guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects

8/3/2019 Guidelines for the Design of Violence Reduction Projects

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Cataloging-in-publication provided by the

Inter-American Development Bank

Felipe Herrera Library

Guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects.

p.cm. (Sustainable Development Department Best practices se-ries; SOC-135)Includes bibliographical references.

1. Violence. 2. Economic development projects. 3. Inter.-American De-velopment Bank. I. Inter-American Development Bank. SustainableDevelopment Dept. Social Development Div. II. Series.

339.46 G282dc21

This document was prepared by a team composed of: Andrew Morrison(SDS/SOC) Team Leader; Tracy Betts (RE1/SO1), Christina Bie-besheimer (SDS/SCS), Loreto Biehl (SDS/SOC), Mayra Buvinic(SDS/SOC), and Ginya Truitt Nakata (RE2/FSS). Consultant reports byMartin Anderson (independent consultant), Katherine Christoffel (Chil-drens Hospital of Chicago) and Ronald Slaby (Harvard University andthe Educational Development Center) provided important backgroundinformation for the document. Helpful comments and suggestions werereceived from many Bank staff.These guidelines have been reviewed and approved by the Banks Pro-gramming Committee on October 2001

June 2003

This publication (No. SOC-135) can be obtained through:

PublicationsSocial Development DivisionInter-American Development Bank1300 New York Avenue, N.W.Washington, D.C. 20577

Fax: 202-623-1576Email: sds/soc/@iadb.orgWeb Site: www.iadb.org/sds/soc


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Contents

Introduction1

Areas for Bank Support7

Evaluating Violence Reduction Projects21

Lessons Learned23

Bibliography26


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Foreword

This document, written in response to requests from both Bank administration and project teams,provides Bank staff guidance on the selection of interventions to reduce violence, whether in thecontext of stand-alone violence reduction operations or as components in other types of loans.

These guidelines are a work in progress, which will be expanded and modified as the Bank gainsmore experience in violence reduction activities.

Actions to prevent violence fall within the Banks mandate to promote development and reducepoverty, given the fact that violence both hinders growth and worsens poverty. In addition, thePlan of Action from the 2001 Summit of the Americas enjoined the multilateral developmentbanks to intensify their support for countries efforts to tackle the problem of violence.

IDB-financed violence reduction activities will emphasize preventive measures that have aproven track record of success. Prevention activities will be emphasized for two fundamentalreasons: they are generally more cost-effective than control measures, and they are more consis-

tent with the IDBs mission as a development bank.

These guidelines detail promising interventions in the following sectors: information systemsand research; health; education; justice, media, police, and prisons (rehabilitation of inmates). Inaddition, promising approaches in situational prevention, social prevention, community-basedinitiatives and violence reduction legislation are described. In supporting these types of interven-tions, the Bank will seek to collaborate with other international agencies, as well as foster part-nerships between government and civil society.

These guidelines also provide recommendations on how to evaluate violence reduction opera-tions, as well as a synthesis of the lessons learned to date in the preparation and execution of vio-

lence reduction projects.

Christof KuechemannDeputy ManagerSustainable Development Department


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Introduction

RATIONALE FOR BANK SUPPORT

FOR VIOLENCE REDUCTIONPROJECTS

These guidelines respond to two institutionaldemands. The first is from the Banks LoanCommittee, which charged the SustainableDevelopment Department with preparingguidelines to assist project teams in justify-ing the economic benefits of reduced crimeand violence and in identifying project com-ponents that effectively reduce violence. The

second demand comes directly from opera-tional staff with an eminently practical con-cern: what types of activities have a proventrack record of performance in violence re-duction? This need is accentuated by the factthat violence reduction is a relatively newarea of work for the Bank.

1

Precisely because violence reduction opera-tions are relatively new to the Bank, theseguidelines are able to incorporate best prac-

tices and lessons learned from only a smallnumber of Bank projects. This has two con-sequences. First, these guidelines have in-corporated information from a variety ofsources other than Bank projects, includingthe voluminous literature evaluating the im-pact of violence prevention programs in de-

1 The focus of these guidelines is violence reduction,

rather than the narrower focus of criminal violence. Aviolent act may or may not contravene existing legis-lation and consequently may or may not be labeled ascriminal by the criminal justice system. Two ex-amples are certain types of domestic violence andcorporal punishment, whichalthough not contra-vened by legislation in some countries of the re-gionare both serious in their own right and havebeen shown to generate further violent behavior.

veloped countries. Second, these guidelines

are a work in progress; they must evolve andincorporate more best practices and lessonslearned specific to the Bank and the region,as the Bank gains more experience in thisarea.

Recent evidence shows unequivocally thatviolence slows economic growth and im-pedes social development. The most obviouscost generated by violence is the value ofresources used to attempt to control it or

treat its consequences; public and privateexpenditures on police, security systems andjudicial services ranged from 2 to 9 percentof GDP in six countries of the region, andexpenditures on health services as a result ofviolence ranged from 0.3 to 5 percent ofGDP (Londoo et al., 2000). If levels of vio-lence were reduced, some of these expendi-tures could be devoted to more productiveends.

Less obvious but perhaps more important isthe impact on economic growth that is gen-erated by violences effect on human capitalaccumulation, incomes, andat the macro-economic levelon investment and produc-tivity. There is evidence that violence affectsschooling performance, leading to a loss instocks of human capital. Domestic violenceis associated with higher rates of grade repe-tition and dropout rates for children who ei-ther witness it or themselves are victims.

Incomes are affected by violence as employ-ees decide to work fewer hours or are lesswilling to work at dangerous times or indangerous neighborhoods. Domestic vio-lence has been shown to lead to significantreductions in the earnings of abusedwomenlosses that in two countries of the


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region were shown to represent between 1.6and 2 percent of gross domestic product(Morrison and Orlando, 1999).

Nor are key macroeconomic variables ex-empt from the impact of violence. The loss

of investment and productivity resultingfrom urban violence is estimated at 1.8 per-cent of GDP for the region as a whole (Lon-doo et al. 2000). Another reasonable short-hand measure of the costs of violence in theregion is individuals willingness to pay forthe elimination of violence. For six countriesof the region, this willingness to pay rangedfrom 1 to 11.5 percent of GDP, with a meanvalue of 5.3 percent (Londoo et al., 2000).

There is also emerging evidence that vio-lence exacerbates poverty. Domestic vio-lence, as the study cited above notes, im-poverishes women. Other research docu-ments that the assets of the poorin particu-lar, their social capitalare more affectedby violence than are the assets of othergroups (Moser and Holland, 1997). If this isthe case, violence also exacerbates inequal-ity. Recent studies have shown that inequal-ity is one of the most important variablesthat can explain differences in rates of vio-lence among countries. Thus, it may be thecase that violence, poverty and inequalityare linked in a vicious cycle: inequalityspawns violence, which in turn worsenspoverty and increases inequality even fur-ther.

2Thus, Bank operations which that re-

duce violence are consistent with the man-dates of the Eighth Replenishment to fightpoverty and inequality in the region.

Finally, current violence impedes futurepossibilities of social development by gen-erating even higher levels of violence in thefuture. There is convincing evidence of theself-perpetuating nature of violence: chil-

2 At the same time, studies in the region have notdocumented that poverty itself generates violence.

dren who are victims of or even just wit-nesses to domestic violence are much morelikely than their peers to engage in violentbehavior, both while still children and lateras adults. In addition, violence has beenshown to have a contagion effect for society

as a whole. In sum, violence begets vio-lence; escalating spirals of violence, in turn,generate significant social and economiccosts in terms of foregone economic growth,decreased social capital, worsening povertyand increased inequality.

High and growing levels of violence in theregion make violence reduction an espe-cially urgent priority. For Latin America andthe Caribbean as a whole, the homicide raterose from 19.6 per 100,000 in 1984 to 28.4per 100,000 in 1994.3 Over the longer periodfrom the early 1970s to the mid-1990s,seven out of ten countries for which data areavailable have registered increases in thehomicide rate.

