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2016 IPSA World Congress

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Global Order of Tianxia:

A Research Framework based on China’s Political

Thoughts for an International Community beyond

Anarchy1

Hsin Chih CHEN (Professor, Department of Political Science, National Cheng Kung University)

Assuming an anarchical international structure, western original main-stream international relations paradigm argued that actors could only accommodate with anarchical structure with power struggle for survive. However, Chinese political thoughts in the pre-Qin era encouraged states to seek the domination position instead and to construct a universal order under heaven, Tainxia. With the purpose to go further beyond the limit of anarchical assumption held by the main international relations paradigm, this article tries to explore new research framework for the improvement of international relations paradigm with ideas which are inspired by the context of the order-orientated Chinese political thoughts in the pre-Qin era. Different from the anarchical assumption held by the main international relations paradigms, China’ classical ideas assumed that the structure of the state of nature will push actors seeking universal order to manage internal and external disorder. This article finds that with combination of material power supremacy, soft resources of economic and culture attraction, as well as the governing legitimacy, Chinese political thinkers have provided to us a different image of how a global community of Tianxia could be constituted.

Keywords: State of nature, Anarchy, Hierarchy, Chinese Political thought, International System, Pre-Qin Era

1 Draft, please do not quote without author’s permission.


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“Tianxia” is the concept of world order developed by the Chinese nation in the early days of the Zhou Dynasty in approximately 1000 B.C.2 After the Qin Dynasty terminated the long-term chaos of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, it dominated the world, established the empire, and the world view was gradually enriched and expanded. It became the self-identity of the Chinese nation, as well as the main perspective to interpret world order. In addition, it was the main content constructing the tribute system of Chinese empires (Fairbank, 1968). Although various Chinese states in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties experienced competitions against one another for a very long time, later generations still firmly believed that the central authority ruling the Central Plains should be the core based on the thinking of “grand unification”, and they refused to define the competitive relationships among the various actors in Chinese society as “international relationships.” They were inclined to view the power competitions among various political bodies in Chinese society as the internal power competitions for a unified position in Chinese society. The idea of “Under the wide heaven, all is the king's land. Within the sea-boundaries of the land, all are the king's servants”, as stated in Chapter Bei Shan of “The Book of Odes” (Chu, 1976: 209-210), which reflects that the dominance of the Central Plains region is subject to the imagination of an empire of central authority. The differences between internal and external worlds laid the foundation for Chinese society to deal with internal power competitions and external foreign relations. The power competitions of Chinese cultural systems were regarded as internal family affairs of communities, while the divisions and wars among states were regarded as internal separation and a combination of communities, rather than as international interactions. The “Records of the Grand Historian”, written during the Han Dynasty (100 B.C.), recorded the constant separations, combinations, and changes of empire rulers, and viewed the fights for orthodox authority among various political bodies on the Central Plains in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as “civil wars” among the lower level feudatories in the empire3. Moreover, the “Records of the Grand Historian” even formed the basis of the current thinking of “grand unification.” The interpretations of traditional history from the perspective of grand unification explain the reasons why various states fought for orthodox and dominant status. 2 King Wu of Zhou defeated King Zhou of Shang and Zhou Gong Dan pacified various states in the east in 1046 B.C. (Yang, 1999: 12). 3 The interactions among various kingdoms in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were

documented in “Hereditary Houses” of the “Records of the Grand Historian,” which is second to the “Basic Annals” that recorded orthodox dynasties. This implied Si Maqian’s perspective to compile history according to order and differences in political bodies and statues (Si, 2002).


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World view has attracted the attention of the field of international relations in the 21st century. In the mid-19th century, the East Asia international order that dominated the Qing Empire was replaced by the Westphalia system, as promoted by the Europe and the U.S., and world view was demoted from a fundamental concept for constructing Chinese international order to a pure Chinese political idea. In the 21st century, American, European, and Chinese scholars were inspired by the rapid rise of material power of the People’s Republic of China, and started to re-explore the theoretical basis of international relations with Chinese political thinking elements, ponder the potential development of international systems in East Asia, and seek a possible basis from the previous tribute system and China’s world view, in an attempt to develop a theoretical analysis framework that can replace, supplement, and innovate international relations4. First, this study inspected the reflection results of the “Tianxia theory” of scholars from Mainland China in modern times. After reviewing the basic concepts of heaven, Tianxia, and heaven’s mandate, as developed by the Zhou Dynasty after it created the concept of Tianxia, this study found that the Chinese world view of “Tianxia” can be used to analyze and interpret the transfer of international order. The concept of the hegemonic governance of the Chinese world view of “Tianxia” inspired us for better understanding on the hegemony maintaining. The three-dimensional Global Tianxia perspecties developed from the traditional planar Chinese world view of “Tianxia” contributes the transformations of global political systems. This study found that, the the idea of“variant mandate of heaven”(天命靡常) of the Global Tianxia perspecties of “Tianxia” can better analyze and interpret the hegemony transfer of hierarchy characteristics.

1. Academia’s Concept of the International Relations of the

Tianxia System World view is the Chinese nation’s crystallization of ideas regarding the governance of political relations among countries. World view of “Tianxia” was preliminarily developed in the Zhou Dynasty. After Qin’s unification of the Central Plains, as well as the separations and combinations of Chinese empires over the past dynasties, world view of “Tianxia” has become an important element of Chinese

4 Preliminary results were obtained from relevant investigations and studies (Wang, 2006; Yen and Hsu, 2009; Kang, 2010).


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political thinking. The tribute system, or the “Tianxia system”, as constructed by the Chinese world view of “Tianxia”, was the core principle and standardized blueprint for previous international governance systems in East Asia (Fairbank, 1968; Kang, 2010). The Chinese world view of “Tianxia” once vanished in the 20th century; however, with the rising strength of the People’s Republic of China, it once again became a research issue attracting the attention of international relations academia. Defining Tianxia as a world system is a major attempt of academia in Mainland China to develop the Chinese school of international relations. Chao Tingyang defined Tianxia as a world system with undifferentiated inclusiveness, which broke through the binary opposition of the Westphalian system and allowed the world to develop an order of co-existence. Jen Hsiao regarded Tianxia as cosmopolitanism, and suggested that, if hierarchy can be excluded, the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia will be an important thinking resource for the world (Jen, 2014: 44). However, Jen Hsiao did not explain how to exclude the Chinese central bias of world view. Chao Tingyang used Tianxia as an level of analysis, which includes the concept of world and external scale, as well as the principle of “all-inclusiveness” (Chao, 2011: 27-48). Tianxia, as defined by Chao Tingyang, included three basic meanings: 1. “All of the lands in the world” in a geographical sense; 2. Thoughts of all of the people living on all of the lands, namely, “public mind;” 3. An ideal Utopia of “One World, One Family” or an attempt to pursue a certain world system, as well as the world government promised by this world system (Chao, 2011: 27-28). However, after 2015, Chao Tingyang changed Tianxia from the highest cultural and political unit (Chao, 2011: 42) to a world system, where the world is the political subject, and it is viewed as the order of co-existence for the overall political unit (Chao, 2015)5. Such a concept formed a sharp contrast to the idea suggesting that a country is a unit of an international system in western international relations theories and examples. On the one hand, Chao Tingyang defined Tianxia as the highest analysis unit of the world system. On the other hand, Chao suggested that Tianxia is a world system. However, Chao did not provide a clear definition of the world system structure called Tianxia, or the mutual relationship between the unit and the structure, which leads to difficulties in theoretical operations. To define the Tianxia system as a universal level of analysis, Chao Tingyang

5 Chao’s English translation of “共在秩序” is “order of coexistence.” The Chinese and English descriptions of Chao may lead to different understanding by Chinese and English readers (Chao, 2015: 5).


