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Liberalism and Its DiscontentsAuthor(s): Raymond GeussSource: Political Theory, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Jun., 2002), pp. 320-338Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3072588

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LIBERALISM AND ITS DISCONTENTS

RAYMONDGEUSS

Universityof Cambridge

Agentsin contemporaryWestern ocieties find themselvesin an odd situ-ation. On theonehand,we seem tohavenorealisticalternativeo liberalism;that s, we knowof no otherapproacho humansociety andpoliticsthat s at

thesametime as theoreticallyrich andcomprehensiveas liberalismandalso

even remotelyas morallyacceptableto wide sections of the population n

Western ocieties,astheyarenowinfact constituted.'Liberal deaspermeateour social worldandoureverydayexpectationsabouthowpeopleand nstitu-

tionswill andoughtto act;theyconstitute he finalframeworkwithin which

ourpoliticalthinkingmoves. Prima acie nonliberal orms of habitualbelief,such as those associatedwith certainreligions,formsof nationalism, esidual

class enmities,and so on, still, of course, exist, butthey seem to be, atbest,isolated andlocalised foreignbodies in a universe,the overall structureof

which is essentiallyliberal; n societies thatareor areaspiring o be 'West-

ern',even these nonliberaldeologicalfragments ometimesadoptprotectivecolouration n the form of the best veneer of compatibilitywith liberalism

theycan muster.

Onthe otherhand,therearesigns of a significant heoretical,moral,andpoliticaldisaffection with some aspectsof liberalism.Liberalismhas for a

longtimeseemed to lack much nspirational otential;t is goodatdissolving

AUTHORSNOTE:This ext s a revisedversionofan articleI wrote n Germanandpublished n

December2001 in theDeutscheZeitschrift ir Philosophieunderthe title 'Das Unbehagenam

Liberalismus'.Theoriginal Germanarticle in turnwas the contentof a series of three talksI

gave at the Universityof Saarbriicken n December 2000. My thanksto Professor WilfriedHinschof Saarbriickenfor hekind nvitation ospeakthere,and also to thecolleagues in Cam-

bridgewithwhomI have discussed this topicmost requently,JohnDunn,ZeevEmmerich, nd

QuentinSkinnerI also owea greatdebtofgratitude oHilaryGaskinand to thetwoanonymousreaders or this ournal whohelpedme to correctseveral mistakesandsignificantly mprove he

original Germanversionof the essav.

POLITICALTHEORY,Vol. 30 No. 3, June2002 320-338

? 2002 Sage Publications

320



Geuss / LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 321

traditionalmodesof life andtheirassociatedvalues,but less obviously goodat

replacingthemwith

anythingparticularlydistinctiveor admirable.2 t fits

all too comfortablywith some of the more ignoble aspects of commercial

society. What contributioncould liberalismconceivablymake to thinkingabout the general degradationof the planetaryenvironment?Liberal deals

like individualism, oleration,orlimitationof statepower,seemeithershort-

sightedlyconfused or mere covers for hegemonic designs. As the Harvard

politicalscientist SamuelHuntingdonnotoriouslywrote,'What s universal-

ism tothe West s imperialism o therest' 3Oldercriticismsof liberalismhave

also lost none of theirpowerandplausibility: hat t hasno clearremedyfor

poverty, orreprehensibleormsof inequalityof power,of conditionsof life,and so on. To the extent to which liberalism s committed o theprinciplesof

individual nitiativeandthe defence of privateproperty,t is hard o avoid the

suspicionthat t is ratherpartof theproblem hanpartof the solution. Politi-

cal theories, however, which, like liberalism,are deeply anchored in the

social institutions,the mentality,and the form of life of largeandwealthy

populationscannoteasily be shifted by even the most vigorous forms of

intentionalhumanaction.Thisinertiaeven in the face of massive andtelling

criticism s notmerelythedisreputable esult of the brutepowerof thepast;rather, n an uncertain,dangerous,andunpredictableworld there aregood

generalreasons not to embarkon radicalchangesin one's social formation

unless one is forced to it by demonstrableoverwhelmingnecessity.The title of this essay is modelledon that of a late essay by Freud.4For

Freudwe modems are condemned to suffer from cultural mperativesand

regulations hatdo not allow us to lead a biologically fulfilling life, butthat

we arealso not able simplyto throw off. 'Discontent'withcivilisationis an

unavoidableate,giventheincompatibilitybetween ourbiology andthe nec-essarydemandsof anyform of specificallyhumansociety,andFreud hinks

that t is strictly mpossibletodoawaywith italtogether;he bestwe can do is

tryto mitigatesomeof its worst effects. Incontrast o this,thediscontentwe

feel with liberalism s of a different ype, if only becausewe canbe sure that

changesin the world aroundus, in ourpolitics,our social arrangements, ur

economic circumstances,or perhapssimplyan improvementn ourpowersof theoretical magination,will sooneror laterdissolve liberalismandrender

it as irrelevanto us as feudalismortheoriesof moralitybased on honour. nthe meantime,though,we are stuck with a politicaland social regimeand a

set of associated doctrineswhose deficiencies arepalpable.

Historically,iberalism s an inventionof the nineteenth entury.5Liberal'

wasoriginallya wordused todesignateapoliticalparty; t seems tohave been

used for the first time in about 1810-11 to referto a groupin Spainwhose

membersadvocateda limitationof theprivilegesof thekingand heintroduc-



322 POLITICALTHEORY June2002

tion of a constitutionalmonarchyonthe Britishmodel.Expost,alegitimising

prehistoryof liberalism is constructed in which

Spinoza,Locke,

Montesquieu,Adam Smith,and others are made to featureprominentlyas

theoreticalprecursors. ince at the latestthe middleof the nineteenth entury,

then, 'liberalism'refers both to a relativelyabstract heoreticalstructure-a

collection of characteristicarguments, deals, values, concepts-and to a

socialreality,apoliticalmovement hat s at leastpartiallynstitutionalisedn

organisedparties.Janus-facedhistoricalphenomenaof thiskind thatencom-

passbothconceptualor theoreticalelements and real social forcespose spe-cial difficulties for traditional orms of philosophy.Since its beginning,phi-

losophy has oriented itself primarilyon the analysis and evaluation of

relativelywell-definedarguments,butthestrugglebetweencompetingpolit-icalgroups s nota seminardiscussion.Questionsof definitionandof purelytheoretical onsistencyareoften not the most relevantonestoaskinpolitics.6

