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How Do Images Signify?Author(s): Michael RiffaterreSource: Diacritics, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Spring, 1994), pp. 3-15Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/465152

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H O W D O IMAGES SIGNIFY?

MICHAELRIFFATERRE

Whether heyfocus on the literaryworks themselves or on thehistoryof theirreception,most criticalapproaches ive much attention o images. Despite its long pastand its still

frequentuse, the term itself has suffered from its breadth,occasionally mistakenfor

vagueness. Image therefore ends to look obsolete in contemporary riticism,whether

ideologicallyorientedor informedby theory. In suchcontexts,theprevailingpractice n

close readingsand in reader-response nalyses is to reduce images to specific tropes

containing representational omponents,whether these tropes serve to represent woobjects at once, as does metaphoror metonymy,or a fragmentof theirobject,as does

synecdoche. Yet thevery conceptof imagery, n its traditional elf-sufficientform orin

its tropologicalversion, remains nadequate o account for the impactof the imagistic

componenton readers, or its semiotic role both within the textas a stylistic device and

outside the text as an agentof intertextuality, ndultimatelyas a factor in the evolution

of literary orms.

In the case of thetropologicalapproach o imagery,this inadequacy tems from the

mere fact that no necessaryrelationship xists betweentropesandimagery. Indeedan

image may be literal rather han figurative,or even literal but with a symbolic value

attached o it without the intercessionof figures. It follows that the image as a form ofrepresentation as an existence of its own, independent romanyfigurativeorsymbolicuse to which it may be put. A literaryentityuntoitself, the image works as a mimetic

device,no matterwhatfunctions tscontextmayconferuponit. Thus,we shouldbe able

to findananswerto the questionof my title in the semanticor semiotic structurewe call

animagebeforewe beginto worryabout hat mage's possible integrationn a rhetorical

network.

At thispoint,a definition s called for: animageis thesegmentof a textorsentence

that we perceiveas a completeor fragmentary ensory representation.I keepthe word

image, despiteor ratherbecauseof its

generality,or two reasons: in ordernotto haveto

distinguishbetween a literal magethat refersto its own objectand a figurativeone, and

in order oemphasizetheprimacyof thesensory response.Theimageis a linguisticsignor sign system,butwhether t is a word,a phrase,or a sentence,it does makeus feel or

imaginewe actuallyperceivetheobject,be it anactor,anaction,ora thing:forexample,"she was standingat the curb"or"largeblackrooks werecawing in thedark oliage,"as

opposedto expressionsthat areonly about thatobject:for example, "I saw heron the

street" r"Iheardbirds na tree."Thelatter xpressionsaremere ndicespointing owards

objects they do not depict, telling themrather hanshowing them.

I have been careful to keepthis definition faithful to a normalreadingexperience,

namely, to empirical perceptionsof the imagistic, followed by rationalizations. Theperceptionsemphasizethevividness andimmediacyof the reader'ssuddencontactwith

the realityoutside the text, the kind of relief we feel when an actual,tangible example

interruptsand clarifies the relatively abstract ine of a story, of an explanation,of a

descriptioneven, when up to thatpoint it has been limited to the bare essentials, to

generalities, o ageometryof spatialandtemporalrelations.Theexampleseems to flesh

outthatgeometry, o invite readers'participationnasmuchas thatexamplemakes them

recallcomparableactual nstances n theirown experience,orrecognizethestereotyped

pictureof arealityperhaps ess real han maginary,ess acollection of facts thanacorpus

diacritics 24.1: 3-15 3iacritics / spring 1994



i



of received deasreflecting heconsensusof a social orethniccommunityabout he world

at large.Thus thereceptionof theimage,and indeed its significance,would seem to depend

ontestingitagainstreferents,on readers' estingitagainstaknowledgeacquired hrough

experienceor

languageorboth. These readers

perceiventhe

imagea

representationheyrecognize, or the analogs of which they alreadyknow. In order to interpret t, theyactualize the referent o completewhatthe text has omitted. This move frompassive to

participatory eadingsuggeststhat all there s to an image's impactcan be explainedbyreadersbecomingawareof itsreferentiality.1To besure,referentialitys a constantof the

communicationprocess,but it remains mplicitunless there s a needtodouble check the

referent, n the case of poetic obscurity,for instance,orwhen a text must be translated.

Theimage'sdifference romother iterary ignswould thenconsist nelicitingatwo-

stage response: firsta dearthor an excess in the informationprovidedby the imagistic

apparatus auses readersconsciously to isolate its referent; econd,they set up a model

of that referent o verifythe details if thesearespelled out,or to supplythem if theyaremissing. Inshort,thereadingprocessidentifiesreferentiality t the level of the text and

transforms t intocomparability t the level of readerresponse. Comparison,of course,

begetsa positiveornegativeevaluation,be itpleasureorrejection.Thismayslow down

reading only for an instant,butthis response,assumingthat it indeed occurs thatway,

basically resembles the common practiceof criticism andof more technical forms of

literaryanalysis:a relianceon the one-to-onecorrespondenceof each word of a verbal

sequence to its referentas a criterionof truth or of verisimilitudeand, within certain

genres,as a criterionof realism. In thefirststageof image recognitionanddeciphering,the mechanismof its effect would dependon the imagecausingan interruption, jolt in

the flow of readingcausedby the apparent mmediacyof the nonverbal,an intrusion

emphasizedby the text's laterreturn o a patternonly brieflydisturbed.

This view, however,raises two objections. One is theoretical, he otherpragmatic.

