iag policy brief · armm was established. the mnlf campaigned to boycott the plebiscite to ... this...

IAG PolIcy BrIef JULY 2012 ISSN 2243-8173-12-07

Bringing Closure to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement

Part 2: The MNLF Perspective

[ 2 ] Policy Brief[ 2 ]

*Transcript of the talk delivered by Atty. Randolph Parcasio at the IAG Forum on Bringing Closure to the 1996 FPA on May 28, 2012 in Cotabato City.

Bringing Closure to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement: MNLF Perspective*

Atty. Randolph Parcasio

Let me state first that the MNLF before the 1976 Tripoli Agreement had this position that they do not recognize the territorial integrity and sov-ereignty of the Republic of the Philippines.

That was the status quo ante before the signing of the 1976 Agreement.

By virtue of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement – an international binding con-tract – the MNLF recognized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines in exchange for the national government’s commitment in that agreement to establish autonomous government in the southern Philippines comprising almost half of Mindanao from Palawan up to Davao del Sur. That was the contract; they call it B-I-C-O – binding international commitment and obligation.

From 1976, there was no implementation of that agreement until Presi-dent Marcos unilaterally contravening the provisions of a unitary autonomous government, established two autonomous governments – one based in Zam-boanga City, the other based in Cotabato City (Region 9 and 10 and Region 12 and part of Region 11).

After the signing of the 1976 agreement, there was a ceasefire. However the establishment of the 2 autonomous governments was viewed by the MNLF as a violation. Hence armed conflict recurred between the two parties.

When President Corazon Aquino became president, there was great hope that at last on the basis of the commitment of her martyred husband who prom-ised to deliver freedom to the Bangsamoro people to Nur Misuari, the matter on the right to self determination of the Bangsamoro people would be resolved.

In fact President Corazon Aquino – against the advice of her peace advis-ers – went to Sulu to meet with MNLF leadership. However something wrong went after that.

First, the Jeddah accord: The agreement was 10+3 formula meaning un-der the regime of Aquino, the government will establish autonomy in the 10 provinces in Mindanao via an executive fayad, using the revolutionary powers

“By virtue of The 1976 Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF recognized the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Philippines in exchange for the national government’s commitment to establish an autonomous government in the southern Philippines.”

[ 3 ] Bringing Closure to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement: The MNLF Perspective

of Aquino and then hold a plebiscite in 3 provinces – Davao del Sur, South Cota-bato, and Palawan. This however did not take place. Aquino’s pronouncement was that the government will unilaterally implement the 1976 agreement by calling a Regional Consultative Commission (RCC). The RCC made a proposal submitted to Congress but it was watered down, becoming RA 6734. Thus the ARMM was established. The MNLF campaigned to boycott the plebiscite to ratify RA 6734 saying it was in contravention to the BICO which was the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. From then on intermittent armed clashes between MNLF and government forces recurred.

President Ramos was elected president. But before the election, Ramos himself went with his representatives to Libya and promised the MNLF to de-liver the autonomy that was promised under the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. And lo and behold, there was the 1996 FPA.

The FPA speaks of the establishment of the autonomous government in all the provinces and cities mentioned in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, in short, half of Mindanao. The agreement provides for a transitory period of two years, during which the law should have been passed legislating all the pertinent pro-visions of the 1996 FPA which shall constitute as a new organic act for a new autonomous government in place of the ARMM. The time given for this legis-lative process to take place was only two years, from 1996 to 1998. Now the MNLF says that from 1996 to the present, that law was never passed. That is the reason why the government agreed to rectify past mistakes via a tripartite review of the implementation of the peace agreement.

The mandate of the tripartite review is to review the implementation of the 1996 FPA. Second, to draft a law to amend, revise, supersede RA 9054 for the full implementation of the 1996 FPA. This is very important because this gave a promise that at last the BICO would be fulfilled.

The MNLF, OIC, and GPH agreed to revise 42 defective provisions of RA 9054 to conform to the 1996 FPA. They also agreed to establish the Bang-samoro Development Assistance Fund (BDAF) and the Tripartite Implementa-tion Monitoring Committee (TIMC). This means that the parties have already identified which provisions of RA 9054 would be revised. [IAG will post online a copy of the outline soon.]

