ha2015 preliminary report

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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in crisis through knowledge and practice

Humanitarian Agenda 2015:Principles, Power, and PerceptionsPreliminary Report

Prepared by:

Antonio Donini, Larry Minear (Team Leaders), Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghad-

dam, Greg Hansen, Tasneem Mowjee, Karina Purushotma, Ian Smillie,

Elizabeth Stites, Xavier Zeebroek

S e p t e mb e r 2 0 0 6


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Strengthening the humanity and dignity of people in cr isis through knowledge and practice

S e p t e mb e r 2 0 0 6

The Feinstein International Center develops and

promotes operational and policy responses to

protect and stren then the lives and livelihoods of

people livin in crisis-affected and -mar inalized

communities. FIC works lobally in partnership

with national and international or anizations tobrin about institutional chan es that enhance ef-

fective policy reform and promote best practice.

This report and accompanyin country studies are

available at c.tufts.edu.


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Humanitarian Agenda 2015:Principles, Power, and PerceptionsPreliminary Report

Prepared by:

Antonio Donini, Larry Minear (Team Leaders), Sippi Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam, Greg Hansen, Tasneem Mowjee, Karina Purushotma,

Ian Smillie, Elizabeth Stites, Xavier Zeebroek

Made possible by grants from the Ford Foundation and contributions fromthe United Nations Of ce for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs andthe government of Canada. Supplemented by the core budget of the Fein -stein International Center.


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2006 Feinstein International Center. All Ri hts Reserved.

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International Centers express permission. However, all commercial use of this

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permission of the Feinstein International Center, is prohibited.

Cover ima e: Trainin session in Darfur. Photo: Helen Youn .

Ima e opposite contents: Villa e elder, Syedabad district, Wardak province, Af-

hanistan. Photo: A. Donini.

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HA 2015 at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2. The Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

3. Framing the Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

4. The Four Petals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

(a) Universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13(b) Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18(c) Coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22(d) Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

5. Thinking Ahead . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32Is the Humanitarian Enterprise Equipped for 2015? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Annex 1: Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Annex 2: Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Annex 3: About the Authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

contents


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8/48F ins in In na ional C n

research shows that the so-called coherence agenda is advanced at humanitarianisms peril, especially inhigh-pro le crises where con ict is on-going or simmering. Tere is a recurrent danger that humanitarianand human rights priorities will be made subservient to political objectives. It is necessary to counter theorthodoxy o integrated missions and to continue to document instances o instrumentalization in orderto be able to develop sa eguards that can protect, to the extent possible, the independence o humanitarian(and human rights) work.

Our data points to a disconnect between the y perceptions o a ected communities and thoseo aid agencies. Understanding local perceptions o security is key both or the e ectiveness o humanitar-ian action and the security o aid workers. Humanitarian sta , both national and international (and theormer more than the latter) continue to pay a high price or their commitment to alleviating the su eringo the most vulnerable. Humanitarian agencies should rethink the way in which they operate in extremely raught and insecure contexts. In asymmetric wars, humanitarian action may itsel be seen as skewed inavor o the more established military and political actors and thereby more vulnerable to attack by non-state groups, hence the need to better analyze local perceptions o security and to re-calibrate programswith these perceptions in mind.

Our ndings in the our areas above con rm that the ma a a p v l abl to manipu-lation by power ul political orces ar more than is widely understood. Its practitioners are more overex-tended and overmatched than most realize. Failure to address and reverse present trends will result in thedemise o an international assistance and protection regime based on time-tested humanitarian principles.Moreover, i the disconnect between the perceived needs o intended bene ciaries and the assistance andprotection actually provided continues to grow, humanitarianism as a compassionate endeavor to bringsuccor to people in extremis may become increasingly alien and suspect to those it purports to help.

Destroyed and Rebuilt Villa e, Sudan. Photo: Michael Wadlei h


9/48S 2006 Hu ani a ian Ag nda 2015: p inci l s, pow , and p c ions

1. Introduction

his Preliminary Report and the research on whichit is based are organized around our key issuesthat will continue to challenge the humanitarian

enterprise during the next ten years. Tese are the avoweduniversality o humanitarianism, the implications o ter-rorism and counter-terrorism or humanitarian action,the search or coherence between humanitarian and po-litical agendas, and the security o humanitarian person-nel and the bene ciaries o humanitarian action. Teseour topics are approached as individual petals which,taken together, constitute a single ower. Te researchhas been structured so as to examine each o the issues indetail and to explore their relationship to each other.

Tese our topics were identi ed in a broad sense at aworkshop convened by the Feinstein International Cen-ter in Boston in October 2003 1 against the backdrop o the US-led interventions in A ghanistan and Iraq and o widespread concern among humanitarian organizations

and donor governments about the implications o thesecrises or the humanitarian enterprise more broadly.More recently, the complexities o humanitarian actionin post-invasion Iraq have rein orced questions aboutwhether these two mega-crises are changing global per-ceptions o humanitarian action and undercutting theneutrality and independence o assistance and protectionwork. Views vary on the extent to which lines have beenblurred and the humanitarian enterprise compromisedby association in these crises. While there may well bedisagreement on the nature o the bruises su ered by hu-manitarianism, there is no denying that the context inwhich humanitarian action takes place is evolving rap-idly. In the wake o muscular approaches to world or-dering, the very essence o humanitarianism may wellbe at stake.

In crises that do not involve the strategic interests o theSuperpower and its alliesBurundi and Liberia come

to mindhumanitarian action in recentyears has been allowed to unction gen-erally within its traditional parameters,even i , as we shall see, pressure or hu-manitarian action to cohere with theinternational communitys political orsecurity objectives is, to one degree or an-other, always present. In the high-pro lecrises, prevailing Northern political andsecurity interestswitness the global waron terror (GWO )trump humanitar-

ian and human rights concerns. In suchcircumstances, our study shows, humani-tarianism is directly and most dangerous-ly under threat. And it is in these coun-triesA ghanistan and Iraq o course,but also Colombia and to some extentSudanthat a malaise in the humanitar-ian community seems most palpable. Inthese raught environments, independentand neutral humanitarian space is therst casualty o the pervasive with-us-or-

against-us polarization.Within the amily o assistance and pro-tection agencies, tensions between policy

FIgURE 1.1 SCHEMATIC REPRESENTATION OF HUMANITARIAN AgENDA

2015 RESEARCH PETALS


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choices are urther complicated by divergent philoso-phies o humanitarianism. A range o positions are pres-ent, rom actors who embrace or acquiesce in a supportrole in the margins o the GWO , to those who seek toprotect humanitarian action rom the overpowering po-litical pressures, even at the cost o rejecting donor und-ing. Generally, a eeling o powerlessness prevails amonghumanitarian agencies, re ecting the sheer complexity and intractability o some o the issues.

GWO casts a large shadow on the ability o humanitar-ians to be aith ul to core universalist principles. Grow-ing e orts to instrumentalize humanitarian action in theservice o counterterrorism and other non-humanitarianobjectives is itsel an ingredient in much more complex

processes related to economic globalization, the privati-zation o the development aid regime, the weakening o nation states (at both ends o the socio-economic spec-trum), the li ing o inhibitions on matters o sovereignty (whether or ordering interventions or in de erence tothe responsibility to protect), the outing o internationalhumanitarian law (Guantanamo, Chechnya, Lebanon),and the blurring o lines between the military, civilians,mercenaries, private contractors, and criminalized eco-nomic elements involved in internal con ict.

Tere is a variety o views in the humanitarian commu-nity on the implications o GWO and the recent spate o world-ordering interventions. We as analysts believe that9/11 has triggered a deleterious quantitative and quali-tative shi in the inclusion o humanitarian action intoNorthern political agendas. Other analysts are more san-guine, recognizing a malaise but not seeing the orces atplay as undamentally di erent in nature to the politicalin uences o the past. Humanitarians are over-reacting,they say, and there is no need to sound the death knell o humanitarianism. Moreover, they add, while the methods

employed by international political-military coalitions inIraq and A ghanistan may give cause or concern, surely humanitarian organizations should recognize their ownstake in the objectivespeace, democracy, and human

rightsthat such coalitions claim to pursue. 2

In the two years that elapsed between the 2003 workshopand the launching o the HA 2015 research, our researchteam has monitored developments on the global sceneas they have a ected humanitarianism and has re nedits own objectives and methodologies. A study on Map- ping Perceptions o Security3 carried out in 2005 helped usne-tune our HA 2015 work plan. Soliciting and analyz-ing the views o local communities, the Mapping Study con rmed a major disconnect at the level o perceptionsbetween local understandings o security and those o in-ternational military and assistance agencies.