4In the mid-1990s, the region

had the second-highest homicide rate in theworld, exceeded only by Sub-Saharan Af-rica.

5

These rising levels of violence and crimepresent difficult challenges for democraticgovernance in the region. The IDBs Corpo-rate Strategy (Renewing the Commitmentto Development: Report of the WorkingGroup on the Institutional StrategyGN-2077-1) recognizes the threat posed to de-mocratic governance by a generalized lackof citizen security. By supporting efforts to

3 Information provided by the Health SituationAnalysis Program, Health and Human Development

Division, Pan American Health Organization. Theestimates are based on data on causes of mortality,which are found in the PAHOs Technical Informa-tion System data base.4 Fajnzylber et al., 1998. Internationally comparabledata on other forms of violencearmed robbery,rape, domestic violence, etc.are not available overtime.5 World Health Organization, unpublished data.


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reduce crime and violence in ways consis-tent with democratic governance, the Bankis in fact supporting the consolidation of theregions democracies.

Finally, it is important to note that govern-

ments of the hemisphere have called for col-laboration between the multilateral devel-opment banks and national institutions ininitiatives to reduce and prevent violence.The Plan of Action from the 2001 QuebecSummit urges multilateral organizations tointensify their support and technical assis-tance to those countries that so request, inthe elaboration of national strategies and ac-tions regarding this topic (violence preven-tion).

COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL

ADVANTAGES OF THE IDB

The IDB must be selective in choosing in-terventions to support violence reduction.Interventions should emphasize preventionand foster partnerships between govern-ments and civil society. It is especially im-portant for the Bank to seek partnershipswith other national and international agen-cies working in the area of violence reduc-tion. Organizations such as the PanAmerican Health Organization, UNIFEM,and UNESCO have undertaken importantinitiatives in violence reduction and IDBprojects should take advantage of potentialsynergies with these efforts.

6The Bank is a

founding member of the Inter-AmericanCoalition for the Prevention of Violence,whose members include the World Bank;the Pan American Health Organization; theOrganization of American States; the United

6 The Social Development Division (SDS/SOC) hascompiled an annotated list of international organiza-tions that have undertaken violence reduction activi-ties, along with the programmatic focus of their in-terventions. This table is available at: http://sdsnet/divisions/soc/violence/guidelines.cfm. (AppendixTable A to the guidelines document).

Nations Educational, Scientific and CulturalOrganization and the Centers for DiseaseControl and Prevention. The Coalition offersa practical vehicle for increased collabora-tion among member institutions.

IDB violence reduction projects should alsobuild upon the Banks unique comparativeadvantages.

7With its capacity to work with

sectors as disparate as justice, health andeducation, the Bank is well poised to designviolence reduction projects with interven-tions in multiple sectors. In addition, theBank can make use of its long-term financ-ing to support those prevention activitiesthat require up-front investments but deliverlonger-term payoffs.

As a borrowers bank, the IDB is able towork closely with its member countries andtailor projects that respond to local condi-tions. This is especially important in vio-lence reduction operations, since the typesof violence and the factors responsible forviolence can vary significantly among coun-tries.

The Bank is able to work effectively withcountries in novel and experimental areasand in areas where relationships, listeningand sensitivity are important. It is able to useits convening capacity to engage stake-holders in discussions of emerging issuessuch as violence reduction, as well as topromote increased collaboration betweengovernments and civil society in this newarea of action.

The Bank has growing in-house capacity toconduct research on violence. Using itscomparative advantage in economic analy-sis, it has done research on the social and

7 Several of these comparative advantages are men-tioned in the IDBs corporate strategy documentRenewing the Commitment to Development (July1999).


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economic costs of violence. It has alsodocumented the link between social anddomestic violence and produced best prac-tices analyses of violence reduction pro-grams. Through its long-standing work inthe area of modernization of the state, it has

gathered evidence and experience in the re-form of the judiciary and criminal justicesystems.

Finally, the IDB has been a pioneer in stand-alone violence reduction operations. TheBank has quickly built the institutional ca-pacity to respond to borrowers demands forprojects in this area. At the same time, it isnecessary to strengthen and expand this ca-pacity by offering ongoing training to stafffrom Headquarters and Country Offices inthe design, oversight and evaluation of vio-lence reduction projects.

These comparative advantages position theBank quite favorably to continue its work inthis area.

BRIEF HISTORY OF IDB PROJECT

WORK IN VIOLENCE REDUCTION

While stand-alone violence reduction projects date only from 1996, many traditionalBank projects have the potential to reduceviolence. Early childhood development pro-grams, for example, have been shown to re-duce both youth violence and criminal con-duct in adult years. Judicial reform projectsthat provide greater access to judicial ser-vices and/or training in conflict resolutionreduce violence associated with vigilantejustice or conflicts between neighbors. Vio-lence reduction initiatives are especially ap-propriate in health, education, judicial re-form and municipal/urban development pro-jects.

The Banks first stand-alone violence project focused on domestic violence against

women by creating local treatment and pre-vention networks in six countries. This andsubsequent domestic violence projects havebeen financed to date by technical coopera-tion funds. In 1998, the Bank approved thefirst two stand-alone violence reduction

loans, one in Colombia (PR-2274; $57 mil-lion) and one in Uruguay (PR-2279; $17.5million). In response to rising demand frommember countries, there are currently anumber of stand-alone loan operations in thedesign stage. These stand-alone operationshave supported the creation of informationsystems, as well as interventions in multiplesectors.8

CRITERIA FOR SELECTING

VIOLENCE REDUCTION ACTIVITIES

Bank funding in any given area must meetthree basic tests. The basic purpose and functions testasks if the activity makes adirect contribution to the Banks basic man-date of accelerating the process of economicand social development. The economic con-siderations test asks if the decision can be justified solely on economic factors. Thenoninterference in political matters test re-quires that the activity not have aspects thatcould be perceived as interfering or poten-tially interfering in internal political mat-ters.

9

Since violence directly inhibits economicand social growth. Actions that reduce vio-

8 SDS/SOC has compiled an annotated list of Bank

operations which address issues of violence, whetherthrough stand-alone violence reduction operationsor through specific components in projects with otherobjectives. This table is available at: http://sdsnet/divisions/soc/violence/guidelines.cfm.9 Spelled out in a memorandum from the Legal De-partment Limits on the Activities Which May BeFunded with IDB Resources in accordance with theBanks Charter (April 9, 1998).


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lence meet the basic purpose test.10 Interven-tions that do so efficiently meet the eco-nomic test. The test of noninterference inpolitical matters requires making a judgmentthat the operation does not further a particu-lar internal political position or agenda.

The principle of cost-effectiveness is, there-fore, the first litmus test to which prospec-tive violence reduction interventions shouldbe subjected. Bank project teams need toselect interventions that are both effective inreducing violence and do so in the leastcostly manner possible. Unfortunately, evi-dence on the cost-effectiveness of differentinterventions is scarce. If available at all, itis typically for interventions undertaken indeveloped nations, which raises questionsof applicability to the developing nationsof the region. Nevertheless, it is clear thatprevention activities are generally morecost-effective than remedial or control ap-proaches. Thus, Bank projects should em-phasize activities that seek to prevent ratherthan control violence. In addition, Bank vio-lence reduction projects should containevaluation components that permit both theBank and the countries of the region to be-gin to amass data on the types of interven-tions that are most cost-effective in reducingviolence.

A second criterion for inclusion in Bankprojects should be that interventions do notcontravene the injunction in the Bankscharter to avoid interference in countries

10It is recommended that project teams contract di-

agnostic studies that identify the most important

manifestations of violence in a country and the asso-ciated socioeconomic costs. Estimating the socio-economic costs of violence is important because itestablishes the importance of crime and violence as apublic policy issue and provides information neededto begin the process of resource allocation.SDS/SOC has prepared a methodological guide oncalculating the costs of violence, which is availableon the website: www.iadb.org/sds/soc.

internal political affairs. As outlined in theBanks charter, noninterference refers notonly to avoiding direct interference in thepolitical affairs of member countries, butalso to ensuring that decisions of the Bank,its officers and employees not be influenced

by the political character of member gov-ernments. The areas in which conflicts po-tentially may emergeand consequently inwhich the Bank should avoid involvementare highlighted in the section on activitieswith police forces. In addition to these areas,the following questions can help gauge thepotential for political interference, as wellidentify human rights concerns.