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attempted to elevate Tianxia from a unique concept in China to a universal concept applicable to the entire world (Chao, 2015: 5). The Tianxia system refers to the cosmopolitanization of the world, and is a dynamic process featured by undifferentiated co-existence. Based on the Tianxia principle of “all-inclusiveness”, Chao suggested that all political entities belong to Tianxia. Therefore, Tianxia only includes “internality,” and does not include externality, meaning there is no outsider that cannot be understood and accepted. There is no country, nation, or culture that is identified as an enemy that cannot be resolved. Any countries or places that have not joined the Tianxia system can be “integrated” by the co-existence order of Tianxia (Chao, 2015: 6). However, Chao Tingyang did not clearly state the definition, process, or approach of “integration” with Tianxia. In Chao Tingyang’s Tianxia system, Tianxia is the highest political analysis unit under which there are countries and families. During the application of the structure of “family-country-Tianxia,” Chao Tingyang suggested that Tianxia means an affair and a value standard that is greater than a country (Chao, 2011: 42). He suggested that, in the political framework of Tianxia-country-family, Tianxia is the highest political unit, as well as the final explanation principle of the overall framework. In other words, Tianxia defines the complete political sphere, and all political issues can be understood and explained according to the concept of Tianxia (Chao, 2015: 10). Therefore, both the explanatory powers of political theories and political legitimacy form the descending order of Tianxia-country-family, where Tianxia is the apex (Chao, 2015: 10). Chao Tingyang suggested that, the concept of a western political system, where individuals are the focus of concern, is a system that can complement the Tianxia system (Chao, 2015: 10). However, there are logical contradictions in Chao Tingyang’s idea, which suggests that Tianxia can complement the western perspective; under the situation where they can complement each other, apparently, there is another political system above Tianxia and western political systems. As a result, in terms of logic, Chao Tingyang’s Tianxia system is unlikely to be the most extreme political analysis system. Moreover, in Chao Tingyang’s Tianxia system, individuals are not the analysis unit of the system. Therefore, it seems that such a system does not inherit the humanistic thought of Chinese traditional Confucianism. Unlike the traditional Confucianism world view that identified Chinese and foreigners, Chao Tingyang adopted Laozi’s concept of “observing Tianxia from the perspective of Tianxia,” and suggested that it is necessary to implement the internalization of the world and make the world becoming an all-inclusive Tianxia,


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as well as a system that includes internality, while omitting insurmountable externality. In the Tianxia system, people no longer look for irreconcilable enemies, view others as aliens that cannot co-exist with them, or define different values as unacceptable heresy. Therefore, all-inclusiveness is the absolute condition for achieving world peace, general safety, and universal cooperation (Chao, 2015: 14). Chao suggested that, although the internalization of the world may not achieve the ideal of “all people belong to one family,” such an ideal is possible, and is a sufficiently good world that can be achieved in reality (Chao, 2015: 14). Jen Hsiao also emphasized that, the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia focusing on ethical relationships is highly inclusive, meaning the status relationships of the Chinese and foreigners are convertible. Therefore, there is no absolute self and other, there is no clear separation of friend and foe, and no mandatory voluntary conversion, but equal and integrated conversion where various actors are allowed (Jen, 2014: 45). However, Jen Hsiao’s optimistic opinion of the inclusiveness of Tianxia still implies the bias of the supremacy of the Chinese, as the all-inclusiveness nature of the Tianxia doctrine is merely the transformation of status relationships, and neither breaks through the bias of the perceived cultural supremacy of the Chinese, nor omits the cultural segmentation of respecting the Chinese and disrespecting foreigners, thus, it is unlikely to allow cultural integration and flow when Chinese are converted to foreigners. Chao Tingyang confirmed that globalization is a path reachable by the Tianxia system. He suggested that global interdependence, as formed by globalization, is achieving the internalization of the world. When the political scale develops to the level where the world can be seen as a single unit, the coming of global politics means that, under the condition of the internalization of the world, game rules will be re-established, power will be re-constructed, interests and resources will be re-distributed, and history and knowledge will be re-described. Therefore, new political principles and systems are required to guarantee the order of global co-existence and political legitimacy; and even stated that, the internalization of the world will become the final issue of all political issues (Chao, 2015: 15). The perspective of the Tianxia system, as proposed by scholars from Mainland China and discourses regarding the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia, require further clarification. First, the Tianxia system, or the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia, only emphasize the normative advantages of Tianxia, but do not provide specific descriptions of how to construct the world system (Chang, 2011: 91) or how to eliminate the hierarchy of the Tianxia Doctrine to achieve the creative transformation


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of the Tianxia Doctrine. Moreover, foreign scholars also suspect that, the Tianxia system is nothing more than an attempt to revive the ruling model of Chinese empires (Callahan, 2008; Carlson 2011). Secondly, during the promotion of Chinese Tianxia order, academia circles of Mainland China did not consider that the world view had confirmed that inequality is justifiably rational (Chin, 2006: 9). The world system, as constructed by the world view, seems to stand against the expectations of current global values. Lastly, the fundamental condition of anarchy logic in western international relations theories is the binary competition and co-existence between individuals of legal equality. The traditional world view does not possess an awareness of sovereignty or binary opposition, and only considers the closeness of distance and intimacy of relationships (Chin, 2006: 8). While the Tianxia system and cosmopolitanism of Tianxia outline a beautiful world, they fail to provide any explanation or solution regarding the competitions and power struggles and interactions of political practices around the world. Failure to step over the reality of international society as a sovereign state is another challenge faced by Mainland China during the development of the Tianxia system and the concept of the cosmopolitanism of Tianxia. Beyond the development of ideas and political practices of Tianxia, the world view of Tianxia includes two levels: politics and governance. The politics of the concept of Tianxia involves the political structure shaped by ancient Chinese world views of Tianxia, as well as the basic model of world order. The governance of world view of Tianxia is the cultural spirit of ancient China to govern common affairs through Tianxia (Li, 2011: 111-112). The use of the Tianxia political model is applied to attempt to restore tradition, where the core hierarchical Tianxia order of Chinese empires is implemented, but does not conform to the reality of international society, as constructed by sovereign states, thus, its feasibility and practicality face many problems (Li, 2011: 114). Historical experiences also verified that, the governance effect of the historical stability of the Tianxia system is poor, meaning that Tianxia may not necessarily resolve the issues faced by the current world (Chou, 2008). In terms of theoretical integrity, although world view of Tianxia is an important element of Chinese philosophical thinking, the use of these elements to interpret rigorous international relations theories, converse with international academic groups, and win recognition, remain very difficult challenges (Liu, 2014: 38). Confucianism, world view, and Chinese and foreign order are the three conceptual structures constituting the tribute system, which provide political legitimacy, maintain economic prosperity in the system, and protect the stable


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functions of East Asia (Chien, 2009). Three cultures: “relatives,” “acquaintances,” and “strangers” exist in the tribute system developed by the Chinese world view. These three cultures, as well as the “statuses” they create, maintain Tianxia order centered on the tribute system (Shang, 2009). On the other hand, Chinese world view of Tianxia seems to lose to materials. Once the tribute system constructed by the Chinese world view loses to the materialistic world of East Asia, and collapses, the Chinese world view of Tianxia will be abandoned by the rest of the world (Wang, 2012: 64). However, the inclusiveness of the Tianxia concept is a possible approach to analyzing the phenomenon of cooperation between countries. If East Asia is defined as a multicenter regional order, instead of single-centered (Jen, 2013: 10-12), East Asia’s operational elements of endogenous order, such as many forms of contacts, tribute trades, voluntary exchanges, peaceful coexistence, and common legitimacy, will be the features of the East Asia order that are different from those of other regions in the world (Jen, 2013: 14-21). Moreover, the rule of the De of Chinese world view thinking of Tianxia, as well as analysis of hegemony’s self-control over use of force, are certainly important thought assets that enrich current international-relation theories. Therefore, re-introspection of Tianxia ideas and specific practices, as established in the Zhou Dynasty, will be an important starting point for later generations to obtain the nutrients of the Chinese world view to develop international-relation theories and examples.