In the start-up phase o HA 2015, we also identi ed the

countries that would serve as ocal points or each topic:A ghanistan (universality), Colombia (terrorism), Bu-rundi and Liberia (coherence), and Sudan (security). Allour topics were explored in northern Uganda. While thelead researcher on each petal has had primary responsi-bility or the collection o data on that petal in the coun-tries s/he has visited, researchers or the other petals haveadded input through secondary data collection in theirown countries. Tis report builds on the six case studiesand presents a set o preliminary ndings, conclusionsand recommendations. It is available both in hard copy

and on our website at c.tu s.edu. Te six country stud-ies are also posted on the web, along with other illustra-tive, methodological, and bibliographical materials.

Phase 2 o HA 2015, launched in September 2006, in-cludes, to the extent that unds are available, additionalcountry studies. Iraq, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the OccupiedPalestinian erritories, and the DRC are under discus-sion. Phase 2 will also include an extensive series o de-brie ngs on the ndings and recommendations o thisreport in northern capitals as well as in the crisis coun-

tries themselves, along with some policy papers and journal articles.

F ins in In na ional C n

TABLE 1.2 HA 2105 TIMELINE

10/05 11/05 12/05 1/06 2/06 3/06 4/06 5/06 6/06 7/06 8/06 9/06

Be in Phase 2Disseminate Report

Draft Overall ReportDraft Country Reports

Team MeetsCountry VisitsSet Up Visits

Develop Methodolo yAssemble Team

Desk Study/Monitorin DevelopmentsOr anize Research/Fundin


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Te ormat or our reporta printed set o conclusionsand recommendations, with the country studies onwhich they are based available only on the webposeschallenges and opportunities or the reader. Each o thecountry studies ollows roughly the same template andormat, in the interest o promoting comparative analy-sis. Tose interested in a given country crisis may pro-ceed directly to the relevant case study, perhaps thenreading the preliminary report to provide global context.Tose interested in a particular issue such as coherencemay go to the eatured countries (in this case, Burundiand Liberia), reading the coherence sections in the othercountry studies and the preliminary conclusions and rec-ommendations as well.

While the approaches taken in the country studies arecomparable, we have made no attempt to ensure a com-mon style, length, or level o detail among them. Tey have some consistent leitmoti s (e.g., the perceptions o

outside actors by local people), but each has a distinc-tive texture, representing the situation on the ground, theperspectives o those interviewed, and issues that struck the researcher as signi cant. Tis ormat has challengedus as researchers to explore synergies and cross-cuttingrealities; it also invites readers to engage in the processthemselves. We welcome and solicit comments romreaders.

As with earlier work conducted by the Center, the over-all approach taken in this study is inductive rather thandeductive. Te core o the research is evidence-basedand designed to shed light on issues a ecting practitio-ner organizations in order to help them improve theire ectiveness. Data derived rom interviews in countriesexperiencing crises, or rebounding rom them, has beensupplemented by reviews o existing literature and inter-national consultations with experts and practitioners.Given the sensitivity o the issues raised and the high

2. The Approach

S 2006 Hu ani a ian Ag nda 2015: p inci l s, pow , and p c ions

Womens community meetin , Old City, Kabul. Photo: A. Donini



degree o subjectivity associated with them, we have puta premium on soliciting and analyzing the perspectiveso people in the eld, both aid practitioners and localpeople themselves. Tis is an area o en overlooked inresearch on humanitarian issues and a deliberate ocuso our approach.

Data have been gathered locally through a combination o oral interviews, in ormal conversations, and ocus groupmeetings and internationally through interviews in do-nor capitals and aid agency headquarters. All in all, morethan 500 persons were interviewed either individually orin ocus groups. In addition, an electronic questionnairewas circulated to the headquarters o selected humani-tarian agencies which elicited some 100 responses.

In broad compass, the research is about local perceptionso key humanitarian issues, as well as o issues related tothe contexts in which externally- unded aid e orts takeplace. It is thus in the rst instance about views andjudgments regarding the nature, appropriateness, andimpact o externally-orchestrated aid e orts. It is aboutmeaning rather than acts. By aid we mean rst andoremost humanitarian assistance, which includes bothassistance activities and the protection o basic humanrights. Although our ocus is on humanitarian action, wehave also recorded views regarding other orms o assis-tance, including military and peacekeeping inputs. In theminds o local people, distinctions between humanitar-ian and other orms o aid (e.g., developmental, human

rights, peace support), as well as distinctions regardingwho provides such aid (e.g., the UN, international or lo-cal NGOs, the Red Cross movement, the military, privateor-pro t contractors) may or may not be particularly relevant.

Serious methodological issues are inherent in research o this nature. Tey include obvious challenges regardingsampling methods and survey techniques, selection o case study countries and, within them, o interview sites,choice o interlocutors, selection and number o ques-

tions, and the highly varied nature o case study settings.In addition, because the research concerns perceptionso international presence and activities and probes issueso great political and cultural sensitivity, special attemptsmust be made to take into account the biases o westerninterviewers and their interviewees, the cultural ltersthrough which data is interpreted, and the possibility that interviewers may be told what interviewees think they want to hear. Te survey instruments were designedwith such challenges in mind. A note on methodology iscontained in Annex 2.

Te research in A ghanistan was conducted by Anto-nio Donini in February 2006; valuable inputs rom eldinterviews were also provided by Sippi Azarbaijani-

Moghaddam. Larry Minear was responsible or the casestudy on Colombia; his eld work was also undertakenin February. Xavier Zeebroek visited Burundi and Libe-ria in February and April 2006, while asneem Mowjeeconducted her eldwork in Sudan in January and Feb-ruary 2006, and Elizabeth Stites traveled to northernUganda in March and April 2006, supplemented by pre- vious research in June 2005. Te research team, whichalso included Ian Smillie and Karina Purushotma, met toreview ndings and recommendations in Andover, Mas-

sachusetts (USA), in April 2006. Greg Hansen took somepreliminary soundings on Iraq in 2004 and 2005 and

participated in the ormulation o the teams conclusionsand recommendations. Tis report represents the collec-tive wisdom o the team, although the actual scribes wereAntonio Donini and Larry Minear.

Acknowled ements

Tis major research undertaking was made possible by a generous grant received rom the Ford Foundation aswell as contributions rom OCHA and the governmento Canada, supplemented by the core budget o the Fein-

stein International Center. Many individuals in the eldassisted the researchers who were working under tightdeadlines and sometimes in difcult conditions. Teircontribution is acknowledged in each individual casestudy but their collective support in making this researchhappen needs to be recorded here. In addition to the teammembers themselves, several colleagues and riends provided thought ul comments on earlier dra s o this re-port: Peter Walker, Norah Niland and Peter Smith.

A town meetin in Zambrano, Bolivar Province, Colom-

bia. Photo: Nils Dybvi


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wo points are worth making in introducing our con-clusions and recommendations. First, we use the sameconceptual ramework as in our 2005 Mapping study in distinguishing between physical security and humansecurity. We see physical security as protection rom violence and abuse, as contrasted (but also containedwithin) the notion o human security, a much broaderconcept that also encompasses socio-economic well-be-ing, achievement o human rights and cultural identity.Similarly, we distinguish between negative peacetheabsence o war or armed con ictand positive peace,which allows or sustainable reconstruction and devel-opment within a context o justice and stability. 4 Positivepeace also connotes a situation in which the structuralconditions that have given rise to the con ict are beingaddressed and citizens have a sense o empowerment,participation, and accountability.

wo o the countries studied (Liberia and Burundi) are

making strides towards negative peace with progressbeing made in protecting individuals and communitiesrom violence and abuse. Others, at the time o writ-ing, were stagnant (northern Uganda, Sudan) or slid-ing backwards (A ghanistan). Colombia presents bothpositive and negative characteristics, linked in part tothe presence o a strong unctioning state and a vibrantcivil society. From the positive peace angle, all six situa-tions remain dire, with perhaps A ghanistan, Dar ur, andnorthern Uganda sharing the greatest de cits in humansecurity. Physical and structural violence a ect the liveli-

hoods o most o the population in these three areas, andthe outlook there was, at the time o writing, generally bleak.

Te second conceptual point relates to the tension be-tween outsiders and insiders. Tere are outsiders atall levels o society. Te government bureaucrat travel-ing rom Kabul or Kampala to a provincial capital is o -ten perceived by local communities as an outsider. Aidworkers may be rom the province or the district, butthey may also be perceived as alien because they are pro-

moting outsider values and behavior. And communi-ties themselves have their own complex hierarchies andgenealogies o power, inclusion, and exclusion. Complexchains o insider-outsider relationships link the periph-

ery, where people in extremis struggle to survive or pro-tect themselves rom con ict and abuse, to the globalizedcenters o governance and power. Te heralds o Jihad , McWorld , and McAid travel up and down these chains,as do people trafckers and those who bene t rom theweapons and narco-economies. Te processes o socialtrans ormation as well as the perceptions and meaningsascribed to change are all a ected by the relationships o agency or dependency inherent in these chains. Outsid-er aid workers have, at best, a limited understanding o these processes; at worst they are ignorant o what goeson under the sur ace o a seemingly straight orward aidagency-bene ciary relationship.