Are there adequate monitoring mecha-

nisms in place to insure that the productsor services resulting from Bank fundedprojects are not redirected to question-able areas in terms of political interfer-ence or human rights concerns? This isan especially relevant considerationwhen financing interventions in sensitiveareas.

Corollary to the above, are there mecha-nisms in place in Bank operations (such

as advisory councils, community consul-tations and other systems of checks andbalances) that foster transparency in theallocation of resources and openness inthe execution of activities, especially insensitive areas?

Do the activities and the executing agen-cies comply with human rights stan-dards? Do the project activities includestrengthening compliance with human

rights standards and/or training in humanrights issues?

A third criterion is that interventions mustbe feasible. Feasibility has several dimen-sions, including the existence of a local ser-vice provider or agency with experience in


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the type of intervention being proposed andan overall program design whose complex-ity does not exceed the capacity of the exe-cuting agency.

Finally, interventions and the programs of

which they are a part should strive to incor-

porate the participation of civil society. Thiswill both increase the likelihood that inter-ventions will achieve their stated objectivesand help ensure the sustainability of the pro-ject over time.


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Areas for Bank Support

In its lending and technical cooperation op-erations to reduce violence, the Bank should

support:

information exchange and knowledgedissemination activities and social mar-keting campaigns;

research on magnitudes, risk factors,costs, best practices and evaluations;

institutional strengthening (schools, hos-pitals, police, etc.);

components in lending operations inrelevant sectors (education, health, jus-tice, modernization of the state, urbanand municipal development); and

stand-alone peaceful societies and vio-lence reduction operations.

In stand-alone multi-sector operations, theBank should work with national govern-

ments whose commitment to institutionalreform and inter-sectoral collaboration isessential to project success. The Bankshould also engage municipalities and otherlocal government agencies, which are wellpositioned to coordinate efforts of differentagencies and to respond to specific localneeds in violence prevention and control.Finally, the Bank should encourage collabo-ration between government and civil society,and involve business, religious, and media

leaders as well.

Before discussing promising interventions, itis important to note the tension that existsbetween more comprehensive and more fo-cused programs. Programs with more com-ponents, addressing more types of violence

and/or more risk factors for violence, havethe potential to have a greater impact on

overall levels of violence.11 At the sametime, such complex programs necessarilywill involve more institutions in the execu-tion scheme. In the worst case scenario,complex programs can exceed the institu-tional capacity of executing agencies, lead-ing to low rates of disbursement, delays inexecution and even the cancellation of someprogram components. Given the heterogene-ity among member countries in terms ofexecution capacity, these guidelines cannot

provide guidance on whether, for any givencountry, a more comprehensive or more fo-cused program is most appropriate. Projectteams are simply advised to take into ac-count the management capabilities of exe-cuting agencies (including past experiencein implementing externally financed pro-jects), as well as the supervisory capacity ofthe IDB country office, when decidingwhether or not to add another component tothe project.

The subsections that follow provide recom-mendations to project teams on possible in-

11 There are multiple risk factors for violence, andsome are specific to certain types of violence. A par-tial list of risk factors includes: gender, age, biologi-cal predisposition, employment status, drug or alco-hol abuse, and early exposure to aggression (at theindividual level); dynamics and norms, a history of

violence, and household size and density (at thehousehold level); and income inequality, history ofsocietal violence and/or wars, lack of effectiveness ofinstitutions of social control, easy availability ofguns, drug trafficking, media violence and culturalnorms (at the community/societal level). Research onrisk factors is ongoing, and the empirical evidence forsome risk factors is stronger than for others. For moredetails, see Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter (1999).


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terventions to reduce violence, organized bysector. The sectors included are:12

information systems and research;

health;

education;

justice (judicial services and judicial re-form);

media;

police;

prisons; and

situational prevention, social prevention,community-based initiatives and legisla-tive action.

INFORMATION SYSTEMS,

RESEARCH AND DISSEMINATION

The lack of reliable information (on the in-cidence and prevalence of different types ofviolent behaviors, the risk factors for differ-ent types of violence, information on whichprograms are effective, and how much theycost) severely hampers efforts to reduce vio-lence. Therefore, the Bank should supportthe collection of information on violenceand its risk factors, policy- and program-oriented research, best practice research and

evaluations, and dissemination of the resultsof these efforts.

Information Systems. The Bank should sup-port the collection of reliable information onviolence and crime at the regional, nationaland local level, and in different sectors. Thisinvolves support of improved case registriesin various institutions (health centers, police,etc.), as well as survey instruments, includ-ing victimization surveys, to measure the

12 SDS/SOC has compiled a more detailed, annotatedlist of possible project interventions. This table isavailable at: http://sdsnet/divisions/soc/violence/guidelines.cfm. The Sustainable Development De-partments publication Technical Notes on ViolencePrevention also provides useful information for pro-ject teams. Available at the same address.

true prevalence of different types of crimeand violence and enable epidemiologicalsurveillance. Teams should take special careto ensure that information systems havebuilt-in safeguards to protect the privacy ofindividuals. Special attention should be paid

to ensuring that information systems cap-ture: (1) gender and domestic-based vio-lence, such as partner violence and rape, aswell as child and elder abuse; (2) youth vio-lence; (3) the ethnic and racial dimensionsof violent behavior, which historically havebeen invisible in the region; (4) the socio-economic characteristics of victims and (ifpossible) aggressors; and (5) the spatial dis-tribution of violence (i.e., the informationsystem should be geo-referenced). Betterinformation will allow more efficient alloca-tion of prevention and control resources,both over types of violence and over geo-graphic areas.

Policy- and Program-oriented Research.The Bank should support research on thesocial and economic costs of violence, aswell as on the situation-specific risk factorsfor violence. Research on socioeconomiccosts will both help justify devoting re-sources to violence reduction and permit thepriority allocation of resources to activitiesthat address those types of violence generat-ing the highest social costs. Such research isespecially useful as part of project prepara-tion, since it serves both to justify IDB sup-port for the project and mobilize supportamong national stakeholders. Research onrisk factors is helpful in the design of pre-vention programs that seek to modify theserisk factors.

Best Practice and Evaluation Research. TheBank should support studies to identify anddocument best practice programs at local,national and regional levels, as well as care-ful, scientific evaluations of violence reduc-


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tion efforts financed by the Bank and otheragencies.

Dissemination. The Bank should use itsconvening capabilities to disseminate theinformation collected from surveys and ana-

lytical research. It should endeavor to en-gage a broad range of stakeholders (includ-ing government, civil society, the businesscommunity, the media and the churches) inpublic dialogues to discuss this information,identify solutions, implement them, andmonitor their implementation.

HEALTH SECTOR

Violence is clearly a public health problem.Measured in terms of disability-adjusted lifeyears lost, homicide and violence worldwideaccount for more loss of healthy life thanlung cancer, breast cancer, leukemia orasthma (World Health Organization, 2000).Violence against womenincluding domes-tic violence and rapeaccounts for morethan five percent of the healthy life yearslost by women of reproductive age in devel-oping countries (Heise et al. 1994). In somecountries of the region, violence has becomethe most important killer of young males.The health sector, which has to deal with theconsequences of violence, can also play animportant role in its prevention. The Bankshould finance activities in the health sectordealing with detection, referral and treat-ment of victims of violence; primary andsecondary prevention through the healthcare system; and training of health care per-sonnel in both prevention and treatment ofviolence.

13

13 This section draws upon the consultant reportGuidance for the IDB on Violence Prevention asPart of Health Sector Loans, prepared by Dr. Kathe-rine Christoffel of Childrens Memorial Hospital,Evanston, Illinois. A copy of this report is availablefrom SDS/SOC upon request.