II

Classicalliberalism s best understoodas a negativephenomenon,a reac-tionagainstcertainevents,theories,and social andpoliticaltendencies nthe

lateeighteenthandearlynineteenthcenturies hatearlyliberals dentifiedas

especiallydangerous.7naddition, his was a twofoldreaction,a kind of war

on two fronts. In one direction,as it were, vis-a-vis the past, liberalism

opposes absolutismandalso the cameralist dea that the state had the dutyandtheright o carefor thepositivewell-beingof its members n an extensive

sense. In the otherdirection,facing the future,classical liberalismstrongly

rejectstheexaggeratedmoralisationof politics that t sees as propagatedbythe FrenchRevolutionaries.The ideological precursorsof liberalism n the

eighteenthcenturywere staunchopponentsof thesubordinationf politicsto

theology,andto the extent to which an absolutistethicssimply stepsinto the

placethatnow discredited heologyonce occupiedin thepoliticalandsocial

spherewithoutchangingtheexistingstructures,t too becomesanappropri-ate object of liberal criticism. Rousseau's theory of the republic as the

embodimentof aunitarygeneralwill opensupahighlyinsalubrious, pecifi-

cally modernpossibility,thatof clothing politicaldecisionswith the mantleof anunlimited,secularmoralauthority.Kant'sattempt o groundpoliticson

a nonnaturalistategoricalethics is understoodby liberalsas a parallelphe-nomenon and correspondinglycondemned. Thus, for the early liberal

Benjamin Constant, Robespierre's 'republique de la vertu et de la terreur' is

a natural utcomeof takingRousseau'scentralconceptionsat facevalue,and




absolutistethics of the Kantian ypeisjust another, lightlyetiolatedversion

of the same basicposition.8Thereare four chief componentsof the classical liberalismof Constant,

Mill, andde Tocqueville.First, iberalsassignahigh positivevalue to tolera-

tion, as the cardinalvirtue of humansocieties. This is the oldest layerin the

liberalsynthesis.Second,liberalsattributepecialnormativemportanceo a

particular ind of humanfreedom.Society should consist as much aspossi-ble of voluntary elationsbetweenpeople,and nparticular,he free assentof

the members s theonly sourceof political authority.Third, iberalsare com-

mitted o individualism: societyis good onlyto theextentto which theindi-

vidualsin it are well off. Fourth, iberalism s characterisedby a particularkind of anxiety, hefear of unlimited,concentrated, rarbitrary ower.Limi-

tation of suchpoweris thusalwaysa goal of liberalpolitics.These four ele-

ments constitute the political substanceof the traditional iberalism of the

nineteenthcentury.Sincemy intention s to start romliberalismas a historicalphenomenon,

it is importanto tryas far as possibleto avoidanachronism,hatis, to avoid

narratinghehistoryof liberalism romanend-point n thepresent hat s pos-

itivelyvalued andassumed eleologicallyas the naturalgoal of thehistorical

process. Precisely this kind of anachronisticview seems to me to have

become increasinglycommon in late twentieth-century iberalism, espe-

ciallyunder heimpactof the workof JohnRawls.Startingn the later1950s,Rawls'sworkgave impetusto a revival of politicalphilosophy,a disciplinethathadbeenpronouncedmoribundby someof its mostdistinguishedpracti-tionersa few years before, and his early achievement,especially as docu-

mentedby TheoryofJustice9 ed to acorresponding ttempt oreinterprethe

historyof liberalismretrospectivelynthelightof hisposition.This had somepeculiarresults,given thatTheoryof Justice(andthe associatedearlywrit-

ings)represented significantdepartureromwhat had been the main lineof

liberalthinking n a numberof important espects.Firstof all,as thetitle of Rawls'smajorearlywork ndicates,heplacedthe

conceptofjusticeat the centreof attention.Since 'justice'for him is thechief

virtue of a humansociety,it is understandablehat he organiseshis political

philosophyarounda 'theoryof justice'. This,however, s arather urprising

development.To be sure,justice was of great importance o a number ofpaganthinkers n the ancient world-the qualification pagan' s importantherebecause the Paulinestrandof primitiveChristianity nceagaindemoted

justice(andthe 'law')in favourof 'grace' 0-but I think t is fairto saythatno

particularaliencyhad been attributedo 'justice' n thepoliticalphilosophyof the modem period.The two originatorsof modem politicalphilosophy,



324 POLITICALTHEORY June 2002

Machiavelli and Hobbes, set the tone. For Hobbes, security and self-

preservationarethe basic

politicalvirtuesandthe

highestgoalsof

politics.'Justice' s a mereword,the contentof which is given by the law laiddownbythesovereign; t is thus ahighlyderivativeandnotvery significantphenome-non. Machiavellirecognisesthe varietyof disparategoals thathumanspur-sue and a correspondingvarietyof differentconceptionsof the good andof

the good life-there is the life of piety,of wealthaccumulation,of politics.Even withinthe realmof politics,apoliticalcommunity s theobjectof praiseon accountof its 'greatness',not itsjustice (in theDiscorsi), and an individ-

ual is 'virtuoso'by virtueof beingable to attain ame,honour,glory,praise,and so forth,rather han orbeing 'just' n mattersof the distribution f goodsor the administration f given laws. The theoreticalupshotof the work of

these two theorists s that ustice is a minorpropertyof subordinate dminis-

trativesystemsrather han the chief virtue of a society as a whole, and that

'beingjust' is the appropriate efiningcharacter raitof the administrator,

functionary, rbureaucratather hanof thepoliticianor citizen.To umpfor-

ward by several centuries from Hobbes, Marx, too, treatsjustice as an

epiphenomenon.Each socioeconomic formationgenerates heconceptionof

justiceit 'needs'to allowproduction oproceedas smoothlyaspossible,andthisconceptionremainsdependenton and has no standingoutsidethe mode

of productionnquestion.This relative heoretical nsoucianceabout hecon-

ceptofjustice is notmerelya general eatureof much of themostinterestingmodempolitical philosophy,but it seems especiallycharacteristic f classi-

cal liberalism.Afterall, for Humboldt,Constant,Mill, and de Tocqueville,

toleration, freedom, and individualism were focal issues, butjustice was

eithercompletely invisible (Constant),or at best a minor side-issue (J. S.