Understanding the perception and meaning o whathappens at the local level, including the perceptions andimpact o the presence o external aid actors, is an areamuch neglected by the humanitarian and human rightscommunitiesand by the social sciences as a whole.

More pressing problems always seem to require priority attention.

Figure 3.1 below illustrates the challenges aced by insidercivil society organizations in a dependency chain domi-nated by outsiders. It attempts a graphic representation o outsider-insider humanitarian relationships. It assumesa certain degree o congruence between the universalist values o the external agency and the local community (this might be the case in Colombia or Burundi, but lessso in A ghanistan and Dar ur). Te cultural di erences,

power relationships, and modus operandi o the two setso actors are, however, more problematic. Te baggagethat each actor carries can easily become an irritant, i not an obstacle in the relationship. In this scenario, theobjective or aid agencies should be to bring the variouscircles closer together. A total overlap would neither bepossible, nor desirable, but when the core values are ar-ther apart, as in the case o A ghanistan, a meeting o minds and perceptions on undamental as well as opera-tional issues is likely to be a very tall order. We return tothe issue o the insider-outsider relationship as it a ects

processes o social trans ormation in the concluding sec-tion o this report. able 3.2 expands on the challengesaced by local civil society organizations in the context o the insider-outsider dynamic.

3. Framing the Findings




0

What emerges rom the country studies is that while

each setting is highly idiosyncratic, there is a clear sensethat countries share common problemsand the agen-cies common challenges. Te challenges o communitiesin Colombia who have to live with the combined threatso insurgency, a criminalized narco-economy, and inter-national pressures echo those o A ghanistan, even i thelatter is objectively situated, as the ormer is not, in thecontext o GWO .

Similarly, a number o issues related to the coherenceagenda and the pressures o politics on humanitarian ac-

tion shape the environment in which aid agencies work,rom A ghanistan to northern Uganda to Liberia andthe Sudan. Such pressures have di erent characteris-tics: institutionally-driven in the case o UN-mandatedintegrated missions (A ghanistan, Liberia); more subtlewhere the integration is less pronounced (Burundi, Su-dan), or largely absent (Colombia, northern Uganda).Nevertheless, a common threadthe dangers o instru-mentalization o humanitarian action in the service o awider political agendaruns through our six country situations. Te themes o universality and security also

come together in those situations where the social con-tract that allows humanitarian actors to be accepted andoperate is threatened or broken (A ghanistan, Dar ur)and/or where the authorities deny access and space to

humanitarians (Colombia) or otherwise impede their

work (Burundi).

Tus, security or humanitarian workers re ects a num-ber o variables: the resonance between the ethos o communities experiencing crisis and the values o in-ternational actors; the degree o scapegoating and politi-cization between local authorities and outside agencies;and the extent to which humanitarian action can be in-sulated rom the prevailing political ramework. Clearly,security can never be reduced to a ormula nor will theapproach taken in one crisis necessarily be help ul in the

next. Problems are not isolated rom one another. Asable 3.3 suggests with re erence to a single days cover-age by a single newspaper, the our petals interact witheach other in dynamic and surprising ways.

Our conclusions and recommendations give a rst ap-proximation o the key challenges or humanitarian ac-tion in the coming decade. Phase 2 o this study will ex-pand on the number o countries, building a wider database which may then re ect a broader and more nuancedset o conclusions and recommendations.

FIgURE 3.1 TENSION BETWEEN INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

INSIDERS OUTSIDERS

POTENTIAL IRRITANTS POTENTIAL IRRITANTS

Core values appear to be lar ely con ruent but there areclashes because of secondary issues


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2

TABLE 3.3 ISSUES IN PLAY

During the rst quarter o 2006 when most o the eld research or this study was conducted, the our is-sues under review evolved in dynamic and high-pro le ashion. Te interactive nature o developments isevident rom dispatches in Te New York imes on a single day, February 8, 2006.

Te universality issue was ront and center by virtue o the publication in Denmark and other Europeancountries o cartoons deemed insulting to the Prophet Mohammed and his ollowers. West Coming toGrasp Wide Islamic Protests as Sign o Deep Gul , headlined a imes dispatch rom London. Te car-toons have set o a pro ound debate about reedom o expression and supposed double standards, wrotereporter Alan Cowell, and the spreading protest signi ed a hardening o extremes that le little room ormoderation. He quoted Pro essor abish Khar o Aarhus University in Denmark as saying, Te moder-ate Muslim has again been e ectively silenced.

Te imes reporter observed that Te catalog o Islamic terrorism rom the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in theUnited States to the March 2004 bombing in Madrid and the July 2005 attacks in Londonhas challengedsocieties to distinguish between moderates and extremists. . . A joint statement by the Secretaries Gen-eral o the UN and the Organization o the Islamic Con erence and the EUs oreign policy representativesought to strengthen the position o moderates.

Highlighting the issue o coherence and political rameworks, a imes dispatch rom Kabul announcedthat 3 A ghan Demonstrators Die in Clash with NA O troops. Te deaths occurred in demonstrationsagainst the publication o the cartoons in the European press. Tis was the rst time NA O troops, whoare in A ghanistan under a United Nations mandate as the International Security Assistance Force to es-tablish and assist reconstruction, had been attacked at their base [in this instance, in the northern city o Maimana] by an angry crowd. Hitherto ISAFs multilateral political ramework had bu ered it rom theactive opposition that had been directed at the bilateral US military presence. Demonstrations had takenplace earlier in the week at the US military base at Bagram.

Te implications o these developments or the security o humanitarian operations was also immediateand pro ound. Chechnya Expels Danish Aid Agency, read a imes news item rom Moscow. Te Dan-ish Re ugee Council (DRC), a coalition o 30 NGOs that had provided humanitarian assistance theresince 1997, had been expelled, with the authorities in the republic threatening other similar actions. Fortheir part, DRC sta struggled to impress upon critics that it was a private charity with no connectionto the cartoons that have in amed much o the Muslim world. On the same day, our researchers in theSudan reported an attack on the DRC ofce in West Dar ur, apparently motivated by outrage against thecartoons.

Te days events sent tremors through humanitarian institutions around the world. Tey raise questions

about the viability and sustainability o a humanitarian enterprise that, in a perceived clash o civiliza-tions, is indelibly associated with the non-Muslim West. Are humanitarian activities contingent not sim-ply upon secure environments but on a political consensus that embraces moderation and rejects extrem-ism? Absent such a climate, can nuanced distinctions or example, between multilateral and bilateralpolitical rameworks or between assistance organizations and the countries rom which they comebemade and sustained? Do such distinctions make any di erence or must the entire humanitarian enterprisebe rethought and reconstructed?


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(a) Universality

One o the points made at our Boston meeting in Oc-tober 2003 was that the Iraq crisis, on the heels o theintervention in A ghanistan, had led to a deepening us- versus-them divide, jeopardizing the very universality o the humanitarian endeavor. A number o actors con-tribute to this perception:

A widespread eeling that the global war on terror hasresulted in an erosion o humanitarian principles andinternational humanitarian law (IHL). US detentions inGuantanamo, the reported increase in secret renditionsand undisclosed detention acilities, and Russian heavy-handedness in Chechnya are cited as examples.

Te disparity in unding patterns re ects the reality that high-pro le crises attract disproportionate resources(which do not necessarily result in e ective programs),

while orgotten, and o en more deadly, emergenciessuch as the DRC or HIV/AIDS, continue to ester. A se-rious lack o proportionality in resource allocations callsthe very idea o a universal humanitarian regime intoquestion.

Te ailure o humanitarian emblems to commandrespect underscores the vulnerability o humanitarianaction but also the perception that it is seen as partisanby militants and the communities that tolerate or sup-port them. Te acceptability o humanitarian action,

once a cornerstone o the humanitarian relationship, canno longer be taken or granted in the new asymmetricGWO -related con icts.

Perhaps more undamentally, Iraq and A ghanistanhave brought home the reality that humanitarian actionis o the North and is largely perceived as such in theSouth. Te web o linkages between Northern politics,economics, values and behavior, on the one side, andthe posture and processes o humanitarian action on theother, are not altogether new, but the polarization result-

ing rom Iraq and A ghanistan has brought these link-ages into much starker view.