Detection. The first step to offering special-ized treatment and services to victims ofviolence is to identify those users of healthservices who have been victims of violence.The Bank should support the developmentof specialized detection protocols for par-

ticular types of violence. For these detectionprotocols to be effective, health personnelranging from receptionists to nurses anddoctorsmust be trained in their use. Thus,the IDB should finance in-service training inhospitals and clinics. In addition, the IDBshould support the efforts of medical asso-ciations and schools of medicine to offer in-service and pre-service training in violencedetection to their members and students.

Treatment and Referral. Identification isonly the first step. The Bank should also fi-nance the design and provision of services tovictims so that they are less likely to be vic-timized in the future. These services mayinclude training in anger management orpeaceful resolution of conflict, as well asgang diversion programs for youth involvedin or at high risk of participating in gangs. Inthe case of domestic violence againstwomen, women should be offered referralsto a variety of services, ranging from coun-seling and temporary shelter to trainingcourses that permit them to establish eco-nomic independence. In some cases, theseservices will be provided within public hos-pitals and clinics. In most cases, however,the providers of these services will be basedin the community rather than the medicalinstitution per se. Thus, the Bank should en-courage public hospitals and clinics to col-laborate with and refer clients to NGOs andother private providers of services for vic-tims of violence, and Bank projects shouldsupport the formation of service provisionnetworks that include both public and pri-vate providers. Network formation will in-volve creating information and referral sys-


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tems, as well as training of staff of memberinstitutions.

Prevention. The Bank should support a widerange of prevention-based interventions inthe health sector, emphasizing work with

low income and excluded populations (in-cluding indigenous peoples, populations ofAfrican descent, and other excluded ethnicand racial groups) and groups at particularlyhigh risk of suffering violence (especiallyyouth and women).

EDUCATION

Aggressive behavior is largely learned, andthis learning often takes place at an early agewithin the family, in the community and atschool. Since violence is learned, it can alsobe unlearned or, more easily, neverlearned as an acceptable response to frustra-tion (American Psychological Association,1993). For many youngsters, the classroomis where they learn and practice aggression,but it just as easily can be made a place tolearn and practice nonaggressive responses.

In childhood, aggressive and disruptiveclassroom behavior contributes to poorschool achievement and poor peer relations(Eron et al., 1994). Poor achievement, inturn, can lead to repetition of grades anddropping out of school, thus limiting forma-tion of human capital and creating a fertileground for crime and violent behavior.When the learning environment becomesdisruptive, teachers cannot teach and stu-dents do not learn as effectively. Since mostviolence occurs in the presence of others andsometimes because of it, the bystander effectis also important. The Bank should, there-fore, support efforts to prevent and combatviolent behavior in school settings by sup-porting general educational interventions toincrease school quality and enrolments, aswell as specific violence prevention inter-

ventions such as conflict resolution and vio-lence prevention programs, training forteachers, special programs for at-risk chil-dren and youth, and informal educationalprograms.

General Educational Interventions. Bankefforts to expand the coverage and improvethe quality of early childhood developmentprograms, as well as primary and secondaryeducation, will lead to higher enrolment andlower drop-out rates, and have a secondaryor collateral effect in the reduction of vio-lence. Extending the number of hours stu-dents are in school also contributes to vio-lence prevention. Another general educa-tional intervention with a potential impact inviolence reduction is the development, im-plementation and evaluation of pilot pro-grams for degree equivalency or acceleratedlearning programs in countries where theycurrently do not exist. In addition, voca-tional and skills training programs, by in-creasing employment probabilities, may re-duce the risk of individuals engaging inviolence. Bank programs should also sup-port the review of all existing textbooks,teaching materials and resources to elimi-nate negative stereotypes (of women, as wellas ethnic and racial minorities), which per-petuate intolerance and in doing so, vio-lence.

Conflict Resolution and Other Violence Pre-

vention Curricula. The Bank should supportthe design and implementation of conflictresolution, mediation and other violenceprevention curricula that teach students cog-nitive and social skills and nonviolent re-sponses to conflict and frustration. Theseprograms should be taught at the preschool,primary and secondary levels, either main-streamed or through separate modules. TheBank should also fund school programs thatattempt to change individual behavior indi-rectly by modifying the school environment


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(e.g., establishing norms and expectationsfor behavior, improving management anddisciplinary practices, and enhancing class-room and instructional management) in sucha way as to promote nonviolent behavior.

Teacher Training. Interventions to changethe behavior of students or modify schoolenvironments will not succeed unless teach-ers and administrators are trained to imple-ment them. Thus, Bank programs shouldalso support pre-service and in-service train-ing in violence prevention for teachers andschool administrators.

At-risk Children and Youth. The Bankshould support after-school and other specialprograms (including sports, skills trainingand community service) for children andyouth at high risk of resorting to violent be-havior.

Informal Educational Programs. The Bankshould finance informal educational inter-ventions (using techniques as diverse as ra-dio programming, street theater, and others)to reach vulnerable groups such as youngmothers and at-risk youth.

JUSTICE

The criminal justice system, responsible forprosecuting crime and providing publicsafety, incorporates organizations of the ju-dicial and executive branches of govern-ment, including police, prosecutors, forensiclaboratories, public defenders, courts, paroleand rehabilitation officers, and prisons.14

A well-functioning criminal justice systemcan aid in the prevention of violence in threeimportant ways. First, it acts as a crime de-terrent by making citizens aware that break-ing the law will have immediate, negative

14 Police and prisons are addressed in separate sec-tions below.

consequences. If crimes are promptly andexpertly investigated, suspects are correctlyidentified, and trials are both timely and fair,then levels of impunity will be reduced andcitizens may well perceive that crime doesnot pay. If due process and the human rights

of defendants are protected and corruption isweeded out of the criminal justice system,this will help ensure that only the guilty arepunished and encourage citizens to collabo-rate with authorities.

Second, a well-functioning criminal justicesystem reduces the probability that citizenswill take the law into their own hands viavigilante justice. Vigilante justice providesno guarantees of due process or fairness forthose suspected of crime and thus presents ahigh risk of punishing the wrong people. Italso perpetuates or strengthens a societystendency not to cooperate with state authori-ties to deal with crime and violence.

Finally, an efficient criminal justice systemdissuades individuals from taking meas-uressuch as arming themselves or hiringprivate securityto protect themselves,their families or their businesses. The prolif-eration of weapons, even when they areowned for purposes of self-protection, islikely to lead to greater incidences of vio-lence, both intentional and accidental. Theproliferation of private security services willtend to escalate the degree of violence em-ployed in crimes against people and propertythat are protected by such firms. The prolif-eration of private security services may alsotend to concentrate crime and violenceamong populations who cannot afford pri-vate protection, thus increasing the vulner-ability of the poor to violence.

Therefore, to both reduce and prevent vio-lence, the Bank should support strengthen-ing the criminal justice system, including thefunctions of crime processing, training and


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alternative sentencing. Specific activitiesinclude:

Evaluating and Strengthening the Weakest

Links in the Criminal Justice System. Abreak in any link along the chain from inves-

tigation to imposition of sentence will in-crease impunity and reduce the effectivenessof the criminal justice system. For the sys-tem to act as a deterrent to crime, then, eachof its parts must function effectively, andeach organization must communicate itsspecific expertise and information to theothers. Thus, Bank projects to strengthen thecriminal justice system should begin with anevaluation of how each component is work-ing, and then target the weakest links, and/ortarget organizations in which there is politi-cal support for and institutional openness tochange.