Theoretically, here s no reasonwhycritics andanalystsshouldassumethat iteraryunits

of significanceare limitedto words or phrasesbecausewords andphrasesareunits of

meaningfor thesemanticist.Thepragmaticobjectionis thattheplainestreadingmakes

it evidentthat heliterary ext stressesimagisticreferentiality nly for afleetingmoment,as if to warnreaders hat twill soon thereafterbe exchangedforanother ign-system,as

if theimagehadprivileged ensoryrealityonlyas an introduction rtransition o a subtext

the functionof which ismetalinguisticorsymbolic. The subtextdevelopsas aderivativeparadigm,unfoldinga series of variationson the imagistic given. Thesevariantsselect

fromthegivensomeaspectsof itsreferent o the exclusion of others,and hisexclusionary

process is soon reinforcedby the competing referentsof the words and phrasesthat

constitutethe paradigm.This selection necessarilymodifies retroactively he reader's

initialunderstandingf theimage. Thesechangesworkinthe two oppositedirectionsof

factualemphasisandcounterfactual limination.Those elementsof theimagethatarenot

retainedby the derivativeparadigmsaresuppressedor downplayed,as if the imagehad

privileged reality only as a pretext to startgeneratinga subtext. The subtext shifts

interpretationroma relationbetweenlanguageandthingsto a relationbetweenlanguage

and a type of discoursevalid only for the text being read. As a resultof this shift, the

sensory information onveyed by the image is not eliminated,butput to otheruses. It

seems to be squanderedorthesakeof bringingabouta new focus thatthe imageperse

did not necessitate,a focus now made not only possible but indeed imperativeby the

recurringnsistenceon selectedcomponentsof thatimage.

1. The most recent discussions of referentialityare by Anna Whiteside and Michael

Issacharoff, eds., On Referringin Literature,and by EdouardMorot-Sir,The Imaginationof

Reference. On thepertinenceof referenceto literariness,see my"Illusionref6rentielle."

4



To summarize,as a transformation f the given, the paradigmplays the role of a

conventionalsign-systemor code,2within the limits of which significancesupersedes

meanings.Readerscannotnotice the existence of thecode, letalone understandhatcode,until they realize that the words of a verbal sequence signify in two differentways.

Separately,achof these words

signifiesin termsof its own referentandof its immediate

context. But these samewordstogetheralso signify in terms of the onerelation heyall

entertainwith a semioticmodelproposedbythegiven. Consequently,discretereferential

meaningsbecome subordinateothe words'significance,that s, theircommon reference

to thatmodel,to the invariant hatwe can deduceonlyfrom therepeatedperceptionof the

writtenvariables hatactualize t. A code maybejusta series,or the whole collectionof

such variables. So long as readershave notgrasped hatthere s a series,its componentsseem to have beenchosenarbitrarily.However,once readershavedetected herepetition,theveryfeatures hatcausedthecomponents o lookarbitrary owproclaim hattheyare

fully motivated,the felicitous exemplarsof stylistic aptness. As usual in literature,a

textualobstacleis also thekey to its solution. Thus arbitrariness nd overdeterminationareone and thesame,thevery visibilityof eacharbitraryonnectionbeingalso one more

determiningactor hanks o theholding powerandundyingfascinationof any departurefromlinguisticnorms.

In all instances, the combination of a sensory given and of a derivativesubtext

translateshe concretenessof theimageintoan abstractnterpretation. treintegrateshe

imageintothe narrative r makes tthekeyto thecognitivecontentof thediegesis. Thus,the isolatedimage undergoesa processof textualization.

I shall distinguish three types of textualization: (1) one image generating a

hermeneuticparadigm; 2) a paradigmof synonymous images, the repetitivenessof

which selects a hermeneutic onstant; 3) a paradigmof synonymous mages generatinga hermeneutic diolect.

My examplefor the firstcategoryis Dickens's portrayalof BradleyHeadstone, he

teacher,in Our Mutual Friend. It would seem that the accumulateddetails make it

difficultnot to visualize theman,the more so becausetheportrayal itilesslyunderscores

the fellow's mediocrity:

BradleyHeadstone, in his decent black coat and waistcoat, and decent white

shirt, and decentformal black tie, and decentpantaloons of pepper and salt,

with his decent silver watch in his pocket and its decent hair-guardround hisneck,looked a thoroughlydecentyoung manof six-and-twenty. [266]

Obviouslythe referencescanbe verifieddespitethereader's nability o find,on today'sstreets,passers-bydressed n this manneror to recognizewhat thecompoundword hair-

guard might designate(itused to be awatch chain made of a tress of naturalhair, nstead

of thegold we now expectforsuch a chain;thehair-guard ould thereforebe interpretedas acheapsubstitute,hat s, asthe watchchainof thepoorand husasymbolof diminished

circumstances).Referencescan be verifiedon thebasis of verisimilitude all this seems

quitenormal),or because of their mereprecision,which presupposes he existence of

appurtenanceshatare worthnamingatall, or thatarepresentedas typicalof theperson

wearing hem. Thepresuppositiontself assumesthe functionof thereferent,whichboils

down to sayingthatreferentialityworks even if it is only a postulation,an indexpointing

2. Fora detaileddefinitionofcode,see UmbertoEco,A Theoryof Semiotics 125-30]. Code,in its semioticsense,mustnot beconfusedwiththepredefined ategoriesdescribedunder hatname

byRoland Barthesin S/Z. Theconcept of code as I use it in thispaper has muchin commonwith

T.S. Eliot's objectivecorrelative:see in his "Hamlet"145], "a set of objects... a chainof events

whichshall be the ormulaof[a] particular motion;such that whentheexternalfacts... aregiven

[the image], the emotionis immediately voked."

diacritics / spring 1994 5



to where a referentmightbe. But the questionis whether hese images account for the

effect of theportrait.Whatmakesus go beyondthe conclusion thatBradleyHeadstone

cannotaffordbetterclothes on a headmaster'smeagersalary? Is it because we aremade

to picturehis outer appearance hatwe deduce from it his innermediocrity? Is this

meanness n himsymbolizedby

thenarrow imitsof his sartorialachievements?