2. Origin and Meaning of the Chinese World View of Tianxia The Chinese world view of Tianxia is the Chinese nation’s imagined ideal for defining political order. In modern times, Tianxia has been defined as the political order of concentric circles constructed with China as the center. This order reflects the relationship between China and barbarians in four directions using level of courtesy (Kao, 2004: 61). Tianxia is defined as the scope of rule under Confucian moral order, and is viewed as a moral community. In this hierarchical structure of concentric circles, the center of Tianxia is China, while the foreign states surrounding the empire are divided into barbarian states and vassal states according to moral level (Liu and Chin, 2006: 110-111). In brief, Tianxia is the Chinese imagined idea, where they view China as the core of the world. In addition, it is a center-periphery cognitive system constructed under cultural supremacy to interpret the phenomenon of interactions between self and others surrounding political groups. Exploration of the origins of this Chinese world view of Tianxia found that, the so-called theory of the Chinese core order, moral supremacy in the division of the Chinese and foreigners, and the planar


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geographical perception hidden in the Tianxia order are not the core concepts of the Chinese world view, as constructed at the beginning of the West Zhou Dynasty. On the contrary, heaven (God) inspects the hegemonic legitimacy of the ruling effect of global rulers, and acts as judge. The highly uncertain power and position caused by “Variant Mandate of Heaven” further request hegemonic countries to be ever be alert to the basic demands of rulers, and understand that the dissatisfaction and complaints of rulers may lead to changed destinies. The concepts of heaven, Tianxia, and “Variant Mandate of Heaven”, as developed in the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, are the analysis approaches to observe how hegemonic countries maintain dominant status in the global system. The review of the development process of the Chinese world view at the beginning of the West Zhou Dynasty and the inspection of the bloody war, where the Zhou defeated Yinshang, and the Zhou people colonized various states in the east using their armed forces (Tu, 1979), which showed that the Zhou Dynasty is undoubtedly the best example of the changed hegemony in the international system. After decomposing the hegemonic rule constructed by Yinshang, which used witchcraft to worship the “empire,” the Chinese world view of Tianxia justified the legitimacy of the Zhou people to become the new hegemony in the international system. The Chinese world view of Tianxia was rooted in the planar geographical perception of self-center, which used the discourse of the mandate-transfer to emphasize that the hegemony in international system must be supported by legitimacy, in order to justify the dominant and leading status of the governance of a new hegemonic state. Moreover, the policy of De ruling for maintaining dominant status was derived from the concept of “Variant Mandate of Heaven.” The Chinese world view inspired many later generations’ understanding of the changes and restructuring of the core countries in the international system. 1. International hierarchical order under planar geographical perception The Chinese world view is a geographical description of planar thinking. The term “Tianxia” has both broad and narrow meanings. In addition to referring to cultural China in the Chinese core theory,6 it refers to geography, namely, everywhere

6 It is necessary to clarify that, the term “China was endowed with the concept of a sovereign country of the Westphalian system in the 20th century. The meaning and perception of China, as interpreted under sovereignty, are completely different from those of the so-called “China” from the West Zhou Dynasty to the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. The term “China” during the Warring States periods at least had seven meanings, and referred to Zhuxia states, Central Plains, nine provinces, Three Jin states, synonyms of capital of emperors, center of the national territory, or a middle-sized country (Chang, 2009: 233).


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under the sun and the moon, where there are people (Hsing, 1987: 15). The world view of the ancient Chinese population was composed of the center and periphery, where the various cultural populations of ancient times all viewed their own residence as the center. For example, Han and Wei states settled in today’s Shanxi Province, Ye state settled in today’s Zhejiang, and Ba Shu in ancient times all suggested that their capitals were the center of Tianxia. As the perception of Tianxia by various cultural populations was actually not the same (Lo, 2011: 16), the center perceived by them was also different. If the various directions of Tianxia in geographical descriptions could all view themselves as the center of Tianxia, then central mainland, the Central Plains, and China could be any ethnic state in Tianxia. From a geographical perspective, China and the central mainland are not fixed geographical locations, but self-interpretation and perception. The concept of the four directions composed of east, south, west, and north was established in the Shang Dynasty (Hsing, 1987: 8-9). The Shang people used directions to construct their world. Under the protection of ancestors, the emperors of Shang became the authoritative rulers of the four directions. The perspective of the center and four directions in the Shang Dynasty formed the basic elements of the world view (Hsing, 1987: 12). According to the memory of Zhou Gong Dan, there were interior domains and external domains in the Shang Dynasty7. Therefore, the center of interior and exterior domains was the emperors of Shang. The division of interior and exterior domains, court officials, and affairs was extended to the Zhou Dynasty, which developed and expanded to the ideal hierarchical ruling model. It was also integrated with the concept of center and four directions to become the basic structure of Tianxia (Hsing, 1987: 14). The historical stereotype of the dynasty changes of the grand unification in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties faces new challenges in modern times. Many opinions suggest that, the Zhou Dynasty in the history of the Chinese nation is still significantly different from the sovereign country perceived by later generations8. In 7 Zhou Gong Dan said, “From him Tang the Successful, down to Di-Yi, all completed their royal De (德) and revered their chief ministers, so that their managers of affairs respectfully discharged their helping duties, and dared not to allow themselves in idleness and pleasure; how much less would they dare to indulge themselves in drinking! Moreover, in the exterior domains, (the princes of) the Hou, Dian, Nan, and Wei (states), with their presiding chiefs and in the interior domain, all the various officers, the directors of the several departments, the inferior officers and employees, the heads of great houses, and the men of distinguished name living in retirement, all eschewed indulgence in spirits. Not only did they not dare to indulge in them, but they had not the leisure to do so, being occupied with helping to complete the sovereign’s De (德) to make it more illustrious, and helping the directors of affairs to reverently to attend to his service.” (Shang Shu, Announcement about Drunkenness) (Chu, 1969: 109). 8 Chinese scholars have started to use the term “composite state structure” (Wang, 2013), as well as the


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addition, the changes of dynasties in the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties are not only the changes of internal dynasties, but are also the changes of core dominant power and position in the international system. According to western arguments regarding state-building and modern archaeological discoveries, historians have suggested that the regime at the beginning of the Xia Dynasty was not necessarily a rugged country (Hsu, 1984: 17). For example, under the rule of Yu the Great, there were tens of thousands of states in Tianxia. By the reign of Tang of Shang, there were only three thousand countries9. In the Xia, Shang, and Zhou Dynasties, there were fierce wars among various states. West Zhou was originally a vassal state under the reign of the emperors of Shang. After West Zhou replaced the Shang Dynasty, it established a kingdom where the regions of Zhou coexisted with vassal states, and Zhou emperors acted as the leaders or overlords of the alliance of vassal states (Tien and Zang, 1996: 10). West Zhou was not a unified kingdom, but an assembly of vassal states. The status as the overlord of emperors of Zhou was established upon the vast and solid economic and military powers of Zhou, and cannot be compared to the monarchy of the future (Tien and Zang, 1996: 17). From the perspective of current international relations theories, such a historical view suggests that the Zhou Dynasty was a hegemonic country, which established a specific authoritative relationship with feudatories in various places. Firstly, the emperors of Zhou could go hunting in various states. Secondly, some of the feudatories, as conferred at the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, were appointed by the emperors of Zhou to act as ministers in the court of Zhou. Thirdly, feudatories had to pay tribute to the emperors of Zhou to express political obedience. Fourthly, emperors of Zhou could order feudatories to join their army to fight against rebels. Lastly, feudatories were ordered by the emperors of Zhou to supervise vassal states (Tien and Zang, 1996: 15-16). From the current perspective, the emperors of Zhou were not entitled to interfere with internal governance mechanism of vassal states, their establishment or dethronement, and levy taxes from them. Therefore, West Zhou was not the extension of the national central authority, but a relationship between leader and alliances (Tien and Zang, 1996: 12-13)10. This perspective reflects that the West Zhou Dynasty was a hierarchical authority of hegemonic rule. Emperors of West Zhou were the leaders of international society, and possessed highly advantageous power and played an authoritative and leading role.

