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God, Man and History

© כל הזכויות שמורות

Contemporary Jewish Thoughtfrom Shalem Press:

Essential Essays on Judaism

Eliezer Berkovits

The Dawn: Political Teachingsof the Book of Esther

Yoram Hazony


Eliezer Berkovits

Edited by David Hazony

Shalem PressJerusalem

God, Manand History


Copyright © 1959, 1965, 1979 Eliezer BerkovitsCopyright © 2004 The Eliezer Berkovits Institutefor Jewish Thought at The Shalem Center.All rights reserved, including the right ofreproduction in whole or part in any form.

First edition 1959. Second edition 1965.Third edition 1979. Fourth edition 2004.

Cover design: Erica HalivniCover picture: “Lower Slopes of Mount Sinai” (1839)Copyright © Historical Picture Archive/Corbis

Printed in Israel

Distribution:The Shalem Center, 22a Hatzfira StreetJerusalem 93102, IsraelTel.: (02) 566-2202North America: 1-887-298-7300E-mail: [email protected]

ISBN 965-7052-15-7


CONTENTS

Foreword by David Hazony vii

I. The Encounter with God

1. Introduction: Philosophy and Religion 3

2. Where Religion Begins 12

3. The Biblical Record 19

4. The Paradox of the Encounter 32

5. Faith, Reason, and the Encounter 41

6. God Encountered 51

7. The Absolute Versus God 58

8. Creation 68

9. Evil 78


II. Encountering the World

10. The Problem of Ethics 87

11. Divine Law and Ethical Deed 102

12. The Holy Deed 119

III. Deed and History

13. Israel 137

14. God in History 145

Notes 160

Index 192


Foreword vii

Foreword

In the three decades prior to the rise of Nazism, Germany gavebirth to a generation of Jewish thinkers without precedent inrecent centuries. Luminaries whose work can be associated withthe ferment in Berlin and Frankfurt during this period includeHermann Cohen, Franz Rosenzweig, Martin Buber, AbrahamJoshua Heschel, Emil Fackenheim, Menachem Mendel Schneer-son, Yehiel Jacob Weinberg, and Joseph B. Soloveitchik. Inrecent years, it has become increasingly evident that one of themost creative figures within this elite group was Eliezer Berkovits(1908-1992), whose 19 books and hundreds of essays and arti-cles broke new ground in nearly every area of Jewish thought,including theology, philosophy of law, Bible studies, the mean-ing of Jewish history, nationalism and Zionism, and contempo-rary trends in Jewish and Western thought.

Despite the breadth and depth of his writings, Berkovits didnot attain during his lifetime the level of recognition enjoyedby other major Jewish thinkers. This, for a number of reasons:In part because he did not have the same tools for the promul-gation of his work, such as the support of a major university orpublishing house; in part because he spent his most productiveyears in Chicago, far from the center of Jewish intellectual lifein America; and in part because his writing did not conform tothe styles and schools that were fashionable in philosophy in his


God, Man and Historyviii

day. Yet he maintained a dedicated following of scholars, rab-bis, and laymen of all denominations, and recent years haveseen a significant revival of interest in his works. Among thesigns of renewed interest have been the publication of a collec-tion of his essays, Essential Essays on Judaism (2002), and theestablishment of the Eliezer Berkovits Institute for JewishThought at the Shalem Center, based in Jerusalem. One of theInstitute’s central projects is the re-publication of all of Berkovits’major works, many of which have been out of print for ageneration, as well as their translation from English intoHebrew.

This edition of God, Man and History marks the inauguralvolume of this series. The decision to publish this work firstreflects its significance within the corpus of Berkovits’ writings,as it is properly viewed as the keystone. First published in 1959,it examines the underpinnings of Judaism as a whole, fromtheology to law to the meaning of Jewish nationhood. In con-trast to other twentieth-century thinkers, who employed theclassic Jewish sources to defend a modernist outlook, or whowrote meditations on the Jewish experience in the style ofcontemporary philosophical trends, Berkovits’ work offers anargument for the independence and validity of a traditionalJewish worldview in a manner reminiscent of Judah Halevi,Maimonides, and Saadia Gaon. God, Man and History is attunedto developments in modern thought, offering not only an ex-ploration of the foundations of Judaism, but also their presenta-tion as a coherent approach that may be contrasted with thecentral streams of Western philosophy since Hume and Kant.

The rationalist expository method that Berkovits adoptedhas obvious limitations. Based in argument rather than in exis-tentialist description, it yields a work that is more challenging toread, and more vulnerable to criticism, than much of recentJewish thought. But this sort of clear, methodical approach was,in Berkovits’ view, a pressing need for Judaism, which he


Foreword ix

believed to have been in a state of intellectual crisis since theadvent of modern philosophy—a crisis that had led the majorityof Jews to despair of their religion in its traditional form, and toabandon it in favor of either a thoroughgoing secularism or aJudaism reconstituted under fundamentally new premises.

The central weakness of modern Western thought, Berkovitsargued, is not its rejection of religion but its inability to providea compelling basis for moral action. The modern era in philoso-phy is often said to have begun with Descartes’ “I think, there-fore I am,” a descriptive statement from which all understand-ing is assumed to follow by means of the strict application ofreason. But as modern philosophers quickly learned, this method,in both its deductive and empirical versions, runs aground pre-cisely where it tries to move from the strictly descriptive to theprescriptive—that is, from “is” to “ought.”

This difficulty was first articulated in full form in the thoughtof David Hume (who was the subject of Berkovits’ doctoraldissertation), but was also confronted, in a different context, byImmanuel Kant, whose writings form the basis of much ofmodern ethics. Kant sought to build an approach to moralitybased purely on rational statements. He was forced to concede,however, that while such a method may describe ethical actionin theory, it cannot explain why anyone should decide to act onthe basis of this theory. In his Grounding for the Metaphysics ofMorals, Kant acknowledged: “But how pure reason can be prac-tical by itself without other incentives taken from whateversource… to explain this is quite beyond the power of humanreason, and all the effort and work of seeking such an explana-tion is wasted.”*

To Berkovits, this difficulty has had far-reaching consequencesfor the modern age, the most important of which is the inability

* Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James W.Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1981), p. 60.


