GROUP 3Adan, Queenie KateBono, Leo Joselito E.Calang, Princess V.Famor, Jewel JadeMagaso, Jovita Andelecia

B. QUALITIES

3-4. IMPARTIALITY AND PROPRIETY

PERTINENT LAWS

REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 204. - Knowingly rendering unjust judgment. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision, shall be punished by prision mayor and perpetual absolute disqualification.

ART. 205. - Judgment rendered through negligence. - Any judge who, by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance shall render a manifestly unjust judgment in any case submitted to him for decision shall be punished by arresto mayor and temporary special disqualification.

ART. 206. - Unjust interlocutory order. - Any judge who shall knowingly render an unjust interlocutory order or decree shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period and suspension; but if he shall acted by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance and the interlocutory order or decree be manifestly unjust, the penalty shall be suspension.

ART. 207. - Malicious delay in the administration of justice. - The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.

Art 215. Prohibited Transaction. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from P200 to P1000 or both, shall be imposed upon any appointive public officer who, during his incumbency, shall directly or indirectly become interested in any transaction of exchange or speculation within the territory subject to his jurisdiction.

Art 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer. The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or a fine ranging from P200 to P1000, or both, shall be imposed upon a public officer who directly and indirectly, shall become interested in any contract or business which it is his official duty to intervene.

ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (R.A. 3019)

Sec 3. Corrupt practices of public officers.  In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

XXX

(h) Directly or indirectly having financial or pecuniary interest in any business, or contract or transaction in connection with which here intervenes or takes part in his official capacity or in which he is prohibited by the Constitution or by any law from having any interest.

CANONS

CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCTRule 1.02 – A judge should administer justice impartially and without delay.

CANON 2 – A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.

Rule 2.02 – A judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory.

Rule 2.03 – A judge shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment.  The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.

Rule 2.04 – A judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court of administrative agency.

CANON 3 –  A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.

DISQUALIFICATIONSRule 3.12 – A judge should take no part in proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.  These cases include, among others, proceedings where;

1. a.      the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

2. b.     the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

3. c.      the judge’s ruling in a lower court is subject of review4. d.     the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant

within the 6th degree or to counsel within the 4th degree;5. e.      the judge knows that the judge’s spouse  or child has a financial

interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.

In every instance the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

REMITTAL OF DISQUALIFICATIONRule 3.13 – A judge disqualified by the terms of Rule 3.12 may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the record the basis of disqualification.  If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or insubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding.  The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceeding.

Rule 4.01 – A judge may, to the extent that the following activities do not impair the performance of judicial duties or case doubt on the judge’s impartiality:

1. a.      speak, write, lecture, teach or participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system and the administration of justice;

2. b.     appear at a public hearing before a legislative or executive body on matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice and otherwise consult with them on matters concerning the administration of justice;

3. c.      serve on any organization devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal system or the administration of justice.

CANON 5 – A judge should regulate extra-judicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial activities.

VOCATIONAL, CIVIC AND CHARITABLE ACTIVITIESRule 5.01 – A judge  may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere with the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the courts:

1. a.      write, lecture, teach and speak on non-legal subjects;2. b.     engage in the arts, sports, and other special recreational activities;3. c.      participate in civic and charitable activities;4. d.     serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-

profit or non-political, educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.

FINANCIAL ACTIVITIESRule 5.02 – A judge shall refrain from financial and business dealings that tends to reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or increase involvements with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of cases giving grounds for disqualification.

Rule 5.03 – Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage investments but should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business except as director of a family business of the judge.

Rule 5.04 – A judge or any, immediate member of the family, shall not accept a gift, bequest, favor or loan from anyone except as may be allowed by law.

Rule 5.05 – No information acquired in a judicial capacity shall be used or disclosed by a judge in any financial dealing or for any other purpose not related to judicial activities.

FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIESRule 5.06 – A judge should not serve as the execution administrator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, or person of a member of the immediate family and then only if such service will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties. “member of immediate family” shall be limited to the spouse  and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity.  As a family fiduciary, a judge shall not:

1. a.      serve in proceedings that might come before the court of said judge; or

2. b.     act as such contrary to Rule 5.02 to 5.05

PRACTICE OF LAW AND OTHER PROFESSION

Rule 5.07 – A judge shall not engage in the private practice of law.  Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the practice of any other profession provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with judicial functions.

