawayfromKantianism,but this is still the sort of easy-going,butnarrow-minded,moralisation hatsome of the most interestingpolitical theorists of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies-Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche, Freud,Dewey-wished toputan end to andreplacewith morehighlydifferentiatedmodes of dealingwithhistoryandpolitics. ForRawls, it seems a truthtoo self-evident to requirementioningthat Spanish hegemony over Latin America in the eighteenthcenturywas something utterlydifferentfrom and much worse than NorthAmericanhegemonyover the sameregion n theearlytwentiethcentury.TheBritishEmpiredid notalwaysuse kidgloves indealingwithcompetitorsandsubjects,butfor Rawlsitwas,incontrast oFrance,apparently everan 'out-law state'.Italso doesnotseem tooccurtohim evenas an abstractpossibilitythat heUnited Statesmightbe consideredby some an 'outlawstate',despitea historyof annihilationof indigenous populations,slavery,and repeatedmilitary nterventionn CentralAmerica(andelsewhere).It is hardeven forthose of us who belong to the privileged, inherentlynonoutlaw,Anglo-Americanworldto resistthe conclusionthat hispartof Rawls'stheory s sig-nificantlyinfluencedby ethnocentrism.Naturally hereare massive differ-ences betweentheSpanishEmpireof theseventeenth enturyandthe BritishEmpireof the nineteenthcentury-who woulddenythat?It is also true thatpoliticians have a stronginterestin distinguishingas sharplyas possiblebetween theirownpolicies (andthe actualeffectsof these)and those of theiranalogues n other states-what is firmnessof purposewith us is repressionin them.23Nowadays most moder governmentswill have huge staffs ofexperts, awyers,and researcherswho arepaidto seek outgrounds or mak-ing theappropriate istinctionsas vividlyandconvincinglyas possible.Thefact thatoccasionally n someparticularxtremecases one can't findanycon-vincingdifferences s notreallyanargumentor thepoliticalrelevanceof thestrictlynormative tandpoint. nthose extremecases in whichadopting hisstandpointdoes deliver a practicallyuseful answer,we usuallyhave suffi-cient reasons to come to a decisionof avarietyof kinds,and in mostrun-of-the-mill casesnormativity ives us aclear decision thatseemsplausibleonlybecause the analysisthat mustprecedethe normativityudgmentrendersacomplex situationartificiallysimple andperspicuous.This analysis,whicheventuates n thejudgment'thisis murder', this is fraud',and so on, is whatis actually doingthe work.Thehistoricalstruggleagainst heocracy,absolutism,anddogmatismhasleft behind in liberalisma thickdepositof scepticismnot only vis-a-vis all-


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encompassingworldviews,but also vis-a-vis universalistpoliticaltheoriesofany kind. On this point Constant, Berlin, Popper,and Rorty (and also, ofcourse,Burke)areof one accord.Classical liberalismdid not wish to be anall-encompassing,universalworldview but merely a political programmeaimedateliminating specific social andpoliticalevils.Inits origin,liberalismhad no ambition o be universaleither n the senseof claimingto be validforeveryoneandeveryhumansocietyor in the senseof purportingo give ananswerto all the importantquestionsof human ife.There is no clearly developed single epistemologyfor classical liberalism,but it would seem that a liberal would have to believe that liberal views areeasily accessible to humanswho have no special expertiseor epistemicallyprivilegedposition.The ideal of liberalism s a practicallyengaged politicalphilosophy hat s bothepistemicallyandmorallyhighlyabstemious.That s,atbest,averydifficultandpossiblyacompletelyhopelessproject. t is there-fore notsurprisinghat iberalssuccumbagainandagainto thetemptationogo beyondthelimitstheywouldideallyset themselvesandtryto makeof lib-eralisma completephilosophyof life. Forcomplicatedhistoricalreasons, nthe middle of the twentiethcentury,Kantianismpresented tself as a 'philo-sophicalfoundation' oraversionof liberalism,and iberalsatthat imeweresufficientlyweak andself-deceived(or strongandopportunistic) o acceptthe offer.Evenwith the infusion of asignificantdose of the Kantianphiloso-phy,however,liberalismhas not succeeded in producinga position thatis'universal' n any relevant sense. Neither has it demonstratedan ability toremainfaithfulto its originaltheoreticaland moralabstemiousnesswithoutlosing politicaleffectiveness.Rortyhas made the extremelyastute andimportantobservation hatthea priori,theocentrism even in its attenuated orm as a 'philosophyof rea-son'), the purelynormativestandpoint,anda specific form of the 'spiritofheaviness'24 ll naturallygo together.A consistent iberalismwouldhavetoturn ts backon all of them.