Te act that traditional humanitarian action is

largely unded by a small club o Western donors is alsoproblematic in terms o universality. Equally problemat-ic is the slighting o contributions rom non-traditionalsources alling outside standard ODA de nitions: con-tributions made by amilies, communities, and organi-zations in a ected countries; diaspora remittances; andcontributions rom governments and other donors inthe Islamic world. Te contributions rom this paralleluniverse, while substantial, remain unrecognized andlargely unrecorded.

Universal Ethos, Western Apparatus?

With the above in mind, our starting point was the ol-lowing: given the new levels o polarization and manip-ulation to which it is subjected, is there anything truly universal about what we call humanitarian action? Inother words, does the predominantly Western nature o the humanitarian apparatus clash with the universalist

values that it purports to convey? Does the act that hu-manitarianism is o the North compromise the ability o humanitarian agencies to unction and to be seen asneutral impartial and independent?

Attacks against NGOs, the UN and even the ICRCtheparagon o humanitarian principlein A ghanistan andIraq underline a newly perceived reality: the so-calleduniversality o humanitarian values is not universally ac-cepted or understood. It may be actively contested only by a small and violent minority, but questions about the

values and modus operandi o the humanitarian enter-prise are more widespread. Tis gap in values and under-standing is difcult to measure or two con icting rea-sons. On the one hand, it appears to be linked to poverty and the quality o li e, to processes o globalization, andto the increasing gap between those who live in extremecom ort and those who struggle to survive in extremis. On the other hand, humanitarianism remains a domi-nant discourse. Northern leaders, thinkers, aid agencies,and donor institutions shape, und and manage whatis generally termed humanitarian action. In setting the

terms o the debate, they may pay lip service to the im-portance o other traditions o humanitarianism andother perspectives on universality, but non-western anddiscordant voices seldom get a serious hearing.

4. The Four Petals


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In a world increasingly polarized by GWO , it is ar romcertain that humanitarianism as a philosophy, as a move-ment, as a pro ession, or even as a compassionate endeav-or to save and protect lives in crisis settings will survivein its present orm. Humanitarianisms credentials may ring more and more hollow in large swaths o the South,and it may become increasingly difcult to maintain thenotion that it is a shared value with truly global reach. Inthe coming years, the Northern monopoly on humani-tarian discourse and action could be urther challengedor negated by pressures on both sides o the North-Southdivide or more open politicization and instrumentaliza-tion.

Our research aimed to provide a reality check on theseissues. Our working hypothesis was that the conceptsand ideology o humanitarianism may still have a certainuniversal meaning but that the practice o these valueshas dri ed away rom its universalist moorings. Hencethe importance o evidence-based research to identi y whether there still exists a broad consensus in the worldsdi erent cultures around the undamental values that wecall humanitarianism, or whether this matter, o im-portance or humanitarian agencies and policy-makers,is one o relative indi erence or the provision o assis-tance and bene ciaries themselves. The Findin s

Our main nding is that the universality issue under-

scores a real and sometimes damaging clash between the value systems o locals and outsiders. Te humanitar-ian enterprise views itsel as universal in mandate andscope. It afrms that the core values o humanitarian-ism have universal resonance, but this is not the same assaying that such values have universal articulation andapplication. Our case studies document many instanc-es o riction at an operational level, re ecting generalcultural insensitivity, poor accountability, and bad tech-nique among humanitarian agencies. Cultural insensitiv-ity a ects the humanitarian relationship on both sides,

though the onus or dealing with complex and delicatecultural issues in an appropriate manner alls primarily on aid workers and their organizations. Te other twonegativespoor accountability to bene ciaries and badprogramming or techniqueare the sole preserve o aidworkers. Te consequence is that the otherness o thehumanitarian enterpriseits undamentally one-sideduniversal vision and apparatusundermines the e ec-tiveness o assistance and protection activities.

Tis major nding has encouraging and discouraging as-

pects. Our researchers did not nd widespread rejectiono humanitarian values. We did not encounter many nay-sayers, and certainly their voices did not dominate debateon this issue. Our ndings were doubtless in uenced by

difculties, or security reasons, in accessing certain ar-eas in A ghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan, where more nega-tive views are held in some Islamist circles. In A ghanistan, those in the aid community who havetried to engage aliban insurgents on this issue have not-ed a shi in view: rom We attack you because you arepart o the western conspiracy against Islam to a moresubtle We will not attack you as long as you work orthe well-being o the A ghan people. Te veracity o thisshi seems to be borne out by an apparent decrease inpolitically-motivated attacks against aid agencies (whilecriminal and opportunistic attacks continue to grow innumbers). Te shi may also indicate an incipient appre-ciation, on the part o otherwise vocal critics, o the services that humanitarian agencies can provide in asym-metrical con icts.

While the values promoted by humanitarian organiza-tions do not seem problematic per se, they are o en nei-ther widely understood nor explained to communities. Ininstances where humanitarian principles and values wereactually discussed with community leaders, the other-ness o the assistance machinery was more problematicthan its inherent values. Te alignment on issues o prin-ciple or rights in generaland the rights o women inA ghanistan and the Sudan in particularwas ar romper ect, however. As able 3.1 above tries to show, clari-cation o perceptions will continue to be required. Littleevidence was ound, however, o a undamental concep-

tual contradiction between Western and other traditionso humanitarianism.

It is encouraging that outright rejection o humanitarianactivity is not apparent in the countries visited and thatstepped-up e orts to convey humanitarian essentials canmake a positive di erence in the breadth o acceptance.Nevertheless, the prevalence o questions about the mo-tivation, agenda, modus operandi , and cultural baggageo Western aid agencies is clearly troubling and presentsmajor challenges.

Being an outsider, however, is not always a negative. O -ten, expatriate aid workers are more appreciated than lo-cals, or they can be more e ective in articulating sensitiveissues such as access or rights with the local authorities.Depending on the situation and the nature o the activ-ity, expatriates can be seen as more neutral and impartialor, on the contrary, as one-sided i not in the service o oreign interests. In some extreme cases, as in south-ern A ghanistan, however, the simple perception that acommunity or its leaders are associated with a oreign

aid agency can put the community at risk. Tis arguesor more intentionality and rigor in the articulation o the relationship with communities: the blurring o linesand the mixing o agendas have a habit o coming back



1

to haunt. Clearer de nitions o the mandates, objectives,and pro les o humanitarian agencies, both individually and as a community would seem to be an important in-gredient in any strategy aimed at re-burnishing the cre-dentials o humanitarianism in contested environments.Tis includes a clearer distinction between humanitarianagencies, on the one hand, and, on the other, the military,or-pro t entities or aid agencies with mixed or non-hu-manitarian mandates.

A ghanistan and Sudan stand out as situations in whichthe issue o universality and related questions o prin-

ciple are most pertinent. Te issue also arises, somewhatobliquely, in northern Uganda. In Colombia, Burundi,and Liberia, respect or humanitarian principles is ac-cepted, and the issue o the universality is not really rel-

evant. But in all six countries, the insider-outsider dy-namic plays an important role, as does the weight o theWestern cultural baggage and humanitarian technique.

In A ghanistan, our original assumption was that the hu-manitarian enterprise would be seen as undamentally Northern in values, appearance, and behavior. Data romthe eld, while not as clear-cut as might have been ex-pected, does indicate that the activities and the modusoperandi o humanitarian agencies, and the types o vol-untary or involuntary alignments they make or are per-

ceived to make, are problematic. Humanitarian action,unsurprisingly, is associated with the work o oreignagencies, and with ew exceptions these are quintessen-tially Northern. Te personal behavior o aid workersalso tends to segregate them, physically, rom the localcitizenry. In many ways, expats are seen as inhabiting an-other world, one that is protected rom the problems andrealities o ordinary A ghans.

More importantly, perhaps, Northern-style humanitar-ian action sets the stage or others pursuing humanitar-

ian objectives. Donor practices and other dynamics pushindigenous NGOs, many struggling to survive, to mimicthe structures and behavior o their Northern counter-parts. Tis undermines the universality o humanitari-

anism as it osters the copying o exogenous processesrather than the development o distinctive but perhapscomplementary domestic approaches to humanitarian-ism. In copy-cat humanitarianism, the dictation by outsiders o the terms o discourse results not only in adominant-dominated humanitarian dialectic. It also ob-uscates the coping mechanisms o local communitiesand o the mostly invisible networks o solidarity (tribal,religious) that allow people to survive in times o crisis.At the February 2006 London meeting that launched theA ghanistan National Development Strategy, participa-tion o A ghan civil society was limited to organizations

and individuals who could speak the language o the oreigners,i.e., English.