term “community” (Hsu, 2015), to refer to the political structure in the three dynasties. 9 The descriptions in the Warring States period said, “Under the rule of Yu the Great, there were tens of thousands of states in Tianxia. By the reign of Tang of Shang, there were only three thousand countries” (Lu, 1991, Use of People) 10 On the contrary, historical authority of Mainland China, Yang Kuan, still viewed West Zhou as a unified kingdom, and suggested that various “domains” surrounding the emperors of Zhou were ruled by the Zhou Dynasty (Yang, 1999: 5)


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In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, in addition to the descriptions of geographical perception, Tianxia was gradually endowed with ideal inter-state order. The “Annals of the Xia” of the “Records of the Grand Historian” stated, “Now beyond the Emperor's capital 500 li constituted the Imperial domain. From the first hundred li they brought, as revenue, the whole plant of the grain, from the second the ears, from the third the straw, but the people had to perform feudal services, from the fourth the grain in the husk, and from the fifth the grain cleaned. Five hundred li beyond the Imperial domain constituted the domain of the nobles. The first hundred li formed the allotments to the feudal nobles, the second hundred those to the people employed by the State, and the other 300 those to the various princes. Five hundred li beyond the nobles' domain lay the peaceful domain. In the first 300 li they cultivated learning and the moral duties, and in the other 200 their energies lay in the direction of war and defense. Five hundred li beyond the peaceful domain was the domain of restraint. The first 300 were occupied by the Yi tribes, and the other 200 by criminals undergoing the lesser banishment. Five hundred li beyond the domain of restraint lay the wild domain. Three hundred li were occupied by the Man tribes, and the other 200 li by criminals undergoing the greater banishment.” (Si, 2002: 43). The “Discourses of Zhou” of the “Discourses of the States” in the Zhou Dynasty stated, “In the Emperor’s system, imperial domain is in the capital. The domain of the nobles is beyond the capital. The protectors of the feudal lords reside in the peaceful domain. Yi tribes reside in the domain of restraint. Barbarians reside in the wild domain” (Tung, 2002: 9-10). The imagination of political forces crossing 2,500 li of the Zhou Dynasty apparently is inconsistent with facts. However, from another perspective, the imagination of the “five domains” in the Chinese world view reflects the limited material power of the central political body, as well as the self-perception of the progressively decreasing central authority within the geographical range. The gradual refinement of the concept of the five domains also represents that, Chinese world view has been gradually established as the model of political order under the self-centered perception of the Chinese nation. In addition to describing the five domains, the “Discourses of Zhou” of the “Discourses of the States” in the Zhou Dynasty also outlined the important characteristic: “Not to rule barbarians; not to conquer the domain of restraint and wild domain.” The refusal to pursue the idea “Under the whole heaven, Every spot is the sovereign's ground; To the borders of the land, Every individual is the sovereign's minister” 11 was deliberately ignored by the currently perceived or emphasized

11 Please see <Decade of Bei Shan> of <The Book of Odes> (Chu, 1976: 209-210).


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Tianxia order. The “Discourses of Zhou” stated, “Daily worshipping, monthly sacrifice, quarterly grand worshipping, annual tribute, and meeting with the Emperor once in a lifetime are the regulations developed by former emperors. If those who reside in the imperial domain do not practice daily worshipping, the Emperor shall perform introspection. If those who reside in the domain of the nobles do not offer monthly sacrifice, the Emperor shall inspect his orders. If those who reside in the peaceful domain do not practice quarterly grand worshipping, the Emperor shall inspect laws and regulations. If those who reside in the domain of restraint do not pay tribute, the Emperor shall inspect the hierarchy. If those who reside in the wild domain do not meet with the Emperor, the Emperor shall perform moral introspection.” It went on to say that the Emperor shall not impose punishments until he implements the said procedures according to the order. Therefore, various measures can be taken to punish those who do not practice worshipping, attack those who do not offer sacrifice, crusade against those who do not practice grand worshipping, condemn those who do not pay tribute, and admonish those who do not meet with the Emperor. As a result, there were penal codes for punishment, army for attack, armament for crusade, strict order for condemnation, and words for admonishment. If those who failed to do the above still refused to fulfill their obligations after the orders are issued, the Emperor shall perform moral introspection again, instead of easily declaring war. By doing so, those who reside in the domains nearby the capital will be obedient, and those who reside in the domains far from the capital will be submissive.” (Tung, 2002: 12-14) Therefore, armed forces were used to threaten those who resided in the domains nearby the capital, while at most, only words of admonishment were used to warn those who resided in the domains far from the capital. The concept of five domains was prestigious, but not practical. The so-called “civil culture and De are to be cultivated to attract remote people” was merely an ideal. Not to rule and not to conquer were the actual strategies in real politics (Lo, 2011: 27). Therefore, the Chinese world view of Tianzxia did not request the hegemon to implement undifferentiated authoritative governance over all the others. On the contrary, the Chinese world view of Tianzxia acknowledged that the level of hegemonic governance would be limited by objective factors, such as geographic isolation, and thus, progressively decreased. 2. Emphasis on the justification of changed dynasties Mandate of Heaven was the only source of justification to endow the hegemonic countries in the three dynasties with leading status. Heaven has multiple meanings for the Chinese nation. Heaven is the material opposite to earth, the


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dominator of personality, unchangeable fate, the sky in nature, and the highest principle involving the universe (Feng, 2014: 70). In addition to being referred to as “material opposite to earth” in “The Book of Odes,” “The Classic of History,” “Zuo Zhuan,” and “Discourse of the States,” heaven was referred to as a dominator. Heaven, as mentioned by Confucius in “The Analects of Confucius,” also represents the dominator (Feng, 2014: 70). In the beginning of the Shang Dynasty and the Zhou Dynasty, heaven generally referred to the God. To be more specific, heaven referred to the “court of heaven” (Yu, 2014: 36). In Chinese civilization, heaven is the dominator of all living things, and is the source of justification for the norms and rules of the world. The emperors of people on earth used sorcerer spells from the emperor in heaven to obtain the mandate to rule the empire (Yu, 2014: 63). Archaeological discoveries verified that, the Shang Dynasty formed witchcraft politics by controlling the monopoly to communicate with the God in the heaven, such as characters and worshipers. Yin-Yang changes the ancient images of a round heaven, a square earth, the leftward rotation of the heavenly path, the center, and the four directions, where the change of the four seasons used symbolic hints and ritual deification to gradually become the unalterable starting point in people’s analogy. The eternal heaven became the external doctrine, meaning heaven was no longer astrology seen by the people, but became the way of heaven, which implied all rationality and constructed the order of knowledge and thought (Ke, 2001: 45-46). Before attacking Jie of Xia, Tang of Shang criticized him as a king without a right way, and a man who lost the justification of rule and dominance. Therefore, Tang of Shang accepted the order from the God of heaven to revolt against Jie of Xia12. To the emperors of the Shang Dynasty, who claimed to be “Da Yin Shang,” their dominant status over various vassal states was endowed by the God of heaven, and thus, could not be challenged.

12 “Come, multitudes of the people, listen all to my words. It is not I, the little child, who dare to

undertake a rebellious enterprise; but for the many crimes of the sovereign of Xia, Heaven has given

the charge to destroy him. Now, ye multitudes, you are saying, "Our prince does not compassionate us,

but (is calling us) away from our husbandry to attack and punish Xia." I have indeed heard (these)

words of you all; (but) the sovereign of Xia is guilty, and as I fear God, I dare not but punish him. Now

you are saying, "What are the crimes of Xia to us?" The king of Xia in every way exhausts the strength

of his people, and exercises oppression in the cities of Xia. His multitudes are become entirely

indifferent (to his service), and feel no bond of union'(to him). They are saying, "When wilt thou, O sun,

expire? We will all perish with thee." Such is the course of (the sovereign) of Xia, and now I must go

(and punish him).” “Please see “Speech of Tang” of “The Classic of History” (Chu, 1969: 49-50).