Mill), or finallyan objectof some suspicionbecause it could be thoughttopresupposea unitary, entralisingview of society that was a dangerto indi-

vidualism Humboldt).Prima acie, it seemshighlyunlikelythat heanalysisof a conceptlike 'justice',which is so highlydependenton shiftingformsof

economic activityandon historicallyextremelyvariableconceptionsof the

good life, could give one anyrealgraspon thecentralphenomenonof poli-tics. If this is correct, he Rawlsianprojectwasheaded nthewrongdirection

from the start, but even if Rawls's reorientationof political philosophy

around heconceptofjustice was on its own terms a philosophically ruitfulmove, it representsa singularlyunfortunateposition from which to try to

rewritethe historyof liberalism,a movementwhose membersoverwhelm-

ingly hadverydifferentconcerns.

The second main element in Rawls's early programmewas a remoral-

isation of political philosophy. For him, in contrast to most nineteenth-

century iberals,politicalphilosophywas 'appliedethics', andthe 'ethics'in




question s acomplexandoriginalconstruction.Rawls is not in anyinterest-

ingsense a Kantianbecause he has no room in his

theoryfor such central

Kantiandoctrinesasthatof the 'apriori',buthe is alsoatpainstoemphasisea

certaincontinuitybetween his position and Kantianethics, particularlyon

two issues: the centralityof individual 'autonomy'and the priorityof the

rightto the good." The characteristic arlier iberalview,however,was one

of great suspiciontoward he intrusionof specificallymoralcategoriesinto

politics, and in particularof principled rejection of the Kantianethics.

Rawls's work hadthe curious effect of advancingKant to the positionof a

kind of patronsaint of liberalism.This is mildlyparadoxical,because Kant

had been seen for most of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturiesby the

main philosophic proponentsof liberalism(Constant,J. S. Mill, I. Berlin;also BenthamandDewey) as an archanti-liberal.

Pre-Rawlsian iberals had two mainobjectionsto Kant.Firstof all, the

concept of the a priori,which is structurallyndispensable or all formsof

Kantianism,s not acceptable o liberals. Kant's abstract onceptionof rea-

son(whichcan insomesensebe seen asthe sourceof hisdoctrineof the apri-

ori)constitutesanattempt oabsolutiseaccidental ormsof thinking hathap-

pento be sociallyimportant tsomeparticularime,andthustofreezehuman

developmentat some givenlevel. Becausepeopleat a certain imeandplaceallthink hatmurderers houldbeexecuted, hatall formsof tellinganuntruth

areintolerable,orthattherightsof propertyareincompatiblewithtaxation,and cannotperhapseven coherently magine any alternatives, hese beliefs

will be stylisedas universalprinciplesand circumflexedwiththehyperbolicradianceof the apriori.An aprioriphilosophy s for liberalsa fetteronhuman

progress.A Kantianethics of unvaryinga prioriprinciples s incompatible

with theopenness, flexibility,andwillingnesstorevise one's view andadaptto therealitiesof thesituationdemandedof liberalpolitics.Second,althoughboth Kant andclassical liberalismare committedto the value of freedom,theirrespectiveconceptionsof freedomareradicallydifferent.Most liberals

are highly suspicious of Kantianfreedom-based-on-reason nd, in fact,

stronglysuspectthat his 'positive'conceptionof freedomcan beused tojus-

tify forms of totalitarianism.12

To avoidanypossible misunderstandingn thispoint,I amcertainlynot

claimingthata Kantian tylephilosophy s absolutely ncompatiblewithanyform of liberalism.Tomake anassertion ikethatwould be to makepreciselyone of themistakesI amsuggesting hat(some)moder liberalsmake,that s,to assumethat here s anessence of liberalismand anessence of Kantianism

andthat he two canbecompatibleorincompatible. f 'liberalism'and 'Kant-

ianism' are open concepts, it is not excluded thataftera sufficientlylong

periodof time, it mightbe possible thatthe two could be made to converge.




Similarly,nothingpreventsus fromusingourpresentconceptsanachronisti-

callyif we wishtodo

that,especiallyif we can

givesome

plausiblereason or

wanting odoit. WhatIdowish toassert, hough, s thatasamatterof factthe

majorityof liberal heoreticiansn thenineteenth entury,and a notinsignifi-cantnumber n theearlytwentiethcentury, aw Kantas anopponentof their

basic projectand that this is a fact that liberals who wish to be Kantians

shouldrecogniseand take some kindof positionon rather hanignoring.If

they were wrong,why exactly wereConstant,J. S. Mill, Dewey, and Isaiah

Berlinwrongaboutthe compatibilityof Kantianismand liberalism?What-

ever the best way forward or liberals in the twenty-firstcentury mightbe,neitherKantnorRawlsprovidesanilluminatingmode of cognitiveaccess to

the historicalphenomenonof liberalism.

III

Topassnow from thehistoryof liberalism o itspresentstate andpossiblefuture,one sometimeshears he claim that iberalismdiffersfromotherpolit-

ical philosophiesthrough ts recognitionof thepluralityof potentiallyvalu-ablemodesof life. This is a highly misleadingassertion.Firstof all, liberal-

ism has no monopolyon the praiseof pluralism.After all, Marx, too, was

convincedthat the capitalisteconomic formationmade it possible for indi-

viduals to developandparticipaten a wide varietyof diverseforms of life.

Second, the multipleforms of life which liberalismrecognises are alwaysassumed to be embedded n anoverridingconsensus thathas a latent moral

significance.What s distinctiveabout iberalism sn't, therefore, o much ts

opennessto pluralismas its view thatall societies should be seen as capableof attaining onsensus,despitea lack of homogeneity nthemanners,beliefs,and habitsof theirmembers.Canone give anyreasonsforadopting his atti-

tude towardconsensus?It is not completelyclear what 'consensus'means.