God, Man and Historyx

to maintain a consistent, effective dedication to moral behavior.According to Berkovits, it is perhaps the central incongruity ofWestern civilization that despite steady progress in science andtechnology—that is, in the rationalization of nature and itsutilization for human ends—modern man is nonetheless unableto advance on the ethical plane. Indeed, he has undertaken themost ambitious acts of barbarism the world has known, ofwhich twentieth-century Nazism and Communism are only themost extreme cases. “The evil done by the power that knowl-edge provides,” he writes, “has always eclipsed the good doneby the same power. Notwithstanding enlightenment, man seemsto remain an essentially unethical being.” (p. 100)

As opposed to modern philosophy, Judaism starts with adifferent first principle, which does not merely describe exist-ence, but also asserts the presence of a moral will and a bindingmoral ideal. It therefore incorporates not only the descriptivebut also the prescriptive realm. “The foundation of religion,”Berkovits writes, “is not the affirmation that God is, but thatGod is concerned with man and the world; that, having createdthis world, he has not abandoned it, leaving it to its owndevices; that he cares about his creation.” (p. 15)

What we know about God, explains Berkovits, we knownot from speculation but from experience, of which the pro-phetic encounter is the central, foundational example, and fromour memory of that experience as passed on in tradition. It isthe encounter alone that provides us with our “raw data,” andfrom there we know that revelation is not simply a matter offactual, but also of moral, truth. Judaism does not require thefabrication of “other incentives taken from whatever source” toinduce moral behavior; rather, such behavior follows from theconcern for the world which God has revealed, the majorimplication of which is that man, too, must be concerned withhuman history and progress. This is the central content of the


Foreword xi

revelation on which religion is based; without it, morality isforever undermined.

This central thesis—that God cares about the world, andtherefore man should as well—forms the basis of Berkovits’approach to Judaism, and is a consistent thread running throughhis writings. We may discern three important ways in which hedevelops and applies this idea: In theology, where God’s concernfor the world translates into a distinct view of the meaning ofrighteousness, holiness, and truth (ideas that Berkovits treatsprincipally in Man and God: Studies in Biblical Theology, 1969,and in Faith After the Holocaust, 1973); in ethics, where his theoryof morality is founded on the principle of human responsibilityfor what happens in the world, rather than on abstract rules ofbehavior (Not in Heaven: The Nature and Function of Halacha,1983);* and in the Jewish conception of politics, in which theconcern for human history requires the creation of an exem-plary political collective, a nation constituted in order to set anexample of righteousness (Towards Historic Judaism, 1943).

All three of these spheres—theological, ethical, and politi-cal—find their philosophical foundation, and their place as partof a coherent whole, in God, Man and History. The theologicalaspect is treated principally in the first half of this work. Berkovitsbegins by exploring the experience of God’s concern for his-tory, and treats it as the epistemological starting point for alldiscussion of Jewish philosophy, and as the basis for a Jewishcritique of other systems of thought. He then shows how thecontent of the encounter between man and God, as depicted inthe Hebrew Bible, establishes a relationship founded on mutual

* For a wider elaboration of Berkovits’ approach to morality and Jewish law,see my introduction to Berkovits’ Essential Essays on Judaism (Shalem, 2002),pp. ix-xxxvi.


God, Man and Historyxii

regard and a shared concern for history. Finally, he addresses theimplications of his thesis for many of the classical problems oftheology, including the question of divine attributes, the mean-ing of creation, and the problem of evil. In Berkovits’ view, thecentral justification for the imperfection of the universe is notto allow the possibility of freedom of the will per se, so muchas of human responsibility: The idea that man, as the pinnacle ofGod’s creation, may himself imitate the Creator by assumingthe burden of responsibility—by becoming, in essence, a crea-tor himself.

This argument, in turn, sets the stage for his discussion ofmorality and law. In the second half of God, Man and History,Berkovits lays the foundations for a Jewish moral philosophygrounded in divine concern and human responsibility. In hisview, the main streams of Western moral thought—from an-cient Greece through Christian theology and continuing insecularized form in modern ethics—suffered because they viewedmorality first and foremost as a matter of perfecting the indi-vidual’s understanding and faith, out of a belief that if one’sintentions could be perfected, one’s actions would readily fol-low suit. This approach, he argues, necessarily failed to produceeffective moral behavior, because it ignored the basic facts ofman’s material nature. “Judaism,” Berkovits writes, “does notaccept the facile optimism of the Socratic-humanistic traditionthat all man needs for the good life is the intellectual study ofthe essence of goodness. According to Judaism, man judged byhis own nature is not as hopeless a creature as Christian theol-ogy would have it; neither is he as easily led to goodness ashumanism imagines.” (p. 110) Man’s actions, in other words,frequently do not follow from his own reasoned understanding;behavior is the product not only of reasonable or faith-baseddecision, but also of blind habit. If goodness is to become acentral feature of human society, morality must be constitutedso as to have an impact not only on man’s mind, but on his


Foreword xiii

entire way of life. In Judaism this is achieved through law,which trains man’s material nature to seek and follow a higherorder of things.

It is important to note, however, that law in Berkovits’ viewis not only the facilitator of a moral orientation. It also stands astestimony to the high position man is understood to hold in theoverall scheme of creation. “The essence of the law is the sameas that of the encounter itself,” he writes. “It is an expression ofGod’s continued concern with man… The law represents thehighest affirmation of man, as well as his crowning dignity. Bygiving man the law, his Maker declares: I do care how he livesand what he does with his life.” (p. 89) Having groundedJewish morality in God’s concern for humanity, and in theresponse of the individual to this concern, Berkovits advancesthis same argument in the sphere of the human collective, inthe process creating the basis for a Jewish politics. If history isthe central concern of religion, he writes, then one must recog-nize that history is made not only, or even principally, byindividuals. Rather, history is the province of communities, andespecially of peoples and nations. “For the deed to be effec-tive,” he writes, “it must not remain the act of an individual,but must become that of a community. The deed makes historyif it is the materialization of the desire and will of a communityof people joined together in a common cause… One cannot bea Jew only ‘at heart’; one must be a Jew together with otherJews in history-making action.” (pp. 138-139)

But because morality is not simply a matter of teaching butalso of affecting habits, humanity requires not only a call touniversal morals, but also the creation of a moral exemplar onthe level of the human collective. Judaism requires the estab-lishment of a “holy nation,” a unified people, dwelling in itsland and enjoying the benefits of sovereign authority, whichseeks to represent the moral vision of Judaism at the level ofnational expression.