Clearly, heanswer s that heportraitdoes not owe itspsychologicalsignificanceto

therecitationof descriptivedetails,butto the repetitionof decent,as if it were the only

adjectivethe characterdeserves. Thus significance dependson the saturationof the

imagistic sequence by one markeronly. Observe that the adjective itself excludes

visualization,andthat it is indeedno more than a marker,as if the headmasterwere a

clotheshorsedisplayingan abstract ntity:the conventional,and thereforehis own lack

of imagination. Each of the sequential images, irrespectiveof the specific object it

represents,s subordinate o a humoristiccode.

Elsewhere n thesamenovelwe encounteranumberof rather ffensive, new-money

people. Prominent mongthem,awhole familyis satirically ingledoutby therepetitionof the adjectivebrand-newto depict every piece of their furniture,a repetitionmade

palpablyslantedand evaluative rather hanaccurateandmimeticwhen it extends to the

baby,whichis literally rue f comical(the babyis new),andtothegrandfather,which is

clearly parodic. The family's name, the Veneerings, clinches the significance by

suggestingthat these people's fortunehas puta thin veneer indeed on theirunpolishedselves. Therepetitionof brand-newandtheemblematic urnameorganizethe imagesso

that theirsignificanceis due not to theirseparatemimeticvalues,but to theircumulative

effect as a typeof discourse rather han as a lexicon.

Indeed theungrammatical

nonreferential mage of a recent grandfather s the

clincher,the sign that the paradigmhas reached its paradoxicalclimax. In BradleyHeadstone'scase,the clincher s thathe is decentnot becausehe ownsa watchbutbecause

the watchseems toown him("itsdecenthair-guardoundhisneck")andbecause the shift

of decent from outergarments o character educes heman to his paltry ooks. Inshort,thereader"gets hepicture," sthephrasegoes, preciselynot from hepictures hemselves

butfrom he fact that he wholesequence s aperiphrasticransformation f a matrix.That

matrix s none otherthan the ironicalproverb: clothes make the man. The images are

practicallyerasedas picturesand signify insteadbecause of two factors: the comical

undertoneof an insistentadjective,resulting n the impliedreductionof moraldecency

to decentclothes, andthe substitutionof synecdochesfor the whole character,with afurthermpliedreduction romsoul to body.

In the next sentence,however,physicalappearance nd moralportrayalarerecon-

ciled andseem to refocussignificanceon an actual mage. This image seems to testifyto the kind of keen observation that critics like to salute as evidence of an author's

sagacity:

He was neverseen inanyotherdress,andyet therewas a certainstiffness nhis

mannerof wearingthis,as if there were a wantof adaptationbetween himand

it, recallingsome mechanicsin theirholidayclothes. [266]

A keen observation,andyet the representation as hardlybeen sketchedwhen its

functionradicallychanges: its meaningas an image is hardlyallowed to linger in our

minds,ordoes so only long enoughto implant irmly n reality(orrather,n the readers'

perceptionof reality)a long playfulderivation rom the noun mechanics:

He hadacquired mechanicallya great storeof teacher'sknowledge.He could

do mental arithmeticmechanically,sing at sight mechanically,evenplay the

great churchorgan mechanically. From his earlychildhoodup,his mind had

6



been a place of mechanical stowage. The arrangementof his wholesale

warehouse,so that it might be always ready to meet the demands of retail

dealers-history here, geography there, astronomy to the right, political

economy o the left-natural history,thephysical sciences,figures, music,the

lowermathematics,

and whatnot, all in their severalplaces-this

care had

imparted o his countenancea lookof care. [266-67]

The derivationdoes not issue directlyfrom the mimetic content of the mechanic

image. Despite the negative or condescendingconnotationsof the noun, it does not

normallyentail the idea thata mechanic actsmechanically,butonly thathe is a passive

tool, the lowest rungof theproletariat.Adjectivesand adverbshere arenot related o the

noun'smeaningbut to the noun'sshape,generatedastheyarethroughparonomasia.The

visual aspects of mechanic are canceled out, and only the behavior or the attitude

attributable o mechanics is represented. Such is the effect of the pun: phonetic

similaritiesreplacereferentiality,orapuninvolves two referentsandcannotmake senseunless their mutual incompatibility is altogether removed [see Culler]. Thus the

significanceresultsherefroma retrospective ereadingof the adverbialderivation rom

thepun,all theway back to its startingpoint,to theparonomastickey whose function s

solely to maketheportrait atirical. To be sure,the mechanicalstowage metaphordoes

invite imagininga process,a sense of longshoremenat work,thusclosing the circle by

implying,I suppose,that a warehouse s mannedby mechanics. But this rationalization

remainssecondary o thecomical impactof a fanciful code depictingthe teacher'smind

as a mentalwarehousewhereknowledgelies fallow, unproductive,andunimaginative.Thatthe rule for this code dependsnow on wordplayrather han on referents is

demonstrated y the antanaclasis3 n the wordcare, that s, on its being used twice, but

the second time with a meaningdifferent romthe first. Inanycase,we havemovedfrom

thedescriptive o theevaluative, rom magestopsychologicalanalysis. New imageswill

follow, buttheywill henceforthbe abstract onventions or thenarrator'snsights nto the

complexes (in the Freudian ense), of a character'smind:

Therewas a kindof settled troublein theface. It was theface belongingto a

naturally loworinattentiventellectthathad toiledhardtoget what t hadwon,and that hadto hold it now that it was gotten. He alwaysseemedto be uneasy

lestanything hould be missing romhis mentalwarehouse,andtakingstock toassurehimself. [267]

A superficialcriticmightfeel thatpunning s a simplisticchoice on Dickens's part,whenhe had odepictthecomplexitythatwe perceiveas the hallmark f truthna fictional

character.Theenormous xpansion hatgenerates whole code fromasingle paronomastic

given (notthe wordmechanic,but thesyllepsis developedfromit) makesup through ts

repetitiveproductivity or the flimsy arbitrarinesswe mightbe temptedto dismiss in a

single pun. While referenceremainsan effective gesturetowards ruth, hereferentsare

not things,manners,or people outsidelanguage,butverbalcommonplaces.