The term vacillates betweendescriptiveand normativeuses in a way thatis

confusing.One candistinguish ourkinds of case.Thefirst s thecase of sim-

ple empiricalagreement.We are bothstanding n therain,andundernormal

circumstances will assume thatyou too knowit is raining.The second kind

of case is that of adaptivebehaviour,conformism,acquiescence,or modusvivendi.Peopledoasothersdo in someparticular reaof life withoutgivingit

muchthought,orbecausetheythinktheymust bow toforce majeure.Thus,certain Islamic groupsin the United Kingdomno longer circumcise their

youngwomen becausetheydon'twantproblemswiththeBritishpolice and

courts,despitethe factthatthey by no meansagreethattheyshouldgive upthis practicethatthey take, to use the now fashionable argon,to be partly



Geuss/ LIBERALISMAND ITS DISCONTENTS 327

constitutiveof their 'identity'. They just thinkthey haveno choice. A third

groupof cases concernsformal

agreements,as in the

paradigmaticase of

contracting. n acontractallpartiesexplicitlyaffirm hat heywill behave n a

certainway,usuallyby transferring ertainresourcesor performingcertain

services.However,all partiesto a contractneed not haveequally good rea-

sons to enter ntoit, andthey certainlyneednothave the same reasons. Two

people can agreeon state-enforcedvegetarianism,he one for religious,the

otherfor medical or sociopoliticalreasons.Thefourthpossiblecase of con-

sensusis one in which theparticipants ave the same reasonsforagreement.Evenif theagentshave the same reasons oragreeing, t does not follow from

that actalone that heagreementhasany particular ormative alueor stand-

ing.Twothieves canhavethe samereasonsforwanting ocooperate n abur-

glary.If one agreesthatincreasing he numberof personsinvolveddoes not

changethestandingof any agreement, t isn't clear thateven the existence of

universalconsensus need be anythingmore than one fact amongothers.

One standardiberal ine of argumentends to runthe notions of 'consen-

sus' that areprominent n these differentcases together.Effective coordina-

tion of action s highlydesirable f humansareto surviveand ive a life anyof

them will find worthliving, but coordinationof actionrequiresthat somekindof at leastminimalandtacitagreementn values and normative oncep-tions exist between thecooperatingparties. f thepartiesdid not sharea largenumber of such values, cooperationwould break down. Therefore,it is

claimed,there exists in everysociety a basic consensusthatcan serveas the

basis on whichfurtheragreements ouldbereached, herebyexpandingeven

further he human ocialsphere n which freedomandnormativity eacefullyintertwine.From histhe further onclusion s drawn hat t is alwayspossible

andrational or humansto tryreach consensuswith theirfellows, or at anyrate with those with whomthey mustregularlydeal.13

To be moreprecise,there arethree variantsof the liberal thesis. Firstan

empiricalversion:in fact, in everyfunctioningsociety thereis, one way or

another,a basic consensus.Second,thepoliticalthesis that t is always possi-ble 'inprinciple' o elaborate he basicconsensuson whichsocial life restsso

thatpeacefulresolutionof conflictsis possible.The thirdmoralisingvariant

has a strongerand a weakerversion.

Thestrongerasserts hatwe are all in some sense obligedto reachconsen-sus or that t is alwaysrational or us totrytoreachconsensus; he weaker hat

it is alwaysa good idea to tryto reachconsensus.

Againstthese liberalpositions,MarxistsandNietzscheanscan makecom-

mon cause. Nietzsche sees humansociety as a field of potentialand actual

conflict,although he 'conflict' nquestionmaynotalwaysbe amatterof fist-

icuffs butmayinvolveonly theexchangeof arguments nd witticisms.Inthe




realworld,Nietzscheargues,anyexisting 'consensus'can be no more thana

momentaryruceentered nto for

pragmaticeasonsandwith no moral

mpli-cations,and to expect anythingmoreis a utopianhope.Marxists n anycase have alwaysbeen of the opinionthat irreconcilable

conflict,continuingdisagreement, ndsocial division arethe normal tatesof

all formsof societythathave existedupto now.Apparentpublicconsensus s

merelythe false (andthin)ideologicalcover that hides a chasmof division

that s asdeepandunbridgeable sanything n the humanworldcanbe. In its

classic form,Marxism eaches thateveryclass society is divided ntogroupsthat not only have no common good but have diametricallyopposedbasic

interests.What is good for the capitalists s bad for the proletariat, nd vice

versa.Onlya classless societycould lacksociallyentrenchednsolublecon-

flicts of interest. ncapitalistsocieties,politics-as-usuals apointlessactivityformembersof theproletariat, ndtheonlysensiblewayto act in thelongrun

is activeengagement n the class struggle.Fora varietyof reasons,the aboveanalysisnowadaysseems out of date.

The thesis thattheeconomicallyandpoliticallyrelevantstructure f a mod-

em societycan be exhaustivelydescribedby the contrastbetweencapitalists

andproletariats no longer plausible.This shouldnot, however,be takento

implythat iberalconceptionsof socialharmonyand the unlimitedpossibil-

ity of peaceful consensus have become any more convincing,because the

mainproblemof the Marxistanalysisis that it oversimplifies he sources of

conflict anddivisionin the modem world. Insteadof one main contradiction

between workersandcapitalists,there is an almostunsurveyablevarietyof

groups hatarepotentiallyoractually nconflict with eachother,groups hat

in some cases havevery sharplydefined,completely incompatible nterests

and control over considerablepowersand resources.In a given case, it may sometimesbe possible to attainagreementabout

somepointsof dispute n real orhypotheticaldiscussion. Sometimesthere s

neutralgroundora groundconstitutedby sharedbeliefs on to which one can

withdrawto find compromises-sometimes, not always. In every societytherearebothareasof consensus and areasof conflict. Both shouldbeunder-

stood naturalistically, nd individuals,social groups,and institutionsmust

learnto deal with both.Naturallywe often-but notalways-have perfectly

goodreasonsfortakingpart n discussion,especiallywhenthealternativesphysicalviolence withopponentswho arestronger hanwe are,but whether

the reasonswe do (ordo not)havein aparticular ase aregood, less good, or

ridiculouslybadis anempiricalmatter.'4Noneof the three iberal hesesaboutconsensus seems tome atallplausi-

ble.Firstof all, it seemsobvious thatmanysocietiesareperfectlywell ableto

maintain hemselvesalthough heirmembersdo not takepart n a consensus




that s inany waynormativelybinding;manypeopleinmanysocietiessimply

putupwith

existingarrangementshat

heymustendureasbest

theycan. Sec-

ond, the claim thatit is 'in principle'alwayspossible to attainconsensusis

completelyuninformative ntil one knows,in more detail thanhas ever been

providedby liberals,whatexactly 'inprinciple'means.Furthermore,ven if

the claimweretrue,why shoulda statementaboutaconsensusthat 'couldbe

attained'under some fictive or hypotheticalcircumstanceshave any direct

relevance o agivenrealpoliticalsituation?Finally, t is alwaysanopen ques-tionwhetherornot it is agoodidea to enter nto discussionorattempt o reach

consensus.If I am dealingwith a small groupof armedfanatics,it is by no

means clearthatIoughtto arguewith them rather han mmediatelyanduni-

laterallydisarming hem. Tobe sure,I will probablyhavevariousreasonsfor

tryingto do thiswith as littleuse of forcemyself aspossible,buteven if I use

minimalforce I won't be discussing anythingwiththem,anda prioriI can't

know thatanyparticularevel of applicationof force will be sufficient.