Strengthening the Functions of Crime Inves-

tigation, Fair Trial and Fair Sentencing.The Bank should support projects that in-crease the ability of the criminal justice sys-tem to investigate crime, provide timely andfair trials, and impose and carry out reason-able sentences. Projects can target police,attorneys general, prosecutors, forensic labo-ratories and forensic medicine centers, pub-lic defenders, courts, parole and rehabilita-tion officers, and prisons. Bank projects canalso target the way that each organizationcoordinates with and reports to other institu-tions within the sector. The fact that the sys-tem must be fair if it is to be effective in de-terring crime means that the IDB shouldemphasize protection of due process andhuman rights in all criminal justice projects.The Bank should pay particular attention toinsuring that ethnic and racial minorities arefairly treated in the criminal process, andBank projects should seek to guard againstracial/ethnic profiling.

Training of Judges and Judicial Staff. In thearea of domestic violence, the IDB shouldupport training for judicial personnel so thatthey are better able to handle such cases. Inparticular, judges can be trained in the appli-cation of international human rights conven-

tions (which, in many cases, supplant na-tional legislation) and in the use of protec-tive orders.

Strengthening Rehabilitation Services and

Victim Protection. In theory, the criminal justice system is not merely punitive, butalso rehabilitative. It is tasked not only withpunishing criminals, but also with trans-forming criminals, whenever possible, intoproductive, law-abiding citizens. Bank projects should support the design and imple-mentation of programs for the rehabilitationof criminals, including the use of alternativesentencing and mediation of sentences, es-pecially for juvenile offenders and minoroffenses. The Bank should also support pro-grams that provide protection to witnesses ofcrime, and protection and shelter to victimsof crime and violence.

MEDIA

The media in its various formsTV, radio,newspapers, and moviesinfluences behav-ior. This influence is a double-edged sword:while media can promote pro-social behav-iors and, in particular, peaceful coexistence,it can also promote violent behaviors.

15

15 A large body of research, dating back to the early1950s, establishes a causal relationship between por-trayals of violence in the media (movies and televi-

sion) and aggressive behavior (Katzman, 2000). Theeffects of media violence can be classified into fourcategories: 1) aggression effect, where an increase inmean and violent behavior is observed; 2) victimeffect, which carries with it an increase in fear, mis-trust, and self-protective behavior; 3) bystander ef-fect, as illustrated by increased callousness, insensi-tivity, and apathy towards violence; and 4) appetiteeffect, which produces an increased desire for media.


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Some individuals are particularly susceptibleto the harmful effects of violence portrayed

by the media. Children, who learn new be-haviors by observing role models in the me-dia and who blend fantasy with reality, areparticularly vulnerable to repeated exposureto media violence. Because they lack criticalviewing skills, children can learn and glorifythe use of violence and, as a result, fail todevelop socially acceptable problem-solvingskills.

Bank projects should work with the media topromote peaceful societies. In all work withthe media, Bank teams should emphasizerespect for individual freedom of expressionand for freedom of the press.

In the area of media interventions to combatviolence, the Bank could fund dialogues andseminars, practical research, advocacy andtraining and social marketing.

Dialogues and Seminars. In order to addressthe issue of media violence, the Bank shoulduse its convening capacity to support publicdialogues and technical seminars. Publicdialogues offer the opportunity for the issue

violence and participation in violent events (Slaby,forthcoming).

of media violence to be discussed by a broadspectrum of the stakeholders involved: me-

dia owners, academicians, researchers, par-ents, teachers, students, policymakers, edi-tors, producers, and reporters. Technicalseminars involve a more narrow audience(usually experts and media representatives)and present best practice experiences thatemphasize the compatibility of socially re-sponsible programming or writing and mar-ket share.

Practical Research. Research documentingthe links between media violence and vio-lent behavior is not needed given the alreadyextensive evidence on this score. Instead, theIDB should support practical research thatinforms project design. Such research maydocument the viewing, listening and readingpatterns of target audiences or pilot-test dif-ferent types of anti-violence programming,for example.

Advocacy and Training. The Bank shouldsupport advocacy and institutional strength-ening initiatives designed to promote pro-social programming and reduce violent con-tent in the media, including the creation orstrengthening of advocacy groups. It shouldfund training seminars for editors, reporters,and producers about responsible reporting of

Box 1. IDB Experience in Judicial Reform

Several IDB judicial reform projects have included important components to address the issue ofviolence directly. The project in El Salvador (PR-2113) included rehabilitation of young inmates,scholarships for young offenders, and recreational programs for at-risk youth. The project in Pa-nama (PR-2280) included the creation of service centers for victims of violent crime and fi-

nances improvements to the investigative capacity of the relevant ministry (Ministerio Pblico)through, in particular, the provision of equipment, training and rehabilitation of physical spacefor the forensic medicine laboratory. Finally, the judicial reform project in Guatemala (PR-2307)trained judicial personnel to better handle domestic violence cases, strengthened the victim assis-

tance offices and supported development of a strategy for inmate rehabilitation.


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violence in the print as well as visual media,and should support media literacy training,particularly for young viewers.

Social Marketing. The Bank should supportthe development and execution of public

information and social marketing campaignswith anti-violence messages that haveclearly defined target audiences and mes-sages. All the steps involved in crafting aneffective communication program (analysisof audiences and resources; strategic designof message; development, pre-testing, revi-sion and production; management, imple-mentation and monitoring; impact evalua-tion; and planning for continuity and self-sufficiency) should be followed (see TilsonPiotrow et al., 1997;if not, the communica-tion programs are unlikely to be successfulin changing violent attitudes and behaviors.

POLICE16

Bank support for the police meets the basicpurpose and functions test mentioned above,since effective policing will lead to lowerlevels of impunity, thus reducing crime andviolence and contributing to the Banks ba-sic mandate of accelerating social and eco-nomic development. This supportas longas it is used to finance high-impact interven-tionscan also meet the economic consid-erations test, but questions could be raisedregarding the noninterference in politicalmatters test. Given past history of police in-volvement in political affairs during non-democratic periods, the concern is that Bankactivities with police forces have the poten-tial to indirectly interfere in political af-fairsshould a police force that has re-

16 An initial, extended version of this section waspresented in a consultative meeting held at the IDB.Participants included representatives of importanthuman rights organizations, experts in police reform(both academics and practitioners), and Bank staff.

ceived Bank resources take part in politicalactivities at some future date.

Another concern frequently expressed isthat, by undertaking projects with policeforces, the Bank may be financing activities

that inherently present some risk of humanrights abuses. Bank project teams shouldavoid financing activities in which humanrights abuses are a clear and present danger.Some of these areas are identified in box 4on proscribed areas for IDB support, butteams must exercise care in identifying otherpotentially dangerous areas.

Accountability is Key. An effective way toprotect the Bank against indirectly support-ing police involvement in political affairs orfinancing activities associated with humanrights abuses is to condition IDB support forpolice forces upon the existence of account-ability mechanisms or the strong commit-ment to implement such mechanisms. (Seebox 2 on the dimensions of accountability.)

If accountability mechanisms do not exist orthere is no strong commitment to developingthem, IDB project teams should not financeactivities with the police force in question.

Financing Preventive Policing. In all theirwork with police forces, IDB teams shouldemphasize the strengthening of the preven-tive functions of the civilian police force.Teams should prioritize activities in threebroad categories to increase accountability;promote professional behavior andstrengthen professional skills; and improvepolice-community relations. Activities thatcan be financed under each of these rubricsinclude:

Increased Accountability: This refers toboth internal accountability (within thepolice force) and external accountability(to political leaders and communities). Internal Accountability concerns the es-


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tablishment or strengthening of internalaffairs divisions and the development ofan early warning system to detect cor-rupt police officers. External Account-

ability entails training political leadersin the review and supervision of policeforces and the establishment or strength-ening of civilian review boards. It alsoinvolves the establishment of mecha-nisms that allow citizens to shape policepriorities for crime prevention and con-trol (e.g., community consultative com-mittees) and the creation of an informa-tion system to monitor trends in crime,which will allow citizens to evaluate po-

lice performance in preventing and con-trolling crime.

Promote professional behavior and de-

velopment of technical and professional

skills: This refers to activities such as therevision of police training curricula;

training for police in human rights, do-mestic violence and/or community rela-tions (including community policing);reform of police recruitment procedures;

and provision of educational opportuni-ties to police officers.