God, Man and Historyxiv

This understanding underlies Berkovits’ entire approach tothe Jewish people and to Zionism. To his mind, the greatestthreat to long-term Jewish survival is exile, which, by renderingthe Jews dependent on others and depriving them of the pre-conditions needed to fulfill Judaism’s own ideal, distorts themeaning of their religion. “A people in control of its own life,capable of implementing Judaism by applying it to the whole oflife, is a people in its own land. Judaism, as the religion of thedeed, requires a people in its land,” he writes. “The peoplealone can realize Judaism; in the land of the people alone mayit be fully realized.” (pp. 139-140)

This must be regarded as a significant statement in the his-tory of modern Jewish thought, for in it we find an argumentfor a Jewish state founded on Jewish moral thinking, rather thanon a messianic reading of modern history. For Berkovits, theestablishment and survival of this state was not a foregone con-clusion, but rather a vital need without which the Jewish peo-ple could not fulfill its most important mission.

In writing God, Man and History, Berkovits thus embarkedon an effort with few parallels in the modern history of Judaism.This is not merely a meditation on, or an exploration of, aspecific facet of the Jewish religion. Rather, it is a comprehen-sive construction of Judaism. This construction begins with firstprinciples and proceeds, on the basis of arguments grounded inthe classical sources, to examine the foundations of Judaism,while at the same time placing itself in contradistinction to thecentral premises of modern thought. This is an ambitious project,conducted by a thinker possessing a thorough command of boththe rabbinic and philosophical traditions. For this reason aloneit is worthy of being placed among the most important worksof Jewish philosophy in the twentieth century.

* * *


Foreword xv

This edition of God, Man and History represents the first in aseries of reissued works by Eliezer Berkovits, published by ShalemPress in conjunction with the Eliezer Berkovits Institute ofJewish Thought at the Shalem Center. Established in 2002, theInstitute seeks to encourage scholarship in Berkovits’ thoughtthrough the publication and translation of his writings, theestablishment of an archive, and the initiation and support ofresearch on Berkovits’ life, works, and philosophy. The currentedition has been corrected and typeset anew; and the noteshave been expanded to include full bibliographical informationfor the benefit of readers interested in following his scholarlyleads. The index from the 1979 edition has been edited andupdated.

It has been a great honor to participate in the project ofbringing Berkovits’ writings to a new generation of readers.My appreciation is owed to a large number of people whohave given support and constructive criticism, including ZacharyBraiterman, who coordinated the first panel discussion onBerkovits’ thought at the conference of the Association ofJewish Studies in 2002; as well as David Ellenson, EmilFackenheim, Howard Gilbert, David Hartman, Norman Lamm,Daniel Landes, Stephen Landes, Yosef Yitzhak Lifshitz, JohnMoscowitz, David Novak, Jay Ozerowski, Roy Pinchot,Aviezer Ravitzky, Marc Shapiro, Joseph Shier, and Tzvi HershWeinreb.

This book would not have been possible without the ableefforts of the team at Shalem Press, most notably Yael Hazonyand Marina Pilipodi. Marla Braverman and Yasmine Garvaloffered crucial assistance in bringing the project to fruition.

Finally, a special debt of gratitude is owed to the family ofEliezer Berkovits, and especially his sons, Avraham, Dov, and


God, Man and Historyxvi

Shimshon; as well as his granddaughter, Rahel Berkovits. Thefamily has been generous in offering its time, support, advice,and materials, and has been an invaluable partner in thisventure.

David HazonyJerusalemPassover 5764/April 2004


God in History 145

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

God in History

Just as the individual does not live alone, neither does a people.For this reason, as long as the holy people remains the “onepeople” in history, its deeds will be, at best, only partiallyeffective. Its success or failure will depend on the internationalconstellation in which the people lives and strives for its goal. Apeople with a purpose of its own, even though the purpose bean essentially universal one, may find itself at odds with otherpeoples, which are guided by exclusively self-serving considera-tions. Indeed, the raison d’etre of a God-centered nation wouldof necessity clash with the life-motifs of a world of self-centerednations. The conflict, at times, is unavoidable, and can havetragic consequences for the “one people.” In the history ofIsrael, these consequences are responsible for the exile; theyhave created the wandering Jew.

In one sense, exile is a natural phenomenon. For millennia,the way of life of the “one people” has been at cross-purposeswith that of the rest of the world. Israel could easily have cometo terms with Assyria and Rome, with Mohammed and evenTorquemada, if only it had been willing to surrender its owndistinctive purpose in history. Because in moments of ultimatetrial Israel was not prepared to betray its destiny as the peopleof God, waves of hatred and destruction have swept over itunceasingly. Exile is not an accident, but the natural lot of the


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people of God. Jewish history is inseparable from world history:The intensity of the exile is the measure of the world’s oppo-sition to the aspirations of the God-centered people. It is thenegative version of Jewish universalism. Israel is always as home-less in this world as God’s purpose for man is in exile in history.The exile of Israel is one of the manifestations of galut hashechina,the exile of the divine Presence from the affairs of men. It istrue that in a mood of rigorous self-criticism, Israel uttered thewords: “Because of our sins we have been exiled from ourland.” This is indeed a valid statement when the Jewish peoplefaces God. Facing the world, however, the truth has beenformulated in the phrase, “for your sake are we killed all theday.”1 From the very outset of its history, Israel knew that exilewould be inseparable from loyalty to its God-oriented course.2

The nature of Israel’s exile, the intensity of Jewish homeless-ness, has always been the measuring rod for the moral andspiritual maturity of the world around the Jew. The wanderingsof the Jewish people, through lands and times, are the mostrevealing records of the ethical and religious history of the non-Jewish world. As was the case with their first exile in Egypt,so, too, were most of the subsequent exiles of the children ofIsrael not God-ordained punishments but humanly imposedpersecutions. The question has thus been raised by Jews andGentiles alike: If the immeasurable burden of suffering that isthe exile is indeed undeserved, why does God allow it tohappen? Why does he not protect the innocent? Why does henot intervene in time and strike down the would-be persecutorbefore he is able to perpetrate his crimes?