Theremotivation, verdetermination,ndconvincing powerof thepuncontinuestobe felt down to the closure,where it spreads romcare to care, for the first care fits the

mechanicsat theirlevel of unskilledhands,soon to be replacedby machines. And the

second care inheritsthe discomfortof the maladjustedmechanics.

We are now in apositionfully to perceivethe basicoppositionbetweenmechanical

and human hat functions to motivatethecharacter f Headstoneandthewhole subplot

3. The antanaclasis s a close relation to theparonomasiaor to thesyllepsis: insteadof two

meanings n one word as insyllepsis, theplay on meanings s distributedbetween twohomonyms.




of which he is the protagonist or 500 morepages, until his drowning. On the model

providedby thestereotypeaboutmechanics n theirholidayclothes,there s a Mr.Hyde

imprisoned n this unappealing orerunner f Dr.Jekyll:

Suppressionofso muchto

makeroom or so much,hadgivenhima constrainedmanner,over and above. Yet herewasenoughofwhatwasanimal,andofwhat

wasfiery (thoughsmoldering)still visible in him.... [267]

The spelling out, animal versus mechanical,is the clausulacorresponding o the

stereotypewhich formed the incipitof the passageand the given of the code. It is also

consistent with dictionarydefinitions of mechanicalappliedto humans: they are like

inanimaterobots. Andso it will come to pass thatthis imprisonment f soul renders he

headmaster apableof love butunable opersuadehewomanhe desirestoreturn islove,

capableof teachingbutincapableof humancontact. Hence his frustration, is attempted

murder of a rival, and his violent death, which fulfills the destiny heraldedby theemblematicheadstoneof hissurname.Hencethecode's self-sufficient,evocativepowerthat no isolatedimagecould display.

The code's efficiency manifests itself more strikinglystill in the second type of

textualization, hatis, when theparadigmgeneratedby an imagisticgiven is comprised'of images synonymouswith the initialone. Eachmemberof theparadigm eems to revert

to thegiven and therefore o thesensory aspectof thephenomenon.And yet thisaspectis notenhanced,aswewouldexpect,byaseriesof variationsonthe samephysical eatures

illustrated gainandagain. Significanceresultsnot fromsuch cumulative imilaritiesbut

from asingle

set ofanalogies

thatwe extractby

induction rom differentmages. Equallyartificialandunconvincingasmimetic ropes, heyarecompellingassymbolsof the same

function,anabstract roperty.It son thisproperty,notonthequestionableverisimilitude

of theirdiverserepresentations,hattheir truth s founded.

My exampleis fromTheGuermantesWay. Proust's narrators describing he first

signs of his belovedgrandmother'satal illness. A decisive telltalesymptom-a minor

but persistent fever-reveals that there is more to the grandmother's roubles than

occasionalmoments of discomfort. The passagecontainsanodd assertionthateach of

us is chainedto an alienbeing from whom we canexpectno pitywhen sicknessstrikes,no understanding, ota clue to what is wrongwith us. Thisbeing is ourown body. We

do find relief fromourailmentsby enlistingthe help of otherbeings more ancientthanthose animals called "bodies." These powerful intercessors are none other than the

unlikelypersonifications f substances hatcontrol ever,likequinineand,moreunlikelystill, themercury n a thermometer whichthehumanmind haslearned o askquestionsin order o understandwhatthebodyis tellingus,justas whena foreigneranswersus we

look for an interpreterrom the same country" 2: 594]. I dwell on this idiosyncratic

mythology the better to demonstratehow bizarre and unconvincing it remains as a

representation.Therefollows a derivation n five stages,each of whichrepresentsan oralthermom-

eter,or rather, hemercurycontainedwithinit, running hegamutof figuresfrom mere

simile to full-fledged personification.The first is a metaphor:

a thermometerwas acquired. Thegraduatedglass tubewas emptyof mercury

for almost itsfull length. Wecouldhardlysee thesilver salamander urkingat

thebottomof its littleden. It looked dead.

[On alla chercherunthermometre.Danspresque toute sa hauteur e tubeetait

vide de mercure. Apeine si l'on distinguait, apieaufond de sapetite cuve, la

salamandred'argent. Elle semblaitmorte.] [2: 595]

8



The metaphors not as farfetchedas one mightthink,since themotilityof mercurymakes it look like a borderline form of life, halfway between the animate and the

inanimate. Ineffect, the animalmetaphors overdetermined y thealchemicaltermfor

mercury,now a poetic word in French,vif-argent("quicksilver,"with quickin its old

sense of"alive").

Fromhereto salamanderthe transition seasy,

since it was believed

thatthis animalcould live in the midst of fire,and fever is a live fire. Thereis a logic to

these fancies.

The linkbetween the salamander nd its successive metamorphosesntoa witch,a

sibyl, aprophetess,andfinally,one of theParcae,mayseem moretenuous. There s quitea gap betweenplainanimation,changinga metal into an animal,andattributingo that

metalsupernatural roperties, hepowerof seeing the future. Forwhile thepersonifica-tions vacillate from one culturalcontext to the next (the prophetess romthe Bible, the

sibyl fromVergil,the witch fromMichelet),a steadyprogressionrisesfrom the token to

theclass, fromthetypeto thecategory,generalizingsibyl intoprophetess. The clausula

brings he series to its endbyrevertingoamerecomparison,but tssymbolicrangebeliesthesimplicityof its form,for now thedropof mercury ooks like a crossbetweentwo of

theFates,Clotho,who spinsthe thread f life, andLachesis,who measuresout its length.Thus the instrumentno longerregisters ever: it now portends he fatal issue the fever

foreshadows.Further n,thethermometer's oblin,notcontent o tell thefuture,becomes

the agentthatmakes it happen:

Weshook downthe thermometer o erase thefateful sign, as if we could lower

thefever as we did the level indicatedon the instrument.