Improve Police-community Relations:This involves pilot testing of communitypolicing programs,17 and improving thequality of services to vulnerable popula-tions (e.g., domestic violence services,family services, and youth services).

The Bank has not yet financed the compre-

hensive reform of national, state, or city po-lice forces, but such a request from a re-gional government is quite likely in the fu-

17 The Plan of Action from the 2001 Quebec Summiturges greater use of community policing in order toincrease dialogue and interaction among police, civilsociety and local communities.

Box 2

Dimensions of Accountability

Accountability has two dimensions: audiences to whom the police are accountable and areas ofaccountability. A police force should be accountable to multiple constituencies, including inter-nal control (within the police department), state control (external to the department but internalto the government) and societal control. Police should be accountable in the areas of publicsafety (reducing crime, violence, disorder and fear) and regulating their own behavior (reducing

corruption, brutality and other misconduct) (Stone and Ward, 1998).

The following questions can be used in determining whether police forces are accountable to thecitizenry and to civilian authorities:

Is there an internal affairs division charged with investigating and sanctioning cases of po-lice misconduct? How well does the internal affairs division function?

Are the police held fully accountable to civilian political authorities, for example via budg-etary and performance reviews?

Are there specific mechanisms available that promote the accountability of police to thecitizenry, such as civilian review boards and community consultative committees? How welldo these mechanisms function?

Are there mechanisms in place to detect and punish corruption and violations of citizens

human rights? How well do they function? Do human rights organizations participate in thetraining of police officers?

The answers to these questions are especially important in cases where there is a documentedhistory of police repression and systematic violation of human rights.


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ture. Questions that project teams should askbefore embarking on comprehensive reformprojects include:

Does the reform effort have the supportnot only of civilian leaders, but also of

the police leadership?

Have the statuary and legal changes in-tegral to the reform (if they are contem-plated) already been approved by therelevant political authority?

Are the police leaders willing to priori-tize reforms and activities that are de-signed to promote police accountability,both internal and external to the force?

Are the police leaders willing to tacklethe issues of corruption and abuses ofhuman rights?

Negative answers to these questions indicatethat the reform effort has little chance ofsucceeding and should not be financed bythe Bank.

Within comprehensive reform packages, ac-

tivities to increase accountability, promoteprofessional behavior and the developmentof technical/professional skills, and improvepolice-community relations should be givenpriority. Project teams should consider de-signing phased operations in which the firstphase consists of actions described above, aswell as the preparation of a strategic plan forreform with clear performance benchmarks

and activities designed to improve coordina-tion with other government agencies.18 Asecond phaseconditional upon successfulcompletion of the firstcan include a widerrange of activities. This wider range of ac-tivities includes training; increased effi-

ciency in organization, structure and staff-ing; and more efficient support processes.19

Training has two components. It entailstraining in problem-oriented policing, in-cluding allocation of police resources basedon patterns and trends in crime and the crea-tion of beat designs based on crime statisticsand neighborhood characteristics.

Increased efficiency in organization, struc-ture and staffing has six components. It re-

fers to the rationalization of organizationalresponsibilities; the definition / delineation /increased efficiency of human resources andadministrative functions and the privatiza-tion of organizational functions (subcon-tracting to civilians). It also entails configu-ration; that is, the type and purpose of units,the elimination of overlapping missions, andthe civilianization of tasks to maximizebeat coverage. Finally, increased efficiencyalso includes technical assistance in plan-

ning and budgeting and performance evalua-tions and incentive systems for good per-formance.

More efficient support processes refers tothe reorganization of support services, train-ing in information technology (IT); systemsdesign and application; and technical train-ing in procurement procedures.

18 These activities can be designed to improve thetransfer of people, property and information amongagencies and across jurisdictional boundaries or re-configure districts to create integrated policy jurisdic-tions.19 This wider range of activities should also be avail-able to police forces with high levels of accountabil-ity.


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Using Existing Bank Experience. The Bankhas experience supporting police forcesthrough loans and technical cooperationagreements. Box 3 summarizes Bank activi-ties to date with police forces; these activi-ties have focused on encouraging the emer-gence of prevention-oriented police forces

through improved training, community po-licing, and the development of better infor-mation systems. In addition, several techni-cal cooperation agreements have trained po-lice forces to better handle domestic vio-lence cases.

Unforeseen Requests and Problematic Ar-

eas. This section on police activities has at-tempted to be comprehensive; nonetheless, itis perhaps inevitable that project teams will

be presented with requests, which are not

explicitly addressed here. In order to protectthe IDB from financing activities that areassociated with human rights abuses or thathave political aspects, this subsection identi-fies activities with police forces, whichshould notbe included in IDB projects.

Box 4 outlines these activities, along withthe reason or reasons for concerns. This listdoes not purport to be comprehensive. Foreach potential activity with police forces,project teams should pose three questions:(1) will the intervention substantially reducecrime and violence? (2) Does support for theintervention risk involving the IDB in thepolitical affairs of the country? (3) Mightproject funds be employed to finance activi-ties associated with human rights abuses?

Box 3.

IDB-Financed Activities with Police Forces Since 1996

IDB financing to police forces has come either via stand-alone violence reduction loans, via judi-cial reform projects or via nonreimbursable technical cooperation agreements. All have been fo-cused on civil police and not military police. Activities included in IDB operations have included:*

Police training in at least five loan operations (Colombia, Uruguay, Guatemala, Panama, Bra-zil, Argentina) and three technical cooperations (Suriname and two regional TCs). Traininghas included review and modification of police training curriculum and training in specific ar-eas such as human rights, community policing, police investigations, and dealing with at-riskpopulations such as women and youth.

Pilot testing of community policing in specific neighborhoods in Uruguay. Improved information systems: purchase of hardware, software, and installation of integrated

information systems in at least four loan operations (Brazil, Uruguay, Colombia, Guatemala). Institutional strengthening of planning capacity in two loan operations (Uruguay, Guatemala). Improved coordination with other agencies of the criminal justice system in at least three loan

operations (Colombia, Guatemala, Uruguay) and one regional TC.

The projects presented in this box are: PR-2274 (Colombia), PR-2279 (Uruguay), PR-2307

(Guatemala), PR-2280 (Panama), PR-2221 (Brazil), PR-2536 (Argentina), and TC 9710270(Suriname).


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PRISONS

The issue of potential IDB support forprison construction is not covered in thisdocument, since this topic is currently beingaddressed by an inter-departmental task

force charged with providing guidelines forjustice projects.

Within existing prisons, the principal strat-egy for reducing crime and violence is tosupport inmate rehabilitation programs sothat inmates released from prison are lesslikely to relapse into criminal behavior uponrelease. Rehabilitation programs that havebeen evaluated and found to be successful inreducing recidivism include drug treatment

and skills development programs. Voca-tional training and more basic literacy pro-grams are also promising, as is job place

ment for newly released inmates. Since re-habilitation is more likely to be effective theearlier it is undertaken, the Bank should tar-get rehabilitation efforts at young and first-time offenders. For this same reason, projectteams are also encouraged to consider alter-

native sentencing and mediation for juvenileoffenders and minor offenses. These alterna-tives to incarceration have the collateralbenefit of not contributing to prison over-crowding.

To date, the Bank has financed rehabilitationprograms directed at young offenders (in ElSalvador and Uruguay) and has supportedthe development and/or improvement of in-formation systems that track prison popula-

tions (in Costa Rica, Guatemala and Pa-nama).20

20 The project numbers for these operations are: PR-2113 (El Salvador), PR-2279 (Uruguay), PR-2002(Costa Rica), PR-2307 (Guatemala) and PR-2280(Panama).

Box 4.

Proscribed Areas for IDB Support

Activity Reason for concern*

Support for military police forces P

Activities designed to preserve state security or investigate crimes committedwith political motivations (support for counter-intelligence or state security)

E,P,H

Undercover operations P,H

Acquisition of lethal or potentially lethal equipment (e.g., weapons, ammuni-tion, tear gas, patrol carsexcept for specially-designed vehicles used in con-junction with community policing)

E,H

Support for specialized units such as SWAT teams, bomb disposal units, drugeradication brigades, canine units, anti-kidnapping units, crowd control units,etc.