FINANCIAL DISCLOSURERule 5.08 – A judge shall make full financial disclosure as required by law.EXTRA-JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTSRule 5.09 – A judge shall not accept appointment or designation to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIESRule 5.10 – A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.  But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship, a judge shall not make political speeches, contribute to party funds, publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan political activities.

NEW CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT

CANON 3IMPARTIALITY

Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.

SEC. 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias or prejudice.

SEC. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or deciding cases.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.

SEC. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

(a) The judge has actual bias or prejudice concerning a party or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceedings;

(b) The judge previously served as a lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

(c) The judge, or a member of his or her family, has an economic interest in the outcome of the matter in controversy;

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(e) The judge’s ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;

(f) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth civil degree or to counsel within the fourth civil degree; or

(g) The judge knows that his or her spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceedings;

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.

CANON 4PROPRIETY

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

SEC. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary and financial interests and shall make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else,

nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or disclosed for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 11. Judges shall not practice law whilst the holder of judicial office.

SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made, provided that such gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

SUPREME COURT ISSUANCES

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 3-92 August 31, 1992

TO: ALL JUDGES AND COURT PERSONNEL

SUBJECT: PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF HALLS OF JUSTICE FOR RESIDENTIAL AND COMMERCIAL PURPOSES

All judges and court personnel are hereby reminded that the Halls of Justice maybe used only for purposes directly related to the functioning and operation of the courts of justice, and may not be devoted to any other use, list of all as residential quarters of the judges or court personnel, or for carrying on therein any trade or profession.

Attention is drawn to A.M. No. RTJ-89-327 (Nelly Kelly Austria vs. Judge Singuat Guerra), a case involving an authorized and improper use of the court's premises

for dwelling purposes by respondent and his family, in which the Court, by Resolution dated October 17, 1991, found respondent Judge guilty of irresponsible and improper conduct prejudicial to the efficient administration of justice and best interest of the service and imposed on him the penalty of SEVERE CENSURE, the Court declaring that such use of the court's premises inevitably degrades the honor and dignity of the court in addition to exposing judicial records to danger of loss or damage.

FOR STRICT COMPLIANCE.

August 31, 1992.

JURISPRUDENCE

A.M. No. RTJ-15-2405, January 12, 2015Dantes, et.al v. Judge Jose S. Jacinto

Facts: A petition for prohibition with urgent application for the issuance of a TRO and WPI for the demolition of the public market of the Municipality of Mindoro was raffled to respondent’s sala. During the hearing, only 12 out of more than 500 members accompanying complainants on that day were allowed to enter. Worse, upon motion of the Mayor, all the complainants were escorted out of the courtroom except for Julieta who had to testify that day. According to the petitioners, during the hearings respondent “argued, berated, accused, scolded , confused and admonished petitioners without basis or justification”, and further claimed that respondent asked complainants “confusing and misleading questions all geared and intended to elicit answers damaging to the cause of petitioners and favorable to the cause of their adversary.

Issues: 1. Whether or not respondent was impartial. 2.Whether or not respondent violated Canon 4 of the New Code of

Judicial Conduct?

Held: 1. No. Mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. The contention of petitioner that respondent’s bias and partiality can be gleaned from the fact that he did not allow the “more than 500 members” who accompanied petitioners during the hearing to the courtroom is devoid of merit. The standard sizes of courtrooms could not accommodate such the huge group inside.

2. Yes. Section 1 of Canon 4 clearly enjoins judges not only from committing acts of impropriety, but even acts that have the appearance of impropriety. In this case, instead of reprimanding Mayor Villarosa for not asking for the court’s permission to leave while the trial was ongoing, respondent appeared to serve as the former’s advocate. He did so by declaring in open court that the abrupt exit of the Mayor should be excused, as the latter had an important appointment to attend. It was the Mayor’s lawyer, and not respondent judge who had the duty of explaining why the mayor left the courtroom without asking for the court’s permission.

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]

RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE

JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN

FACTS: This involves the PORK BARREL SCAM of Janet Napoles. In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate (Blue Ribbon Committee), the names of certain government officials and other individuals were mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer. These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and

events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.