Te humanitarian values pro-pounded by aid agencies arenot generally a problem in A -ghanistan. With the rather largeexception o womens rights andwomens employment, which re-main points o riction, there is,broadly speaking, an easy t be-tween the values o the outsidersand the traditional belie s and

mores concerning, or example, the rights o civilians inarmed con ict. Tat these traditional belie s have so o -ten been violated in the past does not call into questionthe deep attachment o A ghans to notions o protec-

tion and justice, quite similar to those o Northern hu-manitarians. As mentioned above, the cultural baggageand the working practices o outsiders are much morean issue. Our case study documents huge perceptionand communications gaps surrounding the work o aidagencies in A ghanistan. Te gaps have to do with un-met expectations and resulting disenchantment, but they are also symptomatic o a signi cant disconnect betweenoutsiders and insiders. As a result, trust in aid agenciesand governmentalso an outsider entity or many A -ghans, particularly in rural areasis rapidly eroding.

Would greater perceived connectedness between thehumanitarian enterprise and local values matter to ben-e ciaries? We believe it would, to a point. While mostA ghans would not necessarily make a distinction be-tween assistance provided by a principled and universal-ist organization or one working within the ambit o theA ghan government or Coalition orces, deteriorationo the security situation in many parts o the country islikely to make such distinctions much more important.Alignments, overt or covert,with the Coalition or with

its opponentsundoubtedly carry consequences. Teacceptability o humanitarian personnel in contestedareas is undermined by the blurring o lines betweenmilitary and civilian actors and by the way in which aid

Donor practices and other dynamics push indigenous NGOs, many struggling to survive, to mimic the struc-tures and behavior of their Northern counterparts. Tis

undermines the universality of humanitarianism as it fosters the copying of exogenous processes rather thanthe development of distinctive but perhaps complemen-tary domestic approaches to humanitarianism.



agencies themselves de ne the situation. Depending onwhether they de ne it as post-con ict or as one whereIHL should be rigorously applied, their posture towardsauthorities and belligerents is likely to be very di erent.As in Iraq, the credibility and credentials o agencies lay-ing claim to the humanitarian imperative will be suspectunless they can demonstrate that they are adhering tothe spirit and the letter o universal principles. Recentexperience in A ghanistan militates in avor o a clearerseparation between copyrighted humanitarians whowill work only within the precepts o IHL and other aidorganizations that may accept varying degrees o align-ment with a belligerent.

Te situation in Sudan bears some similarity to A ghani-stan in terms o the perceptions o aid agencies, the less-than-per ect t between local traditions and universalist

principles, and, most importantly, the polarization o thesituation on the ground. In Sudan it is the government,rather than the insurgents, which claims that humanitar-ian action is a Western tool being used against it. Con- versely, outsider values are appreciated by the bene cia-ries o humanitarian action who are also the victims o government policies or government-supported violence.

Outsiders are perceived as neutral and impartial by somecommunities (Aid workers rom abroad do not takesides) while agency national sta are mistrusted be-cause they are seen as supporters o the central authori-ties. Te situation is ar rom clear-cut, however. In SouthSudan and even in Dar ur, hostility is not so much direct-ed at the West and its values, but at Islamic organizationsand values. Troughout the country, moreover, thereis tension between the promotion o human rightsinparticular gender equityand local traditions. One nd-ing that deserves to be noted is the contrast between the

sometimes clumsy promotion o humanitarian principlesby aid agencies and the lack o awareness o these prin-ciples among national and sometimes international sta o the agencies themselves.

Unlike A ghanistan or Sudan, the Western nature o thehumanitarian enterprise is not an issue in Colombia,which sees itsel as part and parcel o the Western world.Tere is a com ortable t between Colombian religiousand civil traditions and global humanitarian ethos, laws,and institutions. Te afrmation o universal norms by

the Colombian authorities, however, does not mean thatthey are necessarily applied in the rough and tumbleworld o civil stri e. In act, the government rames thedebate in ways that seek to limit the applicability o inter-

national law to con ict in Colombia. It keeps humanitar-ian and human rights groups on a short leash, limitingtheir access to armed groups and publicly alleging thatthey are motivated by partisan political agendas ratherthan by humanitarian principles. Yet the humanitar-ian ethos is alive and well. Humanitarian principles andadvocacy or their universal applicability are importantrallying points or local Colombian humanitarian andhuman rights groups in their interaction with the gov-ernment and the international community.

Similarly, in northern Uganda, Burundi, and Liberia, theWestern nature o the humanitarian enterprise is not initsel an issue. Foreign aid workers are generally respect-ed and appreciated, and bene ciary communities tend topre er expatriates over local sta because they are seen asless corrupt. Issues related to the imper ect outsider-in-

sider dynamic are, how-ever, present in all threecountries. In northernUganda, or example, itis not so much an issue o cultural insensitivity as a

disconnect between cultural values. Te outsider agenda(with outsider interpreted broadly or example aneducated, cosmopolitan Ugandan NGO aid worker isalso seen as an outsider) is more in tune with IHL andhumanitarian principles, whereas local views are a unc-tion o traditional cultural understandings, based onpatriarchal and more hierarchal norms. Another issue

looms large, particularly in A rica: universalism is un-dermined by the lack o proportionality. Interest in, andunds or A rican crises are scarce compared to Westernmuni cence in the high-pro le crises o A ghanistan,Iraq, Kosovo, and Bosnia.

In summary, our ndings point to three particular re-spects in which the humanitarian endeavor, as evidencedin the countries studied, is less than universal:

1. Humanitarian action is sel -de ned by those who

practice it, with little or no consideration or di erent ap-proaches or traditions aimed at alleviating human su er-ing. rying to universalize a particularistic blend o hu-manitarianism that is inextricably linked with Westernhistory, thought, and values is unlikely to sway doubt-ers and nay-sayers in the South. Reinventing a globally acceptable notion o humanitarianism would requireturning conventional thinking on its head.

2. Te humanitarian enterprise seems to be particu-larly ill-equipped to deal with complex asymmetrical

wars, as in A ghanistan and to some extent Sudan. Insuch contexts, the humanitarian endeavor itsel tends tobecome asymmetrical, in the sense that it is o en one-sided or seen as such, lacks proportionality to need, and

It is the behavior of leaders and warlords that is problematic,not the dictates of cultures and religions.



1

is prone to political manipulation. Tis argues or muchmore culturally sensitive approaches to humanitarian ac-tion, and much more attention to outsider-insider rela-tionships. A deeper involvement with local communitiesis likely to require a departure rom current top-down,supply-driven, and expatriate-heavy approaches to assis-tance and protection.

3. Humanitarian action is o en guilty by association.Because its roots are in the North and because its appa-ratus is essentially Northern in appearance and modusoperandi , humanitarian action is o en associated withpolitical and military ordering processes that also orig-inate in the North. Manipulation and politicization o humanitarian action is, o course, nothing new. What isnew is the extent to which it occurs in high-pro le crisesand, more deeply, the extent to which humanitarian ac-tion is associated with exogenous agendas and politicaldesigns.

Until the lions have their historians, history will always bewritten by the hunters, says the A rican proverb. Perhapsthe time has come to give the lions, the gazelles and eventhe su ering grass a stake in the debate. In act, testingthe universality o the humanitarian impulse and its hu-man rights cousin at the grassroots level, as we have donein our case studies, has helped broaden our understand-ing o contextual issues and how communities look at thework per ormed by outsiders. Much more work needs tobe done in this arena. Caring or war wounded, protect-

ing children and civilians in war situations, and aspiringor justice and accountability are obligations recognized,in their own ways, in all cultures. Tis humanitariansubstratum is undoubtedly universal. It is the behavioro leaders and warlords that is problematic, not the dic-tates o cultures and religions. Hence, working with lo-cal groups and creating partnerships around commonhumanitarian concerns may be a more productive way o promoting e ective humanitarian action based onuniversal principles than a global dialogue o (the dea )civilizations at a political level. Perhaps, also, Northern

humanitarians need to open their ears more to the hu-manitarian voices rom communities in the South.

Recommendations

We believe that the promotion o a more universal hu-manitarian discourse, building on all existing traditions,is a prerequisite or more e ective humanitarian action.o achieve this, a number o urgent measures are re-quired:

1. B g g ma a a gap. Non-westernhumanitarian traditions provide crucially importantli e-saving services to communities caught up in crisisand con ict. Tese include contributions rom a ected

governments, charities and religious oundations, remit-tances, and local communities and amilies. O en theseare the rst, and sometimes the only, line o protectionor the vulnerable. Te international community needsto recognize the importance o this contribution by sup-porting on-going initiatives to oster dialogue betweenand among humanitarian traditions (e.g., those under-taken by OCHA, the government o Switzerland, andIslamic Relie ). A study to quanti y the contribution o non-Western entities to the global humanitarian endeav-or should be undertaken by OCHA, the DAC, or a re-search institution. Te DAC should nd ways o record-ing these contributions in its statistics.