Such questions assume that a certain form of intervention inthe course of history would be proper for the Almighty. Now,if such divine intervention on behalf of the innocent were theobservable rule in history, then the suffering of Israel throughthe ages would prove something. But the suffering of thematerially weak and guiltless seems to be rather the norm in


God in History 147

history. So we may say that the exile conforms to the norm,and that the problem of exile is, therefore, but a specific aspectof the general problem of theodicy. However prominent andincomparable an example of undeserved suffering the exile ofthe Jews may be, it is not the only case of its kind. He who askswhy God permits the people of God to be persecuted might aswell ask why God allows any injustice to be inflicted on any ofhis creatures. Why does God tolerate any suffering of the inno-cent in his creation? Such questions are, of course, as old asrecorded history.3

The problem of theodicy, of God’s justice, exists in twoforms. For the purposes of our discussion we shall call them thecosmic and the historical-ethical aspects. There is evil, or im-perfection, which seems to be congenital to creation itself. Thisis the cosmic aspect of the problem of theodicy, which wasdiscussed earlier in the context of creation.4 Now, however, weare concerned with evil as it is introduced into history byconscious, created beings—as the work of men and nations.And the question is, why does God not prevent man fromspreading misery and sorrow in creation?

In answer to the problem, it has rightly been pointed outthat any specific intervention on the part of God would notonly render the doing of evil impossible, but would eliminatethe foundations of all ethical action as well.5 In a world inwhich evil would be doomed to complete and manifest failurefrom the outset, goodness could not prosper either. One cannotfrighten people into goodness. In order to be good, man mustchoose the good; but there is choice only where there is free-dom. In order to be good, then, man must be free to bewicked; he must be permitted to choose between good andevil. Where there is no practical possibility of choosing evilsuccessfully, there is no opportunity to espouse the good. Thegoodness of man consists in his free commitment to the good.When we discussed the cosmic aspect of the problem, we found



that an imperfect creation was freedom’s only opportunity. Butwhat is true of creation in this context is also valid for God’scontinued relation to the history of the human race. No doubt,God is sufficiently powerful to intervene every time a wrong iscommitted; it would indeed be a small matter for him to elimi-nate all evil and injustice from the earth. But his evident inter-vention would destroy not only evil, but also the essence ofman’s humanity—namely, his moral responsibility. Man is manonly if he may choose between alternative courses of action,and if he can do so in moral freedom.

One may also put it this way: Why ask for continuousmiracles to rectify what goes wrong in the world? Would it notbe simpler to ask for the creation of a perfect man, who wouldbe so endowed by nature as to be incapable of committing anyevil? The answer, of course, is even simpler than the questionis naive. A perfect man is, in this sense, a contradiction in terms;it is an impossibility. A man incapable of doing wrong wouldnot be human. The imperfection of human nature is inseparablefrom its most significant asset: Its potential for goodness, itscapacity for responsible decision and action. Having createdman as a morally responsible being, God had to grant him theopportunity for ethical action. The action itself must remainman’s own choice, or else its ethical quality is lost.6 Man mustbe able to go wrong if he is to go right at all—such is theperpetual risk inherent in the human situation. The possibilityof humanly inflicted suffering, undeservedly imposed on otherhuman beings, is always present in history, as long as man, inGod’s unfathomable wisdom, is permitted to seek his ownfulfillment.

We may now approach once again the problem of the meas-ureless injustice that is implied in the long centuries of Israel’sexile. Exile, as we saw, is the outcome of an unavoidable con-flict between the historic function of the “one people” and theambitions of the other nations. As such, exile is a symptom that


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constructive, universal reconciliation is still lacking in the world.The subhuman excesses of hatred and cruelty to which Israelhas been exposed, almost without respite, are themselves themeasure of the impotence of the spirit and the blind fury of theself-centered passions of man’s biophysical inheritance. Theybear convincing witness to the tragic truth that “humanity” isstill only a potentiality, and far from being a reality; that thedeed of transformation, rendering the spiritual vital and the vitalspiritually purposeful, the mitzva, has still not become effectivein history. And yet, God does not manifestly intervene. Historyis man’s responsibility. The task is man’s, for only man canbuild mankind. Only man can overcome the dualism withinhimself; only if he does so himself is it overcome. Of course,God is omnipresent. If he wished to, he could miraculouslydestroy the tyrant or the guilty nation. But would such an actof God create reconciliation among human beings? Would itestablish mankind? Certainly it would create fear, and no nationwould dare lift up the sword against another—and thus allhistory would end in universal trembling. In every miracle,history is at a standstill. But the stuff of history is the deed ofman. Responsibility and purpose in history have been entrustedinto his hands.

I do not mean to suggest that what has been said here withregard to God’s silence in history is the solution to the problemof theodicy. It is, however, an important step forward to under-stand that the problem is not merely the result of human igno-rance, but is implanted in the scheme of things. If divine provi-dence were indeed manifest in the world, if it convincinglylived up to human expectations, as it were, and if God actedalways as man’s sense of justice would have him do, the over-whelming evidence that “sin doesn’t pay” would extinguishman’s freedom to commit himself to one or another possiblecourse of action. There would be only “goodness” left, im-posed from without. Man would cease to be a morally



responsible creature. Therefore the problem of God’s provi-dence and justice must forever remain unsolved in history, so asto enable the possibility of history itself, and of life’s increasingorientation to God, through human responsibility.

Once again we may point to the concept of the hiding God,which was discussed in the first part of this work.7 We saw thatthe original religious experience of the encounter had to bemomentary in order to be endured by man; and even while itlasted, the divine Presence could reveal itself only from behindsome protective barrier, or else man could not have survivedthe terror of the Almighty. We also saw that the encounters hadto be extremely rare in history in order to leave room for doubtand, thus, to safeguard man’s spiritual freedom, which is themost noble quality of faith. God hides from man most of thetime so that man may believe in him without compulsion. Wefurther noted the religious need for the impossibility of provingGod’s existence intellectually. Any such inescapable proof wouldput the human intellect in chains, prejudicing its search fortruth. Finally, we have found yet another meaning of the con-cept of theodicy: For the sake of man, God cannot evidentlyinterfere in the course of history, for such intervention wouldcompletely crush man’s moral independence and responsibility.As the prophet said of him: “He will be silent in his love.”8 Thevery silence of God in history is due to his concern for man.

Does this mean, then, that God has left his creation completelyto its own devices, allowing things to take their course as theymay? Such a thought would be incompatible with the respon-sibility of which the Creator cannot, in any imaginable way,divest himself. Things need not happen in accordance withhuman insight and expectation, yet there is an ultimate respon-sibility that is God’s. By creating man as a being in need ofspiritual, intellectual, and ethical freedom in order to fulfill


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himself, God took a chance. In respecting man’s God-given—though limited—independence, the Creator incurs a risk. Manis responsible to the extent to which he is free; God is respon-sible to the extent to which he has made man free and sustainsman in freedom. For this reason alone it is inconceivable thatGod departed from his creation and is indifferent to what mandoes with his life and the world.