IV

Whichparts, hen,of classical liberalismdeserveto be furtherdevelopedand cultivated?In the first place the criticismof theocraticconceptionsof

society or, what is another form of the same thing, of absolutist(that is,

explicitlyorimplicitlytheocentric) orms of ethics. The Kantianphilosophyis no morethanat best a half-secularisedversionof such a theocraticethics,

with 'Reason' n theplaceof God. This doesnot amount o muchmorethana

changeof names.15The purenormative tandpointhat Kant'sethics tries to

occupy,a standpointn which we consideronlythenormatively elevant ea-tures of a possible world, abstractingstrictlyfrom the real world and the

empiricalaccidents of concretesituations, s an expressionof whatDeweycalled 'thequestforcertainty'.16nan insecureworld,weak humansstruggle

convulsivelytoreachsomekind of stability; he apriori s anovercompensa-tionin thought orexperiencedhumanweakness.17 his is one of theoriginsof Kant'snotoriousrigidity,his authoritarianevotionto 'principles',andhis

tendencyto promote ocal habitsof thoughtto constituentsof the absolute

frameworkwithin which alone (purportedly), nycoherentexperiencewaspossible; thus, Euclidean geometry is declared the a priori condition of

humanexperience,andsadisticremnantsof puritanismbecomedemandsof

purepractical eason.18 lassical iberalismrejectedKant'spracticalphiloso-

phy,butperhaps his is not enough. Perhapsone should also rejectthe veryidea of a purenormative tandpoint.




This mightbe thoughtto be a ratherextremesuggestion.Kantianshave

some humanailings

likeeveryoneelse;

these neednot bethought

o reflect

negativelyon thepurenormative tandpoint. s thereanyreasonto thinkthat

theveryidea of apurenormative tandpoint mpliestheattempt o absolutise

accidentalexistinghabits of thought?Rather hantryingto give a directanswerto thisquestion,I would like to

approach t by discussingtwo examples.Both are drawnfrom the work of

John Rawls. As I said,Rawls was nevera strictKantian,andas his thought

developed,he moved furtherandfurtherawayfromcommitment o anyform

of purenormativity.This is a further eason ousehimas anexample: f some

of the deficiencies inherent n adoptingapurenormative tandpointare visi-

ble even in a philosopherwho has moved as farbeyondKant as Rawlshas,this seems to me to give furtherweight to suspicionsabout the normative

standpointas a whole.

To startwith the firstexample,in Theoryof Justice,Rawls claims to be

describing he 'reflectiveequilibrium'hatwouldbe attainedby certain ullyrationalagentswhoengaged ndiscussionundercertain dealisedconditions.

This state of reflectiveequilibriums best understoodas a kindof successor

to thepurenormativeperspective.Afterall, thepointof one of the main con-structions-the introductionof the 'veil of ignorance'- is precisely to

exclude from considerationempirical nformation hatmight prejudice he

overridingnormative orceof theoutcome.Itis, then,extremelystriking,not

to sayastounding, o thelay reader hatthecomplextheoreticalapparatus f

Theoryof Justice,operating hroughover500 pagesof densely argued ext,eventuates n a constitutionalstructure hatis a virtualreplica(with some

extremely minordeviations)of the arrangementshat exist in the United

States.19 t strainscredulityto the breakingpoint to believe that 'free andrationalagents'(withno furtherqualifications), venif theywerediscussingbehindanartificialveil of ignorance,andassuming hat heywereto agreeon

anythingat all under those circumstances,would light on precisely these

arrangements. omecriticsmightfastenon this as an indicationof the essen-

tiallyconservativebias of Rawls's discussion:the theoretical magination s

employed not to thinkaboutalternativesto the statusquo, but in order to

reproduce t schematically n thought,presenting t as the outcomeof full,

free,rationaldiscussion.20 hismightseemgrosslyunfair,givenRawls'sevi-dent intention to produce a work that would have some powerfulredistributivemplications.If, however,one thinks it at all reasonable to

judgewhat is afterall presentedas a political philosophyby its actualpoliti-cal effects, it is hard to see how Rawls's perfectly genuine redistributive

hopes could have any chance of being realised-and not merely because

Rawlshas no theoryof politicalaction or agency, although hatis also true.




The actualeffect of Rawls's theoryis to undercut heoreticallyanystraight-forward

appealo

egalitarianism.Egalitarianismasthe

advantagehat

grossfailureto comply with its basic principles s not difficultto monitor.There

are, to be sure, well-known and unsettled issues about comparabilityof

resourcesand aboutwhetherresourcesarereallytheproperobjectsforegali-tarians o be concernedwith,but therecan be little doubt hat f personA in a

fully monetarised ociety has ten thousand imes themonetaryresourcesof

personB, then undernormalcircumstances he two arenot for most politi-

cally relevantpurposes 'equal'.Rawls'stheoryeffectively shifts discussionawayfrom the utilitariandis-

cussion of the consequencesof a certaindistributionof resources,and also

away from an evaluationof distributions rom the point of view of strict

equality; nstead,hefocuses attentionon acomplexcounterfactualudgment.The questionis not, 'Does A have grossly more thanB?'-a judgmentto

which within limits it might not be impossible to get a straightforwardanswer-but rather hevirtuallyunanswerable: WouldB have even less if A

had less?' One cannot even begin to think aboutassessing any such claim

withoutmakinganenormousnumberof assumptionsaboutscarcityof vari-

ous resources,the formthe particular conomy in questionhad,the prefer-ences, and in particularhe incentivestructure, f thepeoplewho lived in it,andunless one had a rather obustanddetailedeconomictheoryof a kind that

few peoplewill believeanyeconomisttodayhas. In a situationof uncertaintylike this, the actualpoliticalonusprobandiin fact tacitlyshifts to the have-

nots;21he 'haves' ack an obvioussystematicmotivation oargue or redistri-

butionof theexcess wealththeyown,orindeedto findargumentso thatcon-

clusionplausible.Theydon'tinthe samewayneedtoproveanything; hey,ex

hypothesi,'have' the resources n question:'Beatipossedentes'.How, however, are the have-nots-or intellectuals speaking in their

name-supposed to makeanargumenthatdependsbothonconvincingoth-

ers of the generalplausibilityof Rawls's approachand in additionon what

cannot be more than a highly speculative evaluation of a complexcounterfactual claim? That Rawls's early views have had no real