2. L g m . Given the institutional momentumo expatriate-driven assistance, Western/Northern hu-manitarian agencies in the eld need to systematically acknowledge and build upon local capacities and cop-ing strategies. Tis would result in internationally-sup-ported activities more in keeping with the perceptionso a ected and bene ciary communities. Providing eed-back to communities should be an essential ingredientin ostering greater accountability to bene ciaries. Agen-cies should ensure that culturally-sensitive strategies area compulsory component o their work. Tis includesmaking their employees aware o the cultural, linguistic,historical, ethnic, and religious contexts in which they work .

3. R k g l a a q a

a l a . Humanitarian agencies at headquar-ters and their international consortia should supportpolicies and programs more attuned to locally-identi edneeds rather than top-down, supply-driven, and expatri-ate-intensive approaches to humanitarian action. Such aqualitative change in the conceptualization and practiceo humanitarian action will have major implications ordonors as well.

4. P g p ma a aag . Te humanitarian regime is only as universal

as its actors are perceived as embodying core humani-tarian principles. In hotly contested environments, agen-cies ace twin dangers: that they will be manipulated by power ul political actors in ways that undermine theirintegrity and that they will be perceived, rightly or not,as vectors o a Northern/Western agenda. In such situa-tions humanitarian agencies should care ully weigh thecosts and bene ts o attempting to operate in a prin-cipled ashion and be prepared to keep their distance i independence rom belligerents cannot be assured, espe-cially i other less principled actors or the military are in

a position to provide li e-saving assistance. Te presenceo agencies with impeccable humanitarian credentialsalongside agencies with mixed mandates underminesthe possibility o principled humanitarian action. Te



humanitarian community is there ore encouraged to ex-amine how universality might be strengthened througha clearer demarcation o various types o actors and theelaboration o veri able standards o humanitarian per-ormance and accountability.

5. N g v al y. Our case studies show thatknowledge o IHL is weak, even among reputed humani-tarian agencies. For example, humanitarian and humanrights groups were well in ormed about the objectivesand strategies o the state and non-state actors in Colom-bia and northern Uganda and did their best to promotebehavior in accordance with international norms. How-ever, in the Sudan and A ghanistan the humanitarian en-terprise was less e ective in situating its work in relationto universal benchmarks. More training and dissemina-tion o best practice is required, notably on dealing withinsurgent groups and the prevention o co-optation.

6. E a g p v l a .Despite progress at the international level in de ning theresponsibilities o individual states and the adoption o the landmark responsibility to protect agenda, suchinternationally-adopted norms have yet to prove their value in reducing attacks against civilians, whether inDar ur, northern Uganda, or Lebanon. Te issue o pro-tection o civilians loomed large in our case studies, butthe R2P approach seemed absent on the ground as aconceptual model or a programming device. Our datashows that the absence o security is o crucial concern to

communities and imperils e ective humanitarian action.E orts by various military con gurations to provide itleads to mixed results.

More evidence-based research is needed to establishwhat internationally-led approaches work best or theprotection o civilians in what kinds o situation. For ex-ample, are multilateral peacekeepers better able to provide protection or humanitarian workas a comparisonbetween Burundi and northern Uganda would suggest?Conversely, are bilateral operations, which o en have

more robust terms o engagement, a better investmentin protecting humanitarian work? Should peacekeeping,multilateral and bilateral alike, ocus as a matter o prior-ity on protecting civilians and engage in hands-on projectwork (quick impact projects and the like) in exceptionalcircumstances only? In situations where peacekeepingunits provide security or humanitarian operations, whatkinds o sa eguards can be built in (e.g., appropriate rela-tionships, unding, accountability)?

(b) Terrorism

Te 2003 consultation process mentioned earlier aggedas an issue o major concern to the humanitarian enter-prise the impact o terrorism and counter-terrorism on

its work. wo years a er 9/11, Humanitarianism in set-tings such as Iraq and A ghanistan, we wrote in summa-rizing the discussions, has become subsidiary to a muchlarger and essentially political agenda. . . . Te global waron terror is casting a large shadow on humanitarian work that seeks to be aith ul to core principles. 5

Tis Preliminary Report, building on the ndings o thesix country studies, is not an analysis o the Global Waron error (GWO ). Tere is already a plethora o reviews o Capital terrorism, several o which are listedin the HA 2015 bibliography on our website. Instead, ourstudy has a humanitarian ocus, assessing the impact o the global war and o Small terrorism alike on civil-ians and on e orts to come to their aid. Te country studies provide a ull array o experience, rom GWOrontlines in A ghanistan to the hinterlands o northernUganda and Colombia, where the terrorism that wrackscivilian populations has little or no global dimension.

In each o the settings, the discourse on global terror-ism has to one degree or another become a distractionand a distortion. Te debate about terrorist threats tonational security has upstaged and eroded humanitarianspace, undermining e orts to address the humanitarianconsequences o con ict. In each setting, there are di er-ent permutations o terrorism, but there are also genericcross-cutting issues. Our review highlights two issuesin particular: the impact o the Global War on error(GWO , or Capital terrorism) on humanitarian ac-

tion and the impact o local or homegrown terrorism.

Te case studies completed thus ar suggest ve broadconclusions.

First , while there is no universally agreed upon de ni-tion, terrorism may be understood in a broad sense asviolence or the threat o violence against ordinary civilians, against their li e, their property, their well-being.[It] is a means to attain a political goal which allegedly could not be attained by ordinary, law ul means, within

the context o the established constitutional order.6

Asnoted by the UN Secretary-General, any action consti-tutes terrorism i it is intended to cause death or seri-ous bodily harm to civilians and non-combatants, withthe purpose o intimidating a population or compellinga Government or an international organization to do orabstain rom any act. 7

Tus understood, terrorism is a act o li e or many o the worlds civilians who nd themselves caught up insituations o armed con ict. 8 Te case studies document

widespread instances o such acts o violence, with par-ticularly grave humanitarian consequences in A ghani-stan, Colombia, Sudan, and northern Uganda. However,terrorism results in human rights abuses in all o the



1

countries studied. Indeed, terrorism is in itsel a directattack on human rights and the rule o law, remarks KoAnnan, adding that I we sacri ce them in our response,we will be handing victory to the terrorists.

Tat said, the degree o connectedness between terror-ism as a daily reality or civilians at the local level (smallt terrorism) and terrorism with a global reach (Capital terrorism) varies considerably. A ghanistan is on therontline in the Global War on error , and the shadowo GWO [has] become a major de ning actor in theoperating environment o aid agencies. In Colombia, by contrast, the GWO connection alleged by Colombianauthorities and their US patrons is widely perceived tobe overstated. Situated between the two is the Sudan,where the one-time residency o Osama bin Laden andthe countrys suspected involvement in the bombing o US embassies in the 1990s establish a Capital con-nection. Even in Sudan, however, our study concludedthat Apart rom the Sudanese governments cooperationwith the USA on Al-Qaeda . . . there was little perceivedconnection [with] the war on terrorpeople elt that thelatter was something distant. We also ound that Teglobal war on terror has had a less direct impact uponhumanitarian assistance in Uganda than in other coun-tries.

Te relative role o terrorism is urther complicated by the reality that con icts resulting in civilian distress andabuse usually have multiple causes and evolve over time.

Te con ict in Colombia is three wars wrapped in one: awar on insurgency, a war on drugs, and a war on terror-ism. Te packaging has evolved along with the con ict:there is a large element o opportunism in how the Uribeadministration in Bogot and the Clinton and Bush ad-ministrations in Washington have presented the con ict.In A ghanistan as well as Colombia, the battle againstillicit trade in narcotics looms large, even though suc-cess in each instance will doubtless be viewed througha counter-terrorism, rather than a counter-narcoticslens. Lower pro le con icts, however, are not necessar-

ily more unidimensional. Our case study on northernUganda describes how exploitation o natural resourc-esa recurrent cause o internal armed con ictblurswith traditional cattle-rustling and historical tensionsbetween nomads and pastoralists, resulting in devasta-tion or civilian populations.

Te politicization o the nomenclature o con ict is alsoevident in Sudan. Unlike in some other countries suchas Uganda and Burundi, notes our case study, neitherthe rebels nor the Janjaweed militias have been labeled

terrorists, although the Janjaweed are clearly engaged ina campaign o terror against civilians, supported by thegovernment. One suspects that cooperation by Khar-toum on terrorism issues muted Washingtons use o

the term terrorism, as also the sustained application o the concept o genocide to events in Dar ur. People incon ict have their own understandings o terrorism. Agroup o young men in Khartoum, interviewed or thestudy, elt that the actions o the West in Iraq and thekilling o Palestinians were the real acts o terrorism.Interviewees in Colombia expressed similar sentimentsabout the US, citing abuses in Guantanamo and AbuGhraib to substantiate their view. 9

Second , terrorism is clearly a use ul analytical con-cept or describing a daily reality aced by many civil-ians around the world. It is relevant to understandingthe vulnerability o rural Ugandans to the very speci cabuses imposed by the LRA, no less than o A ghans toterrorism with a more global reach. Te category ts wellin Burundi, where, locked in a terrorist/counter-terror-ism struggle, the countrys armed orces and its insur-gents have will ully killed civilians and committed otheratrocities in violation o international law. However, ter-rorism is not an all-purpose explanation or todays con-icts, nor should it become the overriding determinantin the allocation o international resources. In particular,the indiscriminate use o the GWO label demeans theterrible conditions that people have been living underyear in and year out or decades.

