grigova j - 2003 - lotman on mimesis

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Sign Systems Studies 31.1, 2003

Lotman on mimesis

Jelena Grigorjeva

Dept. of Semiotics, University of TartuTiigi Str. 78, 50410 Tartu, Estonia

e-mail: [email protected]

Abstract.The article considers some basic notions of semiotics of mimesis byJuri Lotman, such as model, similarity, and relations between an object and its

representation. The way Lotman defines and interprets these notions iscompared with definitions given by adherents of the “semiotics of the

transcendence” (German and Russian romanticism and Neoplatonism, Russiansymbolism, theory of mystical symbol). A certain typological proximity of some important theoretical statements ensures the necessity to revise thetraditional image of Tartu semiotics as a purely positivistic school of thought.

From the diverse variety of Juri Lotman’s writings on art someconstant “favourite” ideas can be extracted. Among them we find the

concept of a piece of art being a specific model of reality and an intent

interest in reciprocal interrelation between “life” and art. The problemof borderline between what is presented and how it is presented was

addressed in the very early Lotman’s works on general problems of

visual art. In this contribution I dare to revisit some of the earlytheoretical statements on the matter.

What is Lotman’s attitude to mimesis in art and semiotics?Visual art here sets a starting point but also becomes a point of

destination. Writing about the problem of mimesis, Lotman did not

use this very term explicitly, but he was constantly engaged in theproblem of the borderline between art and life, sign and non-sign. He

also showed a vital interest towards the mechanism of mirror and textin text. Still he seems to be permanently avoiding the question of the

primacy of patterns. He proves in his works that theatre influences

individual behaviour and everyday life, that folk pictures have nostrict borders separating them from reality, that periphery phenomena

(non-signs) can be transformed into signs in the course of cultural



Jelena Grigorjeva218

evolution, and so forth, but he never makes any statements of the lateWittgenstein’s kind. Thus, we deal with a rather complicated picture

resembling the Möbius strip with no beginning and no end of mimesis.

This question, however, seems to be still inevitable even in an implicit

form. To remind of the notorious paradox with egg and hen: althoughnobody can give a solution to this very local task, being philo-

sophically expanded this problem is solved by humanity in quite afew, yet antagonistic, ways. Either we follow the evolutionary theory

or religious doctrine, or agnostically refuse to solve the problem

because of the lack of information.

The evolution of the scholar’s thought concerning the question of

primacy of reality and representation is to be seen as a way of searching for the next paradox in turn.

In his early article “The problem of similarity of art and life fromthe point of view of structural approach” (1962), Lotman attempts to

give a dialectic solution to this basic question. His main idea is that

evolution of similarity between art and life is subjected to reductive

strategy. This statement is proved with several examples and even

algebraic formulas. Essentially, he states that the higher is the degree

of metonymy convention the higher is the extent of characteristic

individuality of the represented thing. To quote his words:

The more in a represented phenomenon is “taken out of brackets” [...] themore sharply will the phenomenon’s specifics be stressed. “The scarcest is themost characteristic” — has nothing of a paradox, but a mathematical truth. 1

(Lotman 1998: 385)

Although it is stated that it is not, it is an evident case of dialectic

paradox, one of which semiotics is based upon.This statement apparently makes a link to Juri Tynyanov’s notion

of the “density of the verse line” (“The Problem of Verse Language”[1924] — see: Tynyanov 1981) which also arises in the context of theproblem of mimesis. It is not a secret that Russian semiotics

thoroughly studied and widely used theoretical heritage of Russian

formalists; this heritage is generally recognised. In his worksTynyanov discusses the notion of what he calls the “equivalents of

1 “Чем больше в изображаемом явлении “вынесено за скобки”, чем

меньше то, к чему приравнивается вещь, тем резче подчеркнута его специ-фика. “Чем скупее, тем характеристичнее” — совсем не парадокс, а

математическая истина” (Lotman 1998: 385).