E,P,H

Training in weapons use E,H

Notes:E = little effect on crime of violence.P = potential for involvement in political affairs.

H = potential for activities to be associated with human rights abuses.


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SITUATIONAL PREVENTION,

SOCIAL PREVENTION,

COMMUNITY-BASED INITIATIVES

AND LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS

The Bank should emphasize support for a

wide range of violence prevention activitiesbecause of their cost-effectiveness. The pre-ceding sections on media and educationhave included some prevention activities forBank support. More generally, the Bankshould support activities classified into fourgroupings: situational prevention, socialprevention, community-based initiatives andlegislative actions.

Situational Crime Prevention

Situational crime prevention comprisesmeasures that: (1) are directed at very spe-cific forms of crime; (2) involve the man-agement, design or manipulation of the im-mediate environment in a systematic and, ifpossible, permanent way; and (3) makecrime more difficult and risky, or less re-warding and excusable as judged by offend-ers (Clarke, 1997). Situational preventionmay take place in a number of differentplaces: residences, retail stores, bars, publictransportation, parking lots, open publicspaces, etc. (Eck, 1998).

While the specific set of situational preven-tion measures will vary by location, it ispossible to classify situational preventionmeasures into: (1) target hardening, whichinvolves making it more difficult for poten-tial criminals to reach their objective by in-stalling impediments to criminal access; (2)environmental design, which makes specificlocations less friendly to crime, and (3) de-tection and monitoring interventions, whichmay involve police presence, organizedneighborhood groups, or electronic surveil-lance of public places. The Bank should

fund environmental design and surveillanceof public places activities, as well as othersituational prevention measures.

Environmental modifications to improvesecurity should be financed in the context of

housing and urban development projects.They range from the design of access streetsto the design of walkways, parks and light-ing. Slum upgrading programs such as Fa-vela Barrio in Rio de Janeiro (PR-2478)have already incorporated important ele-ments of crime and violence preventionthrough environmental design. The Bankshould also support detection and monitor-ing interventions. Care must be taken in se-lecting interventions, since certain actions ofthis type have been shown to be ineffectivein some contexts. The Bank will generallynot finance target hardening, since thisshould be undertaken by the owners of theassets in question.

Social Violence Prevention

Social violence prevention targets high-riskgroups to reduce the probability that theywill commit violent acts. Some of the mosteffective violence prevention activities tar-get poor mothers and very young childrenproviding them with the support and re-sources needed to ensure that the childrenwill thrive.

The Bank should support programs focusedon low-income mothers, especially adoles-cent mothers, to make sure they receive ade-quate pre- and post-natal care. It should fundearly childhood care and development pro-grams, as well as a variety of activities withhigh risk children and youth, including train-ing in conflict resolution and mediationskills, after school sports and communityactivities, skills training and income-generation programs.


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Community-based Prevention

Community-based interventions are one ofthe most promising approaches to violenceprevention and to delivering services to thevictims of violence. The Bank should fi-

nance the provision of recreational facilitiesand programs, which have been shown to beeffective in reducing violent and criminalbehavior.

Community-based mentoring programsshould also be supported, but care must beexercised to make sure that mentors are ap-propriately trained and supervised. Bankprojects should also support the provision ofsocial skills training in communication, co-operation and sharing, which has beenshown to be effective in reducing domesticand date violence.

A particularly promising intervention to re-duce domestic violence is to support the es-tablishment or strengthening of local net-works of service providers (health clinics,police, prosecutors, judges, shelters, organi-zations providing mental health counselingand job training, etc.).

Strengthening of these networks will lead toan improved quality of services to victims ofdomestic violence, and will also permitthese networks to implement prevention ac-tivities at the community level.

Many nongovernmental organizations areproviding services within networks, and theyshould be included in the strengthening ac-tivities.

Legislative/Regulatory Approaches to

Violence Prevention

Several legislative or regulatory actionshave been successful in reducing levels ofviolence, including: (1) imposing curfews onteenagers,21 (2) restricting the sale of alcoholat certain times and on certain days, and (3)improving existing domestic violence legis-lation. The IDB should finance these initia-tives. It should also finance analyses of ex-isting legislation and the impact that chang-ing legislation may have on levels of crimeand violence. In addition, the Bank shouldsupport seminars and other forums organ-ized to promote discussion of possible legis-lative and regulatory changes to reducecrime and violence.

21 This measure should be supported only if two con-ditions are met. First, research should document that

youth crime is concentrated in hours that will be cov-ered by the curfew; if most crime occurs during theafternoon hours, after-school and other programs maybe more effective than curfews in reducing youthcrime. Second, this measure should only be under-taken if the police force is accountable (see sectionon police above); if not, the risk of human rightsabuses associated with a curfew may be unaccept-able.


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Evaluating Violence Reduction Projects

Careful evaluation of violence reduction

projects is especially important given theseprojects relative newness and the widerange of potential interventions to reduceviolence. While all the interventions rec-ommended in this document have been sub- ject to evaluations, these evaluations havebeen performed almost exclusively in a de-veloped country context. With very few no-table exceptions, violence reduction inter-ventions in Latin America have not beensubject to careful evaluation. Thus, IDB pro-jects in this area should include solid evalua-tion components so that policymakers in theregion, as well as the Bank, can assess thecost-effectiveness of various interventions indifferent economic and social situations.

It is important for project teams to distin-guish between process and impact evalua-tions. IDB country offices are quite experi-enced in conducting process evaluations,which examine the state of disbursements,the number of beneficiaries of a projectcomponent, etc. However, impact evalua-tions that measure the effect of the projecton the outcome variables of interest are per-haps more important for purposes of fine-tuning projects and informing the design offuture projects.

It is not feasible in this brief document todescribe designs for impact evaluations forthe range of interventions proposed. None-theless, the following brief suggestions areoffered:22

22 The Impact Evaluation Plan for the Jamaican Citi-zen Security and Justice project (JA-0105) may pro-vide a useful guide to project teams; it is availablefrom SDS/SOC or from the Jamaica Country Office.

For components that involve institu-

tional strengthening of organizationsthat offer services to the public, it is im-portant to measure user satisfaction withthese services both before and after thestrengthening takes place.

For components to change individualattitudes and behaviors, two evaluationapproaches are possible. The first is tomeasure these attitudes and behaviorsbefore and after the intervention takesplace. The second is to compare post-intervention attitudes and behaviors of agroup of individuals who participated inthe program to the attitudes and behav-iors of a control group of nonpartici-pants. With either strategy, there is awide range of survey instruments avail-able that have been carefully validatedfor reliability.

23

For interventions designed to affectcommunity-level variables (trust in thepolice force, levels of crime and fear,etc.), it is important to collect baselinedata using a victimization survey, andthen to re-administer this same surveyperiodically.

Project teams should be aware, however,that before/after differences may be unre-lated to the intervention per se; they may becaused by other confounding factors. Ran-dom assignment of individuals (or commu-nities, etc.) to intervention and controlgroups is the only way to make unassailable

23 See, for example, the Centers for Disease Controland Prevention 1998 publicationMeasuring Vio-lence-Related Attitudes, Beliefs, and Behaviors

Among Youths: A Compendium of Assessment Tools.


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attributions of a cause-effect relation be-tween project interventions and observedoutcomes, yet random assignment is rarelyfeasible in the context of Bank projects. Pro- ject teams can increase the validity ofevaluations even without perfect randomiza-

tion by using quasi-experimental evaluation

designs or other approaches. To explorethese options, project teams are urged toseek out expertise from within the Bank orfrom outside consultants in the design of theevaluation components of violence reductionoperations.


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Lessons Learned

While the IDBs first stand-alone violencereduction projects and projects with compo-

nents to reduce violence are still in execu-tion, useful lessons have already beenlearned which can be incorporated into fu-ture project designs.