In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division in the Kevlar helmet cases, a previous case which convicted some of the accused but acquitted Mrs. Napoles.

Administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice Ong of the Sandiganbayan.

ISSUE: WON Ong is guilty of Impartiality, Bribery and Misconduct?

HELD: Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case. Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012, as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event hosted by her.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada.

Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of possible bias or partiality. In pending or prospective litigations before them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges' competence, integrity and independence.

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388, June 10, 2014EMILIE SISON-BARIAS vs. JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA

FACTS: The petitioner Barias filed the complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on Nov. 11, 2010 charging respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct. In her complaint, Barias revealed that she had

a dinner meeting with the respondents in a restaurant in The Fort, Bonifacio Global City in Taguig on March 3, 2010 where they have discussed her pending cases. During the meeting, Rubia allegedly asked her questions not related to her pending cases, including her supposed involvement with another man, her being connected with a leading airline in the country and the hospital where she brought her husband when he suffered cardiac arrest.

The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Samuel Gaerlan.

In his investigation report dated March 13, 2012, Gaerlan recommended that the respondents Rubia and Pecana should not be held administratively liable as he was convinced that the meeting of complainant and respondents at Burgos Circle in Global City was “just a chance encounter” and that Barias had failed to present substantial evidence to prove her allegations.

HELD: The SC rejected the report of Gaerlan as they decided to hold Judge Rubia administratively liable. The evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place. Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for administrative liability.

By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Propriety.

Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety at all times. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge. A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.

His actions failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold neutrality of an impartial judge."150 Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality.

Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial." The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

GACAD V. CLAPIS, JR.(A.M. No. RTJ-10-2257, July 17, 2012)

FACTS:            Criselda C. Gacad filed a Verified Complaint against Judge Clapis for Grave Misconduct and Corrupt Practices, Grave Abuse of Discretion, Gross Ignorance of the Law, and violations of Canon 1 (Rule 1.01, 1.02), Canon 2 (Rule 2.01), and Canon 3 (Rule 3.05) of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to a criminal case.

            Petitioner alleged that through Arafol, she was able to meet Judge Clapis at the Golden Palace Hotel in Tagum City to talk about the case of her brother. Arafol informed the petitioner that the Judge will do everything for her favor but on the pretext that in return she has to give P50,000.00 to the Judge. During the meeting,

the Judge, after being satisfied of the promise of the petitioner for that amount, told her "Sige, kay ako na bahala, gamuson nato ni sila." (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.) She was able to give such amount.

On the second week of January 2010, Arafol showed to Gacad a copyof Judge Clapis’ Order dated 4 January 2010 denying the Motion for Reinvestigation filed by the accused. Subsequently, Arafol told Gacad that Judge Clapis was borrowing P50,000 from her for his mother’s hospitalization. Arafol handed to Gacad a postdated BPI check allegedly issued by Judge Clapis as assurance of payment. However, Gacad failed to produce the P50,000. Gacad alleged that, from then on, Arafol and Judge Clapis began to “play different hideous schemes” to prejudice their case.

            When the case was set on hearing, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to the petitioner only after the date of hearing. Thereafter, Judge Clapis set a hearing which Gacad came to know only inadvertently since she received no notice for the hearing. During the 29 March 2010 hearing, PublicProsecutor Alona Labtic moved that the petition for bail be put in writing. However, the counsel for the accused manifested that he was not prepared for a written petition because it was only right before the hearing that the accused informed him of Arafol’s agreement to bail. Thus, Judge Clapis calendared the case for speedy trial. He set a continuous hearing for the petition for bail on 12 April 2010, 13 April 2010, and 14 April 2010. Moreover, Judge Clapis issued a Notice of Preliminary Conference set on 2 December 2010. To bolster her case of corruption against Judge Clapis, Gacad recounted her previous encounter with Judge Clapis and Arafol in a Criminal against her brother. According to Gacad, Arafol suggested that they give Judge Clapis the P80,000 cash bond posted in the case so that her brother’s case could be dismissed. After conceding to Arafol’s proposal, Judge Clapis indeed dismissed the case despite the strong evidence against her brother.