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In order to justify King Wu of Zhou’s replacement of the dominant status of King Zhou of Shang in the Tianxia, the early days of the Zhou Dynasty developed the concept of heaven’s mandate to justify the Zhou people’s leading status in the revolution. Heaven’s mandate is the most important concept of the witchcraft culture, as originated from the pre-Shang Dynasty. It is the residual memory of the history of ancient religious and political development, and reflects that the king on earth used sorcerers as a medium to monopolize communication with “God” or “heaven.” Witchcraft suggested that “God” or “heaven” received the worship of a king on earth, and acknowledged the legitimacy of his kingdom and rule, which represented that his kingdom accepted the “mandate” (Hsu, 2014: 42). However, the formation of the specific concept of heaven’s mandate was originated from West Zhou (Yu, 2014: 78). The Emperor of Zhou replaced the hegemonic status of the Emperor of Shang, which undoubtedly denied the Emperor of Shang’s mandate and legitimacy to rule. How to justify that the Emperor of Zhou accepted this heaven’s mandate, while the Emperor of Shang lost this mandate, was an important challenge faced by the Zhou Dynasty at the beginning of establishing the foundation of rule. In order to persuade the adherents of Yin Shang, Zhou Gong quoted the allusion about how Tang of Shang replaced Jie of Xia because he accepted the mandate. After King Zhou of Shang lost his way, he also lost his mandate to rule Tianxia. The Emperor of Zhou was the successor of mandate favored by the God of heaven, and was viewed by God as an adequate ruler of Tianxia13. 13 “God leads men to tranquil security," but the sovereign of Xia would not move to such security, whereupon God sent down corrections, indicating his mind to him. (Jie); however, he would not be warned by God, but proceeded to greater dissoluteness, sloth, and excuses for himself. Then Heaven no longer regarded nor heard him, but disallowed his great appointment, and inflicted extreme punishment. Then it charged your founder, Tang the Successful, to set Xia aside, and by means of able men to rule the kingdom. From Tang the Successful down to Di-Yi, every sovereign sought to make his De illustrious, and duly attended to the sacrifices. And thus, it was that, while Heaven exerted a great establishing influence, preserving and regulating the House of Yin, its sovereigns on their part were humbly careful not to lose (the favor of) God, and strove to manifest a good-doing corresponding to that of Heaven. But in these times, their successor showed himself greatly ignorant of (the ways of) Heaven, and much less could be expected of him that he would be regardful of the earnest labors of his fathers for the country. Greatly abandoned to dissolute idleness, he gave no thought to the bright principles of Heaven, or the awfulness of the people. On this account God no longer protected him, but sent down the great ruin, which we have witnessed. Heaven was not with him, because he did not make his De illustrious. (Indeed), with regard to the overthrow of all states, great and small, throughout the four quarters of the kingdom, in every case reasons can be given for their punishment;” “Ye numerous officers of Yin, the case now is this, that the kings of our Zhou, from their great goodness, were charged with the work of God. There was the charge to them, 'Cut off Yin.' (They proceeded to perform it), and announced the execution of their service to God. In our affairs we have followed no double aims; ye of the royal House (of Yin) must (now simply) follow us. May I not say that you have been very lawless? I did not (want to) remove you. The thing came from your own city. When I consider also how Heaven has drawn near to Yin with so great tribulations, it must be that there was (there) what was not right.” See “Numerous Officers” of “The Classic of History” (Chu, 1969: 132).


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The concept of “Variant Mandate of Heaven” was further derived from the theory of mandate transition, which reflects the high uncertainty for the maintenance of the dominant status of the international system in the early days of the Zhou Dynasty. Although the statement of heaven’s mandate transition is the foundation of legitimacy to persuade Yin Shang to obey the Zhou people, it also verified that the heaven’s mandate offered to the Emperor of Zhou by heaven, the highest dominator, can also be transferred to other people at any time. Therefore, variant mandate of heaven, which also leads to the highly uncertain state of hegemon. “Wen Wang” of the “The Book of Odes” outlined the adverse situation of the highly uncertain state of the hegemonic country: Profound was king Wen; Oh! Continuous and bright was his feeling of reverence. Great is the appointment of Heaven! There were the descendants of [the sovereigns] of Shang; the descendants of the sovereigns of Shang, were in number more than hundreds of thousands; but when God gave the command, the appointment of Heaven is not constant. The officers of Yin, admirable and alert, assist at the libations in [our] capital; they assist at those libations, always wearing the hatchets on their lower garment and their peculiar cap. O ye loyal ministers of the king, ever think of your ancestor! Ever think of your ancestor, cultivating your De (德), always striving to accord with the will [of Heaven]. So shall you be seeking for much happiness. Before Yin lost the multitudes, [Its kings] were the assessors for God. Look to Yin as a beacon; the great appointment is not easily [preserved]. The appointment is not easily [preserved], do not cause your own extinction. Display and make bright your righteousness and name, and look at [the fate of] Yin in the light of Heaven. The doings of High Heaven, have neither sound nor smell. Take your pattern from king Wen, and the myriad regions will repose confidence in you. (Chu, 1976: 232-234). 3. Rule of De for Hegemony Maintenance The concept of the De-ruling (德治) for maintaining hegemonic governance was derived from the concept of “Variant Mandate of Heaven.” In order to develop long-term hegemonic domination and be permanently free from being challenged, emperors implementing hegemonic governance must understand the feeling and needs of those who are ruled. At the end of the Xia and Shang Dynasties, Zhou was enlightenment for the Zhou people – the dominant status of the Emperor of Zhou would not face the challenges of other emerging states. The leading status to rule various states in the world was conditional; in addition, such a dominant and leading status could not be sustained until certain policies were implemented. Therefore, the


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rule of De became an important means for the maintenance of this leading status. Today, the meaning of De (德) in mandarin Chinese is as equal as virtue, however, in the Yin Shang and Zhou Dynasties eras, the original meaning of De was ancestral worship. De was the performance of a behavior or act, but did not have any moral or regulatory meaning (Wang, 1998: 149-150). De was also a spiritual power combined with crusade (Takao Hirase, 2007: 68-69). Since the era of Zhou Gong, the Zhou people started to emphasize that De was behaviors of the political governance of emperors accepting heaven’s mandate, such as, the protection of people, diligent governance, cautious penalty, obedience to the teachings of the deceased, and the establishment and maintenance of the order of the rule of rites, in order to be praised by heaven and extend heaven’s mandate (Yu, 2014: 106). The establishment of the order of the rites in the Zhou Dynasty centered on De, and its objective was to sustain the heaven’s mandate of the established hegemonic governance, without being permanently challenged. The rule of De was an important capacity to assist in the materials and advantages of the armed forces. According to the review of the era of King Wen of Zhou, the Zhou people admitted that, “My deceased father, king Wen, completed his merit, and grandly received the appointment of Heaven, to soothe the regions of our great land. The great states feared his strength; the small states thought fondly of his De”14. Respect for De was an important governance attitude for the sustainability of heaven’s mandate. The Duke of Shao advised the Emperor of Zhou to recall the lessons of change of past hegemonies; otherwise, the Emperor of Zhou might also face the same fate as Yin Shang did, “We should by all means survey the dynasties of Xia and Yin. I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Xia was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years," nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour prematurely fell to the ground. (Similarly), I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Yin was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years," nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour fell prematurely to the world. The king has now inherited the decree - the same decree, I consider, which belonged to those two dynasties. Let him seek to inherit (the Des of) their meritorious (sovereigns)”15. The specific acts to maintain the sustainability of hegemony included: “Great Heaven has no partial affections; it helps

14 See “Successful Completion of the War” of “The Classic of History” (Li and Wang, 2000: 209-216). 15 See “Announcement of the Duke of Shao” of “The Classic of History” (Chu, 1969: 120).