The encounter, as well as the revealed law of God, is ofcourse in itself a direct indication of the Creator’s interest. Atthe same time, the need for divine silence in history excludesonly manifest intervention; it does not eliminate indirect inter-vention by the Almighty. Such indirect, and therefore not alto-gether convincing, intervention in the affairs of men, which thehuman being is free to recognize or to reject, may well be oneof the ways in which God discharges his responsibility to hiscreation. It may be a counterbalance to the risk of freedom thatis inherent in life and in history. For all we know, God mayeven intervene in the guise of natural events, which happen inaccordance with natural laws. Many of these events are hisinvisible or unrecognized messengers.9

It is not inconceivable, however, that as a result of humanaction, performed in freedom, or of the interplay of naturalforces—and at times a combination of the two—a situation mayarise in which divine intervention may have to be direct andmanifest to all. When, for instance, the intended outcome ofhistory is in utter jeopardy—not to mention other imaginablepossibilities—the evident act of God may be quite in keepingwith what is dictated by God’s own responsibility. In such caseswe speak of miracles. The miracle may be one of God’s ways tosafeguard the intended ultimate outcome. As the human deed isa manifestation of human responsibility met in freedom, simi-larly—although on an incomparably higher level—the miracleis an expression of divine freedom in the service of divineresponsibility. At times, when the deed fails, the miracle may be



the only corrective. This, of course, means that miracles are notthe ideal way of influencing the destinies of men. Only thedeed is according to plan; the miracle is a stopgap in history.Not only is history at a standstill in the miracle, but the miracleis a sign of a serious breakdown in history. The need for themiracle stems from the measure of freedom that is inherent increation. When freedom, misused, threatens to overstep thelimits of the calculated risk God took with his creation, thefreedom of the Almighty may have to bring its trespassing to ahalt. It is, of course, not for man to say when a situation hasarisen that must be salvaged by a miracle. Let us suffice with theidea that there is, indeed, a place for the miracle within thenatural scheme of things.

Another question, however, may also be expected at thisstage: While the logical and ethical necessity for the miraclemay be conceded, is not the materialization of a miracle apractical impossibility? If the question means to imply that mira-cles are impossible because they are contrary to the laws ofnature, we must regard it as completely devoid of meaning. Weneed not enter here into a discussion of the numerous religiousand philosophical rationalizations of the miracle which, ratherthan interpret the concept, simply explain it away. The deistDavid Hume was perfectly right when, in defining the miracle,he maintained that the determining factor was not that an eventoccurred contrary to the observable laws of nature, but that ithappened as the result of a direct intervention by God.10 Puttingit this way implies that not all miracles need be observable assuch. At the same time, Hume’s definition does say that mira-cles are contrary to nature. After all, direct divine interventionis not natural. A miracle is in essence—although not always inappearance—unnatural. Nevertheless, it is a poor contributionto the discussion to maintain that on this account alone a mira-cle could not happen. What is contrary to nature is, of course,naturally impossible. No one who is prepared to give credence


God in History 153

to the possibility of miracles ever denied that fact. Indeed, thepoint of the affirmation of the miracle is that the naturallyimpossible may happen as the result of divine intervention. Thereal issue, therefore, is not whether what is contrary to naturallaw is within the realm of natural possibility, but whether aform of direct intervention on the part of God is conceivableor not.

Obviously, the possibility of such intervention cannot bedenied on the basis of God’s lack of power. Starting with thepremise of an almighty Creator, it does not seem logical to denyGod the might to act within his creation. As long as we con-sider nature a thing apart from God, as we indeed do when wesee it as creation, not even a strictly deterministic interpretationof its laws will rule out the possibility of the miracle. Thatnothing within nature may disrupt the chain of cause and effectdoes not prove that the God of nature may not do it. We oughtto understand the philosophical significance of a position thatrejects any form of direct divine intervention. There is, indeed,no way of establishing the practical impossibility of the miracle.The miracle may only be rejected for logical reasons as beingincompatible with the premises of certain forms of metaphysics.

Such logical rejection follows, for instance, from the positionof pantheism. Assuming, for example, the Stoic contention thatthe laws of nature are identical with the laws of reason, or withthose of a universal pneuma that is the soul of the universe, nointervention by God in the flow of events is conceivable. Suchintervention would indicate that the laws of universal reasonwere somewhere faulty and in need of correction. Quite withinthe Stoic tradition, Spinoza wrote: “For whatsoever is contraryto nature is also contrary to reason, and whatsoever is contraryto reason is absurd, and, ipso facto, to be rejected.”11 For Spinoza,of course, the cosmos becomes absorbed in God. The identifi-cation is so complete that nature disappears as a separate entity.There is only the infinite substance, which is deity. Starting



with such concepts, Spinoza must conclude that “the powerand efficiency of nature are in themselves the divine power andefficiency.” The laws of nature are themselves the will of God;they are his decrees, “following from the necessity and perfec-tion of the Divine nature.”12 Miracles, therefore, would becontrary not only to the laws of nature, but also to divine natureitself.

There is also, however, a form of theistic metaphysics fromwhich the rejection of the miracle follows as a logical necessity.Assuming that creation was perfect, representing a divine orderin completion, the need for a miracle would reveal a flaw inwhat was originally planned to be without blemish. The correc-tive measure of the miracle would indicate that a “slip-up” hadoccurred in the divine order. It would be no less absurd toentertain such a possibility on the basis of the premises outlinedthan it would be to accept Spinoza’s assumption that anythingcontrary to reason could never occur in nature.

The Spinozistic argument against the miracle need not de-tain us longer. Spinoza’s reasoning is cogent, but only as long aswe grant his acosmic pantheism. As discussed earlier, the veryessence of religion is the confrontation between man and God.13

The religious experience of the encounter and the idea ofcreation are diametrically opposed to any form of pantheism.Thus, far from agreeing with Spinoza’s dictum that “the powerand efficiency of nature are in themselves the divine power andefficiency,” we can conceive of creation only as an act of divineself-limitation. Nature, as creation, is apart from God; it isoutside him, it is “the other” to him. The laws of nature mayindeed be called the decrees of the Creator, but they are not, aspantheism understands them, identical with the divine will. Thelaws of nature are nature’s laws; they are not divine but natural,which is to say created. There is no logical contradiction be-tween such a concept of natural laws and the possibility ofdivine intervention in them.