In his comment, the judge claimed that notices were made verbally because of time constraints. Nevertheless, he stressed that both sides were given the opportunity to be heard since in almost all proceedings, petitioner was in court and the orders were done in open court. He admitted that his personnel inadvertently scheduled the preliminary conference of the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Judge is guilty of the charges.

HELD: YES. Judge Clapis committed grave misconduct for acting contrary to the prescribed standard of conduct for judges.

          The acts of Judge Clapis in meeting the petitioner, a litigant in a case pending before his sala and telling her, “Sige, kay ako na bahala gamuson nato ni sila” (Okay, leave it all to me, we shall crush them.), both favoring Gacad, constitute gross misconduct.

        Misconduct means intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior in connection with one’s performance of official functions and duties. For grave or gross misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should be corrupt or inspired by the intention to violate the law, or a persistent disregard of well-known rules. The misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment.

Judge Clapis’ wrongful intention and lack of judicial reasoning are made overt by the circumstances on record. First, the Notices of Hearings were mailed to Gacad only after the hearing. Second, Judge Clapis started conducting the bail hearings without an application for bail and granted bail without affording the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Third, Judge Clapis set a preliminary conference seven months from the date it was set, patently contrary to his declaration of speedy trial for the case. Judge Clapis cannot

escape liability by shifting the blame to his court personnel. He ought to know that judges are ultimately responsible for order and efficiency in their courts, and the subordinates are not the guardians of the judge’s responsibility.

         The arbitrary actions of respondent judge, taken together, give doubt as to his impartiality, integrity and propriety. His acts amount to gross misconduct constituting violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly: Canon 2, Section 1 and 2; Canon 3, Section 2 and 4; and Canon 4, Section 1.       

We also find Judge Clapis liable for gross ignorance of the law for conducting bail hearings without a petition for bail being filed by the accused and without affording the prosecution an opportunity to prove that the guilt of the accused is strong. Here, the act of Judge Clapis is not a mere deficiency in prudence, discretion and judgment but a patent disregard of well-known rules. When an error is so gross and patent, such error produces an inference of bad faith, making the judge liable for gross ignorance of the law. If judges are allowed to wantonly misuse the powers vested in them by the law, there will not only be confusion in the administration of justice but also oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.

Judge Hilarion P. Clapis, Jr. is DISMISSED from the service.

A.M. NO. RTJ-06-2014               March 4, 2009 NILDA VERGINESA-SUAREZ, Complainant,

vs.JUDGE RENATO J. DILAG AND COURT STENOGRAPHER III CONCEPCION A.

PASCUA, Respondents.

FACTS:These consolidated cases involve (a) the administrative charges of graft and corruption against respondents Judge Renato J. Dilag (Judge Dilag) and Court Stenographer III Concepcion A. Pascua (Pascua) of Branch 73 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Olongapo City, Zambales filed by Nilda Verginesa-Suarez (Suarez), Court Stenographer III of the same court; and (b) the administrative charges for gross misconduct and gross ignorance of the law against Judge Dilag filed by the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). These cases also include the counter-charges of Judge Dilag and Pascua against Suarez for falsification, negligence in the transcription of stenographic notes, and absence without official leave.The OCA observed that the controversies between the parties were replete with substantial factual issues, and so it recommended a formal administrative inquiry to be conducted by a designated Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. In a Resolution[8] dated August 2, 2006, this Court resolved, upon the recommendation of the OCA, to: (1) treat the comment of Judge Dilag as a complaint against Suarez; (2) redocket the instant matter as an administrative matter and refer the same to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation within ninety (90) days from receipt of the record; and (3) require the Investigating Justice to submit a report within thirty (30) days from termination of the investigation.ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Judge is guilty of gross misconduct and/or gross negligenceRULING:

The exhaustive evaluation of evidence and findings of fact by the Investigating Justice are quoted hereunder:

 A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014

 A. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag

 This Investigating Justice finds that there is no sufficient,

clear and convincing evidence to hold respondent Judge administratively liable for graft and corruption.Jurisprudence dictates that the ground for the removal of a judicial officer must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The general rules regarding the

admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply to charges of misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence.