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only the virtuous. The people's hearts have no unchanging attachment; they cherish only the kind. Acts of goodness are different, but they contribute in common to good order. Acts of evil are different, but they contribute in common to disorder. Be cautious! In giving heed to the beginning think of the end;--the end will then be without distress. If you do not think of the end, it will be full of distress, even of the greatest. Exert yourself to achieve your proper merit. Seek to be in harmony with all your neighbors. Be a fence to the royal House. Live in amity with your brethren. Tranquillize and help the lower people. Follow the course of the Mean, and do not, by aiming to be intelligent, throw old statutes into confusion. Watch over what you see and hear, and do not for one-sided words deviate from the right rule”16. It was also necessary to enlighten the defeated Yin people: “It was your greatly distinguished father, the king Wen, who was able to illustrate his De and be careful in the use of punishments. He did not dare to treat with contempt (even) wifeless men and widows. He employed the employable, and revered the reverend; he was terrible to those who needed to be awed - so getting distinction among the people. It was thus he laid the foundations of (the sway of) our small portion of the kingdom, and the one or two (neighboring) regions were brought under, his improving influence, until throughout our western land, all placed in him their reliance. The fame, of him ascended up to the high God, and God approved. Heaven accordingly gave a grand charge to king Wen, to exterminate the great (dynasty of) Yin, and grandly receive its appointment, so that the various countries belonging to it and their peoples were brought to an orderly condition. Then your unworthy elder brother exerted himself; and thus it is that you Feng, the little one, are here in this eastern region.” The king says, “Oh! Feng, bear these things in mind. Now (your success in the management of) the people will depend on your reverently following your father Wen; do you carry out his virtuous words which you have heard, and clothe yourself with them. (Moreover), where you go, seek out among (the traces of) the former wise kings of Yin what you may use in protecting and regulating their people. (Again), you must in the remote distance study the (ways of) the old accomplished men of Shang, that you may establish your heart, and know how to instruct (the people). (Further still), you must search out besides what is to be learned of the wise kings of antiquity, and employ it in tranquillizing and protecting the people. (Finally), enlarge (your thoughts) to (the comprehension of all) heavenly (principles) and De will be richly displayed in your person, so that you will not render nugatory the king's charge.” The king says, “Oh! Feng, the little one, be respectfully careful, as if you were suffering from a disease. Awful though Heaven be, it yet helps the sincere. The feelings of the people can for the most part be discerned; but it is difficult to preserve (the attachment of) the lower classes. Where you go, employ all

16 See “Charge to Zhong of Cai” of “The Classic of History” (Li and Wang, 2000: 331-335).


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your heart. Do not seek repose, nor be fond of ease and pleasure. I have read the saying, "Dissatisfaction is caused not so much by great things, or by small things, as by (a ruler's) observance of principle or the reverse, and by his energy of conduct or the reverse. Yes, it is yours, O little one, it is your business to enlarge the royal (influence), and to protect the people of Yin in harmony with their feelings. Thus, also shall you assist the king, consolidating the appointment of Heaven, and renovating the people.”17 In brief, the rule of De was to recall historical lessons, to understand the acts to protect and respect people of the past hegemony, including Yin Shang, to not insult the weak, to enable people to fulfill their strengths, and to impose adequate punishments using armed forces. The specific content of the protection of the people included: to make efforts in people’s affairs, not to be pleasure-seeking, not to overlook any scale of people’s complaints, transform the adherents of Yin Shang whose hegemony was replaced, to enlighten people and protect their wellbeing in life, and to become the example for the maintenance of hegemony of the Zhou Dynasty. The so-called rule of De revealed how new hegemony in the international system endeavored to integrate adherents to the replaced hegemony and took specific governance measures to incorporate the power and the resources of the old hegemony. The efforts and achievements of the rulers, especially their performance of the rule of De, became the stable foundation of the dominant and leading status of the core country. The “Announcement of the Duke of Shao” of “The Classic of History” emphasized that: “Although the king is young, yet he is the great son (of God). Let him effect a great harmony with the lower people, and that will be the blessing of the present time. Let not the king presume to be remiss in this, but continually regard and stand in awe of the perilous (uncertainty) of the people's (attachment). Let the king come here as the vice-gerent of God, and undertake (the duties of government) in this center of the land.” Dan said, "Now that this great city has been built, from henceforth he may be the mate of great Heaven, and reverently sacrifice to (the spirits) above and beneath; from henceforth he may from this central spot administer successful government." Thus, shall the king enjoy the favoring regard (of Heaven) all-complete, and the government of the people will now be prosperous. Let the king first subdue to himself those who were the managers of affairs under Yin, associating them with the managers of affairs for our Zhou. This will regulate their (perverse) natures, and they will make daily advancement. Let the king make reverence the resting-place (of his mind); he must maintain the De of reverence. We should by all means survey the dynasties of Xia and Yin. I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Xia was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years,"

17 See “Announcement to the Prince of Kang” of “The Classic of History” (Chu, 1969: 97-98).


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nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour prematurely fell to the ground. (Similarly), I do not presume to know and say, "The dynasty of Yin was to enjoy the favoring decree of Heaven just for (so many) years," nor do I presume to know and say, "It could not continue longer." The fact simply was, that, for want of the De of reverence, the decree in its favour fell prematurely to the ground. The king has now inherited the decree - the same decree, I consider, which belonged to those two dynasties. Let him seek to inherit (the Des of) their meritorious (sovereigns)” (Chu, 1969: 120). The review of relevant articles in “The Classic of History” and “The Book of Odes” showed that, the De repeatedly emphasized by the Zhou people was not the moral requirements for human relationships, but the political behaviors of rulers. Therefore, viewing morality as the starting point of the governance of international relations was actually a misconception of the heaven’s mandate perspectives, as well as the rule of De in the Zhou Dynasty18. The request for rule of De also reflects the governance concept of “To rule people, and not to rule land” in the Chinese world view of Tianxia. The people to whom the rule of De was implemented were the general public. Therefore, the lands of four directions were merely the positions where the emperors implemented the rule of De, instead of the objects and targets of governance by the dominant and leading country in the system. The above perspective is completely different from the sovereign ruling which governs exclusively people, things, and matters in a specific territory, as emphasized by the Westphalian system. After the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the geographical perception of the four directions in the Tianxia was combined with the cultural supremacy. Therefore, Tianxia became Chinese expression of the world, where geography was integrated with culture, and formed the cultural location imagined by the middle kingdom of Chinese nation. The middle kingdom further suggested that, they themselves were the geographical center of the world, as well as the center of civilization. The world seemed to be a checkboard of concentric squares, and the periphery continued to extend outward from the center. The innermost concentric square was the capital, followed by the imperial domain, the domain of the nobles, and the wild domain. In such a geographical space, the further the domain was, the wilder it was, the more barbarous the foreign people residing there were, and the lower the level of civilization (Ke, 2014: 36-37). In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, Tianxia, which

18 Some of the scholars from Mainland China emphasized the morality, righteousness, and rites in Confucianism. For example, Xuetong Yen attempted to create “moral realism” to supplement international relations theories (Yen, 2014); Wang Rihua advocated the development of international relations theories based on Confucianism (Wang, 2011).


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was originally the pure expression and perception of space, was mixed with cultural segmentation and supremacy of ethnic identity. It deprived the potential of non-middle kingdom nations to become the geographical and cultural core of the world, and justified the dominant status of the middle kingdom. However, in the concepts, the defensive barrier between foreigner and the middle kingdom people (the Chinese?), which implied ethnic supremacy, and the international socialization argument, which suggested that foreigners may become Chinese, the objects governed under the Chinese world view of Tianxia referred to people, rather than lands. The territorial expansion under hegemonic in the Chinese world view of Tianxia was additional geographical expansion, as generated during the process where other regions were integrated into Chinese hegemonic governance. According to Zhou peoples, while all kinds of self-alertness issued in the beginning after they obtained Tianxia, after the Emperor of Zhou accepted the mandate from heaven to become the new hegemony, the sustainability of the hegemonic achievements were not unconditionally protected. On the contrary, heaven paid continual attention to the feelings of the people under hegemonic governance. If the hegemony accepting the heaven’s mandate implemented proper policies and established the order of the rule of rites that satisfied all the people, it could be verified that this empire respected De and could continue receiving the heaven’s mandate to rule. However, if the hegemony failed to do so, it would lose the heaven’s mandate and encounter the fate of being replaced by an emerging country. Therefore, this study found that, heaven’s mandate, proper ruling measures of De were all requirements for ruling Tianxia. The ruling empire respected De in order to achieve the effect of empire sustainability. The above were all compliant with the regulations of heaven (Yu, 2014: 107-108), as well as the essential conditions for the permanent maintenance of the dominant and leading status of the system. Overall, the Chinese world view of Tianxia expresses the political order of dominating tens of thousands of states. In terms of geographical perception, Tianxia is the imagined ideal regarding planar space, where round heaven and square earth are extended to the nine continents and four seas. Heaven is interpreted and defined as the origin of general principles. Heaven’s mandate justifies the dominant governance of the ruling country in the system. However, due to the high uncertainty caused by a heaven’s mandate transition, a ruling country should be self-alert at all times and implement adequate governance strategies, namely, the “rule of De,” in order to maintain the sustainability of its leading status. However, the concepts of the heaven’s mandate and rule of De, as developed at the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, were