Lotman on mimesis 223

of the thing. The beholder moves from a picture to the skin of things, and

from the skin to the thing itself. (Florensky 1993: 252; emphasis in theoriginal)

This description could be included in a natural way into C. S. Peirce

writings and simultaneously seems to fit accurately into the positi-vistic semiotics of Lotman. What makes here the difference, is that

Florensky does not regard the notion of model to be a symbol, so heseems to be less a symbolist than his follower is.

In fact, Florensky was not very consistent in his terminology.

Some of his statements concerning the problem of mimesis lead to adistinct understanding of the connection between “what” and “how” of

signification. This seems to be determined by the general ambivalence

of the theory of “dvoemirie”, which Zara Mints commented on re-ferring to V. Solov’ev’s reasoning. Florensky distinguishes two

different types of representation: false naturalistic and true symbolic

ones.

Moving from the real into the imaginary naturalism proceeds in a sham imageof reality, empty double of an everyday life; the inverse art — symbolism —

embodies another experience in real images and thus what is given by itbecomes the higher reality.”5 (Florensky 1993: 19–20; emphasis in the

original)

Then he adds: “The same happens in mysticism” (Florensky 1993:20). So here we see an apparent connection to the philosophy of

Symbolism that also made use of the parallel between the true

language (symbolic signification) and revelation of the truth. We even

can observe here that a sign (symbol) appears as the highest reality,

i.e. replaces naturalistic everyday reality with itself. Orthodox icons

and the temple as a whole are analysed in “Iconostasys” as such

symbols-models of the higher reality. It can be stated that this strategyof defining symbol is compatible with the notion of model by Juri

Lotman. Again the difference between mystic semiotics of Florensky

and positivistic semiotics of Lotman lies not within formal aspects butrather in the sphere of evaluation. Whereas Florensky uses generously

such words as “higher, highest, false, improper”, Lotman thoroughly

5 “Идя от действительности в мнимое, натурализм дает мнимый образ

действительного, пустое подобие повседневной жизни; художество жеобратное – символизм – воплощает в действительных образах иной опыт, и

тем даваемое им делается высшею реальностью” (Florensky 1993: 19–20).




with the situation of the “mouse-trap” of text in text, when a textpoints always at its textual mirrored double, and from the other hand,

this extremity characterises all magic aspects of manipulating with

symbols. The latter case can be also formulated as using Peirceansymbol for the symbol of the transcendent semiotics of kabbalah and

of that ilk.

This is exactly the method of semiotic description of the situationof similarity, mimesis by Lotman:

Portrait constantly oscillates on the border between artistic duplication and

mystic reflection of reality. That is why a portrait is a mythogenic object in itsessence. […] Exactly due to its genre portrait seems to be destined for embodying the very essence of a human. Portrait is located on the half way

between reflection and face, between what is created and what is not made by

hands. (Lotman 1998: 509)

This problem’s field is already quite close to the main philosophicquestion on the origin of man and mind. And it could be predicted that

the question of mimesis would lead to the question of transcendence

and divinity. So Lotman points at the representation of Christ being anarchetype of portrait as such. And in this connection the notion and

idea of the so-called “bogochelovechestvo” is mentioned:

En face image of Christ represents in itself the highest manifestation of the

idea of portrait, divine and human at the same time. This ambivalence as amatter of fact reveals the nature of portrait as such. […] At the same time theproblem of “bogochelovechestvo” is concentrated in the image of Christ.(Lotman 1998: 510)

A discussion on the term “bogochelovechestvo” (usually poorly

translated as Godmanhood), which was one of the most important inthe philosophic system of V. Solov’ev, one can find in Judith Korn-

blatt’s article “Vladimir Solov’ev on spiritual nationhood, Russia andthe Jews” (Kornblatt 1997: 158–159). Remarkably, Lotman describesthis semiotic case with the term of the godfather of Russian symbo-

lism.