While permutations vary rom setting to setting, theproblems evident in the various con icts examined areessentially structural. In Colombia, many o those inter-

viewed are actors in a decades-long drama o impover-ishment and marginalization. Be ore 9/11, the guerrillaswere recognized as political counterparts to the State,noted one analyst. In the a ermath o 9/11, they werebeyond reach as the government had basically depriveditsel , and others, o the possibility o dialogue with them.US policy has taken a similar approach, augmenting itspre-existing list o oreign terrorist organizations anddeclaring interactions with terrorists to be o limits. InColombia, this approach has impeded US ability to sup-port the paramilitary demobilization plan and even, it

seems, to negotiate or the release o US contractors heldhostage by the FARC.

Te other country case studies con rm similar dynam-ics. One interviewee in Sudan observed that the eitheryoure or us or against us stance has le little room inthe debate or moderate Muslims. An OCHA employeein Sudan lamented that the Manichean ormulation o the war on terrorism had closed avenues or dialoguebetween countries and obscured any middle ground. Arecurrent observation in the country studies is that play-

ing the terrorist card reduces opportunities or negotia-tion and the paci c settlement o disputes, narrowing theoptions o governments to their own disadvantage.



0

A number o individual interviewees and several ocusgroups took exception with the prevailing approach toterrorism as a problem to be con ronted by war, rath-er than as a law en orcement challenge to be tackledthrough national and international judicial institutions.Our northern Uganda research ound that the Ugandangovernment had used the US classi cation o the LRAas a terrorist organization to ocus on the military de-eat o the rebels as the primary strategy or ending thewarat the expense o peace negotiations and an amnes-ty process. In global perspective, terrorism has clearly strengthened the extremes and made the moderate mid-dle ground less tenable.

A recent illustration o the narrowed options availableunder the prevailing terrorism paradigm is provided by the challenge o dealing with the needs o Palestiniansollowing the election victory in late 2005 o Hamas, agroup classi ed by both the US and the European Unionas a terrorist organization. In June 2006, press reportsindicated that A European proposal to provide aid orPalestinian health care has stalled because o concernsby the Bush administration that the plan may violate anAmerican ban on paying salaries to a Hamas govern-ment. Te extent to which a humanitarian crisis evenexists is at issue. Te Europeans, rein orced by data romUN organizations, hold that it does. Te US denies thehumanitarian crisis, claiming instead, in the words o asenior administration ofcial, that Tere is a politicaland security crisis, and the Hamas government has to

make some responsible decisions about how to handleit.10 Te Israeli minister o health has showed greaterexibility in trying to avoid a worsening humanitariansituation, terrorism concerns notwithstanding. 11

In a more generic sense, the in ltration o political judg-ments into the appraisal o humanitarian need is a recur-ring problem: witness, or example, UN Security Councildebates on the imposition o sanctions on various coun-tries.12 A US observer has concluded that: Te war onterror is a alse metaphor that has led to counterproduc-

tive and sel -de eating policies. . . . An endless war wagedagainst an unseen enemy is doing great damage to ourpower and prestige abroad and to our open society athome.13

On balance, our studies suggest that the e ects o the ty-ing o terrorism to humanitarian and human rights work have been more negative than positive, distorting percep-tions o the issues and distracting rom e orts to addressthem. o be sure, in the six countries studied, a number o modest positive impacts on the humanitarian enterprise

rom the connection to terrorism were observed. Teseinclude wider awareness o the vulnerability o civiliansand o the obligations o belligerents to assist and protectthem or to allow other institutions to do so. In some in-

stancesA ghanistan is onethe desire to combat ter-rorism has generated additional levels o internationalresources. In A ghanistan and Colombia, however, theassistance provided has been disproportionately security and military in nature, leaving many human security pri-orities unaddressed. Some interviewees in both settingsexpressed the view that counter-terrorist strategies pur-sued under the GWO banner have in reality only ueledterrorism. One person interviewed in Sudan expressedthe view that the war on terrorism had made the UnitedNations itsel more vulnerable because it is now seen aspart o this war and, there ore, a legitimate target. 14

hird , terrorism puts states on the de ensive. It is o enperceived as threatening their very survival. erroristsput pressure on a states constitutional processes, whichmay not prove equal to the test. Te pressures are evidentin Colombias own executive, where the constitutionalcourt and the ofce o the ombudsman have both ques-tioned undamental policies: the governments denial o the existence o an internal armed con ict, its obligationsto the displaced, and its ground rules or the demobiliza-tion o paramilitaries. Similar pressures are also evidentin US discussions regarding the rebalancing o nationalsecurity and individual civil liberties in the creation o the USA Patriot Act in late 2001 and its extension in2006.

States are not only the victims o terrorism; they may beperpetrators as well, either directly, or through proxies

(e.g., the Janjaweed in Dar ur, the paramilitaries in Co-lombia). Foreign governments may also be linked to state violence: negatively through political, nancial, technical,and material assistance or more constructively by press-ing governments under duress to abide by internationalnorms. Te US role in Colombia o ers examples o each,with the US providing major ows o military assistancebut also seeking to promote a culture o respect or hu-man rights within the Colombian military. Te Ugandangovernment has also encouraged and acilitated the cre-ation o local militias to protect the civilian populations.

Where non-state actors are disinclined to abide by in-ternational norms, the resulting asymmetry can temptstates themselves to cut corners in meeting their ownobligations. However, the Geneva Conventions o 1949and the Additional Protocols o 1977 impose obligationson state and non-state actors alike. Sensing the value o afrming such norms, some 30 non-state actors haverenounced the use o anti-personnel mines. 15 Indeed,non-state actors alienate civilian populations at a cost totheir political objectiveswitness the revulsion against

the FARC in Colombia or against the Lords ResistanceArmy in northern Uganda.

A telling example o the trade-o s aced by political ac-



21

tors and their outside backers emerged during the writ-ing o this report. Militia loyal to sharia courts, theA rican Union reported in June 2006, wrested controlo Mogadishu on Monday rom a sel -styled anti-terror-ism coalition o warlords, widely believed to be backedby Washington, a er a three month battle that killed 350people.16 De ending a ailed policy, ofcials in Washing-ton are quoted as saying that the US will support anyoneghting terrorism. 17 Te pursuit o terrorism irrespectiveo consequences is reminiscent o A ghanistan, wherebroad support or the US-led war against Al-Qaeda andthe aliban has been undercut by the lack o consultationwith village leaders in the execution o raids. Te eleva-tion o peace over justice (Justice is a luxury we cannota ord, President Karzai is quoted as saying) and the re-tention o warlords in positions o authority has drawnwidespread criticism both among the A ghan people andin the wider international community.

Fourth , terrorism and e orts to counteract it have spe-ci c, discernible, and recurring impacts on the humani-tarian enterprise. Tese include increased unwillingnesson the part o belligerents to allow organizations to carry out their mandates, stepped up e orts at manipula-tion and control, and reduced space or advocacy. Ourcase studies o er abundant and instructive instances o each.18

Assistance and protection work require regular access tocivilian populations in need. Tis is essential both or in-

ormation-gathering or program design and or the con-duct o programs themselves. Te sensitivity o access tocon ict zones is evident in Colombia. FARCat the timeo our research in early 2006had requested all aid andrights agencies to exit a particular area. Tey sought ree-dom or their tactical operations in places that were atthe same time the areas o maximum need among im-periled civilians. Similarly, Sudanese authorities, citingsecurity concerns, have regularly denied access to Dar uror humanitarian personnel, to the UNs highest humani-tarian ofcial and most recently to a UN peacekeeping

orce authorized by the UN Security Council.

errorism and e orts to counteract it also breed suspi-cion. Te readiness o the government o Uganda to usethe terrorist label has . . . a ected the ability o the NGOsto operate reely, particularly in the North. (Te sameagencies operate without difculty in the South, wherethere is no internal armed con ict.) Te governmentmakes re erences to the NGOs in the north who are involved in supporting terrorists but has yet to speci y whothese are. Suspicions such as these, recurring in various

country settings, lead to the scapegoating o humanitar-ian and human rights groups, undermining their cred-ibility and undercutting their sa ety. Incriminating butalso overblown allegations about the extent to which

NGOs are implicated in supporting terrorism have comerom high places, including the president and memberso the A ghan cabinet, the prime minister and rankingofcials in Sudan, the president in Colombia, and a se-nior ofcial in the US reasury. Ill-advised or unpro es-sional behavior by aid personnel on occasion appears tocon rm such suspicions.