Unfortunately,Rortystronglysuggestsaninterpretationf this observa-tion thatdoes notdojusticetoit,andhe seems to draw romthisinterpretationtwofalseconsequences.Firstof all,Rorty s obviouslykeen topromote ronyas the mostappropriate ttitude or acontemporaryiberal.While, however,it is truethattherejectionof atheocentricview of theworld will mostlikelybringwith it a discreditingof acertainnumberof humanattitudes hatwereclosely associatedwith it-automatic deference to authority,attraction ocertainkinds of solemnity,unctiousness,andobscurantism-irony is nottheonly alternative o piety.Anotheralternatives to adoptan extremelybusi-nesslikeattitude, o identifyoneself fully withvariousprojects n theworld,


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andso forth.Indeed, ookingatthe matterhistorically, herewouldnot seemto be any particular aturalaffinitybetween liberalismandirony.If one con-sidersthemostsignificant ronistsof themoder period-Pascal (inthe 'Let-tresProvinciales'),Swift, Voltaire,Kierkegaard-only Voltaire eemsinanyimportantwayaprecursor f liberalism,and I thinkone would search n vainin thewritingsof themajor iguresof liberalism Humboldt,Constant,Mill)fortracesof irony.Infact,theonly obvious 'ironist'amongthepoliticalphi-losophersof the nineteenth entury s deMaistre,whowasanythingbuta lib-eral.When de Maistre n a famouspassage25eports hat he executionerafterdischarginghis functionreturnshomeina self-satisfiedmood,sayingtohim-self, 'No one can breaka man on the wheel as well as I can', this is anarche-typical nstanceof whatwe usuallycall irony.deMaistre s invitingus heretolook at this situationsimultaneouslyfrom three distinctperspectivesthatconflict. There s thepointof view of the executionerhimself('theonly manwho wearsgloves inchurch'); hepointof view of (post-Beccarian) ommonsense, which finds the executioner(andhis family) repellentand his self-satisfactionnauseous;andfinallythepointof view of God,whosees theexe-cutioneras thenecessarycentralpointof any society,holdingit all togetherand making civilised life possible. 'Ironically', the executioneris (fromGod'spointof view and, therefore,also de Maistre'sto some extent)right,not perhapsrightto be self-satisfied,butrightto glory in the efficient dis-chargeof a dignifiedand commodiousoffice. The examplesof de MaistreandKierkegaard lso show that ronyis notin itself inherently ncompatiblewith a theocentricview of the world.

Rortyto be sure would be unmovedby all this, becausehe is not using'irony' n the normalsense in whichwe use that term-which is admittedlyhard o grasp-but ratherhe is engagedin theprojectof 'usingold wordsinnew senses'26 so as to breakdownexistingvocabularies.Rather, or him anironist s someonewho hasdoubtsabout heexisting'final'vocabularynusein society and 'does not believe thathervocabulary s closerto realitythanothers, that it is in touch with a power not herself'.27 On this use of the term,neitherPlato,de Maistre,norKierkegaard reironists,a consequencethatIthinkRortywould welcome.Nor,although thinkRortywoulddisagreewithme, is Hegel.28Mostoddlyof all,Heidegger urnsout onthisreading obe anironist,a claim thatwill not,I think, mmediatelyrecommendtself toanyonewho has followed theearth-heavyootfallof the Sage of Messkirch hroughanyof his worksand who retainsagraspon anyof the senses 'irony'hashadin Europeanife sinceantiquity.29one of this,again,would botherRorty-of course, breakingdown the old vocabularywill generateparadoxes ikethis,andmy pointingthem outisjust partof mystrategyof being, in Rorty'seyes, conventionalandboring,or of rejiggingthemeaningof 'irony'to suit