It took the parties three years to be able to agree on the 42 provisions to be revised. The BDAF meanwhile is supposed to address the socio-economic demands of all places covered by the treaty which is the SZOPAD area com-prising half of Mindanao. The terms of reference of BDAF was initially submit-

“The mandate of the Tripartite

Review is to review the

implementation of the 1996 FPA,

and draft a law to amend, revise, or supersede RA 9054 for the full

implementation of the 1996 FPA.”


ted to the Islamic Development Bank for their comments. The IDB was identi-fied as the principal source of the funds. Of course as it will be implemented, there will be several portfolios: IDB portfolio, and other portfolio for other fund-ing agencies/donor countries that would want to participate/contribute to the development assistance fund. The TIMC will be in charge of monitoring the implementation of all tripartite agreements during the review. This body shall have representative from all parties: MNLF, OIC, and GPH.

On the question, what are the remaining issues, these are issues on ter-ritory, control of strategic minerals specifically on definition and sharing of revenues, and transitional mechanism which the MNLF defines as provisional government.

On territory, the MNLF maintains its position that when the law will be finally crafted by Congress, it shall be submitted to a plebiscite in all the prov-inces and cities as identified in the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and the 1996 FPA.

Why is this an issue? In the discussions, it seems that the government does not agree with this. One, for the GPH the issue on territory with refer-ence to the implementation of the 1996 FPA was finally resolved by the 2001 plebiscite. This is problematic because the MNLF view is that the law that was submitted for ratification in the 2001 plebiscite was rejected by the organiza-tion simply because of the infirmities in that law. In other words, the MNLF rejects RA 9054 as the implementation of the Third Part, Phase 2 of the 1996 FPA. It would seem that the government would just submit the law for ratifica-tion in the 5 provinces now comprising the ARMM. To put closure to the issue, the matter should be submitted to all areas that was agreed simply because there is no law/constitutional provision that prohibits government or Congress the submission for ratification of that law in all the provinces. There is another dimension why the MNLF wants it submitted in all the provinces agreed. The reason is to determine finally which among the areas identified by the 1976 and 1996 agreements would be joining the autonomous government as envisioned in the two covenants. Again, there is no constitutional provision that prohibits the government from doing so.

On control of strategic minerals:

Under the peace agreement, the general rule is that the autonomous government shall have control and supervision over mines and minerals ex-cept strategic minerals. If you will read the particular provision on strategic minerals under 9054, it is very clear that the existing autonomous region has no power at all, no legislative power over strategic minerals, not only strategic

“There are 3 remaining issues: territory; control of strategic minerals; definition of strategic minerals and sharing of revenues; and transitional mechanism.”


minerals, but all mines and minerals including forest reserves, internal waters and those that are considered potential sources of energy.

There are two issues here. Number one is the issue on the definition of strategic minerals. The parties have impliedly come up even during the 1993 talks with the idea by defining strategic minerals by enumeration. For the MNLF, strategic minerals shall comprise those that have value for security of the country. They have identified uranium as one of the strategic miner-als. The other minerals comprise those that are not found in the country but are imported from other states as strategic minerals following the French and American definition of strategic minerals. The GPH stopped with their enu-meration under RA 9054 which practically covers all mines and minerals that are not considered strategic insofar as the MNLF is concerned. Take note also that there is no law in the country that defines strategic minerals.

On the sharing of revenues:

MNLF follows two models: Aceh and West Papua, Indonesia. In Aceh, 75 % goes to Aceh, 25% shares goes to the central government, not only strate-gic minerals but natural resources. In West Papua, it’s 80/20. The Philippine government wants to stick to the 50/50 sharing under RA 9054.

These are the two issues confronting the parties that remain unresolved up to the present. Although in the interregnum, the parties have agreed for an interim arrangement which is: 1) that the autonomous government shall co-manage strategic minerals, 2) they shall share revenues thereof 50/50.

What is co-management? Let me apprise you of the power that the ARMM has now under this agreement because this is immediately imple-mentable. ARMM has now the power to receive applications for licenses, con-cessions for the exploitation, development of strategic minerals. Necessarily, with that power, it can now formulate its internal rules and regulations in ap-proving or disapproving applications for exploitation, utilization, development of natural resources. After that, it will be forwarded to the appropriate office in the national government for approval. After approval, both will co-manage the exploitation, utilization, and development such that the ARMM has the power to see to it that the terms and conditions of the concession or the license are fully complied with. That’s the interim arrangement. It was agreed after the meeting in Bandung in March 2012, that, 1) the President shall immediately issue an executive order to implement the interim agreement; 2) Governor Hataman shall immediately issue an executive order creating a special office for this special concern.

“In the interregnum,

the parties have agreed that the

autonomous government shall

co-manage strategic minerals

and share revenues

thereof 50/50.”


We are not yet updated as to whether or not this was already imple-mented by the President or the Governor.