God in History 155

What is more, we have found that creation as such must beconceived as being, of necessity, imperfect.14 Now, in a perfectuniverse—if such a universe were possible—a miracle couldnever happen: All intervention with perfection can only bedestructive. Nor would there be any need for the miracle insuch a universe. It was in the very imperfection of the creationthat we discovered both the challenge for man and the sourceof his freedom to meet that challenge. Within perfection thereis no choice, no alternative, no freedom. The imperfection ofcreation is man’s opportunity. This same opportunity granted toman in the form of freedom and responsibility may in historynecessitate the corrective act of the miracle. As the element ofimperfection is the chance for human freedom, how muchmore may it serve as the thin end of the wedge for divineintervention.15

While the miracle may be the divine corrective, man’s destinyon earth can be fulfilled only by man himself. The task and theresponsibility are his. A man made good by a miracle is not agood man, but a good puppet. The essence of goodness, as wesaw, is expressed in an attitude or action consciously undertakenby man without outside compulsion. If the creation of “man-kind” consists, as we have argued, in the achievement of uni-versal reconciliation, it can be accomplished only by man him-self. Unless reconciliation is an actual experience brought aboutby human desire—unless it means fellowship fostered by manthrough his own exertions—it cannot exist. And even the dayof which the prophet says, “And the Eternal shall be King overall the earth; On that day shall the Eternal be One, and hisname one,”16 cannot be the Eternal’s doing alone, withoutreference to man’s success or failure in history. If it were alto-gether the work of the Eternal, it would have been more logicalto dispense with all history from the very beginning and start



with the day on which “the Eternal shall be King.” There is ashare of human responsibility in making the Eternal King overall the earth by placing all life under his sovereignty. Thestriving for this goal is the meaning of history.

Man’s redemption is, therefore, within the scope of humanresponsibility. That is how God willed it. While “mankind,”established through the self-redemption of man, is always farremoved in the future, in history one may discern its emergingoutlines in the interdependence of all human destinies. No onelives in “splendid isolation”; all have their neighbors, and what-ever one does, or leaves undone, affects others and, in somemeasure, all. These facts point to the common responsibility ofthe race of men. Because of the interdependence of all life, therighteous, too, suffer from the consequences of the deeds of thewicked; this reflects the reality of mankind in its negative state.That we are tied to each other from the beginning is the signthat we should join each other in the end. Universal redemp-tion is the common responsibility of all.

This should not, of course, be taken to suggest that man isentirely on his own. He who knows of the encounter and therevelation of the law is sure of God’s concern and care, withwhich history, as man’s creation of mankind, is initiated. Healso knows that even in those long stretches of human historyduring which God seems to be silent, he is in fact “silent in hislove.”17 In the boldness of faith, man may often recognize thehints of the workings of the hiding God—not to mention thoserare moments when man is overwhelmed by more convincingsigns of divine concern. The rabbis of the Talmud were right toview man as a “partner” of God in the works of creation.18

Who would say where the work of God comes to an end andthe human contribution begins? Man may be “as nothing”before God, yet God nonetheless desires man’s partnership.

The goal of human history may never be achieved, the unityof mankind may never become a complete reality, and the day


God in History 157

on which “the Eternal shall be King over all the earth” may yetrequire a culminating act of divine grace and love; but man’sown responsibility never ceases, for his opportunity to bring thegoal closer to realization is never lost. As long as man lives, hisfailure cannot be final. For after every failure, not only can hebe forgiven, but he may even start anew, if he “returns.” Afterevery failure, teshuva, or return, allows man to continue as if thefailure had been a success. The return to God is an act ofcomplete transformation of character. In the act of teshuva, thepast is not undone—which would be impossible—but redone.The impact of past failures becomes creative in its effect onfuture desire and action. The man who returns to God incor-porates even his past sins into the structure of his reborn per-sonality. Moreover, man is forever invited to return.19 Universalreconciliation may never be achieved by man alone, yet it isalways achievable by him. Because of teshuva, the hope for re-demption is never forfeited.20

What, however, ensures that man will make use of the giftof teshuva; that, after his numerous and tragic failures, he willseek the way of return to God? What ensures that, in a fit ofuniversal folly and criminality, he will not extinguish life itselffrom the face of the earth and thus commit his final blunder? Ina sense, we have already answered this question. God, in en-dowing man with a measure of freedom—the source of allhuman folly, and all human achievement—accepted responsi-bility for the final outcome. God alone, who determined thebeginning, will determine the end. Having granted man thefreedom to fail, God will not let him fail irrevocably. Thedivine responsibility for creation is the guarantee that the pur-pose of man’s formation in freedom and responsibility will notultimately be thwarted. That is the root of the messianic faith.God’s intention for man, as revealed in the encounter and byhis law, will be fulfilled. It is the messianic promise, inseparablefrom history. But only the goal is preordained; the path to it,



however, must be blazed by man, and the time required toreach it will depend on him. What the Sages said of Israelapplies to the entire race: They will not be redeemed unlessthey return.21 Since in the final reckoning God will not bedefeated, there is always time to return. And so we have amplefailure in ample time, which means ample suffering. The hopeof man is that, through suffering, he will return to be redeemed.But redeemed he will be, for God lives.

The messianic fulfillment of history is beyond any doubt.The most convincing indication of this is the survival of Israel.The survival of Judaism and of the Jewish people in all times, inconditions of utter political and material weakness, in spite ofcontinuous persecution, and in defiance of an endless series ofthe most barbarous attempts at their extermination, defies allexplanation. It is the mystery of the ages. The return of Israel toits ancient homeland in our days, as Israel maintained for num-berless generations that it would do, is incomparable in humanhistory. As a manifestation of the interdependence of all life,Israel’s suffering is the measure of man’s failure to become apartner with God in the task of human salvation. Israel is alwaysas close to martyrdom as the human race is removed fromhumanity. On the other hand, Israel’s survival is itself the proofthat God’s purpose in history will not be defeated, and that theday of mankind’s reconciliation will yet dawn.

Whether the price that must be paid in terms of sufferingand misery will be well worth the achievement is not withinman’s ability either to affirm or to deny. Judging from thestandpoint of experience, the rabbis of the Talmud have said:“It would have been better for man not to be created”; yet theynevertheless accepted life as a task and a responsibility, for theycontinued: “However, now that he has been created, let himlook to his deeds.”22 Only one who knows of the originalintention that moved God in creating may judge the road aswell as the destination. We may have some hint of God’s own


God in History 159

purpose for man, as revealed to man by God; yet we can knownothing of God’s purpose with his creation as a whole. Beingplaced in this world, man has been invited to accept, and tocooperate with, what God desires for him. Let this suffice.