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myownpurposes.If, however, irony', nthetraditional r theRortyan ense,is not theonlypossibleattitudewe canadopt f we wantto avoidpiety,andif'irony' n Rorty'ssenseis ratherdifferent romwhatthe traditionwould havecalled 'irony', t is hard oavoidaskingwhywe shouldaccedetoRorty'ssug-gestion. And to answer this in turn,it mightbe useful to think about whatmotivatesRorty omakethissuggestionandwhattheconsequencesof adopt-ingitwouldbe.Thisbringsme tothesecondplacein which he seemstome topointus in thewrongdirection.I thinkhis motivation s to detachus as muchas possible from tryingto approachpolitics theoreticallyand to denigratepoliticalactionin a verysubtle andsophisticatedway.Ironystandsorthogo-nal to anyform of active,practicalengagementwith the world. It is a luxuryof people who do not pressinglyhave to act, the kind of people Rortycallswithadmiration bookish ntellectuals',andwhomhe wishestoencourage ofind self-realisation nprivate ife, notpolitics.30Thisis why it is particularlyimpressivethat Socratesand Kierkegaard,who thoughtthey did in somesense have to act, also allowed themselves to indulge in irony.An 'ironic'execution s eitherno executionat all (buta literaryor theatrical vent),oritisa form of attemptedadditionalmockeryof the victim, or both at the sametime: 'This isJesus,Kingof theJews'.The Christianhinks hat hisis doublyironic,and that thejoke is finallyon Pilate.The liberal who gives up the sanctimoniousnessof the purelynormativestandpointwill perhaps,asRortycorrectlyrecognises,standata certainkindof distanceto somekindsof beliefs, but the attitude nvolvedin this does notseemappropriately apturedbycallingit either'irony'or(anotheroldercon-tender) 'scepticism'. With this, one is returned o the issue from which Istarted,namely,whatattitudewe shouldadopt owardiberalism.Thiscannotbe completely separated rom questionsabout the intentions of liberalismandhowto describethe kinds of attitudes hatare,havebeen,ormight easilybe or have been associated with existingformsof liberalism.Ironywill notallow therightkind of theoreticallyreflective,engaged political practice.Some will (correctly) object that the demand that I made earlier thatanachronismbe avoided s an ideal impossible fully to attain.Of course,theaccount of 'liberalism'I have given is a selective one-an ideal type-thatarises from emphasisingcertain featuresand downplayingothers,and thechoice of what to emphasiseto some extentdependson what I judge to bephilosophically ruitfulandmorallyandpoliticallyvaluable.We all havenoalternativebut to construct hepastin thelightof what we taketo be a viablefuture,but it does not follow from this that all constructionsare equallyenlighteningorthat he usualempiricalanddocumentary tandardsorjudg-ing historical accounts are irrelevant.The anti-Kantianand anti-Rawlsianperspectivehas,in my view,a twofoldadvantage. tis abetterguideto liber-


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alism as a historicalphenomenon, hatis, one thatallowus to attaina fuller,moredetailed,andmore correctunderstandingf itshistory,and t alsoat thesame time providesa more promisingorientation or thinkingand actingpoliticallyin the future.As longasthe realsocial, economic,andpolitical nstitutionsand circum-stances of ourlife do not change,31we cannotexpect to ridourselves com-pletely of our discontent with liberalism.This might, however, even bethought o be avindicationof one strandn theliberal radition,hestrand hatis action-orientedbut reflexively anti-utopianand asserts that no systemeitherof actionorthought s perfect.This shouldhold as much forliberalismasforanything lse. Thiskindof discontent, hen,mightnotnecessarilybe anobjectionbut a sign of thecontinuingvitalityof this tradition.

NOTES1. JohnDunn, WesternPolitical Thought n the Face of the Future,2d ed. (Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993).2. Alastair MacIntyre,After Virtue(London:Duckworth, 1981); FriedrichNietzsche,Jenseits von Gut und Bise, in KritischeStudien-Ausgabe,ed. Giorgio Colli and MazzinoMontanari Berlin:de Gruyter,1980), vol. 5, ?260 andZurGenealogieder Moral in Kritische

Studien-Ausgabe, d. GiorgioColli andMazzinoMontanariBerlin:de Gruyter,1980),vol. 5,Essay II, ?? 11-12.3. SamuelHuntington,The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remakingof the WorldOrder(London:Simon & Schuster,1977), 184.4. SigmundFreud,Das Unbehagen n der Kultur n Studienausgabe,vol. IX (Frankfurt:Fischer,1974).5. See alsochapter2 of myHistoryand Illusion n Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-sity Press,2001).6. See also my Historyand Illusion in Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), 1-13 and69-73.7. I'm particularly nterested n four theoristsas representativesof classical liberalism:Wilhelm von Humboldt(especially his Ideen zu einem versuch,die Grenzendes Staates zubestimmen Stuttgart:Reclam,1967]),BenjaminConstant De la libertechezles moderes, ed.M. Gauchet[Paris:Hachette,1980]), Alexis de Tocqueville(L'ancienrdgimeet la revolution[Paris:Gallimard1967]),andJ. S. Mill ('OnLiberty', n 'OnLiberty'andOtherWritings, d. S.Collini [Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989]).8. See below,footnote 16.

9. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971.10.See, forinstance,AlanBadiou,SaintPaul:Lafondationde l'universalisme Paris:PUF,1997), esp. chapterVII. This element becomes even more prominentin the work of the'Ultrapauliner'GiinterBornkamm,Paulus[Stuttgart:Kohlhammer, 969],24) Marcion,aboutwhom the best work is still Adolf von Harnack,Marcion:Das EvangeliumvomfremdenGott(Leipzig, 1924, reprintedDarmstadt1985).11. See Theoryof Justice,? 40, for the first of these andTheoryof Justice,p. 31 n. 16 andthroughout or the second.


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12. See IsaiahBerlin,FourEssays on Liberty Oxford).13. To be sure,one mustperhapsdistinguishmerelyapparent onsensus,pseudo-consensus,from realvoluntaryagreement,but this is a minorcorrection hatchanges nothingin the basicstructure f the argument.14. See also my Public Goods,Private Goods (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2001), 96-104.15. It was a commonlyheldobjection o Kant nthe lateeighteenthcentury hathiscriticismof traditionalheologywas substantively adical n nameonly.The whole contentof traditionaltheology could be reintroduced imply by renaming t 'Postulatesof Pure PracticalReason'.This was notexactlyfair because not all of traditionalheologywouldsurviveKant'sattack.Alaterversion of basically the same line of thoughtoccurs in Stirner'scriticismof Feuerbach(Stirner,Der Einzigeund sein Eigentum Stuttgart:Reclam, 1967]).Feuerbach,Stirnerclaims,doesn't, as he pretends,radically detheologise religion, he simply uses the words 'humanessence' in placeof the word 'God'. The structure f Feuerbach's heoryand the content of themoral obligations it imposes on individuals,though, remain the same as that of traditionaltheology.16.JohnDewey, TheQuestfor Certainty n JohnDewey: The Later Works 925-1953, ed.JohnBoydston(Southern llinoisPress, 1988),vol. 4; similarthoughts n TheodorAdornoandMax Horkheimer,Die DialektikderAufklarung Frankfurt:Fischer,1969).17. In a complex industrialisedworld,there is a furtherreason for adherence o fixed andrigid generalprinciples: fficiencyandsimplicityof administration. ee my Historyand Illusionin Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), 150-52.18. For Kant as 'gallows-philosopher', ee JacquesLacan,SeminaireVII:L'ethiquede lapsychanalyse Paris:Seuil, 1986),andalsoAdornoandHorkheimer,DialektikderAufklarung.19. Of course it is not at all difficult to see how Americansmightfind it plausiblethatanyrational agents discussing politics under favourable conditions would agree on thesearrangements.20. See Theodor Adorno, Der Positivismusstreit n der deutschen Soziologie (Berlin:Luchterhand, 972) 'Einleitung'; ee alsomy Morality,Culture,andHistory Cambridge:Cam-bridge UniversityPress, 1999), 69-76.21. This is not a logical point.22. See Noam Chomsky,RogueStates(London:PlutoPress,2000).23. Sometimes, of course, politicians have the reverse interest,one in presentingtheirprogrammesas being as like as possible those of some favouredmodel.24. Nietzsche,Also sprachZarathustra.25. Joseph de Maistre,Les Soirees de Petersbourg(Paris:Edition du vieux colombier,1960), 40.26. RichardRorty, Contingency, rony,and Solidarity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress 1989), 78.27. Ibid.,73.28. Hegeldid changehis mind on a numberof thingsduringhis philosophicallyactivelife,but the one thing he never gave up was the commitmentto a form of absolute knowledge(couchedin a finalvocabulary)andalso a rejectionof whathe called 'irony'(whichhe saw asinstantiatedn the workof FriedrichSchlegel).29. Itis, of course,alsothecase thatHeidegger s nota liberal,and s aparadigm f those atti-tudes of willful obscurantism,authoritarianism,ndsanctimoniousness hat liberalismshouldterminate.

30. Rorty,Contingency, rony,and Solidarity,65.


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31. 'Le liberalismen'est evidemmentpas une ideologie ni un iddal. C'est uneforme degouvernementet de "rationalite"gouverementale fort complexe.'Michel Foucault,Dits etecrits,vol. IV (Paris:Gallimard,1994), 36.

RaymondGeuss is a Reader in Philosophyat the Universityof Cambridge;his mostrecent booksare Historyand Illusionin Politics (CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001);PublicGoods,PrivateGoods(PrincetonUniversityPress,2001); and At CrossPurposes(London:HearingEye, 2001).

geuss--liberalism and its discontents

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