Con icts also increase the need or advocacymany o the problems encountered are beyond the direct capac-ity or competency o relie and rights agencies-but they also heighten the belligerents sensitivity to the e ortso agencies to enlist governments and the internationalcommunity in reining in abuse. We are in a very difcultcontext, said one church leader in Colombia. Appealingto the authorities to stop displacement is more risky thantending to the displaced. Te Khartoum authorities havekept NGOs on a short leash in Dar ur, threatening to ex-pel two agencies that testi ed on human rights abusesbe ore the UN Security Council. Indictments o LRAleadership by the International Criminal Court were ol-lowed up by targeted attacks on international NGO per-sonnel.

E orts by the belligerents to manipulate and control theactivities o humanitarian and human rights organiza-tions increase dramatically during con icts. Te armedactors come in and play with our programs, laments aUSAID ofcial in Colombia, describing terrorist tacticsthat discourage enrollment and/or expropriate bene ts.

Te Ugandan government has tightened oversight onNGO activities, adding several ofcials rom the state se-curity sector to the relevant parliamentary committee. 19 US authorities have argued in one speci c instance thata man being detained in Guantanamo should be held asan enemy combatant in part because he worked or anIslamic relie organization. 20

Canadian, US, and EU authorities have also imposedtighter oversight over the international activities o NGOs. Te Canadian government has closed down sev-

eral organizations reportedly channeling unds rom theamil diaspora in Canada to the amil igers in Sri Lan-ka. An Executive Order issued by President Bush shortly a er 9/11 prohibits transactions with individuals andorganizations deemed by the Executive Branch to be as-sociated with terrorism. In response, US NGOs have re-sisted the governments proposed implementation guide-lines as potentially harm ul to their work and unlikely toaccomplish the stated anti-terrorism objectives. NGOsmaintain that they are not agents or en orcement o USlaws or the policies re ected in them. In responding to

the Lebanon crisis in 2006 ollowing the Israeli invasion,they nd it difcult not to deal with Hezbollah, an or-ganization on the US list o terrorist groups, which onits own initiative is spearheading the rehabilitation and



2

reconstruction e orts in southern Lebanon. At the sametime they were encouraged by two ormer senior US ad-ministration ofcials to join in the race between Hez-bollah and the Lebanese government to rebuild homesand liveson the side o the Lebanese government. 21

Fi h, and nally, support or robust civil societies rep-resents a critical international investment in the viabil-ity and vitality o the humanitarian enterprise, both incon ict countries and at the global level. Te six casestudies show civil societies in various stages o vitality and disarray. In the case o Colombia, the resilience o civil society is viewed as something o a silver lininga er decades o withering violence. Legendary Sudanesetraditions o hospitality to strangers and guest- riendli-ness across ethnic lines have been eroded by years o civilstri e, both North-South and in Dar ur, but still exist.In northern Uganda, groups o parents have organizedto try to prevent the abduction o young people by theLRA. In A ghanistan, where NGOs and other externalactors are subjected to increasing scrutiny and criticism,endogenous alternatives to social trans ormation are be-ing sought through direct project agreements with com-munities and local tribal structures. In Burundi, throughregular meetings, local NGOs help ONUB monitor hu-man rights violations perpetrated by rebels and govern-ment orces in the rural areas. Tis helped the SRSG inher e orts to hold rebels, Burundian government, police,and military orces accountable or their actions.

Te targeting o civil society leaders, whether rom re-ligious, labor, journalism, academic, or other sectors, isrequently employed as a weapon o war, whether by thegovernment or non-state actors. Tat has been the casein A ghanistan, Colombia, northern Uganda, and Libe-ria, among others.

Recommendations

1. U a g v . Given thecomplexity o con icts that generate humanitarian and

human rights needs and the varying links o terrorismto them, humanitarian organizations should give higherpriority to understanding and taking into account intheir strategic planning the underlying drivers o speci ccon icts. Failing to do so may well result in acceptanceo the problmatique and the nomenclature o thecon icts espoused by one belligerent or another, thereby contributing to the continuation o the problem ratherthan to its resolution. Te e ort to understand con ictsbetter would have both global and country-speci c as-pects, as well as implications or individual agencies and

or the humanitarian enterprise as a whole.2. N a g v a m. Given the

opportunism requently re ected in the application o

the concept o terrorism, individual states and the inter-national community should cultivate a more nuancedapproach to the use o the concept. It is essential thatthey separate the assessment o humanitarian need rompolitical judgments about a given con ict and its bellig-erents. In addition to approaching terrorism as a diplo-matic and law en orcement challenge rather than an ex-clusively military task, they should cra a more balancedset o international inputs, including larger proportionso economic and human security assistance in relation tomilitary and security aid.

3. R a m g mp a ma a a val-. Given the inevitable rebalancing o priorities that

transpires when governments and non-state actors areengaged in the pursuit o security interests, the indis-pensability o humanitarian and human rights valuesrequires constant reafrmation including in interactionswith militant groups that employ terror tactics. Moreover,the practice o counterterrorism must not be pursued inways which compromise humanitarian standards. Telonger term political bene ts to the belligerents rom ad-herence to international norms should be stressed. Tereis arguably a role or OCHA in this area, but, given thepolitical constraints on UN-led humanitarian action, in-dependent coalitions also need to become engaged.

4. N g a p al m. In order toincrease its e ectiveness in settings where terrorism is aact o li e, the humanitarian enterprise should nurture a

more strategic and cohesive approach to assistance andprotection challenges. A higher level o pro essionalismneeds to be cultivated, both within individual organiza-tions and across the enterprise as a whole, to deal withthe pain ul dilemmas o humanitarian action illustratedin this study. Meanwhile, political ofcials should be heldto account when they attack without due cause agenciesor their presumed partiality. In the long run, there canbe ew real winners rom such tactics.

(c) Coherence

Te third theme in our Humanitarian Agenda 2015 study centers on how humanitarian and human rights activitiesshould relate to political-military interests and prioritiesin responding to con icts . Our discussions in 2003 con-cluded, that: Te last ew years have seen the emergenceo the coherence o political, humanitarian responses asa standard templatebut or the most part only in high-pro le crises where the overall policy approach is drivenby the Security Council or superpower interests. In lowerpro le crises, principled humanitarian action has a bet-

ter chance o survival.22

From the discussion among stakeholders in these meet-ings two basic options or humanitarian and human


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UN, juggled humanitarian and political priorities. OurA ghanistan case study notes, Once used to describe theaspiration or a higher level o concern or humanitarianand human rights principles in the context o a multi-dimensional response, coherence and integration havenow become euphemisms or the subordination o prin-ciples to political objectives.

What particulars are adduced to substantiate the conclu-sion that in A ghanistan the pluses o integration aregreatly outpaced by the minuses? A major one was thatmounting and maintaining humanitarian and humanrights activities were carried out within limits imposedby the UNs overriding concern that the peace processsucceed. Ranking UN political ofcials chose not tochallenge the government on incidents o abuses againstcivilians and harassment o humanitarian and humanrights sta , nor to send dispatches to UN headquartersin New York detailing difculties regularly encounteredby aid agencies. Our study suggests that the UN leader-ship did not see the value o promoting humanitarianprinciples and human rights as necessary ingredients o peace. Tus, greater separation rom the UNs politicalobjectives might have allowed humanitarian and humanrights activities to be pursued without ear o undercut-ting the peace process.

Tese negatives were not o set by the modest positivesrom the UNAMA association, or example, in the acili-tation o communications among diverse UN personnel

now operating under a single roo , with somewhat en-hanced security. Indeed, rom a humanitarian perspec-tive, it is debatable i there were any bene ts derived romthe association. At this point in the evolution, our pre-liminary study concludes, the encroachment on humani-tarian space within UNAMA, and, more importantly, by the Coalition and the Provincial Reconstruction eamsis largely irreversible.

Beyond A ghanistan, the other country case study expe-rience is less stark and in a sense, there ore, less instruc-

tiveperhaps because the lower level o political con-cern has muted some o the trade-o s between politicsand principle. Like A ghanistan, our Sudan study alsoexamines two di erent rameworks: the UN Mission inSudan (UNMIS), operating in South Sudan, and the A -rican Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the instrument o theA rican Union in Da

ha2015 preliminary report

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