Indeed, before the day of fulfillment and universal salvationarrives, many will have suffered because of the sins of others;many will have fallen by the wayside. What of them? What ofthe numberless millions who pay the price for the risk that Godhas taken with creation, but never live to see the day of justifi-cation? One can answer only by saying that our concept ofdivine justice demands that on the day of universal fulfillment,they, too, must be vindicated and justified individually, just asthey suffered individually. Divine justice, which is one of theways we have conceived of God’s care for man, is the postulateof immortality. It requires that in the act of final redemption, allgenerations that were ever born be redeemed.23 Even the deadmust live to share in the realization of the promise that alonejustifies the travail of all times.

God, as he has made himself known to man, is a caring God.God is our surety that nothing that has value, in accordancewith his desire for man, ever perishes. He is the Preserver.Because he is, we know that no good deed and no kind word,no noble thought and no sincere striving for the good, are everin vain. Because he is God, nothing worth preserving is ever solost in history as not to be found again—be it even beyondhistory.24



Abraham 37, 42, 140, 188discovery of God 170not founder of a church 140

Absolute, the 7, 39-40, 53, 57-61, 63-64, 81

no path from it to God 55not a subject of religion 54

Active Intellect 163agnosticism 22Akiva, R. 81Aleinu (prayer) 188Altmann, Alexander 178amor dei 40, 167anthropomorphism 65, 78Aquinas, Thomas 93, 167-168Aristotelianism 4, 163Aristotle 13, 102, 109, 168Asharites 181Assyria 145atheism 21-22attributes (of God) 7, 9, 51, 174

of action 56the fundamental attribute 59negative 7-9, 48, 55-56, 162,

170-171the problem of 58, 60

relational 57-58, 65-66, 82, 88-89

Augustine 5-6awareness

akin to the instinctive 122habit-forming 116-117of the other 116, 129, 132,

142-143of the “Wholly Other” 132

Baeck, Leo 179Barth, Karl 175Beethoven, Ludwig van 72-73bein adam l’havero 131bein adam lamakom 131being, the “unnatural” givenness

of 72Bergson, Henri 99-100Bhagavad-Gita 181Bible 8, 19, 32, 43, 74-75, 114,

128, 140, 169biological, the vindication of 129-

130; 132body

may cleave to God 122not “a prison of the soul” 126

Index


Index 193

rejection of as an act of irreli-gion 129

religious rejection of 120the spirit as the servant of 133

The Book of Doctrines and Beliefs(Saadia Gaon) 160

Bradley, Francis Herbert 162

categorical imperative 95, 103-104

categories, the personal and theobjective 25-26

causa essendi 173causa fiendi 173chosen people 137, 143Christianity 14, 96, 179-180, 187Christian

God idea 180theology 110

civilization, Western 112Cohen, Hermann 6, 162covenant 43-44creatio ex nihilo 69-70Creation 60-61, 68, 72-73, 75,

84, 175-177, 190act as divine self-limitation 65-

66, 79, 174and causation 70, 72, 175imperfect 79-83as relationship 59the religious idea 62-63, 173and value 77

creative evolution 99Crescas, Hasdai 7Critique of Practical Reason (Kant)

103, 175

De Burgh, William George 181deed 138, 143, 145

the ethical 107, 112and history 138, 145the holy 130, 186

deism 94Descartes, Rene 173determinism 97Deuteronomy 16, 32, 43divine

grace 99, 101, 157intervention 146-147, 151, 154,

190justice 159, 180nature 33, 154relatedness to man 57self-denial 36, 66transcendence 35, 48, 53

divine Presence 24, 36, 44, 46,48, 121, 128, 144, 146

and fear 33dualism, of human nature 38,

120-121, 124-125, 129, 132, 149Duns Scotus, John 93

elan vital 99-100Elijah 166emotions 114encounter

ambivalence of 35dualism overcome in the 121and faith 42the first 59with God 30the Jewish 30and the law of God 89not repeatable 24, 26with the “other” 87possibility of 19possibility of never exhausted 31and prophecy 28



and religious knowledge 62a revelation 17-18, 52and scientific method 22-23threatens 34trustworthiness of its biblical

record 27Epicurus 178ethical theory

effective ethical conduct 110man’s ethical predicament 108obligation in 102-106practice 109problems of 94

ethicsevolutionary 97-98, 181intellectualism in 96intuitive 95Marxian 97secular 106

evilaccording to Judaism 81involuntary 96-97in Manichaeism 80-81without reality 178

evolutionary theory 70-72, 75,176

exile 145-146, 148Exodus 56experience 20-21, 62

faith 41an act of recognition 46, 48as commitment in freedom 49essence of 42and reason 47

First Cause 7, 12freedom 36, 49, 84, 147, 155,

157, 190

and ethics 100, 147-148, 189-190

and imperfection 82and nature 190the risk of 151

fundamentalists 93, 104

galut hashechina 146gnosis 80God

and the Absolute 58-59, 63the basis of reality and source of

value 80-82of the Bible 52caring 41, 57, 63, 65and Creation 76, 84“hiding” 35, 46, 66, 150, 166,

189highest service of 182“humility” of 37image of 183inapproachability of 8intellectual service of 4involved 65, 89Jewish encounter with 30knowledge of 179the Lawgiver 89-90the Living 17metaphysician’s concept of 7and nature 66-67no deus ex machina 11, 96the Preserver 159proofs for the existence of 12relationship to Israel 44of religion 34, 47, 55, 59, 61removed and near 36responsibility of 150-151, 157of revelation 6


Index 195

silence of 149transcendence of 35

The Guide of the Perplexed(Maimonides) 160, 182

Halevi, Judah 11, 14, 162, 172hamuda genuza 180Hanina, R. 188heaven, fear of 188hedonism 95Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich

6Heisenberg’s Principle of Indeter-

minacy 165Heraclitus 25Herford, Robert Travers 187Hillel 164, 186Hinduism 173, 181history 27, 134, 142, 145

divine intervention in 146, 190as man’s responsibility 149, 155meaning of 156realization in 141-142suffering in 146, 148, 158and the universal goal 141,