redistributive ffect is not merely a result of the usual difficultyof imple-

mentingpoliticaltheories n the real world.The secondexamplecomes from

Rawls's late work On the Lawof Peoples. In this work in which Rawls dis-cusses certainaspectsof internationalelations,he introduces hecategoryof

an 'outlawstate',a 'regimethatrefuses to complywith a reasonableLaw of

Peoples' (p. 90), and writes that 'France,Spain, the Hapsburgs-or, more

recently Germany'were instances of 'outlaw states' (pp. 105f.). 'Outlaw

state' is a slightly more refined variantof the term'roguestate', which has

come to fashionableuse inthe contextof theattemptby the Bush administra-




tion to justify its missile defence programme,22nd Rawls's claims about

'outlaw states'arethephilosophicalpendent

of formerU.S. PresidentRea-

gan's characterisation f the Soviet Union as an 'evil empire'.At this late

pointin his career,Rawls has movedveryfarindeedawayfromKantianism,but this is still the sort of easy-going,butnarrow-minded,moralisation hat

some of the most interestingpolitical theorists of the nineteenthandearlytwentiethcenturies-Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche, Freud,Dewey-wished toputan end to andreplacewith morehighlydifferentiatedmodes of dealingwith

historyandpolitics. ForRawls, it seems a truthtoo self-evident to require

mentioningthat Spanish hegemony over Latin America in the eighteenth

centurywas something utterlydifferentfrom and much worse than North

Americanhegemonyover the sameregion n theearlytwentiethcentury.The

BritishEmpiredid notalwaysuse kidgloves indealingwithcompetitorsand

subjects,butfor Rawlsitwas,incontrast oFrance,apparently everan 'out-

law state'.Italso doesnotseem tooccurtohim evenas an abstractpossibilitythat heUnited Statesmightbe consideredby some an 'outlawstate',despitea historyof annihilationof indigenous populations,slavery,and repeated

military nterventionn CentralAmerica(andelsewhere).It is hardeven for

those of us who belong to the privileged, inherentlynonoutlaw,Anglo-Americanworldto resistthe conclusionthat hispartof Rawls'stheory s sig-

nificantlyinfluencedby ethnocentrism.Naturally hereare massive differ-

ences betweentheSpanishEmpireof theseventeenth enturyandthe British

Empireof the nineteenthcentury-who woulddenythat?It is also true that

politicians have a stronginterest in distinguishingas sharplyas possiblebetween theirownpolicies (andthe actualeffects of these)and those of their

analogues n other states-what is firmnessof purposewith us is repression

in them.23Nowadays most moder governmentswill have huge staffs ofexperts, awyers,and researcherswho arepaidto seek outgrounds or mak-

ing the appropriate istinctionsas vividlyandconvincinglyas possible.The

fact thatoccasionally n someparticularxtremecases one can't findanycon-

vincingdifferences s notreallyanargumentor thepoliticalrelevanceof the

strictlynormative tandpoint. nthose extremecases in whichadopting his

standpointdoes deliver a practicallyuseful answer,we usuallyhave suffi-

cient reasons to come to a decisionof avarietyof kinds,and in mostrun-of-

the-mill cases normativity ives us aclear decision thatseemsplausibleonlybecause the analysisthat mustprecedethe normativityudgmentrendersa

complex situationartificiallysimple andperspicuous.This analysis,which

eventuates n thejudgment'thisis murder', this is fraud',and so on, is what

is actually doing the work.

Thehistoricalstruggleagainst heocracy,absolutism,anddogmatismhas

left behind in liberalisma thickdepositof scepticismnot only vis-a-vis all-




encompassingworldviews,but also vis-a-vis universalistpoliticaltheoriesof

anykind. On this

pointConstant, Berlin,

Popper,and

Rorty(and also, of

course,Burke)areof one accord.Classical liberalismdid not wish to be an

all-encompassing,universalworldview but merely a political programmeaimedateliminating specific social andpoliticalevils.

Inits origin,liberalismhad no ambition o be universaleither n the sense

of claimingto be validforeveryoneandeveryhumansociety or in the sense

of purportingo give ananswerto all the importantquestionsof human ife.

There is no clearly developed single epistemologyfor classical liberalism,but it would seem that a liberal would have to believe that liberal views are

easily accessible to humanswho have no special expertiseor epistemically

privilegedposition.The ideal of liberalism s a practicallyengaged political

philosophy hat s bothepistemicallyandmorallyhighlyabstemious.That s,atbest,averydifficultandpossiblyacompletelyhopelessproject. t is there-

fore notsurprisinghat iberalssuccumbagainandagainto thetemptation o

go beyondthelimitstheywouldideallyset themselvesandtryto makeof lib-

eralisma completephilosophyof life. Forcomplicatedhistoricalreasons, n

the middle of the twentiethcentury,Kantianismpresented tself as a 'philo-

sophicalfoundation' oraversionof liberalism,and iberalsatthat imeweresufficientlyweak andself-deceived (or strongandopportunistic) o acceptthe offer.Evenwith the infusion of a significantdose of the Kantianphiloso-

phy,however,liberalismhas not succeeded in producinga position thatis

'universal' n any relevant sense. Neither has it demonstratedan ability to

remainfaithfulto its originaltheoreticaland moralabstemiousnesswithout

losing politicaleffectiveness.

Rortyhas made the extremelyastute andimportantobservation hatthe

a priori,theocentrism even in its attenuated orm as a 'philosophyof rea-son'), the purelynormativestandpoint,anda specific form of the 'spiritof

heaviness'24 ll naturallygo together.A consistent iberalismwouldhaveto

turn ts backon all of them.

Unfortunately,Rortystronglysuggestsaninterpretation f this observa-

tion thatdoes notdojusticetoit,andhe seems to draw romthisinterpretationtwofalseconsequences.Firstof all,Rorty s obviouslykeen topromote ronyas the mostappropriate ttitude or a contemporaryiberal.While, however,

it is truethattherejectionof atheocentricview of theworld will mostlikelybringwith it a discreditingof acertainnumberof humanattitudes hatwere

closely associatedwith it-automatic deference to authority,attraction o

certainkinds of solemnity,unctiousness,andobscurantism-irony is notthe

only alternative o piety.Anotheralternatives to adoptan extremelybusi-

nesslikeattitude, o identifyoneself fully withvariousprojects n theworld,




andso forth.Indeed, ookingatthe matterhistorically, herewouldnot seem

to beany particular

aturalaffinity

between liberalismandirony.