[Nous secouames bien fort le thermometrepour effacer le signe fatidique,comme si nous avions pu par la abaisser la fievre en meme temps que la

temperaturemarquee.] [2: 596]

Finally, mythological discourse broadens from a succession of walk-on characters

crossing the stage to a fully developed tableau vivant in which Quinine holds Fever

underfoot, ike a crusheddragon.Thedragon'sname,Python,evokes thewholeDelphicscene, completewith thePythiaorPythonessherself,sittingon herthronecovered with

the skin of the foul beast. This confirmsthe fatal symbolismof the figures,but it also

worsens theirdissonancewith asoberawarenessof mortality, speciallyas the overtonesof euphuismreach the pointof self-parodywith a dialogueendingon a defiantreplyof

Mercury o Quinine.Now a warderwatching romhertoweringbastion,thegraded ube,

Mercuryyields to themagicpowerof thedrugbut swears to returnwhenQuininegrowstired of the contest. All this does seem the height of artifice, harkingback to the

mannerismsof Baroquepoetryandblending togethera crediblepoetic appropriationf

the epic andverbal humor.

Humor,however,betraysa formalconflict: none of theemblems ends tselftoactual

visualization. Visualization demands there should be at least a minimal similaritybetweenthecomparedand the comparing.This is not the case. Thereis nothing n the

mercuryof a thermometerhatcouldevoketheshapeof thePythia nherprophetic hrine.Even if we were willing to go along becausethe corpusof traditionalpersonifications

encouragesgivingbodily shapeeven toabstract ntities(Faith,Hope,and so on),thefirst

emblem, the salamander, eems to precludethe shift to humanpersonificationsof the

same shapeless dropof quicksilver,or rather hisjumpfromreptileto human orm tells

us thatwhile shapesare rrelevant,ransformations relevant. Inshort,mercuryhas to bea sign for themagical,and themagicalconsists in tellingthe future. Even within human

shapes,thesibyl,thewitch,theprophetess, ndFateatherspinningwheelare oo differentintheir raditional epresentations,nd ndeed nthewaystheyactualize heirrelationship




to the future,forany commonsensoryidentification o take hold. Thefollowing detail

suggests thatreference s almostentirelyerased. Proustspecifies "littlesibyl devoid of

reason."The sentenceliterallywithdraws he image as quicklyas it is offered-within

thesamesyntagm. Clearly hesibyl is but a turnof speech alludingto themercury,and

thereforeno more of animage

thanDickens's mechanic. It is a conceitreferring

o a

property f themetal,thechemicalconnotationsof which make t hard o reconcile twith

those of conventionalpoetic imagery,especially in the frameworkof a contraptionas

decidedlyprosaicas an instrumentormeasuring emperatures.Nothingtangible s left

fromthis filteringout of each successive representation. Somethingis being repeatedfrom onemythologicalfigureto theother,yet thissomething s notphysicalor moralbut

a conventional personification translating nto a code of the supernaturala logical

oxymoronor adynaton, he effect of which is the imaginaryrealizationof the impos-sible-to know theunknowable.

Ifwedonot count heonly imagethat s not ahuman hapeand hat see asatransition

from the factual mercuryto a live entity making motion a sign of life, all symboliccharacters nto which thetransitional alamander s metamorphosed ave in commonan

abilityto predictthefuture---"theittle sybil,""thelittleprophetess,"and the Fate with

her "silverdistaff." Only the word "witch"does not per se referto the future,but a

descriptiveperiphrasis orrects his failureby specifying that herwitchcraftconsists in

fortune-telling.Thereis no morereferentialityo thisthan n thepunswe have observed n thefirst

type: paradoxas paronomasias a formal,abstract tructure, ffective as such,without

any need for a physical representation. The personificationsdo not add credibility:

credibility s unnecessary n the firstplace;theironly pertinence s the need to insertthe

code into astorywithoutcancelingout the minimalrequirementhatanarrativemusthave

charactersanda setting.The sensory natureof the images does not weaken the thematicmessage: Proust

powerfullyappropriates dramaticmotif of nineteenth-centuryiterature hatconfers

pathos o such mundane ncidentsasmedicalconsultations.Thenineteenth enturydoes

not expect, as we would, a diagnosis from doctors, but a prognosis. Whereas our

civilization prefersto avoid the shock of a revealed future,and even hides diagnosisbehind aboratory nalysesandscannerpictureswhose decoding s notusuallywithinthe

reach of the patient, nineteenth-centurymedicine provides literarynarrativeswith a

hyperbolic ormof suspense,afavorite nstanceof explicitprolepsis,wheredoctorsatthepatient'sbedside are describedas "oracles." Balzac calls a very pedestrian urgeon"a

terrifyingharuspex" Pierrette776] or stages melodrama hata moder readermay be

hardputto takeseriously: "Thesesupreme udgeswereabouttodecide on a sentenceof

life ordeath. To knowthe last wordof humanscience, he [theprotagonist]hadbrought

together heoraclesof modem medicine"[Lapeau de chagrin211]. Proust, n another

context, resorts to self-deprecatinghumor,and in effect one could take the passage in

questionas a good matrix or thegiven of thederivationwe are now discussing: "Iwas

expectingfrom my physicianthat,thanksto his art,the laws of which escapedme, he

would renderan oracularpronouncement boutmy healthby consultingmy innards"1:

561]. The last fourwordshilariouslyrefer o ancientaugurs'practiceof reading hefuturein theentrailsof a victim sacrificedon the altar.