143Hiya, R. 166holiness 130, 133, 187Hosea 28humanism 96, 110humanity 149Hume, David 69, 152, 165Huxley, Julian 181

ibn Gabirol, Solomon 172-173ibn Pakuda, Bahya 185The Idea of the Holy (Otto) 166,

170

imitatio dei 87, 129immortality, postulate of 159,

191imperfection, of human nature

148indirect method 114, 120Infinite, the 7, 53, 60inhibition 183

method of 111interpenetration, of mind and mat-

ter 107, 129, 140, 142Isaiah 28, 35-36, 53, 80, 82, 128,

168, 178Islam 14, 92, 181Israel 29, 43, 137, 144

concept of 137, 141historic mission of 140martyrdom of 101, 158memories of 46national characteristics of 142suffering of 146-147survival of 158witness of 29

Jeremiah 28-29, 88, 91Jewish

deity 33history 30, 146homelessness 146people 29, 144philosophy 6, 93rebels 30ritual laws 92way of life 133

Jews 30, 101, 127-128, 139, 141,144, 169

life of 91religious 116



way of worship 39Job 163-164Judaism 14, 18, 90, 110-112, 116,

125-128, 137-139, 187anti-pantheistic 40beginning of 170and Christianity 178-179the essence of 36historic religion 42identical with metaphysics 4and mankind 141not “idealistic” or “spiritual”

137non-mystical 39-40

Kant, Immanuel 5, 9, 12, 21, 94-95, 125, 165, 175, 179, 188

karma 181kavana 117, 125kingdom of God 143kingdom of priests 140, 143koneh 173kreaturgefuehl 62, 166Krochmal, Nachman 6Kuzari (Halevi) 14

lawand biological function 128dietary 122essence of divine 92fulfilled 133God’s 89, 102, 105of Judaism 91as man’s affirmation 89and revelation 89, 103ritual 113-115, 118-119, 122,

131takes second place 4

validity of 93Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 5life

as basic value 126and holiness 130preservation of 185

Locke, John 162Luria, R. Isaac 174

Maimonides, Moses 4, 7, 56, 70,160, 162-163, 172-173, 175, 182

Malachi, book of 56man 156

affirmed 37as “correlate” to the God of rev-

elation 6cosmic condition of 83creation of 155dependent-independent 36dual nature of 38the ethical 186ethical dilemma of 108goodness of 147harmony of 142liberation of 131negative state of 156neither only soul nor body 123not a puppet of God 50as partner of God 156unredeemed 101of value to God 15

Manichaeism 52, 80marriage 128Marx, Karl 109materialism 97

dialectical 97Mekor Hayim (ibn Gabirol) 172Mendelssohn, Moses 161


Index 197

messianicfaith 157promise 157

Micah 28Milton, John 178mind 105, 120

and body 107, 112and emotions 109and matter 107, 120

miracles 151-152, 154-155 and metaphysics 153mitzvot 92, 123-126, 128, 140, 142

aseh 112lo ta’aseh 111ma’asiyot 132as public deeds 139as the union of body and soul

123, 126Modim (prayer) 117Mohammed 145monotheism 6Moses 16, 22, 32, 166Murray, Gilbert 188Mutazilites 181mysterium tremendum 52mystical

way 8communion 39

mysticism, and pantheism 40mythology, Persian 80

Naive and Sentimental Poetry(Schiller) 186

nation 140-143holy 140-144

nationalism 141natural selection 71, 176nature 66-67, 68, 154

inorganic 107laws of 102, 152-154, 190rationality of 164

necessity, logical 12Neo-Platonism 9, 59-60, 80, 163,

172, 177-178Nishmat (prayer) 124

optimismdogmatic 97a philosophy of critical 84, 110Socratic-humanistic 96-97, 99,

101, 110Otto, Rudolf 166, 170

pantheism 9, 14, 153-154, 169Passover 122people of God 140, 144Philo 8“pious of the nations” 182phylacteries (tefillin) 115, 122Plato 87-88, 96, 102, 109, 126,

176dialogues of 96

Platonic demiurge 12Plotinus 171pneuma 153prayer 117, 124, 127Presence of God 16, 32, 34-35

awareness of 122, 126veiled 64

prophets of Israel 27, 42providence, divine 149, 163

the problem of 13, 150Psalms 168

Rashi (R. Shlomo Yitzhaki) 164,181



rationality, the notion of 47reality

physical 176subjective and objective aspects

of 25and value 76

reason 93, 102-103disappointment with 10function misunderstood 102and the requirements of religion

50transcendental usage 21universal 153

religion 61, 89, 94, 125absorbed by metaphysics 5biblical 27, 33conflict with reason 5of the deed 137foundation of 15independence of 47logic of 55monotheistic 80natural and revealed 5“natural”and “spiritual” 125personal 43philosophy of 4, 55, 61and reason 54and relationship 34of the whole man 125, 128

republic, God-centered 141revelation 34, 164

as fellowship 18and law 89need for 18and reason 5, 11, 93, 104at Sinai 42-44

Rome 145ruah hakodesh 187Russell, Bertrand 182

Saadia Gaon 4, 93, 160, 172Sabbath 124-125, 127-128, 138sanctification 130, 132Satan 178Schiller, Friedrich 186Schleiermacher, Friedrich 169Scholem, Gershom 162, 167, 174science 22, 26, 75, 176

basic principle of 20and religion 22the scientific attitude 22scientific observation 22

sexual morality 128Shulhan Aruch (Karo) 92Sinai 6, 16, 32, 43, 89, 161, 169-

170timelessness of 44

skepticismethical 10and religious orthodoxy 10

Socrates 97Spinoza, Benedict de 9, 60, 109,

153-154, 168, 177Stoa 102sublimation 118summum bonum 105

Talmud 87-88, 90, 117, 156,158

Tertullian 10testimony

of the Jewish people 29prophetic 27

theodicy 149problem of 78, 81, 147, 149specific case of 147

Timaeus (Plato) 176Tora 93, 133, 169Torquemada, Tomas de 145


Index 199

teshuva 157tzimtzum 174

utilitarianism 95universalism 141-142

Jewish 188negative 146

universe 83-84, 170deterministic 82dualistic 52essence of 174imperfect 81order in 72soul of 153value of 78

Unmoved Mover 14

value 77and imperfection 80life as basic 126and potency 107

Ward, James 175will

of God 105, 143-144, 154,173

not holy 130as source of obligation 103-

105Windelband, Wilhelm 10

yetzer hara 111yetzer hatov 111


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