On transitional mechanisms:

This is one of the most contentious issues because the MNLF maintains the view that the transitory period of Phase 1 of the 1996 FPA provides spe-cifically among others that during the transition a law shall be passed for the implementation of the 1996 FPA. It is the view of the MNLF that until now, it is very obvious that the law has not been passed. In fact the parties have agreed that a law shall be passed implementing the FPA when the parties would com-plete their review and submit this to the President and the President would submit this to Congress for legislation and then of course it shall be ratified in a plebiscite.

In the interim, the MNLF demands that a transitional mechanism or a provisional government of whatever you call it that will address transitional is-sues shall be established. The parties have not yet agreed what kind of mecha-nism shall be established. Without the resolution of the three issues the MNLF thus would not agree or did not agree that the 42 provisions that were already agreed be now submitted to the President because that would be incomplete. Take note that this review has taken the parties more time than the time con-sumed during the negotiations of the crafting of the peace agreement.

In the meantime, another peace track is undertaken by the government. And the MNLF has never been apprised by the government of the develop-ments on the other peace track – the negotiations with the Moro Islamic Lib-eration Front (MILF). When the government speaks with the MNLF it is as if there is no other peace track. I believe that is the same situation in the other side, negotiating as if there is no other peace track. And the government is ne-gotiating with the two parties – MNLF and MILF – as if you (ARMM) do not exist; meaning ARMM does not exist because your participation has not been engaged officially.

Why did the government engage in two peace tracks without engaging an existing legal entity that the government says is the answer to the demand of the Bangsamoro people for their right to self-determination? I have no an-swer for that.

But I would like to stress that it is not true that nothing has been done. This is a great achievement for both parties. At least for the government, they have admitted that indeed RA 9054 is defective.

“Why did the government engage in two peace tracks without engaging the ARMM which it says is the answer to the demand of the Bangsamoro people for their right to self-determination?”


Take note that the Constitution does not prohibit the holding of another plebiscite. In fact under the existing Constitution, two plebiscites were already held: one in 1990 for the establishment of the ARMM and another in 2001 for the expansion of the ARMM.

The Philippine Constitution even provides for autonomy greater than what has been provided in the peace agreement. The Constitution is broader in so far as addressing the right to self-determination is concerned.

The Philippine Constitution provides that the autonomous region shall “consist of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structure and other relevant characteristics” (Sec. 5, Art. X). This is actually the Jeddah Accord because it provides for more areas for autonomy and as far as the MNLF leadership is concerned, it continues to receive demands and requests from indigenous peoples of the Davao region, Bukidnon areas, and other areas in Mindanao who would like to join an autonomous government. The Constitution does not prohibit them from demanding that and does not prohibit Congress from providing a law to address such demand.

But what has been happening is, the GPH invokes the Constitution and its internal laws when favorable to the central government but when the Philippine Constitution and internal laws favor the Bangsamoro people, it fili-busters and procrastinates. This has been the attitude of the GPH since the beginning of the tripartite review and even previous to that.

Atty. Randolph Parcasio is a peace advocate and participant in the Tri-partite GPH-OIC-MNLF drafting of a legislative proposal to amend Republic Act 9054 and fully implement the provisions of the 1996 Final Peace Agree-ment.

“The Philippine Constitution even

provides for autonomy greater

than what is provided in the

peace agreement.”

Opinions expressed in the articles are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of IAG and KAS. IAG as a policy platform continues to create more “tables” in our common search for genuine autonomy and governance. IAG Policy Brief is published monthly. Associate Editor: Ramie Toledo. Lay-out Artist: Omar Tadeja. Go to www.iag.org.ph to download the pdf version. Cover photo: The Indonesian Embassy in Manila


The remaining Unresolved issUes as discUssed dUring The formal meeTing of The ad hoc high level groUP gPh-oic-mnlf: The mnlf PosiTion.

Bandung City, Indonesia March 1-2, 2012

Introduction

The GPH-OIC-MNLF Tripartite Review on the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement cannot carry out the mandate to draft an amendatory law to revise RA 9054 because the three (3) issues namely: territory, provisional government and definition/sharing of revenues of strategic minerals are not resolved.

