global climate change negotiations: a perspective on intergenerational and social equity p.r. shukla
TRANSCRIPT
Global Climate Change Negotiations:A Perspective on Intergenerational and Social Equity
P.R. Shukla
NORTH-SOUTH EQUITY:NORTH-SOUTH EQUITY: UNFCCC UNFCCC
Article 3.1 “common but differentiated responsibilities”
Article 3.2
Special attention and considerations for parties: “that would have to bear a disproportionate or
abnormal burden under the Convention” “vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change”
Carbon Emissions per Capita (1993)Carbon Emissions per Capita (1993)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Afr
ica
Ind
ia
Ch
ina
Oth
er A
sia
Lat
in A
mer
ica
Oth
er E
uro
pe
EU
12
For
mer
US
SR
Jap
an
Au
stra
lia
US
A
Can
ada
Car
bon
em
issi
ons
per
Cap
ita
(tC
/cap
)
Historic CO2 and Methane Contribution 1800-1988 (%)
Region Industrial CO2
TotalCO2
CO2 +CH4
1 OECD North America 33.2 29.7 29.2
2 OECD Europe 26.1 16.6 16.4
3 Eastern Europe 5.5 4.8 4.7
4 Former USSR 14.1 12.5 12.4
5 Japan 3.7 2.3 2.3
6 Oceania 1.1 1.9 1.9
7 China 5.5 6.0 6.3
8 India 1.6 4.5 4.8
9 Other Asia 1.5 5.0 5.2
10 N. Africa & Mid-East 2.2 1.7 1.8
11 Other Africa 1.6 5.2 5.2
12 Brazil 0.7 3.3 3.3
13 Other Latin America 3.2 6.5 6.5
Developed Countries (1-6) 83.8 67.8 66.9
Developing Countries (7-13) 16.2 32.2 33.1
EFFICIENCY: EFFICIENCY: UNFCCCUNFCCC
Article 3.3
“policies and measures to deal with climate change should be cost-effective so as to ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”
Why Delay Mitigation Actions?Why Delay Mitigation Actions?
Future Generations shall be:Affluent
More CapableKnowledge Technologies
BURDEN SHARING AGREEMENT:BURDEN SHARING AGREEMENT: Developing Country ConcernsDeveloping Country Concerns
UNFAIR BACKGROUND CONDITIONS
ASYMMETRY OF EMISSIONS & IMPACTS
UNFAVOURABLE TIMING
Intergenerational Concerns
Total Burden SharingMitigationImpactsRisks (including extreme events)
Minimize Welfare LossesBurden Sharing based on Income
NorthNorth EFFICIENCY (MARGINAL COST)
GRANDFATHERING
Equity Principles: Equity Principles: The North - South DivideThe North - South Divide
SouthSouth HISTORICAL RESPONSIBILITY
BASIC NEEDS
OBLIGATION TO PAY
ABILITY TO PAY
RAWLSIAN CRITERIA
PER CAPITA ENTITLEMENTS (EGALITARIAN)
Cumulative Carbon Emissions(1991 to 2100) for IPCC - IS92 Emission Scenarios
Emissions Cumulative Emissions: 1991 - 2100Scenario (Giga Ton Carbon)
IS92a 1500
IS92b 1430
IS92c 785
IS92d 975
IS92e 2187
IS92f 1845
Cumulative Carbon Emissions (GT Carbon)
Stabilization “S” Trajectory “WRE” TrajectoryTarget
450 ppmv 628 714
550 ppmv 872 1043
650 ppmv 1038 1239
750 ppmv 1194 1348
Cumulative Carbon Emissions (1991 to 2100):“S” and “WRE” Concentration Stabilization Trajectories
Mitigation Needed for Stabilization(from 1990 to 2100)
Stabilization Mitigation Needed Target for IS92 Case
(Billion Tons of Carbon)
450 ppmv 872 -786
550 ppmv 628 - 457
650 ppmv 462 - 261
750 ppmv 306 - 152
Convergence of Per Capita EmissionsConventional Concept
2000 2050 2100
Industrial Countries Emission Profile
Developing Countries Emission Profile
Convergence Target
0.3
0.7
2.0
Years
Equitable Convergence
Con
verg
ence
Tar
get
2000 2050 2100
Industrial Countries Emission Profile
Developing Countries Emission Profile
Convergence Target
Years
0.3
0.7
2.0
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
60
80
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030U
S$
Bil
lion
(19
93)
Grandfathered
Per capita
Gain/Loss for India under Different Gain/Loss for India under Different Permit SchemesPermit Schemes
• Distribution matters
• India’s gains/ losses can be several % of GDP
PROTOCOL WITH INCOME BASED ENTRYPROTOCOL WITH INCOME BASED ENTRYAND TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONSAND TECHNOLOGY CONDITIONS
EQUITY CRITERIAEQUITY CRITERIA Non- Annex I enters when income (in PPP) equals 2020 Annex I Income
TECHNOLOGY CONDITIOSTECHNOLOGY CONDITIOS (Annex I to implement after 2020) New Fossil Power Plants to scrub and dispose carbon from exhaust
New Synthetic fuels to capture and dispose carbon released in conversion
WHEN SOME NON-ANNEX JOIN IN?WHEN SOME NON-ANNEX JOIN IN? China in 2045; India in 2062
EFFICIENCYEFFICIENCY 30 percent expensive than most cost-effective mitigation
SEPARABILITY OF SEPARABILITY OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCYEQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
COASE THEOREMStipulates
in absence of transaction costs, market exchange will lead to efficient resource allocation regardless of distribution of rights
Implies the process of minimizing burden size is
independent of the burden sharing scheme
SEPARABILITY OF SEPARABILITY OF EQUITY AND EFFICIENCYEQUITY AND EFFICIENCY
COASE THEOREM:TWO INTERPRETATIONS
1. Neo-Classical/ Northern World ViewEquity is irrelevant to global co-operation
2. Developing Country PerspectiveEfficiency is simple - just needs agreeing on instruments. Equity (sharing of burden) is vital
Sharing the BurdenSharing the Burden
1.1. Stabilization Burden shall be substantiveStabilization Burden shall be substantive
2.2. Significant mitigation shall be in NA-I Significant mitigation shall be in NA-I (“Where” Flexibility for Cost Effectiveness)(“Where” Flexibility for Cost Effectiveness)
3.3. Transition from Cost to Welfare Effectiveness Transition from Cost to Welfare Effectiveness (“Justice” in Burden sharing is vital)(“Justice” in Burden sharing is vital)
Conclusions: Conclusions: A Fair AgreementA Fair AgreementBurden Sharing Burden Sharing
Explicit Burden Sharing Regime
Fair CompetitionFair CompetitionPolluter PaysMarket Price for CDM Mitigation
Minimize Welfare LossesMinimize Welfare LossesAbility to PayCompensation for Impacts
Precautionary PrinciplePrecautionary Principle Hedge against extreme eventsProtect most vulnerable
“It is the nature and the advantage of strong people that they can bring out the crucial questions and form a clear opinion about them. The weak always have to decide between alternatives which are not their own.”Dietrich BonhoefferGerman Philosopher, anti-Nazi thinker (executed in Flossenburg concentration camp, April 9, 1945)