global swing states and the non-proliferation order
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Global SwinG StateS workinG PaPer 2012
Global SwinG StateS and
the non-Proliferation order
MeGan Garcia
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2012 Te German Marshall Fund o the United States. All rights reserved.
No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm or by any means without permission in writing
rom the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to:
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Tis publication can be downloaded or ree at www.gmus.org/publications.
G Sg Ss Pj
Tis working paper is part o an ongoing project undertaken by the German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF)
and the Center or a New American Security (CNAS). Te project, co-led by Daniel M. Kliman and Richard Fontaine,
examines how the United States and its European allies can partner more closely with Brazil, India, Indonesia, and urkey to
strengthen international order. Te views expressed here are those o the author and do not necessarily represent the views
o the project leaders or their respective institutions.
au GMf
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global challenges and opportunities in the spirit o the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institu-
tions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members o the policy and business communities,
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Washington, DC, GMF has seven oces in Europe: Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF
also has smaller representations in Bratislava, urin, and Stockholm.
GMfs as Pgm
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or the United States and Europe through research, publications, commentary, conerences, ellowships, study tours, and
collaborations with other GMF programs. Te Programs initiatives include the Stockholm China Forum, India rilateralForum, the Global Swing States Project, the Young Strategists Forum, rilateral Forum okyo, ransatlantic Workshop on
Pakistan, and high-level conversations at GMFs major conerences. Te program also publishes independent analysis by
more than 15 in-house experts on Asia and externally commissioned papers looking at American and European approaches
to the Asia-Pacic and on deepening cooperation between democratic Asia and the West.
au c n am Suy
Te mission o the Center or a New American Security (CNAS) is to develop strong, pragmatic and principled national
security and deense policies. Building on the expertise and experience o its staf and advisors, CNAS engages policy-
makers, experts and the public with innovative, act-based research, ideas and analysis to shape and elevate the national
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Cover photo: Fornaxus
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Global Swing States andthe Non-Proliferation Order
Global Swing States Working Paper
November 2012
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Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order 1
Nuclear issues are
a source of intense
domestic debate.
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States2
he global nuclear order
is under increasing
pressure as the
perceptual gap grows
between nations with
nuclear weapons and
those without.
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Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order 3
Since the initial deb
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States4
Brazil has also been
a stalwart champion
of generating regional
solutions to nuclear
security problems.
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Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order 5
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Balancing Regional and Global Relationships:
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Turkish leaders hav
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States6
The Iran Fuel Swap Deal
As a singular case of global swing states taking a high-profile role in addressing a non-proliferation challenge,
the fuel swap negotiations with Iran undertaken by Brazil and Turkey warrant close attention.
In 2009, Iran raised concerns by revealing that it had built a secret nuclear facility near Qom, and outside
experts said that the plant could produce enough nuclear material to fuel one bomb per year.1 The
permanent members of the UNSC responded by pushing the IAEA board of governors to adopt a resolution
demanding that Iran immediately stop building the facility and freeze uranium enrichment.2 Amid the
concern about developments in Irans nuclear program, the UNSC permament members and Germany began
discussions about whether to hold talks with Iran. With support from the Obama administration, Brazilian
President Lula and Turkish Prime Minister Erdoan began discussions about how they might be able to
negotiate a deal with Iran.
On May 17, 2010, Brazil, Iran, and Turkey agreed on a plan in which Iran would export 1,200 kilograms
of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey in return for fuel for a medical research reactor. The terms of the
arrangement were nearly identical to a proposal that France, Russia, the United States, and the IAEA had
proposed to Iran the previous October.3 One day later, the five permanent members of the UNSC forwarded
a draft sanctions resolution on Iran to the councils ten rotating members, which included Brazil and Turkey,
putting the future of the fuel swap in question. In addition, the permanent members reacted coldly to the
deal negotiated by Brazil and Turkey. Western leaders indicated that Irans stockpile of low-enriched uranium
had grown since the previous October, and removing the 1,200 kilograms would thus account for a smaller
percentage of Irans total stockpile, reducing the deals value as a confidence-building measure and leaving
an unacceptably high amount of low-enriched uranium in Iran.
The Turkish and Brazilian governments were caught off guard, having expected their role as mediators to
be heralded. Heavily criticized by the domestic press, Lula was lambasted as a pawn of the major powers.
Turkish leaders were also viewed negatively at home. Particularly in light of Obamas earlier encouragementof Turkey and Brazil playing a role in discussions with Iran, Lula and other Brazilian policymakers publicly and
privately fumed when the permament members of the UNSC disavowed the deal, arguing that the traditional
centers of power will not share gladly their privileged status.4 In the end, the UNSC adopted new sanctions
against Iran, effectively taking the agreement negotiated by Brazil and Turkey off the table. The deal and
the subsequent Brazilian and Turkish decision to vote against UNSC sanctions sent ripples through the
established powers by providing an example of how emerging powers could negotiate on a highly charged
issue like nuclear policy.
1 David Albright and Paul Brannan, Critique of Recent Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Article on the Fordow Enrichment
Plant (Institute for Science and International Security, November 30, 2009).
2 George Jahn, Nuclear Agency Comes Down on Iran, Associated Press, November 28, 2009.
3 Peter Crail, Brazil, Turkey Broker Fuel Swap with Iran,Arms Control Today, 40 no. 5 (June 2010).
4 Celso Amorim, Lets Hear From the New Kids on the Block, International Herald Tribune, June 14, 2010.
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Global Swing States and the Non-Proliferation Order 7
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Forging a Regional Leadership Role: Indonesia
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The German Marshall Fund of the United States8
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Moving Forward
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The most dramatic
and recent instance
in which Indonesia
forged a role as a non-
roliferation leader was
its ratification of the
CTBT.
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