24

Keep the project focused on a limited num-

ber of risk factors directly linked to violence

reduction. There are many risk factors asso-ciated with violent behavior, ranging fromearly exposure to domestic violence, to vio-lent media programming, association with

violent peers, and overall income inequality.No violence reduction project should at-tempt to address all such factors, since sucha project would involve so many activitiesas to be completely unwieldy. A good wayto focus project activities is to concentrateon reducing certain types of violence (e.g.,youth violence and domestic violenceagainst women); even with this narrowerfocus, project interventions should be tar-geted only at the most important risk factors

for each type of violence addressed. Severalprojectsnotably in El Salvador and Uru-guayhave focused on the problem ofyouth violence, in response to studies show-ing that the majority of victims and perpetra-tors of violence in these two countries wereyoung males.

Contract country-specific diagnostic re-

search as part of project preparation. This

24 This section was prepared on the basis of informa-tion compiled from interviews with Tracy Betts,Rafael Hernndez, Juana Salazar, Mara Teresa Tra-verso, Paz Castillo-Ruiz, and Loreto Biehl fromIDB/Washington; Ana Luca Muoz fromCOF/CCO; and Carlos Bastn, Coordinator, Pro-grama de Seguridad Ciudadana, Ministerio del Inte-rior in Uruguay.

research is essential to identifying the typesof violence most prevalent in a country, re-

gion or city, as well as to identify the riskfactors responsible for the violence. Re-search can also quantify the economic andsocial costs produced by violence, which isuseful both in justifying IDB participationand in mobilizing support for the projectamong stakeholders. In addition, it is usefulto prepare a matrix showing which institu-tions are addressing different types of vio-lence and in what ways; this matrix is a use-ful tool for project design, allowing identifi-

cation of synergies and avoiding redundan-cies in the project.

Include low-cost and high short-term impact

interventions. The focus on addressing riskfactors for violence is not synonymous withtaking a long-run approach. Certain fac-torsalcohol abuse is a prime examplecan be addressed with interventions that areboth inexpensive and deliver results in avery short time frame. Situational violence

prevention initiatives, which aim to increasethe perceived effort of committing crimes,increase perceived risks, reduce anticipatedrewards or induce guilt or shame, may alsoprovide high impact in a short time frame.

Select a well-established and respected exe-

cuting agency. The importance of the exe-cuting agency and project coordinator can-not be over-emphasized. With regard to do-mestic violence projects, assigning execu-

tion responsibility to a relatively weak insti-tution may doom the project from its start.In citizen security projects, conflicts be-tween different government institutions mayhinder execution. When the various actorsreport to an executing agency to whom theyare ultimately responsible (such as a plan-


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ning ministry in the case of a national pro-ject or a mayor in the case of a municipality)commitment to the projects goals is morelikely. Finally, the project coordinatorhim/herself must also have the mandate andinfluence to effectively move the project

forward.

Devote sufficient project resources to

strengthen participating institutions and im-

prove inter-institutional coordination. Lackof institutional capacity among counterpartagencies to design and manage violence re-duction projects has been one of the mainchallenges facing IDB project teams in thisarea. Project resources can be used to traincounterparts in areas such as strategic plan-ning, monitoring, and evaluation. Inter-institutional cooperation can be improved bythe creation of inter-agency committees ortask forces, as well as by the development ofinformation systems that facilitate sharing ofknowledge.

Create project ownership. Violence reduc-tion efforts must be embraced by all stake-holdersincluding government and civilsocietyin order for a project to achieve itsdesired impact. Without ownership of theproject there is no corresponding commit-ment. This requires the judicial system, po-lice force, educational and health institu-tions, media and the community to be in-volved in project planning and execution.Effective measures taken to date include:holding a high level workshop to elevate theimportance of a project nationally and createpublic dialogue at the design stage; creatinga national commission on crime prevention;supporting dialogue between civil societyorganizations and government; conducting asocial marketing campaign to disseminateaccurate information about the problem andinform private citizens of their responsibili-ties in crime reduction efforts; and workingdirectly with municipal governments, which

in turn hold public meetings to discuss pro-ject design and goals. Workshops and semi-nars are useful in bringing together differentgroups and interests to address particularproblems; they are also a good opportunityto inform the public about the projects

goals and activities.

Support local-level institutional strengthen-

ing. Projects may encounter weaknesses inthe ability of municipalities and/or civil so-ciety organizations to coordinate violencereduction efforts at the local level. In suchcases, the project may need to incorporateinstitutional strengthening as an importantcomponent. If there is a perceived lack ofcommitment to the project among some lo-cal stakeholders, the project can supportworkshops that highlight the importance ofthe problem to local development. Theseworkshops also can help ensure that projectactivities respond to community needs.

Support dialogue between civil society or-

ganizations and police forces. In order tofoster greater understanding between civilsociety organizations and police forces, theproject can support a process of dialoguethat begins to build trust and enables com-munity policing efforts to succeed. This ac-tivity is especially important in countries inwhich the relationship between the policeand civil society historically has been one ofdistrust.

Mobilize a multidisciplinary team. As em-phasized in this document, effective vio-lence reduction activities can be undertakenfrom many sectors, including police, justice,health, education and others. Therefore, cre-ating a multidisciplinary project team is es-sential if interventions will be designed inthese disparate sectors.

Incorporate flexibility into project design.Given the relative newness of violence re-


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duction projects to the IDB and the fact thatrisk factors for violence may vary signifi-cantly between and even within countries,projects should have sufficient flexibility inorder to adapt to potential changes in cir-cumstances throughout execution.

Address information system and data prob-

lems. One common constraint to project de-sign and evaluation is the lack of an infor-mation system or data on violence. Accurateinformation is vital to establish the extent ofthe problem in the country, develop appro-priate interventions, increase public aware-ness of the problem (projects may find pub-lic perception of the problem to be muchhigher than reality), and evaluate projectimpact. Geographically disaggregated dataare also required to facilitate the allocationof resources within and among municipali-ties.

Allocate sufficient resources for communica-

tion. Especially in pilot or innovative vio-lence reduction projects, social marketingshould be included in the projects designand must be allocated sufficient resources.Social marketing is usually understood toinvolve changing attitudes and behavior inthe population that will benefit from a project, but another important role of socialmarketing is mustering support for the project in the various agencies and ministriesthat will execute the project.

For regional projects, select countries at the

same level of ability to address violence.Regional domestic violence projects may bedifficult to execute simultaneously in coun-tries at very different levels in their ability toaddress the issue. For some countries, thefirst problem to be overcome is the lack ofacknowledgement that the problem exists. Inthese countries, it is impossible to form net-

works of service providers, given that fewsuch providers exist. In other countries, rec-ognition of the seriousness of the problemalready exists, and interventions have beendesigned, implemented and evaluated.

Involve influential civil society groups thatare not dependent on the governing political

party in project preparation. A change ingovernment is especially problematic forcitizen security projects, since a sense ofownership is so crucial to project success.Influential civil society groups remain apowerful constituency regardless of whichpolitical party is in office. If these groupsare stakeholders of the project, there is lesslikelihood that the project will be cancelledor suffer substantial modifications when anew government assumes office. A particu-larly promising way to involve civil societyin the execution of a project is by creatingwatchdog commissions (veeduras), com-posed of representatives of civil society, tomonitor the governments performance inproject execution. In Medelln, Colombia, awatchdog commission lobbied to ensure thecontinuation of a violence reduction projectwhen a new municipal administration tookoffice.

Do not bypass creation of a log frame and a

system of monitoring and evaluation. Citizensecurity projects tend to be multi-faceted. Asa result, it is absolutely necessary to defineproject indicators (through a log frame) aswell as a system of monitoring and evalua-tion. In just one component of a violencereduction project, there were 22 differentactivities occurring simultaneously, many ofwhich were being implemented by consult-ants. Without a system in place as an inte-gral part of the project, monitoring andevaluation become nearly impossible.


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guidelines for the design of violence reduction projects

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