Obviously,nosingle imagewould suffice to transform modest thermometerntoa

substitute or medicalauthority,a synecdochefor the scientific man. Nor would it be

explicit enough to move its usage from diagnosis to prognosis, from observationto

prognostication.Thewholesynonymicparadigms neededtoachievethe transformation

of the daily measuringof vital signs (as a modernnurse would say) into an oracular,

supernaturalialoguewithFate.Thecumulativeparadigm f propheticwomenproposesvarious mages,that s, asuccessionof sememes. Each s a bundleof semes, fromamong

10



whichonly two eachtime will be found in thenextsememe as theywere in theprevious

one, only two thereforerepeatedand drilled into the readers' consciousness. One is

mythological, the otherprophesizing. The mythological silhouettes vanish, but the

mythological tag remainsas an index of a literarygenre, the exemplum but the fable

woulddojust

aswell).

I do not mean tosay

thatProust'ssibylline

characters ome from

suchgenresbut thatthey partakeof theirethos,which is to impart essons, and of their

technique,which is to offerpatently ictional storieswith thepromisetheyare neverthe-

less true.

The paradigm havejust analyzedis therefore magisticonly inasmuchas a lureis

needed o attract he notice of readers.The mimetic ngredientsarekept ust long enoughto helpreadersrecognizethatthe whole stringof examplesboils down to rehearsing wo

semes. It is thereforea conventionthatsays: this is not real,andyet it is true;and this

message is aboutthe latentpresenceof Fate,at timesglimpsedat,a message heregivenin mockmythologicalcode. Fully developed images,treated or their own sake,would

jarwith the dramaof impendingDeath. The code merelyemphasizesthatTime hasforProust anotherdimension,metaphysical perhaps,undoubtedlya concretizationof the

principleof the narrative, ince the substanceof this foretold future s suspenseitself.

It remains or us toexplorehowcodingtransformshemeaningnotonlyof theimagesfrom which it derives,butof the words the coding involves, carrying hemalong in its

stream, husgeneratingan idiolect that becomesa characteristic eatureof the text, and

eventuallyof the author'sstyle. We must also tryto understandhow this idiolect can

insurecommunication seffectivelyas the sociolect does. This is the third ypeof imagetextualization.

I shall start rom anestablishedcode: a chronotopen Woolf's Mrs.Dalloway. The

chronotopemay be a representation f space in time code, or the reverse.4 In Woolf's

novel,the time coderepresents netime in severalspaces,one timeexperienced herefore

by several characters imultaneously,albeit from their own distinctperspectives. The

functionof suchastructure s to solve aproblempeculiar o thenarrative,heproblemof

representing arietyand differenceswithinsimultaneity.Descriptive exts do notrequire

simultaneity. Nonliteraryor paraliterary arrativesmake do with some metalinguistic,

marginal,extradiegeticcomment,not unlikeparenthetical tage directions,such as the

almostparodicphrase"meanwhileback at the ranch"n comic strips.The single time, common to all charactersbut diversely used by them (which

diversity-call it subjectivized duration-generates significance) this single time isrepresented y thebells of theclocks of London. Heardby two differentcharactershat

nothingelse has yet brought together, they at the very least invite moralcomparisonsbetween theirrespectiveattitudesabout ife. Sooner orlater, hesecomparisonsactually

guidereadersproleptically owardendingsthataresymbolicbecausetheycome inpairs.Forinstance,the code posits, between theprotagonist,an idle socialite, and anunhappyand indeed suicidal proletarian,a parallelism; they are colisteners of the same bell,

suggestingthattheprotagonist'sown snobbish ennui is just as depressingas the acedia

thatails the poor helpless misfit.

Thisparallelismdictates he telos of thestory,andthe telos of course is preciselythe

difference hatdistinguishes he narrativediegesis froma meredescription.Inshort, he

repeated hronotope s a hermeneuticndex,even though t is in itself openorempty,as

would be the title "A Day in the Life of a London Housewife." It symbolizes all it does

by pointingto its teleological motivation.

Coding (here, the fact that the bells constitute the sensory sign of a chronotope)valorizesthecode wordbell, making t first a conspicuoussignal,seconda summarizing

4. Bakhtindefines the chronotopeas "the intrinsicconnectednessof temporaland spatialrelationships hat are artistically expressedin literature" 84].




sign. The sign summarizes n two ways: its mere appearance irst summonsup the

recollectionof the narrative ituations t hasorganizedchronologically,and tconveysin

a nutshelleither the significanceof theirpastsimultaneity, hemoral,psychological,or

dramaticand narrativemplicationsof theirchronologicalcoincidence;or the actantial

featuresof the actors nvolvedin the multifoldsequence

of events. The lattercharacter-

izationis powerfulenoughto createmeaningsout of forms thatcarriednone in linguistic

usage. Thesemeaningsdo reach magistic evel in theeyes of thereader,butthisapparentmimesis is actuallythe semioticizationof oppositionalor contrasting eaturesbetween

eventsandcharacters,heseoppositionscreating heconditions orsignificancewhereno

such possibility was offeredby the lexicon or syntax. The contrast,for instance,that

doomedtheearlylove betweenClarissaDalloway andPeter,a formerflameof hers,is

represented hrough he actualizationof morphological eaturespreviouslydormant n

language. Theyhad lainunexploited,until the valorizationof bells occurred.