1. The GPH POSITION

The Tripartite Review cannot complete the writing of an amendatory law to RA 9054 or a new law for autonomy because the GPH continues to impose its oppressive and erroneous funda-mental positions for more than four (4) years during the tripartite review up to the present which are as follows:

• Republic Act 9054 is the full implementation of the 1996 GPH-OIC-MNLF Final Peace Agreement (FPA);

• The result of the 2001 plebiscite (conducted unilaterally by the GPH) was the final determination of the territory and area of the autonomous region in accordance with the FPA and for this reason it is prohibited to hold another plebiscite to establish territory of the New Regional Autonomous Government stipulated in the Second Paragraph of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and Part III (Phase 2) of the 1996 Final Peace Agreement;

• The state is the absolute owner of all mines and minerals contrary to Paragraph 146 of the FPA which stipulates that as a general rule the Regional Autonomous Government has con-trol and supervision over mines and minerals except strategic minerals;

• The Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) and Consul-tative Council (CA) supersedes any reference to provisional government including that found in the 1975 Tripoli Agreement ;

2. MNLF BASIC POSITION

The MNLF adheres to the basic principle that the 1976 Tripoli Agreement and its imple-menting mechanism the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) are binding international obligation and commitment of the MNLF, GPH and the OIC. The terms and provisions of these agreements


are non-negotiable except upon the mutual consent of the MNLF, GPH and OIC.

3. RA 9054 VIOLATES THE 2976 MNLF-OIC-GPH TRIPOLI AGREEMENT AND THE 1996 FINAL PEACE AGREEMENT

The MNLF continuously rejects the ARMM law (RA 9054). It violates the provisions of Part III (Phase 2) of the 1996 FPA entitled “THE NEW REGIONAL AUTONOMOUS GOVERN-MENT”.2 In fact, the GPH-OIC-MNLF tripartite review established very clearly that RA 9054 is full of errors.3 There are now 29 “Common Proposals” and 13 “Common Grounds” formulated dur-ing the tripartite review to amend and revise RA 90544 . Unfortunately, because of the failure to resolve the issues of (1) territory, (2) provisional government/plebiscite and (3) definition/sharing of revenues of strategic minerals, the writing of the draft amendatory law to RA 90545 cannot be completed as mandated by the MNLF-OIC-GPH Third Tripartite Review.

4. ON TERRITORY AND PLEBISCITE

The MNLF asserts that the territory of the autonomous region comprises the Bangsamoro Homeland stipulated in the Second Paragraph of MNLF-OIC-GPH 1976 Tripoli Agreement and its implementing mechanism – the MNLF-OIC-GPH 1996 Final Peace Agreement – namely the 15 provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Palawan, Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga del Norte, Sibugay6 , Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Saranggani7 , and Davao del Sur and the 13 cities of Isabela, Lamitan, Puerto Princesa, Zamboanga, Dipolog, Pagadian, Iligan, Marawi, Cotabato, Tacurong, Marbel, Kidapawan, and General Santos.

On the other hand, the GPH wrongly contends that with reference to the 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA) the territory of the ARMM comprising the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Ta-wi, Lanao del Sur, and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and Lamitan8 constitutes the final and full implementation of Phase Two of the 1996 FPA. The GPH wrongly argues that the result of the plebiscite held in the year 2001 is the final determination of the territory of the autonomous region and therefore it is prohibited to hold another plebiscite.

Based on these fallacious, oppressive and evasive reasoning, the GPH is imposing on the MNLF and the Bangsamoro people to accept the existing territorial boundaries of the ARMM as the final implementation of the Second Paragraph of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement thereby reducing the territory of the Bangsamoro homeland from 15 provinces9 and 10 cities to 5 provinces and 2 cities.

MNLF POSITION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION

The GPH position that it is prohibited to conduct another plebiscite to determine the ter-ritory of the New Regional Autonomous Government violate Section 15, Article X of the 1987


Philippine Constitution and is a blatant suppression of the right of the Bangsamoro people to self-determination.

Firstly, there is no existing law in the Philippines that prohibits the conduct of another pleb-iscite to ratify a new autonomy law that will include provisions on territory of the New Regional Autonomous Government.

Secondly, since the approval of the Philippine Constitution in 1987, the Philippine govern-ment had unilaterally conducted 2 plebiscites in the creation of the ARMM and the expansion of its territory in the years 1989 and 2001 respectively. Therefore, the position of GPH not to conduct another plebiscite in reference to the full implementation of the 1996 FPA is based on whim and caprice, without basis at all even under its internal laws and constitution.

What is most deplorable here is that immediately after the signing of the 1976 Tripoli Agree-ment, the GPH dragged the peace process into its internal laws and constitution (which is totally inconsistent to the internationality of the MNLF-OIC-GPH international agreements) and now it has become very clear the GPH will not honor, respect, observe nor apply its own laws and consti-tution when it favors the God-given fundamental rights of the Bangsamoro people to self-deter-mination and the implementation of peace agreements. Simply put, the GPH will impose its laws and constitution when favorable to its neo-colonial interest but when favorable to the Bangsamoro people’s right to self-determination, the GPH procrastinates and filibusters and does not honor its internal laws and constitution.