If one con-

sidersthemostsignificant ronistsof themoder period-Pascal (inthe 'Let-

tresProvinciales'),Swift, Voltaire,Kierkegaard-only Voltaire eemsinany

importantwayaprecursor f liberalism,and I thinkone would search n vain

in thewritingsof themajor iguresof liberalism Humboldt,Constant,Mill)fortracesof irony.Infact,theonly obvious 'ironist'amongthepoliticalphi-

losophersof the nineteenth entury s deMaistre,whowasanythingbuta lib-

eral.When de Maistre n a famouspassage25eports hat he executionerafter

discharginghis functionreturnshomeina self-satisfiedmood,sayingtohim-

self, 'No one can breaka man on the wheel as well as I can', this is anarche-

typical nstanceof whatwe usuallycall irony.deMaistre s invitingus hereto

look at this situationsimultaneouslyfrom three distinctperspectivesthat

conflict. There s thepointof view of the executionerhimself('the only man

who wearsgloves inchurch'); hepointof view of (post-Beccarian) ommon

sense, which finds the executioner(andhis family) repellentand his self-

satisfactionnauseous;andfinallythepointof view of God,whosees theexe-

cutioneras the necessarycentralpointof any society,holdingit all together

and making civilised life possible. 'Ironically', the executioneris (fromGod'spointof view and, therefore,also de Maistre'sto some extent)right,not perhapsrightto be self-satisfied,butrightto glory in the efficient dis-

chargeof a dignifiedand commodiousoffice. The examplesof de Maistre

andKierkegaard lso show that ronyis notin itself inherently ncompatiblewith a theocentricview of the world.

Rortyto be sure would be unmovedby all this, becausehe is not using

'irony' n the normalsense in whichwe use that term-which is admittedly

hard o grasp-but ratherhe is engagedin theprojectof 'usingold wordsinnew senses'26 so as to breakdownexistingvocabularies.Rather, or him an

ironist s someonewho hasdoubtsabout heexisting'final'vocabularynuse

in society and 'does not believe thathervocabulary s closerto realitythan

others, that it is in touch with a power not herself'.27 On this use of the term,

neitherPlato,de Maistre,norKierkegaard reironists,a consequencethatI

thinkRortywould welcome.Nor,although thinkRortywoulddisagreewith

me, is Hegel.28Mostoddlyof all,Heidegger urnsout onthisreading obe an

ironist,a claim thatwill not,I think, mmediatelyrecommendtself toanyonewho has followed theearth-heavy ootfallof the Sage of Messkirch hrough

anyof his worksand who retainsagraspon anyof the senses 'irony'hashad

in Europeanife since antiquity.29one of this,again,would botherRorty-of course, breakingdown the old vocabularywill generateparadoxes ike

this,andmy pointingthem outisjust partof mystrategyof being, in Rorty's

eyes, conventionalandboring,or of rejiggingthe meaningof 'irony'to suit




myownpurposes.If, however, irony', nthetraditional r theRortyan ense,is not the

onlypossibleattitudewe can

adoptf we wantto avoid

piety,andif

'irony' n Rorty'ssenseis ratherdifferent romwhatthe traditionwould have

called 'irony', t is hard oavoidaskingwhywe shouldaccedeto Rorty'ssug-

gestion. And to answer this in turn,it mightbe useful to think about what

motivatesRorty omakethissuggestionandwhattheconsequencesof adopt-

ingitwouldbe.Thisbringsme tothesecondplacein which he seemstome to

pointus in thewrongdirection.I thinkhis motivation s to detachus as much

as possible from tryingto approachpolitics theoreticallyand to denigrate

politicalactionin a verysubtle andsophisticatedway.Ironystandsorthogo-nal to anyform of active,practicalengagementwith the world. It is a luxuryof people who do not pressinglyhave to act, the kind of people Rortycalls

withadmiration bookish ntellectuals',andwhomhe wishestoencourage o

find self-realisation n private ife, notpolitics.30Thisis why it is particularly

impressivethat Socratesand Kierkegaard,who thoughtthey did in some

sense have to act, also allowed themselves to indulge in irony.An 'ironic'

execution s eitherno executionat all (buta literaryor theatrical vent),oritis

a form of attemptedadditionalmockeryof the victim, or both at the same

time: 'This is Jesus,Kingof theJews'.The Christianhinks hat hisis doublyironic,and that thejoke is finallyon Pilate.

The liberal who gives up the sanctimoniousnessof the purelynormative

standpointwill perhaps,asRortycorrectlyrecognises,standata certainkind

of distanceto somekindsof beliefs, but the attitude nvolvedin this does not

seemappropriately apturedbycallingit either'irony'or(anotheroldercon-

tender) 'scepticism'. With this, one is returned o the issue from which I

started,namely,whatattitudewe shouldadopt owardiberalism.Thiscannot

be completely separated rom questionsabout the intentions of liberalismandhowto describethe kinds of attitudes hatare,havebeen,ormight easilybe or have been associated with existingformsof liberalism.Ironywill not

allow the rightkind of theoreticallyreflective,engaged political practice.Some will (correctly) object that the demand that I made earlier that

anachronismbe avoided s an ideal impossible fully to attain.Of course,the

account of 'liberalism'I have given is a selective one-an ideal type-thatarises from emphasisingcertain featuresand downplayingothers,and the

choice of what to emphasiseto some extentdependson what I judge to bephilosophically ruitfulandmorallyandpoliticallyvaluable.We all haveno

alternativebut to construct hepastin thelightof what we taketo be a viable

future,but it does not follow from this that all constructionsare equally

enlighteningorthat he usualempiricalanddocumentary tandardsorjudg-

ing historical accounts are irrelevant.The anti-Kantianand anti-Rawlsian

perspectivehas,in my view,a twofoldadvantage. tis abetterguideto liber-




alism as a historicalphenomenon, hatis, one thatallowus to attaina fuller,moredetailed,andmore correct

understandingf its

history,and t alsoat the

same time providesa more promisingorientation or thinkingand acting

politicallyin the future.

As longasthe realsocial, economic,andpolitical nstitutionsand circum-

stances of ourlife do not change,31we cannotexpect to ridourselves com-

pletely of our discontent with liberalism.This might, however, even be

thought o be avindicationof one strandn theliberal radition,hestrand hat

is action-orientedbut reflexively anti-utopianand asserts that no systemeitherof actionorthought s perfect.This shouldhold as much forliberalism

asforanything lse. Thiskindof discontent, hen,mightnotnecessarilybe an

objectionbut a sign of the continuingvitalityof this tradition.