The fact that Lotman’s thought was linked to the Neo-platonic one

with multiple ties can also be supported by a minor adoption and

allusion. For example, one can find a certain similarity between theattitude to the museum practice shown by Lotman and by Florensky.

Florensky (1993: 287): “The task of a museum is precisely tearing off [otryv] an artistic piece that is falsely understood as a thing that could



L i i 233




and semiotic activity of the humans give a strong enough evidence for proving that language is organised as a model? And another question:

does the fact that the humans are involved in what is called by

intellectuals a semiotic activity allow us to expand this notion onto allthe processes and elements of the universe? Is nature already codified

in itself or is this code implicated by a man? In the way of Lotman’s

reasoning I see the only consistent answer (although not formulated byhim) that nature is already “written” in multiple languages, which

already provide situation of a dialog, and a man only makes use of this

natural phenomenon consciously. So the difference between human

language and languages of natural communication is important but not

essential.I guess that exactly this concept of biological nature of sign and

signification (and thus — primacy of “consciousness” in nature)underlies Lotman’s theory of semiosphere (see Lotman 2001).

Although again he never allows himself to assert this explicitly. This

kind of argumentation can be described as the replaced responsibility:

semiotics of communication, i.e. of dialogue in asymmetric systems,

starts simultaneously with life itself, so let biologists and scientists

decide the problem of its origin. Evidently, Lotman erects his theory

of semiosphere on the basis of “biosphere” by Vernadsky and, more-

over, makes frequent parallels to Vernadsky’s writings, but avoidsdirect causative conclusions.

Communicative act can exist only in semiotic space. To come into a

dialog participants must already posses some skills and language of communication. Life gives birth to life, semiosphere to language. A

culture is preceded by a previous culture. In his lectures and presen-

tations Lotman used to repeat that even archaeological data show thateach settlement is found at the place of a previous settlement. There

are no voids in culture.

While the biosphere is a cumulative and organic unit of the live

entity, the semiosphere is a result and condition of the cultural

evolution. Lotman extends Vernadsky’s statement, that life on Earth islived in a special space-time continuum, which life itself creates:

Conscious human life, i.e. life of culture, also demands a special space-timestructure, for culture organizes itself in the form of a special space-time andcannot exist without it. This organization is realized in the form of the




Then who communicates with whom by codifying a program of phylo- or ontogenesis with genes? To stay within positivistic dialec-

tics (however it is really problematic here) we can only say that the

sphere of signs communicates with the sphere of non-signs althoughwe can judge nothing of the latter.

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системам [Sign Systems Studies] 3: 117–192.

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Лотман о мимесисе

В статье рассматриваются некоторые базовые понятия семиотики

подобия по Ю. Лотману. В первую очередь, такие как модель,

сходство, соотношение объекта и репрезентации. Трактовка этихпонятий по Лотману сополагается с определениями представителей

“трансцендирующей семиотики” (немецкие и русские романтики-

неоплатоники, символисты, теоретики мистического символа). Опре-

деленное типологическое сходство основных теоретических положе-

ний убеждает в необходимости пересмотреть традиционное пред-ставление о тартуской семиотике как об исключительно позити-

вистской школе мысли.

Lotman mimeesist

Vaadeldakse mõningaid mimeesi semiootika alusmõisteid Juri Lotmani

töödes. Eelkõige selliseid nagu mudel, sarnasus, objekti ja selle repre-

sentatsiooni suhe. Nende mõistete tõlgitsus Lotmanil suhestatakse “trans-

tsendentse semiootika” esindajate (saksa ja vene romantikud-neoplatooni-

kud, sümbolistid, müstilise sümboli teoreetikud) määratlustega. Teoree-

tiliste aluste teatud tüpoloogiline sarnasus veenab vajaduses vaadata üle

traditsiooniline ettekujutus Tartu semiootikast kui puhtpositivistlikust

koolkonnast.

grigova j - 2003 - lotman on mimesis

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