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gradually transformed after the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Cultural and ethnic supremacy were integrated with the original imagined ideal regarding the planar geographical space to develop the system of five domains, which further formed the meaning of the order of the future Chinese tribute system. The re-interpretations of the Chinese world view of Tianxia by Mainland China scholars mainly emphasize the inclusiveness and normative value to defy the Westphalian system. The operational details of the Chinese world view of Tianxia have not been further analyzed, interpreted, or investigated. However, it is a shame that, despite these efforts, an optional international relations analysis approach has not been developed. International academic communities fear that the research results of the Chinese school of IR may be inclined to Chinese ethnocentrism and become the tool supporting PRC’s foreign policies (Acharya, 2015: 14-15).

3. Global Tianxia Perspectives for Explaining World Hegemony

Transition Based on the traditional Chinese world view of Tianxia and the mainstream international relations theories, this study defines the Global Tianxia is the logic of international hierarchical order transition of material power and ruling legitimacy in international systems. Inspired by the Chinese world view of Tianxia, the Global Tianxia suggests that the uncertainty of the “Variant Mandate of Heaven” exists in the international hierarchical order, and the hegemony shifting is the co-product of the transition of material power and ruling legitimacy. The Global Tianxia further emphasizes that, if hegemony can implement the proper strategy of De-ruling to understand the needs of the ruled, the foundation of its legitimacy can be solidified to suppress the rise of challengers and create sustainable hegemony. Being different from the hegemony theory and power transition theory, which focus on the international material power shifting (Gilpin, 1981; Kugler and Organski, 1989; Modelski, 1987; Tammen, 2000), the Global Tianxia perspecties considers material power, the function and influence of hegemonic governance, and the legitimacy of the maintenance of hegemony. 1. Universal applicability of Global Taianxia Perspectives The Global Tianxia breaks the prejudice of the Chinese world view of Tianxia–


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that only China can be the hegemony of the world, and suggests that, in global Tianxia, all countries, including China, can become the political center dominating world order, as well as the Tianxia hegemony of “middle kingdom” composed of the cultural normative center and geographical center, after acquiring the material power supremacy and governance legitimacy. The scope of the Global Tianxia of “any place can be the center” is global. The Global Tianxia breaks the Sino-centric bias of the Chinese world view of Tianxia, and is integrated with the mainstream international relations paradigms with universal applicability, which depicts the transformation of the global hierarchical order. The prejudice of the Chinese world view of Tianxia– “only China can be the center” suggests that, only when peripheral seized the geographical core of middle kingdom can it become the political and cultural core of Tianxia. The Chinese world view of Tianxia is a planar geographical perception, meaning the starting point of the Chinese world view of Tianxia is self, which extends unlimitedly to the four directions and further forms the so-called Tianxia. In the planar Tianxia, the traditional Chinese world view of Tianxia suggests that the leading state of the international system can only be the country at the center of the geographical space, namely, the middle kingdom (China) as the cultural peak. Therefore, the traditional Chinese world view of Tianxia can explain the tendency where barbarians from four directions invaded the middle kingdom-country in the center- and fought for world leadership, cultural supremacy, and the center of the geographical space. However, when the world changed from Tianxia extending from the center to the four directions of the spherical world, and where any place can be the geographical center, normative and culture core, and political leadership center, the traditional perspective of Tianxia and the four directions, which suggests that the fight for the Central Plains is certain, faces the fate of collapse. For example, the U.K. or the U.S. would not have to invade the Central Plains and proclaim itself Emperor in Beijing to become the global political, economic, and cultural core. It can create global hegemony at its own geographical location. The original idea of the Chinese world view of Tianxia is not to view middle kingdom or the Central Plains as the political, normative, cultural, or geographical core. During the establishment of West Zhou, discourse regarding the change of heaven’s mandate did not suggest that the geographical center, cultural center, and political core should be overlapped, but emphasized the variations of political hegemonic status and its ruling legitimacy, and justified the process and inevitability of the hegemony transition in the international system. The fact that the Zhou people


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replaced Yin Shang’s “Da Yi Shang” to become “Da Yi Zhou”19 showed that, the Zhou people intended to replace the core political hegemony status of Yin Shang in the international system, rather than replacing its geographical center location. As a matter of fact, the origin of the Zhou people was in the west of Central Plains. From a geographical perspective, Zhou was not the so-called country at the center of the Central Plains. The geographical location of the Qin state, which unified Tianxia in the Warring Periods, was not middle kingdom (country in the center) on the Central Plains, either20. Therefore, the transfer of heaven’s mandate and the Zhou people’s self-alertness of “Variant Mandate of Heaven” justifies that every state can become the hegemonic core of international society. The Global Tianxia perspectives allows every country in the world to have to chance to have their heaven’s mandate from heaven, and become the core (middle kingdom) governing Tianxia. The spherical geographical perception of Tianxia does not reject the fact that the Zhou people, who resided in a remote geographical location, replaced Yin Zhang. Under the perception of the Global Tianxia, the hegemonic and dominant status, power supremacy, normative and cultural core, and geographical center are interrelated. Therefore, when the Zhou people residing in a remote geographical location replaced “Da Yi Shang,” they also realized power and status transition from the peripheral area of geography, power, norms, and culture to “Da Yi Shang” of Yin Shang, and obtained triple status for controlling Tianxia: meaning the geographical center, hegemonic power, and civilization supremacy. The developmental process of the international relations history also proves that, any country that enjoyed the material power and soft power could establish the global hegemony in its own geographical location. Therefore, emerging hegemonic countries do not have to relocate themselves to the so-called geographical center of the world, because in a global Tianxia, any place can be the center (Ke, 2014: 42), and any point (country) of the sphere is a geographical core with a certain distance between coordinates in the four directions. Accepting that any point in the world can be the geographical center liberates the world view of Tianxia from the sino-centric default and further lays the theoretical foundation for the Global Tianxia to be developed into a theoretical paradigm regarding the global transition of hierarchical order.

19 “Successful Completion of the War” of “The Classic of History” said, “Heaven's favors stir them up, so that they come with their allegiance to our great state of Zhou.” (Li and Wang, 2000: 211). 20 “China” (country in the center) at the time should refer to states, such as Han, Chao, and Wei (Chang, 2009: 229).