 The exhaustive evaluation of evidence and findings of fact by the

Investigating Justice are quoted hereunder: A.M. No. RTJ-06-2014

 A. Respondent Judge Renato J. Dilag

 This Investigating Justice finds that there is no sufficient,

clear and convincing evidence to hold respondent Judge administratively liable for graft and corruption.Jurisprudence dictates that the ground for the removal of a judicial officer must be established beyond reasonable doubt. The general rules regarding the admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply to charges of misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption or incompetence.

 In the instant case, there is no clear and convincing evidence

that indeed respondent Judge received money from litigants to obtain favorable decisions. The testimonies of Belen Trapane and Aurea Rowena Cayabyab, stating to the effect that they each paid P30,000.00 to respondents, through respondent Pascua, cannot be given due weight against respondent Judge for being hearsay evidence. By the same token, the rumors relative to the alleged acceptance of money in exchange for a favorable decision remain as such and cannot be admitted as evidence, let alone given due evidentiary weight. Corollary, private complainant Suarez fell short of the required degree of proof needed in an administrative charge of graft and corruption.

 Respondent Judge, however, should be made accountable

for gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, specifically Sections 1 and 2 of Canon 2; Section 2 of Canon 3; and, Section 1 of Canon 4, of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary which provide:

 Canon 2. Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to the personal demeanor of judges.

 Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the peoples faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done. 

Canon 3. Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision to made.

 Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and

litigants in the impartiality of the judge and the judiciary. 

Canon 4. Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.

 Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety of a judge.

 This finds support in the case of Kaw vs. Judge Osorio [A.M. No.

RTJ-03-1801, March 23, 2004], where the Supreme Court, though dismissing the charges of extortion and graft and corruption against respondent judge therein, nevertheless, held him administratively liable for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

 In the case at bench, the existence of the two (2) sets of

conflicting decisions in the Pancho, Tomboc and Del Rosario cases, respectively, though speculative, absent clear evidence that respondent Judge received monetary considerations, the same, however, from a reasonable point of view, would seriously arouse the suspicion of a reasonable mind that something is wrong. In other words, while not conclusively and clearly proving the charge of graft and corruption, the same casts a cloud of suspicion upon the integrity, impartiality and propriety of which respondent Judge is expected to possess and manifest. These requirements are concepts of the mind which can only be manifested through actuations of a magistrate. Thus, as explicitly worded in the New Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge must not merely possess these requirements but he must be also be seen and perceived to be such. The judiciary is the bastion of justice, fairness and equity. Certainly, it cannot afford to have erring magistrates who will only tarnish its image rather than maintain and preserve the same.

  A judge is the embodiment of competence, integrity and

independence to uphold and maintain public confidence in the legal system. Thus, while he is expected to keep abreast of developments in law and jurisprudence, he is presumed to have more than a cursory knowledge of the rules of procedure. Not every error is indicative of ignorance, for if committed in good faith, no administrative sanction is imposed. Good faith, however, inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment. It does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal procedures evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error. In the case at bench, respondent Judge failed to follow basic legal procedures which are not excusable but renders him liable to administrative sanction for gross ignorance of the law and procedure.

BAR QUESTIONS AND SUGGESTED ANSWERS IN RELATION TO IMPARTIALITY AND PROPRIETY

ESSAY

2013

IX.

Atty. Hermano requested his fraternity brother, Judge Patron, to introduce him to Judge Apestado, before whom he has a case that had been pending for sometime. Judge Patron, a close friend of Judge Apestado, acceded to the request, telling the latter that Atty. Hermano is his fraternity “brod” and that Atty. Hermano simply wanted to ask for advice on how to expedite the resolution of his case. They met, as arranged, in the fine dining restaurant of a five-star hotel. Atty. Hermano hosted the dinner. Did Atty. Hermano, Judge Patron and Judge Apestado commit any ethical/administrative violation for which they can be held liable? (8%)

Yes. This is literally in violation of the provisions against fraternization. Atty. Hermano violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, in particular, the duty not to influence judges and the prohibition against fraternization with judges before whom they have pending cases. Judges Patron and Apestado violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, in particular the Canons on Impartiality and Propriety. Judges are precluded from socializing with lawyers who have pending cases before them. The Supreme Court has decided in several cases that Judges must not only be impartial, they must also appear to be impartial.