The 1987 Philippine Constitution does not limit the territory of the autonomous govern-ment to the boundaries of the existing ARMM. The constitution provides that the autonomous region shall “consist of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structure, and other relevant characteristics” (Section 5, Article X). Based on this provision, the territorial jurisdiction of the au-tonomous region can be established not only in accordance with the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, 1996 Final Peace Agreement but as well as the MNLF-GPH Jeddah Accord.

5. ON THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

The issue on Provisional Government was not discussed in the Second GPH, MNLF and OIC-PCSP Ad Hoc High Level Group Meeting in Bandung City, Indonesia last march 1-2, 2012 for lack of material time. Besides, the issue of Provisional Government is tied with the issue on Terri-tory because Paragraph 15 of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement dictates that “a Provisional Government shall be established in the areas of autonomy..xx” (and not only in the ARMM areas).


6. ON THE DEFINITION AND SHARING OF REVENUES OF STRATEGIC MINERALS

The definition and sharing of revenues of strategic minerals remains unresolved because the GPH invokes the neo-colonial principle of “Regalian Doctrine” and maintains the position that the Philippine state is the absolute owner of all mines and minerals which is contrary to Para-graph 145 of the 1996 FPA that stipulates as follows: “Except strategic minerals which will be defined later, the control and supervision over the exploration, exploitation, development, utiliza-tion and protection of mines and minerals in the area of autonomy shall be vested in the Regional Autonomous Government”. It is wrong for the GPH to invoke against the New Autonomous Re-gional Government the “Regalian Doctrine” because the latter is an integral part of the state and not a foreign entity or private person. Moreover, the constitution allows even the grant of titles, licenses, concessions and permits to private entities which caused the devastation of ecology and natural environment in Mindanao and other parts of the Philippines. Not to grant this power to the autonomous government is blatant discrimination against the Bangsamoro peoples.

7. ON THE PARTICIPATION OF THE OIC-PCSP

The MNLF expresses appreciation to the Chair and Members of the OIC-PCSP for their continuing support in the Tripartite Review of the Implementation of the 1996 Final Peace Agree-ment.

The support extended by the Chair of the OIC-PCSP through the Indonesian Embassy in the Philippines and Embassies of Members of the OIC-PCSP also in the Philippines to the infor-mal meetings held in Manila, Tagaytay City and Davao City, Philippines have greatly helped crys-tallize the fundamental issues which have to be resolved by the Tripartite Review, INSHA ALLAH.

1Please see “REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL COMMITTEE OF THE AD HOC HIGH-LEVEL GROUP”, page 3, June 22, 2011, Solo City, Central Java Province, Republic of Indonesia.2Part III (Phase 2) of the FPA requires that paragraphs 21 to 153 of the FPA shall be enacted into law as amenda ory or repealing law to Republic Act 6734, the first Organic Act of the ARMM.3Please see “REPORT OF THE GPH-MNLF LEGAL PANEL” pages 3-38 signed by the GPH, OIC, MNLF January 15, 2011.4Please see second page of “COMMUNIQUE” 4th Session of the Tripartite Meeting between the GPH, MNLF and the OIC-PCSP, Jeddah, February 22-23, 2011.5Please see “REPORT OF THE GPH-MNLF LEGAL PANEL” pages 39-40 dated January 15, 2011.6Formerly part of Zamboanga del Sur7Formerly part of South Cotabato8Lamitan City which is a component city of the province of Basilan used to be a municipality until it was elevated to a status as a city by law.9At present the number of provinces have increased from 13 to 15 because of the splitting into two of the provinces of Zamboanga del Sur and South Cotabato giving rise to the creation of the provinces of Sibugay and Saranggani

Shaping

public policy for peace and

good governance

The Institute for Autonomy and Governance (IAG) is an independent and non- partisan think tank founded in 2001 to generate ideas on making autonomy an effective vehicle for peace and development in the Southern Phil-ippines. IAG is an institutional partner of the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung in the Philippines.

IAG is located at Notre Dame University, Notre Dame Av-enue, Cotabato City,Philippines, Telefax (64)421-2071.Email: [email protected] and Website: www.iag.org.ph

KAS is in 5th floor, Cambridge Center Building, 108 Tord-esillas Corner Gallado Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, telephone 894-3737.

iag policy brief · armm was established. the mnlf campaigned to boycott the plebiscite to ... this...

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