NOTES

1. JohnDunn, WesternPolitical Thought n the Face of the Future,2d ed. (Cambridge:

CambridgeUniversityPress, 1993).

2. Alastair MacIntyre,After Virtue(London:Duckworth, 1981); FriedrichNietzsche,Jenseits von Gut und Bise, in KritischeStudien-Ausgabe,ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino

Montanari Berlin:de Gruyter,1980), vol. 5, ?260 andZurGenealogieder Moral in Kritische

Studien-Ausgabe, d. GiorgioColli andMazzinoMontanariBerlin:de Gruyter,1980),vol. 5,

Essay II, ?? 11-12.

3. SamuelHuntington,The Clash of Civilizationsand the Remakingof the WorldOrder

(London:Simon & Schuster,1977), 184.

4. SigmundFreud,Das Unbehagen n der Kultur n Studienausgabe,vol. IX (Frankfurt:

Fischer,1974).5. See alsochapter2 of myHistoryand Illusion n Politics(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-

sity Press,2001).6. See also my Historyand Illusion in Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,

2001), 1-13 and69-73.

7. I'm particularly nterested n four theoristsas representativesof classical liberalism:

Wilhelm von Humboldt(especially his Ideen zu einem versuch,die Grenzendes Staates zu

bestimmen Stuttgart:Reclam,1967]),BenjaminConstant De la libertechezles moderes, ed.

M. Gauchet[Paris:Hachette,1980]), Alexis de Tocqueville(L'ancienrdgimeet la revolution

[Paris:Gallimard1967]),andJ. S. Mill ('OnLiberty', n 'OnLiberty'andOtherWritings, d. S.

Collini [Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1989]).8. See below,footnote 16.

9. Cambridge,MA: HarvardUniversityPress, 1971.10.See, forinstance,AlanBadiou,SaintPaul:Lafondationde l'universalisme Paris:PUF,

1997), esp. chapterVII. This element becomes even more prominentin the work of the

'Ultrapauliner'GiinterBornkamm,Paulus[Stuttgart:Kohlhammer, 969],24) Marcion,about

whom the best work is still Adolf von Harnack,Marcion:Das EvangeliumvomfremdenGott

(Leipzig, 1924, reprintedDarmstadt1985).11. See Theoryof Justice,? 40, for the first of these andTheoryof Justice,p. 31 n. 16 and

throughout or the second.




12. See IsaiahBerlin,FourEssays on Liberty Oxford).13. To be sure,one mustperhapsdistinguishmerelyapparent onsensus,pseudo-consensus,

from realvoluntaryagreement,but this is a minorcorrection hatchanges nothingin the basicstructure f the argument.

14. See also my Public Goods,Private Goods (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,

2001), 96-104.

15. It was a commonlyheldobjection o Kant nthe lateeighteenthcentury hathiscriticism

of traditionalheologywas substantively adical n nameonly.The whole contentof traditional

theology could be reintroduced imply by renaming t 'Postulatesof Pure PracticalReason'.

This was notexactlyfair because not all of traditionalheologywouldsurviveKant'sattack.A

laterversion of basically the same line of thoughtoccurs in Stirner'scriticismof Feuerbach

(Stirner,Der Einzigeund sein Eigentum Stuttgart:Reclam, 1967]).Feuerbach,Stirnerclaims,

doesn't, as he pretends,radically detheologise religion, he simply uses the words 'humanessence' in placeof the word 'God'. The structure f Feuerbach's heoryand the content of the

moral obligations it imposes on individuals,though, remain the same as that of traditional

theology.16.JohnDewey, TheQuestfor Certainty n JohnDewey: The Later Works 925-1953, ed.

JohnBoydston(Southern llinoisPress, 1988),vol. 4; similarthoughts n TheodorAdornoand

Max Horkheimer,Die DialektikderAufklarung Frankfurt:Fischer,1969).17. In a complex industrialisedworld,there is a furtherreason for adherence o fixed and

rigid generalprinciples: fficiencyandsimplicityof administration. ee my Historyand Illusion

in Politics (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2001), 150-52.

18. For Kant as 'gallows-philosopher', ee JacquesLacan,SeminaireVII:L'ethiquede la

psychanalyse Paris:Seuil, 1986),andalsoAdornoandHorkheimer,DialektikderAufklarung.19. Of course it is not at all difficult to see how Americansmightfind it plausiblethatany

rational agents discussing politics under favourable conditions would agree on these

arrangements.20. See Theodor Adorno, Der Positivismusstreit n der deutschen Soziologie (Berlin:

Luchterhand, 972) 'Einleitung'; ee alsomy Morality,Culture,andHistory Cambridge:Cam-

bridge UniversityPress, 1999), 69-76.

21. This is not a logical point.22. See Noam

Chomsky,RogueStates(London:PlutoPress,2000).

23. Sometimes, of course, politicians have the reverse interest,one in presentingtheir

programmesas being as like as possible those of some favouredmodel.

24. Nietzsche,Also sprachZarathustra.

25. Joseph de Maistre,Les Soirees de Petersbourg(Paris:Edition du vieux colombier,

1960), 40.

26. RichardRorty, Contingency, rony,and Solidarity(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress 1989), 78.

27. Ibid.,73.

28. Hegeldid changehis mind on a numberof thingsduringhis philosophicallyactivelife,

but the one thing he never gave up was the commitmentto a form of absolute knowledge(couchedin a finalvocabulary)andalso a rejectionof whathe called 'irony'(whichhe saw as

instantiatedn the workof FriedrichSchlegel).29. Itis, of course,alsothecase thatHeidegger s nota liberal,and s aparadigm f those atti-

tudes of willful obscurantism,authoritarianism,ndsanctimoniousness hat liberalismshould

terminate.

30. Rorty,Contingency, rony,and Solidarity,65.




31. 'Le liberalismen'est evidemmentpas une ideologie ni un iddal. C'est uneforme de

gouvernementet de "rationalite"gouverementale fort complexe.'Michel Foucault,Dits et

ecrits,vol. IV (Paris:Gallimard,1994), 36.

RaymondGeuss is a Reader in Philosophyat the Universityof Cambridge;his most

recent booksare Historyand Illusionin Politics (CambridgeUniversityPress, 2001);PublicGoods,PrivateGoods(PrincetonUniversityPress,2001); and At CrossPurposes

(London:HearingEye, 2001).

geuss liberalism its discontents

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