Clarissa,we know,neverwasableto shed herprim ense of propriety,heself-control

that defines her social personaand thatearly shapedher now frustratingdestiny as amarriedwoman andasasymbolof the conventionsandpompandpageantofhigh society.This is expressed iterallyand magisticallybytheparallelismbetweenherpreoccupationwithbeingontime,her senseof duty,and her use of thisdisciplineas aprotectionagainst

passionand the dangerof lettingloose. Herinabilityto let go will always keepher and

Peterapartdespitethe love andnostalgia.He,on the otherhand,remainsunconventional

as he returns o England:

an adventurer, eckless,he thought, wift,daringindeed(landedas he was last

nightfromIndia) a romanticbuccaneer,careless of all these damnedpropri-

eties, yellow dressing-gowns . . and respectabilityand evening parties and

spruceold menwearingwhiteslips beneaththeirwaistcoats. [80]

Thegapof alienationbetween this romanticmanand the woman he loves hasjustbeen

madepresentagain,tested as unbridgeableby the only words she could find aftertheymeetagain,when he leaves herhouse, suddenly realizingthat his return o Englandhas

not servedany purpose, hat t was naiveteon hispart o havehopedshe would be moved:

"Peter! Peter!" criedClarissa,following himout on the landing. "Myparty

to-night!Remembermyparty to-night!"she cried,and... overwhelmedbythetrafficand the soundof all the clocksstriking,her voice ... sounded rail and

thin and very ar away as Peter Walshshut the door.

Remembermyparty,remembermyparty, said Peter Walshas he steppeddownthestreet,speakingto himself rhythmically,n time withtheflow of the

sound,thedirectdownright oundofBigBen striking hehalf-hour.(The eaden

circles dissolvedin theair.) Oh theseparties, he thought;Clarissa'sparties.

Whydoes she give theseparties, he thought. [72]

It is quiteclear thattheprimacyof social engagementsexemplifiesthe alienationof

the romantic rom the socialite. It is equallyclear thatPeter'smonologueis bitterand

ironical,and that ts bitterness s symbolized by the fact that themonologueis uttered n

time with the bell's toll. We do have an image, althoughthe image is not a mimetic

metaphordirectlybased on verisimilitude,on referenceto a presumedreality,but on

referenceto an abstractanalogy: the clock's bell is to Peter's ironical repetitionof

Clarissa'swordswhat herpunctualitys to his freedom. Realityis represented,but at a

second remove.

From magetocoding,onemore transitions necessary:theimageworksfromwhat

it refers to in its literalacceptation o what it substitutes or figuratively(thesocialite is

12



punctualas clockwork),whereas thecode canreversethe orderof reference clockworkcan be describedas time-conscious,or as accurateas a dutifulsocialite, mindfulof what

she owes herguests). In otherterms,this reversalcannot be takenseriously,as true,but

as a parody,or a witty or quaintmannerism,as a personification,arbitrarynasmuchas

it is trueas a referencewhile false as a referent: hisagain

definesa code becauseits self-

evidence is not a matterof experiencebut a decision of evaluatingin terms of an as if

hypothesis,in termsof a preliminaryagreement o a suspensionof disbelief. But as a

result,whatever has to be demonstrated r illustrated here,punctualityor mechanical

subservience to a principlethatmay be paralyzingor negative as indeed it is in a love

situation)has shifted from the comparedto the comparing,from the sign slot to the

referent lot, fromthespotwhere what hasto be provenis to the spotwhere theproofis

supposed o be (it is now theconceptof a hostess thatprovesin anostensibly ocularway,as a game, thatclockwork is a reliablemeasureof time; andin so doing the hostess is

presentedas anexemplarof self-consciousness,as themodelof anunfeeling,unbending

character,unfit for the disorderof passion). Hereis the clock of St. Margaret's,whosebells ring to exemplify the mechanical in the human: "the skeleton of habit,""time

flap[ping] on the mast,""feeling hollowed out, utterlyempty within,"or again "like

somethingalive which wants ... to be ... at rest" these sketches end on a premonitoryvision of Clarissa"comingdown thestairson thestrokeof thehour nwhite" tobe felled

by her heartattack"whereshe stood, in herdrawing-room"):

Ah, said St.Margaret's,likea hostess whocomes into herdrawingroomon the

verystrokeof the hour andfinds herguests therealready. I amnot late. No, it

is precisely half-pasteleven, she says. Yet,thoughshe is perfectly right,her

voice, beingthe voiceof thehostess, is reluctant o inflictits individuality.[74]

Formingan antithesis o Clarissa'spropriety,here s PeterseeingherforthefirsttimeafteryearsinIndia,meetingalso herdaughter, vivid reminderhatshe is anotherman'swife:

"Tellme,"hesaid,seizingherbytheshoulders. "Areyouhappy,Clarissa?Does Richard-"

Thedoor opened.

"Here is my Elizabeth," said Clarissa, emotionally,histrionically,per-haps.

"Howd'y do?" said Elizabethcoming orward.The soundof Big Ben strikingthehalf-hourstruckout betweenthemwith

extraordinary igour,as ifayoungman,strong, ndifferent,nconsiderate,were

swinging dumb-bells his wayand that. [71]

The semioticizationaffectsthefirstsyllableof dumb-bells. It cannotbe missed: so

long as a bell code has been developed,it must have a term to express the oppositeof

Clarissa's rigidprimness.Hence,her over,aman still youngandwho actshisyouththe

way she neverdid, is muchalive andquite improperon herown territory the drawing

room),but in a way that can be described n bell code as well. He therefore s notjustgesticulating,butgesticulatingwithequipmentaliento a formaldrawingroom,andsuch

that,as an isolated mage,would be totally mplausible.Theonlypossible reason orthis

cocky young man to use dumbbells in these surroundings,or for Woolf to risk sofarfetchedan example, is the presenceof the bell code, and the basic rule for any signsystem, that it exhibit a completeset of polaropposites. Hencedumbbells,because thederivation romthenarrative iven andthe need to contrast hesebells with the ones that




ringthehourcombine to select a semiotic node: they are thebells that do not ring,and

they symbolizethe dumbbehaviorof apassionatemanwho will alwaysdisturbdecorum.