2007

-V-(10%)

During the hearing of an election protest filed by his brother, Judge E sat in the area reserved for the public, not beside his brother’s lawyer. Judge E’s brother won the election protest. Y, the defeated candidate for mayor, filed an administrative case against Judge E for employing influence and pressure on the judge who heard and decided the election protest.Judge E explained that the main reasons why he was there in the courtroom were because he wanted to observe how election protests are conducted as he has never conducted one because he wanted to give moral support to his brother.

Did Judge E commit and act of impropriety as a member of the judiciary? Explain?

Yes, Judge E committed an act of impropriety as a member of the judiciary. The personal behavior of a judge must be beyond reproach for he is the visible representation of the law and of justice. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not only impropriety, but even the appearance of impropriety in all their conduct, whether in their public or private life. The proscription includes a judge's meddling with judicial processes in courts other than his own and acting in a manner that would arouse suspicion that he is meddling with such court processes as what Judge E demonstrated in the case at bar.

2008

VIAtty. Abigail filed administrative cases before the Supreme Court against Judge Luis. Thereafter, Atty. Abigail filed a Motion for Inhibition praying that Judge Luis inhibit himself from trying, hearing or in any manner acting on all cases, civil and criminal, in which Atty. Abigail is involved and handling. Should Judge Luis inhibit himself as prayed for by Atty. Abigail? Explain fully. (6%)

No. Being the subject of an administrative case is not one of the grounds for disqualification of a judge from handling case provided by the Code of Judicial Responsibility in Canon 3 Rule 12.

IX

State, with a brief explanation, whether the judge concerned may be sanctioned for the conduct stated below.

a. Refusing to inhibit himself although one of the lawyers in the case is his second cousin. (3%)

No. Under Canon 3, Rule 3.12 a judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. One of the cases would be where the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to counsel within the fourth degree. A second cousin is a relative within the 6th degree, hence it is not covered by the prohibition.

b. Deciding a case in accordance with a Supreme Court ruling but adding that he does not agree with the ruling. (3%)

No. There is no law or rule prohibiting such conduct. Regardless of his opinion, the judge still followed the Supreme Court's ruling thus there is really nothing wrong with such act. Further, his opinion will not have any bearing as it is not part of the decision.

MCQ

2011 (SET A)

6. In a verified complaint, Kathy said that Judge Florante decided a petition for correction of entry involving the birth record of her grandson, Joshua, who happened to be child of Judge Florante's daughter, Pilita. Judge Florante insisted that he committed no wrong since the proceeding was non-adversarial and since it merely sought to correct an erroneous entry in the child’s birth certificate. Is Judge Florante liable?

A. Yes, because Florante breached the rule on mandatory disqualification.B. No, because Judge Florante has no pecuniary interest in the proceeding.C. No, because it is true the proceeding was non-adversarial so it prejudiced no one.D. Yes, since the correction in the child’s record affects the details of birth of the child.

13. On appeal, RTC Judge Rudy affirmed the MTC’s conviction of Lorna for violation of the bouncing checks law and awarded Agnes, the complainant, Php1.6 million in damages. Two years later, upon Lorna’s motion and after ascertaining that her counsel never received the court's decision, Judge Rudy recalled the entry of judgment in the case, reversed himself, and absolved Lorna of guilt. Claiming an unjust judgment, Agnes filed an administrative complained against Judge Rudy, saying that it is plain from the circumstances that he connived with Lorna, her counsel, and the handling prosecutor. But she offered no further evidence. Rudy denied the charges and asserted that any error in his judgment is correctible only by an appeal, not by an administrative suit. Should Judge Rudy be disciplined?

(A) No, because Agnes' complaint is merely based on suspicions and speculations.(B) No, because Agnes has yet to establish that Rudy's decision is plainly erroneous. (C) Yes, because he gravely abused his discretion in recalling the entry of judgment. (D) Yes, because reconsidering the judgment of conviction that the MTC and he earlier issued shows anomaly in Judge Rudy's action

18. Judge Cristina has many law-related activities. She teaches law and delivers lectures on law. Some in the government consult her on their legal problems. She also serves as director of a stock corporation devoted to penal reform, where she participates in both fund raising and fund management. Which of the following statements applies to her case?

A. She should not engage in fund raising activities.

B. Her activities are acceptable except the part where she is involved in fund management.

C. She can teach law and deliver lectures on law but not do the other things.

D. All of her activities are legal.