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2. Status Uncertainty in the Hierarchical System Due to differences in cause-and-effect logic, the Global Tianxia and mainstream international relation theories face the same conclusion regarding power transition. The Global Tianxia suggests that, highly intensified status uncertainty also exists in hierarchical order. Such fear and worry about the loss of power supremacy and dominant position is an important factor leading to the hegemony transition. The mainstream international relations paradigms aim to explore the behavioral models of countries under a the international anarchical system (Chen, 2014: 133-136). Realism suggests that, under the pressure to safeguard state’s survival and safety in the uncertain anarchical world, a state of anarchy is the only source leading to the security uncertainty (Jervis 1978; Waltz 1979: 105; Mearsheimer, 2001: 42-46; Schweller, 1996). On the contrary, mainstream international relations paradigms view hierarchical systems as the synonym of stable order (Kang, 2005; Waltz, 1979: 114-116), and suggests that hegemony will create stable order in international society (Gilpin, 1981). However, at the beginning of the Zhou Dynasty, the kings were alerted to the warning of “Variant Mandate of Heaven,” which emphasized highly intensified power and status uncertainty in a hierarchical order. As the Zhou people replaced the hegemony of Yin Shang, they also perceived the fearful pressure of “Variant Mandate of Heaven.” The idea of “Variant Mandate of Heaven” verifies that the structural logic of Global Tianxia is consistent with the hegemony theory and power transition theory. “Variant Mandate of Heaven” demonstrates that the hierarchical characteristic of the international system does not block the material power shifting. The international society of hegemonic hierarchy, as constructed by Yin Shang, did not ensure that Yin Shang could permanently maintain the material power supremacy to dominate international society. The power of Zhou people’s in the west was gradually expanded, verifying that the hierarchical structure did not freeze the distribution and re-distribution of material power. The development of hegemony in the U.K. and the U.S. in modern times also reflects that, even the hegemonic hierarchical order of highly centralized power and position cannot freeze the material power redistribution in the hierarchical system. The Global Tianxia perspectives also verifies that logic in the hierarchical order– a dominant country in the hierarchical system cannot permanently maintain the relative material power supremacy (Gilpin, 1981; Tammen, 2000). Moreover, the legitimacy of hegemonic governance is extremely fragile and sensitive. The unpopular and counterintuitive measures as well as the behaviors of


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excessive exploitation of vassal states will lead to the rapid loss of the legitimacy of hegemonic governance, and further increase the legitimacy of emerging states that challenge the hegemony. On the other hand, the pressure of “Variant Mandate of Heaven” means that, even if hegemony had obtained dominant status in the international hierarchical order, it was still under security and status uncertainty, thus, reflecting the structural constraints imposed on hegemony in a hierarchical system. Vassal countries benefit from the security and public finance provided by the hegemony, and may remain in a relatively safe environment under the dominance of hegemony. However, the hegemony at the top of the power distribution pyramid in a hierarchical society still worries about the loss of relative material power, as well as their leading status, which could occur at any time if the legitimacy of their hegemonic governance had been undermined. The Global Tianxia perspectives do not deny the use of coercive power. However, it also emphasizes that legitimate ruling policies are ways for overcoming the security and status uncertainty raised form the “Variant Mandate of Heaven”. The various measures and advices taken by the Zhou Dynasty, due to the early perception that Variant Mandate of Heaven, showed that incorporating the resources of the defeated Yin Shang hegemony for the use of the emerging hegemonic country of the Zhou Dynasty were important tactics to respond to the security and status pressure that “Variant Mandate of Heaven” generated. The global Tianxia suggests that, emerging hegemonic countries must take proper acts, such as re-constructing itself as the political, normative, and cultural center, thus, constructing itself as the new core attracting the people in Tianxia, as well as implementing specific political policies (i.e. respect for De), winning the recognition and obedience of the people of the former hegemony, and transforming the power resources of the former hegemony into the emerging hegemon. The purpose of respect for De is to understand people, and the grassroots people habiting in various states in Tianxia are the targets for hegemonic governance sustainability. Taking the U.S.’s reuse of the defeating Germany and Japanese resources after the WWII for example, the global Tianxia’s perspectives explain how the new hegemony absorbs the resources of the old one, reshapes the identity of whom had attributed their loyalty to the old hegemony.


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3. Strategies for Maintaining Hegemony The Global Tianxia perspectives emphasise the important about how to solidify and maintain hegemony, an issue that current international relation paradigms ignore. The Global Tianxia sees the important role played by the De-ruling strategy. The Global Tianxia suggests that governance legitimacy can increase the material power supremacy by incorporating human and material resources of the old hegemon. The De-ruling strategies can relatively increase the legitimacy of hegemonic governance and strengthen the solidification of hegemony. The hegemony theory and power transition theory suggest that material power supremacy is the unique foundation for the hegemonic maintenance, while denying the importance of normative legitimacy (Gilpin, 1981: 34). They suggested that the relative power distribution is the main cause of hegemonic shifting, as well as the only foundation for the hegemonic governance. Those who use armed forces to seize the dominant status in Tianxia will encounter the resistance of the armed forces of the original hegemonic country21. Moreover, the alliances and partners of the original hegemonic country will become obstacles hindering the emerging hegemonic country’s establishment of their hegemonic and dominant status. Therefore, how to incorporate the defeated hegemony and its alliances, is an important challenge for an emerging power to solidify its hegemony. Governance legitimacy is an important element for the Tianxia ruling. The Global Tianxia perspectives found that, the legitimacy is required for obtaining the world and developing the hegemonic order. The initial stage for the development of world order is definitely associated with armed forces; however, to seize the recognition of the world people, and obtain their obedience, hegemonic state must rely on legitimacy to win the obedience of various states in the world. Legitimacy is the foundation for the use of force to neutralize the opponents’ resistance and unite alliances. Before the Battle of Muye, King Wu of Zhou started to destroy the legitimacy of King Zhou of Shang’s leading status, and claimed that the fight against King Zhou of Shang was God’s mandate from the heaven. King Wu of Zhou demanded that the various states join the alliance against Shang, and claimed that vassal states that refused to cooperate with Zhou would be punished by heaven. The king of Zhou also used heaven’s mandate to defeat the morale of the armed forces of King Zhou of Shang, which triggered the armed forces of Shang to become traitors.

21 The form is hegemonic wars (Gilpin, 1981).


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On the other hand, King Wu of Zhou claimed that, the nobles who originally had been adherents of the King of Shang would be protected if they followed the heaven’s mandate to obey the King of Zhou. However, if they failed to do so, they would be exterminated in the name of heaven (Yang, 1999: 517-518). Therefore, the support of legitimacy is an important means for emerging country to increase her power supremacy to challenge the status quo hegemony. The material power alone is insufficient to ensure hegemonic sustainability. Hegemon must maintain a humble attitude, and adopt different governance measures for the different governed objects in order to satisfy the basic living needs of the people under her rule. Hegemon must also consider the quality of their policies in order to strengthen the credibility of their hegemonic governance, avoid the merge of her challenger caused largely because of her internal corruption and decline, obtain the legitimacy for ruling the world, and further destroy the alliance formation of her challengers leading to the overturn of hegemony.

IV. Conclusion Reflection on the idea of Tianxia may provide a feasible approach to explore Chinese cultural and historical experiences and review international relations research paradigms. The Tianxia thinking offers many new findings regarding the hegemony shifting in the international system. The Tianxia perspectives suggest that the international hierarchical system of hegemonic governance will face the challenges of emerging countries. After overturning the status quo hegemony, emerging countries aim to avoid repeating mistakes, and intend to lay a foundation for the hegemony sustainability of De-ruling that meets the needs of the ruled. The Tianxia perspectives found that the collapse of hegemony, namely, the shift of heaven’s mandate, can be attributed to the undertaking of non-De policies, i.e. ignorance regarding the proper means of hegemonic governance and the abuse of hegemonic material power. The most critical factor leading to the loss of De, and thus, the loss of Tianxia, is the internal corruption rather than the rise of external challengers. If hegemonic state can maintain governance efficacy, countries on the rise have no chance to obtain legitimacy to exceed the hegemony or obtain material power supremacy to replace the status quo hegemony. The sino-centric prejudice is a major obstacle limiting the development of the Chinese world view of Tianxia into a paradigm for interpreting and analyzing


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international relations. However, any place including China can be the core of the world because any point on the sphere can act as the core and maintain an equal distance with the four directions. As a result, every member of the international system at any point of spherical Tianxia can become the political power, cultural, normative and institutional core, and center of the geographical space of the international system. Apparently, after the hierarchical hegemony is established, security uncertainty does not disappear in the international system, and it even imposes more pressure on the hegemonic leading state. The Global Tianxia perspectives found that legitimacy is an important factor affecting the power distribution between the emerging power and the status quo hegemony. With the support of legitimacy, emerging countries can unite alliances and strengthen material power advantages. Legitimacy can also become a weapon for enlightening the conquered people to have their obedience after the new hegemony is established. It is difficult to maintain the hegemony once it loses its legitimacy, and the loss of legitimacy may even create favorable conditions for challengers to take the chance to rise.


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