Thepsychological symbolism s evident,thepictureasvivid as it is improbable, nd

for once the device is unquestionably n image. And yet no readerwill take it seriouslyas a

representation,or

codinghas undermined he mimesis

by makingthe referent

irrelevant o the literarinessof the device. While the wordstill refers to weights, quite

normally,and while theswingingmotionrequiredwhenexercisingwith thembroadens

the referentialbase and is consistentwith thepictureof a youngathlete,there s no waytherepresentationanhold its own despitethepun. Butagain,thepun by itself would be

silly, if it were not thatthe code had made theringingof bells, normallya sign fortellingtime, into a sign for an orderly ife, for self-control,for a sense of propriety,and so on.

Therefore,ustas languageopposesorder anddisorder,the codeopposes (ringing)bells

to dumbbells.

Consequentlythe pun is twice motivated,while it should be in itself a climax of

arbitrariness,ince it is overdetermined y thecombinationof a codingconstantand ofphonetichappenstance.This coincidence ntroducesa new factor n the model Ipropose:

segmentation.Segmentations anoperationperformedby linguists,critics,andordinaryreadersalike,more or less intuitively. Itconsistsof discoveringwhat theminimalsignsare that convey meaning in the verbal sequence. As we saw before, languageusers

unthinkinglyconfuse suchsigns withwords,if only becausespellingkeepsthemapart.

Morphemesikeprefixesandsingular,plural,anddeclensionorconjugation ndingshave

similarsemanticautonomy,aslinguistsknow. But readersusuallyperceivethistechnical

fact only when a writtenpairof opposites spells out theirseparateness,or when some

phonetic proplike

rhymeunderscores t.

This is preciselywhat is happeninghere: the promotionof ringingbells to coding

abilityhascarvedout a slot of significanceready obefilled outbyanyprefix-like exeme

thatmightactualize the opposition. We may now say that,without the code, dumbbell

would be a vulgarpunand thatwithin the code it is integratedn thesignificance systemthatorganizes he wholeplot,andthereforewe arewitnessingthe birthof literariness.Or

else, we arereaching hepointat which we perceivethathomonymy,againwithinacode,is a powerfulgeneratorof literary ignificance.

I shall conclude nthreepoints.The first s that heerasedor diminished eferentialityof imagesdoes not entail heirdisappearanceromthe reader'sawarenessoranyreductive

strategyon thepartof the critic. Imagesrailroaded ntoconveyingsignificanceinsteadof theirown meaningsbecausetheyareembedded n a code, andharnessed, o tospeak,in theservice of a commoncause,are indeed no more reduced o thestructureheynow

stand forthantheyareimpoverishedby concretizingonly one or two semes insteadof a

wholesememe. The reason s that heyareonlyrefocused,whichmeansthat hose of their

sensory aspectsthat are now irrelevantmove from a denotativeto a connotativestatus

(that would be the case, for instance, for the hellenism or classicism of the sibyllic

personae nProust).Similarly,sensorymemoriesmaystill lingerabout hem in the mind

of a reader amiliarwith theirhistoricalplaceorrolein a tradition r in agenre. But both

connotationsandremnants fpreviousactualizations ow reverse heir unctions: nstead

of sustainingrepresentationndenriching heimage, theyformascreen,motivatingand

strengtheningreaders'expectationsof the familiar. As a screen, their role is now to

misleadreaders,or to slow down theirperceptionof the code-induced ignificance. The

images are thus made more difficult, and as a result they impose themselves more

effectively ontoreaders'attention.The loss of referentiality,arfromwastingthetext's

abilityto represent,s but a formof imagisticentropywhoseconsequence s anincreased

performanceof thereaders,a moreconscious,morethoroughreader-response, ne that

is more faithful to the letter of the text.

14



Mysecondpoint s that ignificanceresulting roma code differs undamentallyrom

thatderived fromtropesandfigures. These cannotbe perceivedanddecipheredwithout

involvingtheprincipleof substitutability:no figurativeexpression s accessible assuch

if somehow, explicitly ornot, readersdo not have in mind a literalhomologue,orjust a

simpler,plainersynonymforwhich the

figurativeword or

phrases substituted.

This termfor termsubstitutionhas facilitatedmanya reductionist eading. Readers

run no such risk with codes, since the coded figural componentshave by definition

severed theirties withtheir ndividual iteralhomologues,andsince the foci selectedbythecode's repetitiveness an neverbe "seen" romanyisolatedmemberof theparadigm.Thiswas, Ithink,obvious n thecases of themechanics, hesibyls,and he bells. Whateversubstitutionwe might maginewould be impossible,eitherbecausethesignificanceis not

equaltothesum of themeanings,orbecause thecodesignifiesnot intermsof thedistancebetween a literaland afigurativehomologuebut intermsof anabstract onfigurationforexample,order vs. disorder nMrs.Dalloway). We are thereforedealingwith a mode of

expressionwhose basic unit s likelytobeatext,rather hanaword,asentence,or atrope.This, I submit,opens up a broad avenuetowards a rethinkingof literature n terms of

literariness, ndof literariness ntermsof universals.The firstsuch universals hatcomesto mind as likely to be pertinent o codes are artificeandtextuality.

My thirdpoint,which I venturewithunderstandablerepidation,s that theconceptof code might lead to favorablereappraisal f the usefulnessof aestheticevaluation in

literaryanalysis. Aestheticfeatures endtodayto be dismissedas historicalvariablesoras suspect vestiges of the styles and readingpracticesof the embattledcanon. The

sequentialnature andtheoverdeterminationf theparadigm uggest it is time for us to

recognizethataesthetic(andsemiotic) unityis pertinent o literariness.

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